On preference and principles

 

I

 

            Sen’s arguments about the variety and motivations behind choice, some of which involve direct or indirect self-interest but some of which (noble or self-denying choices made from duty or commitment) can go against this

 

[beware of ‘strategic’ nobility, however, and consider the effect of introducing guilt; but backed by Nagel’s contention that ‘an appeal to our interests or sentiments to account for altruism is superfluous’]

 

            = possibility of choosing (preferring) on principle, not for own gain.

 

But, there’s also the possibility of choosing (preferring), against principle:

 

weakness of the will (have principles but cave in, giving way to preferences we might not prefer to have);

addiction (if this counts as choice at all);

selfish choices;

immoral choices, e.g. cruelty.

 

And of under-informed or misinformed choices:

 

sometimes choices would change with more information (e.g. may apply to some choices by children);

choices driven by peer pressure but unwelcome otherwise;

choices induced by advertising but bringing disappointment.

 

And, of ‘meddlesome’ preferences over what other people do:

 

            Sen on their possible conflict with liberalism;

            Dworkin on the risk of ‘double counting.’

 

Joan Robinson: might we then begin ‘to doubt whether preferences are what we really prefer?’

 

Move to say: some preferences (e.g. the sadist’s?) should be left out of account.  But this may defeat the initial object. 

 

Robinson again: ‘Preference is [held to be] just what the individual…prefers: there is no value judgement involved…But drug-fiends should be cured: children should go to school.  How do we decide what preferences should be respected and what restrained unless we judge the preferences themselves?’

 

(Dr. J G T Meeks)