[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 16, 1941
Purple
#962. (Part 1 of 5) (Extremely Urgent)
By
previous arrangement WAKASUGI, HULL and WELLES had a conference lasting two
hours beginning at 5:00 p. m., on the 16th. The substance of their talk was as
follows: (Probably because he had received news of our Cabinet's general
resignation, WELLES said that he would like to talk with WAKASUGI in the
presence of Secretary HULL. He led WAKASUGI to HULL's room and they talked
together.)
1.
HULL asked the circumstances of the Cabinet's general resignation and wished to
know what the outlook for the new Cabinet was. WAKASUGI said that all we had
received was a public announcement of the general resignation and as yet no
detailed news had reached us. WAKASUGI continued, "No matter what sort of
Cabinet it is; however, it is impossible to leave Japanese-American relations
in their present state. The world being in its present condition, particularly
faced by the China problem, our people cannot continue undecided as they now
are in the face of American opposition. They demanded a Government that would
take a definite stand either to the right or to the left. There is no mistake
about that. If no unanimity can be discovered between our two nations, it would
be hard to say in which direction the wind will blow. I wanted to talk with the
Under-Secretary today and see if we could not find some points of agreement
between your proposal of June 21st and our proposal of September 25th. That is
why I came."
Army 23711 Trans. 10-20-41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 16, 1941
Purple
#962. (Part 2 of 5) (Extremely Urgent)
HULL
spent half an hour recounting the substance of his conversations so far and
then went on to say, "The United States is certainly not playing along
with a policy of procrastination. I earnestly wish to see peaceful and normal
political relations reestablished between Japan and the United States. In
Europe HITLER is trying to set up a new order by force of arms. Now, if you
Japanese also are attempting to set up-a new regime in the Far East by force of
arms, this world is becoming cramped indeed. We cannot stand by and approve
this course of events with equanimity. We stand for non-discrimination in trade
and for freedom of the seas and are opposed to all of these militaristic policies.
One of the hardest things to reconcile in Japanese-American relations is the
fact that, while proclaiming the maintenance of peace, Japan actually carries
on a military invasion. There are so many military expansionists now among the
Japanese people and among influential people there that I doubt if it would be
possible for Japan to cooperate on a new peaceful policy." WAKASUGI then
said, "It is true that there are those who advocate expansion northward or
southward; however, ever since we have been a naval power foreign nations have
lined up our neighbors as colonies of theirs to oppose us. Recent events show
how this economic pressure has again brought us to grief. All we have done is
to follow the trend necessary for the national security and existence of our
people. As a measure for self preservation we had to get necessary materials.
Do not think that we deliberately embarked on a military campaign with any joy.
Army 23712 Trans. 10-20-41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 16, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#962 (Part 3 of 5)
"The
United States seems to have an idea that in order to establish an understanding
with Japan on these important questions, she must stop military moves northward
and southward, but unless the United States ceases measuring everything by her
own yardstick and understands Japan's peculiar position, and unless she shows a
friendly attitude in lifting the limitations on the settlement of the China
question which faces Japan, as well as commercial limitations, the situation
will inevitably continue to grow worse."
3.
WELLES urged HULL himself to continue an explanation of the three points he had
made, and HULL repeated that the present object of the United States is to
defeat Hitlerism; in short, (a) to abolish all militarism, and (b) to bring
about equality of treatment and opportunity throughout the whole Pacific area,
including China. He showed quite a bit of understanding of Japan's position
with respect to the Tripartite Alliance. He seemed, however, loathe to go too
deeply into the question of peace between Japan and China because he has always
been an advocate of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other powers. He
asked if there was not some Chinese with whom he (WAKASUGI) could discuss these
matters directly. WAKASUGI, however, said that although he knew both AMBASSADOR
HU SHIH and SOONG TSE-WEN, he was not able to discuss the relations of the two
countries with them. HULL seemed to understand this and said that in any case
this would have to be worked out between Japan and China.
Army 23713 Trans. 10/20/41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 16, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#962 (Part 4 of 5) [a]
WAKASUGI
then went on to say that it would be very difficult for us to evacuate China.
He told them it was very necessary to keep troops there. He went on to explain
the activities of the Communist forces in the north as described in your
messages and by the Naval Attache. He told them that the Communists were like a
cancerous growth on the development of China. He explained that we had to keep
forces and to protect the lives, property, and commercial interests of both
Japanese and foreigners. HULL then asked, "Well, if you did not take your
troops away and left them there for a long time, how would the Chinese take
it?" WAKASUGI said, "What the Chinese are most interested in is the
safety of their lives and a guaranteed livelihood." He went on to say,
"So far as the maintenance of peace is concerned, the Chinese do not care
in the hands of what people it is. It is apparently being reported to the
President that the Communist Party is engaged merely in educational activities.
However, this is a tragic error. What the Communists are trying to do is to
destroy Chinese society and industry at the very roots. All the Chinese fear
this exceedingly." HULL, however countered by saying, "In the past
we, too, stationed some soldiers in Central America and left them there as long
as ten years, but the results were bad, and we brought them out. Since then we
have found it more profitable to practice the "Good Neighbor Policy."
He did not appear to wish to discuss this matter any further and seemed to
think that this should be thrashed out between ourselves and the Chinese.
WELLES then asked, "Well, have you any other questions besides those three
which you wish to discuss?" and HULL answered, "None in
particular."
4.
WELLES told HULL the desire of WAKASUGI to look into the differences and points
of agreement in the Japanese-American proposals HULL immediately agreed. He was
all in favor of having the officials concerned in this business convene and
work out the details immediately, but WAKASUGI said that when the officials
concerned on both sides had met before, all they had done was waste their time
in arguments without any results. He said that the time would not permit of
such procrastination and that he would, for the time being, like to confine his
discussions to important questions only and to discuss them with the Under
Secretary alone.
Army 23714 Trans. 10/20/41 (2)
[a] Part 5 not available.
(EXHIBITS
OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)