[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
(18 November-probable date of drafting)
(19 November-intercepted)
#1133 (In 2 parts, complete)
From
Kurusu.
(1)
According to Ambassador Nomura's and my own observations, the President is
maintaining a very self-composed attitude outwardly, but he seems also to be
very much in earnest in regard to effecting an understanding between Japan and
the United States. Therefore, we must exercise great care just now against
forming a hasty conclusion that they are merely deferring in order not to seem
to swallow our proposals at a gulp, and also against taking any steps that
might prove irretrievable.
(2)
As a result of the revision of the neutrality act, the attention of the United
States has turned more than ever toward the Atlantic of late, and a
determination is being strengthened to be ready even for a war with Japan if
necessary. However, there seems to be a desire to be reassured as to their rear
by negotiations with our country. Herein seems to be the chief reason why both
in the conference with the President on the 17th and in the one with Secretary
Hull on the 18th the point of emphasis was on the Three Power Pact, and there
was more insistence than heretofore on this. In other words, the United States,
in order to give the American people the impression that an estrangement is
taking place between Japan and Germany, would make use either of a joint
declaration by Japan and the United States regarding non-discrimination in
trade, or of having Japan become party to a treaty on problems similar to those
on which negotiations are now in progress between Britain and the United
States, or again, of a message from our country giving a declaration of peace
policies, as was suggested by Secretary Hull in conference on the 18th.
(3)
Of course, any sudden change in the present status of Japanese-German relations
would be out of the question, but in view of the above mentioned situation I
feel that it is most essential that we do everything we can to fully reassure
the United States and let them become more and more involved in the Atlantic
areas, and thus place us in a favorable position, not only for effecting a
settlement of the China incident, but also, in regard to the international
situation following the war.
(Part 2)
In
regard to the question as to whether after the war Britain and America will not
turn their weapons toward oppressing us, in our conference on the 17th, I
explained about the bitter experience that came to us after the former world
war, and frankly told them how some of our nation have felt in regard to
Britain and the United States. To this the President replied that the treaty
now under consideration would "cover all" such points.
(4)
In view of the internal situation in our country, although I think there will be
difficulties to be met in trying to reach a settlement in harmony with the
wishes of the Americans, I feel that as a stop-gap for the present, we should
ask them to consider our strong desires for a "time limit" in
connection with the conclusion of such a Japanese-American agreement and for
the purpose of breaking the present deadlock, as them for the removal at once
of the freezing act and also for assurances regarding imports of a specified
amount of oil.
In
the conference of the 18th both Ambassador Nomura and I suggested the
resumption of the status quo prior to 24 July, but in view of the progress of
negotiations thus far, the Americans will likely not consent to this merely for
our agreeing to not forcefully invade any territory aside from French Indo-China
as per Proposal "B" or for our promise in vague terms of evacuation
of troops from French Indo-China . Please have your mind made up to this. I
desire instructions re "time limit" and as we desire to press for a
speedy settlement, please give consideration to the above and advise at once.
25242
JD-1: 6759 (F) Navy Trans. 11-25-41 (2)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)