[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 10, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#1070 (Part 1 of 4)
(To
be handled in Government Code. Secret outside the department)
My
interview with the President, referred to in my #1069, [a] was held in a
private room in the White House in order to avoid publicity. It was as follows:
Prefacing
my remarks with the fact that I was speaking on instructions, I said, "I
have had no talks with the Secretary of State for about three weeks: ever since
the resignation of the KONOYE cabinet; and since the present situation between
Japan and the United States is such that it could not be left as it is, I am
very pleased to have this opportunity of speaking with you. The conversations
on this question have lasted for more than six months. From their inception,
Japan has been wishing to arrive at a quick settlement. The people of Japan
also looked forward to these conversations with much hope; however, the
conversations have dragged on and in the meantime the relation between the two
countries has grown worse. It has become increasingly difficult for the people
of my country to be patient. Now, the Government of Japan has in the meantime
made many concessions, but the Government of the United States has held to its
arguments and has shown no willingness to respond to our compromises. As a
result, some people in Japan have begun to doubt if the United States is really
sincere in this matter. The Japanese people regard the freezing of funds as a
kind of economic blockade, and there seem to be some who say that modern
warfare is not limited to shooting alone. No country can exist without the
supply of materials indispensable to its industry. From what reports I have
received from Japan, the situation seems to be serious and threatening and,
therefore, the only way to keep peace is for Japan and the United States to
come, without further delay, to some kind of a friendly and satisfactory
agreement. It is for no other purpose than that of keeping peace in the Pacific
that the Japanese Government is endeavoring so hard to arrive at a satisfactory
agreement by continuing our conversations.
Army #24714 Trans. 11/13/41 (1)
[a] S.I.S. #24652 which states that President ROOSEVELT will endeavor to continue the parleys and that what the United States most desires is (1) to prevent the expansion of the war, and (2) to bring about a lasting peace.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 10, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)
#1070 (Part 2 of 4)
"As
a major effort in attaining this objective, our Government has made the recent
proposal. I wish that your Government would make its views clear to us as soon
as possible by responding to the views and desires expressed by the Japanese
Government."
I
incidentally told him that the Japanese Government, realizing the seriousness
of the situation, is dispatching Ambassador KURUSU to assist me. Then I
continued and said, by way of an explanation of our proposal, that taking
together the views expressed on October 2 by the Secretary of State relative to
our proposal of September 25, and what both the Secretary and the Assistant
Secretary had said subsequent to that date, the whole question could be boiled
down to consist of the following three difficult points. I went on to say:
1.
"As to the principle of non-discrimination, we have decided to recognize
the fact that if this principle is, as your Government wishes, to be applied to
the whole world, it is to be applied in the entire Pacific area including
China. Since this is something which the Secretary of State has often spoken to
me about as being a long-cherished desire of his, I hope that this guarantee
which our Government is offering would prove to be satisfactory to you.
2.
"Now as to the attitude of the two governments toward the European war, we
proposed in our proposal of September 25 that the action on the part of the two
governments should be based upon consideration of 'protection and
self-defense.' " (The English text used our expression as it stood.)
Regarding
this point, I asked whether the United States Government would guarantee that
it will not give an unnecessarily broad interpretation to the words
"protection" and "self-defense", and I said, "If the
Japanese Government could get such a guarantee from the United States
Government, the Japanese Government is also willing to give a similar
guarantee." I continued, "As to the words 'in case the United States
enters the war, etc.,' since our conversations had for their object the
maintenance of peace in the Pacific, we are not in a position, under the
present circumstances, to make any definite statement outside of what has been
given in our proposal of September 25. Unless we have confidence in each other,
as you well realize, no guarantee would be a satisfactory one even if backed by
a hundred promises and a hundred documents."
Army 24715 Trans. 11/13/41 (1)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 10, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)
#1070 (Part 3 of 4)
3.
I submitted the new proposal, as it stood, regarding the question of stationing
and withdrawing of troops and proceeded to say, "With regard to this
question, the Japanese Government has gone a step beyond her past proposals and
has, by definitely fixing not only the localities in China where our troops
would be stationed but also the period of their occupation, made it clear that
the occupation is not a permanent and definite one. No doubt you would like to
see the troops withdrawn at once, but I am sure you well understand that it is
impossible under the present circumstances to do so. I earnestly wish that you
would give favorable consideration to this question from the standpoint of the
general situation."
Next,
I said, "The Japanese Government is making the following proposal with
regard to the Japanese troops in French Indo-China," and so saying, I
submitted the proposal contained in your instructions.
In
reply to this, the President, remarking-that he had already thought on the
question before our explanation was given him, spoke as follows from a note
which he had been holding in his hand, "As a result of a confusion created
by the forces of aggression, the whole world has fallen into a critical state.
What seems to me to be common sense is for us to wish earnestly that the world
will return to peaceful normalcy and for the United States Government to do its
utmost in the spirit of fair play for the establishment of peace, stability,
and order in the Pacific. If this object is to be realized, actual results must
be effected for the sake of human welfare. It is my earnest wish that the
preliminary talks relative to this question would have good results which would
serve as a basis of future negotiations. I will; just as the Japanese
Government hopes, do my best in order to help carry on these negotiations
successfully. I wish that the Japanese Government would clearly set forth its
intention of following a peaceful course in its policy and not an opposite
course. This is the way to attain the results toward which both you and we are
working."
What
the United States desires, according to the President, are: (1) to prevent the
war from spreading; and (2) to establish a permanent peace.
Army 24716 Trans. 11/13/41 (1)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 10, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)
#1070 (Part 4 of 4)
The
President elaborated on the point that with regard to the question of
non-discrimination, he had agreed with CHURCHILL when he had conferred with
that statesman to abolish the economic limitations throughout the world; that
he had opposed Germany because Germany followed a policy contrary to this idea;
and that he wished that the principle of non-discrimination would be applied
generally throughout the world. The President then said by way of an incidental
remark that in the days of President TAFT when disturbance arose in Cuba, the
United States had failed by resorting to a policy of force; however, today
under his administration, because the government had adopted a friendly policy,
the relations with the Latin-American countries had improved. He then explained
how necessary it is to follow a new policy in accordance with new situations.
Secretary HULL inserted the remark that the South American countries who had in
the past been fearful of the United States, have come to take an attitude of
welcoming the United States. Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect
that economic pressure had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and
had made them impatient, the President said, "It is necessary to find a modus
vivendi if the people are to live," and proceeded to explain that
this expression should be translated as "method of living." Although
it is not clear to me what it really means, I intend to ascertain whether he
refers to, possibly, a provisional agreement.
The
President then asked if Ambassador KURUSU was bringing with him a proposal
other than that referred to above. I replied that he was not bringing any
proposal, but in response to my wishes he was coming to assist me. Then the
President said that he is leaving on the 15th and will be away for one week, as
he must attend, as is his custom, a children's party at Warm Springs during the
Thanksgiving week (the 20th), and that he wondered whether he would have the
opportunity of meeting Ambassador KURUSU before he leaves.
Army 24717 Trans. 11/13/41 (1)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)