[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1225 (Part 1 of 3) [a]
When
I and Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull on the 1st, we conveyed to him
the matter contained in your message #857*. Roughly speaking, Hull's reply
stayed within the bounds of his earlier explanations. He placed the most
emphasis on two points, namely, the tone and trend of the Japanese Government's
expressions and movements and that of the general public opinion organs; and,
the increase in strength of the garrisons in French Indo-China.
From
the beginning of today's conference, Secretary Hull wore a deeply pained
expression. Without wasting any time, he brought up the subject of the
Premier's statement, (see my message #1222**), and said that that was one of
the reasons for the President's sudden return to Washington. (Upon our arrival
at the State Department, we found not only newspaper men, but even some members
of the Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these speculators
were of the opinion that the issue of war or peace was to be immediately
decided upon. In general, the scene was highly dramatic.)
We,
therefore, replied that we were convinced that the Premier's statement had been
erroneously and exaggeratedly reported in the vernacular. We pointed out that
regardless of who the speaker may be if only an excerpt from his speech is
reported, without having the entire text available, it is quite possible that the
reader will get exactly the opposite meaning from that intended by the speaker.
We
went on to advise the Secretary that we were at present awaiting the delivery
of the entire text.
During
the course of our explanations, the Secretary showed visible signs of relief.
He
said: "Since our talks were begun recently, there has not been a single
indication of endorsement and support from Japan. I have not heard of any steps
being taken in Japan aimed at facilitating these conversations, all of which is
exceedingly regrettable."
25778 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
JD-1: 7042
[a] For Part 2 see S.I.S. #25715.
*JD-1: 6921 (S.I.S. #25496).
**Available, dated 30 November (S.I.S. #25761).
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available)
(Message
having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.)
For
this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatisfaction.
It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President recently
said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four years
of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.
Japan,
too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by successfully
concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support
and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction.
With
regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China the government of the
United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been receiving
report after report during the past few days, from U. S. officials stationed in
that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy; the landing of
various types of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is felt
as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was that they feared
that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the
southwestern Pacific area).
As
to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are
planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the
Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans even if, in actuality,
that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible
eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces
in that area.
25715
JD-1: 7042 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7)
*Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message.
[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
1 December 1941
(Purple) #1225 (Part 3 of 3)
(Purple)
Hull:
"In the final analysis, that means that Hitlerism is being given indirect support,
and for this reason please exercise the utmost of caution.
"In
view of the fact that Japan is acting in the manner described above, there is
absolutely no way of bringing about a settlement of the situation.
"Disruptions
in Japanese-U. S. relations is exceedingly unfortunate, not only for our two
countries, but to the world in general. There shall be nothing constructive
about a Japanese-U. S. war. We fully realize that it can be nothing other than
destructive. For this reason, we are still highly desirous of bringing these
conversations to a successful conclusion.
"However,
with the existence of the above described conditions, and because of the nature
of this country, the Secretary of State and the President are placed in an
exceedingly difficult position."
I:
"It seems mutually regrettable that all of our efforts which lead to the
21 June and 25 September proposals, should have been in vain."
In
general he expressed his agreement to this.
Hull.
"The recent situation in Japan and the U. S. public opinion made it
necessary for us to return to the most recent proposal."
We
then said that behind the problems at hand, there has always been the China
problem.
"As
I have pointed out on several occasions", I said, "this has been the
bitterest experience since the Washington Conference. Peace between Japan and
China could not be attained through any such terms as were contained in your
most recent proposal. We hear your argument to the effect that you cannot stand
by and do nothing while China dies. The converse of that argument should be
even stronger. That is, that it is of the utmost importance for us to avoid
standing by and watching our own respective countries die, just because of the
China problem."
Hull
indicated his agreement with this, but went on to say:
"Because
the situation is as I have already described, I hope that Japan will take steps
to bring about order through her public organs."
25778
JD-1: 7042 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
(EXHIBITS
OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)