[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
23 November 1941
(Purple)
#1161 (In 2 parts, complete)
Regarding
my #1160*
General
outline of conversation on the night of 22nd is as follows:
Trade
between Japan and the United States could gradually be resumed if Japan were
willing to take a peaceful attitude, representatives of foreign powers that are
friendly with the United States met in conference yesterday. They were all
advised of this and are to meet again on Monday, after they have reported to
their own government and received their answers.
Hull
continued that there was a limit to his powers, and although he understood the
reason for Tokyo's demand of urgency regarding the matter, he does not seem to
see the reason why Tokyo can not wait a few days.
The
Chinese Ambassador KOTEKI came to the conference yesterday, getting up from.
bed (due to illness) and arriving at the end of the conference.
According
to Hull he does not intend to act as a mediator in the Japan-China incident
right now, or to give up aid to China, (however the aid to China today is not
to a very great extent). It seems as though he wishes to handle (discuss) the
China incident later.
According
to reliable information it seems that to station troops for duration of
necessity can be considered as stationing of troops indefinitely, but if it was
stated that troops were to be stationed for a certain period of four or five
years, at the end of which period conditions were to govern restationing of
troops, there might not be so much opposition. But with just an indefinite
stationing of troops for an indefinite period, it would be against the U. S.
policy which is against annexation and interfering with self-government. (The
fact that during the preparatory conference last July, the Japanese troops went
into French Indo-China, causing the conference of that time to be broken
off)-the above was mentioned again today and thus hinting that it was hoped a
similar occurrence would not develop this time.
He
continued that to merely move troops which were in southern French Indo-China
to the north would not relieve the tension in the south Pacific or relieve the
anxiousness of the countries of the south Pacific, etc. so that it was
explained that to an experienced military observer this was great information
and should add much to the peace of that part. Hull explained that the contents
of the conference would be strictly restricted to himself alone, (then later
said he would mention it to a few), so that gave the appearance of his not understanding
much about military aspects.
I
presented the prelude of our B Proposal and tried to get his answer of yes or
no on each item, and Hull seemed to feel that our B Proposal was a demand on
the United States by Japan, and seemed very displeased. He said there was no
cause for Japan's making such demands, and that he was greatly discouraged in
the attitude of Japan of insisting on direct answers when he was trying so hard
to arrange a peaceful negotiation between the two countries.
We
(Japanese Ambassadors) kept a calm appearance throughout the talk, and at no
time became excited, and the opponent's attitude was also the same.
Hull
explained that the United States was following peaceful attitude in the
negotiations and he hoped Japan would also follow this peaceful attitude of the
United States throughout the negotiations.
25588
JD-1: (Y) Navy Trans. 12-201 (X)
*JD-1: 6857 (S.I.S. #25397).
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)