a.weu/documents File: 1333cppr.nun Document 1333 30th October 1992 Parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty ______ REPORT(1) submitted on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations(2) by Mr. Nunez, Rapporteur ______ TABLE OF CONTENTS DRAFT RESOLUTION on parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM submitted by Mr. Nunez, Rapporteur I. Introduction II. Parliamentary debates in the WEU member countries (a) Belgium (b) France (c) Germany (d) Italy (e) Luxembourg (f) Netherlands (g) Portugal (h) Spain (i) United Kingdom III. Parliamentary debates in Denmark, Greece and Ireland (a) Denmark (b) Greece (c) Ireland IV. Debates in the European Parliament V. Conclusions ---------------------- Draft Resolution on parliamentary debates on security policy under the Maastricht Treaty The Assembly, (i) Noting the significant progress in the process of European political integration due to the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty concerning the definition and implementation of a common foreign and security policy; (ii) Aware of the importance of the role the Maastricht Treaty attributes to WEU, which will be required to work out and implement the union's decisions and action in the defence area; (iii) Bearing in mind the need to ensure that there is a new consensus on the one hand between the political and social forces and public opinion in the member countries of Western European Union and, on the other hand, between those countries on questions connected with security and defence policy; (iv) Aware that the definition and implementation of a common foreign and security policy is one of the most difficult challenges to be met by the European Union; (v) Regretting that, in certain countries, the public was not kept sufficiently informed of the progress of negotiations on the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht; (vi) Noting also the absence of an in-depth debate on the role of WEU and on its relations with the institutions of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance, a debate that ought to have been required by the declaration on WEU appended to the treaty, INVITES THE GOVERNMENTS OF WEU MEMBER COUNTRIES To instigate a parliamentary debate on the common foreign and security policy provided for in the Maastricht Treaty and on the role of and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance; INVITES THE PARLIAMENTS OF WEU MEMBER COUNTRIES 1. To arouse public interest in the common foreign and security policy provided for in the Maastricht Treaty, the role of WEU and its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance; 2. To strengthen their co-operation with the WEU Assembly in particular by increasing exchanges of information with it; 3. To debate in full the common foreign and security policy provided for in Maastricht, its evolution and the role of WEU as specified in the treaty, as well as relations between our organisation and the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. ------------------------ Explanatory Memorandum (submitted by Mr. Nunez, Rapporteur) I. Introduction ____________ A consequence of the radical changes that have occurred in recent years, mainly on our continent, is to bring out even more clearly the contradiction beween the economic strength of Europe, on the one hand, and its lack of political influence, on the other. Events in Yugoslavia in 1991 clearly demonstrated this shortcoming and consequently the urgency of Europe being as politically present as possible on the international stage. The European Economic Community treaties have two main goals: a common agricultural policy and the free movement of factors of production. Europe's founding fathers were indeed aware that Europe could not be built in one swoop: it had to be built progressively, creating solidarity by introducing bases of joint development. In force since 1st July 1987, the Single European Act modifying and completing the treaties setting up the European Communities has three dimensions characteristic of European integration. First, it institutionalised political co- operation and the European Council, it modified the powers and decision-taking mechanisms of the institutions and, finally, it launched new Community policies. Institutionalisation of political co-operation, introduced in 1970, and of the European Council, set up in 1974, gave European integration a framework different from the one laid down in the original treaties. The Single European Act effectively granted both institutions the same juridical and institutional status as the other Community institutions. The European Council thus became the main institution of European integration and, whereas the latter had hitherto been hinged on the Community, with the Single European Act, it was now organised round two nuclei: the Community and political co- operation. The Single European Act brought the Commission general responsibilities for applying Community regulations and strengthened the European Parliament's participation in drawing up these regulations although it was not given real legislative powers. The Council for its part was able to take certain decisions by qualified majority. This rapid reading of the Single European Act now comes to the aspects that relate to European co-operation in foreign policy matters as provided for in Title III. This is symbolically limited to laying the juridical foundations for action. By concerting and harmonising positions and taking joint action, exchanges of information and reciprocal consultations are to lead to more definite influence in external policy matters. Nevertheless, such co-operation is not binding on member countries. Finally, according to the Single European Act, greater co- operation in European security matters will make a decisive contribution to the development of a European identity in external policy and, furthermore, none of its provisions should rule out the possibility of closer co-operation between member states in security matters in the framework of Western European Union or the Atlantic Alliance. The Single European Act refers to security solely as a general strategic concept and to the political and economic aspects of security but not to its military aspects. The foundations have thus been laid and the ground covered has been neither unduly long nor as constructive as might have been wished; it is on the basis of this experience that, with Maastricht, this title has been revised, as provided for in Article 30, paragraph 12, of the Single European Act. First, the Treaty on European Union replaces political co- operation by common foreign and security policy and, although it does not formally change the responsibilities member states retain for themselves in such sensitive areas, it nevertheless implies a major qualitative step in political matters since, for the first time, these areas are integrated in the union, implicitly moving towards a full Community, even if the process has to transmit through international co-operation. The opening declaration of the Treaty on European Union says member countries are "resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world". These principles, repeated in Article B of the Common Provisions, are a reflection of the ambiguity and conditional nature to be found throughout all the articles relating to the common foreign and security policy - and in particular its security and defence aspects - which are due purely and simply to the need to reconcile the parties' different wishes and susceptibilities. Most certainly parliamentary debates may bring out differences between those who wish WEU to be half way between the Atlantic Alliance and the Union and consequently not integrated in the latter and those who believe WEU should be fully integrated in the union, even if it continues to co- operate with NATO. According to Article J, "a common foreign and security policy is hereby established" and lays down the aims of this policy and the means of attaining them. These aims, i.e. "to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the union; to strengthen the security of the union and its member states in all ways; to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Charter of Paris; to promote international co-operation; to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms", will be attained "by establishing systematic co-operation" and "implementing ... joint action in areas in which the member states have important interests in common". "Loyalty and mutual solidarity" and refraining "from any action which is contrary to the interests of the union or likely to impair its effectiveness" must be the practice in member states. "Whenever it deems necessary, the Council shall define a common position" in foreign policy and security matters which must be adopted in accordance with the unanimity rule and "member states shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions and, to this end, they "shall co- ordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences". Procedure provided for in Article J.3 for adopting joint action establishes a delicate balance between respect for national sovereignty safeguarded by the unanimity rule required to approve the principles of joint action and the ability of the Council to determine the tangible aspects of this joint action, which may be decided by qualified majority. The whole of this article shows us, once again, through the ambiguity of the text and the optional nature of its provisions, the reservations, reticence and resistance of certain signatories vis-a-vis any deepening that involves more decision-taking in common foreign and security policy matters. Article J.4, after referring to "the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence", goes on to say that "the union requests Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements". It is immediately specified that decisions and actions are to be governed by the unanimity rule, that the defence policy will "not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states and ... respect the obligations of certain member states under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework". Finally, it is underlined that none of the provisions of the article will "prevent the development of closer co-operation between two or more member states on a bilateral level, in the framework of WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such co-operation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this title". Articles J.5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 subsequently specify that "the presidency shall represent the union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy" and be responsible "for the implementation of common measures". The presidency is to consult the European Parliament on these matters and ensure that its views are taken into consideration. "The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy" and on this basis the Council is to define and implement common foreign and security policy. Finally, "the Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field". The WEU member countries endorsed two non-binding declarations appended to the Maastricht Treaty that are directly and specifically linked with Title V of the Treaty on European Union. These declaration specify the nature of WEU's participation in European defence policy and its relations with the European Union and NATO. They refer to the accession of new members. The first declaration, on "the role of Western European Union and its relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance", refers to the agreement of WEU member states "on the need to develop a genuine European security and defence identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters" and adds that "this identity will be pursued through a gradual process". "WEU", continues the declaration, "will be developed as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defence policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role." The tightening of links between WEU and the European Union will be encouraged mainly by "the synchronisation of the dates and venues of meetings and harmonisation of working methods, establishment of close co-operation between the Council and Secretariat-General of WEU on the one hand and the Council of the union and General Secretariat of the Council on the other", harmonisation of the respective presidencies, ensuring that the Commission is regularly informed and consulted and, finally, "encouragement of closer co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament", a subject that will be tackled below. On relations between WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, the declaration states that "the objective is to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance". Transparency and complementarity are to be the basis of the development of a closer relationship, still with a view to strengthening "the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU member states in the alliance". In regard to the operational role of WEU, provision is made for defining "appropriate missions, structures and means covering ... [a] WEU planning cell, closer military co-operation complementary to the alliance ..., meetings of WEU chiefs of defence staff" and "military units answerable to WEU". "Creating a European armaments agency" and "development of the WEU Institute into a European security and defence academy" are also envisaged in the declaration, which also provides for the transfer of the seat of the organisation to Brussels. The second declaration contains an invitation to join WEU ("on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty") to countries which, although members of the European Union, are not yet members of WEU. Furthermore, other European states members of NATO may become associate members of WEU, thus playing a full part in its activities. Hence it is these points, referred to briefly above, that should be the subject of the parliamentary debates that are considered in the next chapter. Logically and fortunately, these debates have already been extended to the public and to organisations and institutions directly affected by common external and security policy. From these debates, a clearer definition should emerge of aims that are - as they should be - ambitious and means that will have to be really functional to enable them to be attained. These, too, will be better understood thanks to these debates. Referring to the Treaty on European Union, a Spanish diplomat recently affirmed that the timidity and slowness of the steps now being taken in reality concealed the fact that it was a giant stride forward. Whatever the strength of their impact may be, steps have been taken and perhaps the virtue of patience, as shown by Robert Schuman, thus explaining his obstinate optimism in undertaking the building of Europe, has already, for the time being at least, already produced its final and, it is to be hoped, irreversible, results. Parliamentary debates in the various Community countries will probably remove the shadows that still remain. II. Parliamentary debates in WEU member countries _____________________________________________ (a) Belgium ------- In Belgium, procedure for parliamentary ratification of the Treaty on European Union provides that the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate must approve a bill bringing into force the treaty, its protocols, the final act and the appended declarations. Furthermore, the councils of the communities (i.e. the Vlaase Raad, the Conseil de la Communaute francaise and the Rat der deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft) must also approve the treaty since some of the matters covered by it affect areas such as international co-operation and the conclusion of treaties, which are within the purview of the three communities (Flemish-, French- and German-speaking). The communities' international responsibilities include cultural and educational matters and certain aspects of health and welfare. For the same reason, the United Assembly of the Joint Community Commission, which exercises community responsibilities in the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital, also has to approve the treaty "for matters which concern it". Ratification of the treaty also means modifying the Belgian Constitution in respect of the right to vote and to stand as a candidate of citizens of other countries of the union resident in Belgium. The State Council considers the constitution should be revised before the treaty is ratified but the government overruled this opinion, considering that Article 8b of the Treaty on European Union was not for immediate application and that, consequently, the constitution could be modified before the article in question came into force. The government also considered that, since international law takes priority over internal law in Belgium, ratification of the treaty in itself implied acceptance of the rights provided for in Article 8b. In June and July 1992, the External Relations Committee held a total of seven meetings to examine and discuss the bill on the Treaty on European Union. At the close of this series of meetings, a committee report was approved and transmitted to the Chamber of Representatives for debate and vote. This report quoted Mr. Claes, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who recognised that foreign policy had evolved little compared with what had been provided for in the Single Act, unlike defence policy, which he thought had made considerable progress. As he said, it was the first time since 1955 that a European text mentioned defence. The union would not merely define a joint security policy; in future, it would also move towards joint defence. He believed it would be necessary, in 1996, to revise provisions relating to security policy since application of the decisions taken was raising questions, in particular about the definition of a joint security policy at military level and the effectiveness of the decision-taking process adopted. He underlined that successes in this area had not been scored prior to the Maastricht summit meeting but were a result of it. In the general debate that started in the Chamber of Representatives on 14th July, Mr. Van Dienderen of the AGALEV- ECOLO parliamentary group expressed the opposition of the greens to the Maastricht Treaty, particularly because nuclear war remained a possibility within the context of the treaty. He believed Europe, through WEU, could behave like a formidable nuclear power. Furthermore, apart from humanitarian assistance, the creation of WEU rapid action forces was intended to safeguard our economic situation vis-a-vis countries producing raw materials, thus maintaining an unfair division of wealth. Mr. Annemans of the Vlaams Blok, the Flemish group that is also opposed to ratification, believed no progress had been made in common foreign and security policy; the status quo ante had been perpetuated which, he thought, prevented the adoption of flexible, energetic action. Mrs. Spaak of the Front democratique des francophones, in favour of ratification, endorsed the Lisbon declaration on common foreign and security policy which she considered to be a considerable improvement on political co-operation because of the common action envisaged. The co-operation between the CSCE, NATO and WEU that had been decided in Helsinki was a practical example of this and showed, according to Mrs. Spaak, that the European security architecture was capable of working with due respect for the principles of co-operation and openness. Mr. Van der Maelen of the Socialistische Partij considered common foreign and security policy revealed one of the treaty's shortcomings: it was not included in Community structures and was subject neither to serious parliamentary control nor to scrutiny by the European Court of Justice, thus increasing the democratic deficit. Mrs. T'Serclaes of the Parti social chretien spoke in similar terms; she said the pillared structure of the treaty left foreign and defence policy outside the field of application of Community regulations. Mr. Matagne of the Front national was in favour of transferring sovereignty to the European Union in areas such as foreign policy but added that his party was insisting on a referendum on the treaty. Although the Front national was in favour of European unification, the presence of other negative elements in the text led him to abstain when the vote was taken. All these speeches were made in the general debate preceding the debate on the various articles. When dealing more specifically with common foreign and security policy, the Rapporteur, Mr. De Decker, first declared that Maastricht gave the European Union instruments that would allow it to assert its own identity in future. The process was thus under way. It would be re-examined in 1996 in the light of progress and experience. During the last forty years, European unification had made war impossible between its members and twelve-power Europe had become the main factor of stability on the continent. Mr. De Decker considered this to be its great merit and he also underlined that procedure agreed upon for defining common positions that should lead to further joint action would not be as effective as had been intended. He thought the twofold rule of unanimity and qualified majority would undeniably be a handicap to the implementation of a common foreign policy. Mr. De Decker also referred to the task assigned to WEU by the Maastricht Treaty and the measures agreed upon to enhance its operational role. In this connection, he mentioned the transfer of the Secretariat-General to Brussels, the setting up of the planning cell, co-operation with the alliance, the meetings of WEU chiefs of defence staff and the formation of military units under the aegis of WEU. In relation to the latter decision, he said the creation of the Franco-German army corps might be the nucleus of the future European army. Our colleague Mr. Kempinaire of the Parti de la liberte et du progres spoke of the need for the European Community to have a coherent, operational instrument to draw up guidelines for the political and military aspects of European policy. He said Maastricht had restored the balance between economy and security in the framework of the European Community. Nevertheless, he expressed concern at the gap separating the political world and the people and his fellow citizens' ignorance of Maastricht, due partly to the difficulty of understanding the text of the treaty. He therefore called for a clear, intelligible information campaign to reduce the gap between citizens and politicians. On 17th July 1992, the Chamber passed the bill ratifying the Treaty on European Union by 146 votes to 33 with 3 abstentions. The ratification process, which is still under way at the time of writing, will be completed in October or November in the Senate, the Community Councils and the Assembly of Brussels- Capital. (b) France ------ On 11th March 1992, the President of the Republic submitted the Treaty on European Union to the Constitutional Council, thus initiating the process leading up to its ratification by parliament by 31st December of this year. On 9th April, the Constitutional Council decided that authorisation to ratify the Treaty on European Union by law could be given only after revision of the constitution. There were very precise reasons justifying the decision taken by the Constitutional Council: these were voting rights for foreigners (nationals of other Community countries), the single currency and Community policy towards third countries in respect of visas. The Constitutional Bill adding a new chapter on the European Communities and European Union to the constitution was passed by the National Assembly on 12th May after a first reading and then examined and amended by the Senate in June. The National Assembly passed it without amendment after a second reading and the President of the Republic then convened parliament in congress (in accordance with one of the methods of revising the constitution) at the chateau of Versailles on 23rd June. Of the 665 votes cast, 592 were in favour of adopting the constitutional reform required by the treaty (the majority needed being three-fifths, i.e. 399 votes) and 73 against. Most Socialist Party and UDF members and the Union des republicains et independants, the Rassemblement des democrates europeeens, the Union centriste and the Union du Centre voted for, the Communist Party against and the RPR was absent when the vote was taken, having left the sitting immediately after it was opened. The constitutional reform was therefore approved and opened the way to ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. In the midst of the trouble caused by the result of the Danish referendum, the President of the Republic decided to submit ratification of the treaty to referendum, thus triggering off an intense, impassioned debate in the country that divided parties and public opinion and kept European governments and citizens in suspense until the evening of 20th September. The referendum thus placed the fate of European political and monetary union in France's hands, a fact of which those for and against the treaty were well aware. Before examining the various positions adopted by the parties and some of their leading members, your Rapporteur thought it useful to analyse the information reports on the Treaty on European Union prepared in the National Assembly and the Senate by their delegations to the European Communities. The National Assembly's report saw an improvement in the chapter on common foreign and security policy and considered that, while more modest than expected, it would produce a mobilising, dynamic movement. According to this report, progress in defence matters, unthinkable a few years earlier, was due to the Gulf war. The report also indicated that the plan submitted in Maastricht on the basis of a text by the Luxembourg presidency provided that the area of application of foreign policy would be defined unanimously, while methods of application would be decided by a majority. However, the text approved in Maastricht increases the use of unanimity for the principles and form of common action while, under the terms of the treaty, the practical content of such action would be subject to qualified majority voting. The report considered that the practice followed at meetings of the Council of ministers for foreign affairs would be decisive: would unanimous decision-taking continue or would there be an evolution so that minority countries would resign themselves to endorsing a joint decision? Where European defence was concerned, the treaty contained the first signs of such a movement; although no directly applicable measure had been taken, there had been a move towards developing co- operation between WEU and the European Union. Finally, the document underlined that common foreign and security policy was set in an intergovernmental rather than Community framework and that the Commission played no part and was merely fully associated with such work. On the European Parliament, as well as the provisions already provided for by political co- operation, there were consultations by the presidency on the principal aspects of foreign policy and the possibility of putting questions, making recommendations and holding an annual debate. Furthermore, the National Assembly delegation for the European Communities, at a joint meeting with the Foreign Affairs Committee on 22nd April 1992, was addressed by Mr. Klepsch, President of the European Parliament. On common security policy, he believed the forthcoming deadline for the WEU treaty would provide an opportunity to define and complete it; moreover, the neutrality of certain present or future member states of the Community was not, he thought, an obstacle to the definition of such a policy. Finally, he said he was in favour of holding joint meetings between the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the European Parliament and the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly. Your Rapporteur does not quite see the point of holding such meetings with a body which, according to a questionable statement by Mr. Klepsch, is destined to disappear in the near future particularly if, as he said, this would facilitate a more precise definition and a deepening of common security policy. Where the Senate report is concerned, Mr. Guena, Rapporteur, underlined the approximate nature of the text and subsequent difficulty of interpreting it. He thought the treaty also bore the mark of suspicion of national policies. Common foreign and security policy being a particularly changing area, the procedure laid down was cumbersome and hence liable to hamper action. The unanimity rule might lead governments to decide action on the basis of the lowest common denominator existing between states. Mr. Guena was also astonished that compatibility with the strategy of the Atlantic Alliance was specifically stipulated in such an institutional treaty that included an affirmation of the identity of the European Union on the international stage. In regard to the Commission's power to make proposals in this area, Mr. Poniatowski recalled that it had been opposed to intervention in Iraq; the senator believed acts of war were the responsibility of governments and not of the Commission. The Rapporteur, too, was surprised at this recognition of the Commission's power to make proposals but considered the latter would probably carry less weight vis-a-vis the heads of state and of government. To return to the vast national debate stemming from the calling of a referendum, in the ranks of the Socialist Party, there was not complete unanimity. Mr. Chevenement, former Minister of Defence, said he had scruples about the Maastricht agreements and this prevented him supporting the government position. He believed the treaty, far from being a step forward, was on the contrary a move backwards since the cold war was over; moreover, it would lead to a two-speed Community and a three-speed Europe. Max Gallo, a Socialist member of the European Parliament, adopted a similar position and rejected the theory that what was right for Germany was right for Europe and what was right for Europe was right for France. The President of the Republic, who had described France as the driving force of Europe, said that if the "Noes" won it would put an end to forty-five years of French foreign policy; it would stop the building of Europe and it would also destroy everything the Community had done to date. Mr. Mitterrand tried to remove any links between the referendum and a personal plebiscite, but many of those in favour of voting "No" had been unable to avoid this latent link. The President considered the treaty to be confederal with states remaining states and entrusting to the Community the role of settling a number of problems. He thought a move to federalism would be an unduly hasty step for Europe. The President affirmed that the Single European Act by which it had been decided to abolish frontiers and internal barriers would have deprived us of means of ensuring our own security had it not been completed by the relevant provisions adopted in Maastricht. The referendum was called because there was a wish to change a spontaneous but vague pro-European feeling into reasoned, lasting accession. Moreover, the President of the Republic believed the referendum would make it necessary to remedy part of the public's lack of information and the lack of interest of others. The Prime Minister affirmed that, in defence and security matters, France would be stronger with its partners than on its own. Mr. Beregovoy made the following statement at the opening of the forty-fifth session of the Institut des hautes etudes de defense nationale: "Defence is at the heart of state sovereignty. Whatever may have been heard in certain quarters, it is not true that the Maastricht Treaty, by including security among European ambitions, calls in question state sovereignty. The truth is quite the opposite. On the contrary, the treaty shows that Europe is walking on two feet: while pursuing economic integration it is adding political co-operation between member states, particularly in security matters, responsibility for which it assigns not to an administrative body but to intergovernmental institutions, democratically answerable to their respective peoples and supervised by the national parliaments. Sovereignty is intact, while co-operation increases strength." Mr. Giscard d'Estaing for his part conducted a convincing campaign in favour of a "Yes" vote, his first argument being the maintenance of peace. On the left, some advocates of a "No" vote held that the Europe of Maastricht was the liberal Europe of Giscard. The latter has never concealed his satisfaction at this comparison. He was certainly one of the main winners in a referendum that he considered dangerous because of the unpopularity of the person who called for it. In the RPR, the organisation of a referendum opened a wide split between those for and against the treaty. The former included Mr. Chirac, for whom a "No" victory would mean the collapse of Europe, and the latter included Mr. Pasqua, former Minister of the Interior, for whom Europe should be built on states and peoples and not on risky federalist theories like those of Maastricht, and Mr. Seguin, former Minister for Social Affairs, who, in a debate with the President of the Republic, made national sovereignty a decisive aspect of his position. The Communist Party, consistently following its traditional line, advocated voting "No" in the referendum. Mr. Marchais asserted that the treaty bore the mark of Germany and that its economic and monetary provisions alone justified a negative vote; then there was the federal trend which would lead to the abdication of a large part of national sovereignty. The personality of General de Gaulle was also recalled during the referendum campaign, both by those in favour of voting "No", such as the General's son, Admiral Philippe de Gaulle, a senator, who had no doubt whatsoever that his father would have voted "No", and by those in favour of a "Yes" vote, such as Mr. Chaban-Delmas, former Prime Minister, who said Mr. Pasqua and Mr. Seguin, both members of his party, had understood nothing about the General's way of thinking. General Maurice Schmitt, who was army chief of staff from 1987 to 1991, wondered whether the treaty involved France's independence and whether its provisions might improve the conditions in which peace and freedom in France were guaranteed and its interests defended. General Schmitt thought there was nothing in the treaty that might hinder French policy or create more commitments than those that had been freely entered into when the Brussels and Washington Treaties were signed. Conversely, he thought the Maastricht Treaty offered an opportunity to build a solid European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance that France had wanted for so long. The General added that, in this way, the weight and responsibilities of Europeans in the alliance would be increased as they were going to have to take account of many new problems relating to their security and the protection of Europe's interests. Finally, after affirming that Europe must unite to be certain of ensuring its security and defence, the General concluded that nothing in the treaty created new commitments for France or limited its freedom of action; on the contrary, the treaty provisions would strengthen the security of Europe and hence of France. When the referendum was called, about 60% of the electorate intended to vote "Yes" but this percentage fell steadily until it almost equalled the percentage that would vote "No". The latter drew ahead at the beginning of the campaign on 7th September. The final result, 51% for and 49% against, meant the victory, however slight, of "the most French idea that has ever existed", to quote Jean Daniel, Director of Le Nouvel Observateur. The result of the French referendum is probably a key factor in general thinking on the future of the European Union. While the "Yes" victory suggests that the lines laid down in Maastricht are still largely valid, it is nevertheless impossible to ignore the high percentage of "no" votes. If forgotten, this would lead to public opinion being distanced from the building of Europe; this danger is moreover a threat in France and also in the other Community countries. Most of the lessons that can be drawn from this referendum are applicable to the rest of the Community: your Rapporteur will therefore return to this point in his general conclusions, where he will analyse them in greater detail. The French people's approval of the Treaty on European Union in the referendum brought the ratification process to a conclusion. (c) Germany ------- Procedure for ratifying the Treaty on European Union relates to two bills. The first is the bill on the ratification of the treaty proper, creating the necessary conditions for the Treaty on European Union to come into force. In view of the fact that the Treaty on European Union contains provisions which, to be applicable at national level, require a change in the Basic Law (constitution), the Federal Government tabled a second, parallel bill modifying the Basic law. The latter bill provides for the modification of Article 28 by adding a phrase to the effect that, when local elections are held, the nationals of a member state of the European Community also, in accordance with European Community law, have the right to vote and stand for election and of Article 88 on the European central bank, together with the inclusion of an article on Europe making provision inter alia for extending the Bundesrat's right to take part when sovereign rights are transferred to the Community and confirming European integration as an aim of the state. Under this proposed new article (Article 23.2, laying down that the Bundestag and, through the intermediary of the Bundesrat, the Laender will take part in examining matters relating to the European Union, and Article 23.4, laying down that if a matter that is the excluive responsibility of the federation affects the interests of the Laender and in all cases where the federation has the right to legislate, the Federal Government will ask the Bundesrat for its opinion), the Bundesrat, the chamber that represents theLaender, will have to be consulted on each transfer of national sovereignty to the Community, including areas outside the purview of the Laender. It should be added that the Laender have adopted a reticent approach to the ratification of the treatyainly because they think there is a lack of clarity in regard to the application of subsidiarity to attributions at national and Land level. For instance, the parliament of Rheinland-North Westphalia, in a resolution on the result of the European Council meeting in Maastricht, while recognising the complexity of the negotiations and the ensuing obligation to reach compromises, considered the result obtained fell far short of what the Laender wanted. To this end, the parliament in question ecalled a resolution that it approved in 1990 calling for the union to have a federal structure and a detailed declaration concerning the breakdown of responsibilities with a view to enhancing the role of the regions in Europe. The proposed constitutional reform, moreover, reflects the Laender's proposals on extending their rights to participate when sovereign rights are transferred to the Community and guaranteeing Germany's rights in the Council through the presence of a representative ofthe Laender appointed by the Bundesrat. The Basic Law might also be amended by the creation of a Committee on European Union that would be better able to guarantee the Bundestag's right to be kept informed and its participation in European affais than has hitherto been the case. Consideration is also being given to the possibility of allowing the Bundestag, in exchange for major transfers of responsibility to the Federal Government in European affairs, to have increased rights to receive information and to participate. On 21st July, the Federal Government adopted unanimously the bill on the ratification of the Treaty on European Union and the related bills on constitutional law. Germany thus started the procedure for ratifying the treaty. Both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have to approve the treaty. Any law modifying the constitution has, moreover, to be approved by two-thirds of the members of both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, while, for the law ratifying the treaty a simple majority in both houses is sufficient. Chancellor Kohl described the ratification of the Maastricht agreements as by far the most important bill of the current legislature. He thought the European Community would thus be completed by an economic and monetary union, major common foreign policy provisions and joint procedure for certain specific areas relating to internal policy. The Chancellor said the European monetary union would set up an independent European central bank on the lines of the Bundesbank so that German political interests relating to stability would continue to be guaranteed in full. The Bundesrat gave its opinion on 25th September 1992. While declaring itself on the whole in favour of the Maastricht Treaty, it nevertheless made its approval subject to a few conditions. For instance, it asked that the Bundestag and the Bundesrat be consulted before moving on to the third stage of the European economic and monetary union. In regard to the adaptation of Article 104e of the treaty setting up the European Community (budgetary discipline), the Bundesrat insisted that the Laender be able to intervene in the framework of existing co- ordination instruments (financial planning council); it lso insisted that the government clarify and enter into commitments vis-a-vis the composition of the regional committee that had just been set up, and more specifically on the participation of representatives of the Laender in the Council of the Commnity. On 1st October 1992, the Federal Government placed these two bills before the Bundestag, accompanied by the opinion of the Bundesrat, itself accompanied by the government's opinion on it. The first reading in plenary sitting of the Bundestag was planned for 8th October 1992. The committee competent to examine the bill amending the constitution is the Juridical Committee of the Bundestag; in regard to the bill on the ratification of the treaty, the competent committee has not yet been named (Foreign Affairs Committee or Committee on European Community Affairs). Both bills will then have to be passed by the Bundestag at the latest during the plenary session to be held from 7th to 11th December 1992. Finally, the vote in the Bundesrat is planned for 18th December 1992. Since the major political groups in the Bundestag are in favour of the early ratification of the Maastricht Treaty -as confirmed on 25th September 1992 by a government declaration followed by a debate on the future of Europe - the two bills should be passed as planned by the Bundestag before the end of the year. During the abovementioned debate, the SPD and Buendnis 90/Gruene Groups asked that a referendum be held on the Maastricht Treaty. Even if the majority of the political parties agreed (although there does not seem to be a majority at present), the request tabled by the two political groups would be out of order since the Basic Law, in its present form, would not allow a referendum on the Mastricht Treaty. (As indicated above, constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in both houses.) However this may be, opinion polls conducted in Germany all reveal that, in the hypothetical event of a referendum, there would be a majority of more than 50% in favour. The German public followed the campaign for the referendum in France with remarkable interest, including the televised debate between the President of the Republic and Mr. Seguin in which Chancellor Kohl took part. This debate satisfied the media and public opinion because it was not centred on the fears and apprehensions aroused by the spectre of greater Germany. The Chancellor himself thought the establishment of the European Union was the best way of allaying these fears and linking his country firmly with Western Europe. Moreover, because of the federal structure of Germany, the evolution of the European Community towards what some may consider to be a federal European Union is perceived by the Germans as a natural process. Germany is not afraid of losing its identity in the future union; the most it may fear is that it will lose its Mark. The principal German parties, the government coalition and the SPD agree that European integration is the proper response to German unity or, to quote Adenauer, that the achievement of German unity is possible only within European unity. (d) Italy ----- On 17th September 1992, the Italian Senate passed the Bill on the treaty on European Union with the seventeen protocols and thirty-three declarations contained in the Final Act. The Senate Foreign Affairs and Emigration Committee discussed the Maastricht text at three meetings on 3rd, 8th and 14th September. At the first of these meetings, the Rapporteur, Mr. Orsini, said the political development of European integration was quite clear in the definition of a common foreign and security policy and in the hint of j said that, in spite of the treaty's limits, it was quite certain that, after Maastricht, Europe could and should speak with a single voice on the world stage. He considered the common foreign and security policy to be so significant that it would have to lead to a decisive change in relations between European peoples and states. He concluded that all these factors constituted real progress towards a federal-type European Union. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Colombo, underlined that the treaty was perfectly coherent with the evolution of the building of Europe in view of the new circumstances prevailing on the continent since 1989. The Minister added that the treaty was a stabilising factor in face of a disintegrating situation and also wondered what agreement could replace it and when in the event of the treaty not being ratified. Mr. Colombo recalled the experience of the fifties, when the EDC was not ratified. Senator Staglieno of the Northern League, announced that his group was in favour of ratification because of its European, federalist leanings, but he admitted his perplexity at the wish to pursue the process after the unfavourable result of the Danish referendum. Senator Benvenuti (PDS) expressed his group's support for the treaty. In view of the revival of nationalism, or even racism, in certain countries, early ratification was required in response to the disturbing signs of this cultural and political development. Senator Arduino Agnelli regretted that not all the aims previously proposed by the Italian Parliament had been included in the treaty: he referred in particular to the lack of a real federal framework, which most Italian political forces wanted. For Senator Vittorino Colombo, the end of bipolarisation had given rise to a polycentric structure grouping, on the one hand, the United States, Canada and Mexico and, on the other hand, Japan and South-East Asia. Europe should therefore be made the third pillar of that structure. In this context, the senator thought the security and defence policy embodied in the Treaty on European Union was inadequate. Meeting on 16th September, the Defence Committee also discussed the bill: several senators expressed their discontent at not having had enough time to analyse the text. The same complaint was made in the Foreign Affairs Committee and then in plenary sitting in the Senate. The Republics, the PDS, MSI and the Northern League believed Mr. Amato's cabinet had tried to take advantage of the date of the French referendum so that the Senate would ratify the treaty as a matter of urgency, thus giving a sign of support for advocates of the "Yes" in France. Mr. Cappuzzo, Vice-Chairman of the Committee, said the horizon had been darkened by the emergence of phenomena of regression, including separatist tendencies that might lead to nationalisation of defence policies. If this tendency were confirmed, the presence of two member countries with nuclear weapons plus Germany's economic expansionism would contribute to the revival of hegemonic leanings in complete contradiction with the European ideal. However, Mr. Cappuzzo thought the treaty could effectively counter such tendencies. The Vice-Chairman added that the Franco-German agreement on a joint army corps in part reflects this search for hegemony. Senator Zamberletti recalled that WEU had been formed for a priority aim, i.e. to control possible German rearmament, while today, with the Maastricht Treaty, it was on the point of becoming an instrument supporting Germany. He said it could not be forgotten that two Community countries, France and Germany, had strategic weapons and that the treaty did not say whether the nuclear component would or would not be taken into account when working out the model of joint defence. The parliamentary Assembly of WEU must not overlook this aspect. Closing the committee meeting, Mr. Cappuzzo regretted that it had been so short and added that the questions raised might be dealt with during a subsequent discussion on the defence model that should be brought about by the innovations adopted in Maastricht in this area. During the debate in the Senate in plenary sitting, the majority Rapporteur, Mr. Orsini, started his address by declaring that the treaty did not pave the way for the United States of Europe, an idea for which some Italian political and cultural forces had fought for a long time. Nevertheless, the treaty introduced European integration with sufficient supranational institutions, standards and powers to guide the Community towards a common destiny. From Maastricht onwards, the Twelve would have to speak with a single voice on the international stage and adopt similar positions. Mr. Orsini added that, fifty years after the collapse of the EDC, there were signs not merely of the possibility of joint defence but a real prospect, involving complex procedures and obstacles that would have to be overcome. Mr. Vinci, minority Rapporteur, a member of the Rifondazione Comunista Group, described the treaty as anti-social, anti- democratic, militarist and hostile to the developing world. He said that, for the benefit of the European Union, Maastricht had taken over WEU's offensive-type military system in tune with NATO, opposed to the Warsaw Pact countries and now converted to act as a police force in current and future crises in the third world and Central and Eastern Europe in order to protect the economic, political and strategic interests of the principal Western European countries. Mr. Pozzo, also a minority Rapporteur and a member of the MSI national right-wing group, underlined the lack of information given to public opinion on the treaty, a subject which the major media organs themselves had not gone into. He then regretted the speed with which the debate in the Senate had been held on the pretext that reasons of state made ratification prior to the French referendum essential at any cost. Mr. Pozzo also referred to the loss of national sovereignty that would ensue from the treaty which he thought could not be ratified without prior modification of the constitution. Senator Acquarone answered the last speaker that the Italian constitution favoured European integration and consequently contained nothing that might prevent ratification of the treaty. Speaking of defence policy, Mr. Migone (PDS) held that the fall of the Berlin wall had removed NATO's raison d'etre and that nothing therefore stood in the way of Europe's right and duty to have its own defence with the aim of security and legitimate defence in conformity with the provisions of the Italian constitution. Senator Molinari of the Rifondazione Comunista Group, said the security policy foreseen in the treaty was an essential military policy whose main aim was to defend Europe against the third and fourth world. As compared with the treaty, the speaker described his group's concept of security based on disarmament, pacifism and co-operation with other nations. Senator De Matteo (Christian Democrat), although in favour of ratification, expressed doubt about the seriousness of the procedure laid down for joint action and its implementation. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Colombo, affirmed that WEU, which was the security arm of the European organisation, pursued no offensive aims, contrary to what had been said earlier. The Minister added that foreign and defence policy should be the true, authentic sign of the move to political union. He considered foreign policy had without any doubt come within the purview of the Community but that it would be implemented partly in accordance with the principle of co- operation and partly in accordance with that of integration. This way of operating would not be sufficient to solve or help to solve crises in Europe and outside, he said, referring specifically to the Balkans and the Middle East. In the final vote, the Senate passed the bill on ratification by 176 votes to 16 with 1 abstention (the necessary majority being 96). Opinion polls conducted in Italy had always given a high percentage for those in favour of ratification: over 70%. Nevertheless, the possibility of calling a referendum did not exist since the Italian constitution allowed referenda only by special derogation and on internal policy matters. On 29th October 1992, the Chamber of Deputies approved the Treaty on European Union by 403 votes to 46 with 18 abstentions. (e) Luxembourg ---------- The Luxembourg Parliament was the first to ratify the Treaty on European Union. On 26th May 1992, the State Council expressed its opinion that the treaty should be approved by a bill passed by qualified majority of three-quarters of the Chamber in view of the fact that, as a result of this treaty, the exercise of attributions assigned by the Constitution to the legislative, executive and judiciary authorities devolves temporarily upon institutions under international law. The State Council also considered that Article 8b.1 of the treaty meant amending the Constitution, although this did not have to precede ratification. It should be recalled that Luxembourg has a total population of 400 000 and that about 100 000 nationals of other Community countries live there. In respect of the chapter on common foreign and security policy, the State Council also said that the planned process would be unable to attain its aims without there first being effective political determination. Finally, the State Council approved the broad lines of this essential chapter of the treaty insofar as it was to make the Community a more influential and active actor on the international stage. The special Maastricht Treaty Committee, whose members include Mrs. Err, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette and Mr. Goerens, all members of the WEU Assembly, submited its report on 24th June 1992. This report, together with the assessment of provisions concerning common foreign and security policy, underlined, among the principal innovations in the treaty, the concept of joint action and the Commission's right of initiative that it did not have in the framework of political co-operation. Moreover, the report regretted the lack of precision in the definition of areas in which joint action might be envisaged, the fact that the European Parliament was not associated with common foreign and security policy other than to express its opinion and that the Court of Justice of the Communities had no competence in this matter, thus revealing the democratic deficit that was characteristic of this sector. The report affirmed that the European defence identity would be the result of an evolutive process and that the intergovernmental structure - to take a particularly sensitive area that is a matter for national sovereignty - was explicable during a transitional period. Finally, the report found it particularly regrettable that no serious progress had been made for controlling the arms trade. In his speech to the Chamber of Deputies, meeting to ratify the bill on the Treaty on European Union, the Prime Minister, Mr. Santer, referred to the end of the empire that had separated Europe into two parts: its fall had released many forces, some dynamic but others harmful, and it was therefore necessary to find a new balance for Europe. Mr. Santer said we were currently passing through a period of uncertainty rather than certainty: close to home, it must be ensured that Germany was firmly set within a union of states with equal rights and duties. He said the fall of the Berlin wall, reunification and the growing power of Luxembourg's neighbour had raised many questions. He believed that development of political integration in our countries, on a basis of equality, provided the answer to these questions and was the best way to ward off reductive nationalism whose effects mught be devastating. The Prime Minister thought the economic and monetary union would not last without political union. Europe must therefore be an economic power with political personality, capable of gathering together its resources and defending its own interests: for this purpose, it should set priorities, define objectives and have the ability to attain them. These means of action were provided for in the Treaty on European Union through common foreign and security policy, which he said was a decisive step on the way to a single foreign and security policy. Mr. Santer stressed that, for the first time, majority decision-taking was being introduced for carrying out joint action and he considered this to be modest but real progress. Joint actions could be implemented in areas relating to the CSCE process, disarmament policy and nuclear non-proliferation as well as the economic aspects of security. The Prime Minister concluded the part of his speech devoted to common foreign and security policy by saying that Luxembourg's security could no longer be ensured except within a wider entity. He said history had shown us that, by trying to play the national card or the card of neutrality, his country lost at every level. As the text of the debate following Mr. Santer's speech is available only in the Luxembourg language, your Rapporteur was unable to understand it. In the final vote, the bill was passed by 51 votes (45 were needed as the Chamber has 60 members) to 6 with 0 abstentions. (f) Netherlands ----------- On 3rd June 1992, the Netherlands Government handed the Second Chamber of the States-General (the lower house of the Netherlands Parliament) the bill ratifying the Treaty on European Union accompanied by an explanatory memorandum in which the government said it considered the treaty was in conformity with the Constitution, which would not therefore need to be revised. The Standing Committee on European Community Affairs of the Second Chamber held a first reading of the text and drew up a provisional report, which was transmitted to the government at the beginning of September. The government will have to answer it in a document known as an answering memorandum, after which the committee will draft its final report. If the government considers it expedient, it may send the Chamber a note on the final report. Once the preparatory stage has been completed, the bill can be debated by the Second Chamber. This debate will be held at the end of October and the beginning of November and will be wound up by the vote on motions, any amendments and the bill itself. The debate will then be pursued in the First Chamber of the States-General (the upper chamber) in accordance with the same procedure, the only difference being that the First Chamber does not have a right of amendment. The D-66 and Groen Links parties are in favour of a referendum on the treaty, for which there is no provision in the Netherlands Constitution which would thus have to be revised. The government coalition parties - Christian Democrats, Liberals and Social Democrats - are against holding a referendum. Moreover, in her speech from the throne opening the annual session of parliament a few days before the French referendum, Queen Beatrix said the text signed in Maastricht made it possible for all member countries to safeguard their own identity and she expressed the hope that the "Yes" vote would win in France. France and the Netherlands could contribute to unity and the building of Europe. (g) Portugal -------- In Portugal, ratification of the Treaty on European Union required prior revision of the constitution. The decision to revise the constitution has to be taken by a four-fifths majority of the members of the Assembly of the Republic. On 12th June 1992, that Assembly, having obtained the necessary majority, had the power to revise the constitution. Such revision has to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly. A total of six bills on revising the constitution were tabled in the Assembly, by the Social Democrat Party in power, by Mr. Tome, an independent member, and by the Socialist, Communist, Democratic and Social and National Solidarity Parties. The bill tabled by the Social Democrat Party, the government party that has an absolute majority in the Assembly, contains the wording of a new article laying down that Portugal may, subject to reciprocity and with due respect for the principle of subsidiarity, share the exercise of the powers necessary for building Europe. Furthermore, and still subject to reciprocity, foreign residents in Portugal have the right to vote and to stand for election in local and national elections and in elections to the European Parliament. Finally, Article 105 is amended and provides that the Bank of Portugal will co- operate in the definition and implementation of monetary and financial policy in accordance with the law. The Socialist Party's bill, similar to that of the Social Democrat Party, also contains a proposal by which the autonomous regions (Madeira and the Azores) may give their views on matters within their purview. The Communist Party, considering that the Treaty on European Union involved the partial relinquishment by states of their sovereign powers in fundamental areas such as foreign and defence policy, which guaranteed independence and national identity, tabled a draft revision to the constitution allowing a referendum to be called on the Maastricht Treaty. In its proposed revision of the constitution, the Democratic and Social Centre included, with slight variations, the provisions set out in the texts by the Social Democrat and Socialist Party to which it added the constitutional obligation to hold a referendum for all treaties involving the attribution to an international organisation of the exercise of responsibilities of the Portuguese state. The National Solidarity Party's proposed constitutional revision follows the same line. On 20th October 1992, the parliamentary committee responsible for revising the constitution had only decided the procedure its work should follow. At the time of writing, there is no idea what the parliamentary time-table will be for this revision and for the ratification of the Treaty on European Union. There is every sign that the constitutional revision in question will be closest to the bill tabled by the Social Democrat Party and that the possibility of allowing a referendum to be called has been dropped completely. Finally, it sould not appear that ratification of the treaty will encounter the slightest difficulty when submitted to the Assembly of the Republic. (h) Spain ----- On 17th December 1991, the Spanish Head of Government, Mr. Gonzalez, addressed the Congress of Deputies meeting in plenary session to which he had just reported on the meeting of the European Council in Maastricht. Mr. Gonzalez, who considered the results of the summit meeting satisfactory, nevertheless believed the debate on that occasion about the common foreign and security policy "pillar" had been complex and difficult, particularly from a semantic point of view. He thought the most remarkable aspect of the treaty was the affirmation that common foreign and security policy covered "all questions related to the security of the union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence" compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. Mr. Gonzalez said the latter area remained the responsibility of the Council which defined the principles and general guidelines of common foreign and security policy and decided unanimously on joint action and by qualified majority on its implementation. He added that, for such matters, decision- taking swung between the understandable fear of member states to lose control of foreign policy decisions and the need to continue to make progress in this area. Spain had proposed reaching unanimous agreement on which questions should be decided by qualified majority, said the Head of Government, in order to "get out of the mess", since there was no means of reaching agreement. In his opinion, political co-operation had produced far more results than had been expected in the Single European Act, thus creating a sort of case law, which was not binding where decision-taking was concerned, but that no one had failed to respect in recent years. According to Mr. Gonzalez, the most interesting part of the treaty was where provision was made for the eventual framing of a joint defence policy, which would probably take some time to achieve, but the fact that it was set down as an aim amounted to qualitative progress of great importance, particularly since the present period was of historical importance. The Head of Government stressed that it would be for the European Council to define the principles and general guidelines of the common foreign and security policy but that the Commission would be fully associated with work in this area and the European Parliament would be consulted and informed. Answering Mr. Gonzalez, Mr. Aznar, Leader of the Popular Party, quoted, in regard to the positive aspects of the treaty, the remarkable positions adopted on defence. They were very close to those adopted by the Popular Party in respect of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU, joint defence policy and the possible linkage of WEU and the Community with a joint defence policy. He said this was a coherent approach that strengthened security. For the Izquierda Unida spokesman, the chapter relating to common foreign and security policy was a major step forward, but procedure for adopting joint action seemed to him far too complex and its future effectiveness was a matter of concern. The representative of the Democratic and Social Centre affirmed that some British analysts were heaving sighs of relief on noting the lack of pragmatism in the agreements on common foreign and security policy, but to his great regret these impressions were close to reality. Finally, the spokesman of the Basque Nationalist Group also expressed doubt about the real effect of the provisions relating to common foreign and security policy. When briefing the Senate Defence Committee on 30th March 1992 on the security and defence aspects of the Maastricht agreements, the Minister of Defence said it was essential to take advantage of the sound experience acquired by the Atlantic Alliance but without restricting the area of action and responsibilities of other organisations, in particular WEU. Circumstances made it crucial to draw up a common foreign and security policy, otherwise the political union would not have the necessary autonomy. In its defence-related provisions, the agreement reached was realistic in view of the well-known initial antagonism. Once both houses had been informed of the agreements subscribed to by the government in Maastricht, the process of ratifying the treaty started. According to the Spanish Constitution, approval of an international treaty containing provisions contrary to the constitution means the constitution has to be revised first. For this purpose, the government (or the two houses of parliament) may turn to the Constitutional Council to express a prior opinion specifying whether or not there is contradiction. On 24th April 1992, therefore, the government asked the high court to give its views on the subject. On 1st July, the Constitutional Council decreed that Article 8b, paragraph 1, of the treaty was contrary to the Spanish Constitution as it gave non-Spanish citizens of the European Union "passive" voting rights in municipal elections (i.e. the right to be elected, the right to vote already being provided for in the Constitution). The Council also said procedure for constitutional reform should be conducted in a parliamentary framework, which does not require a referendum unless one-tenth of deputies or senators call for one. This was not so and Congress approved the constitutional reform on 22nd July, followed several days later by the Senate, the votes in both houses being unanimous. This opened the way for parliamentary ratification of the treaty. The results of the Danish referendum and the fact that one was to be held in France encouraged the Izquierda Unida coalition to call for a similar consultation in Spain. Under the Spanish Constitution, political decisions of special importance may be the subject of a consultative (i.e. not binding) referendum, but the government, using the words attributed to Giulio Andreotti, said it did not consider such a consultation necessary and that "anything that is not necessary is, in the best of cases, harmful". A poll conducted by the daily paper El Pais and published early in July showed that 37% of the population was for ratifying the treaty and 17% against. 46% were undecided. At the same time, the division was growing in Izquierda Unida between those against ratification (in the majority) and those in favour. At the meeting of party steering bodies intended to find points of agreement, it was agreed that parliamentarians from the group would abstain from voting when the text came before parliament. Nevertheless, some of these parliamentarians said they did not feel bound by this decision and announced that they would vote in favour. The leader of the pro-Maastricht group even proposed, if invited, to campaign for a "yes" vote in France, like the Prime Minister in Strasbourg and the President of the Catalan Government, the liberal Jordi Pujol, in Toulouse. Members of the European Parliament belonging to the Izquierda Unida coalition had moreover already voted in favour of the Maastricht Treaty on 7th April 1992. Furthermore, the country's two main trade unions, the General Workers' Union (socialist) and the Workers' Commissions (communist) demonstrated their support for the treaty, as had earlier been the case of the European Trade Union Confederation, to which both movements belong. At the beginning of September, the government asked the Congress of Deputies to adopt urgent procedure for ratifying the Treaty on European Union so that ratification might take place before 20th September, the day of the French referendum. The Prime Minister thought Spain's ratification would be a positive gesture vis-a-vis public opinion, particularly in France. The presidency of the chamber decided tht normal procedure would be adopted, which meant the debate in the Congress of Deputies would start on 1st October. Although the procedure provides for a full debate in the chamber in plenary sitting, its referall to the Foreign Affairs Committee and its return to the chamber, followed by the same procedure in the Senate, nothing must prevent the ratification process being concluded by 31st December 1992. The narrow "yes" margin in France and the economic crisis in the Community did not initially significantly change political positions towards the treaty in Spain. The government's attitude was to approve the treaty in its present form and to reconsider its renegotiation impossible. It was said that the aim was to avoid a setback to the building of Europe while influencing the aspects that the government had defended the most strongly: cohesion, European citizenship and common foreign and security policy. On 1st October 1992, the Congress of Deputies started a debate on the Maastricht text and three amendments were tabled relating to the treaty as a whole. The first emanated from the Izquierda Unida coalition and was based on the idea that the Spanish people should make its opinion known by referendum prior to parliamentary ratification. In his speech, the Chairman of that group also raised a series of points relating to various aspects of the treaty. He said the common foreign and security policy had been defined in vague, not very enthusiastic terms and believed that, from a democratic standpoint, it was unacceptable for WEU, to which important defence responsibilities were delegated, to escape any kind of control by the European Parliament. He also thought it unacceptable to try to set up a European defence system in the framework of NATO. The Chairman of Izquierda Unida went so far as to assert that WEU was part of the NATO structure and dependent upon it. The second overall amendment was tabled by Mr. Mur, a member of the Aragon Regionalist Party belonging to the mixed group of parliamentarians not members of a political group. The reason given for this amendment was the need, justified by events in Europe after the signing of the treaty, to postpone the debate until more was known about relevant decisions that might be adopted by other countries. The third amendment was tabled by the Democratic and Social Centre. Its spokesman said that, while fully accepting the treaty, his group wished to remedy the democratic deficit in the text, guarantee that the policy of cohesion was given adequate financial support and ensure that the convergence programme was applied with due respect for a fair sharing of the sacrifices asked of the Spanish people. Before these three amendments were tabled, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had, moreover, declared that the treaty gave the union a common foreign and security policy that would eventually include joint defence, thus remedying the imbalance between complete economic integration and inadequate political integration that was more than ever necessary. In the grouped vote, the three amendments were negatived by 281 votes to 25 with 4 abstentions. The amendments to the text as a whole having been negatived, the bill is now to be referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee and will follow the process described above. Since the treaty attributes to an international institution the exercise of constitutional responsibilities, this bill is an "organic" one requiring an absolute majority of Congress (176 votes) in the final vote on the bill as a whole. On 29th October 1992, the Congress of Deputies approved the ratification of the Treaty on European Union by an overwhelming majority: 325 of the 350 deputies were present in the chamber; 314 voted for ratification (Socialists, Conservatives, Centrists, Basque and Catalan Nationalists, 8 of the 17 Izquierda Unida deputies and most members of the mixed group of members not belonging to a group), 8 members of Izquierda Unida abstained and 3 members of the separatist Herri Batasuna coalition group (linked with the ETA terrorist organisation) voted against. The Socialist Group spokesman, Miguel Angel Martinez, stressed the significance of the "no" votes in view of their origin. (i) United Kingdom -------------- Of all the Community countries, the United Kingdom is probably the one whose parliament has paid the most attention to the Maastricht Treaty, as testified by the number and extent of debates on the matter. The first was held on 20th November 1991, a few days after the meeting of the European Council in the Netherlands city. Immediately after that meeting, on 18th December 1991, the Treaty on European Union started on its parliamentary peregrination. The ratification process requires the passing of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill by the House of Commons. This bill will carry into law the amendments the treaty makes to the Rome Treaty and other Community treaties. It also contains a provision to require a separate act of parliament to be passed before the United Kingdom can move to the third stage of economic and monetary union. The European Communities (Amendment) Bill had a second reading on 21st May 1992, giving approval to the principle. As is customary with constitutional matters, consideration of the detail of the bill will be undertaken on the floor of the house in committee of the whole house. However, consideration of the bill in committee was delayed as a result of the Danish referendum and the narrow "Yes" victory in France. The subsequent economic crisis in the United Kingdom in particular and in the Community in general led the Prime Minister on the one hand to delay parliamentary ratification of the treaty until next year and on the other to convene an extraordinary summit meeting of Community heads of state or of govenment in Birmingham on 16th October 1992. Your Rapporteur thought it appropriate to mention in the present study, apart from the debates already referred to, the Queen's speeches opening the United Kingdom Parliament and to the European Parliament, the debate in the House of Commons on 3rd June on the result of the Danish referendum and the extraordinary debate on the Maastricht Treaty on 24th and 25th September 1992. When presenting the text of the Maastricht Treaty to the House of Commons on 20th November 1991, the Prime Minister underlined that the text submitted by the Netherlands in September brought all the elements of the treaty under a unitary structure. That would have brought foreign, defence, interior and justice policy under the Rome Treaty and within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. It would have been a massive stride towrds a centralised federal structure. The United Kingdom's refusal of that text led to it being modified. The new text created what have become known as separate pillars. Some of these, notably foreign and security policy, would be conducted on an intergovernmental basis so that they would remain outside the Rome Treaty and the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice; nor would the Commission have the sole right to make proposals. The Prime Minister recalled that intergovernmental co-operation in foreign policy, security and defence was a result of the Single European Act, in the interests of the country and had been successful. Mr. Major said he was in favour of the concept of joint action which, he said, had been introduced by the Single European Act; nevertheless, the United Kingdom retained the possibility of taking separate decisions and acting separately and unilaterally even after adopting a joint action if the country's interests required. On the fact that majority voting should be used for implementing decisions, the Prime Minister said: "We see great difficulties in that proposal. What, for example is the difference between a decision of principle taken by unanimity and an implementing decision to be taken by majority vote? That seems to be a recipe for muddle and confusion." "On defence", continued the Prime Minister, "the position is clear. We have in NATO the means of our defence. At the recent summit all the members of NATO were clear that we must do nothing to call in question the continuing American and Canadian presence in Europe... We need to develop a policy that is consistent with our existing obligations and arrangements through NATO and Western European Union. It is for that reason that Britain and Italy put forward proposals which would build up WEU, not as the European alternative to NATO, but as the European pillar of NATO." Throughout his speech, the Prime Minister insisted on the need to safeguard NATO against "competing security structures". Learning that WEU was to be the European pillar of NATO and that there should be no incompatibility between the two organisations Mr. Wilkinson asked the Prime Minister to describe the government's aims. Mr. Major's answer was brief and clear: "The government's aims are ... to build up WEU and to ensure that it has an adequate relationship with NATO and the European Council but is not subordinate to either NATO or the European Council." In any event, he added, the government would not accept any treaty that made WEU subordinate to the European Council. Sir Patrick Duffy, former President of the North Atlantic Assembly, enquired what was happening about the Franco-German proposal, which competed with the British-Italian proposal. Was that not still on the European security agenda? Mr. Major told him that the Franco-German proposal had suffered a rebuff as a result of the NATO meeting in Rome and said the government could not accept WEU being subordinate to the European Council - that was the essential core element of the Franco-German paper. The Prime Minister added that there were many in Europe who wanted to set everything in a Community legal framework for fear that if they did not old nationalisms might reassert themselves. Mr. Kinnock, then Leader of the Opposition, disagreed with the idea that that the European political identity would be strengthened by adopting common foreign and security policies with qualified majority voting. On the contrary, he believed it would weaken the Community and its ability to act; co- operation and consensus therefore remained the most reliable arrangement for Community foreign and security policies. Mrs. Thatcher said "countries with a history and a tradition such as Britain's cannot allow their hands to be tied on defence and on foreign policy". On this point, she agreed with the Prime Minister but not with the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Hurd, who had suggested in The Hague that there might be majority voting for implementating joint action. She preferred the Prime Minister's opinions. The member for Finchley warned her audience that by removing the word "federal" from the treaty would not stop the European Community coming back with new demands for more power for the Commission that she called "the conveyor belt to federalism". Mr. Ashdown, Leader of the Social and Liberal Democrats, having listened to Mrs. Thatcher's views on the European Union, was delighted that the present Prime Minister was in his seat and that Mrs. Thatcher was in another. Being resolutely in favour of the process of European Union, Mr. Ashdown bore in mind recent progress made in this direction by both Mr. Major and the Labour Party but attributed their previous lukewarm attitude to the fact that the United Kingdom had been the laggard in Europe instead of being among the leaders. The United Kingdom should share Europe's institutions instead of submitting to institutions shaped by others. Turning to common foreign and defence policy, Mr. Ashdown underlined the need for Europe to speak with a single and powerful voice. Yugoslavia might well be the first example of threats that might be followed by others: they would come not from border conflicts but from religious, ethnic and cultural conflicts and we should be prepared to cope with them. A strong Europe, speaking with a common voice, would be a rock of stability at the end of a sea of confusion and potential chaos. The presence of United States and Canadian troops on the mainland of Europe was one of the conditions for such stability, although it could not be ruled out that those countries might one day wish their troops to leave Europe. An integrated European pillar within NATO therefore made good sense for today and provided a sensible preparation for what might happen tomorrow. Mr. Ashdown said the battle over the word "federal" was ludicrous since the rest of Europe knew the word meant, not concentrating power, but spreading power. He referred to the paradoxical situation in which the government had placed itself by demanding decentralisation while dismissing out of hand any notion of a parliament for Scotland and Wales. Finally, Mr. Ashdown was in favour of organising a referendum on the Treaty on European Union which would allow a vast national debate once parliament had expressed its opinion. Sir Geoffrey Howe stressed that the role of NATO must be preserved while Western European Union should be developed as the European pillar. He illustrated the division within his own party (Mrs. Thatcher was wondering how the people could express themselves when all the parties were split by internal divisions) between those for and those against the Maastricht Treaty, the Euro-sceptics (Euro-phobes or Euro-separatists, to use Mr. Ashdown's words): the latter were tending to increase or at least to speak more loudly, as shown by the debates, and henceforth were not confined to a single party since ambiguity over or even radical opposition to the treaty found a response even on the Labour benches. Mr. Benn considered the argument was not about sovereignty but should be seen in terms of democracy, since the treaty implied that the nation would be governed by people it did not elect and could not remove. Between those for whom foreign, security and defence policy is a fundamental aspect of national sovereignty and independence, which consequently cannot and should not be transferred to another body - unless there is a desire to wipe the country off the map - and those for whom this policy has been controlled by the United States for forty-five years and who are thus not afraid to follow the same course as their European partners, there is a wide spectrum of opinion: however, the leitmotif of criticism concerns majority voting for the implementation of any joint action. One argument has been used regularly against the treaty provisions relating to common foreign and security policy: if a common policy had existed when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the allies would not have intervened and the United States would have had difficulty in acting alone. For some, therefore, the course proposed offered no solution but, on the contrary, placed obstacles in the way of settling Europe's problems. Finally, answering some of the speakers in the debate, Mr. Hurd said the United Kingdom's aim was a common foreign and security policy on issues where there was unanimous agreement, always allowing for national freedom of action in other matters. No one was proposing a system that would have prevented Britain from liberating the Falklands, or Belgium and France from sending paratroops to Zaire to rescue their fellow citizens. No one, according to Mr. Hurd, was attempting to foist a foreign policy on the United Kingdom. Here, he said he was not persuaded that the distinction between the original agreement, which must be taken unanimously, and the implementing measures (by a majority vote) could be made to stick. The possibility having been put to him that France might attempt to separate Europe's defence responsibilities from NATO, Mr. Hurd said first that any common defence policy must be compatible with NATO, second, that WEU, the instrument of the European defence identity, should be linked to common foreign and security policy and the alliance, but be subordinate to neither, and, third, that European defence co-operation should not marginalise other allies, i.e. the United States. Reticence about Germany and, above all, France, suspected of leading a movement that accepted only minimum, not to say zero, participation in Europe's security and defence also provided grist for the debate, as did the underlying fear that this attitude might help to weaken the Atlantic organisation. The debate closed with a vote on the motion endorsing the government's negotiating approach to the Maastricht negotiations (ayes 351, noes 250). About 150 members put their names down to speak during the debate on 18th December following the meeting of the European Council. The Prime Minister, after saying that the word "federal" had been removed from the text of the treaty, said the most significant agreement of the treaty was the agreement to co-operate in a legally binding framework in the key areas of law and order, foreign policy and defence policy. He also believed United Kingdom wishes had been met in regard to making WEU the defence pillar of the European Union while preserving the primacy of NATO. This was a vital national interest for the United Kingdom that had been secured. On common foreign and security policy, there had also been agreement to United Kingdom proposals for a common foreign and security policy going beyond the Single European Act, but remaining outside the Rome Treaty and beyond the reach of the European Court of Justice. In his speech, Mr. Kinnock, Leader of the Opposition, made no reference to foreign, security and defence policy, and this was almost so in the speech by Mr. Ashdown, Leader of the Social Liberal Democrats. Subsidiarity, economic and monetary union, social aspects and the Commission were most frequently raised during the debates. When speakers referred to defence, it was to say that, even if WEU were not subordinate to the union but independent of it, the tendency towards "Communitisation" was inevitable: this would lead inevitably to an effective loss of national sovereignty in one of the key national issues, i.e. defence. Mr. Hurd insisted once again on the possibility of co-operating with other member countries of the Community without necessarily having to do so within Community institutions, thus avoiding the Commission having a monopoly of initiatives and avoiding the jurisidiction of the European Court. Once what was now commonly called a pillared architecture had been achieved, it should be possible to show that such co-operation between governments could be as effective as action through Community institutions. Other speakers considered the final drafting of the chapters of the treaty of concern to the present report was a victory for the views of pro-Atlantic tendencies, supported by the United Kingdom, over those of pro-Europeans, supported by France with the complicity of Germany, and this victory must be maintained during the future renegotiation of the treaty. One parliamentarian said: "We must not allow salami slicing of NATO powers gradually to transfer them to Western European Union so that WEU does not function, as we hope, as a bridge between NATO and the European Community." Your Rapporteur considers this opinion to be purely anecdotal and consequently of no interest. It may rightly be assumed that, apart from speakers who expressed a positive opinion on aspects of the treaty relating to security and defence policy, there are others who refrained from criticising those aspects and are thus assumed to be in favour of them. The House closed its debate by agreeing, by 339 votes to 253, to a motion congratulating the Prime Minister on achieving all the negotiating objectives set out in the motion that was supported by the House on 21st November. After the April general elections, when the Conservative Party retained a majority in the House of Commons, the Queen's speech at the state opening of parliament included the following paragraph on security and defence: "My government attach the highest importance to national security. They will continue to give full support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and will work with our allies to adapt it to changing risks. They will aim to develop Western European Union as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the alliance and the defence component of the European Union. The United Kingdom's armed forces are being restructured to reflect these changes. Britain's minimum nuclear deterrent will be maintained." The Queen's speech to the European Parliament on 12th May 1992 was more controversial. It reopened an impassioned debate on relations with the European Community and did little to calm the Euro-sceptics in the United Kingdom Parliament. The Queen paid tribute to diversity, which was rewarding, asked that deisions be taken at a level as close as possible to the people, stressed Europeans' ability to act together when the nature of the problems involved required a European response, recalled that the strengthening of the Community had always accompanied enlargement and, referring to the debates in parliament, affirmed that differences of style and opinioth Europeans' confirmed vocation for conciliation and democracy. The day before, part of the speech had been leaked. This considered that different national parliamentary traditions were considered of no importance compared with the values of conciliation and democracy. Neither the subsequent correction of the paragraph in question nor the explanation that the differences in question referred to those that existed between national parliaments could prevent the Euro-sceptics' conviction that the treaty implied a lack of importance of Westminster's sovereignty and a relinquishment of powers to Brussels. It was therefore in a heated atmosphere, with the prospect of the coming Danish referendum and in anticipation of its result that the second reading of the European Communities (Amendment) Bill opened in the House of Commons on 20th May. In moving the bill, Mr. Major said: "The bill contains no provision for those aspects of the Maastricht Treaty which cover foreign and security policy, and justice and home affairs issues. If it did, we would have failed at Maastricht to meet the commitments that we gave this house last November. The virtue of those provisions in the Maastricht Treaty is that they are outside the Treaty of Rome, outside the competence of the Commission, and wholly for agreement between governments, on a case by case basis. They need to be put to the house, but quite specifically have no direct effect in United Kingdom law... There is no social chapter, there is no diminution in the role of NATO, there is no power for the European Parliament to approve decisions rejected by the Council of Ministers, no weakening of our power of national decision-taking in foreign policy, no word 'federal' and no commitment to a federal - by which I mean a centralising - Europe." This was a further attempt to convince national sovereignty die- hards that national sovereignty was not affected in respect of matters of such importance. This attempt was in vain since opposition to the treaty seemed to increase from day to day or at least was becoming increasingly evident. Mr. Major held that "for the first time in a single treaty, agreements between governments are given equal standing with action under Community law. In foreign and security policy, and in justice and interior matters, the member states will work together when it is in their common interest to do so. ... Where such co-operation is helpful to this country, we shall co- operate with our partners in Europe. It also means that we cannot be forced into policies we do not approve of". The Prime Minister considered that a new era in the history of the Community was beginning. Mr. Kinnock, then Leader of the Labour Party, again proclaimed the (far from unanimous) agreement of his party with the treaty in spite of his criticism of the United Kingdom's opting out of the social chapter and monetary union (which, according to him, mean that neither the European Monetary Institute nor the European Central Bank could be located in the United Kingdom). Here, mention should be made of the support for the treaty from the United Kingdom's trade unions, the driving force behind the Labour Party and a decisive factor when the latter's policy is worked out. Mr. Ashdown also confirmed that he was in favour of the bill, in spite of the democratic deficit of the European institutions that the treaty had been unable to remedy. The rest of the debate was confined to consolidating previously-expressed opinions and to showing once again the strength of opposition to the treaty among the Conservatives and, to a lesser degree, the Labour Party. Finally, the Maastricht Treaty's approach to common foreign and security policy was seen as a solution mid-way between the federalists, who had advocated these questions being submitted to European institutions, and, at the other extreme, those who would have liked to maintain the situation prevailing before European political co-operation. The vote held at the end of this second reading of the bill resulted in 336 votes for and 92 against. The first consequence of the negative result of the Danish referendum was the postponement of the bill of ratification, first until autumn 1992 and more recently until 1993, in liaison with the trend of the process in Denmark. The request for a postponement emanated from the Labour leader and was accepted by the Prime Minister, who said on that occasion that ratification and implementation of the treaties was of national interest. The Danish "no" also showed that a growing number of Conservative members of parliament wished to make use of the breach thus opened to amend a text with which they deeply disagreed. During the parliamentary debate held after the Danish referendum, about a hundred members of parliament tabled a motion calling for the revision of the United Kingdom position towards the Community. This motion, because of its moderation and lack of precision, attracted many members not belonging to the group of Euro-sceptics. The division of the parliamentary group also seemed to have spread as far as the government benches. Pressure for a referendum, fuelled by the Danish result and the prospect of the French referendum and by the attitude of the Labour Party, anxious not to refuse its support for the initiative, has increased. The Prime Minister has said that he is firmly opposed to a referendum. Opinion polls show, on the one hand, that, if one were held, the majority of the population (as in the rest of Europe) would be in favour of organising a referendum and, on the other, that if one were held the "noes" would win, although more than 30% of those questioned had not yet taken a decision. After the postponment of the parliamentary debate and in view of the position adopted by the United Kingdom Government, which was determined to withdraw immediately the bill ratifying the treaty if the result of the French referendum were to be negative, since this, in Mr. Major's own words, would mean the death of the treaty, attention turned towards France. The economic storm raging in Europe and the narrowness of the "yes" victory in France led to the convocation of an extraordinary session of the House of Commons at which the Prime Minister had to face renewed attacks from Euro-sceptics and his own party and strong arguments from the new Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Smith. The Prime Minister again proclaimed his support for European Union but was unable to avoid giving an impression of some confusion; the same is probably true of his European colleagues. A few days later, the Labour Party national congress rejected overwhelmingly the possibility of holding a referendum. An opinion poll published in The Times early in October revealed that opposition to Maastricht had grown, this probably being connected with the pound's difficulties and its withdrawal from the European monetary system: 68% of those questioned were against ratification of the treaty. These were the circumstances in which the Prime Minister addressed the annual conference of the Conservative Party and affirmed that he would never let Britain's distinctive identity be lost in a federal Europe. Mr. Major recalled the exemption clauses the United Kingdom had obtained in Maastricht in respect of social policy and the single currency and declared that the centralising tendency that had prevailed in the Community in recent years had now been reversed with the agreements reached in Maastricht. The Birmingham summit meeting would also be a move towards decentralisation. However, Mr. Major added that a United Kingdom "No" to Maastricht would be a historic mistake and that the first reason for supporting European unity was in order to safeguard peace. The hearty applause of members at the conference during speeches by Euro-sceptics gave way to approval by the majority of the position adopted by Mr. Major. As the Prime Minister himself said, the applause had come from the heart but delegates had supported him with their head. III. Parliamentary debates in Denmark, Greece and Ireland ____________________________________________________ (a) Denmark ------- On 12th May 1992, the Bill ratifying the Treaty on European Union was passed by a large majority in the Danish parliament (130 votes to 25). Among those voting against were the members of the right-wing Progress Party and the extreme left-wing Popular Socialist Party. Those voting for the treaty included the members of the minority coalition government parties (Conservatives and Liberals) and members of other opposition parties, mainly Social Democrats. However, the referendum campaign that began immediately after the parliamentary vote showed that the results of this consultation would not reflect those of the vote. The opinion poll published on 8th May by the daily newspaper Boersen showed that 41% of Danes were in favour of the treaty, 37.9% against and 20% still had not made up their minds. This poll was also revealing since it showed that most of those who were undecided were among the Centrists and Social Democrats. 50% of the latter said they were hostile to the treaty. In the referendum held in Denmark in 1986 on the Single European Act, which was approved by 56% of the votes, the Social Democrat Party had voted against the text. Another poll by the Gallup Institute, published on the day of the elections, also gave the "yes" votes a lead over the "noes" (47%), while a poll conducted two days earlier had shown that the "noes" were increasing. The final results confirmed the victory of the "no" vote (50.7%) over the "yes" vote (49.3%), by a narrow margin of 40 000 votes. Although the Danish Government decided not to debate joint defence policy until 1996, when the treaty is due to be revised, this matter was the main source of controversy throughout the campaign because of the interest of opponents of Maastricht in tackling it. On the one hand, the parliamentary majority in favour of the Treaty on European Union does not exactly coincide with the groups supporting Denmark's accession to WEU, these being in the minority. The Minister for Foreign Affairs considers it absurd to support a European Union including common foreign and security policy while refusing accession to WEU, which will be responsible for carrying out decisions taken in the framework of that policy. Yet this is the case of the Social Democrats (with 69 of the 179 seats in the Folketing), who refuse such accession. Rivalries in its midst have not helped to clarify the situation in the party or, consequently, among the public. Moreover, the possibility of joining WEU was considered by some of the population, marked by a strong tradition of neutrality, as abandoning the sacrosanct principle of non- interference. Maintaining transatlantic links in defence matters and fear of seeing the role of NATO diminish in terms of European defence brought grist to the debate for those who believed WEU would act exactly contrary to their wishes. Mr. Elleman-Jensen, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in commenting on Canada's decision to withdraw the 1 100 men of its operational force from Europe as from 1994, said this withdrawal should mean Europeans would be given greater responsibilities in NATO. It also showed the need for WEU to play a new role and for Denmark to join that organisation. The decision would have to be taken during the year. Another point must be taken into account in the result of the referendum: this is the forecast of opponents of a Europe that they consider would be dominated by the larger states such as France and, in particular, Germany, and the ensuing loss of decision-taking power for the smaller countries. Where Germany is concerned, the spectre of the past for the older generations and the image of an economically strong Germany exercising hegemonic power for the younger generations also influenced the state of mind of a large part of the Danish electorate. It should also be pointed out that a majority in areas along the frontier with Germany voted "yes". Quite apart from any other reasons, the arguments set out above had a particularly strong impact on the result of the Danish referendum; whatever solution Denmark may choose for solving the serious internal crisis caused by the referendum and the no less serious crisis from which the Community is suffering, common foreign and security policy will be at the heart of the debate. (b) Greece ------ On 31st July 1992, the Greek Parliament passed the Bill ratifying the Treaty on European Union. 295 of the 300 members of parliament were present and 286 of them voted for the treaty. One member of the PASOK abstained and the votes against emanated from the Communist Party (KKE) and the Ecologist member. The party in power (the New Democracy Conservatives), the PASOK Socialists and members of the Left-Wing and Progress Coalition voted in favour of the treaty. Although the main opposition parties voted in favour, this vote, as they themselves admit, was critical approval because of the social cost of the measures that would be necessary in the context of the economic and monetary union in a country already suffering from serious economic problems. Speaking of the Danish referendum, the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Mitsotakis, affirmed that, if a similar consultation had been held in Greece, 90% of the electorate would have voted in favour. The overwhelming victory of those in favour in parliament probably proved him right. In the same statement, the Prime Minister included a word of warning: his country's pro-European feelings might change if the Community decided to support Yugoslav Macedonia's claims to retain its name once it became an independent state. In fact, members of the Community were showing growing irritation at the blockage of common foreign policy by the Greeks, who refuse to recognise the right of the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to retain its name after independence. In other statements to the press last June, Mr. Mitsotakis held that the use of the name of Macedonia by a new Slav republic in the Balkans was unauthorised assumption of the name of a Greek republic that had borne it for 3000 years and an attempt to steal the Hellenic patrimony and culture of that territory and its population. He added that Skopje's insistence betrayed territorial claims and undermined the prospects of peace throughout the region. Parliamentary ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was initially programmed for November but was brought forward to prove Greece's gratitude at the Community's support for its position vis-a-vis the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Unfortunately, the report of the debates on the Treaty on European Union in the Greek Parliament exist only in Greek and attempts to obtain accurate information, even verbally, on this text have been unsuccessful. Your Rapporteur is therefore unable to express an opinion on these debates. (c) Ireland ------- The result of the referendum on the Treaty on European Union held in Ireland on 18th June 1992 to some extent restored the balance that had been upset by the Danish referendum. With 57% of the electorate voting, 69% were in favour of the Maastricht Treaty and 31% against. According to the Prime Minister, Mr. Reynolds, the electoral campaign had revealed a shortage of information. The campaign had perhaps done little to remedy this because of the determination of certain ultra-Conservative Catholic groups to assimilate the Maastricht Treaty with the introduction of abortion in the Republic of Ireland. The possible convening of another referendum on the subject this autumn did not discourage the pro-life movement from pursuing its campaign, basing it solely on the legalisation of abortion in Ireland through the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, the left-wing and green groups concentrated their attacks on the Treaty on European Union on what they considered to be the threat of the treaty provisions relating to common and foreign security policy for Irish neutrality. Some went so far as to refer to the hypothetical recruitment of a European army, and the image spread throughout the country of young Irishmen called up for that army and taking part in far-off missions. The Prime Minister had affirmed, on the one hand, that none of Maastricht's defence implications would be felt before 1996, when another referendum on those matters would be organised, and, on the other, thanks to the referendum, Ireland might be able to maintain its traditional neutrality within a Europe pursuing a common foreign and security policy. The green paper published by the Irish Government with the intention of making an objective, balanced assessment of the treaty makes the following precisions in the chapter on common foreign and security policy: "The distinction between security and defence drawn by Ireland in the negotiations is upheld. Security issues are matters for the European Union. Where these have defence implications, a role for WEU may arise. Moreover, any decision by the European Union to refer matters with defence implications to WEU for elaboration or implementation requires unanimity." The treaty includes a provision that is of particular importance for Ireland since it lays down that the union's security policy "shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states". This guarantees that the union's actions or decisions will not be able to prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of Ireland, which is outside the military alliances. In regard to the declaration appended to the treaty in which the member states of WEU invite states members of the European Union to accede to WEU or to become observers if they so wish, the abovementioned green paper says Ireland has already accepted invitations to attend, as an observer, three ministerial meetings of the WEU Council, two of which to discuss the Yugoslav crisis and the third, in Maastricht, when WEU examined its future relations with the European Union and the abovementioned invitation to member states of the European Union. The green paper adds: "Membership of WEU or attendance as observers at WEU meetings are not required by the treaty. Nonetheless the government believe that attendance at future meetings of WEU as an observer would have a number of advantages for Ireland. It would ensure that Ireland is fully informed of developments in WEU which might have a bearing on discussions in the European Union when issues with defence implications arise. It would place Ireland in a better position to formulate appropriate policies and responses on such issues within the European Union. It would better enable the government to decide on any vote in the European Union on the reference of defence matters to WEU. Finally, it would enable Ireland to follow the subsequent course of discussions in WEU." The green paper goes on to say: "It is important to note that attendance as observers would not require Ireland to become a member of WEU, to accede to the Brussels Treaty establishing WEU, to take up any obligations under the Brussels Treaty, or to subscribe to policy positions or platforms adopted by WEU. Ireland would not become a party to WEU as an alliance or undertake any mutual defence commitments or military obligations under the WEU treaty." Finally, the text specifies that the treaty provides for the common foreign and security policy to be revised in 1996. Article J.4.6 of the treaty provides that the conference convened in accordance with Article N may revise the provisions of the common foreign and security policy relating to security, including the possible establishment of a joint defence policy. The result of the intergovernmental conference would have to be the subject of unanimous agreement and any changes to the treaty ratified by member states would have to be in conformity with their respective constitutions and legislation. The problem of Ireland's neutrality having thus been deferred to a possible referendum in 1996 and that of abortion to a similar consultation to be organised before the end of the year, the number of "yes" votes recorded in the referedum on 18th June exceeded all estimates. The government coalition parties (Fianna Fail and the Progressive Democrats) were in favour of ratification as were the Fine Gael and the Labour Party (the latter with some reservations, however), while the pro-life movement mentioned above, the Democratic Socialist Party and the Greens were against. The "yes" vote triumphed in every constituency in the country, including the western rural areas. The highest percentage of "no" votes corresponds mainly to the working-class districts of Dublin, which are particularly affected by unemployment. This referendum, in which the Irish people expressed themselves on the subject of Europe, was the third of its kind, following the ones in 1972 on joining the Community and in 1987 on the Single European Act. IV. Debates in the European Parliament __________________________________ The President of the Commission of the European Communities, Mr. Delors, addressed the European Parliament on 12th February 1992 on the occasion of the presentation of the text entitled "From the single Act to Maastricht and beyond: the means to match our ambitions" and of the Commission's programme of work for 1992. In his address on "1992: a pivotal year", Mr. Delors said, on common foreign and security policy, that its functioning depended on decisions to be taken by the Council of Ministers on its implementation. In this area, he added, everything still had to be invented in order to benefit from the process of simple, effective assessments and decisions. In regard to the Commission he said that, because it was granted a shared right of initiative in those areas, it must also organise itself accordingly and adjust its own methods to those that the Council of Ministers would have. Referring to the Council's decision to prepare a report on the Community's foreign policy priorities, Mr. Delors stressed that these priorities also corresponded to the need for coherence between foreign policy proper and economic and financial actions obeying Community rules. The existence of different pillars should not, he thought, prevent foreign policy being handled globally, coherently and effectively. For Mr. Delors, the Community's contribution to international stability must first be through the strengthening of security and stability in Europe, in view of developments in the Central European countries which affect the Community's immediate environment and political, economic and military problems in Russia and the other states of the new Commonwealth of Independent States. Secondly, the Community must assume special responsibility in the Mediterranean and in countries with which it has historical and geographical links, most of which are faced with serious problems of political instability, very high birth rates and vast migrations of populations due to a particularly high unemployment rate among young people. Finally, Mr. Delors said the Community should not forget its responsibilities to Africa, South America and Asia and these should remain essential aspects of foreign policy. In the text from the Commission mentioned above, it was considered that it would not be easy to have a common foreign and security policy in view of the trend of the discussions that dominated the intergovernmental conference on political union. However, it was of little importance that some considered the prospects offered by the new treaty satisfactory while others thought they would cause paralysis; the main thing was to follow the course laid down and seek to solve the problems that arose bearing in mind priorities already indicated by the President of the Commission. On 7th April 1992, the European Parliament debated the Institutional Committee's Martin report and approved Resolution A3-D123/92 on the results of intergovernmental conferences by a large majority: 226 to 62 (Greens, French Communists and the European extreme right-wing) with 31 abstentions (RPR and Conservatives). The resolution adopted recalled that the Parliament had previously affirmed that a common foreign policy including joint examination of matters relating to peace, security and arms control was one of the fundamental elements of the European Union. After noting that the Maastricht Treaty contained provisions that contradicted the requirements laid down by the Parliament and underlining that the treaty provided for the convocation of an intergovernmental conference in 1996, which amounted to taking note of the inadequacy of its results, the European Parliament urged national parliaments to ratify the treaty and ensure that their respective national governments fill in the principal gaps as soon as possible. Among these gaps are the fact that common foreign and security policy is not included in the European Community treaty, thus implying that the Commission and the Parliament play a less important role in this area and ruling out any possibility of recourse to the Court of Justice, and also that the treaty entrusted defence matters to WEU without providing for adequate parliamentary control of the activities of that organisation. The European Parliament has probably forgotten that, on the one hand, Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty lays down that the WEU Council has to present to the Assembly an annual report on its activities and, on the other, that, insofar as defence remains a matter for states, the WEU Assembly, composed of representatives of national parliaments deciding their respective defence policies and approving the corresponding budgets, is the only body capable of filling the gap referred to in the European Parliament's resolution. A working paper of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the European Parliament relating to the establishment of common foreign policy for the European Community, dated 8th April 1992, holds, in regard to parliamentary supervision of the activities of the WEU Council, that it is for the European Parliament, the only democratically- elected body, to exercise such supervision and that the parliament should consquently replace the WEU Assembly in all respects, the latter being composed of parliamentarians who must, statutorily, be members of national parliaments and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The text concludes by inviting the WEU Council to take an official political undertaking to answer questions by the Parliament, to present its activities in plenary sitting or in committee and, in short, to apply procedure in force for foreign policy matters. Your Rapporteur considers the strengthening of co-operation between the parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament as envisaged in the declaration on WEU appended to the Maastricht Treaty should overcome the inadequacies of the abovementioned European Parliament texts. V. Conclusions ___________ Generally speaking, the relative difference between the degree of approval obtained by the Treaty on European Union in the various parliaments and among the public should be underlined, whether the latter expressed itself in a referendum or through opinion polls. Probably a cause of this dissonance between parliamnts and public opinion is due to what some considered to be the democratic deficit of the Community institutions. Community Europe has been built on agreements between governments with no direct participation by the public. The institutions and bodies which have absorbed some of the responsibilities of state do not enjoy the same level of representativeness and legitimacy as the corresponding national institutions and bodies. In some cases, the absence of an in-depth national debate and the lack of detailed, clear information have influenced those citizens who were tempted to reject what they did not know or did not know well enough. A referendum is not always the best means of solving the problems referred to above, partly because this type of consultation implies an answer based not so much on the question put as on the person who puts it, thus adding to the debate a whole series of factors, most of which are alien to the subject of the consultation. In any event, it is when parliamentary forces are the most deeply divided that a referendum seems the most appropriate solution. Moreover, because of its imprecision, the model of a supranational institution proposed as an alternative to the national model has not convinced the public that it would offer adequate guarantees of participation, viability and effectiveness. However this may be, the shortcomings noted should not serve as a pretext for preventing ratification: the treaty is an attempt, insufficient perhaps but no less real, to remedy these shortcomings. Ratification certainly does not mean that present difficulties will be overcome completely but it is also sure that failure to ratify would increase these same difficulties and start a period of great instability and uncertainty. In regard to the common foreign and security policy provided for in the Treaty on European Union, rejection of the present text would not result in a better, clearer and more ambitious text; on the contrary, it is to be feared that integration would not go so far, that it would be more acceptable to the United States and Japan as our political and economic rivals and that it would consequently be less European. Furthermore, it would heighten nationalist tension on our continent and return us to positions held prior to Maastricht. Moreover, it is clear that there is an immediate need for national parliaments to debate in extenso, at sessions devoted solely to the matter, the common foreign and security policy provided for in Maastricht, its evolution, the role of WEU as set out in the treaty and relations between our organisation and the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. The path has already been traced, but to embark upon it will mean follow-up action, assessment and contributions by the various national parliaments in full consultation with the WEU Assembly. __________ 1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 2. Members of the committee: Mr. Tummers (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer (Alternate: Mueller), Sir John Hunt (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Amaral, Buehler, Caccia, Mrs. E, Mr. Eversdijk (Alternate: Dees), Sir Anthony Durant, Mr. Fiandrotti, Mrs. Frias (Alternate: Roman), Mr. Ghesquiere, Dr. Godman (Alternate: Baroness Lockwood), MM. Gouteyron, Greco, Sir Russell Johnston (Alternate: Baroness Hooper), MM. Kempinaire, Lemoine, Lopez Henares, Martins, Nunez, Pfuhl, Reimann, Seitlinger, Stegagnini, Vial-Massat. ------- For information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ | ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ | 43, avenue du President Wilson _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ | F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ | Tel 331-47235432; Fax 331-47204543 _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ | E-mail: 100315.240@Compuserve.com