CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 197
To: Contact office noted by
General Short & Col Phillips, new Acting C of S.
C/S
HUD
CONFIDENTIAL
Issuing Office: G‑2,.H. H.
D.
Army Contact Office,
Honolulu, T. H.
Time and date: 1200 25 Oct.
1941.
G‑2 ESTIMATE OF
INTERNATIONAL (JAPANESE) SITUATION
1. Summary of Situation.
Reference paragraph 1; G‑2 Estimate of the International (JAPANESE)
Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no fundamental changes in the
international situation, centering on Japan, since the time mentioned; and the
estimate is still in almost complete accord with contemporary opinions of
most high officials and reputable observers who are known to be in close touch
with the various phases of the present fast moving situation. However; the
following generally summary is considered appropriate at this
time:
a. A crisis of the first
magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on
the 16th instant. The fall of said cabinet was allegedly precipitated by
unsatisfactory progress of the rapproachement negotiations between America
and Japan, and by extreme pressure from "rightest" elements who have been
clamoring for stronger ties with the Axis and more forceful apposition to the
ABCD block, including Russia.
b. An apparently imminent
collapse of the Russian forces in the west, together with the loudly proclaimed
German successes everywhere, tended to accentuate the cry for action on the side
of the Axis to such a degree that the Konoye cabinet could no longer resist,
hence resigned en block, and was almost immediately replaced by a new
cabinet headed by ex‑War Minister, General
Tojo.
198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c. Ministers of the new
cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have openly declared their intentions of
stronger ties with the Axis—which automatically underscores Japan's policies
with "intensified aggression"; definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the
United States and other democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful
intentions a sham or objective of suspicion; and forces America into a state of
constant vigilance—but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent , that
we do know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be
done.
2. Conclusions. No
change in paragraph 2 of G‑2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941.
However, several important
incidents have transpired, or are scheduled to take place, which are certain to
have a profound bearing on the probable course of events in question in the near
future. These are:
a. The formation of a new
Japanese "War Cabinet", headed by ex‑War Minister, General
Tojo.
b. The decision of Premier to
continue his predecessor's order to permit three Japanese vessels to visit
American ports for the purpose of transporting stranded Americans and Japanese
nationals to their respective homelands.
c. Premier Tojo's expressed
desire to continue rapprochement negotiations with the United
States.
d. The order by the navy
department to American vessels to avoid Asiatic ports in the north Pacific,
including Shanghai.
e. The announced decision of
the American government to abandon Vladivostok as a port of entry for war
supplies to Russia, and to adopt the port of Archangel as the sole point of
entry for such shipments.
f. Announcement of Ambassador
Nomura's return to Japan for consultation with the new
cabinet.
3. Justifications for
conclusions. The following is a brief analysis and evaluation of the above.
based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as conclusive, but
rather to assist in making accurate conclusions on the general situation as
subsequent events and special situations are presented:
a. New Cabinet.
Paragraph 1 c above is the general answer. The only other noteworthy
viewpoint received, and considered to be worth mentioning, is that General Tojo
was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the only man considered
capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and thus stave off' any
precipitate action until such time as the situation in Europe has become
definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in
rapprochement negotiations with the United States.
b. Japanese vessels to
America. The Japanese government's decision to permit three ships to
visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded nationals of both
countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as a measure to
"clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and military moves.
It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove Japanese nationals
from the interior of south China before spreading military operations to that
section. It is considered impracticable to remove all Japanese nationals
from America and American territories.
c. Rapprochement
Negotiations. Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has openly declared its
intentions of stronger ties with the Axis‑definitely our enemy—we can only
expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as her partner, Hitler,
i.e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies. From a military
point of view such peaceful overtures should be preceded by concrete evidence of
sincerity before they can be seriously considered.
d. Navy Order to Clear
American Ships from North Pacific. This action on the part of the navy seems
to have been largely "precautionary", which also appears fully
justified—realizing that we are now definitely dealing. with an exponent and
ally of Hitler.
e. Abandonment of
Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies. Two issues are here
involved:
(1) Military. The
crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue to face Hitler across
the English channel, across the Atlantic, or on American shores, centers in the
British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order to hold the British
Isles at all cost, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific. Convoys to
Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on incidental
to convoys going to the British Isles. Requirements of armed escorts for the
remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than
what
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION 199
would be required over any
Pacific route. .In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet in the Pacific, any
practicable route across the Pacific to Russia may have been entirely ruled out.
Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be not to undertake a
thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later.
(2) Diplomatic.
Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladivostok has been one
of the major issues between America and Japan recently, the abandonment of said
route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open for a longer period; and, in
ease of an unforeseen major reverse for the Axis in Europe, might provide an
open door for successful negotiations at a time when Japan desired to change her
mind, seeing that further ties with the Axis were useless, and that a compromise
with the democracies has become inevitable.
Confidential
f. Nomura's report to New
Cabinet. This is considered a very normal procedure with the Japanese
government. Mr. Nomura will be expected to give a review of his efforts in
Washington and perhaps the last word on the American attitude. If his previous
work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he may return to Washington.
If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not even be replaced. In case the
abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a subordinate to Tokyo, it may be
taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity of the situation. This is not,
however, a prediction.
Remarks. Everyone is interested in
the answer to the question, When will Japan move?—a question which no one dares
predict with certainty. However, the following points are considered to be worth
of mentioning:
a. Things which tend to
indicate that a major move will not take place for approximately another month
are:
(1) The dispatch of Japanese
vessels to the United States for return of stranded nationals of both countries
to their respective homelands.
(2) Ambassador Nomura's
return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the new
cabinet.
(3) Repeated declarations by
Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue rapprochement
negotiations.
(4) Extreme cold over
Eastern Siberia makes military operations against Russia very risky before
spring.
(5) A protracted
Russo‑German war seems much more likely now than it did immediately prior to the
assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the "rightists" who were
crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again hesitate to take the
final plunge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus a tired Russian
army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow (?), wisdom
may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a rested Russian
army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow.
(6) Announcement that
Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito to convoke a special five‑day
session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at which time, it is predicted
the government will be asked to clarify its stand on international policies
particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's message to President
Roosevelt and the progress of the Washington negotiations.
b. In other words, it seems
logical to believe that no major move will be made before the latter part of
November—in any direction—with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will
not occur before spring.
George W.
Bicknell,
GEORGE W.
BICKNELL,
Lt. Col., G. S.
C.,
Asst. A. C. of S.,
G‑2,
Contact
Officer.
Distribution:
C/S H. H. D.
G‑2 H. H. D.
G‑3 H. H. D.
G‑2 Schofield Barracks
G‑2 24th Div.
G‑2 25th Div.
F. B. I. (2)
O. N. I. (2)
Capt. Bryan, Trans.
Sect.