[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 24, 1941
Purple
#995 (Part 1 of 4)
On
the 24th from 2:30 p. m., WAKASUGI conferred with WELLES for an hour, and
following the purport of your telegram, explained that our new cabinet was as
anxious as the former cabinet for a just readjustment of our relations; that
our desires have already been clearly stated; and that since, from what
WAKASUGI himself could judge on the basis of what he saw and heard during his
recent visit in Japan, circumstances there do not permit prolonging these
conversations any longer, he-though not yet in receipt of detailed
instructions--would like to see, without a day of further delay, some sort of
conclusion reached. He then requested that the United States submit a counter-proposal
to our proposal of September 25th. WELLES first expressed his pleasure of
learning that the new cabinet intends to continue the discussion of this
question and proceeded to say that recently men in responsible positions in
Japan-for example, the Naval spokesman-had made such a war-like statement as
"the Japanese Navy is 'itching for action' ", and that the ferocious
attacks which the Japanese newspapers have been making on the United States had
greatly provoked the American people both in and out of the government and are
injurious to the continuation of discussions.
Army #24002 Trans. 10-27-41 (1)
[a] S.I.S. # 23968 which points out the fact that the new cabinet is anxious as the former one to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations and that Japan has made her stand perfectly clear and can do no more. It furthermore directs WAKASUGI to inform the U. S. that Japan is not in a position to prolong the discussion and would like to be informed of the United States' counter-proposal to that of Japan's dated September 25th.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 24, 1941
Purple
#995 (Part 2 of 4)
WAKASUGI
replied that there were not a few influential politicians in the United States
as, for example, Senator PEPPER, who have severely criticized Japan; that
especially the speech made today by Secretary of Navy KNOX to the effect that
Japanese-American war is inevitable and the clash of the two countries is only
a few days ahead and other warlike statements are quite provocative to the
Japanese government as well as the people; and that in this respect the two
countries are very much alike. To this, WELLES came back with the argument that
the Naval Secretary's speech was not such a provocative one but the newspapers
had played up certain parts of it; that as a man responsible for the United
States Navy, which is the most powerful influence in the country, he
occasionally indulges in strong words with the intention of encouraging the
Navy; and that he would like WAKASUGI to realize that these speeches are
nothing other than those made for such purposes. WELLES proceeded, saying,
"As to the counter-proposal which you request of the United States, as I
have repeated at the time of the previous conversation, the principles as well
as the proposal of the American Government are clearly given in the proposal
made on June 21. To be sure, one way of approaching a solution would be to
adjust the wordings of that proposal to those of the proposal made by Japan.
Army 24003 Trans. 10/27/41 (1)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 24, 1941
Purple
#995 (Part 3 of 4)
"However,
in the light of the experience of the informal discussions held during the past
several months, to do no more than to consider each paragraph of the past
formula would result in repetition of the same old arguments and, therefore, would
not be conducive to progress. As I have pointed out during the previous
conversation at which Secretary HULL was present, it might be well to try to
reach an agreement on such general matters as the three important points which
are comparatively easy of settlement; such a new formula may be a short-cut.
However, if this is to be done, we had better take up at the beginning the
question of equal treatment in commerce, a question which is comparatively easy
of agreement by both countries (in reference to this point, WELLES asked if we
had transmitted to our government what HULL had so strongly advocated during
the previous conversation, and so WAKASUGI replied that he had communicated the
matter in detail); and secondly, we should debate the question of Japan's
duties to the Three-Power Alliance." He spoke as if there was a
possibility of some adjustment also on the part of the United States with
regard to this question. WELLES then suggested taking up the China question
next. Thus, he made an entirely new proposal.
Army 24004 Trans. 10/27/41 (1)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 24, 1941
Purple
#995 (Part 4 of 4)
WAKASUGI
replied, saying, "Since I have not yet received detailed instructions from
my government, I haven't the liberty to add anything today to the proposal of
September 25, but I would like to have the United States authorities draw up a
definite proposal with reference to the new approach you dust suggested and
submit it before we will have our next conversation. We, too, shall make a
study of this point."
Speaking
on the request that frozen funds be released for the dispatching of the two
tankers referred to during our previous conversation and the two ships of the
NYK line at this time, WELLES said, "We at that time made immediate
arrangements, and all procedures have been completed by the Treasury Department
with regard to the three NYK ships; but in the matter of tankers, since the
United States banking laws require strict investigations for the purpose of
protecting bank depositors, once money has been transferred to an account with
the Yokohama Specie Bank, it is impossible to release it, regardless of the
fact that the money is in the form of cash or of a draft for transference of
money to that bank. However, the State Department will offer as much assistance
as possible if you wish to have drafts made so that they could be transferred
through some American bank."
Army 24005 Trans. 10/27/41 (1)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
, EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)