[Secret]

 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#726 (Part 1 of 4.) 

Proposal "A".

1. This proposal is our revised ultimatum made as a result of our attempts to meet, insofar as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our insistences as follows:

(1) The question of non-discrimination in trade.

Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect, insert the following statement, "The Japanese Government is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non-discrimination are applied to the entire world."

(2) The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.

At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no expansion of our sphere of self-defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific.

 
Army 24334                                            Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

 

[Secret]

 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA)
(Urgent) 
#726 (Part 2 of 4.)

(3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops.

We are toning down our stipulations in this connection as follows:

(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China since the outbreak of the China Incident.

Japanese troops which have been sent to China will be stationed in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and on the Island of Hainan after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a suitable interval. The evacuation of other troops will be carried out by Japan and China at the same time that peace is established. In order to maintain peace and order, this will be carried out within a period of two years. (Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to "the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years.)

(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo-China.

The Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is established, or that the China Incident is brought to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched to French Indo-China and are there now shall be evacuated.

(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States (whether it is called an understanding proposal or some other sort of a statement.)

 
Army 24335                                            Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

 

[Secret]

 
From: Tokyo 
To: Washington 
November 4, 1941 
Purple (CA) (Urgent) 
#726 (Part 3 of 4)

2. Explanation.

(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider non-discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an understanding on this matter.

(2) As for the question of the Three-Power Pact, your various messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self-defense, I feel sure that we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.

 
Army 24336                                            Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

 

[Secret]

 
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 4, 1941
Purple (CA) (Urgent)
#726 (Part 4 of 4)

(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals mentioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible concession. How hard, indeed, have we fought in China for four years! What tremendous sacrifices have we made! They must know this, so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the United States understand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can quickly bring about an understanding.

 
Army 24337                                            Trans. 11/4/41 (S)

 

(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)