[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941.
Purple (Extremely urgent)
#1189. (Part 1 of 2)
At
4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary
HULL and we talked for about two hours.
HULL
said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting
the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations
concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of
this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length,
however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment,
reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and
yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following
two proposals:
A.
One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."
B.
(1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington,
Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
(2)
Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and
Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic
treatment fir French Indo-China.
(3)
The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French
Indo-China.
(4)
Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in
China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
(5)
The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.
Army 25441 Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple (Extremely urgent)
#1189. (Part 2 of 2)
(6)
The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States
on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
(7)
The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.
(8)
Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.
(9)
No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has
contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these
treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or
to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to
emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)
In
view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could
not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back
furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to
propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China
doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping
CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging
that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been
rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her
national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we
think so.
Army: 25442 Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)