[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
15 November 1941
(Purple)
#1095 (In 2 parts, complete)
On
this, the 15th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull,
(Ballantine was also present), for an interview which lasted about one hour and
a half. I shall report in detail subsequently, but in the meantime, I am
sending you a resume of the meeting as follows:
The
United States handed us an explanation of their stand on the
"non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter, which I am
forwarding to you as separate wire "A", numbered my message #1096*,
separate wire "B", numbered my message #1097**, contains the text of
their proposal involving this matter. (The latter is a proposed joint statement
on economic policy and is composed of (1) general policy; (2) Japanese-U. S.
relations; and, (3) policies involving the Pacific area).
We
stated that we would give these notes our careful study and after requesting
our government's advice, would make a reply. We went on to say that we insist
that these talks have now progressed to the negotiations stage.
To
this Hull replied that before any settlements can be reached, it is necessary
that other countries involved, such as Britain and the Netherlands East Indies,
be consulted. This procedure is desired by Japan too, he pointed out. There are
reasons, he said, that make it inconvenient for the United States to state that
negotiations are being conducted with Japan alone, before they have had a
chance to participate therein. He went on to repeat that for those reasons,
these talks shall continue to be of an exploratory nature. At the same time,
the continuation of these conversations shall not be hampered, he promised.
We
then requested that he reply with regard to other matters to which Hull said:
"Japan
on the one hand is attempting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the
United States, while simultaneously, on the other hand, she is insisting that
her military alliance with Germany be maintained. I, personally, can understand
Japan's explanations however, I feel that it would be exceedingly difficult to
make the general U. S. public and even of the world, see through the seeming
paradox.
(Part 2)
"For
this reason, it is essential that we have the definite word of the new Japanese
Cabinet on the peaceful policy. In other words, it is essential that this new
Cabinet give definite recognition and approval of the statement submitted by
the previous government concerning this matter. On 21 June, we made certain
proposals which concerned political stabilization of the entire Pacific area.
Even if Japan were to favor limiting this area to only the southwestern Pacific
area, the United States would continue to desire that it be made applicable to
the entire Pacific area.
"Therefore,
we shall submit our reply on the other two points only after we have received a
reply to the proposal we are submitting to you today."
We
therefore stated that our government's attitude has already been expressed by
the contents of our proposal through which it may be seen that there has been
no changes therein. However, for the sake of reassurance, we would ascertain
this point, we said.
Hull
expressed several doubts concerning our relations to the Tripartite Pact. He
pointed out that in spite of the Japanese-U. S. S. R. neutrality pact, it was
apparently essential that great armed forces of both countries had to
constantly face each other across the Japanese-U. S. S. R. border. The United
States wants no peace of that nature. He went on to say that the United States
desires that simultaneously with a peace agreement between Japan and the United
States, the Tripartite Pact shall become a mere scrap of paper.
We,
therefore, repeated that part of our proposal which involved that alliance and
again pointed out that there need be no clash between U. S.-Japanese peace and
the continued existence of that treaty. We went on to say that our government
would no doubt be very disappointed at the results of today's conversations. We
then decided: to meet again after I had received my government's further
instructions.
Will
you, therefore, please rush your instructions concerning the matters contained
herein.
24930
JD-1: 6584 (D) Navy Trans. 11-18-41 (2)*JD-1: 6585 S.I.S. No. 24931.
**JD-1: 6586 S.I.S. No. 24932.
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)