Popper and his critics: the role of refutation in
the establishment of scientific theories.
(Philosophy of science background to Friedman’s concern with a theory surviving attempts at refutation; and perhaps to his final, more sociological, ‘folklore’ claim?)
Issues for discussion:
(with reference to: Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge, Chapter 1 (esp. sections I, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, and Appendix 13)
‘it is obvious that [the]…craft of ‘valid induction’…does not exist…Induction, i.e. inference based on many observations, is a myth. It is neither a psychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure’ (p. 53).
Compare with Strawson’s positions: he maintains that the statement:
‘Induction is a reasonable procedure’ is a necessary truth, because
‘the rationality of induction…is a matter of what we mean by the word rational on its application to any procedure for forming opinions about what lies outside our observations or that of available witnesses. For to have good reasons for any such opinion is to have good inductive support for it’ (Introduction to Logical Theory, p 261-263).
‘[Hume’s demonstration that] it is not possible to infer a theory from observation statements…does not affect the possibility of refuting a theory by observation statements’ (p 55).
Consider Warnock’s criticism, to the effect that in treating refutation or survival of attempted refutation as significant:
‘we must suppose at least that [the theory tested] would again withstand the very same tests, if they were repeated…[So] if there is such a thing as the problem of induction, it is a problem for Popper as much as for anyone else’ (Mind, 1960, review).
Or, as Quinton puts it:
‘the inductive procedure [Popper] ostensibly rejects makes an implicit reappearance. Is there any real difference, [critics] ask, between the view that a theory depends for justification on the occurrences of confirming instances and the view that it depends on the failure of falsifying ones to occur? (article on Popper in Edward’s Encyclopaedia of Philosophy).
‘the method of science is…attempted falsifications’ (p 52).
Difficulties in the ‘crucial test’ idea
(see Cross, R. ‘The Duhem-Quine thesis, Lakatos and the appraisal of theories in macroeconomics’, Economic Journal, 1982; but also Blaug, M. The Methodology of Economics, or How Economists Explain)
Contrasted with Popper’s view in Kuhn’s provocative claim:
‘There are, I think, only two alternatives: either no scientific theory ever confronts a counterinstance, or allsuch theories confront counterinstances at all times’ (Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p 77-80).
(Dr. J.G.T. Meeks)