From: Washington (Nomura)
29 October 1941
#1010 (In 2 parts, complete)
Chief of Office routing.
I report the following points to you merely as reference material in connection with the adjusting of national relations.
1. Admiral Standley, Retired, told Member of Parliament Kasai that the more influential Congressmen from the Middle West (where there are many Americans of German descent) state that the majority of the Middle Westerners are opposed to a war against Germany, but that at the same time, a great number of them favor a U. S.-Japanese war. This is due, in part, he said, to Germany's superior propaganda work. I have heard O'Laughlin, who is familiar with that area, express similar opinions.
2. Secretary Hull has told Congress that the U. S. Government looks upon the Tripartite Pact as an instrument to be used to intimidate the United States. Its aim is to make impossible the aiding of Great Britain by the United States and thus gradually to force the United States to give up the control of the seas and bring back the first line of U. S. defense to the U. S. shore line. The United States desires peace; however, it is a well established fact that there is a better chance to have peace if strength can be shown. If I (Hull) were to make too many concessions to the Axis powers, there is danger that they would be interpreted as weaknesses on my part and no doubt their demands would be increased. (This is particularly true in Tokyo). There are indications, Hull continued, that the degree of enthusiasm in Tokyo to proceed on selfish courses, is determined to a considerable extent on how the German-Soviet war is going.
It is said that he went on to say that the situation was "very delicate and very changeable" (Reported in the New York Times, 28th).
To me, Secretary Hull once said that the people of both Japan and the United States were proud peoples. For this reason, neither would easily succumb to bluffs of the other.
3. It is said that Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long told a certain Japanese who called on him and set forth the many advantages of speedily entering into an understanding with Japan alone the lines published in a newspaper as a Tokyo dispatch, that it would be impossible for the United States to get everything in order before 15 November.
4. On two different occasions recently, I met and talked with Lord Halifax. I tried to sound him out as to British attitude with regard to a Japanese-U. S. understanding. I gather from these that, in accordance with the Churchill speech, Britain would string along with the United States. Lord Halifax said that British did not want trouble on the Pacific; that is true of the United States, too, he said, adding that he hoped that Japan would give the matter her thorough study from all angles and exercise the utmost of patience before doing anything.
He refused to enlarge upon the U. S. and British embargo policy in effect at present.
JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (2)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)