[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 12, 1941
Purple
#1087 (Part 1 of 4)
(Departmental
secret. To be handled in Government code.)
On
the 12th at 3 p. m. WAKASUGI went with me to talk with Secretary HULL.
BALLANTINE sat in and we conversed for about an hour. I asked if they had any
answer to our proposal and HULL gave me the oral statements contained in my
#1083 [a] and #1084 [b]. He said that he wanted me to ascertain if the new
cabinet would also approve of oral statement A and stated that oral statement B
was presented in the sense of a suggestion concerning peace between Japan and
China referred to in our last conversation in accordance with our request. He
went on to say that if the same principle were applied to the China question as
was applied to all the other problems, a settlement should be possible; that
also, such things as the question of non-discrimination in commerce had to be
connected with this; and that by day after tomorrow he could let us have a
definite proposal I said that judging from this suggestion and our conversation
it looked as though it was implied that unless Japan and China could get
together on the question of the stationing of troops there would be no chance
for any success at all in the Japanese-American negotiations I said that if
this was what was meant it would be leaving the key to Japanese-American
relations in the hands of someone else, which looked rather inappropriate, and
I asked him if he meant that Japanese Chinese relations could be left to Japan
and China and that the United States and Japan could agree on the other questions.
HULL, however, replied vaguely that if the general principles were applied to
China too, an understanding would be possible.
He
then continued, "We have not yet privately informed China about these
talks, but we are letting England and the Netherlands, who are concerned, know
something of their general lines. In case some basis for negotiations is worked
out, I believe it possible that they may sign along with the United States.
However," he added, "I cannot guarantee this."
Army 24794 Trans. 11/14/41 (2)
[a] See S.I.S. #24785-24788, inclusive.
[b] See S.I.S. #24789 for part 1 of 4. Other parts not available.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 12, 1941 Purple
(Extremely Urgent)
#1087. Part 2 of 4. [a]
To
be handled in government code.
Then
BALLANTINE inserted the remark that it is stipulated in the American proposal
of June 21st that the United States will not be a party to applying to other
countries any condition conflicting with the principles which the United States
has been consistently upholding.
WAKASUGI
said:
"While
we heartily welcome the suggestion offered, I would like to know more
definitely how China is to be made to pledge to follow the suggestion. Is it
the intention of Secretary HULL to leave this matter up to direct negotiations
to be conducted between Japan and China; or is it his intention to have the
United States secure the pledge from China and transmit it to Japan; or it is
to be accomplished with Japan, the United States, and China meeting in a
conference?"
It
seems that Secretary HULL had no definite plan in mind regarding this matter,
but he spoke as if he was confident that if the Japanese-American negotiations
are carried out in accordance with the principle of peace that a stage would in
due time be reached at which this suggestion could be carried out.
Whereupon
WAKASUGI asked:
"Is
it your intention to have China make this pledge when that stage has been
reached in the course of the negotiations?"
HULL
avoided making a definite reply and instead he brought out an example, stating
that when two parties in a dispute wish to come to an agreement they could do
so by the mediation of a third party and, so saying, HULL hinted his having the
intention of mediating between Japan and China depending, of course, on
conditions.
Army 24837 Trans. 11/15/41 (2)* For Part 1 see S.I.S. 124794.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 12, 1941
Purple
#1087 (Part 3 of 4) [a] (Departmental Secret)
(To be handled in government code)Concerning
the stationing of troops, I explained to him that in the new proposal we made
it clear that we do not mean to keep them there indefinitely. HULL replied that
to interfere in the private affairs of other nations contravenes any general
peace program and that permanent occupation is impossible. However, he seemed
quite satisfied with my explanation.
In
connection with a general peace policy, HULL said, "In one breath you say
that the three-power pact has a peaceful objective and in the other you confess
that Japan is bound by the agreement and is tied up with Germany. Now the
officials of our country and our public are at a loss to understand any
explanation like this. HITLER has a hard task and to carry it out, he is making
the people of the various small nations suffer. Now he cannot hold out forever
in such a difficult undertaking, and sooner or later we are going to have to
take charge of things after the war. In this we are going to need every
resource. Leaders of both Japan and the United States ought to cooperate in a
peaceful program. Thus, if some sort of plan can be worked out between Japan
and the United States comprising the nations concerned-for example, England and
the Netherlands-to bring about complete harmony over the Pacific, Japan would
no longer need to worry about the three-power pact, and the three-power pact
would die a natural death." I refuted this argument, saying, "The
Japanese-British alliance was in effect at the time of the Russo-Japanese war,
but afterwards at the time of the Washington conference it was nullified, so
you see the situation changes with the times. The existence of the three-power
pact presents no obstacle to any peace plan.
Army 24838 Trans. 11/15/41 (2)[a] Part 4 of 4 not available.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 12, 1941
Purple
#1087 (Part 4 of 4) [a]
Departmental
secret. (To be handled in government code.)
Continuing,
he said, "Japan does not like to exercise force-not by any means. If we
could get petroleum and other raw materials from the United States and the
Netherlands Indies, we would not have to use force, would we? Then, when we
come to the question of non discrimination in commerce, I don't think that the
United States will have any objection to our proposal."
HULL
answered, "The United States also recognizes that the situation is tense
and is considering your proposals concerning the three problems. We are doing
this just as fast as we can but questions pending over a period of ten years
cannot be settled over night. By day after tomorrow, I will be ready to
reply."
WAKASUGI
reiterated, "As I told you, the Diet assembles on the 25th and the
situation is drawing more and more grave. I want to get a definite reply to our
proposal at any time now so by day after tomorrow I will expect a clear concise
reply on these various problems."
In
a word, during that conversation they sought our recognition of the statement
of August 28, number B, and made explanations of their recent suggestions for a
Japanese-Chinese peace. They only wished to tell us that the United States is
going deeper into the three problems and our proposal of September 25 and that
they are making ready for a quick reply. I am not satisfied with their attitude
toward taking up negotiations so tomorrow morning I am going to have WAKASUGI
again tell HULL please to hurry up with a decision.
Army 25428 Trans. 11/26/41 (X)[a] For Part 1 of 4 see S.I.S. #24794. For parts 2 and 3 see S.I.S. #24837 & #24838. A report of the conference between Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary HULL with WAKASUGI and BALLANTINE present.
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)