[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
23 November 1941
(Purple)
#1159 (In 4 parts, complete)
On
the 22nd, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the Secretary of State,
Hull. (Ballantine was also present). The resume of our conversation follows:
Hull:
"I conferred with the Ambassador and Ministers of Britain, Australia, and
the Netherlands on the 22nd." (The press reports that this conference
lasted for about two and a half hours.) "I sought their opinion on the
Japanese proposals. They all said that if Japan's intentions are assuredly
pacific, then they would wholeheartedly favor, them. They said that it would be
the source of much joy to them to cooperate in the matter of resuming trade
relations with Japan under those circumstances.
"However,
they said, we are not sure of Japan's real intentions as yet, for while on the
one hand she apparently indicates her desire for peace by dispatching a special
envoy, the tone of the politicians and press of Japan seems to be in direct
opposition.
"The
diplomats who called on me also pointed out that just prior to the application
of the freezing order, Japanese imports of petroleum took a very sudden upward
swing, disproving any contention that it was to be used solely for peaceful
undertakings, but that it was being stored away by the navy.
"They
further expressed the opinion that the embargo should be lifted only in slow
degrees.
"These
diplomats, however, said that they would seek their home governments'
instructions regarding the Japanese proposals and would submit their replies by
the coming Monday. Upon receiving these advices, I shall make a reply to
you."
(Part 2)*
Thus
the Secretary seemed to feel considerable concern over the recent trend of
Japan's public opinion. He pointed out that a clear statement by the Japanese
Government of its desire for peace would have a most important reaction on the
public opinion of the United States. (Ballantine said that a clear statement of
attitude from the government of Japan to the Japanese people, which would of
course be cabled abroad, would bear more fruit than propagandistic reports sent
through press channels for foreign consumption only) and in turn would have a
most favorable bearing on the chances of a settlement He even went on to say
that was it not the duty of every politician to strive for peace up to the day
before war is found to be unavoidable? The President and the Secretary of
State, he said * * * (two or three lines too badly garbled).
I
then said: "Leaving British, Australian and Dutch opinions aside for the
time being, what is the attitude of the United States itself regarding our
proposal?"
His
subsequent reply, which he made by taking up the proposal paragraph by
paragraph, was a complete evasion. However, there were indications that what
the United States, Britain, Australia, etc. actually desire is to dissolve the
crisis in the south Pacific, so that the fighting powers they have to maintain
in this area to keep things under control, may be transferred for action in
other parts.
(Part 3)
He
pointed out that since that is their main objective, the assurances given by
Japan in her proposals were insufficient.
I
said: "Our troop concentrations m the northern part of French Indo-China
are aimed at cutting Chungking's life line. Therefore, they are, for the most
part, directed towards Yunnan. As such, they do not and are not intended to
form a threat to the south Pacific area."
After
I pointed out this fact, Kurusu said that the acceptance of our proposal would
naturally lead to the conditions desired not only by the United States, but by
the other nations he referred to. To this, Hull replied that what these
countries desired was a quick turn-about in the situation.
Hull:
"With regard to resumption of trade, a rapid change in the situation can
be wrought here, too, once Japan's Pacific intentions have been ascertained.
This change for the better can be brought about in a mere matter of days."
Regarding
aid to China, Hull said:
"We
must take into consideration the possibility of a U.S. mediation when
considering the possibility of cutting off aid to Chiang. If we promise Japan
that we shall cease aiding China, the United States could no longer be considered
a fair and neutral party to propose peace between China and Japan.
(Part 4)
"Moreover,
if it is terminated immediately upon the beginning of the negotiations, the
promise would be utterly without value. In any event, the so-called 'aid to
Chiang Kai-shek' is not as great as is commonly publicized.
"It
is Japan's desire to improve the situation which has reached a critical stage
by first settling the outstanding factors involved. Since that is the desire
expressed by your proposals, we cannot at this time concur in Japan's demands
with regard to stopping aid to Chiang."
He
went on to say that he did not believe that the time was as yet ripe for the
President to suggest peace to China.
I
said "I feel that on Monday the United States will submit some sort of a
counter proposal to us. I further feel that this proposal will contain a
suggestion that Japan join in some plan to maintain peace on the Pacific and in
some kind of a trade agreement. No doubt it will be necessary for the United
States and Japan to come to some preliminary agreement, after which it would be
submitted to the other countries for their approval."
Kurusu:
"If it is intended that a sort of a group be formed by those nations and
that if they expect to make it appear as if we were 'voted down' by the
majority of the voters, we wish to state now that we shall be absolutely unable
to accept such a proposal."
25347
JD-1: 6839 (D) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (2)
*Part 2 badly garbled; considerable reconstruction work contained.
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)