a.weu/documents 1332taco.lop Document 1332 23rd October 1992 European armaments co-operation after Maastricht ______ REPORT (1) submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee (2) by Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman and Rapporteur ______ TABLE OF CONTENTS ================= DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on European armaments co-operation after Maastricht EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mr. Lopez Henares, Rapporteur I. Introduction II. Is more armaments co-operation required in a less threatened Europe? III. Operational requirements and the results of efforts made so far to meet them with the development of common equipment (i) Ground and air environment (ii) Naval and naval aviation environment (iii) Air and air defence environment (iv) Space (v) Summary IV. Creation of a European armaments agency and the future of the IEPG V. Conclusions APPENDICES I. IEPG Panel I - operational requirements and equipment programmes: sub-group overview II. IEPG Panel II - list of RTPs III. Structure of the IEPG _________________ Draft Recommendation ==================== on European armaments co-operation after Maastricht The Assembly, (i) Recalling that the new tasks attributed to allied forces in Europe make essential an in-depth re-examination of defence equipment and technology requirements, taking account inter alia of: - the disappearance of the threat of a mass attack against Europe; - uncertainty about the risk of conflicts and tension that exist or may emerge in several regions of the world; - reductions in defence budgets in the majority of WEU member countries; - the rapid evolution of advanced technology in the defence area; (ii) Stressing that the creation of multinational forces in the framework of NATO and WEU shows how urgent it is to make more effort to enhance the standardisation and interoperability of their equipment; (iii) Noting with satisfaction the increased activities of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) in joint research on and development of defence equipment; (iv) Noting nevertheless with concern the existence of a number of bi- and multilateral equipment co-operation programmes which are not certain to be either developed or completed; (v) Welcoming, on the one hand, WEU's Maastricht and Petersberg declarations, in which it is suggested that a deeper study be made of strengthening European armaments co-operation with a view to setting up a European armaments agency, and, on the other, the Council's proposal to instruct WEU and IEPG experts to study this problem together so that it may be settled without delay; (vi) Astonished nevertheless that, more than seven months after the IEPG defined its positions relating to the conditions for possible association of the IEPG and WEU, the Council has still done nothing to implement these proposals; (vii) Convinced that it is the duty of the public authorities, as defence industries' principal customers, to try to help them to find means of facilitating their conversion and adapting themselves to the new conditions; (viii) Convinced that defence industries should not be excluded from the European market but noting that the Twelve did not reach agreement in Maastricht on abolishing Article 223 of the Rome Treaty, RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 1. Speed up its work in order to work out a concept of the role and operation of a European armaments agency; 2. Appoint representatives immediately to contact without delay the team made responsible by the IEPG for the dialogue with WEU with a view to studying together the conditions for a merger between the IEPG and WEU; 3. Ensure that the future agency has adequate authority and powers to enable it to facilitate the process of harmonisation, by member countries, of their armed forces' defence equipment in a sensible, not too burdensome manner; 4. Ensure that all the IEPG member countries participate fully in the agency; 5. Reach agreement on its policy towards exports of military equipment and end-destination controls on exports of jointly- produced equipment; 6. Draw up an inventory and a financing plan for all medium- and long-term plans and studies launched by WEU and the IEPG for equipment, and draw up a list of priorities; 7. Inform the Assembly of the results of its study on Europe's strategic mobility needs; 8. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions it drew from the first stage of the feasibility study for the creation of a European space-based observation system. _____________________ Explanatory Memorandum ====================== (submitted by Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman and Rapporteur) I. Introduction ----------------- Since Sir Dudley Smith's report on "Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force" (3) , the evolution of the international politico-military environment has given a new dimension to thinking that had been under way for decades with a view to achieving greater harmonisation of arms and equipment for armed forces in Europe. Reassessment of the threat and the operational needs involved was dictated inter alia by a worsening of the war in former Yugoslavia, the re-emergence of tension between Iraq and the United States, the outbreak or pursuit of conflicts in several regions of the former Soviet Union such as Moldova, Ossetia and Nagorny-Karabakh, uncertainty about the future role of Russia as the Soviet Union's principal successor and the precarious situation prevailing in several sensitive areas of the world, including the Mediterranean. Initiatives taken to set up multinational forces in the alliance and WEU continued with: - the creation, on 21st May 1992, of a Franco-German army corps with a European vocation that is to become operational in 1995; - the official inauguration of the rapid reaction force (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, ARRC) in NATO on 2nd October 1992; and - the announcement by the Ministers of Defence of France, Italy and Spain on 7th September 1992 that they intend to examine the possibility of creating a European naval aviation force in the framework of WEU. Furthermore, the obligation for countries that signed the treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE) to reduce their armaments in accordance with that treaty and the budgetary constraints facing all the countries concerned can but stimulate joint efforts to rationalise available means to meet remaining legitimate defence needs. At institutional level, the Maastricht Treaty, signed on 7th February 1992, requested WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the European political union which have defence implications. The WEU member countries have consequently taken a number of decisions, including that to strengthen the operational role of the organisation and to examine the possibilities of strengthening co-operation in armaments matters with a view to setting up a European armaments agency. At the same time, the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) is examining its role in the new European security architecture, but the conditions for a rapprochement with WEU -advocated by the latter in the Petersberg declaration in the context of the creation of a European armaments agency - have not yet been defined. Europe's defence industries, most of which are suffering from a sharp fall in orders from states which are their main customers, are seeking new forms of co-operation among themselves and how to adapt themselves to the new challenges in order to safeguard their competitiveness and ensure their survival. These industries are following very closely the process of building Europe and inter-state co-operation within alliances since these matters have a crucial influence on decisions to be taken in regard to industrial policy, particularly as from 1st January 1993, when free movement of goods within the European Community is to start. However, account must also be taken of prevailing fears among a large section of public opinion about the need for and usefulness of continuing armaments efforts now that the East- West confrontation has come to an end and the public is calling for substantial peace dividends. European political leaders should give the public more explanations about the basis of their future guidelines in this connection. However, in spite of the many declarations of intention issued in Maastricht and Petersberg on strengthening armaments co-operation, the problem does not seem to be a matter of prime importance for governments and administrations. For instance, the half-yearly report of the German Government on the activities of WEU, published on 18th August 1992 and covering the period from 1st January to 30th June 1992, does not even mention the subject of European equipment co-operation or the plan to set up a European armaments agency. Uncertainty about the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty following the Danish "No" and the French people's timid approval have encouraged some commentators to think that these results may slow down the progress of European defence co-operation, thus automatically affecting armaments, too. In any event, it seems necessary to recall that the absence of a joint policy in respect of equipment affects not only the operational standard of forces but also public budgets, research and technological development guidelines, arms export policy and industrial and employment policy. II. Is more armaments co-operation required in a less threatened Europe? --------------------------------------------- In the alliance's new strategic concept, approved at its meeting in Rome on 7th and 8th November 1991, the North Atlantic Council noted inter alia that: "The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for allied strategy. Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced, and minimum allied warning time has increased accordingly. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi- directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess." Opinions of all kinds have been expressed this year on defining the state of European security two years after the collapse of the Soviet empire. Mr. Pierre Beregovoy, French Prime Minister, described this as follows on 3rd September 1992 (4) : "The unjust Yalta order is no more. A new international order is announced, but it is far from being achieved. We are therefore in this intermediary stage, at one and the same time exulting and disturbing: one major threat has disappeared but new forms of instability are emerging with reawakening nationalism, a possible new source of conflict. The accession to full and entire sovereignty by the republics belonging to the former Soviet Union has had as a corollary uncertainty about what is to become of its nuclear arsenal. ...... All continents, in a manner that is always dramatic for their populations, are exposed to many forms of instability. ...... Unfortunately, intolerance, the spirit of revenge and the reawakening of ancestral hostility often accompany this movement of history. This is the reason for confrontations in the Caucasus and Moldava. At our doors, the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation has made that country a battlefield, first in Croatia, above all in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, and tomorrow perhaps in Kosovo. ...... However, hotbeds of instability, disorder and distress are not confined to Europe. Violence is also killing in Iraq and Sri Lanka. ......." Asked about possible threats to the United Kingdom, Mr. Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defence, said in an interview in Defense News (5) : "Russia's relationship with Europe and the rest of the world has been transformed. But we are anxious of the fact that even after implementation of [strategic arms reduction treaty] agreements with the United States, Russia will come down from 10 000 strategic nuclear warheads to over 3 000, far in excess of what is required for a minimum nuclear deterrent. They still have massive nuclear stockpiles, and that is something you cannot ignore. Secondly, we have no certainty about what the future holds for Russia itself, and we cannot exclude the possibility that there will be changes in Russia, and one has to build that into one's policy. Thirdly, there is the worrying problem of nuclear proliferation." Conversely, Mr. Salvo Ando, Minister of Defence of Italy, now Chairman-in-Office of the WEU Council, said in an interview in Defense News (6) : "The conventional military threat from the East has practically disappeared, even if a residual nuclear deterrence is still needed. But other risks are emerging, especially from the Southern European and Mediterranean regions. We do not fear a massive military attack, but we are worried about the growing and general instability, stronger indirect threats against our security and unpredictable limited attacks against our territory and lines of communication. Finally, we worry that nuclear, chemical and missile proliferation may become the greatest threat of the future." Mr. Nevrat Ayaz, Minister of Defence of Turkey, described as follows the threat to his country as he now perceives it (7) : "Turkey lies at the centre of a region of instabilities and uncertainties, from the turbulent Balkans and Transcaucasia to the Middle East, which witnessed a major war only last year. For the 1990s, Turkey sees the threat against it [in] regional crises and conflicts rather than a preplanned large-scale attack." The German Government's position was described on 17th June 1992 in an answer by Mr. Wilz, Secretary of State for Defence of Germany, to a question put by Mr. Scheer, informing him that his ministry had prepared an analysis of the risks at the beginning of 1992 and this had been adopted by the government: "It is clear from this analysis of the risks that Germany is not at present under threat. The military potential of the former Soviet Union, which still exists albeit to a lesser degree, is still a serious danger but it is unlikely that it will be used at present. ...... More real currently are risks stemming from growing political instability, accompanied by the latent danger of recourse to military means. This is the case in particular of South-Eastern Europe and the crisis area stretching from Morocco to India. Political tension prevailing there suggests that regional wars may break out at any time and that they are increasingly liable to involve means of mass destruction. It cannot be ruled out that such conflicts may spread to the southern alliance partners. This assessment of the risk is shared by NATO as a whole. ...... In this context, the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO can no longer take as a premise the existence of a one-dimensional threat consisting of a massive military aggression in its traditional meaning. This has effectively made way for new, less precise, risks which have emerged in various parts of Europe and might even lead to kinds of warfare that were thought to have had their day." The Atlantic Alliance and WEU have started to learn the lessons of the new situation in order to adapt their defence instruments, each within the framework of its own mandate. In Rome on 8th November 1991, the North Atlantic Council declared: "Our military forces will adjust to their new tasks, becoming smaller and more flexible. Thus, our conventional forces will be susbtantially reduced as will, in many cases, their readiness. They will also be given increased mobility to enable them to react to a wide range of contingencies, and will be organised for flexible build-up, when necessary, for crisis management as well as defence. Multinational formations will play a greater role within the integrated military structure. Nuclear forces committed to NATO will be greatly reduced." (Paragraph 5 of the declaration) WEU for its part, learning the lesson of the Gulf war, the war in former Yugoslavia and latent regional conflicts in several regions of the world, has taken a few fundamental decisions made necessary by the new role assigned to it by the Maastricht Treaty. The first fundamental decision was to strengthen WEU's operational role, as a consequence of which member states agreed "to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed fores for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU" (8) . The second was the definition of its forces' principal tasks, on which member countries agreed: "Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: - humanitarian and rescue tasks; - peace-keeping tasks, - tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.(9) " The third was the decision to organise these military units on a multinational and multi-service basis (10) . It may easily be deduced that, the more multinational the forces in question become, the more essential it would seem to harmonise their equipment. Greater co-operation is therefore essential in this connection, which does not mean increasing arms but, on the contrary, making available by technological means the capability necessary for new tasks with smaler quantities of equipment. The principle of multinationality of forces also implies far greater standardisation and interoperability of equipment "than was required in the old days of large, in-place national forces set out in a layer cake configuration" (11) . These considerations therefore bring us to a problem that has been well known since the creation of the alliances and to which it has never yet been possible to find a satisfactory solution. III. Operational requirements and the results of efforts made so far to meet them with the development of common equipment ----------------------------------------------- Although your Rapporteur obtained the impression from his talks with senior officials responsible for armaments and equipment in several Western European countries that the need to harmonise equipment concerned at one and the same time land- based, naval, air and space equipment, recent conflicts, particularly the Gulf war, tend to suggest that attention should henceforth be concentrated on the importance of: - intelligence, data-processing and command equipment, using satellite-borne means of communication; - space-based observation and electromagnetic monitoring devices; - strategic mobility (air and maritime transport); - the choice of accurate stealth systems; - the need for anti-ballistic missile defence, this being the subject of the report presented by Mr. Lenzer. However, these very specific needs must not make us forget the multinational forces now being set up. The national components of these forces will have to be able to operate together, to communicate among themselves, to afford each other mutual support and undergo joint training. Non- standardised, incompatible equipment, which was not such a stumbling-block in the days when strategy was based mainly on national units, might seriously affect the interoperability of multinational, integrated forces. However, none of the efforts made since the Atlantic Alliance and WEU were set up with a view to harmonising allied forces' equipment requirements in the framework of various bodies specialising in equipment matters has done anything to change the fundamental fact that all the member countries determine the needs of their own armed forces on an individual basis. Consequently, the degree of both bi- and multilateral co- operation between states in armaments matters until now depended more or less on the hazards of ad hoc decisions and varying relationships between the countries and industries concerned. After more than thirty years of effort, relatively few European bi- or multilateral projects have reached the production stage. Mention may be made of: - Gazelle, Lynx and Puma helicopters (Franco-German co- operation); - the Jaguar aircraft (Franco-British co-operation); - the Alpha-Jet aircraft (Franco-German co-operation); - the Tornado aircraft (co-operation between Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy); - Milan anti-tank missiles (Franco-German co-operation); - Hot anti-tank missiles (Franco-German co-operation); and - mine-hunters (co-operation between France, Belgium and the Netherlands). The two tables below show how far European production has become diversified in comparison with that of the United States. In spite of efforts by European industries, dependence on the United States for military equipment in 1988 was 89% for Turkey, 78% for Greece, 77% for Denmark, 64% for Norway, 53% for Italy, 44% for the Netherlands and Portugal, 41% for Spain, 33% for Germany and 32% for Belgium. (i) Ground and air environment Among the areas in which harmonisation of equipment is the least developed, mention should be made of tanks, which are designed in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France but also in other countries under the responsibility of national industries. It would appear that only the latest models of the French Leclerc tank, the German Leopard 2 tank and the United States M1A1 Abrams tank have interchangeable munitions, while the new United Kingdom Challenger 2 tank will have a totally different gun system (12). TABLE 1 GB = United Kingdom; F = France; D = Germany; I = Italy; S = Sweden; E = Spain; A = Austria; CH = Switzerland; BR = Brazil; B = Belgium; NL = Netherlands. 1. The only armaments included are those effectively produced or whose assembly lines may be reactivated in the event of new orders (mainly for export). In this case, the selection criterion is presentation of the equipment for export (at shows, exhibitions, etc.). Nuclear arms are not considered (missiles, missile-launching nuclear submarines). 2. In the air sector, and contrary to European countries, the United States produces strategic bombers (B1, production of which stopped in 1989, and B2, now being produced). 3. In the naval sector, the United States produces cruisers/missile-launching destroyers (Ticonderogat and Arleigh Burke classes) and nuclear aircraft-carriers (T. Roosevelt). In these two categories, only France produces a nuclear aircraft-carrier (Charles de Gaulle). TABLE 2 F = France; GB = United Kingdom; D = Germany; I = Italy; E = Spain; BR = Brazil. 1. These aircraft are currently in the development or pre- production stage. The accompanying figures are estimates worked out in 1991-92. They are of indicative value only and will very probably be revised downwards in the coming years. * Aircraft in production for which there may still be export orders. Sources: GRIPDATA with J.P. Hebert, Strategie francaise et industrie d'armement, FEDN, Paris, pages 100-111; Military Balance 1991-92, IISS, London, 1991; The cost of peace: assessing Europe's security options, Harwood Academic Publishers, London, 1991, page 45; Jane's Defence Weekly, International Defence Review, Aviation Week and Space Technology, years 1991 and 1992; figures communicated by firms. The example of tanks also shows the importance of more concrete harmonisation of views on operational needs, which may differ, not only for purely military reasons. Thus, Germany's decision not to develop a new "2000 tank" is largely based on financial considerations and the French decision to produce the Leclerc tank is based partly on the assumption that it can be exported to third countries. While several alliance countries have started to concentrate on lighter, more mobile forces, in other regions of the world, particularly the Middle East, some countries are still modernising their heavy tanks. In the ground armaments sector, it seems particularly difficult to determine valid requirements for everyone. The IEPG's Panel I, now under Norwegian chairmanship, is responsible for harmonising operational needs, including equipment for NATO's European rapid reaction corps. According to information given by the chairmanship of the IEPG to the Technological and Aerospace Committee in Brussels on 9th February 1992, the IEPG's Panel I has about twenty projects in hand. The latest report on the activities of the IEPG, dated 7th September 1992 (13), specifies that there are twenty- one projects, of which thirteen relate to armaments or the ground-air environment(14). Among recent initiatives in the ground sector, mention should be made of the French, German and United Kingdom industries, which are trying to develop a new type of combat vehicle (modular armoured vehicle), which seems to follow on from work started in the framework of the defence ministries of the three countries with a view to agreeing on criteria for defining their requirements. On the other hand, it is not known whether the IEPG is associated with this project. In the air-ground environment, experts recognised the need for allied forces to be more mobile and there is no controversy on the matter. In the tactical transport sector, four countries - France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands - have at last reached agreement on the joint production of a new European transport helicopter, the NH-90, which should be developed by the European consortium Eurocopter and be ready for delivery as from 1998. Government financial contributions are broken down as follows: France 42.4%, Italy 26.9%, Germany 24%, the Netherlands 6.7%. The helicopter will have to be capable of carrying at least twenty troops or a combat vehicle over distances of 900 km at a speed of 280 km per hour (15). The North Atlantic Council set up NAHEMA (NATO Helicopter Management Agency) to manage this programme and, on 1st September 1992, the agency notified industry of the development contract. Development of the Italian-United Kingdom designed EH-101 helicopter received a new boost with Canada's decision to buy fifty for its armed forces 16). In the framework of efforts to improve the mobility of ground forces, there is another example of the difficulties to be overcome in defining needs, jointly at first, then taking decisions on the choice of options offered by industry and subsequently on development and, finally, producing the chosen transport equipment. In the IEPG, eight countries - Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain - with the United Kingdom having observer status negotiated for almost a year before instructing the firm Euroflag to carry out a prefeasibility study for a future large aircraft (FLA) programme, this study to be completed by the end of 1992. To meet the needs defined in the framework of the IEPG, a consortium composed of Aerospatiale, Aliena, British Aerospace, CASA and Deutsche Airbus set up the firm Euroflag SRL, which has subsequently been joined by FLABEL (Belgium), OGMA (Portugal) and TAI (Turkey). The call for tenders launched by the IEPG specifies that the new aircraft should mainly meet tactical transport needs but must at the same time be usable for strategic transport purposes. The aircraft, which should replace C-130 and C-160 aircraft in the period 2003-2011, might also be designed in a refuelling version, maritime patrol aircraft or remote surveillance and monitoring version, of the AWACS type. According to Euroflag, the planned time-limits for carrying out the project may be exceeded because of the slow decision- taking procedure in IEPG participating countries and uncertainty about the trend of defence budgets. However, when it visited the Farnborough Air Show, the committee was briefed on the progress of the prefeasibility study by Euroflag representatives, who said they were confident that the time- limits for the project would be respected, while underlining that the programme should receive more support from the governments concerned. The fact that, since 1991, the WEU Defence Representatives Group (DRG) has also been examining questions relating to strategic mobility does not seem to facilitate matters since studies are progressing very slowly and there is no news of the result of the Franco-German study requested on the subject. The slowness of this process merely increases doubt, particularly in the United Kingdom Government, about the usefulness of the Euroflag programme: the British first underline the importance of leaving to each country responsibility for defining its own needs; second, they are very anxious to remain free to seek the most economic solution which might consist either of procuring American aircraft or of using civilian aircraft or maritime transport means. In any event, they are not giving priority to this project, rationalisation being their essential aim. It is hardly conceivable that all these considerations are not also being studied in other member countries participating in the project. The main aim of prior consultations between governments concerned in the IEPG should be to study possible options from every angle before giving a mandate to industry. The committee's previous report on "Arms and equipment for a European rapid action force" (17) listed possible candidates for ensuring air transport capability and, inter alia, described the performances of the American C-17 and C-5 Galaxy project. However, it must be certain that the American transport fleet can be easily available in the event of a future crisis compelling American forces to mobilise their entire capability. The difficulties encountered by the German army in transporting heavy equipment to Turkey during the Gulf war because the United States army was incapable of providing transport aircraft should be recalled. Furthermore, the success of the Euroflag project aimed at giving Western Europe a large-capacity air transport system to meet the needs of strategic mobility tends to show that parallel co-operation between a large number of European states and industries can produce encouraging results, thus contradicting the very widespread opinion among governments that the optimum number of participants in a project is three or four. Euroflag's presentation to the Technological and Aerospace Committee of the progress of studies made a very positive impression on the committee and it would therefore like the WEU Council to pay more attention to this project than it has done so far. Some experts consider the need for long-haul air transport capability to be of such importance that they are going so far as to advocate the creation of an air transport agency. In regard to co-operation on attack and reconnaissance helicopters, there is an impressive range of national, bilateral and multilateral projects, so this means of transport and armament is not included in IEPG Panel I's list of requirements. The Franco-German consortium Eurocopter and British Aerospace have reached agreement on proposing that the British army procure the Franco-German Tiger attack helicopter (18) . Even if France were to delay bringing it into service, British interest in it might jeopardise the chances of the American AH- 64 Apache helicopter, opted for by the British army. However, the future of the German version of this project, designed as the PAH-2 anti-tank helicopter, is uncertain insofar as a massive tank attack in Europe has become increasingly unlikely. In regard to weaponry for combat helicopters, the situation has evolved since the last report by Sir Dudley Smith in that the United Kingdom Government is still interested in the long- range anti-tank missile (Trigat) project in which France and Germany are co-operating (20) . The programme for the multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) of American design, developed in co-operation with France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, is still a success although the development of the warheads is presenting a few problems. In the meantime, the French army has started to integrate the first units of this system in its arsenal. The fact that the harmonisation of equipment is proving particularly difficult because of national divergences at the stage when needs are determined seems to fully justify the large number of projects now being studied by IEPG Panel I with the very aim of facilitating harmonisation in this area. It is interesting to note that anti-tank weapons still play an important role in the work of that panel and they are the object of at least four projects, as follows: - aimed control effect anti-tank mine; - third-generation anti-tank weapon; - short-range anti-tank weapon; and - stand-off air-to-ground weapon. Where artillery is concerned, a joint 155 mm artillery weapon system and M483/864 artillery munitions are among the projects under discussion. Two air-to-ground missile systems such as Stinger and Mistral are also being studied and a low- caliber individual support weapon. Three combat vehicle projects are being studied: vehicle robotics, armoured reconnaissance vehicles and new logistic vehicles. It is difficult to pick out a system in the list of projects being studied by IEPG Panel I, but it is certain that efforts are only starting and that we are still a long way from achieving standardised or interoperable joint equipment in every branch of ground armaments. (ii) Naval and naval aviation environment Things are not easy in the naval area, particularly for submarines, where nearly all European countries, within the limits of their budgets, still build several generations of submarines themselves. It is therefore interesting to know to what extent the proposed definition of criteria for designing an advanced propulsion submarine, discussed by IEPG Panel I, will lead to joint approaches among participating states. Among national programmes, the coming into service of the Triomphant, the first French new-generation missile-launching nuclear submarine, has been delayed until July 1995 (21) , while the fate of the future German 212 conventionally-propelled submarine is uncertain. Moreover, France and Spain have started to study a joint concept of a conventionally-propelled attack submarine known as Scorpene, which might be procured by the Spanish navy and would be offered for export by both countries (22). Except for the projects relating to the coastal mine-sweeper and the combat support ship 2000, now being studied by IEPG Panel I, most naval programmes are still the responsibility of the national authorities, which co-operate in only a limited manner. However, the project for the Franco-British anti-aircraft missile-carrying frigate is taking shape, the defence ministers of the two countries having agreed to start preparatory work on the vessel, which should come into service after 2000. Italy is now showing interest in the programme and next year may decide to participate. The vessel's task will be to escort naval forces and it will be armed with a FAMS (family of anti-air missiles systems). In regard to anti-ship missiles, Franco-German co-operation to develop a new supersonic anti-ship missile system to replace the Exocet system is still encountering difficulties, particularly financial. In July 1991, France and Italy decided to develop together a light torpedo designed mainly for submarine attack, to be launched by aircraft (maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters) or by surface vessels. It can also be used by submarines. At the same time, several countries (United States, Germany and Norway; United States and United Kingdom; Germany, France, Netherlands and Italy) have started to study an anti-submarine system and an anti-torpedo defence system but no joint programmes have yet been defined. In regard to the AV-8B short or vertical take-off and landing aircraft programme, negotiations between American, Italian and Spanish industries are proving difficult because of cuts in the United States defence budget. Conversely, the development of a new generation of FSA anti- aircraft missiles planned by the EUROSAM consortium comprising the French groups Aerospatiale and Thomson-CSF and the Italian group Alenia is looking healthy, even after Spain's withdrawal, particularly as Germany is considering returning to the programme (23). In naval aviation, the IEPG's Panel I is examining requirements for a maritime patrol aircraft; in parallel, the principal European aircraft manufacturers - Alenia, British Aerospace, Casa, Dassault, DASA and Fokker - have just set up an industrial consortium Europatrol to define criteria for a maritime patrol aircraft that might equip Europe in the next century (24). It should be recalled that prefeasibility studies conducted by the Euroflag consortium on the development of a future large aircraft include the possibility of producing a maritime patrol version. (iii) Air and air defence environment While the IEPG's Panel II (25) , responsible for research and technology, in particular the EUCLID programme (European co- operation for the long term in defence), is examining inter alia the harmonisation of modular avionics, European fighter aircraft programmes continue to be developed either on a national basis or in co-operation between a small number of states: the most celebrated is the European fighter aircraft (EFA). There has been a serious threat to this quadripartite project, launched in 1988 by the German, Italian, Spanish and United Kingdom Governments, since the German Minister of Defence announced, in July 1992, that Germany would not take part in the production stage of the aircraft and might even withdraw as from the development stage. It is not yet known whether Germany will manage to convince its partners to build a lighter and far less expensive version of a fighter aircraft to replace the EFA, whether the United Kingdom Government will manage to pursue the initial project without Germany's participation but with other interested countries or whether, if necessary, the United Kingdom will proceed on its own. Without recalling here the entire history of this aircraft and all the diverging arguments about its usefulness and about the operational requirements of air defence in an international situation that has changed, it has to be noted that a definite failure of efforts to find a compromise solution would be extremely regrettable and merely increase the influence of those who doubt whether projects carried out in co-operation are more advantageous than those carried out in a purely national framework. The example of the EFA shows once again how difficult it is to co-operate successfully in such a specific area as equipment while all the countries concerned continue to work out their defence requirements on the basis of different criteria, to pursue different security policies and different industrial policies and have different economic and financial problems. In regard to equipment for fighter aircraft, the United Kingdom and France are co-operating on the development of a new radar for new-generation aircraft in which Germany is interested. According to unconfirmed information, the United Kingdom, French and German armaments directors are believed to have reached agreement on the principle of enlarging the Franco- British project to make it a trilateral programme (26). Conversely, where air-to-air missiles are concerned, the advanced short-range air-to-air missile (ASRAAM) project, initially a programme common to the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway and Canada, is in the process of being carried out by the United Kingdom alone, all the other partners having withdrawn for financial reasons. Anglo-American co-operation on the advanced medium-range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) came to an end at the end of July and in the meantime British Aerospace has started to study a new medium-range air-to-air missile project with the French and Swedish industries. In the framework of Franco-German co-operation, the two countries have concluded a protocol of agreement for studying an observation system known as Brevel based on light, pilotless stealth aircraft equipped with infrared cameras like the American drones (27) . (iv) Space For a long time, France and the United Kingdom were the only Western European countries to carry out, each on a national basis, programmes for the military use of space, particularly in the field of communications. As from 1969, the United Kingdom developed a series of communication satellites (Skynet) and, as from 1980, France developed the Syracuse system (a system of radio communication using a satellite). Other countries followed, such as Spain, with the Hispasat programme, and Italy, with the Sicral project. At the end of 1991, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain started to examine the conditions for developing a joint military satellite communication system (EUMILSACOM). It is above all in regard to earth observation that Europe has started to define the conditions for co-operation of a new type. While the development of a military observation satellite system such as Helios remains limited to co-operation between France (the initiator of the system), Italy and Spain, the decisions taken by the WEU Council in 1991: - to set up a satellite data interpretation and training centre in Torrejon (Spain); and - to instruct a consortium of space industries to conduct a feasibility study on the possibilities of setting up a European space-based observation system demonstrated the determination of member countries to bring about the conditions for institutionalised space co-operation whose quality and intensity would exceed all forms of technical co-operation hitherto seen in Europe. The success of such an audacious undertaking is still far from certain. After the first stage of the feasibility study, which comes to an end in December 1992, it will be for the WEU member countries to decide to move on to the second stage, which will last from February to October 1993. When representatives of the firm Dornier, prime contractor for the feasibility study, briefed the Technological and Aerospace Committee at the Farnborough Air Show on 9th September 1992, they were optimistic about the ability of the industrial consortium responsible for the study to carry out the planned system in spite of the technical requirements imposed, but it is not certain that all the countries taking part in the project will be prepared to bear the cost of investment, then operational expenditure and then expenditure on running the project. While the fact that about thirty European firms have agreed to share the task of establishing the system is an encouraging example for industrial co-operation, it would appear that the choice of which industry should equip the Torrejon satellite centre is causing a few problems. The official inauguration of the centre, initially planned for June 1992, has still not taken place and the decision on its equipment, expected for 8th September 1992, has not yet been taken. NATO for its part is devoting much effort to space-based observation systems, including the requirements of the observation terminals on which the NATO Communications and Information Systems Agency (NACISA) is working. Another programme in which NATO is taking part is the improved AWACS system, examined in the framework of the NATO Airborne Early-Warning Management Agency (NAPMA). Other NATO programmes such as BICES (Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems) and ACCIS (Allied Command Europe C2 Information Systems) are progressing very slowly because of their technical complexity. The "sensitive" programmes carried out in NATO often have to overcome political problems stemming either from a restrictive American attitude in respect of technological proliferation or from difficulties encountered by France in gaining access to certain programmes in view of the fact that it is not part of the military command structure. Your Rapporteur proposes not to consider nuclear or strategic weapons in the present report because of their specific nature and the limited number of European countries belonging to the "club" of nuclear powers. It will be for the committee to decide whether a special report should be devoted to the nuclear problem in the framework of a future European Union. (v) Summary The present sitution might be defined as follows: (i) there is a multitude of unco-ordinated bi-and multilateral programmes based on specific agreements between the states and industries concerned; (ii) experience and points of view diverge about the optimum number of participants for carrying out a programme; (iii) opinions are divided about whether the development of co-operative programmes is more or less expensive than purely national development; (iv) the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), the only European forum responsible for harmonising equipment since the abolition of the WEU Standing Armaments Committee (SAC) in November 1989 has, in recent years, intensified its efforts to: - harmonise requirements; - draw up a research and technology programme; and - set up progressively an open European defence equipment market,but it is not possible to see whether its activities have a direct influence on co-operation as it is now being organised between states or on decisions to develop and produce a given piece of equipment; (v) the process of collective redefinition of the threat and equipment requirements is making slow progress; (vi) in specific areas such as earth observation, co- operation has been institutionalised in WEU; (vii) all public budgets, in particular defence budgets, are tending to diminish not only because of economic difficulties but also due to the changing priorities resulting from the disappearance of the former threat; (viii) on the other hand, technical developments in all armaments sectors suggests that there will be a rise in the cost of developing new systems, particularly for space; (ix) there will be no common rules for exports of armaments outside Europe, which are now falling sharply; (x) there is no common doctrine for industrial policy (competition or co-operation?) and the responsibilities of the public authorities vis- a-vis industry. IV. Creation of a European armaments agency and the future of the IEPG --------------------------------------------- While the Twelve, by signing the Maastricht Treaty, aim to take a decisive step towards European Union, it is not surprising that they should have recalled the rather unsatisfactory state of co-operation in armaments matters. In view of its complexity and member countries' different positions, it will not be found surprising either that, instead of taking concrete decisions (e.g. the abolition of Article 223 of the Rome Treaty), the governments again sought to evade the difficulty by proposing the creation of a new body without specifying its attributions. After the momentum given by the Franco-German initiative of 14th October 1991, the nine WEU member countries mentioned in their declaration appended to the Maastricht Treaty, among the "proposals that will be examined further", "enhanced co- operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency". The Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992 gives no details on this rather timid wording in the Maastricht text. On the contrary, it sets this project in the context of the future evolution of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG): "WEU ministers welcomed the IEPG defence ministers' decision, at their Oslo meeting on 6th March 1992, to analyse the future role of the IEPG in the new European security architecture. This represents a positive development fully in line with the objective set by WEU member staes in Maastricht further to examine enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a WEU European armaments agency. WEU ministers propose that both WEU and IEPG experts analyse this issue in depth, carry out an initial examination of the role and functions of a possible European armaments agency and submit a report for consideration." It should first be recalled that the WEU Council thus followed up several WEU recommendations calling for clarification of its armaments policy, particularly after the ministers decided, on 13th November 1989, to abolish the WEU Standing Armaments Committee (SAC), a subsidiary body of the Council, set up on 7th May 1955 in application of Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the modified Brussels Treaty. It is also worth recalling that the purpose of the SAC, which was composed of representatives of WEU member countries, was to develop, in close liaison with NATO, consultations and co-operation in the armaments field with a view to finding joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in meeting their military equipment requirements by agreements or arrangements on such subjects as the development, standardisation, production and procurement of armaments concluded between all or some WEU countries and open to participation by other NATO member countries. To this end, the SAC was free to set up any subcommittees and working groups that might be required and observers from NATO might be associated with them. In the context of the examination of arrangements for a future European armaments agency, it will certainly be useful for the WEU experts who will have to contact the representatives of the IEPG to discuss this problem to take cognisance of the experience acquired by the SAC during its thirty-four years of work both in order to use it as a guide and to avoid repeating the shortcomings in the concept of the SAC and which complicated its work. However, at present the WEU Council does not give the impression that it is in any hurry to implement the Maastricht and Petersberg decisions on this subject. According to information that your Rapporteur has obtained from the Secretariat-General, the problem of the agency takes second place to the other projects WEU is to carry out with the aim of enhancing its operational role. It emerges from the speech by the Secretary-General of WEU at Chatham House, London, on 22nd September 1992, that the planned meetings between representatives of WEU and the IEPG have not taken place and it is not even known whether WEU has already decided how it will be represented on that occasion. On the IEPG side, things seem different. First of all, the WEU Assembly is gratified to have received from the Secretary- General of WEU, last September, further information about the activities of the IEPG (28), although it has to note that the Secretary-General's promise in his previous letter, dated 16th January 1991, that the presidency of the IEPG would henceforth send information letters of this type after each of its ministerial meetings has not been kept. It emerges from the last report on the activities of the IEPG that this group has inter alia enlarged its structure (29) and that, in 1991, it set up an "IEPG team" under United Kingdom chairmanship for dialogue with WEU. Also under United Kingdom chairmanship, it set up an "ad hoc group on EC/WEU matters" to examine developments in these forums with possible implications for the IEPG. Finally, at its last meeting in Oslo, the IEPG approved basic principles which should guide the discussions on a possible association between the IEPG with WEU, as follows: "1. All IEPG members should be entitled to participate fully, and with the same rights and responsibilities, in any armaments co-operation forum. 2. There should be a single European armaments co-operation forum, there should be no duplication in this field. 3. The IEPG should continue to operate until any replacement forum was to be operational. 4. Any armaments co-operation forum should take over, as starting point, the agreed policies of the IEPG and maintain existing links with NATO. 5. Armaments co-operation activities in Europe should be managed by the national armaments directors of all current IEPG members, who will be accountable to the defence ministers of those member governments. 6. The existing basic structure of the IEPG should, initially, be incorporated into any future armaments co-operation structure and the existing linkage between the IEPG and EDIG should be maintained." It should be recalled that the IEPG member countries that are not members of WEU include Norway and Turkey, which belong to NATO but not to the European Community. These two countries are invited by WEU to become associate members. Conversely, Denmark and Greece, which are also members of the IEPG, are at the same time members of NATO and of the European Community. These countries are invited to become members or observers in WEU if they so wish. The words in the Petersberg declaration that observers and associate members "will have the same rights and responsibilities as the full members for functions transferred to WEU from other fora and institutions to which they already belong" are perfectly compatible with the first principle laid down by the IEPG. Nor would there be any difficulties in respect of points 2 and 3 of the basic principles. Points 4, 5 and 6 will have to be studies carefully since they concern the fundamental question of final aims, the creation of a European armaments agency in the framework of WEU and the transfer of IEPG institutions to WEU. The question whether and to what extent the IEPG's structure and organs, in their present form, could be incorporated in the agency depends largely on the definition of the aims and tasks of the agency. In this connection, all concerned acknowledge that an attempt must be made to avoid creating new bureaucracies to carry out tasks already pursued by existing bodies. In the absence of general agreement on the tasks of the future agency, it seems that the most concrete ideas on the subject are now being worked out in France, which, in co- operation with Germany, has proposed to the other WEU countries working guidelines on which the Minister of Defence has given his views several times. Recalling the success of the European Space Agency created to accompany a great European space programme, Mr. Joxe underlined inter alia that the context was different for the European armaments agency. It would come into being at a time when the various countries were involved in co-operative programmes that were already under way. He said the agency would therefore have to prepare itself and be ready when the time came, i.e. at the time future programmes are conceived and launched. He said the agency might therefore, in a first stage, play an active role in European research policy; it might first be instructed to guide the EUCLID programme and then take responsibility for other tasks, for instance co-ordinating investment policies in testing facilities (30). In an article in Le Figaro on 9th September 1992, Mr. Joxe also included among the proposed tasks the management of co- operative programmes. It would appear that, in Germany, emphasis is also being placed on equipment production problems, while the United Kingdom is being more cautious. It is advocating a step-by-step approach, leaving all decisions, including that of recourse to the agency's services, to the discretion of member states. If the future agency is not to suffer the same fate as its predecessors, such as the SAC and the IEPG, which ran into enormous difficulties in their efforts to ensure that their work produced tangible results, i.e. the production of truly European equipment, agreement should be reached on a concept allowing past stalemates to be avoided. In regard to aims, WEU can take as a basis the four tasks defined when the IEPG was created as these are still just as topical, i.e.: - to promote effective use of resources in the areas of research, development and procurement of military equipment; - to increase standardisation and interoperability of equipment; - to safeguard an adequate industrial and technical base in Europe; and - to strengthen the European element in transatlantic relations. To date, the IEPG has hardly gone beyond the research stage, which is important but cannot be an end in itself. It is the development and subsequent procurement and production of equipment in accordance with previously-defined requirements that are essential. Now that the threat of a massive attack in Europe has disappeared and in view of uncertainty about the nature of new security risks, an attempt should be made to boost the importance of defining operational needs, and this is currently the task of the IEPG's Panel I. The panel and its various subgroups, whose activities were analysed in depth in the report presented by Mr. Wilkinson on the IEPG and WEU (31), seem to have concentrated too much on technical details and suffered from a lack of political guidelines, starting with the criteria on the basis of which operational requirements should be determined: will each member country decide on its own needs or is this the task of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole or of WEU in its enlarged form? If common criteria are to be found, either for the alliance or for WEU (depending on the breakdown of tasks between the two alliances which is still to be decided), another problem arises. Some member countries determine their military equipment needs largely in the light of the possibility of exporting to third countries, while other countries have adopted stricter legislation for limiting arms exports. The problem of harmonising export policies is even more acute when it is a matter of deciding on, developing and producing equipment jointly. It is difficult to imagine how the Twelve will manage to agree on common measures - as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty - for controlling transfers of military technology and weapons exports if Article 223 of the Rome Treaty remains in force. The German Government, answering a question put by Mr. Feldmann on 7th July 1992, states quite plainly that: "In the foreseeable future, it is not possible to count on significant harmonisation of the various national authorisation procedures in respect of exports of military equipment since several countries are not prepared to make the necessary concessions. The talks envisaged in the framework of European political co-operation have so far produced very few significant results. Nor therefore is there as yet unity at the level of consideration of end-destination controls of exports in the framework of military equipment co-operation." In the absence of common rules, member states applying the most binding regulations in respect of exports will have great difficulty in taking part in projects for the joint development and production of armaments with countries having the most lax regulations once the free market comes into force within the Community on 1st January 1993. Your Rapporteur is not advocating that the future agency be made responsible for managing arms exports. However, if equipment co-operation is not to be paralysed in the future as a result of disagreement about end-destination controls of military products in the framework of the Twelve, it is essential to seek intermediary solutions. A WEU group of experts might, for example, examine on a regular basis the legitimate defence requirements of third countries importing weapons in the light of political and military assessments by member countries. This group might draw up and publish recommendations concerning exports to certain regions. WEU member countries would follow these recommendations on a voluntary rather than a compulsory basis. If a country did not wish to follow a recommendation, it would have to consult its co-operation partner or partners, so the export in question would be ruled out if the partner or partners were opposed to it. In all the agency's areas of activity, in particular in research and development, emphasis should not be just on a more rational use of existing resources; a list should also be drawn up of the financial means necessary for Europe to remain technologically competitive and carry out the various projects now being studied. It emerges from a study presented at the second international congress on land-based armaments in Paris on 19th June 1992 that, according to an estimate for 1992, the United States is this year investing F 213 000 million in weapons research and development, compared with a total of F 63 000 million for three WEU member countries - France, Germany and the United Kingdom. All European capabilities should therefore be pooled to avoid duplication but the list of priorities should also be revised in the light of the most important requirements. Particularly worthy of attention is the work started in the framework of IEPG Panel III on creating a European defence equipment market (EDEM), intended to facilitate cross-frontier procurement and allow optimum use of member countries' defence budgets which are liable to be cut. Here, for instance, experience acquired by the IEPG should be examined in regard to the focal points set up in member countries and the publication by member countries of bulletins listing calls for bids that contain basic information on the possibilities for foreign firms to take part in national defence equipment programmes. The future agency should therefore, as the IEPG has started to do since 1991, establish close working relations with the European Community, and the Commission in particular, with a view to harmonising Europe's industrial policies. This is particularly important since Article 130 of the Maastricht Treaty - and this is an innovation - encourages the Community and member states to ensure that the conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Community's industry exist and lists a whole series of concrete measures to be taken. In view of the special situation of the defence industry, which is not subject to the authority of the Community because Article 223 of the Rome Treaty remains in force, close links between the agency and the Community are essential. Similarly, the agency will have to establish close relations with the European Defence Industries Group (EDIG), as the IEPG has hitherto done. However, it must be recalled that it will not be possible in the long run to make significant progress towards the establishment of a European defence equipment market without working out a joint defence policy, a task that is incumbent upon WEU. In regard to the transatlantic dialogue on defence equipment matters, the future agency will have to steer a middle course between those wishing to lay emphasis on the opening of the arms market in all NATO countries and those wishing to concentrate on creating a European defence equipment market. However, the example of the IEPG shows that the two approaches should be considered to be complementary, not contradictory. The close relationship between the IEPG and NATO institutions dealing with the arms trade should be maintained by the agency in a spirit of openness and compatibility. The strengthening of Europe's industrial competitiveness, far from weakening transatlantic co-operation, may on the contrary enhance it. It will be particularly important for the agency to co- operate very closely with all NATO bodies responsible for strengthening standardisation and interoperability of equipment insofar as this is a need that concerns the alliance as a whole. But the agency should set up a special working unit to examine the needs of multinational forces and, in particular, the Franco-German army corps. In regard to the structure and duties of the agency, a compromise will have to be found between two concepts since some advocate an agency with considerable authority whose responsibilities would replace those of national agencies while others wish its duties to be confined to the co-ordination of national initiatives. The IEPG deplored the fact that it cannot adopt any binding measures because it is not recognised officially by a treaty. "How can we open up one or all of our markets if we have no recourse against the protectionist attitudes of other countries? (32) " It should also be recalled that the status of the former WEU Standing Armaments Committee (SAC), based on a WEU Council decision in application of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, prevented that body too from going further than the discussion and consultation stage. Simply transferring IEPG structures to WEU would not eliminate the well-known difficulties. It would be purely symbolic. On the lines of the European Space Agency, the new body should have a minimum of legal status and a right of initiative which may, for instance, allow it to call for tenders. This would change nothing in the principle of decision-taking by governments from the moment it is the WEU ministers of defence who constitute a supervisory council. However, even the best juridical structure will not be enough if it lacks the political will of all member countries which is essential if they are to agree on a joint equipment policy. V. Conclusions ---------------- For more than forty years, expenditure on defence and military equipment in all member countries of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance has been a heavy burden on national budgets since the threat had to be met. The threat having disappeared, the Western European countries are now faced with new challenges, including the need to help the recovery of Eastern Europe and help to ensure their economic, political and social stability. The number of citizens believing that larger cuts should be made in defence budgets is steadily rising. At the same time, Europe is at a point where the risks of conflict in the world are increasing without it being possible to define their nature clearly. While Europeans wish to follow the evolution of defence technology, they have to grapple with new financial requirements that they will be able to meet only by pooling their capabilities. In the circumstances, it is unacceptable to delay the implementation of more rational, less costly European co- operation on defence equipment in the framework of the new role attributed to WEU by the Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, armaments co-operation is a means of enhancing and promoting the policy of European integration in a specific area where such integration, in spite of the possible technical difficulties, is undeniably useful. ____________________ APPENDIX I IEPG Panel I Operational requirements and equipment programmes Sub-group overview 1. Future large aircraft 2. Vehicle robotics 3. Armoured bridgelayer interoperability 4. Maritime patrol aircraft 5. 155 mm artillery weapon system 6. Aimed control effect-antitank mine 7. Third generation antitank weapon 8. Microwave landing system 9. STINGER 10. Coastal minesweeper 11. Mistral 12. Low caliber/individual/support weapon 13. M483/M864 155 mm arti ammunition dual 14. Submarine advanced propulsion 15. Armoured recce vehicles 16. Meteorological equipment 17. Simulation 18. Combat support ship 2000 19. New logistic vehicles 20. Short-range antitank weapon 21. Stand off air to ground weapons APPENDIX II IEPG Panel II List of RTPs 1. Modern radar technology 1.1 Mission related aspects 2. Silicon microelectronics 2.2 SOI technology 2.2 Interconnection assembly 2.3 Military qualification 2.5 SOI cell library 2.7 Mixed analog digital design 2.8 Very high speed A/D converters 2.9 User programmable integrated circuits 3. Composite structures 3.1 Application technology 3.2 Light ballistic optimisation 3.5 Development of technology for high temperature composite 3.6 Composites for electromagnetic windows 3.8 Naval application technology 4. Modular avionics 4.1 Modular avionics harmonisation study 5. Electric gun (dormant) 6. Artificial intelligence 6.1 Advanced work station for command and control systems 6.2 High speed pattern recognition environment 6.3 Knowledge engineering 6.4 Combinatorial algorithms for military application 7. Signature manipulation 7.3 Improvement of RCS prediction codes 7.8 Optimum shape design in electromagnetics 8. Optoelectronic devices 8.1 Affordable lightweight IR sensors 8.2 Intelligent sensors 8.3 Solid state laser sources 9. Satellite surveillance technology, including verification aspects 9.1 Technology concepts and harmonisation 9.2 High resolution optical sensor technology 9.3 Advanced space synthetic aperture radar 9.4 Real time processing and data handling 9.5 Ground segment technology 10. Underwater detection and related technologies 10.1 Low frequency underwater sound propagation 10.2 Towed array heading sensors 10.3 Hydrodynamic noise study 11. Technology in the field of human factors including simulation for training purposes 11.1 Training system concepts 11.2 Simulation techniques 11.3 Mission and/or battle simulation 11.8 Low cost simulators __________________________ 1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 2. Members of the committee: Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman); Mr. Lenzer, N ... (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Atkinson (Alternate: Sir Dudley Smith), Biefnot (Alternate: Kempinaire), Mrs. Blunck, MM. Boehm, Caccia, Colombo, Curto, Davis, Dimmer, Mrs. Francese, MM. Lagorce, Le Grand, Gnzalez-Laxe, Litherland, Menzel (Alternate: Probst), Palacios, Pocas Santos, Sarens, Savio, Sir Donald Thompson (Alternate: Alexander), MM. Tummers (Alternate: Aarts), Valleix, Verbeek, Worms. 3. Document 1292, 27th November 1991. 4. Speech at the opening sitting of the forty-fifth IHEDN session. 5. Defense News, 7th-13th September 1992. 6. Defense News, 14th-20th September 1992, page 54. 7. Defense News, 31st August-6th September 1992, page 46. 8. Paragraph II.2 of the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992. 9. Paragraph II.4 of the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992. 10. Paragraph II.6 of the Petersberg declaration of 19th June 1992. 11. See David Cooper, "Allied arms co-operation: need for a transatlantic polical strategy", NATO Review, October 1991. 12. Defense News, 29th June-5th July 1992, page 6. 13. Document 1330. 14. See list at Appendix I. 15. Le Monde, 3rd September 1992. 16. Atlantic News, No. 2447, 29th July 1992. 17. Document 1292. 18. Le Monde, 26th February 1992. 19. Document 1292. 20. Le Monde, 12th March 1992. 21. Le Monde, 17th February 1992. 22. Le Monde, 10th September 1992. 23. Le Monde, 21st July 1992. 24. Impact, La lettre du SIRPA, No. 48, September 1992. 25. See Appendix II. 26. Defense News, 7th-13th September 1992, page 72. 27. Le Monde, 12th-13th January 1992. 28. Document 1330, 7th September 1992. 29. See Appendix III. 30. Speech to the IHEDN, 13th May 1992. 31. Document 1228, 25th May 1990. 32. Briefing by General van Diest to the Technological and Aerospace Committee, Brussels. ------- For information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ | ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ | 43, avenue du President Wilson _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ | F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ | Tel 331-47235432; Fax 331-47204543 _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ | E-mail: 100315.240@Compuserve.com