[Secret]

 
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 8, 1941
Purple
#907 (Part 1 Of 4) [a] 

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)

Re your #637. [b]

I will tell you more about this after I interview the Secretary of State a little later on. However, my views at present are as follows:

(1) According to the American memorandum of the 1st, the Americans realize that there is unanimity on the various principles and fundamentals which they have stuck to. However, they are dissatisfied because you did not express a desire to go into a detailed discussion. The Americans believe in the four principles as the basis on which relations between the two countries must be adjusted. The Americans consider that it is necessary to achieve unanimity on the various questions which have been fundamentally explored by both nations in the unofficial talks held so far in order to settle the Pacific question. They have always felt that if conversations between the leaders of the two countries are to be realized immediately, it must be definitely understood that these principles are to be applied to the concrete problems in the Pacific, and they desire a further clarification of our views.

 
Army 23319 Trans.                                           10/10/41 (1)  
 
[a] For Part 3 of 4 see S.I.S. #23293.
[b] S.I.S. #23118 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador 
NOMURA to immediately clarify with the U. S. Government two points. 

 

[Secret]

 
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 8, 1941
Purple
#907 (Part 2 of 4)

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)

Thus, they hope that we will make ourselves clearer on these points. In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We limited the area to which the principle of non-discriminatory treatment would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China (including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact. These points you probably already know.

 
Army 23320.                                         Trans. 10/10/41 (1)

 

[Secret]

 
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 8, 1941
Purple
#907 (Part 3 of 4) [a]

(To be handled in government code.)

Judging by the impression I got from the above mentioned facts and my contacts with them so far, they figure on first bringing about unanimity on the fundamental questions on which our two countries have so far failed to see eye to eye, and then gradually to turn to the other matters. They evidently feel that so long as there is disagreement on the aforementioned points it would be vain and futile to discuss the various other problems, therefore, up to now the United states has done no more than express her opinions on the other matters in the proposal of June 11. (As I have wired you, some changes were made in the last clause.)

In their proposal of June 21, they made it evident that they were going to stick to this as the basis for negotiations. The latest reply of theirs shows, I am sure, that they are entirely disregarding our own proposal of the 25th. This shows that they are going to stick to their ideas as they stand; however, it will still be necessary for us to talk through certain matters concerning, A. The matter mentioned in the annex of the clause concerning the China incident. B. Discontinuing activities designed to help CHIANG. C. The stipulation concerning Nanking Treaty in the clause concerning the China incident (an agreement between Japan and China); joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning our attitude toward the European war; the question of eliminating the annex to the clause concerning commerce between the two nations.)

 
Army 23293                                           Trans. 10/10/41 (7)  
 
[a] Parts 1 and 2 not available. 

 

[Secret]

 
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 8, 1941
Purple
#907 (Part 4 of 4)

______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______. Concerning the four principles mentioned in (2) during the conversation mentioned in your #634 [a], the American Ambassador talked like I had already reached an understanding with Secretary HULL on this. As I have told you in various messages, they shelved the question in both letter and spirit, but on April 16 when Secretary HULL presented me with these four points (see my #277 [b]), I certainly was in no position to accept such a proposal before getting instructions from my home government, nor would I give the impression that we would accept them. Please note that. Nevertheless, these are very abstract principles, and I figured that there would be some elasticity in their application. This country applies them with prudence to other foreign nations; for example, in peace conferences, discussions of principles are extremely circumlocutionary, so I do not think you need to be troubled over this.

 
Army 23321                                          Trans. 10/10/41 (2)
 
[a] The number is apparently wrong, as the subject matter of the message mentioned is unrelated.
[b] S.I.S. #17168 in which NOMURA gives his views on the attitude for policies of the United States Government, and the four basic points which the United States advocates.

 

(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)