[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 16, 1941
Purple
#959 (Part 1 of 2)
On
the evening of the 15th TERASAKI was invited to the home of Admiral TURNER,
who, as you know, is a most trusted friend of Admiral STARK. In the course of
their conversation TURNER said:
(a)
"If HITLER gains control over Europe, it will constitute direct threat to
Central and South America, and America must certainly fight this. Therefore, it
is the present policy of the United States to prevent the enfeeblement of Great
Britain's national resources (including the Far East) by assisting her in
stopping Germany."
(b)
"It is said that the present Japanese cabinet is a strong one; however, it
is doubtful whether it has the support of the Army, and if the Military finds
itself at variance with the opinions of the cabinet, the cabinet might be
overthrown at any time. Therefore, the United States cannot help feeling a
little trepidation in broaching any negotiations with the Japanese Government
under these circumstances."
(c)
"It is urgent that a formula be drawn up on the basis of a fifty-fifty
compromise between Tokyo and Washington." (TURNER does not think that we
are compromising.)
Army 23715 Trans. 10-20-41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 16, 1941
Purple
#959 (Part 2 of 2)
RETRANSLATION
TERASAKI
explained that some Americans had already questioned him about the permanence
of the present cabinet but that this was beside the point because to broach the
Japanese-American negotiations while doubting the permanence of the cabinet was
putting the cart before the horse. He said that at present, when mutual doubts
were rife, particularly in the United States, the United States ought certainly
to exercise statesmanship, and continued, "The United States is
exceedingly idealistic concerning the Far East. Aiding China might be called a
question of principle, but if I may say so, this talk of principles is a sort
of hobby among the rich. If it's not a question of principle, all I can conclude
is that you all are determined to make us fight with China until we are
exhausted. On the other hand, you have followed a very, very realistic policy
in Central America. Forgetting the history of Panama for a moment, we can find
plenty of present examples proving what I say. Well, China is not an
over-simplified question of principle with us Japanese. It is a question of our
life. We have already fought there for four years. You went to Japan on the Astoria.
I am sure you know something of the temperament of the Japanese. Once a
Japanese is in a corner, he will forget all interest in life and death and
fight back with fury. I know that we are much poorer than you Americans in
material things I don't know what the result of Japanese-American war might be,
but even though we lost, I can tell you we would put up an awful fight. If we
do not achieve what we are trying to do, it may come to that. Now if you
Americans would only extend your hand in friendship to us a little, you could
have our lasting amity; otherwise we may turn out to be permanent enemies.
Army 23716 Trans. 10/22/41 (2)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)