Challenged utilitarianism attempts defence
The persistence of utilitarian ideas in economics and philosophy is linked with tenacity on the part of utilitarians responding to attack. Are the defences offered convincing? Or do they leave the approach empty / too vague / stripped of the very virtues that initially made it appealing…?
Pursuing the line of attack considered last time (conflict of utilitarianism with certain fundamental values):
|
Attacker |
Conflict
with |
Possible
defence |
|
Williams |
Individual integrity (George/Jim) |
Self-indulgent to resist U; See also ‘ideal’ U |
|
Rawls |
Justice/fairness (Slavery) |
‘Ideal’ U (J. S. Mill) – value incorporated as requirement of happiness. |
|
Sen |
Liberalism (prude, lewd, & Pareto) |
Veto ‘meddlesome preferences (various schemes of ‘preference laundering’ from e.g. Hare, Harsanyi, Mirrless) |
|
Sen |
Equality (handicap) (leading to development of Sen’s capability approach) |
Debatable assumptions, e.g. of knowable unequal capacity to generate utility (Harrod, Pigou, Lerner, Williams…), of purely self-regarding utility functions. |
For longer-term reference, two particularly useful books are:
Glover, J. (ed.) Utilitarianism and Its Critics (1990) – comprehensive and lively collection, containing several of the extracts we’ve been discussing, and others, with very helpful Introductions by Glover to its various sections.
Sen, A. and Williams, B. (eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond, especially the Introduction –useful on possible U responses to attack.
Also, some of the material I’ve been covering so far is included in my [J G M Meeks] survey paper, ‘Utility in Economics’, in Turner, C. and Martin, E. (eds.) Surveying Subjective Phenomena, Vol. II.
(Dr. J G T Meeks)