[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
29 October 1941
(Purple)
#1008 (In 3 parts, complete)
From
Minister Wakasugi
U.
S.-Japanese relations are now fast approaching a critical crossroad. In view of
the fact that the times are indeed grave, I am waiving formality and, though it
may seem very presumptuous of me, am reporting to you my views on the general
attitude of the United States after coming in contact with its representatives
on several occasions.
As
you no doubt are well aware through the many other reports pertaining to this
matter, the basic U. S. policy is the crushing of the so-called
"Hitlerism", (establishment of a new order through the force of
arms). Working from this principle, the United States is gradually
strengthening its war-time structure. Britain and China have been set up as the
first line of national defense. In this way, the United States has succeeded in
steamrollering over the isolationist opposition and is forcing the government
and the public alike to follow this policy.
The
government has determined to gamble on a long term program. It is on these
grounds that Hull has said on several occasions that though he yearns for the
preservation of peace on the Pacific, on the other hand it will have to be
based on agreements covering the entire Pacific area and not upon a patchwork
of hit-or-miss local agreements. During my talks with him on the 24th, Welles
said that the United States was not in agreement with the British practice in
the past of establishing special relations with her colonial holdings. The
United States is a firm advocate of an absolute non-discrimination and equal
opportunities for all in the entire Pacific area, (including Japan, United
States, Britain, China, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, etc.) Every nation
will be offered opportunities equal to those existing between the home
government and its colonies. For this reason, Welles pointed out on that
occasion, this policy should be advantageous to Japan as well.
Judging
from these factors, we assume that the United States based their demands for
equal opportunities of access to the natural resources of French Indo-China and
Thailand, as well as a guarantee that they will remain strictly neutral, upon
their principle of non-discrimination. Apparently, they presume that we intend
to develop this area under the principle of our military's co-prosperity
sphere, in a monopolistic manner, and through the force of arms.
Thus,
there has arisen a clash of ideologies.
The
United States-wants to tackle the China problem as merely one phase of the
aforementioned "peace on the Pacific" issue. On the other hand, it
should be recalled that Hull once said to the late Ambassador Saito that it was
exceedingly doubtful that there should be war between Japan and the United
States over merely the China problem. There are indications that the United
States is still not anxious to fight Japan over only the China problem.
However, it must be borne in mind that China is now relying solely on the
United States. (It is said that T. V. Soong and others in the United States are
working on the Treasury Department in particular) and the United States is
doing everything in its power to prevent the bringing about of a truce between
Japan and the United States. Since China is entirely dependent on the United
States, the United States cannot turn a cold shoulder to her pleas. It is
impossible for the United States to cruelly impose terms on China which would
be almost impossible for the United States herself to endure.
Welles
used the above described excuse during our talks on the 24th. He went on to
say, however, that the United States would not be unreasonable; she would not
demand of Japan to carry out that which is immediately impossible. What his
implications were when he said that is not clear, but possibly he may have been
referring to some such tough problem as that of evacuating our forces,
(indications are that in spite of our repeated explanations concerning the
garrisoning of troops in China, the above ambiguous statement may have been his
camouflaged way of pointing out a means of carrying out a program of withdrawal
of troops). I got the impression that he wanted to convey to me that the United
States would not demand that it be carried out immediately.
In
any event, it has become apparent that U. S.-Japanese relations have now become
an integral phase of the national policy of the United States. There is every
indication that the United States is anxious to adjust the relationship between
the two nations as it has much bearing on her national policy, However, she is
willing to come to terms only if the conditions suit her. She has set forth her
stand in her proposals of 21 June and of 2 October. I am very doubtful that she
will make any concessions therefrom.
Her
preparations in the event of the worst have been completed. Therefore, I cannot
believe that she is stalling for time. On the other hand, I am of the opinion
that she is not so anxious to enter into the agreement that she will sacrifice
any of her terms. Therefore, I do not believe that we should expect any further
counter proposals from them. They have decided on a course of economic pressure
plus watchful waiting.
Therefore,
if we choose to good-naturedly continue these talks, I am of the opinion that
all is not hopeless. I feel that such a move will almost automatically open up
ways of breaking down differences if we make the best use of world
developments. However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local
differences by insisting upon our freedom of action, we must have our minds
made up that not only will these negotiations be terminated, but that our
national relations will be severed
The
United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the talks after she
has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly formed Cabinet of
Japan. I urge, therefore, that the new Cabinet establish its basic policy as
speedily as possible, so that we may lay our cards on the table for them to
see. I sincerely believe that that would be to our best interests.
24250
JD-1: 6207 (D) Navy Trans. 11-1-41 (1)
(EXHIBITS
OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)