[Secret]

 
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 
To: Washington
October 8, 1941 
Purple (CA) 
Message to Berlin #873. Part 1 of 4.

Re my #708 [a].

1. The Japanese American negotiations began under the conditions described in my aforementioned message during the Administration of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet. There was, however, a rupture caused by the occupation of French Indo-China. We hope by the penetration of French Indo-China to hasten the end of the China trouble; to break the Anglo-American encirclement by joint defense; and to procure raw materials. It is a measure taken in self defense. But England and the United States brought to bear against us measures equivalent to an economic blockade. Japanese-American relations deteriorated extremely and our internal situation was perilously affected. In the meantime, the European War took the trend of a protracted struggle. The fight between the Reich and the Soviet Union contrary to the calculations of Berlin reached a deadlock. Now the Soviet is going over to the Anglo Saxon camp and we must make ready to cope with this situation. Moreover commerce is disrupted between Europe and Asia and liaison between our country and Germany and Italy is for the time being severed.

 
Army 23221                                          Trans. 10/8/41 (S) 
 
*See S. I. S. #20461-42 inclusive, giving the statement of the policy 
and views of the Imperial Government.

 

[Secret]

 
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
October 8, 1941
Purple (CA)
Message to Berlin #873 Part 2 of 4

All the while England and the United States were strengthening their net about us and we could see no means of concluding the Sino-Japanese affair. It was under these conditions that the Imperial Government suddenly decided upon diplomatic negotiations to terminate their struggle with the Chinese; to establish an area of co-prosperity in East Asia; and to conserve our national resources in preparation for the future. We feel that it is necessary to open the way for a compromise in our relations with the United States.

2. When we concluded the Three Power Pact, we hoped while maintaining amicable relations with America, and to tell the truth through this very means, to conclude the China trouble; to win the Soviet over to the Japanese-German-Italian camp; to have Germany use her good offices between Tokyo and Moscow (STAHMER said that Germany would be an honest go-between and would be sure to bring about the solution of our troubles with the Kremlin and OTT sent us a letter to the effect that he himself was going to work for an understanding between Japan and the Soviet); to guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy who, in turn, were to give us mechanical and technical assistance. But since then times have changed and unexpected events have taken place. All that remains unchanged is Japanese-American relations and that is about the only thing that could be patched up.

 
Army 23222                                           Trans. 10/8/41 (S)  

 

[Secret]

 
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
October 8, 1941
Purple (CA)
Message to Berlin #873 Part 3 of 4

At the time Germany stated that she would not spare any effort to prevent a clash between Japan and the United States and that she would even do all she could to improve relations between the two countries (this was during the MATSUOKA-STAHMER talks.) Then Japan and Germany felt the need of preventing the United States from entering the war.

3. The objective of the Japan-German-Italian Three Power Pact was to prevent the expansion of the European war, to restrain the United States from participating, and to establish universal peace. Statements exchanged at the time make this perfectly clear but now the war covers the face of Europe. The only placid expanse of water on earth is the Pacific. Under these circumstances, it is felt that it is up to both nations to probe into the causes of the trouble between their respective governments and to assure the harmony of the Pacific. It is further felt that this coincides with the spirit of the Three Power Pact.

 
Army 23223                                          Trans. 10/8/41 (S)  

 

[Secret]

 
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
To: Washington
October 8, 1941
Purple (CA)
Message to Berlin #873. Part 4 of 4

4. It was with this view that the former cabinet began negotiations with Washington and still today we feel the necessity of continuing them. On the very occasion when Tokyo and Washington were arguing over our occupation of French Indo-China, Prince KONOYE was moved to reopen negotiations and messages were exchanged between him and President ROOSEVELT and ever since the respective Governments have been endeavoring to lay the groundwork for the opening of parleys through an exchange of opinions. We got our latest answer from Washington on the 4th of October and we are studying it now. It is not that we are divergent from our relations with the signatories of the Tri-Partite Pact but we are continuing our negotiations hoping to end the China affair. (The three principles of KONOYE envision a conclusion of hostilities with China through basic treaty and the use of the United States to coerce the CHIANG regime, to establish an area of co-prosperity in greater East Asia, to procure materials, to prevent the expansion of the European war, to seal peace in the Pacific area and to prevent the United States from entering the war. Of course, however, we expect our ups and downs.) This is for your private information.

Relayed to Washington.

 
Army 23224                                          Trans. 10/8/41 (S)  

 

(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)