File: atbm0493.002 a-weu/proceedings This is the second part of a four-part document. ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE FOR EUROPE (II) =============================== SYMPOSIUM Rome, 20th-21st April 1993 Official Record Office of the Clerk of the Assembly of WEU ********************************************************************* SECOND SITTING ============== Tuesday, 20th April 1993 ______ (The sitting was opened at 2.40 p.m. with Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, in the Chair) How to cope with the challenges ------------------------------- Countering proliferation: new criteria for European security Dr. PAYNE (Professor of National Security Studies, Georgetown University, President of the National Institute for Public Policy, United States). - The point of departure for this presentation is President Bush's January 1991 reorientation of the strategic defence initiative, the SDI. Since its entrance in 1983, the SDI had been designed to provide protection against a massive Soviet missile threat. In 1991, however, President Bush redirected the programme. Henceforth it was to provide protection against a very limited missile threat, such as that posed by the modest missile arsenals of developing states or the threat of an accidental or unauthorised missile launch. The President's reorientation of the SDI was in recognition of two emerging features in the international environment: first, political relations with the Soviet Union had improved to the point where the launching of a massive, co-ordinated missile attack against the United States was considered so unlikely as to no longer constitute a basis for planning. Second, the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction posed a rapidly-emerging threat to United States overseas forces and allies - a threat involving a relatively modest number of missiles but against which there was no defence. As part of this reoriented SDI programme, United States allies were encouraged to analyse their own need for defences and to consider participation, particularly in defence against shorter-range missiles (TMD). Co-operation among the traditional western allies would be a logical means of utilising the technology developed under SDI to meet common security needs. The United States identified several general avenues for allied co-operation: - participation in basic research and development programmes that have application to defence against limited threats. This could mean participation in technology research and development, or in GPALS-related experiments; - government-to-government co-operation specifically in TMD-related aspects of missile defence, as may be of particular interest to a number of America's allies; - independent acquisition of a TMD system, either purchased from another country or indigenously developed, which could be interoperable with other elements of a GPALS system. Based on recent sympathetic expressions about missile defence by some European leaders, it appears that the many concerns previously held by allies with respect to missile defences have been alleviated, at least to some extent, by the obvious maturing of the proliferation threat and the dramatic reorientation of East-West relations. European leaders having endorsed missile defence now include the new French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner and German Defence Minister Volker Ruehe, among many others. In this regard, various options for United States co-operation with Western uropean Union on missile defence, especially in the area of TMD, are reasonable. The war in the Gulf appears to have vindicated the reorientation of the United States missile defence programme toward the proliferation threat. The coalition was able to gain complete mastery of the air, but it could not prevent the launching of Iraqi missiles throughout the Gulf war. Indeed, a single Scud strike in Saudi Arabia inflicted 127 casualties, the greatest loss from an individual incident in the war. Unfortunately, the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction shows no sign of abating. An increasing number of countries are capable of producing missiles indigenously, and there appear to be both buyers and suppliers of missile technology. According to official United States public figures, by the end of the decade fifteen or more countries in the developing world will have the indigenous capability to produce ballistic missiles. Six are likely to have missiles with ranges of 2000 km or more, and several may possess missiles with intercontinental ranges. The trend is toward the proliferation of missiles with greater range and lethality. For example, two years ago, Iran purchased the 500 km-range Scud-C ballistic missile from North Korea. According to United States officials, Iran now appears to be in the process of purchasing the new 1000 km-range Nodong I missile from North Korea. According to both Russian and United States reports, the Nodong I can carry conventional, chemical and, possibly, nuclear warheads. Nodong deployment in Iran could place much of Turkey at risk and, if transferred to North Africa, it could threaten numerous targets in southern Europe. With regard to the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons: by the close of the 1990s, at least eight developing countries will have nuclear weapons or an advanced nuclear weapon programme, thirty are likely to possess a chemical weapons capability, and seven or more will possess biological weapons. Proliferation during the 1990s will lead to an unprecedented situation: by the early years of the next decade numerous countries will be armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The implications of this for western security and international stability are tremendous. First and foremost, the vulnerability of population centres in Europe, Russia and, eventually, America could lead to very high western casualty levels in a future conflict with a regional power. In addition to this direct threat, unless countered, proliferation will impose significant constraints on the future deployment of western coalition forces for peace-keeping, peace- making, or even humanitarian reasons. When considering sending expeditionary forces western leaders will have to reckon with the possibility of ballistic missile strikes against their forces and cities. It is not difficult to envisage the debilitating effect this could have on the West's capacity to establish an allied coalition in response to aggression. Similarly, in the future, unilateral military actions that hitherto have been considered reasonable options, such as the British recovery of the Falkland Islands or French support for Chad against Libya, could become too risky. Even the humanitarian use of military force, such as now being conducted in Somalia, could be considered too dangerous if it might provoke a party armed with missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that western powers could be paralysed from action by a missile threat, even if the prospective opponent has no intention of actually launching its missiles. An implicit or explicit threat to strike western cities would force western leaders to consider the vulnerability of their cities, and respond accordingly - the paralysing effect on western political will would be the same whether or not the attack actually came. This role for missiles as instruments for deterrence and coercion is well-appreciated by proliferant states and even terrorist groups. In the future, ballistic missiles will pose a much more significant direct threat, first to Europe, but inevitably also to the United States. Unless countered, that emerging threat will undermine our will and capacity to respond to aggression. The fielding of missile defences by the West, preferably in co-operation with Russia, is a necessary, if insufficient, response to proliferation. Three other prospective countermeasures have possible roles under certain circumstances. These are: deterrence policies, export controls and pre-emptive offensive strikes. Permit me to discuss each one of these briefly. First, the counter to the proliferation threat suggested most frequently is the traditional policy of deterrence. The notion that western threats of retaliation will reliably deter in the future is comforting. Unfortunately, predictions about how other countries will behave, based on one's interpretation of what constitutes rational behaviour, frequently are wrong. Mistakes and misreading of intentions and likely behaviour abound in international relations, occasionally leading to conflict that simply was not anticipated. In 1904, for example, the Tsar simply refused to believe that the Japanese would dare to attack. In like manner, in 1941, United States foreign policy advisors in Washington persuaded President Roosevelt that the Japanese would not dare risk an attack against the United States. At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister Tojo Hideki reported to the Emperor that "our empire has no alternative but to begin war". Finally, following the British defeat of Argentina in 1982, General Galtieri lamented about how unreasonable British behaviour had been in his view: "Why would a country situated in the heart of Europe care so much for some islands located far away in the Atlantic Ocean, in addition, islands which do not serve any national interest? It seems so senseless to me." The point of these historical anecdotes is to underscore the fact that for deterrence to function requires that countries behave in predictable ways, and share a common definition of what is rational. Yet, opponents frequently are not so obliging or similarly-minded. The increasing number of developing countries that will possess missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and our general lack of knowledge and understanding of those countries, reduces the confidence western leaders can place on deterrence "working" adequately in a multipolar world. This is not because third world leaders should be considered "irrational", but because the high level of mutual understanding and effective communication necessary for deterrence is unlikely to characterise western relations with many of the developing countries now acquiring advanced military technology. In the future, reliance on deterrence for protection will almost certainly continue to be useful in some cases. It cannot, however, be considered a reliable substitute for missile defence in the emerging international environment. The second response to proliferation commonly suggested involves international controls by the industrialised countries on the export of ballistic missile technology. The industrialised countries should indeed focus on international efforts to restrict the export of ballistic missile technology and components. Such efforts, however, will at best serve only to slow missile proliferation - primarily because such technology control measures do little to dampen the incentive to acquire missiles; and because civilian missile technologies can be adapted for military use. Those countries desiring missiles tend to persevere until they find willing suppliers or develop indigenously those technologies and materials which they find difficulty importing. Experience with the existing international effort to control the export of missile technology, the missile technology control regime (MTCR), demonstrates the inadequacy of such efforts. The key problems encountered by MTCR are inherent in any attempt on the part of supplier countries to control the transfer of technology and materials. For example, not all potential supplier countries participate. So long as there is a strong demand for missile systems and technology, their export value will encourage some potential suppliers to disregard export controls and supplant those who do abide by MTCR's limitations. In addition, export controls will have only a marginal effect on those countries capable of indigenous production. As I mentioned earlier, the trend is toward increasing numbers of countries being able to produce or purchase missiles independently of the industrialised participants in the MTCR. Efforts to retard the proliferation of missile technology through multilateral export controls may be helpful in delaying the problem. Experience with the MTCR and supplier cartels in general, however, strongly suggests that such measures alone cannot provide a solution - missile defence will remain a necessary part of the solution. The third and final suggested countermeasure is a policy of preventive or pre-emptive offensive strikes. The Israelis demonstrated this method in 1981 with their air strike on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak. More recently, the air strikes of Desert Storm pre-emptively destroyed at least some of the Iraqi missile capability and weapons of mass destruction. It is, however, virtually inconceivable that the United States, for one, could pursue pre-emptive strikes against proliferant countries as a general policy response to proliferation. Only when a third party's missiles obviously represent a "clear and present danger", such as would be the case in crisis or wartime, could an offensive strike be acceptable politically. In short, while offensive strikes in response to proliferation may be appropriate in some circumstances, they generally will not be politically acceptable and could prove very difficult to implement effectively. It appears that each of the responses to missile proliferation typically discussed - deterrence, export controls, and offensive strikes - has a potential role to play. Nevertheless, missile defence will be critical for those cases when a missile threat is present, but deterrence or pre-emptive action cannot be considered reliable. As a final topic, I would like to discuss developments in the United States-Russian dialogue on a global missile defence system. From the introduction of the SDI in 1983 until late in 1991, the official Soviet position was strongly negative toward the United States proposal for co-operative efforts to expand missile defences. In January 1992, however, Russian President Boris Yeltsin completely rewrote the terms of the debate about missile defence. He proposed a co-operative global protection system (GPS) to defend against limited missile strikes. Continued serious Russian interest in a co-operative missile defence effort was demonstrated in June 1992 by the creation of a joint high-level group and working groups to pursue further study and conceptual development of a GPS. The high-level group has met twice since June and the first working group meetings were held in late October. As reported publicly, substantial progress in narrowing the differences between the two sides was made at these meetings. There are several reasons, I believe, for this new Russian enthusiasm for co-operative missile defences, including the emerging proliferation threat to Russia. In addition, it is clear that Russian officials see the prospect for a co- operative, multinational defence system as both reflective of a new East-West security relationship and as a long-term means of further solidifying that relationship. For example, at the October 1992 meeting of a United States- Russian working group, the Russian side observed that it viewed co-operation on a global protection system as part of a broad range of new and important contacts which will fundamentally alter the strategic relationship between Russia and the West. The Russians also observed that this fundamental development would transcend any political changes that might take place in either country. The ABM treaty does not appear to be a necessary stumbling- block for United States - Russian co-operation. At the October United States-Russian working group meeting, the Russian side suggested that outstanding issues to be resolved, "to include ABM treaty relief, did not pose an insurmountable problem". Indeed, some senior Russian officials, including Grigoriy Berdennikov, a member of the joint high-level group, have observed that the ABM treaty does not in any way hinder a GPS because the ABM treaty restricts national missile defence programmes and a GPS would be developed, created and operated on a multinational basis. Numerous Americans and Russians, including Henry Kissinger, the chief United States architect of the ABM treaty, have declared that treaty to be archaic in the new international environment. It now appears that charges of missile defence being a catalyst for heightened arms competition and instability are out of date. The Russian Federation and the United States clearly have mutual incentives and intentions to move together to revise the ABM treaty and to deploy missile defences, with each gaining greater security. In summary and conclusion, the proliferation of increasingly lethal ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction will introduce an unprecedented threat, first to Europe, Japan and Russia, and then to the United States. In the absence of missile defence, countries armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction will pose a direct threat to our cities and be able to challenge both our will and capability to respond to regional aggression. In the absence of missile defence, the type of coalition-building and successful out-of- area power projection recently conducted against Iraq will be increasingly difficult and risky. A number of responses to proliferation have been suggested and pursued. These responses include: deterrence, export controls and offensive strikes. An examination of these proposed counters suggests, however, that none can replace missile defence. Individually or in combination they cannot promise protection against limited missile threats. In short, there are complements, but no reliable substitutes for missile defence. The need for defences in the emerging strategic environment will become increasingly obvious during the 1990s. It seems nearly certain that both the West and the Russian Federation ultimately will pursue missile defence - proliferation will compel it. This opportunity to pursue common security interests - not at the expense of one another, but in co-operation - could help to define the character of the post-cold war order. I thank you for your attention, and will be pleased to respond to any questions or comments you may have. Lt. General GRAHAM (Ret.) (Director of High Frontier, United States). - It is fitting that this conference be held in Italy which is the only member of WEU whose territory has been attacked with ballistic missiles. I refer to the Libyan attack on Lampedusa, happily a failure. Also happily for some unknown target in some NATO country, an accidental attack by a nuclear- armed Soviet ballistic missile, which a Soviet Rocket Troops general reported was fired by accident some years ago, malfunctioned and failed to follow its path to terrible destruction. These events underscore the seriousness of your undertaking here in Rome. On the one hand, more "Libyas" are acquiring the capability to strike the territories of European and other states with ballistic missiles and mass destruction warheads. On the other, the uncertainties of political and military affairs in the former Soviet states increase the chances of accidental or unauthorised launch of missiles at Western European, North American, or even Far Eastern countries. To ignore these growing threats would be both military and political folly with tragic probable consequences. High Frontier United States and High Frontier Europa have for the past ten years urged co-operation between Europe and the United States in the creation of defences against the most awesome of modern military weapons, ballistic missiles armed with mass destruction warheads. We are in general accord as to the most practical solution to this problem in light of the changed and still changing nature of the ballistic missile threat. In brief, our recommendation is the further extension of the extended air defence system of NATO to include the co- ordination, but not direct control, of national anti-ballistic missile defences. In consonance with the views of the Russian Government expressed by Mr. Yeltsin at the June 1992 summit meeting in Washington, which called for a global protection system involving countries other than the United States and Russia, we believe that nations outside NATO who are willing to co-operate should be welcome to participate. This would include East European states, former Soviet states, Israel, and certainly Japan, now threatened by the intransigence of North Korea. NATO is the only existing international organisation capable of planning and co-ordinating such a global protection system. The contribution of the United States to such a system would be primarily in the area of space-based interceptors and their warning and tracking supporting systems. The space systems would be able to detect, track and destroy any ballistic missile fired from any point on earth fired at any target - except for very short-range missiles. This would provide protection for areas not defended by surface-based systems, and make the surface-based systems deployed by co-operating nations far more effective. This is due to the fact that the surface-based systems would be required to deal only with missiles escaping early destruction by the space system and due also to the greatly-enhanced efficiency of surface-based systems when provided accurate warning and tracking data from space sensors. A second, very important United States contribution to this concept should be provision of SDI-developed warheads for surface-based missiles which can sharply increase effectiveness and sharply lower costs. The primary contribution of European and other nations would be provision of defences of their own territory, the means and scale of which to be determined by individual nations. All WEU nations have the capability to build or purchase the basic missiles required for surface-based ballistic missile defences. Russia already possesses such weaponry and others (e.g. Israel) are well on the way to acquiring them. The only constraint on the development of national ABM systems would be the need for compatibility with the warning and tracking data supplied by United States-developed space systems. One technological development in the field of ABM interceptors should be of great interest to NATO and to any government seeking ways to defence against missiles while avoiding great costs. This is the LEAP (lightweight endoatmospheric projectile). LEAP is a small, smart missile- kill package with adequate sensors and manoeuvrability to lock onto and intercept targets both in atmosphere and in space, given reasonably accurate tracking information from auxiliary space sensors. This is a technology which has been aggressively pursued by the United States SDI effort for nearly ten years. In May 1984, this type of technology enabled the homing overlay experiment (HOE) to intercept a target warhead in space. At that time, the intercept package weighed over 500 kg. In a remarkable demonstration of miniaturisation, the LEAP package now weighs from 6 to 25 kg depending on variations in the design by four United States companies. LEAP technology has been extensively tested. Its very light weight makes it possible to add a propulsive stage to creat an "enabling stack" to increase the velocity, range and performance of surface-based intercept systems. This opens up an opportunity to retrofit currently available missiles, replacing conventional warheads with the LEAP stack to create very effective anti-ballistic missile systems without the high costs of totally new systems. This option is currently being developed by the United States army with Patriot, by the navy with the Aegis missiles, and by the air force with SRAM and modified Minuteman ICBMs. Similar options should be available to modify current missiles of other than United States origin. I regret to report that the current situation regarding SDI is not promising for our view of practical global defences against ballistic missiles. Our military programmes in general are under heavy political pressure, and SDI has always been a special target for our farthest left politicians. Even so, the Clinton administration has proposed level funding, i.e. the same $3.8 billion of the total is to be spent on tactical-theatre defences and on a single ground-launch site in North Dakota. There is only $800 million for all the rest of the SDI programme including space-borne systems, which are likely to be relegated to "research" only. This priority of expenditure is politically based and is contrary to strategic, military and technological common sense. Much of it springs from an illogical reverence for the ABM Treaty - a relic of cold war, designed to deal with nuclear confrontation between two superpowers (one of which no longer exists), and made obsolete by twenty years of technological advance. But the urge to maintain that treaty exists and results in huge sums being spent on a marginally effective, but treaty-compliant, set of 100 launchers in Dakota protecting the least-populated third of America. It also results in even heavier expenditures on "tactical" and "theatre" systems less impacted by the treaty and deployed in Europe where the nations are not signatories to the treaty. We at High Frontier have serious logic problems with the concepts of "tactical" and "theatre" defences. Emphasis on tactical ABM defences assumes that the current and growing ballistic missile threats are designed to attack United States and allied military forces in battle. This is absolutely not the case. The missiles we worry about still existing in the former Soviet states are not the tactical ones. Missiles being acquired or in the hands of rogue nations are not being acquired in order to attack military forces in the field; they are for attack or threat of attack on cities. Iran and Iraq fired hundreds of missiles at Baghdad and Tehran, not military forces. Saddam Hussein fired at cities, not military installations per se. The use of the term "theatre" to describe United States ABM systems deployed abroad is also misleading. Is Europe really a "theatre of operations" in today's strategic situation? Or is that merely a convenient holdover of cold war nomenclature? The reality is that the current United States programme visualises deployable United States surface ABM units - ground and naval - stationed in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East providing what is essentially national defences for European and other nations. While this might appear to be the lowest cost option for Europeans, I suspect that there will be good reasons found in European capitals to object to such a dependency. I am sure that the United States Congress will eventually object to spending the bulk of United States SDI funds to defend other nations while Americans remain vulnerable. The terms "tactical" and "theatre" thus have little meaning in the context of defending ourselves against ballistic missiles. At best they suggest ranges of missiles - "tactical", a few hundred kilometres range; "theatre", more than a few hundred kilometres. The use of these terms within United States Government circles is driven by the desire of some bureaucrats and politicians to avoid the terms "strategic" and "global", terms that invoke the need for space-borne, not merely surface- based defences. If we must speak in terms of "tactical" or "theatre" defences, we should nonetheless bear in mind that space-borne systems are the most effective and least costly defence against missiles of all ranges (except the very shortest-range weapons which are not the weapons constituting the grave threat to our nations). Every Iraqi Scud fired in the Gulf war could have been intercepted by a Brilliant Pebbles defensive system had it been deployed. There are sound technical, operational and strategic reasons for stressing the space-borne intercept systems. Technically, space-borne systems have a great advantage over surface-based systems in their capability to intercept in the early stages of a missile's trajectory when the target is large and slow relative to the interceptor. Surface-based systems intercept in the late stages of trajectory when the target is small and very fast relative to the interceptor. Operationally, space-borne interceptors, engaging their targets early in trajectory, cause debris and/or submunitions to fall far away from the defended target rather than on those being defended. Strategically, space-borne defences require no guesswork as to the probable target areas of accidental, unauthorised or rogue nation attack or blackmail threats. Surface-based systems, because of limits to the area they can effectively defend, must be deployed with a predetermination of likely targets for missile attack. Further, while any defence against ballistic missiles reduces the enthusiasm of nations to acquire such weapons, the global nature of the space-borne systems would have the broadest and strongest deterrent effect on proliferation. The current political scene in the United States does not bode well for the vigorous pursuit of the space-borne capabilities which are the key to co-operation among the nations of Europe in a common defence. However, increasing strategic uncertainties world-wide, the need to discourage the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and the serious attention of Europeans and Russians to these problems give us hope that the United States SDI programme will be reoriented toward more promising ends soon. The results of this conference in Rome could have tremendous impact on the fluid scene in Washington. If the WEU experts here assembled recognise the need for global ballistic missile defence and the crucial role that space-borne assets would play in a multinational effort, I am sure their views will carry great weight in current deliberations by my government. Russia's anti-missile defence Mr. TCHUVAKHIN (Deputy Director for Missile Technology, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation).- I am grateful for this opportunity to speak at this symposium. The matters being discussed have come to the forefront of international security policy. Russia's military and politics are close to those of the Western European countries. The background to this is that there have been radical political transformations in the world in 1989-90 with a shift in the East-West confrontation which has reached a stage of partnership in which new challenges are studied and identified. The principal East-West milestones and efforts were the treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces (1990); the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons - START-1 (1991); and START-2 (1992). These are tremendous achievements, but at the same time they have attenuated other problems that are still unsolved and may have a dramatic influence on strategic stability. First, there are problems relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The paradox of the situation is that, in several of these areas, the international legal mechanisms and regimes that have, to some degree, been effective were introduced before the Soviet Union (Russia) and the United States concluded the abovementioned treaties. Hence the question of the steps to be taken and the efforts to be made by the international community of civilised states to strengthen these regimes significantly. In short, it is essential to have another look at non-proliferation problems, first of all in the context of today's radical political changes. This is the very standpoint from which Russia's proposal on the joint establishment and use of the global protection system (GPS) by the international community should be considered. I should like to make one remark straight away. As you know, addressing the entire international community, the President of the Russian Federation put this idea to the United Nations Security Council. However, it so happened that the actual discussion of GPS problems was started in the context of the Russo-American dialogue. The outline for such a discussion was drawn up at the Washington summit meeting in June 1992 where it was decided to set up a high-level group (with Mr. Mamedov for Russia). This group held two rounds of consultations: in Moscow in July and in Washington in September. Three working groups held consultations in Moscow in October 1992. They concentrated on non-proliferation, the establishment of a joint concept and the attitude towards the exchange of technology. The discussions were very substantial, useful and fruitful. On several aspects, positions were identical. On others, it was seen that special studies were necessary. At the same time, it was noted that there were differences of views with the former United States administration on certain aspects. Russia is prepared to pursue this dialogue. We understand, however, that the new United States administration will take some time to work out its analysis and assess and define politico-military priorities. We hope this will not take too long. For this reason and in view of our undertakings regarding the confidentiality of the dialogue with the United States, I shall have to confine myself to describing the main aspects of in the Russian concept of the GPS without giving details of the discussion we had during the bilateral consultations. In short, there are two main aspects to the Russian concept of the GPS: first, technical: establishment of a system of measures to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, testing and the combat use of missiles and also a system of protective measures against their use; second, politico-legal: strengthening existing regimes relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, particularly the regime for controlling ballistic technology, including the question of setting up new and more effective regimes. Before moving on to a more detailed description of each of these elements and their interaction, allow me first to say something about the fundamental principles of the GPS concept. First, the maintenance and strengthening of strategic stability. Here I wish to go into rather more detail. In the discussion in scientific and public circles, the idea sometimes emerges that Russia has changed its attitude towards the role of anti-missile defence systems and their impact on stability. This idea is wrong. We are still thinking about the real situation, i.e. the existence of five nuclear powers and their potential to ensure strategic stability. It goes without saying that our policy is counting on the role of this factor diminishing in the future. We hope that the other three nuclear powers will subscribe to the nuclear disarmament plan. At present, however, the deterrent factor must be recognised. In this context, our attitude towards the treaty on anti- missile defence remains intact. It is a bilateral agreement. It concerns the strategic anti-missile defence system of Russia and of the United States - systems to fight against strategic ballistic missiles. Maintaining this treaty is the condition for ensuring implementation of the START-1 and START-2 agreements. Yet it is quite clear that the significance of this treaty goes beyond the framework of bilateral relations between the United States and Russia, and the world recognises this. Second, opening up the GPS to participation by a large number of states. We consider that, although Russia and the United States started this dialogue, they have no right to dictate new collective security standards and principles to other countries. That is why the Russian approach assumes that, before practical work starts on the GPS, the approval of the international community must be obtained for the appropriate concept. Third, conciliation in the development and use of the GPS. We believe the GPS can be of real benefit only if the potentials of other countries are associated in its work. Here the main criterion must be the possibility of collective management of the system. However, this must not conflict with the sovereign right of individual participants to retain control of their national components. Fourth, creation of the GPS step by step. The complexity of creating such a collective security system in accordance with objective political transformations and their development means that the system will have to be set up gradually. This concern both the technical and the politico-legal components. Now I shall speak in greater detail about the technical and politico-legal components of the GPS. It is essential to give priority to the objective perception of the threat to the international community stemming from the proliferation in the world of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The GPS must be set up on a basis of profitability. For instance, the scale of the means of active counter-action deployed must be strictly in relation to the threat. However, everything has a price. If we can manage to prevent proliferation effectively by perfecting existing international regimes we should no longer need one or other anti-ballistic missile system. We estimate that, in the near future, it is unlikely that third countries will have missiles with a range of more than 2 000 to 2 500 km. The ability to produce tactical ballistic missiles and intercontinental missiles is a gigantic technological "gift". Here, one can obtain a better idea of the choice of appropriate means of counter-action and the location of regions of greater risk. The other potential threat is from unauthorised launchings of ballistic missiles, which is not very probable. However, this problem can be solved through measures to improve technical and organisational efforts to prevent such launchings. The third threat is an inadequate assessment of the situation where missiles and space are concerned. The only way out is to improve the system that gives early warning of any launching of ballistic missiles whatsoever, thereby preventing this happening (French proposal). All this leads to the idea of setting up, during the first stage of the GPS, an international centre to give early warning of missile attacks (EWC) which might then take over the duties of the GPS management centre. The EWC might carry out the following tasks: gathering and analysing information on the testing and launching of ballistic missiles for combat or training purposes, the estimated targets of launchings and undeclared launchings, and their flight parameters and data on the combat use of these missiles; through the United Nations, informing other states of the proliferation, testing and deployment of missiles; monitoring space production. The EWC might take as a technical basis Russian and United States anti-missile observation systems. The sovereignty of national systems must be safeguarded. In the future other countries should have such observation systems. Algorithms and criteria for transmitting information should be concerted. During the first stage of the GPS, the tactical system of anti-missile defence might also be studied. In particular, this should cover the creation of rapid-deployment tactical anti-missile defence, similar to the system in the Persian Gulf. These formations would be deployed in crisis areas on the orders of the GPS management centre and at the request of the participating countries concerned or following a decision by the United Nations Security Council. It is essential to carry out the study of the whole of this technical part of the GPS in parallel with efforts to strengthen existing regimes aimed at the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their ballistic means of delivery (1968 non-proliferation treaty, 1987 bacteriological, 1987 ballistic and 1992 chemical). A word about the ballistic missile technology control regime. We are respecting it, but it is not a treaty. There are no systematic verifications. There are exceptions and ambiguity in its provisions. We need a new mechanism and new stimulus, an International Atomic Energy Agency in the ballistic and space areas (but this may be refused). Co-operation in the peaceful use of space must not be jeopardised. Then there is Cocom. To sum up, we hope to pursue the dialogue with the United States; the opinion of the western countries is extremely important; we must have an accurate perception of the threat; it is time to set up an early-warning centre; the regimes must be strengthened and we must work together in the area of defence against tactical missiles. Russia and the organisation of a world system of protection Dr. FITUNI (Director, Centre for Global and Strategic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow). - I will try to shorten up my prepared paper because my colleague and compatriot, Mr. Tchuvakhin, has actually helped me by very accurately and correctly describing the stance of the Russian Government and the vision of the concept of global protection. I think that, for the sake of understanding the present situation in Russia and the present vision in Russia of the problem, we should also consider the whole gamut of the questions and political discussions surrounding anti-missile defence, both in Europe and in the world in general. Of course, the diplomatic post of my colleague has made his task rather difficult. So as to explain not only the official view of the problem but to give you an idea of other interpretations of the problem and, understanding Mr. Tchuvakhin's problem, I will try to help him in his effort. Not being a state official but being a researcher, an academic, I am in an easier position. I would like to remind you that after ten years of transition Russia has found itself in a new political, strategic, economic and social cultural situation. Many strategic guidelines and landmarks have been lost. Communist ideology and confrontation have lost their role of determining both foreign policy and defence doctrine. But new concepts have been too slow in replacing the old ones and at present we have a strange situation where new concepts co-exist with old ways of technically dealing with the problem. This dichotomy reflects a generic problem for the present situation in Russia. For many reasons, it is difficult to speak about Russia's role in international efforts and in particular in building up anti- missile defence. For example, in four days time we are to have a referendum that might to some extent alter the whole vision of the problem and have big repercussions on both our foreign policy and the international atmosphere. So I think it is important to analyse all points of view so as to see our future more clearly. On 2nd March, parliamentary hearings on the START-2 Treaty, signed by President Yeltsin and President Bush, began in Moscow. They are due to continue for two months, with a two-week interval, generating intensive discussions between politicians and military experts. The Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence acted in unison to defend the treaty. Their opponents are mainly from the ranks of the people's deputies, many of whom criticise the treaty as an unequal one. One of the issues discussed was a close interdependence of defensive and offensive armaments issues. The START-2 Treaty contains no direct linkage with anti- ballistic defence issues or the ABM Treaty. The latter is mentioned in the preamble, as well as a joint statement by the Russian and American Presidents made in June 1992, which said: "The presidents continued their discussion of the potential benefits of a global protection system (GPS) against ballistic missiles, agreeing that it is important to explore the role for defences in protecting against limited ballistic missile attacks." This kind of latent linkage of course contains deeply-rooted contradictions, which may in the long run bring about a certain devaluation of the ABM Treaty. For twenty years, it was an important barrier in the way of the arms race. However, the new sentiment among many Russian democratic politologists is that the ABM Treaty, signed at the height of the cold war, is outdated and requires reviewing. It is interesting, however, to point out that the amendments they want to see in the treaty are directed towards liberalising the restrictions imposed by the present treaty. Thus the question is being raised of broadening the possibilities of testing some components of anti-ballistic missile systems, creating new regional defence projects, etc. This recalls the United States attempt back in 1987-88 to adopt a broad interpretation of the treaty to facilitate SDI reconciliation with the ABM Treaty. However, the United States Congress confirmed the interpretation of the treaty in its orignal form. Is there really a shift in the Russian stand and how viable is the idea of Russian participation in the GPS? On the one hand, there are a number of written documents and even practical steps have been taken to translate this kind of participation into practice. We may single out three main levels of such activity: (a) the conceptual level; (b) the legal, and diplomatic level; (c) the practical implementation level. Speaking of the first conceptual level, it is important to remember that Russia's participation in any international GPS effort should conform with broader state military and political doctrine, and in particular comply with the state doctrine of strategic defence. Russia is now living through a transitional period, whose main characteristic feature is the coexistence of old doctrines and practices from Soviet times and the revolutionary approaches of reformers. The situation is made more complex by the ongoing struggle between the presidential reformist team and a broad gamut of opponents, starting from more cautious democrats and centrists and finishing with communists and nationalists. Though the top people in the Defence Ministry and major related entities have been replaced by President Yeltsin's supporters, the bulk of experts and upper-middle decision-makers are people trained in the old days. Many of them are simply unable to change their ideas about the nation's defence requirements and tend to think in terms of the old superpower system of co-ordinates. In this context, one may say that to reach any kind of agreement with a top-ranking Russian delegation is to walk along only part of the road. As you know, last year the presidents agreed "to start work without delay to develop the concept of the GPS". How the two presidents agreed that their two nations should work, together with allies and other interested states, in de concept for such system is part of an overall strategy regarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Such co-operation would be a tangible expression of the new relationship that exists between Russia and the United States and would involve them in an important undertaking with other nations of the world community. After some procrastination, an agreement was reached on creating a group of experts, who would study potential steps in sharing early-warning information, technical questions (such as co-operation in developing ABM technologies) and working on juridical issues of such co-operation. While the stand of the government and the President on the GPS issue is quite evident and unambiguous, the arguments of opponents both in parliament and among military and experts need some clarification. On the conceptual level they stress that Russia's participation in the GPS will have global political, military and economic implications, because the concept in itself is not purely military or technological. In the political sphere, the opponents of participation regard the GPS as yet another attempt to solve both international and President Yeltsin's own political problems with the help of a new round of the arms race by developing new military technologies. They cite many past examples of such attempts and forecast that it will be just another waste of Russia's scarce resources. They emphasise that intergovernmental projects of this kind are usually executed within the programmes of military blocs and alliances. The GPS is a project of the most developed industrial nations. Thus, less-developed countries will feel permanently threatened by it. This will intensify the political and strategic division between North and South, enhance military confrontation and generate the creation of new military alliances. The counter-arguments on the military repercussions of the GPS are mainly centred around the threat of a qualitatively new level of the arms race. United States specialists agree that the necessary level of efficiency of interception of the attacking missiles can be reached only provided that an echelon of space interceptors is created. For this purpose, Brilliant Pebbles interceptors of global coverage, capable of intercepting 500 km (and more) range missiles, are to be based in space, thus bringing the arms race into the last natural environment free from nuclear armaments. Another weak point, to their mind, is the military limitations of these weapons. Not only ballistic, but also tactical, long-range or cruise missiles may be used as carriers for nuclear warheads. Civilian means of transportating nuclear weapons cannot be excluded, this being the more probable because of the obvious financial constraints of potential aggressors. The expensive GPS will then protect against a very limited and specific kind of carriers, those which are the least probable for the third world countries that we are thinking of. Those were the most frequent citations of the GPS heard in the Russian Parliament. However, with or without Russian participation, the implementation of the programme is now a reality. The global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) option, which envisages interception of 200 delivery vehicles, became the focus of the western anti-nuclear attack defence effort. Based on kinetic energy use (destruction by means of physical impact), GPALS comprises three basis systems: space- based sensors, the Brilliant Eyes and ground-based interceptors deployed on six sites in the United States. The first one is to be inaugurated in Grand Forks in 1996. The project will cost at least $25 billion; tactical anti-missile systems, deployed in the United States, in conflict areas and on ships to protect the United States forces and their allies ($10 billion); Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptors of global coverage, capable of intercepting 500 km (and more) range missiles. The Congress has authorised only research and development expenses for this component. However, the overall cost of the project, according to some estimates, may reach $100 billion by the year 2005. According to the GPAL's proponents, the project no longer aims to protect regional alliances against limited Soviet intervention, but against unforeseen attacks, arising from regional conflicts or unauthorised or accidental launches. However, the provenance of the accidental attacks is well- defined: non-authorised strikes from the ex-USSR, China or "proliferators" from the Middle East. Within the framework of "expense-sharing" and partly in order to secure their political and military leadership, the United States is trying to "sell" the project to Europeans. Taken the sluggish state of European military industries, they may well succeed in their effort. This, however, may seriously influence the nuclear defence doctrines of both France and Great Britain. Contrary to original SDI logics, GPALS is no longer based on the idea of dissuasive strategy but on the concept of operational anti- ballistic missile protection. The adoption of this doctrine would include Europe in American "operational continuum", thus reinforcing American strategic and military leadership. In case of real conflict, it would also mean not containment but "peripheral" field action. What may Russia's role be in this context? Both Russia's existing capabilities and unused potential might be used for that purpose. Needless to say, in its present state Russia will not be able to become an equal financial contributor to the project, and consequently may only be regarded as a junior partner in it. Some Russian missiles from the old days may become its material input. For example, top United States SDI experts earnestly study the possibility of using Russian heavy SS-18 missiles, which are to be liquidated for putting into space "Brilliant Pebbles" interceptors. However, Russia's participation may drastically reduce the costs of some elements of the GPS. I am speaking mainly about technological aspects of co-operation. According to information the Centre for Strategic and Global Studies has at its disposal, the United States is planning to acquire at least 50 different supersensitive technologies from the Soviet Union on very favourable terms, paying on average $1 million for each of them. Even more promising is a possibility of incorporating individual Russian scientists into western research in a modern version of the Manhattan project. Russian participation seems to be very promising because the form envisaged virtually does not have a negative effect on the economic interests of potential western participants. Russians are seen only as playing a limited (though cost-saving) role in research, rather than marketing their final manufactured products. This possiblity may be dangerous for Mr. Yeltsin's image at home. The West still continues to preserve many of the cold war restrictions on technology exports to Russia (including some types of computers). On the other hand, CSGS research shows that, even in the case of the United States being prepared to exchange technologies on equal terms, the present state of Russia's economy will not allow it to be used, meaning that they will simply join the ranks of many Russian original technologies unused at home. However, despite the hostile attitudes from many politicians and a majority of technical implementors in Russia, involvement in the GPS becomes more and more significant. On the infrastructure level three Russian-American groups have been set up: (a) on the concept of global protection system to study the structure, conditions and functions of a future protection system; (b) on technical co-operation to examine research and development projects and possible tasks; (c) on non-proliferation of weapons. Joint testing of plasma weapons may become the first practical co-operation effort. As discussed during the last summit, Russia and America may fulfil a joint project "Trust", which envisages destruction of ballistic missiles with the help of Russian-built microwave and optic plasma generators and systems. The disintegration of the Soviet Union was one of the main factors conducive to the GPS concept. Two new elements of destabilisation undermined the old global nuclear security balance: quantitative increase of de facto nuclear powers (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan) and the relative transparency of ex-Soviet borders for arms trafficking on the one hand, as well as the disappearance of superpower rivalry, which ironically served as a containment factor for third world countries feeling threatened by "the other" superpower (now they have to look for protection on their own). It is obvious that, after the disintegration of the USSR and the end of confrontation between the East and the West, the world faces a new danger - the threat of uncontrollable spread of nuclear and other superdangerous technologies, and their falling into the hands of aggressive, dictatorial and terrorist regimes, organisations or even individuals. The new threat is many times more dangerous than the one we were accustomed to, because it is obscure, unpredictable, there are no rules of the game and it is not regulated by any security mechanisms created in the past. In this respect, GPS may become an adequate response to new challenges. Future prospects for disarmament, arms exports control and non-proliferation Mr. KARP (SIPRI, Sweden). - It is hard to recall, but as recently as the mid-1980s the threat of missile proliferation seemed remote if not fanciful. A few well-publicised launches had raised western awareness of regional interest in long-range rocketry. But any such concerns were trifling compared to the overwhelming dangers of superpower nuclear confrontation. While no one, to my knowledge, disputed the importance of the issue, only a handful of officials and analysts were prepared to take it seriously. This situation changed suddenly only five years ago. In 1987-88 missile proliferation became a topic for discussion at the highest levels of government, at international summits, in the press and at conferences like this one. A rapid series of revelations forced the issue upon the international agenda. First came the disclosure of the Argentine-Egyptian-Iraqi Condor-2 intermediate-range missile programme; this was followed a few weeks later by the dramatic use of hundreds of ballistic missiles in the war of the cities between Iran and Iraq. Soon long-range rocket projects were discovered in virtually every region of the world. In the eyes of many, missile proliferation is a symbol of the anarchy prevailing after the cold war. The problem appeared just as the superpower confrontation was receding. Not since the world learned of the atomic bomb in August 1945 has a major threat to international security appeared so abruptly. The discovery that dozens of regional actors possessed or were experimenting with large rockets was uniquely chilling. Potentially armed with anything from conventional explosives to thermonuclear warheads, these new weapons threaten to recreate the balance of terror from which the world had just escaped. Trends and capabilities The discovery of missile proliferation in the late 1980s was such a shock for many observers that it led to exaggeration of the problem. Press reports contributed to the alarm and confusion by revealing dozens of previously obscure regional rocket projects, typically implying these had only recently started and were close to establishing complete regional strategic forces. Public officials in America and elsewhere wove these tales into a lurid picture of rockets out of control. The hype made it easy to overlook the fact that most regional rocket programmes had started years or decades ago and few showed signs of rapid progress. The intervening years have helped separate the wheat from the chaff. There can be no doubt that missile proliferation poses a grave danger to international peace and stability. But it is misleading to view it as a uniform threat; the challenge of missile proliferation varies significantly from country to country. Missile proliferators themselves can be divided into three categories: those with substantial indigenous technical resources capable of creating their own strategic missile forces, those with sufficient resources to conduct rocketry development but only with large-scale foreign help, and those dependent on foreign suppliers for entire missile systems. First-tier proliferators: The first category of missile proliferators, those capable of indigenously developing a complete strategic missile force, is very exclusive. Nor is it likely to grow very rapidly. Of all regional powers, Israel has both developed and deployed its own long-range, nuclear-armed missile forces. Israel has invested in rocketry research and development systematically since the early 1960s, culminating in the current Jericho II-Shavit series, which appears to be fully integrated into its strategic forces. Israel relied extensively on foreign technology - mostly from France - in the early years. Today it has the only truly indigenous regional rocket programme among all emerging powers, with little need for foreign assistance. Only political choice and military doctrine restrain its its missile forces, which almost certainly could be expanded to include ICBMs. The only other regional power with comparable technical capabilities is India. The Indian research programme is as old as Israel's and considerably larger in scale, although it has not demonstrated equal coherence. With resources divided among several competing civilian and military projects, India has been unable to bring any but the smallest to completion (1) . Nor has New Delhi made strategic decisions establishing clear goals for these projects. Instead, India's rocketry programmes exhibit the symptoms of a vague experiment. Despite several test launches of large civilian and military rockets since 1980, little has been accomplished beyond showing long-run potential. Such demonstrations are not without impact; with the launch of the PSLV booster scheduled for this year, India will mark the ability to develop ICBMs. North Korea is the only other nation known to be rapidly developing a strategic rocket force of its own. Although its engineering capabilities are more limited, North Korea stands out for its goals, as much economic as military. Work started in the early 1970s, but there was little progress until the early 1980s when the programme was wedded exclusively to Scud technology. By 1987 Scud copies were in series production and sold to Iran. An extended range version was transferred to Syria and Libya in 1992 and assembly arranged for Iran and possibly Egypt. With a 1 000 km version under development, North Korea has reached the limits of Scud technology and seems unlikely to make further advances unless a new source of technology can be found. Within the range of its capabilities, however, North Korea is the single most destabilising of missile proliferators, both mostly likely to use and most likely to sell its missiles. A comprehensive list of countries capable of developing ballistic missiles would have to include more distant possibilities, countries lacking any intention to develop long- range ballistic missiles today but which could do so if compelled. Leading this list is Japan, whose M series solid- fuel space launchers could be adapted into IRBMs within a few months, although high-performance guidance and re-entry vehicles would require a few years for full development. Japan's liquid- fuel N and H series launchers could be adapted into ICBMs, but with greater difficulty. Britain, Canada, Germany, Italy and Ukraine have industries capable of developing large rockets within as little as five years, while Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland could do so in roughly ten years. Second-tier proliferators: After these countries follow a second class that has experimented with large-scale rocket technology but, for one reason or another, has not been able to extend this work beyond the prototype stage. All relied extensively on foreign assistance and have had great difficulty since it became difficult to acquire in the late 1980s. Several dropped their programmes before the metal-cutting stage where expenses swiftly rise. Others probably were never committed to the idea of full-scale development and abandoned it after some initial experiments, as appears to have been the case in Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan. A few like Argentina, Brazil, Egypt and South Africa downgraded their programmes as regional tensions eased and to avoid antagonising outside powers, especially the United States. Others like Iran, Libya and Pakistan found it infinitely easier to rely on missiles purchased from China or North Korea. And one country - Iraq - was forced to stop by the military intervention of United Nations forces. With their own programmes moribund, several of these countries now fall to the third tier. The overwhelming question in these moribund cases is what technology and what interest remain? Can they still develop long-range rockets within a decade or so? Or must they start virtually from scratch? One of the most daunting questions in assessing quiescent missile programmes is determining whether a project is over permanently, if technical resources have been shelved for future applications, or if design and development work actually continue. In countries where the armed forces and other agencies have substantial autonomy it is entirely possible for relevant work to continue in extreme secrecy, even without the knowledge or consent of the central government. An extreme example of this ambiguity is the Argentine Condor II, which the Menem government declared at an end in April 1990. The decision prompted a tug of war with the Argentine air force which kept the project alive covertly, a dispute which also had to do with the question of who controls the Argentine military. After many conflicting announcements, in February 1992 the remnants of the project were formally transferred to a civilian agency. The saga seems doomed to continue so long as Argentina still has some rocket technology left to fight over. Third-tier proliferators: A third and final group includes those countries relying entirely on foreign-supplied missiles. These countries are both the most susceptible to control and the most volatile; in lieu of foreign help there is little they can accomplish, but one shipment can give strategic clout overnight. The most extreme example is Iraq, which relied on foreign suppliers for all the ballistic missiles it deployed - its fifteen-year research and development programme failed to generate a single usable missile up to the moment that the United Nations Special Commission began to take it apart. Although Saddam has consolidated his remaining rocketry resources and started new projects, he has virtually no chance of deploying new missiles unless foreign suppliers can be found. The scale of foreign missile transfers can be intimidating. Iraq received over 800 Scuds from Moscow, while Afghanistan took another 2 000. China furnished Saudi Arabia with approximately 60 massive DF-3 IRBMs. But these cases appear to be exceptional. Ordinary recipients got only token numbers during the cold war; from this perspective the small missile forces of countries like Algeria, Cuba and Yemen appear to be historical accidents, not harbingers of future trends. But Libya, Pakistan and Syria have shown how the post-cold war diplomacy offers opportunities to buy from new suppliers if one is willing to endure the financial and diplomatic cost. The threat these various countries pose to international security varies greatly, as does their susceptibility to international control. A few countries more may be able to build and deploy large rockets on their own in the long run. Their progress, however, tends to be so deliberate it is readily monitored and scrutinised. Consequently, they can be countered one way or another long before they become seriously destabilising, leaving time for regional arms control and outside reactions. The most immediate danger arises from short- range weapons like the ubiquitous Scud which still can be purchased from foreign suppliers. Unlike long-range rockets, which are extremely difficult to buy abroad and equally difficult to improvise, short-range missiles can be bought quickly in large numbers, instantly creating grave and permanent threats. The market and foreign technology transactions The mechanisms of missile proliferation range from sales of complete rockets to transfers of arcane bits of equipment. Uniting almost all missile proliferators, however, is reliance on foreign technology. No regional actor has deployed operational ballistic missiles or space launch systems without relying on foreign technology. A few of the most advanced regional powers - the first group above - have accumulated enough foreign assistance to become largely autonomous. Yet control over the transfer of technology remains the most effective instrument in efforts to control the spread of missiles, especially over the short run. Deprived of foreign technical assistance, the vast majority of regional missile projects have come to a halt. Even in the most advanced regional powers the rate of progress is slowing down significantly. The trade in rocket technology has narrowed over the years as suppliers like Moscow and China became more circumspect. Today only North Korea still exports missiles with ranges over 300 km. With sources of large missile systems drying up, transfers of short-range missiles, components and manufacturing technologies have become the most important aspect of the trade. In these areas as well, most potential exporters have become increasingly restrictive. The missile technology trade has shrunk to a fraction of its dimensions five years earlier. What remains is mostly alarming exceptions, proof that vigilance never can be relaxed. The only countries that continue to license major exports of ballistic missiles or related technology do so almost exclusively for economic motives. Income from such transactions tends to go directly to the agency making the sale, be it the armed forces or civilian space agency, subsidising their own undertakings. The temptations can be great; for supplying DF-3 IRBMs to Saudi Arabia, the Chinese army earned an estimated $2.5 - 3.5 billion, North Korea's sale of some 100 Scuds to Iran in 1987 was the largest part of a $500 million deal, while Russia expects to earn $250 million for furnishing India with space launch engines. Although transfers of complete missile systems continue to pose a grave problem, the biggest problem today is the transfer of dual-use technology. Some of this, like engine nozzle fabrication equipment and fuel-processing facilities, has few other likely uses. But a vast array of equipment is required to develop a ballistic missile and much of this, like supercomputers and testing equipment, has numerous other applications. The growing trade in dual-use technology during the 1980s was not accidental; not only were would-be proliferators designing better procurement programmes, but supplier policy often favoured such exports (2) . The only way to cope with the dual-use problem is to change export policy, making restrictions as comprehensive as possible. Extreme restrictiveness is not without cost. The market for dual-use technology is potentially large and stands to benefit industries of strategic importance to supplier nations. The total investment for completion of the Argentine-Egyptian-Iraqi Condor II, for example, has been estimated at $4.5 billion, mostly for foreign equipment and support. Unlike most arms deals or defence-related transactions, moreover, this is pure income, undiminished by countertrade or offset requirements. To demand that military contractors abandon these opportunities in a time of declining defence spending at home requires a vigorous national consensus. As transfers to aid foreign rocketry programmes became more sensitive, suppliers went to great lengths to maintain discretion, sometimes concealing their activity through special subsidiaries and foreign brokers. But until the late 1980s transactions usually could be kept entirely legal. Indeed, even after the numerous revelations of European and North American firms in regional missile projects, prosecutions have been rare. Discretion was necessary, rather, to minimise other kinds of risks, illustrated by the attempted murder in 1988 of the European head of the Condor II and the assassination in 1990 of Gerald Bull, designer of Iraq's superguns and Al Abed long-range rocket. In both cases, it should be noted, the work skirted the law but remained legal, as illustrated by Britain's unsuccessful supergun prosecutions. Perhaps most surprising is the small role played by espionage and the black market. Both certainly have been present, as shown by American prosecutions of the Egyptian spy Abdelkader Helmy in 1989 and the American businessman James Guerin in 1990. Despite their notoriety, the role of such rascals is marginal. Regional powers seldom depend on the small bits and pieces that the illegal trade can provide. Rocket programmes are enormous undertakings, involving the co-ordinated acquisition of vast arrays of designs, equipment and facilities. They usually require continuous foreign assistance of the sort available only from major contractors, firms with independent financial strength and the protection that only comes with government approval. The black market is more romantic than significant, forever on the fringes of the incomparably more lucrative and secure legal activity. The black market can, at great expense, risk and delay, provide particular pieces of technology. But it cannot form the basis of a serious rocket programme. Of greater significance for control efforts is the pooling of technology among missile proliferators. This is a long- standing trend previously noted in other fields (3) . Commonly and mistakenly seen as a reaction against the rise of the MTCR, the trade among regional powers in missile technology dates at least to the late 1970s, when Egypt exported Scuds to North Korea. Co-operation on the Condor II was fully organised between Argentina, Egypt and Iraq a year before the MTCR went into limited effect. In the mid-1980s Israeli support became crucial to the South African rocket programme, while Iran received Scuds from Libya and Iraq got technical help from Brazil. The pooling of missile technology is potentially of great significance, enabling countries to circumvent multinational export restrictions. In practice it faces technical and political limits. Few regional powers have been able to go beyond Scud technology independently, and co-operation among themselves cannot overcome this natural limit; the levels of financing, expertise and foreign technology required for sophisticated rockets differ by orders of magnitude. Few regional actors have sufficient resources even if pooled. Although there may be technical benefits in the short run, in the long term such co-operation tends to combine weaknesses. Emerging exporters, moreover, must balance the diplomatic costs of their activity. In practice, many have abandoned the trade when pressed by outside powers. Having started with the Scud, regional co-operation alone appears to be insufficient to move beyond it. The need for foreign technology remains great, creating powerful opportunities for outside control. Opportunities for outside control The ability of emerging powers to continue procurement of ballistic missiles without outside assistance varies greatly. Countries in the third rank, having relied entirely on foreign suppliers for complete missiles, cannot acquire additional weapons. Their existing arsenals, moreover, will deteriorate without foreign servicing and oversight, with the readiness of more complex, longer-range weapons deteriorating fastest. Such weapons are complex and delicate; liquid-fuelled IRBMs can become permanently unusable after a few weeks without care. Middle Eastern Scud operators can be expected to perform routine maintenance to keep their missiles serviceable for as long as several years. But without spares and regular overhauls even these relatively simple systems will become highly unreliable. Five years after a complet cut-off, only unguided, solid-fuel weapons like the Frog would be fully operational. Second-rank countries, lacking full indigenous capabilities, also would be stuck with the missiles on hand, unable to continue production of whole rockets or development of new types. Their limited capabilities may be sufficient, however, to maintain their existing missiles more effectively and even perform some modification. Iraq, for example, apparently was able to continue extending the range of its Scud inventory by itself, but dropped its most ambitious variants (the 900 km al Abbas and 2000 km Tamuz-al Abed) when help was cut off. Without outside support, their forces will deteriorate over time, but not as rapidly as in less-developed countries. Only the most advanced emerging missile powers can continue manufacturing large rockets and make technical progress without direct foreign help. Even their progress will slow down. More ambitious projects must be dropped in favour of gradual development of existing technology. As Israel has shown, over time this strategy can lead to highly capable systems. But even a country like India would have to make major concessions in its space launch plans and concentrate its resources on its least demanding projects to assure progress. Without outside help, missile proliferators must contend alone with the technical hurdles that have impeded development of large rockets everywhere. Unless a country can replicate an enormous array of research and development work, investing tens of billions of dollars and wait over a decade, foreign help is essential. This must cover such diverse elements as missile aerodynamics, high-energy fuels, engine design, guidance and control systems, stage separation, re-entry vehicles, fusing and armament, systems integration, testing and support. No emerging power has tried to undertake such an effort alone (4) . The MTCR and the structure of proliferation The importance of outside technical assistance creates tremendous opportunities for export controls to slow or even halt the proliferation process. But the unco-ordinated efforts of dozens of potential exporters would not amount to much; left to themselves, as was the case before the mid-1980s, the market for missile technology would attract exporters convinced that "if I don't, someone else will". By establishing even standards for export controls, the missile technology control regime provided an alternative to this kind of competition. Since it was publicly unveiled in 1987, the missile technology control regime has become an important and widely- accepted element of the new world order. It undoubtedly will continue to serve as an essential instrument of non- proliferation diplomacy for decades to come. Yet it remains extremely controversial. Officials have praised its success, especially in helping to terminate provocative missile programmes like the Argentine-Egyptian-Iraqi Condor-2. Others point to its mediocre performance dealing with established suppliers like China and its total inability to restrain the missile exports of North Korea. As in most things, the truth regarding the MTCR lies somewhere between. Neither panacea nor failure, it is only one element in a complete non-proliferation strategy. Like older export control regimes such as Cocom, the London Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australian Group on chemical weapons precursors, the MTCR does not have the power of an international treaty. Its commitments are formalised by trading diplomatic notes. The regime establishes "a strong presumption to deny" exports of rockets and cruise missiles capable of delivering a 500 kg warhead 300 km. Exports of major missile components such as engines and guidance sets are denied except under "binding government-to-government assurances", while facilities for their production "will not be authorised". Transfers of dual-use manufacturing technologies are permitted only with assurances that they will not contribute to long-range missiles (5) . If missile proliferation can be said to symbolise the dangers of the post-cold war world, the MTCR is typical of the international community's shaky response. Crafted in confidence by middle-level officials with only a hazy image of the missile proliferation threat (its basic provisions were completed in 1985, before missile proliferation was well understood), it is a modest instrument at best. But by focusing on the weakest link in missile proliferation it was relatively easy to negotiate and surprisingly effective, especially at first. By greatly diminishing western exports of relevant technology, it played an instrumental role in slowing large rocket projects in Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan and South Africa, projects that were subsequently dropped or set aside. It was not sufficient to stop the more self-sufficient programmes of India and North Korea, although it has clearly slowed their rocketry development. The MTCR has become more effective over time through wider membership, better enforcement and tighter restrictions. Nevertheless, it appears that recent reforms and expansion have reached their practical limits. There is only so much that can be accomplished by export controls; a point of marginal returns has been reached, leaving policy-makers with no choice but to develop other non-proliferation mechanisms. Membership: The growth of membership is the most visible improvement in the regime. Since it was made public in 1987 the MTCR has seen its formal membership grow from 7 countries to 23, including all relevant western countries (6). Several East European countries and ex-Soviet republics have indicated their desire to join and undoubtedly will be admitted as soon as they have the necessary export controls fully in place. Other countries which do not intend to join for various idiosyncratic reasons have agreed to adhere to MTCR restrictions unilaterally, including Argentina, Brazil, Israel and South Africa. China also has stated its intention to respect MTCR guidelines but, with international confidence in Beijing low, it remains on virtual diplomatic probation. Only a few countries of any consequence remain to be brought within its framework. North Korea is the most conspicuous exception, the only country still exporting ballistic missiles beyond the MTCR thresholds. Enforcement: During its first few years, the MTCR was weakened by the low priority of the issue and the unwillingness of many members to enforce it rigorously. Lacking an institutional home or secretariat, the MTCR has no enforcement agency or mechanism. Its members meet twice a year, share intelligence and conduct a lively diplomatic dialogue. Enforcement, however, is the responsibility of individual members. At first France and Germany were noticeably hesitant to carry out their obligations; the French offer of Ariane engine technology to Brazil in 1989 and Bonn's continuing willingness to license exports of dual-use technology to India and Iraq led to major controversies. In practice, participants had to learn through experience. By 1989-90 enforcement had become more efficient and consistent, but lingering domestic disputes seem likely to ensure that controversies over missile technology exports will flare up in the future. Three types of domestic disputes make it difficult for leading supplier countries to resolve their missile export issues once and for all. First, export control issues inevitably involve numerous government agencies and legislative factions. Such disputes are fuelled by rival interpretations of the national interest, in which trade needs are sometimes subordinated and sometimes superior to security requirements. Moreover, the national interest itself changes over time, as yesterday's adversaries requiring strict controls become today's allies calling for free trade, inviting further strife. Restrictions: A final set of problems for the MTCR are the limits of its restrictions. The original Technology Annex represented a series of compromises between the desirable and the feasible. The participants agreed that it would be too difficult to control short-range missiles, a belief reinforced by their initial emphasis on missiles as nuclear delivery vehicles. The threshold for 500 kg payload, 300 km range missiles left out many of the conventional or chemically-armed ballistic weapons of greatest concern today, such as the Russian SS-21 and the Chinese M-11. The performance levels for dual-use technology also were set relatively high in order to permit established export trade. The lessons of Iraq and experience with India and other countries have shown that these limits must be tightened. The Iraqi experience catalysed support for the first major revision of the MTCR, released on 4th November 1991. The expanded and tightened Technology Annex is a great improvement, applying the lessons of dozens of controversies (7) . Previously limited to missiles able to carry nuclear warheads, it now covers chemical and biologically-armed missiles also. The revisions tighten controls on dual-use technology as well. There has been greater resistance among some members to proposals to reduce the missile range thresholds to 150 or 90 km, as has been widely suggested. Some influential members argue that the technology is too easily available for such measures to be effective. But there clearly will have to be a move in this direction if the MTCR is to continue responding to the problems of greatest current concern. The normative basis for control The MTCR will remain the foundation of efforts to stop ballistic missile proliferation for many years to come, continuing to gain support and effectiveness. Despite its strengths, however, the MTCR will never be able to create an image of fairness. Although it is a regime in the legal sense, its basis in adversarial delineations makes it more like an alliance politically. From the perspective of key regional spokesmen, of which India is the most vocal, the whole approach discriminates against the sovereign rights of regional governments to arm themselves as they see fit, to acquire a weapon accepted among other countries. The critique is important because it casts doubt on the legitimacy of North- South export controls in general. This challenge ultimately is a question of world order. Will future international security affairs be dominated by the pursuit of distinct national interests organised only through us-against-them alliances, or will it give a greater role to collective security organisations based on universal principles? Most missile suppliers are divided on such issues, willing to sacrifice some self-interests, but not if it means providing potential adversaries with weapons like long-range ballistic missiles. The normative issue in this instance focuses largely on regional space launch projects. India and Israel have reached important milestones toward creation of reliable domestic space launch capabilities. Other countries including Brazil and some East Asian countries are interested in doing the same. Although such projects make little sense commercially, they are of great importance as prestige symbols. Given the dual-use nature of long-range rocket technology, however, their direct military applications cannot be overlooked. The MTCR originally endorsed such endeavours, but official opinion clearly has grown less tolerant over time. The revelation in April 1992 that Russia had previously agreed to provide engine technology for Indian space launchers showed that this question is not an abstraction. This deal, worth an estimated $100-250 million, was harshly criticised in Europe and North America. Although clearly intended to serve civilian objectives, it also will give India new military potential. The MTCR is not very helpful on this issue, since it permits members (which Russia is not) to transfer such technology with proper assurances. The dispute points to the need to resolve the larger issue of aid to civil space launch projects if the MTCR is to be fully consistent. The impact of regional criticism of the discriminatory nature of the MTCR has not been great otherwise. Western leaders may feel some regret, but not enough to reconsider their policies. Contrary to the statements of regional spokesmen, there is no evidence of any country accelerating its rocket projects simply to spite the outside powers trying to slow them down; large rockets are too costly to pursue so frivolously. Indeed, erstwhile adversaries in Latin America and East Asia increasingly support the regime. Even in India there is growing awareness of the advantages of joining (8) . The limits of export controls A more serious problem confronting export controls and the MTCR lies in the inherent limits of the approach. The regime has reached a point of marginal returns in its efforts; further development of the regime demands much greater diplomatic effort and cost, but will produce only slight improvements in proliferation control. The only quick and effective step of significantly upgrading it would be enlisting North Korea, a far-fetched development under present circumstances. Otherwise current membership and enforcement are about as good as can be expected. The problem of marginal returns is clearest in debates over the tightening of dual-use technology restrictions. Expanding the MTCR's technology lists to cover smaller missiles has been difficult. Several members have resisted these efforts, arguing that the required technology lists either must be of enormous scope - seriously impeding trade - or must rely on case-by-case judgments, which would expose the process to political considerations. The controversy regarding the Russo-Indian engine deal illustrates the problem, raising a dispute that deals less with the inherent nature of the technology than the question of intentions and political relations. As export controls reach beyond widely-accepted technologies, they inevitably become political instruments, subject to political judgments. The goals of the process cease to be simple non-proliferation and drift into much more flexible and general purposes of general diplomacy. While the process may still be worthwhile for many reasons, if pursued to such extremes it ceases to serve non-proliferation objectives. In the end one must conclude that there is more to controlling missile proliferation than endlessly tightening the MTCR. It is essential to find additional instruments to support non- proliferation. Conclusion: beyond export control Having reached a point of marginal returns, efforts to restrain missile proliferation must move beyond reliance on export controls alone. The MTCR is the most important element in our response to the problem and undoubtedly will remain so for a long time to come. Yet it clearly is not the whole solution. In some cases it may be possible to overcome regional resistance and bring additional countries into the regime, as was accomplished with Argentina and Israel. But stopping missile proliferation and dealing with its consequences where that is not possible will require other approaches. Future discussions seem likely to be dominated by the following five: Incentives for non-proliferation. To make the loss of the missile option more palatable, it has been suggested that regional powers be offered compensation, either security guarantees or civilian space launch services (9) . While there is obvious merit in such proposals, they do not promise a general answer to missile proliferation. It is not clear that outside powers are able or willing to assume the costs and dangers of assuring regional stability sufficiently to reduce the demand for missiles. Nor are new space launch services likely to assuage regional aspirations for prestige symbols. Incentives may be more valuable in specific situations, rather, when a government is searching for a way to halt a controversial rocket project gracefully. Regional initiatives seem more promising, especially if they involve confidence-building measures or arms control agreements. Unfortunately there is not much outside powers can do in this regard except offer encouragement. The key to such arrangements, as demonstrated by the experiences of the superpowers, in Europe and Argentina-Brazil, appears to lay in the resolution of regional political disputes. As often happens in post-cold war discussions of specific regional peace and security issues, this leads to the conclusion that the key to regional solutions lies not in the specifics of controlling ballistic missiles, but in the generalities of regional conflict resolution (10) . Active defences clearly will have a greater role to play. The controversy over Patriot's performance defending cities against Iraqi Scuds cast doubt on the overall potential of defences (11) . But regional governments appear to see a growing role for systems like Patriot for the less demanding task of defending military installations. Specially designed interceptors like THAADS and Arrow will be better suited to defence of cities against limited attacks. It is less clear whether SDI technology should be applied to defence of North America and Europe. Modest versions, relying on a few hundred ground-based interceptors, seem more likely to be deployed than the extensive space-based systems envisioned by SDI advocates. A ballistic missile test ban is one way to ameliorate not only competitive pressures for regional missile acquisition, but also their prestige. Such proposals have been around since the Eisenhower administration, but won little support so long as ballistic missiles played a major role in great power forces (12) . Now that the United States and Russia agreed at the June 1992 Washington summit to eliminate all but a few hundred ground-based ICBMs, the prospects for a test ban are much better. Unlike nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles cannot be developed without extensive testing nor can operational missiles be kept reliable. Many serious problems would have to be resolved first, including differentiating allowable space launchers and the status of sea-launched missiles, but these do not seem insurmountable. The most straightforward and extreme answer to missile proliferation would be an outright comprehensive ballistic missile ban. Previously students of missile proliferation have gone no further than to advocate a global INF treaty, banning the missiles of greatest danger in most regions. But this does not satisfy regional demands for equal treatment since it would leave great power ICBMs and SLBMs (13) . The Bush-Yeltsin Washington summit, however, made the universal elimination of ballistic missiles seem feasible for the first time. The biggest obstacles are the independent nuclear forces. Tailoring a proposal to permit some SLBMs would meet the objections of Britain and France, but Chinese and Israeli resistance mayr to overcome (14) . While a ballistic missile ban remains distant, it can no longer be dismissed as fanciful. The experience of the last few years has shown that missile proliferation remains a serious challenge. It has also shown that missile proliferation is far from inevitable. To the contrary, the 1987 INF treaty, subsequent Russo-American agreements and the fate of long-range missiles can be reversed. It may be true that the battle against missile proliferation cannot be won in an absolute sense, for there will always be future threats, but nor need the battle be permanently lost. Mr. COMPARD (Aerospatiale, France), referring to the only operational anti-ballistic missile system in the world, i.e. the one protecting Moscow, which he believed was a system which used nuclear means to destroy incoming missiles, wished to hear the views of the Soviet authorities regarding the future of this system. Was it to be dismantled or was it to be developed into a non-nuclear system? Dr. FITUNI (Director of the Centre for Strategic and Global Studies, Academy of Sciences of Russia, Moscow) thought this was not so much a question for an academic or a researcher but rather for somebody who represented a more official line of post-analysis and practical action. In his conversations with representatives of official bodies, he thought one line of thinking could be heard from representatives of the ministries or those close to the Presidential team, and another line might be heard in discussions with military experts or people closer in their thinking to the line of the legislative body. He believed that there had not been any official change in the position towards the ABM Treaty and other treaties signed by the Soviet Union. He stressed, however, that this knowledge or this position might change in a couple of days or might be maintained. Perhaps Mr. Tchuvakhin might be able to add something to this response. Mr. CONTE (Alenia, Italy) wished to make a few comments in response to the various speakers. He believed Dr. Payne's view of the threat in the year 2000 was rather pessimistic and did not necessarily correspond to reality. Mr. Karp had circumscribed the threat of proliferation and that future threat justified the GPALS initiative. With regard to General Graham's views, he wondered how much time would be necessary and how much it would cost for European industry to catch up technologically with the GPALS programme. With regard to the global protection system, he was convinced that the approach mentioned by the Russian speakers of tackling the problem from a conceptual, legal and political point of view would avoid the problem being handled in a NATO framework. Dr. PAYNE (Professor of National Security Studies, Georgetown University, President of the National Institute for Public Policy, United States), responding to the comment that he had a pessimistic view of the threat of proliferation which did not correspond to reality, said that the threat figures given in official United States public documents were not very different from those given by Mr. Karp. The development of a comprehensive arsenal of militarily-effective missiles would be fairly slow. Conversely, a modest number of weapons that could be used for deterrence, coercion or terrorism could be achieved far more rapidly. In 1992, the former Head of Central Intelligence had said he could not see a missile threat to the United States within ten years, but the new Director had been more realistic, perhaps more pessimistic, in saying he was unable to give precise dates because nobody knew when missile threats would mature. Whether it would be in eight, ten or twelve years' time would depend on the pattern of imports and exports which might help countries to develop and deploy missiles more quickly. He and Mr. Karp had not been very different in their assessments in that they had been talking about two different types of arsenals. Mr. KARP (SIPRI, Sweden) recalled that other speakers had referred to 32 countries trying to obtain ballistic missiles including large artillery rockets. There were about 22 or 24 countries working on ballistic missiles and rocket engines alone. In 1989, the Central Intelligence Agency estimate was 15 countries able to build ballistic missiles by the end of the century. Two years later it was 15 countries that possessed them and a smaller number capable of building them. The threat diminished the more one analysed it. The threat could be fairly clearly identified and resources could be allocated very scientifically to deal with the most severe manifestations of that threat. Lt. General GRAHAM (Director of High Frontier, United States) wished to comment on the option of trying to control ballistic missiles by agreement. Very severe lessons had been learned in the last few years by trying to control weapons by agreement. Iraq had signed the non-proliferation treaty but observers had noted the tremendous effort being pursued there to acquire ballistic missiles. North Korea had recently announced its withdrawal from the treaty and was building nuclear weapons. The only reason for withdrawing now was to prevent this fact being confirmed. Regarding the missile technology control regime, ballistic missiles and space boosters were practically the same thing. It would be difficult for countries with a space capability to deny their knowledge to technologically-emerging countries. If some countries did so, others might not as had happened between Russia and India with technology for the space programme. This was the flaw in paper agreements but they were at least one way of discouraging some countries from trying to develop missiles but any country really determined to develop a ballistic missile capability could certainly get around such agreements as North Korea and Iraq had done. Mr. RAIMONDI (EIR, Germany) asked Mr. Fituni for more details about the Trust project for co-operation between the United States and the USSR and the plasma weapons project. What could be the spin-off for technological research, for the SDI and also for industry in Europe? Dr. FITUNI (Director of the Centre for Strategic and Global Studies of the Academy of Sciences of Russia, Moscow) said this possible line of co-operation had been discussed by Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Clinton at their last summit meeting. The plasma weapons project had been one of the lines of secret Russian research as a response to SDI. Several years ago, the Soviet authorities had stated that Russia would try to respond to SDI not necessarily by putting armaments into space, but by finding new or standard ways of countering the possible threat of SDI. The plasma weapons project was probably a possibility then envisaged. It was a project followed by several research institutions such as the research institute of experimental physics. Technically, the plasma weapon was concentrated not on the target itself but on the trajectory of the flying target, ionising the area in front of the flying target, thus destroying its aero-dynamic possibilities, be it a missile or a plane, for moving along this trajectory. At present it was technically impossible to assess the capabilities of this system so it had been proposed to stage a joint experiment, possibly with the help of several vessels of the Russian navy, a Russian aircraft- carrier and land facilities on United States bases. Surface plasma modules would be involved and rockets were to be launched both from American and Russian territory. No decision had yet been taken and a stalemate had been reached since neither the Russian nor the American weapons producers were very happy about this project. The question was still on the agenda, however, and might be a qualitatively new aspect of the defence system. (The sitting was suspended at 4.45 p.m. and resumed at 4.55 p.m.) Current state of industrial studies on anti-missile systems in Europe --------------------------------------------------- High technology security co-operation Mr. STEINICKE (Director, Planning and Research Division, Deutsche Aerospace (DASA), Germany). - Within the time given to me, I want to review briefly our present security situation - that is, developments since the collapse of the Soviet empire. And against that background, I would like to share some of my own thoughts on the following agenda: - new security environment - risk analysis; - co-operative strategies study - an answer to risk potentials; - technological scenario and possible solutions; - individual positions of the partners involved in the study. 1. Security situation today The future of the process of European integration is an integral part of any discussion about the European security embedded in a global environment. Given the events of the last months, the way ahead is perhaps a little less clear than it seemed before. But let me state at the very outset my own confidence that Europe can and will continue to move forward - in concert and co-operation with North America - on many fronts in a new world order. While the cold war has ended, we are still in the midst of a transition in Europe. As a fact, the transition to democracy and free markets in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union is a painful one, with uncertain prospects for immediate success. National and ethnic conflicts that decades of communist repression kept in check have now resurfaced, with appalling results. The ongoing carnage in Yugoslavia is the worst case so far, and the closest to home. But more and more, our governments will also have to reckon with conflicts in such unfamiliar places as Nagorno-Karabakh and Tajikistan. These local conflicts are horrific enough for the killing and wanton destruction involved. But they also pose a clear and present danger to the stability of the regions in which they lie. I should also mention that not all the threats and risks now facing European security are home-grown. The potential proliferation of ballistic missile technology and the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons could threaten Europe and all of us more directly than ever. And this cannot be regarded as a possible problem only for the southern region. Economic and political turmoil in the Maghreb and the Horn of Africa represent another set of risks. The "security of Europe" is more than ever a question whose boundaries extend well beyond the territory of NATO's sixteen member states. With this background and from talks to Russian reformists, it seems to me - and this is of specific importance to our theme - that there is growing Russian interest in enforcing strategic stability by forming controlled integrated early-warning systems. Keeping this development in mind, a different light is cast on the threat by arms capable of mass destruction. Now, as the old scenarios have gone to very low probabilities for the foreseeable future, new threats to population and infrastructure seem to emerge. Crisis potentials like instable political dynamics driven by economic, demographic, ethnic or religious developments, in conjunction with the acquisition of technologies for mass destruction via proliferation or the development of related production capabilities enforced by the availability of knowledge and material from the former USSR, are forming the background. The complexity of these interdependencies of evolution, motivations and means result in our perception of potential opponents as being unpredictable or irrational, also meaning a diminished effectiveness of - rational - deterrence strategies. Together with this, the spectrum of threats increases: it extends beyond the missile-delivered warheads - once viewed as predominant - spreading to low-cost chemical or biological weapons deliverable by low-accuracy missiles as well as by other means; ordinary and "low cost", down to terrorist groups with chemical/biological agents "in bottles". Psychological effects on the population supplement possible large-scale damage. In this "inventory", ballistically-delivered nuclear, chemical or biological warheads are but one item - however, a prominent one as their acquisition and development by an increasing number of countries continues. As a consequence, efforts for a defensive posture must not be focused on this singular segment (missile) but have to be based on a thorough risk assessment resulting in a balanced evaluation of potential threats versus measures to counter them (ATBM, political, non-proliferaton, embargo, surgical operations, police). A prerequisite for this is intelligence, one of the means is surveillance and, because of the global aspects of the problem, preferably global surveillance. 2. Co-operative strategies study Under the above auspices, it seems natural to envisage a high-technology security co-operation between nations and organisations with parallel needs and interests, particularly in the framework of declining defence budgets. An initiative to that end has been taken by the United States CREST (Center for Research and Studies on Strategy and Technology) starting in 1990. This initiative brought together representatives of industry, research and politicians from France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States to bring forward an agenda for future alliance defence technology co-operation in the context of NATO. As a result against the background of until now unsatisfactory transatlantic co-operation and of technology transfer barriers, four areas of common interest, directed towards enhanced global stability and, more specifically, towards tactical ballistic missile defence have been identified for co-operation initiatives: - a distributed surveillance system in terms of architecture, operations and political implications; - a TMD architecture study in the new security political environment, comprising a technical threat assessment and defence concepts; - technologies for hypersonic flight with the goal of a common United States-European demonstrator/prototype programme; - build-up of NATO industrial capability for military wargaming and analytical modelling based on common and standard definitions, goals and procedures. The motivation for the first area, the surveillance system, is to get intelligence and information. Recognising the shortcomings of actual systems, the approach aims for an integrated network of satellite, airborne and ground-based systems to provide a continuous all-weather surveillance over geographically dispersed areas. This is not only a provision for TMD systems but also enhances the locating of mobile missile launchers and enables timely attack on these. Moreover, surveillance is a crucial element for European participation in preventive crisis management, especially when used to check test ranges, launches and non-proliferation agreements. As arms and export control policies are unlikely to halt proliferation completely, in addition to these an improved ability to intercept ballistic missile launches appears critical, particularly as increasing ranges of such weapons could threaten not only deployed forces but also the population centres and infrastructure of western nations. The question is, what degree of area defence is required, respective global coverage needed. Complexity and cost of a full-scale TMD system argue srongly in favour of a truly co-operative programme. Hypersonic technology for future transport to space systems, for surveillance, TMD and other activities, is an essential strategic asset. Development costs, however, ask for global, minimum transatlantic co-operation on fair and balanced terms. No doubt that political willingness and government support are essential for any project success. Thus, the rationale of the co-operative strategies project is to lay the focus on a number of technology areas capable of addressing common alliance security needs and of enhancing global stability. 3. Technological questions From the four areas of possible transatlantic co-operation identified in the study, I would like to elaborate somewhat more broadly on technical aspects of the second one, there addressed as theatre missile defence architecture. Now, where are the technical problems and clues to implement a defensive posture against ballistic missile threats as addressed before? The reports of success and failure of operations against ballistic missiles in the Gulf war, as far as accessible to us, give some hints: - deficiencies in surveillance and reconnaissance; - severe problems for ground-based defence with SAMs lacking surveillance/early warning. In consequence, even against existing conventional ballistic threats, only an unreliable shield with very restricted footprints (i.e. area protected by a defence system) seems achievable, intended upgrades only alleviating the most severe shortcomings. What are the technical perspectives in this situation, as far as ground-based ATBM systems are concerned? A viable approach is first to describe the technical characteristics of the threat to be countered, then to discuss the demands on the protection level required (a somewhat political question), scan the systems and technologies available or discussed, and finally analyse the need for technologies to be developed and acquired. Threat characteristics are, as already outlined: - TBMs of increasing range with increasingly steeper/faster re-entry conditions, vehicles/warheads of increasingly lower (radar) signatures; - warheads with conventional, chemical, possibly nuclear means. Demands on the protection level will be higher: - levels for protection of military assets and troops must be very high. Even higher levels are required when protection of the population in non-war conditions is concerned (against state's terroristic action or blackmailing). - requirements towards keep-out altitudes (i.e. minimum altitude for intercept) are increased when chemical or nuclear warheads are taken into account; - kill mechanisms must assure warhead destruction or full incapacitation, particularly for the protection of area targets. At the high end of performance, also in terms of cost, an ATBM system might consist of space-based surveillance, missile detection and acquisition sub-systems, ground-based fire control radars, ground-based interceptors for regional protection. All these items linked together by local battle management centres plus a remote communication/command/control and larger-scale battle managament installation. As an alternative, a global system has to rely on space- based effectors. This, in my mind, affects non-militarisation of space and requires an international command structure. At the low end one may think of an autonomous system relying exclusively on own detection/acquisition/fire control, comparable to the Patriots in the Gulf war. Whereas this autonomous employment of multi-purpose SAMs is at best adequate for point defence, for extended area defence, various stages, from regional to global protection, could be envisaged. For such an area defence, required in particular for the protection of population and infrastructure, the main technology areas which are not straightforward available, are in my view: (a) space-based (global) surveillance by satellites - sensors, data-processing and communication links as a prerequisite if not for early warning and reactive defence, then to open the option for counterattack on launch sites; (b) sensors for detection and tracking of incoming threats, where at least for the time being two approaches should be pursued: ground-based radars and airborne infrared systems; (c) BM/C3I (battle management/command, control, communication information) systems linking together the sub-systems, mainly specific software, with decisively reduced functions compared to SDI; (d) interceptor technology - missile guidance in outer layer of the atmosphere; - seeker technology, radar and IR, including target acquisition processes; - fusing techniques handling very high-speed situations and enabling appropriate kill mechanisms for complete incapacitation or destruction of threat warheads, including chemical warheads. 4. National positions Finally, let me say some words about my German industrial perception of some nations' views of the ATBM issue, also linked to the peripheric discussions of the study work. In general, one of the main political obstacles for progress in the area, namely the ABM Treaty, is still a topic, however this treaty should no longer be seen as prohibitive for the initiation of technological co-operation in some areas by Europeans, this encompassing treaty not affecting technologies. Even more so, Russian voices indicate that there is interest for increasing strategic stability by forming an integrated early-warning system. There is even further interest in controlling and preventing unauthorised launches through area warning systems. This may result in an opportunity to put Russian competence and knowledge into the efforts, widening the ongoing talks with the United States. Vis-a-vis the United States, one of our main interests is to exploit whether possible European contributions could be tied into co-operation on truly balanced terms of fair partnership. The Japanese view seems to be favourable in response to the GPS initiative, still being restricted by tight constitutional regulations. Within the United Kingdom, the tendency seems to be towards a regional approach within the European framework, favouring means to counter a broader spectrum of threats (including airbreathing). Italian positions appear difficult to interpret. Therefore, I leave it to the discretion of the expertise in this room. As far as I can assess it, the French position is even more interesting, it is threefold. Politically, no threat is perceived and excellent relations with all neighbours, including the opposing coast exist. Second, the nuclear force de frappe is claimed to be able to handle emanating threats not susceptible to deterrence. For this, an early warning component could be of interest, provided no militarisation of space be linked to this. On the other hand, French industry is active in this field, for example, Aerospatiale and Thomson-CSF under the auspices of CoSyDe (Conception de Systemes de Defense) and in the context of Western European Union analyses. In Germany, due to overall financial constraints, political priorities linked to completion of German reunification, and the resulting socio-economic situation, the development and procurement of systems against very low probability threats are not affordable. Therefore, the German perspective and policy-making criteria in general are easy to name: - low probability of threat; - extreme resources problems; - still important political hesitation about staying close to former SDI type activities which might affect the ABM Treaty. More specifically, the German position, recently presented by an airforce officer, still is: - there is little if not any threat at all by IRBMs and LRBMs from former Warsaw Pact countries; - BM threat from other countries against populated areas in Germany is rather unlikely; - ATBM capabilities will be provided with Patriot PAC3, TLVS and some long-range detection system to be selected; - however, German forces need ATBM capabilities to protect military assets and missions in NATO peripheric actions. Having said this, I shall point out, there is an ongoing process which in some years may change these driving factors and therefore the conclusions. Meanwhile, the discussion continues, as a statement in the planning directive for 1994 indicates: "Keeping up the option to participate in multinational activities for strategic air defence". Of course, we have to emphasise necessary means like early warning for crisis management and we have to recognise the ballistic threat which we have indicated today and which means: we should not put our population at risk. It is our desire from an industrial point of view to provide our experience, recent study results and technological capabilities to find the best solutions to the mutual benefit of partners in collective security. Industrial co-operation in limited anti-missile defence Mr. ZALONIS (President of Eurosam, Italy). - 1. Eurosam: Aerospatiale (France), Alenia (Italy) and Thompson (France) joint venture Eurosam (ES) is a "groupement d'interet economique" (GIE) established under French law in 1989 by Aerospatiale, Alenia and Thomson-CSF to negotiate and manage the contracts for studies, development and production of surface-to-air defence systems for short- and medium-range, naval and ground-based applications, financed by Italy and France in equal proportions. Such systems represent a family of surface-to-air systems to counter the future threat of the years beyond 2000 (FSAF). The family has a basic system structure of a fire control unit, a vertical launcher and a missile, each constituting a sub-system. The sub-systems (seven in total) and their assemblies are designed to ensure maximum commonality through the various applications. Eurosam is in charge of the overall management of the contracts and holds the system design responsibility. Eurosam is staffed with highly-qualified personnel from the three members. Its offices are located in Chatillon (Paris) near the Franco-Italian Government programme office and the two French members. As prime contractor, Eurosam is the natural interface for the Franco-Italian programme office for reports about progress of work, release of deliveries and contractual aspects. As system design authority, Eurosam carries out the system studies, sub-systems and their interface specifications, system evaluation through simulation, system qualification, testing, etc. Eurosam is also responsible for the interfaces between the anti-air warfare systems (AAWS) and the ship combat system or the army's C3I. An important role is played by system simulation programmes. The performances of each system in various battle scenarios are continuously checked by means of the simulation whose reliability is progressively increased as experimental values replace the design ones. The members are responsible for the development of the various sub-systems, for their qualification, for the specification of their assemblies, etc. For each sub-system there is a member as main sub-contractor of Eurosam and another member, of a different nationality, acting as co-contractor. To ensure an in-service date (ISD) at the end of the century, the industrialisation phase will be launched shortly, and will be conducted in partial overlap with the final part of the development phase. In addition to the contracts with the Franco-Italian administrations for the development activity, Eurosam has also been tasked to perform the definition studies of two medium- range naval anti-air warfare systems: the Franco-Italian SAMP-N and the British LAMS. Both are conducted with the aim of using the FSAF building blocks possibly modified to meet their specific requirements. The LAMS (local area missile system) study is conducted in co-operation with United Kingdom industry: British Aerospace (BAe) and Marconi. The system activities are performed in Eurosam by a technical team that is principally staffed with BAe and Marconi representatives. The complementarity of the members' capabilities helped but was not essential. What was particularly important was their system and prime contractorship experience. In fact, at equipment level, the three members have largely sub-contracted the development activity to specialised industries of the two nations. It helped to reduce costs and risks by involving first-class companies such as SDE and DCN in France, OTO, SNIA, ELT, LITTON, SMA, etc. in Italy 2. The FSAF programme The FSAF systems are the response to the converging requirements expressed by France and Italy in the 1980s for apparently different missions: - the naval requirement for surface-to-air defence against subsonic and supersonic missiles as well as against aircraft, in replacement of naval Crotale and Albatross systems; - the ground requirement for the defence of the army corps and air force high value sites against aircraft, subsonic and supersonic missiles, in replacement of ground-based Crotale and Hawk systems. Preliminary studies conducted separately in the two countries showed that the characteristics requested of these systems could lead to similar basic structures within which technologically-advanced solutions allowed the creation of a common trunk. France and Italy signed an umbrella MOU in 1988 followed by a specific MOU in 1989 authorising the procurement agency to launch with Eurosam the development of three systems: - surface-to-air anti-missile systems (SAAM) for naval applications, in two similar configurations for France and Italy; - surface-to-air medium-range ground-based (SAMP-T) system in the same configuration for the Italian and French army and for the French air-force, as well as the definition study of: - surface-to-air mid-range naval (SAMP-N) system for the French and Italian navies, also based on a fully common configuration. The contracts notified in 1990 to Eurosam for these activities are worth about F 10 billion. The qualification of the systems is planned for the second half of the decade, closely followed by the delivery of the operational systems, the first of which is the SAAM for the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to enter service in 1998. The threat against which surface-to-air defence is directed is that of the years 2000 and beyond. Its sophisticated characteristics can be identified as follows: - all-weather environment - massive saturating attacks - omnidirectional attacks - severe ECM environment Moreover, the targets are characterised by: - a small radar cross section - high speed - manoeuvring trajectories - sea-skimming trajectories - diving trajectories The response to such a complex requirement is provided by a modular architecture of the various systems, composed of: - a fire control unit organised around a multifunctional radar (in some cases supported by other sensors), managed by a command and control system largely common to all anti-air warfare systems; - a missile with a front part and a cruise engine common to all systems and a booster dimensioned for the range of the mission; the missile is fired from a vertical launcher, adapted to ground or naval applications, suitable for the omnidirectional attack. Additionally, the ground system will be easily air transportable with good roll on/off characteristics. It will require a low number of personnel. The equipments/sub-systems that constitute the common trunk of the various anti-air warfare systems are: - the multifunction radar Arabel, used in the French SAAM and in the Franco-Italian SAMP-T; - the multifunction radar Empar used in the Italian SAAM and in the Franco-Italian SAMP-N; - the Aster missile that with the smaller booster (Aster 15) is used in the naval systems (SAAM'S and SAMP-N) and with the larger booster (Aster 30) is used in the medium-range systems (SAMP-T and SAMP-N); - the C2, based on the Magics consoles, and Mara computers family, used in all FSAF systems with slightly different missions; - the vertical launchers, structured in two configurations: naval and ground-based. Also the software development allows for a large amount of commonalities. This is particularly applicable to the C2 functions over the various systems and is the natural consequence of the sub-systems/equipments programmes. The LAMS definition study launched in 1991 for the British and Spanish branch of the FAMS programme was also based on the utilisation of the FSAF building blocks, modified as necessary to meet a requirement that was somewhat different from the Franco-Italian branch (SAMP-N). Unfortunately, Spain had budget problems and did not enter the programme even though satisfactory work had been agreed for its industry. The LAMS study was continued with the United Kingdom taking over the Spanish share. When approaching the conclusion of SAMP-N and LAMS studies, the United Kingdom, France and Italy decided to unify their requirements for the future frigates programme. The result was that at the end of last year the two requirements for an MR-SAM converged into a single trinational staff requirement (TSR) and Eurosam was redirected to complete the LAMS study identifying the modifications needed by the FSAF building blocks to satisfy the TSR. The final report is to be issued by mid-1993. 3. The future of FSAF As I said before for the LAMS programme, the FSAF family of anti-air warfare systems can be utilised, with a particular integration of its building blocks, possibly modified to meet special requirements, also for other similar missions. Eurosam has proposed with GMDL its SAMP-T to United Kingdom MOD in response to an RAF requirement for the anti-air warfare defence of a number of high value sites, as a replacement of the ageing Bloodhound system. Combining the naval opportunities of FAMS with the ground-based systems, it seems possible that the United Kingdom could become, in the future, a third partner for France and Italy for the total programme. Another European country that has clearly stated its interest for the FSAF programme is Germany. Germany, as Italy and many other countries, needs to provide for the replacement of its Hawk systems. Germany has in mind to carry out a definition study based on the utilisation of as much as possible of the FSAF building blocks. The study has been postponed because of financial difficulties but the interest in the FSAF progress is kept alive with special regard to the possible evolution of the SAMP-T system. Eurosam is convinced that, for its sophisticated characteristics, the FSAF family could be advantageously adopted also by the United States for its ground-to-air limited anti- missile defence needs. If it was prepared to recognise this European capability, significant two-way industrial co- operation, in line with the requests of the European partners, could be really developed between the two sides of the Atlantic. The events of the Gulf war have shown the risk of a TBM attack and the need for deployment of defence forces far away from domestic borders. The Gulf war has also demonstrated the performance of early-warning satellites (DSP type) to detect the ballistic missile launchers and to alert the ATBM batteries through the Milsatcom (DSCS) satellites. Some European governments have already taken into account the former two aspects in their staff requirements for their M-SAM. This is the case of Germany for its TLVS mentioned above. Others may review their requirements in the near future. This could be the case for the United Kingdom that appears likely to postpone the procurement of its M-SAM, also to be able to update the requirement against which to buy it. The ATBM role has not yet been specified in the need expressed by France and Italy in the FSAF programme. The SAMP-T design enables it to ensure its own defence against TBM. A full local ATBM role can achieved through this system growth capability! In view of the above, Eurosam is prepared to perform a parametric study for the definition of the improvements needed by the SAMP-T building blocks to cope with the various steps of an increasing TBM threat. To this end, Eurosam is enquiring among its current and potential SAMP-T customers about their established or potential requirement in this area so as to cover them all in the scope of the study. Above a certain level of threat, the architecture of the overall ATBM system will include EW satellites, military communication satellites, data-processing and control centres and ABM batteries. The system performance will be therefore enhanced if SAMP-T is integrated in an adequate European architecture including EW satellites linked to military communication satellites (like existing/planned Skynet, Syracuse, Sicral) required to relay data and to broadcast the warning messages, the EW satellites being possibly devoted to the areas of interest to WEU. A major benefit pursued by international co-operation is the cost savings offered by the sharing of non-recurring costs and the reduction of recurring ones, due to the scale factor. When this co-operation concerns several European countries another major objective should be aimed at. This is the interoperability factor. It may take some time to achieve it but European defence will be approached jointly by the European Community sometime in the future. The fact that a part of the Community will have already chosen to equip itself with defence systems using as much as possible of a common trunk will be a major asset. We deeply believe in this common approach; so much so that for Eurosam's motto we have selected "Our job is European defence". Comments on possible protection systems for Europe Mr. DELAYE (Director, Aerospatiale, Espace et Defense, France). - Introduction It is a pleasure for me to be here in Rome three years after the symposium on observation satellites - a European means of verifying disarmament organised by the Technological and Aerospace Committee of the Assembly of Western European Union in this same city in 1990. WEU's initiative certainly helped Europe to make progress in space-based observation. Let us hope that today's symposium will help defence Europe to make progress in the fight against new threats stemming from the proliferation of missiles and of technology associated with such weapons systems. 1. The threat and the technical assessment of the threat 1.1. Present situation and foreseeable future Today, at the beginning of 1993, a large number of countries already have scores (and sometimes hundreds) of operational launchers and ballistic missiles and some of them are developing their own missile programmes with a view to eventual autonomy. It has to be noted that it is quite precarious for a state to depend on a foreign supplier for this type of weapon for which international controls are increasingly stringent. In the last ten years, the number of countries possessing ballistic missiles has increased considerably. In some countries, the number of launchers and missiles is being increased very significantly, several categories of these devices are being procured and some of the most sophisticated, too, usually in order to add to or even replace their old Scuds. It may be assumed that in the years to come the principal proliferating countries will have hundreds of ballistic missiles of various types. Ballistic missiles are procured in four different ways: - The first is the purchase of complete systems ready to use that will be operational shortly after delivery. Such purchases may be made relatively openly. Sales and deliveries of missiles may also effected "discreetly". - The second method consists of modifying missiles that are already available. Thus, a country may decide to transform a launcher into a ballistic missile, to transform a surface-to-air missile into a surface-to-surface missile or, again, to modify an available surface-to-surface missile to increase its range significantly (the Iraqi example is the best illustration of this operation). - The third known method consists of copying devices procured from a third country in order to deploy more of its own systems and to export them. This was the course followed by North Korea, which is now exporting a large number of more or less modified copies of Scud-B missiles of Soviet origin. - The last method is to develop one's own ballistic missile programmes. This approach may be more or less elaborate. Thus, a country may receive missiles in separate parts in order to assemble them on the spot with little industrial "added value"; it may also itself produce certain components of the system. Some countries seem capable of developing nearly all the components themselves either on the basis of (or in parallel with) a civil launcher programme or directly for a missile. It has been noted that many developments are initiated on the basis of the development of probe rockets. Local progress raises the problem of dual technology since there are a number of similarities between the development of a launcher and that of a missile. Thus, on the basis of knowlege and an analysis of the current flow of technology and/or of missiles, it is possible to deduce the threats represented by the procurement of ballistic missiles by the countries which proliferate the most. The immediate potential threat in 1993 remains localised; it consists mainly of missiles with a range of less than 1 000 km. The technically possible threat as from the year 2000 may include missiles with a range of almost 3 000 km. One comment has to be made here: cruise missiles, like ballistic missiles, are also the subject of widespread proliferation by the same countries and in accordance with similar procedures. However, even now, a proliferating cruise missile - whatever its launching platform - does not have such a wide range of action as a ballistic missile; moreover, in view of its trajectory and speed, there is greater probability of it being intercepted than a ballistic missile. Finally, a cruise missile very often carries a far smaller load of explosive. Moreover, recent air defence systems and others now being developed may counter the threat of cruise missiles. 1.2. Technical threat assessment Slide 2 illustrates Aerospatiale's experience in research, test development and deployment of ballistic missiles from the feasibility studies in the sixties up to the development and deployment of SSBSs and MSBSs by the French national deterrent force. Aerospatiale was responsible, on behalf of the Missile and Space Directorate of the General Delegation for Armaments, for the prime contractorship for strategic ballistic missile systems. Thus, Aerospatiale, together with its industrial partners, can contribute expert capability in the technical assessment of the threat and its evolution in the years to come, i.e.: - the circulation of ballistic technology; - development and production times; - provision of the necessary means and other test capabilities. 2. Battle theatres and possible missions of a European anti-missile defence 2.1. Potential theatres (slide 3) The risks identified above bring out the following potential theatres: - the European theatre, faced with proliferating missiles of every range carrying payloads of all kinds, including nuclear; - external theatres: - concerning intervention forces threatened by short- range missiles; - concerning friendly countries threatened by missiles of all ranges; - European possessions overseas threatened by blackmail or retaliation on the same basis as Europe itself. 2.2. Possible missions Four possible missions might be assigned to a European anti- missile defence system: 2.2.1. Threat assessment Technical aims should allow: - surveillance of the installation of missile test firing ranges, launching ramps and plants; - detection of test and "operational" firings; - assessment of the physical features of missiles (signatures). The results will allow catalogues of threatening missiles to be prepared for use in possible conflicts by combining information from various sources. Observation, detection and other measures would be exercised continuously. 2.2.2. Identifying the aggressor In time of conflict, as well as these tasks of surveillance, it is expected that, perhaps with the assistance of other sources of information, it should be possible to locate launching points with sufficient accuracy to be certain of the identity of the aggressor. In this case, results should be communicated in real time to the military involved and to political leaders (before representatives of the media present in the theatres of operation). 2.2.3. Alerting civilians and the military (passive defence) In this case, the aim is: - to plot, i.e. calculate, attacking trajectories accurately enough to determine points of impact; - to pass on this information as quickly as possible to allow those threatened, and only them, to take shelter, with a minimum of false alerts. 2.2.4. Protecting civil and military sites (active defence) The aim is: - in Europe: - to protect the population; - to protect sites of vital economic interest; - to protect sensitive military bases; - to protect urban areas and sensitive sites for European possessions, e.g. the European Space Agency launching base in Kourou (Guyana); - in external theatres: - to protect intervention forces: - the forces themselves; - more particularly, logistic and command bases; - to protect friendly populated areas and their industrial sites. 3. Possible defence systems To counter these threats, several systems are possible. They allow some or all of the missions just defined to be carried out: (i) passive defence, based on an architecture that includes one or more satellites; (ii) active defence which, according to the type of threat and mission, would consist of one or more of the three different types of system corresponding to their area of action: - low-altitude so-called "low-endoatmospheric" defence from the ground for intercepting attacking missiles in the lower layers of the atmosphere; - "high-endoatmospheric" defence from the ground when missiles enter the upper layers of the atmosphere; - "exoatmospheric" defence, also ground-based, to intercept missiles in ballistic flight above the atmosphere. These defences should be coupled with long-range radar if an accurate estimate of the point of impact is required. I will now give a brief description of these systems. 3.1. Satellite observation and detection of missile launchings Slide 4 shows an example of architecture including two geostationary satellites which, suitably positioned, can: - each in its own observation area, detect the launching of a missile and localise, grosso modo, its trajectory and area of impact; - by combining the two, determine the trajectory of the attacking missile and indicate its area of impact with average accuracy. Accuracy in determining the area of impact can be improved with long-range radar. Such a system allows passive defence missions to be carried out (observation of proliferation, identification of the aggressor and warning) and also the detection and designation of targets by an active defence system. 3.2. Low-altitude (low-endoatmospheric) active defence Slide 5 illustrates this architecture. The intecking missiles with a range of less than about 1 000 km is effected at an altitude of between 5 and 25 km to defend specific sites or limited areas with a diameter of about 30 km. Such defence is based on the SAMR/G system, Aster missiles and Arabel (or Empar) target designation radars, flanked by a mobile observation radar. The alert is given by the geostationary satellites and the medium-range mobile radar designates the targets for the batteries. One battery allows an area containing 500 000 inhabitants to be protected. This portable and mobile system allows missions to be carried out to protect intervention forces and sites in friendly countries and in external theatres. 3.3. High-endoatmospheric active defence (Slide 6) This defence consists of: - the same satellite system as for the alert; - medium-range radar that distinguishes between the various bodies linked with attacking missiles after they are decelerated by the atmosphere below 80 km. It designates the target for the interceptors; - the interceptor, weighing about a ton, is composed of a pilotable acceleration stage with a flight time of about 16 s and a terminal self-guided IR multispectral vehicle, piloted by force, allowing destruction by direct impact at an altitude of between 15 and 40 km. The areas of action of a battery of interceptors have a range of between 100 and 600 km depending on the range of the attacking missile. A network of twenty radars coupled with more than thirty batteries would allow Europe to be protected against attacks by missiles with a range of up to 3 000 km. 3.4. Exoatmospheric active defence (Slide 7) This last possible defence system consists of: - the same satellite system as for the alert; - long-range radar for observing attacking missiles and target acquisition. The interceptor is designed to intercept targets at an altitude above 100 km. It consists of a two-stage solid-fuelled 1.5 ton missile and a terminal self-propelled infrared vehicle protected by a cover for passing through the dense layers of the atmosphere. Such a system allows areas of more than 1 000 km in diameter to be defended. Thus, five identical interceptors - in Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey, coupled with four radars in Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey - are enough to protect Europe. The geostationary satellite system gives the alert for the whole area. These bases allow the whole of Europe to be defended against missiles with a range of more than 800 km. Additional defence against shorter-range missiles would be necessary. 4. Industrial feasibility Industrial feasibility for this type of system is accessible to Europeans. As you have been able to see, a wide variety of options is possible for building an anti-missile defence system. Aerospatiale can help reflection on the specifications of requirements for optimisation in terms of the missions and protection sought (threat assessment and/or local, national or European protection). Optimisation must be done in the light of global cost analyses (research and development, cost of procurement, use and system support). This question will be dealt with by my colleague, Jacques Verdoux, of Thomson-CSF, a group with which Aerospatiale is associated in the framework of CoSyDe. Producing this type of system is suitable for co-operation between European industries. Co-operation with the United States at technological level is also quite possible, a fortiori if the approach comes from the European side. However, we must well realise that it takes about ten years to produce such a system whereas a few months are enough for a real threat to emerge; I am thinking in particular of the purchase of ready-to-use proliferation missiles and the transformation of existing missiles (e.g. the Iraqi Scuds). The decision to produce all or part of the system will therefore have to be taken before the risk becomes a threat. However, studies, development and deployment of a complete system are particularly suitable for slicing up into successive stages and hence the staggering of decision-taking in the light of the missions required in relation to the evolution of threats: - identification of the aggressor; - technical assessment of the threat; - alert; - protection. Finally, the experimental assessment and demonstration of feasibility stages of a system, or component of a system, are of twofold interest: - to show the technical and industrial feasibility of a European defence system; - to ensure deterrent value vis-a-vis proliferating countries by showing Europe's capabilities and determination. Conclusion In the framework of CoSyDe, Aerospatiale and Thomson-CSF are combining their know-how obtained in the course of the development, production and maintenance in operational conditions of strategic, tactical and space weapons systems and the observation and detection systems of the French armed forces. This experience in the areas of the design and industrialisation of such complex systems is unique in Europe. The Alenia group in Italy (in Eurosam) and Deutsche Aerospace in Germany are already making a major, essential contribution in the area of anti-missile systems. European industrial co-operation in this area is just waiting to be amplified. To counter the threat to European interests stemming from the proliferation of ballistic missiles, Europe must make up its mind without delay since the present risk may be transformed into a concrete threat before the appropriate defence systems become operational. This is why we propose that Western European Union launch the development of an experimental warning satellite followed by the development of a system of defence against low-altitude ballistic missiles and, finally, a technological study programme to prepare for future exo- and endoatmospheric systems. WEU, which would at all times remain in control of the progress of the programme, would thus give Europe the means of showing its ability and determination to fight proliferation. Command, control and cost of systems Mr. VERDOUX (Director, Electronic Systems Division, Thomson- CSF, France). - 1. Introduction Among the important questions raised by thinking on anti- ballistic defence, Mr. Delaye dealt with the requirement -what threat? - and how to meet it. I, for my part, wish to talk about two topics that are the logical follow-up to what he said. On the one hand, how should these means of defence be used and controlled? On the other hand, is it a realistic option from an economic point of view to develop and deploy an anti-ballistic missile defence? In tackling these two questions, I shall take as a basis the mission analysis and architecture described by Mr. Delaye. This analysis was made jointly by Aerospatiale and Thomson-CSF in the framework of studies conducted by CoSyDe. We shall therefore consider a "proliferating" type of ballistic threat, i.e. based on basic technology, comprising missiles with a range that may reach more than 4 000 km and carrying conventional, chemical or even nuclear military payloads. We are concerned with the defence of civil and military targets in Europe, in particular populated areas. Since shorter-range missiles (up to 1 000 km) are already widely deployed, protecting highly-exposed southern and south-eastern areas of Europe against such missiles is a more immediate need. Similarly, account is taken of the protection of military forces that may have to operate outside our frontiers in the framework of international operations. To meet these requirements, defence must consist of four components: - a warning system using satellites to detect launchings and radar to determine trajectories and points of impact; - mobile systems capable of ensuring the defence of smaller sites (the size of a town or an air base) against missiles with a range of 500 to 1 000 km; - systems that allow vast areas to be protected (several hundred kilometres in diameter) against longer- range missiles; - and, of course, a control and command system (C2) ensuring the integration of this defence and its insertion in the military, political and geographical environment. 2. The command and control system The command and control system (CCS) of anti-ballistic missile defence has original features compared with known systems: - continental or even broader geographical cover to ensure the protection of planned or allied forces deployed outside Europe. Such deployment means implies the participation of various nationalities under different authorities; interoperability requirements go far beyond usual standards; - a dramatically reduced time-scale. The flight time of a missile is counted in minutes and the time available for deciding and implementing action in seconds. These scales show that, at one and the same time, new technical solutions will have to be implemented to assist decision-taking and, above all, the traditional concept of human operators, rules for delegation and decentralisation of decisions will have to be reanalysed. This CCS must also be readily available since the suddenness of action by ballistic missiles allows an aggressor, in ambiguous conflict situations that may last for long periods, to take advantage of the slightest weakness he may detect; moreover, this remark raises the question of the robustness and survival capability of the command system, which may be the target of pre-emptive military, terrorist or even political action (failure of a partner playing a key role in the system). In the framework of these general requirements, the CCS will have to ensure two types of role: - on the one hand, integration and co-ordination of anti- ballistic defence; - on the other hand, many complex roles of interface with political and military environments and civil protection, such interfaces probably being one of the more complex aspects of this CCS. As soon as the threat has been detected and assessed and the aggressor identified, the political authorities will have to be informed within a very short lapse of time and have to determine the options for defence and retaliation; procedure for consultation between the various authorities involved will have to be foreseen and various options prepared in parallel: warning of the alert in threatened areas and implementing means of civil protection, preparing retaliatory military action, activating anti-missile defence, diplomatic action and guidance of intelligence. Decisions will have to be implemented instantaneously. Where the possibility of military retaliation is concerned (e.g. air raids on missile-launching sites), two remarks should be made: - first, their preparation requires a transfer of data and interfacing of air operations command and control systems, or even the integration of certain functions; - then countries which have chosen a deterrent policy will have to plan for the inclusion of their nuclear weapons in their decision-taking process, which might imply a direct transfer of data to strategic command systems. The description of functions of co-ordinating and integrating anti-ballistic defence seem more conventional. The CCS will first have to process data from various sensors (satellites, radar) to detect the departure of enemy missiles, determine their trajectory, distinguish between military payloads to be destroyed among the many objects in flight, assess the positions of points of departure and arrival and circulate this information. To do this, it will organise the use of means of detection and ensure their co-ordination (transfer of data from one to the other). The CCS will also have to control the use of hostile means by defence systems: assigning targets to batteries and designating them and, if necessary, controlling the effectiveness of target interception and reassignment. However, carrying out these functions is a technical challenge in view of the response time, geographical cover and availability referred to above. For some of the functions referred to, the CCS could be backed by existing or planned command systems such as the SCCOA in France; however, its specific developments cannot be circumvented. Furthermore, decision-taking and command structures may have many levels operating within the framework of a multinational organisation; however, they will very probably have to retain purely national levels, too (for launching retaliatory action in particular). The command system may be seen as a two-level structure including a "nucleus" designed, developed and exploited co- operatively for all functions linked with surveillance, detection, trajectography and sounding the alert. This "nucleus" would be extended by national structures for the implementation of means of retaliation. The co-ordination of active means of defence should probably be carried out in the international part of the structure: the geographical deployment of means to be implemented goes far beyond the frontiers of one European country and the time factors to be respected imply unity of command and decision- taking; the Torrejon centre is already an example of cross- frontier deployment. Such thinking is the fruit of the work of a special team and does not claim to express all the views of potential partners. Any action will be subject to prior consensus. Other preparatory work has been carried out, some of it with our participation (AAS 29 study conducted by AGARD). It would seem, therefore, that very high priority should be given to carrying out, as soon as possible, a co-operative study of the architecture of the control and command system that should be associated with anti-missile defence. 3. The cost The cost of a defence system and the magnitude of the effort to be made are key parameters in assessing its interest and, a fortiori, in working out decisions. However, well prior to these stages, there may be a stumbling block, an excuse for intellectual laziness and reliance on the efforts of others. It has been repeated too often that there is no point in thinking about anti-missile defence because Europe could never afford it. Too many unrealistic figures, blown up out of all proportion, have been mentioned haphazardly. We should first forget all we have heard about the phenomenal cost announced several years ago for the American strategic defence initiative. The SDI project aimed at worldwide defence against massive strikes by sophisticated intercontinental ballistic missiles designed and produced by countries with a high level of technology. Today, we are concerned with regional protection against a basic threat in the form of isolated attacks. The technical and operational facts are quite different and the cost is far less. In the context of their studies, Aerospatiale and Thomson- CSF have made an estimate of the various components of a European defence system. Many simplifying hypotheses have been accepted: financing and production by a single country, development over a total period of ten years, exclusion of extra cost for time-scales not being respected (delay in taking decisions, for instance), etc. In these conditions, an operational warning and trajectography system comprising, for instance, two operational geostationary satellites and three trajectography radars is estimated at about 10 GF. However, the exploratory development of a demonstration model (which would be integrated in a satellite produced for other purposes) might be possible within the 500 to 1 000 MF bracket. The SAMR/G (surface-to-air medium-range/ground) has already been under development since 1989 in co-operation between France and Italy (Aerospatiale, Alenia and Thomson-CSF) to come into service by the year 2000; the total cost of the programme (development and supply of forty systems) is in the region of 30 GF. To give it a capability against ballistic missiles with a range of less than 1 000 km, extra financing would be required of some 5 GF. This amount would cover the development of modifications to missiles and radar (with no significant impact on the cost of production runs) and the supply of mobile distant observation radar systems to give the SAMR/G an autonomous anti- ballistic capability. An area defence system capable of protecting areas of several hundreds of kilometres in diameter against missiles with a range of up to and including 4 000 km can be developed in Europe within eight to ten years. The cost of development is estimated at about 10 GF and the supply cost 10 to 15 GF for Europe as a whole (about 5 GF for France), plus 30 to 40% of the supply cost for protecting defence sites. Finally, the cost of the command and control system is estimated, for France, at about 3 GF. The existence of a consensus among European partners is no doubt a prior condition before any decisions are taken. Although such co-operation concerns entire aspects of the defence system, undue rigidity must be avoided. The boundaries of co-operation must be adapted to the matters to be covered. A European configuration seems particularly well-adapted to the development of a warning system and a point defence system (as is already the case for the Franco-Italian SAMR/G). It may also cover a large part of the control and command system. However, it must not rule out other forms of co-operation (the area defence system, for instance). Europe might benefit from work carried out in the United States or the CIS. In such hypotheses, a first simulation leads to estimated savings of 20 to 25% from which each participant might benefit (an estimate that endeavours to take into account the sharing of development costs and extra expenditure linked with co-operation and the price of equipment). In the event of a full programme being launched, participation in the production of a European anti-missile defence system for a country like France might be no more than an average of 2 to 3 GF per year over a period of ten to twelve years (compared with 3 to 4 GF for stand alone development). It should be stressed that anti-missile defence is not a monolithic structure: its various components may be developed and deployed one by one, modularly, sequentially, depending on the rate of political construction and financing capability. Such flexibility will be an extremely strong point in facilitating a rapid start with co-operation on an anti-missile defence system for Europe. (The sitting was closed at 6 p.m.) ---------------------------------- (1) Current Indian projects include three space launchers, the ASLV, PSLV and GSLV, and two ballistic missiles, the Agni and Prithvi, as well as many other smaller missiles. The largest system actually approaching deployment is the Prithvi, a tactical missile for the Indian army and technically the least ambitious of all Indian rocketry projects. Based on a propulsion system borrowed from the Soviet SA-2 Guideline SAM, it comes in 150 km and 240 km versions and could be fully operational in the mid-1990s. (2). An example is the American tilt toward Iraq in 1983, which made possible large sales of dual-use technology for Iraq's ballistic missile projects. Kenneth R. Timmerman, The death lobby: how the West armed Iraq (London: Fourth Estate, 1992), Chapter 12. (3). William C. Potter, International nuclear trade and non- proliferation: the challenge of the emerging suppliers (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990). (4). Even Britain, with extensive American help, was unable to complete its Blue Streak IRBM at an acceptable cost and schedule, abandoning it in 1960. (5). Statement by the assistant to the President for press relations (Santa Barbara: The White House, 16th April 1987), and Missile technology control regime: fact sheet to accompany public announcement, ibid. (6). The original members were Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States. They have been joined by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. (7). The numerous changes in the revised Technology Annex can be read as a kind of catalogue of previous disputes among the MTCR members. 8. Gautam Adhikari, Requiem for non-alignment, Times of India (New Delhi), 26th May 1992; Dilip Mukerjee, The nuclear option: ambiguity difficult to maintain, ibid., 9th June 1992. 9. Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of power: ballistic missiles in the third world (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991), pages 164- 66. 10. The author makes this point more thoroughly in Controlling ballistic missile proliferation, Survival, November/December 1991, especially pages 525-29. 11. Theodore A. Postal, Lessons from the Gulf war experience, International Security, winter 1991/92; and the refutation by Robert M. Stein, Patriot ATBM experience in the Gulf war (Lexington: Raytheon, 1991). 12. The Eisenhower administration's consideration of a missile test ban was brought to my attention by George Rathjens. The only full-length study in print is by peace researcher Udo Schelb, Raketenzielgenauigkeit und Raketenteststopp (Marburg: Interdisziplinaeren Arbeitsgruppe Friedens- und Abraestungsforschung, UniversitaetMarburg, 1988) who examines the idea as a way of stopping the MX ICBM. See also Robert Sherman, Deterrence through a ballistic missile flight test ban, Arms Control Today, December 1987, pages 8-13, with a rejoinder by Walter B. Slocombe. 13. Bailey, Doomsday weapons, op. cit., pages 197, 127. 14. Jasit Singh, Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, has suggested that India might agree to a global missile ban but only if it also prohibited sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. ------- For information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ | ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ | 43, avenue du President Wilson _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ | F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ | Tel 331-47235432; Fax 331-47204543 _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ | E-mail: 100315.240@Compuserve.com