[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 14, 1941
(Purple)
#943 (Part 1 of 2) [a] (To be handled in Government Code)
I
had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is
this:
"What
the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a
conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite
preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into
Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks
of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently,
and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations
toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or
stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it
would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China
for a gradual withdrawal."
He
speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems
that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.
Army 23570 Trans. 10/16/41 (2)
[a] For part 2 see S.I.S. #23516.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 14, 1941
(Purple)
#943 (Part 2 of 2) [a]
He
said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany offer
Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England would not
now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position
and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and
his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and
should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, this whole fray
would end with unimaginable quickness. CASTLE [b] told me that HUGH GIBSON
feels the same way and that Japan, too, should be on the alert for this
possibility. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by the
Isolationists. MOORE [c] reports that Secretary HULL told Senator THOMAS that
he is proceeding patiently with the Japanese-American negotiations, but he
hopes that Japan will not mistake this for a sign of weakness on America's
part, and that no answer had arrived to the memo of October 2nd. KIPLINGER [d]
reports that there is a very good basis for rumors of a cessation of
hostilities between Russia and Germany and that the chances for war between
Japan and the United States are fifty-fifty.
Army 23516 Trans. 10-15-41 (7)
[a] Part 1 of 2 not available.
[b] Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan.
[c] American legal advisor to Japanese Embassy in Washington.
[d] Washington newspaper correspondent.
(EXHIBITS
OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)