[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 8, 1941
Purple
#907 (Part 1 Of 4) [a]
(To
be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)
Re
your #637. [b]
I
will tell you more about this after I interview the Secretary of State a little
later on. However, my views at present are as follows:
(1)
According to the American memorandum of the 1st, the Americans realize that
there is unanimity on the various principles and fundamentals which they have stuck
to. However, they are dissatisfied because you did not express a desire to go
into a detailed discussion. The Americans believe in the four principles as the
basis on which relations between the two countries must be adjusted. The
Americans consider that it is necessary to achieve unanimity on the various
questions which have been fundamentally explored by both nations in the
unofficial talks held so far in order to settle the Pacific question. They have
always felt that if conversations between the leaders of the two countries are
to be realized immediately, it must be definitely understood that these
principles are to be applied to the concrete problems in the Pacific, and they
desire a further clarification of our views.
Army 23319 Trans. 10/10/41 (1)
[a] For Part 3 of 4 see S.I.S. #23293.
[b] S.I.S. #23118 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador
NOMURA to immediately clarify with the U. S. Government two points.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 8, 1941
Purple
#907 (Part 2 of 4)
(To
be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)
Thus,
they hope that we will make ourselves clearer on these points. In our proposal
of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did we limit them and
narrow what we had discussed in our informal conversations thus far, but we
also curtailed extremely the guarantees we offered concerning the
aforementioned principles. We equivocated concerning guarantees that we would
not engage in armed aggression. We limited the area to which the principle of
non-discriminatory treatment would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that
China was geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On
the question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China (including
French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands which we in principle
have objections to. Moreover, they figure that they must be much surer of our
attitude toward the three-power pact. These points you probably already know.
Army 23320. Trans. 10/10/41 (1)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 8, 1941
Purple
#907 (Part 3 of 4) [a]
(To
be handled in government code.)
Judging
by the impression I got from the above mentioned facts and my contacts with
them so far, they figure on first bringing about unanimity on the fundamental
questions on which our two countries have so far failed to see eye to eye, and
then gradually to turn to the other matters. They evidently feel that so long
as there is disagreement on the aforementioned points it would be vain and
futile to discuss the various other problems, therefore, up to now the United
states has done no more than express her opinions on the other matters in the
proposal of June 11. (As I have wired you, some changes were made in the last
clause.)
In
their proposal of June 21, they made it evident that they were going to stick
to this as the basis for negotiations. The latest reply of theirs shows, I am
sure, that they are entirely disregarding our own proposal of the 25th. This
shows that they are going to stick to their ideas as they stand; however, it
will still be necessary for us to talk through certain matters concerning, A.
The matter mentioned in the annex of the clause concerning the China incident.
B. Discontinuing activities designed to help CHIANG. C. The stipulation
concerning Nanking Treaty in the clause concerning the China incident (an
agreement between Japan and China); joint mediation and the right of
self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning our attitude toward the
European war; the question of eliminating the annex to the clause concerning
commerce between the two nations.)
Army 23293 Trans. 10/10/41 (7)
[a] Parts 1 and 2 not available.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 8, 1941
Purple
#907 (Part 4 of 4)
______
______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______
______. Concerning the four principles mentioned in (2) during the conversation
mentioned in your #634 [a], the American Ambassador talked like I had already
reached an understanding with Secretary HULL on this. As I have told you in
various messages, they shelved the question in both letter and spirit, but on
April 16 when Secretary HULL presented me with these four points (see my #277
[b]), I certainly was in no position to accept such a proposal before getting
instructions from my home government, nor would I give the impression that we
would accept them. Please note that. Nevertheless, these are very abstract
principles, and I figured that there would be some elasticity in their
application. This country applies them with prudence to other foreign nations;
for example, in peace conferences, discussions of principles are extremely
circumlocutionary, so I do not think you need to be troubled over this.
Army 23321 Trans. 10/10/41 (2)
[a] The number is apparently wrong, as the subject matter of the message mentioned is unrelated.
[b] S.I.S. #17168 in which NOMURA gives his views on the attitude for policies of the United States Government, and the four basic points which the United States advocates.
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)