[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#1191 Part 1 of 4.
On
the 26th at the request of Secretary HULL, KURUSU and I visited him. First of
all, we read over cursorily the documents he handed us, which we sent you in
separate messages #1192 [a], 1193 [b] and 1194 [c], and then engaged in an
argument. The gist of it was as follows:
(1)
HULL said: "Although we have conferred with the various nations concerned
and have studied your proposal of the 20th (B proposal with 6 and 7 left out)
for five days, we have decided that we cannot consider it."
(2)
I said: "You talk of reconciling the American proposal of June 21st with
ours of September 25th, but this is vastly different from either."
HULL
retorted: "As for that I want you to read and compare the paragraph I
point out with the one immediately preceding it. I said that it was a plan for
reconciling both the Japanese and American proposals. Since the opening of
conversations, the contents of it have been kept secret and, therefore, in this
country where popular opinion counts for so much, various surmises are arising;
particularly rumors are being circulated to the effect that we are leaving
China in the lurch. I myself am in the foreground and in spite of what Japan
said at the time of our conversation of the 22nd, various important people are
still uttering non-pacific statements. There does not seem to be much I can do
in the fact of that."
Army 25481 Trans. 11/29/41 (2)
[a] See S.I.S. #25485.
[b] See S.I.S. #25489.
[c] See S.I.S. #25491.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#1191 Part 2 of 4.
To
be handled in government code.
(3)
Concerning Section 1 of the proposal, I pointed out that of the four
principles, the fourth has changed the so-called Stimson Doctrine; but I got no
clear reply. I reminded him of their insistances so far concerning the
principle of non-discrimination and said that if we applied that immediately to
China there would be a sudden darkening of the already cloudy economic
situation and that this was improper and impossible.
HULL
replied: "I fully understand that and the principle as such does not
necessarily have to be put into effect right away."
(4)
Concerning 1 of Section 2 of this proposal, I said: "If this plan aims to
revive a Nine-Power Treaty set-up, we cannot feature it at all because we have
fought a four year war in China without a cent of profit."
To
this he countered with no strong rebuttal.
Army 25482 Trans. 11/29/41 (1)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple (Extremely Urgent)
#1191 Part 3 of 4
(5)
I said that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same section were out of the question
and, as for paragraph 4, for a country like the United States, who recognizes
the Chungking Government, to say that she cannot desert the Chiang Regime is
just like us saying that we certainly cannot desert the Nanking Regime."
In
reply HULL said: "The evacuation under 3 would be carried out by
negotiations. We are not necessarily asking that it be effected immediately. As
for the Nanking Government, according to the best reports available to us, it
hasn't much influence over China as a whole any way."
I
retorted: "Well, that argument is based on the statement that in the long
history of China there have been many rises and falls of governments."
(6)
When we came to the question of the Three Power Treaty, I said: "For the
United States to hope, on one hand, that she can make us make the last possible
concession regarding the Three Power Pact and on the other virtually to say to
us concerning the China question 'apologize to Chungking' is certainly strange.
I do not suppose that that is what the President meant the other day when he
spoke of 'introducing'. "
HULL
made no special answer.
Army 25483 Trans. 11/2/41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple (Extremely urgent)
#1191. (Part 4 of 4)
I
said, "Well, I have read this only cursorily. It is a very difficult plan
for us to consider accepting. As far as the China part is concerned, it
contains clauses which are entirely out of the question so I, who would like to
see an understanding established between Japan and the United States, do not
know if I should even report it to Japan as it now stands. I have grave doubts.
We will both read it over again and consider it fully. Then we will reply."
Finally I said, "I wonder if the United States means that there is no
other way but for us to consider this plan. You know the President the other
day said that between friends there are no last words. I wonder if you could
arrange for an interview." To the former he replied that in a word this
was a plan, and to the latter he said that, although he did not think that much
progress was being made, he would manage the matter.
Army 25484 Trans. 11-29-41 (2)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)