[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#798
Re
my #797*
The
condition outlined by them namely "After the peaceful policies of Japan
have been made more definite", we imagine would naturally have reference
to the question of the three-power treaty. It does not mean merely that Japan
will withdraw her troops from Southern Indo-China, and that then the U. S. will
go back to conditions prior to the freezing act. It leaves the way open for the
U. S. to bring up rather complicated terms.
On
the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would be
difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China,
merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be
restored. It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that would come up
to the B** proposal. With the situation as urgent as it is now, it is of utmost
importance that you play your hand for the amelioration of the situation, to
the extent of the proposal in your message, then to push on for an
understanding.
The
Ambassador did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made the proposal
contained in your message for the purpose of meeting the tense situation
existing within the nation, but this can only result in delay and failure in
the negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, having received our revised
instructions, (after reading our #797*, #800,*** and #801****) will please
present our B** proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concessions
can be made.
If
the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be
broken off, therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best
efforts.
We
note what you say in your #1133***** and #1134*****, but in these negotiations
consent can be given only within the scope of the instructions of this office.
We would emphasize this.
S.I.S. #25040
JD-1: 6658 (F) Navy trans. 11-20-41 (S-TT)*JD-1: 6657.
**JD-1: 6250, with additional paragraphs 5, 6, 7 in JD-1: 6528.
***JD-1: 6660.
****JD-1: 6661.
*****Not yet available
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)