Positive economics revalued
(the fact/value distinction in economics)
Issues in economics: whether there can be such a subject as purely positive economics; how far economists ‘qua economists’ may be justified in tackling moral or political questions.
Philosophy employed: Hume and Searle on ‘is’ and ‘ought’; the logical positivist movement and criticism of it in the philosophy of science; ethical theories of intuitionism, emotivism, prescriptivism and the subsequent challenge of the ‘autonomy’ of ethics.
Argument
i. is/ought shorthand for fact/value (not a verbal distinction); meaning of ‘assumptions contain their conclusions’; facts plus values can imply ‘ought’ statements.
ii. background in past philosophy: Hume.
iii. but re-interpretation of Hume.
iv. and Searle’s possible counter-example on ‘is’ and ‘ought’ (utters – promises – has an obligation – ought) (‘Institutional facts’)
i. early 20th Century: the logical positivist movement
ii. rejection of positivism: no such thing as a mere ‘brute’ fact, a pure sense-datum. ‘Theory laden’ facts (Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, Carr)
iii. from ‘theory-laden’ to ‘value laden’ facts? (Myrdal in the late 1950s; but Sen’s important dissent - ‘curiosity’)
i.
the autonomy of ethics,
variously asserted in the moral theories of intuitionism (
ii. dissatisfaction with these theories, especially over the nature of moral argument
iii. ethics seen as essentially related to human needs and wants (Philippa Foot, the Warnocks). From the autonomy of ethics to ‘fact-laden’ values?
Upshot: In the early 1900s, there might seem to be a warrant for Lipsey view that a rigid gulf must part positive and normative economics; it has been withdrawn in some recent philosophy. However, the loss of the positivist ideal doesn’t mean economics must inevitably be a wholly subjective affair, just offering propaganda for particular ideologies.
(Dr. J G T Meeks)