Information for topics one, two (a & b) and three:


           I'll just run through the gist: then perhaps anyone unsure about additional items or with puzzles over this can contact me direct for individual suggestions. (In general, closely analysing material we've discussed in the sessions is likely to yield greater gains than doing lots of extra reading). The extracts already given out in the course back up the first question on utilitarianism. Glover's book allows you to put them in context and extend them a bit (e.g. to include what Williams goes on to say or how the survival lottery is argued for....) See J.S.Mill's Utilitarianism, and Glover's introductions to the relevant sections of his book, for some points of defence......

 

The second question is broader so there's more you could read - but again don't risk letting reading swamp thinking. Source of the quotation: Sen's Development as Freedom, p.74. Relevant therefore to read at least this part of this book.... Sen's 'Equality of what?' is another obvious paper that relates; and you could refer also to his Inequality Reexamined. For possible criticisms, refer back to our talks last term, try Sugden from the reading list (early critic), consult the Robeyns paper......

 

On question three, the focus is on what is meant by the two quoted authors (see extracts from the 4th session - quotes from F & F, p.181 and T, p.168) but read enough from the two books concerned to put them in context [the earlier Capitalism and Freedom by Friedman might also help]. The reading list gives some other classic sources on freedom (Mill, Berlin on supposed 'positive' and 'negative' liberties; maybe Hayek too; also Sen's remarks in e.g.the intro to Rationality and Freedom, sec. 5 for instance), and on equality (e.g.Williams, Dworkin). The encyclopedia extract sheet includes a reference to the book Free and Equal (Norman) which could be useful; but although any of this could come in, the most essential thing is to focus on what mileage if any can be gained from what Tawney and the Friedmans say themselves.....


Information on remaining topics:

 

(Note: LRL is long reading list, or ‘bibliography’ section on this website)

 

Q.4. Suggested at the session more recent pieces of literature which could be helpful, to add to the more classic entries on LRL sec 8: they were:
Dasgupta, P., 'What do economists analyse: values or facts?' [on shelf]. (= Revised draft 2004: there has been a later version too, I think, but unless you are going to go deeply into his point of view Jan 2004 should serve OK). Non-economists: don't be intimidated by the more technical parts of this: pick out the parts that you can follow easily and that relate most closely to the question - e.g. parts of the intro {paper with relevance to capabilities issues too]
and
Putnam, H., The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 2002 (and/or 2003 paper, ''For ethics and economics without the dichotomies', Review of Political Economy). [Referred to in Dasgupta, who could give you the flavour of this before you decide whether to invest library time in it]
Note the format of the question ('possible links', 'outline', 'use').
Quotation in the question: from Sen 1980, in the extract I gave out.
On (i) try Popper? (LRL sec 8) - though there are other possible sources for this too - including Sen.
On (ii), again many sources, including Sen, but - see LRL - you could try Myrdal (1958) [you may just want the key quotation which I distributed in a later session - same is true as I remember of the key quotation from E.H.Carr's What is History - fishing metaphor]
On (iii), try Dasgupta and - of course - Sen!
How does it all then add up? [Do you add it up as Sen does?]

Q.5. Compact literature for this. Draw heavily on the extracts given out [ref details are on LRL sec 3] (= Sen's 'Rational Fools'; Hahn v. Sen from my book; Sen's Econometrica 1997 paper, including the garden party chair analysis and the strategic nobility fruit-passing game; Sen's summary account from Development as Freedom) - but perhaps read round the extracts from Rat. Fools and the '97 piece to get the context clear. The different selection bases which you can catalogue may depend on the circumstances of choice (which is where your 'filling in of the background circs' comes in). leave space for the last - puzzling - part.....

Q.6. Again a (very) compact literature - here relatively few pages but ones that it can take a long time to digest and compare......
Anand quote from extract given out (which is from his 1993 book);
Broome quote from his chapter in my book (extract also circulated?) [Refs on LRL sec 3 again]

Q.7. This is much broader so you will need to keep the 2000 word limit in mind from the outset. If you didn't take down this remark during Kahneman's lecture, don't worry - see p. 774 in Kahneman and Tversky, ed., Choices, Values and Frames, Ch 42 ('New challenges to the rationality assumption'); and read his Nobel lecture, available on the web. [Also try browsing the intro in the earlier book edited by Kahneman and Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, originally appearing as a paper of this title in Science for 1974]. Simon on 'bounded rationality' could relate too. For the rest, left to you to draw together material from our sessions that address this question - note that several handouts relate..... [Relevant LRL secs = 2, 3, 10]

Q.8. My two papers on this (ch 8 in my Thoughtful Economic Man, = longer version, and ch 2 in Runde,J. and Mizuhara,S., The Philosophy of Keynes's Economics: Probablility, Uncertainty and Convention, = shorter version, slightly updated) cover much of the material and provide further refs: saves time to start here. You should also read some of Keynes himself (esp.extracts given out) and work out how you would interpret him. This gives you the basis. If you want more backup, there's an awkwardly large literature (beware the word limit.....); see LRL sec 1. Shackle, Robinson, Moggridge on LRL emphasise the irrational factors; O'Donnell, Lawson and many others (see intro to Runde and Mizuhara on my part) pursue the coexistence of rationality. But can Keynes indeed have it both ways? - need your own assessment on this......[Runde's papers on LRL on the weight of arguments and on comparisons with Bayesian methods are much recommended if your argument takes you in those directions - not essential to read for this question wording though. Coddington's paper on 'deficient foresight', AER 1982 (see LRL) - not so recommended in itself and definitely not essential - could be tried for its presentation of a very different viewpoint].

Q.9. Had a longer wording originally, spelling out what 'analyse' now covers (try separating out the various elements in the claim - how many? - that might be denied by those who disagree). Use Deane's papers, circulated, as the jumping-of point; see also the quotations from Popper and Kuhn given in extracts/on the handouts; read enough from these two to put those extracts in context. Recent book on Kuhn by Thomas Nickles updates discussion by philosophers of science - could be browsed (e.g. intro by Nickles; ch 3 by Worrall on Kuhn v. Popper and Lakatos), but this is an optional extra. Note that Kuhn later revised his position somewhat (see Deane on this; also try Lakatos and Musgrave, LRL sec 11). Wide-ranging question, so don't attempt a full answer on each element (not possible in 2000 words) - rather, concentrate on presenting all the relevant elements and their role in the discussion of the claim, with brief comment only - space for a few sensible remarks on each but clearly not for extensive analysis of e.g. Popper or Kuhn (or......? Are other authors relevant?)

Q 10. Quotation from Layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science, out this spring (page ref, from memory only - John has my book - is 224). Book ordered for the
Marshall but may not be in yet: John [jes79] will share my copy so you do not have to buy - new from the presses so you are breaking fresh ground here. Have tried to narrow the focus of the question so that it does not relate so much to the (important) issue of why we should be concerned with maximising happiness at all (not dealt with very fully by Layard but already the topic of earlier questions) - but rather to the idea that measuring happiness can at last be put on an objective, scientific basis (slight overlap with question 4?). You are not required to read scientific papers on the brain, however! Layard refers us to Kahneman: so see Kahneman and Tversky, eds., Choices, Values and Frames, section 9 (Experienced utility and objective happiness), ch 37, but continued into chs. 38 and 42. You will no doubt want to take into account the sorts of difficulty earlier writers had felt to be a stumbling block - see LRL sec.4, esp. Robbins (1932, later modified in '38); here try my survey article in Turner and Martin, eds., Surveying Subjective Phenomena, Vol.II ('Utility in Economics'), to save research time on the earlier positions - sieve this with 'problems of measurement' as your identifier - you needn't to get involved in all the detail of earlier ways of trying to get round the problem. However I will provide two short Sen extracts expressing optimism (justified? misplaced?) in the possible scope for making interpersonal comparisons and for sometimes being able to sidestep precise quantification [these, on shelf]. But focus most on working out how well you think the measurement difficulties have been overcome.