9 October 1941
Re your #637*
This morning, the 9th, I called on Hull and relayed the matter contained in your instructions and at the same time brought up the points discussed at the White House on 3 September. The Secretary, in reply, merely repeated that non-discriminatory treatment should extend over the entire Pacific area. He added that geographical proximity, etc., could be interpreted in many ways. He said that he would have Ballantine and others make a detailed reply to me later after the papers I submitted were carefully perused and studied. (Hamilton and Ballantine are supposed to call on me this afternoon.)
Referring to the matter of evacuating or stationing of troops in China, I carefully and in detail described the political situation in China from the Japanese viewpoint and pointed out that stationing of our troops in certain parts of China was absolutely essential. I requested that this point be given a reconsideration in this light.
I also stated that the Prime Minister had stated that he was in accord with the "Four Principles" in principle only, but Hull indicated that he was already aware of this fact.
*JD-1: 5665 (S.I.S. #23118). Re the U. S. note of 2 October it is
assumed there is agreement with the U. S. on all points of the
negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from
China, and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in
principle the Four Principles laid down by the U. S. and expected to
iron out their application in conference.
JD-1: 5805 (D) Navy Trans. 10-13-41 (1)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)