On preference and principles
I
Sen’s arguments about the variety and motivations behind choice, some of which involve direct or indirect self-interest but some of which (noble or self-denying choices made from duty or commitment) can go against this
[beware of ‘strategic’ nobility, however, and consider the effect of introducing guilt; but backed by Nagel’s contention that ‘an appeal to our interests or sentiments to account for altruism is superfluous’]
= possibility of choosing (preferring) on principle, not for own gain.
But, there’s also the possibility of choosing (preferring), against principle:
weakness of the will (have principles but cave in, giving way to preferences we might not prefer to have);
addiction (if this counts as choice at all);
selfish choices;
immoral choices, e.g. cruelty.
And of under-informed or misinformed choices:
sometimes choices would change with more information (e.g. may apply to some choices by children);
choices driven by peer pressure but unwelcome otherwise;
choices induced by advertising but bringing disappointment.
And, of ‘meddlesome’ preferences over what other people do:
Sen on their possible conflict with liberalism;
Dworkin on the risk of ‘double counting.’
Joan Robinson: might we then begin ‘to doubt whether preferences are what we really prefer?’
Move to say: some preferences (e.g. the sadist’s?) should be left out of account. But this may defeat the initial object.
Robinson again: ‘Preference is [held to be] just what the individual…prefers: there is no value judgement involved…But drug-fiends should be cured: children should go to school. How do we decide what preferences should be respected and what restrained unless we judge the preferences themselves?’
(Dr. J G T Meeks)