[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#726 (Part 1 of 4.)
Proposal
"A".
1.
This proposal is our revised ultimatum made as a result of our attempts to
meet, insofar as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result
of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our
insistences as follows:
(1)
The question of non-discrimination in trade.
Should
they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect,
insert the following statement, "The Japanese Government is prepared to
carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as
well, providing the principles of non-discrimination are applied to the entire
world."
(2)
The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.
At
the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no expansion of our
sphere of self-defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly explained in the
past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific.
Army 24334 Trans. 11/4/41 (S)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA)
(Urgent)
#726 (Part 2 of 4.)
(3)
The question concerning the evacuation of troops.
We
are toning down our stipulations in this connection as follows:
(A)
The stationing and evacuation of troops in China since the outbreak of the
China Incident.
Japanese
troops which have been sent to China will be stationed in North China, on the
Mongolian border regions, and on the Island of Hainan after the establishment
of peace between Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of
a suitable interval. The evacuation of other troops will be carried out by
Japan and China at the same time that peace is established. In order to
maintain peace and order, this will be carried out within a period of two
years. (Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to
"the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should
encompass 25 years.)
(B)
The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo-China.
The
Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the French
possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is established, or that
the China Incident is brought to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which
have been dispatched to French Indo-China and are there now shall be evacuated.
(4)
As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the
draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States
(whether it is called an understanding proposal or some other sort of a
statement.)
Army 24335 Trans. 11/4/41 (S)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#726 (Part 3 of 4)
2.
Explanation.
(1)
Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to
consider non-discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands
along this line hitherto and put the question of non-discrimination on a
world-wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in
effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain
specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another
specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this statement, I
do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an
understanding on this matter.
(2)
As for the question of the Three-Power Pact, your various messages lead me to
believe that the United States is, in general satisfied with our proposals, so
if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly
enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self-defense, I feel sure that
we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.
Army 24336 Trans. 11/4/41 (S)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#726 (Part 4 of 4)
(3)
I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest.
However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our
stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of
occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We
will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us
to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis
this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of
occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched
our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant
language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that
unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up,
Proposal A accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals
mentioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning
the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible
concession. How hard, indeed, have we fought in China for four years! What
tremendous sacrifices have we made! They must know this, so their demands in
this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case,
our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further
compromise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the
United States understand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can
quickly bring about an understanding.
Army 24337 Trans. 11/4/41 (S)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)