[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
13 November 1941
(Purple)
#1089
Re
my #1087*
On
this, the 13th, Wakasugi called on Ballantine.
(1)
Wakasugi said:
"Yesterday's
conversations led to no settlement and moreover, the outcome of it fell far
short of Japanese anticipations. The times have become exceedingly critical and
the Japanese people have become impatient with regard to the Japanese-U. S.
conversations. They are becoming desperate as far as Japanese-U. S. relations
are concerned. This being the general condition in Japan, and being confronted
with the fact that it is the eve of the convening of the session of the Diet,
the government of Japan is anxious to have these U. S.-Japanese talks reach
some conclusion without a moment's unnecessary delay.
"The
above is as was explained forcefully in yesterday's conversations. In the next
conversations, any discussions of general attitudes and comments on the
possible outlook should be unnecessary.
"We
request that Hull be asked to give a clear reply at our next meeting on the
following points: Does the United States intend to accept our proposal of 25
September, including the proposals submitted by us on 7th and 10th of this
month? If not, will the United States submit a counter proposal to the above,
clearly indicating the revision desired? Or, on the other hand, is the United
States of the attitude that she will stick to her proposal of 21 June and make
that instrument her final proposal?
"Many
in Japan are of the opinion that the United States is purposely stalling the
procedure", Wakasugi said.
Ballantine:
"The
United States is also aware of the fact that matters have reached an
exceedingly critical stage. In spite of the fact that the 11th was a holiday,
it was disregarded and this matter was discussed. There is no truth in the
charge that the United States is pursuing a "stalling" policy.
"However,
in spite of the fact that we do not wish to appear to be quibbling about
details, there are several points which will have to be explained by Japan
before the United States can make definite replies.
(Part 2)
"For
example, Japan has expressed her acceptance of non-discrimination of commerce
on the Pacific but on condition that said nondiscriminatory treatment be
applied to the entire world. Does this sweeping proposal include those nations
which are at present embroiled in the war? We cannot help but have some
misgivings as to when such an agreement would become effective over the entire
Pacific area, if its effectivity there depends on its applicability on the
nations at war."
Wakasugi:
"Fundamentally
speaking, the basic aims of this is to bring about a U. S.-Japanese agreement.
The supporters would be Japan and the United States, hence the terms are not
intended to be made applicable to every country in the world. It is our
intention that the United States and Japan agree upon the basic principle of
non-discriminatory treatment throughout the world."
(2)
Concerning the matter contained in your messages #758** and #764***, it is true
that the United States is still assuming that, as it was in the beginning,
these talks are as yet in the exploratory stages through which the basis of
agreements may be discovered. We, on the other hand, are going on the
assumption that these are the actual negotiations. There exists, therefore, a
fundamental discordant note.
Wakasugi
pointed out this fact, to which Ballantine replied:
"The
United States is proceeding along the lines set forth heretofore. Even as late
as yesterday, Hull said that if these conversations can be carried to the point
of their being made the basis of a negotiation, we could no doubt get Britain
and The Netherlands to participate."
(Part 3)
Wakasugi:
"Leaving
aside the U. S. viewpoint on this particular matter for the time being, if
talks between the duly recognized Ambassador of one country and the President
and Secretary of State of another, concerning adjustments of relations between
the two countries they represent-regardless of the form in which said talks are
conducted-are not negotiations, we are indeed hard put to it to figure out
what, indeed, does constitute a diplomatic negotiation.
"I
request that Hull be clearly advised that we are treating the present
proceedings as part of the negotiations."
(3)
Regarding your message 766****:
The
main objective of that day's interview was to submit our new proposal and to
arrange for a meeting with the President together with Secretary Hull and to
advise them that we would make a more detailed explanation at that time. For
that reason, as I reported in my message, the only reference I made to the
Tripartite Pact was to express my hopes that they would not insist upon
enlarging the scope of the right of self-defense. Besides that, we discussed
nothing pertaining to the Tripartite Pact. Hull never requested that we made a
"concrete statement" concerning our relations with the Axis Powers.
Had he done so, I would have been compelled to make some reply.
For
the sake of reassuring myself, I had Wakasugi make indirect reference to this
matter to Ballantine who was present on the occasion in question. Wakasugi
asked Ballantine if he could remember any other points that might have been
discussed, stating that he wanted this information for the sake of the records.
Ballantine replied that he could recall nothing further.
If
any mention was made of the topic you state was in the records of the meeting,
it would not be likely that Ballantine, who was the only other person there,
knows nothing about it. No doubt there is some mistake there. You are aware, of
course, that the United States is trying to get us to assure them on our stand
with regard to our duties under the terms of the Pact. You can see that by the
contents of their proposal.
(Please
insert "766-(2)" following that part reading "764" in (2)
of this message.)
24882
JD-1: 6559 (D) Navy Trans. 11-17-41 (2)
*JD-1: 6521 (S.I.S. #24794, 24837-38).
**JD-1: 6413 (S.I.S. #24650).
***JD-1: 6417 (S.I.S. #24824). (Note: In connection with this ref. see last sentence above.)
****JD-1: 6455 (S.I.S. #24712).
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)