File: atbm0493.003 a-weu/proceedings This is the third part of a four-part document. ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION ANTI-MISSILE DEFENCE FOR EUROPE (III) =============================== SYMPOSIUM Rome, 20th-21st April 1993 Official Record Office of the Clerk of the Assembly of WEU ********************************************************************* THIRD SITTING ============= Wednesday, 21st April 1993 ______ Current state of industrial studies on anti-missile systems in Europe (continued) ------------------------------------------ Observation and warning: mastery of complex systems (The sitting was opened at 10.05 a.m. with Mr. Lopez Henares, Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, in the Chair) Mr. ROCHE (Director, Systemes Matra Defense Espace, France). Requirements of an anti-ballistic defence system A complete ATBM system has a number of technical and operational functions meeting several types of requirement: The architectures being studied by Matra Defense Espace with the United States and other countries include a satellite or series of satellites that observe the strong light emitted by the propellant of the attacking missile as soon as it emerges from the clouds and until the propellant is extinguished. These satellites therefore detect the departure of the missile. They then estimate the area of impact to within a few dozen kilometres and hence whether or not it may be hostile. Finally, they determine the launching area to within a few kilometres. Radars then follow the missile and its warhead in order to improve positioning and estimated impact measurements. A system of battle conduct may then be envisaged, using various very long- and long-range anti-missile missiles to destroy the hostile missile in flight with a good chance of success. Consideration may also be given to a system of counter- attack, by rapid management of accurate bombing, generally from the air, to destroy the vector, stocks and command systems before these systems, which are often mobile, move. Apart from these purely defensive features, such a system will provide information: it will give valuable information on the state of progress of operational systems in proliferating countries by following each test carried out. It will also show heads of state of countries which have a nuclear deterrent which country actually launched a nuclear missile and not another country, this being a sine qua non of deterrence in the case of a coalition between several proliferating countries. The system also keeps a detailed record of the anti-missile battle when it takes place. In particular, in the case of active defence at European or NATO level, each country will, by means of such a system, be able to assess the degree of effectiveness of the means of defence deployed. Such a system can also launch and issue the alert: It will alert civilians and military and allow them to protect themselves rapidly (shelters, clothing, masks). The psychological and social value of the alert is important. Following Israel's experience during the Gulf war, it has been confirmed that, in the event of conflict and an effective risk of chemical attack, the population, knowing there is a reliable warning system, will continue its activities (civil or defence) as long as the alert has not been sounded and stops them only when it does sound. It has been shown that, if there is no system to give warning, particularly in case of nuclear or chemical attack, the activities of the country or region will come to a complete standstill after a few days, with extremely serious risks for the population. Technical sub-systems and their cost Technically, the complete system comprises a number of sub- systems such as the satellite, radars, command and communications systems, missiles and warning arrangements. Each of the abovementioned requirements is met by a combination of these elements, which may be more or less complex and more or less costly. The following table shows the relevant combinations according to requirements and the cost. It can thus be seen that: - the simplest system, costing about $240 M in its pre- operational version and about $2 000 M in its operational version, already fulfils all intelligence functions relating to proliferation, alert and passive protection of individuals and safeguarding economic activity and indication of who is firing, followed by the anti-missile battle when there is complete NATO or European defence; - at an extra cost of about $150 M, it is possible to have command systems managing means of bombardment; the need for counter-attack and counter-battery is met if means of attack such as bombers, accurate missiles or bombs also exist; - conversely, about $2 000 M extra is required if some theatre protection is to be ensured by anti-missile missiles; - and between $3 000 and 10 000 M extra for Europe to be protected fairly effectively. The hypotheses used by Matra Defense Espace for working out these estimates and the coefficients of attribution and permeability obviously still have to be discussed. Specific requirements of European nations - It would seem that most European nations are interested in information about proliferation and the conduct of the anti- missile battle. - It would also seem that many are interested in information about "who is firing? or "who has fired?". However, European countries with nuclear deterrents are no doubt far more interested. - The need for warning for passive defence in the theatre is mainly of interest to countries which may become involved in military actions outside Europe. - The need for warning for the passive defence of civilians and protecting the economy for survival is of interest to countries believing there is a risk of nuclear or chemical attack on their own territory. - The need to be able to counter-attack effectively and prevent other raids exists in countries that may be involved in actions in external theatres or that run the risk of invasion or of attacks close to their frontiers. - Finally, the active protection requirements that are by far the most costly: the nations interested are those which may be involved in actions in external theatres or may be invaded or attacked and find the cost-effectiveness of complete defence worthwhile. Thus, each European nation can define its own requirements and priorities, depending into which of the following categories it fits: - nuclear or non-nuclear nations; - nations wishing or not wishing to be involved in external theatres; - nations believing they run a risk of close attack or invasion; - nations believing they run a risk of direct attack. Possible deployment scenario The following scenario may be imagined for development and deployment: There would be a first stage known as 1-1, during which a few European countries invest in an experimental, semi- operational warning system consisting of an optical payload on a geostationary satellite and its ground processing. Let us call it EUROWISAT (European warning information satellite). At the same time, all European countries would build a ground-based communications network for warning and information on the characteristics of missile launchings. Let us call it EUROWINS (European warning information network system). These EUROWISAT and EUROWINS systems may be interoperable with United States systems such as DSP, FEWS or Brilliant Eyes. In 1-2, a more operational stage would be reached in which inter alia the space payload would be replaced by a group of two or three geostationary satellites. Each country could then develop its own means of counter- attack or defence, but there might be a stage 2 in which European countries developed a common system of counter-attack for theatre operations outside the European theatre by linking EUROWINS, national systems as required and a common management and command system. Finally, in the longer term, there would be a stage 3 at European level allowing defence of theatre forces (stage 3-1) and of the territory (stage 3-2) in which national defence systems might be interoperable between each other and with those of the United States. Mr. GRICOURT (Matra Marconi Space, France). - Trial EUROWISAT programme For the mission of detecting missiles in the propelled stage, two basic satellite configurations are possible: either a constellation of ten to twenty satellites in low orbit (solution suitable for worldwide cover) or two geostationary satellites at an altitude of 36 000 km in a fixed position over the area to be observed. In our case, we have a threat that is limited in extent and we propose a more economical solution based on geostationary satellites. The following slide illustrates the global coverage from the ground that is possible by using two geostationary satellites separated by about 60_ (one satellite over Gabon, the other over the Sea of Oman). Three zones can be distinguished, the two extremities (rectangles on the right and left) which correspond to simple observations by each of the satellites. The central zone is covered by both satellites, making stereo sighting possible. Inter alia, it will improve the system's detection performance. Compared with the American programme, the complexity and performance of the proposed solution are closer to those of DSP than of FEWS. The proposed satellite would be composed of a Telecom-type three-axis stabilised platform and an optical payload using mosaic infrared sensors. This configuration is well within Europe's reach at reasonable cost. It must be understood that, whereas the Americans want to observe the whole world and, at the same time, be able to cope with a strategic attack, all we want is a means capable of detecting tactical ballistic missiles in a far smaller geographical area. In terms of optical observation, the basic difficulty concerns the detection of plumes of liquid or solid missiles on extremely variable surface backgrounds. As a result, there are difficult technical problems relating to infrared sensors and the accuracy of the geostationary satellite's plotting. The following slide illustrates a possible trial semi- operational satellite (stage 1.l) based on a future experimental platform of a Telecom satellite. This geostationary satellite would accumulate, in peacetime, enough data on surface backgrounds in infrared and on missiles (by observing firing ranges) to make up for about fifteen years of lost time in this area and prove the worth of the proposed technical concept. It would then allow the development of the entire operational stage 1-2 system. The development logic illustrates the approach just described: IR sensor activities must be launched in 1994: the first models would be mounted in the trial optical payload at the end of 1997. The satellite platform, launched in 1995, would take this payload on board at the beginning of 1999 for firing at the end of the same year. Work carried out in orbit would be of direct benefit to the operational satellites due to be launched in 2005. Mr. ROCHE (Director, Systemes Matra Defense, France). - Conclusion In conclusion, a European system can be established progressively by allowing each European country to decide, at each stage, to meet one or another of its requirements at European or national level in the light of its own balance of cost and requirements. From the very first stage, these systems would be built in such a way as to allow interoperability with United States systems in the best interests of national forces, European forces as a whole and Atlantic Alliance forces as a whole. Europe has all the know-how required to produce all or part of these systems, including architecture and concept capabilities. We propose to make available to WEU this know- how and our experience drawn from the Matra Group's research in international co-operation with the United States and other countries, with Matra Marconi Space for space systems, with Matra Defense for missile systems and with Matra Cap Systemes for C3I command systems. TABLE The use of satellite systems for protection against ballistic missiles: prospects and limits of integration of civil and military systems Mr. MINICUCCI (Amministratore Delegato, Telespazio, Italy). The defence of Europe, initially localised, specific and directed towards a given threat, has changed into a sort of global, scattered defence against a whole range of sources of risk. Only more judicious use of satellite means and the corresponding ground sectors can provide the information and communications that are essential for carrying out operations in the new security scenario. Obviously, the more uncertain the situation, the more essential it is for accurate information to be transmitted to users in time. The existence of optical (infrared) and radar observation satellites, i.e. IMINT (Image Intelligence), and the relevant electronics, ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) and COMINT (Communication Intelligence), is an essential factor in carrying out the operations envisaged. Otherwise, such operations would have "no eyes or ears". In telecommunications, the use of satellite stations relieves intervention forces of the need for ground infrastructure which - in the case of distant operations - generally does not exist; when it exists, it is more fragile, prone to interception and vulnerable to direct attack than space stations. Satellites may act as command centres located in space and allow forces widely dispersed over the theatre of operations, sometimes very far from home territory and faced with scattered hostilities, e.g. guerrillas, to be operational immediately. Proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles and even weapons of mass destruction in the third world can only be delayed by multilateral verifications carried out by the industrialised countries; it cannot be completely and permanently avoided. What action should be taken in view of such proliferation? This is the fundamental question that is becoming increasingly urgent. The necessary measures and arrangements in this connection will inevitably have to include a combination of defensive and offensive/deterrent systems. At present, only the latter exist. However, in the future they will not be enough. There will have to be a capability to destroy enemy missiles in flight, in particular because their preventive elimination, apart from the fact that it is not certain (as was seen in the case of attacks against Iraqi Scuds), will always present political problems and requirements that are hard to overcome. Paradoxically, success in the Gulf war stimulated proliferation because it showed that it was impossible for third world states to withstand the West's high technology conventional megasystems, particularly those of the United States, whatever the scale of conventional weapons held by the third world. The only possibility still open to trouble-makers, apart from the choice of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, is to impose restrictions on the massive use of the West's high technology military power. The only means of doing this is to threaten western territories and peoples with direct retaliation and to limit operational and logistic concentrations of intervention forces by threatening to use missile-borne weapons of mass destruction. After giving a strategic reason for the possibility of threatening the West with the use of missiles (in particular as a means of carrying nuclear or biological weapons) it should be underlined that it is technically possible for the countries which are potential enemies to put such a threat into practice. The number of third world countries with rudimentary types of ballistic missiles, generally derived from Soviet Scuds and modified locally, such as the Al Hussein and Al Abbas missiles produced by Iraq, is increasing rapidly. There are now eighteen such countries and this figure will probably rise to twenty-four by the end of the century. Furthermore, the new missiles are now switching from liquid fuel to solid fuel and are consequently acquiring a far longer range than before. According to certain scenarios, it is believed that about ten countries that may be considered potential enemies will have missiles with a range of 1 000 to 2 500 km at the beginning of the next century. The area that might be threatened will therefore extend from the southern shore of the Mediterranean to a large part of Europe. As said earlier, it will be difficult to stop this proliferation of missiles. Basic technology is the same as for civil space programmes from which it will be practically impossible to exclude third world states. Moreover, such technology is very widespread, especially because it is fairly similar to that of any other type of anti- aircraft missile. It will certainly be possible to master the necessary technology in order to increase the accuracy of launchings and the technology for penetrating anti-missile defences. However, the lack of accuracy is of importance only if missiles are used against concentrated military targets while lack of progress in means of penetration is obviously of little consequence if there is no effective anti-missile system. This scenario becomes still more complicated if it is borne in mind that there is a real possibility of cruise missiles being used, too. Although less sophisticated than the West's, they allow a better-adapted, more advanced anti-missile defence. Possible recourse to such threats, associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons, is a choice wihin the reach of our potential enemies for influencing the policy of the industrialised states should the latter be without a credible anti-missile defence and hence the means to protect Western Europe's large urban areas. The elements of the scenario described above may be summed up as follows: - proliferation can be delayed but not eliminated; - the threat does not concern southern Europe alone but the whole of the European Community; - retaliation will therefore have to be effected jointly, at European level; - probably the United States will not finance an overall European anti-missile and space defence system. It is also probable that NATO will be able to supply the offensive components for this defence but not the anti-missile component proper; - Europeans must therefore solve the problem of whether to acquire, by their own means, an anti-missile and space defence system (TABM + EDI: Tactical Anti-Ballistic Missile and European Defence Initiative) that can be linked to American systems for the components if they are unable to produce them independently. The architecture of the European system should include: A. specialised reconnaissance and warning systems (IMINT, ELINT, etc.); B. systems for the command and conduct of operations; C. high-altitude anti-missile systems (e.g. Arrow or Thaad) and close defence systems (e.g. PAC 3 or ERINT and modified versions of Aster 45, etc.). For component A, it would initially be necessary to resort to American systems, as for high-altitude anti-missile defence. Component B can and must be produced independently, as must close anti-missile defence systems. In this architecture, which would guarantee relative European independence, the production of DRS satellite networks (for transmitting data) for continuous liaison with American satellite networks and the GPALS system is crucial. Systems for the command and conduct of operations must be the same in Turkey as in Portugal and the same in Sicily as in Denmark. The C2 element (command and conduct of operations) must therefore be developed on the basis of satellite platforms. In short, this must be a combined Euro-American system that allows Europe some degree of autonomy, because the present situation does not allow it, technologically and financially, to act in a completely independent manner. It should be added that, if such a system is not produced, Europe will lose its strategic flexibility, thus becoming more dependent and vulnerable to blackmail. Common ground must therefore be found between Europe and the United States and, although difficult, this does not seem impossible. I do not think Europe's problem is to realise that it is necessary to have more sophisticated space backing for its entire military arsenal and in particular for anti-missile defence. The problem is rather one of finding the necessary financial resources. Only the United States, which spends some $18 to 20 000 million each year on the military aspects of space, can envisage covering all sectors. Europe, for its part, is in no position to do so: this year, it has earmarked only just over $1 000 million for military space purposes. Nevertheless, France and Germany are planning a considerable increase in their investments in space in the next decade, not only in percentage terms but also in absolute figures. The European space industry, including that of Italy, has reached an excellent level of technology but it is mainly pursuing civil scientific or commercial programmes whose annual financing represents about 55% of that of American programmes ($7 000 million compared with $13 500 million for NASA), whereas European orders in the military sector amount, as has just been said, to a total of just over 5% of those for the United States. This lack of symmetry between Europe and the United States, between the military and civil sectors of space, immediately brings us to the following conclusion: bearing in mind the present attribution of financing, it is possible to achieve greater European autonomy by using civil space means for military purposes. This should encourage us to resort to a dual use of space and to draw up integrated civil and military programmes right from the stage when technical specifications are defined. This is, moreover, the aim pursued by the United States, as underlined on several occasions in the 1993 annual report of the Department of Defence to the President and Congress. The United States has made provision for a special programme to use all existing national means at operational level, for instance that of an expeditionary corps intervening abroad. This is the TENCAP programme (Tactical Exploitation of National Capability Programme), which is certainly an example that might be referred to. In regard to European space policy as a whole, priority should therefore be given to dual-purpose programmes - ensuring greater integration between civil and military systems - as compared with specialised systems for which it would be very difficult to find the necessary funds. Such integration has already been achieved in part, for instance: - the Helios satellite, launched by Ariane and using the Spot platform; - the French Syracuse and British Skynet military communication systems which do not use special satellites but military installations on board civil space platforms. During the Gulf war, the Americans themselves made widespread use of civil satellites, whether for remote sensing or communications purposes. The GPS-NAVSTAR system also has widespread civil applications. Dual-purpose systems are especially easy to set up since provisions in the civil area are steadily moving closer to those of the military area; however, this obviously does not apply to all sectors, including warning, ELINT, COMINT and anti-missile defence, the main topic of our symposium. Nevertheless, a large number of components of specialised military systems (and associated systems) can be put in place thanks to the military use of civil means. Civil space programmes, be they for detection or communications purposes, have interesting possibilities of which optimum use should be made thanks to appropriate agreements for permanent military use or in the light of requirements in order to have additional means available. Merging data gathered by civil and military sensors offers particularly promising prospects. These possibilities cannot be exploited to the full without common management of ground sectors. This might be effected by service contracts including special provisions meeting specific military requirements, for instance relating to the continuity of the supply of services in time of crisis. It will always be more difficult to achieve the integration of separate bodies; this would also lead to duplication of costly equipment and specialised staff. Problems relating to the security of information and military secrecy can always be solved with appropriate regulations governing the distribution of data. The solution I have outlined offers the greatest flexibility since, on a case-by-case basis, it allows all available space resources to be pooled to meet priority national or European requirements. If military requirements have to be met, available civil resources can be used by requisitioning them, as is customarily the case for air or maritime transport. There are clearly sectors in which it will not be possible to meet specifically military needs solely through the use of civil space resources. Here I believe a distinction should be drawn between the qualititative and quantitative aspects of these specific needs. On the first aspect, we have already spoken of warning satellites where the United States is now making remarkable efforts at modernisation with the FEWS (Follow-on Early Warning System) which is to replace the DSP (Defence Support Programme), and with the COMINT and ELINT systems and those relating to anti-missile defence. Furthermore, military requirements call for a higher resolution capability for satellite sensors, greater resistance to electronic counter-measures and channels with a broader band width to allow signals to be coded, etc. From the quantitative standpoint, military requirements include far more continuous cover than is needed for civil applications and, in the event of crises, they increase unforeseeably and significantly. Ideally, at military level, there should clearly be a permanent availability of specialised space means to cope with peak needs in times of crisis, but this is not a realistic aim. Even in the most optimistic hypothesis, the necessary resources will never be available, particularly in Europe. However, it is not acceptable to opt for a contrary course, either. A via media must be found between all or nothing. Conversely, it seems logical, in a European framework, to provide for the use of the civil satellite network as a basis for military space means in normal times by integrating it in satellites earmarked for specific applications such as Osiris or Zircon, now planned by France. In the event of an emergency, existing capacity in the remote sensing or communications sector would be integrated and increased by launching mini-satellites to allow a quantitative increase in the frequency of observation, number of communications channels, etc., deemed necessary. Thanks to the present sophistication of mini-satellites, it is possible, inter alia, to satisfy tactical operational requirements for better resolution and greater frequency of cover than needed for politico-strategic purposes. For more sophisticated needs, e.g. anti-missile warning or the space sectors of anti-missile defence, including the theatre sector, American means will have to be relied upon for at least the next fifteen years. It will also be necessary to turn to the United States to respond to military needs beyond those of conflicts of low or medium intensity, particularly against technologically developed enemies able to jam inadequately protected civil satellites. This is an objective limit for European autonomy, but it should be noted with realism, at least in the short and medium term. Furthermore, in the event of a major crisis, Europe could certainly not manage without United States support, even in the long term. It would thus be pointless and even impossible to draw up programmes that would duplicate the worldwide capability of the United States itself. Moreover, such a capability would be out of proportion with Europe's independent politico- strategic action capability. Conversely, resources, including financial resources, should be concentrated so as to meet requirements better adapted to Europe by adopting an approach complementary to that of the United States potential and, through complementarity, greater European autonomy should be obtained. In this context, very special attention should be paid to the ground sector and the effective possibility of armed forces making full use of resources offered by civil satellites which it would be possible to increase in the event of an emergency by launching mini-satellites and by complementary means supplied by the Americans; consideration might also be given to linking European ground sectors direct to American networks by means of the DRS (data relay system). With this in mind, co-operation in a European framework between the military and civil sectors would be not only expedient but necessary in order to co-ordinate the requirements of all users and to define jointly the technical specifications of the various projects. Only by this means will it be possible to make optimum use of the technological and industrial capabilities existing in Europe. From the advanced multi-purpose standpoint, major programmes launched in a European framework should be reviewed, ranging from the WEU observation satellite network to EUMILSATCOM, in order to meet civil and military needs in a co-ordinated manner. After starting as simple projects based on very uncertain financial prospects, such programmes will thus become more definite and more reliable. In the medium term, co-ordination will inevitably have to concern ESA, if only because of the importance of space research in a large number of sectors of advanced technology which are the very ones on which the Community is concentrating with programmes such as Eureka, Brite, Esprit, Race, etc., and Euclid in the framework of the IEPG. In this connection, a convention might be signed between the EEC, WEU and ESA similar to the one concluded in France in August 1991 between the DGA and CNES. As I have said many times today, the standards necessary for carrying out anti-missile missions exceed the possibilities of civil satellite systems. However, the need for economy encourages a search to be made among civil systems for the best possible support for specialised military missions. In other words, the situation in Europe is forcing us to think about how to reorganise civil means so that they may become a factor in reducing the cost of dedicated military systems. We have already pointed out that certain military missions could, without insuperable difficulties, benefit from the backing of civil satellites if less stringent standards were accepted although these would be adequate in face of the potential enemy. In anti-missile defence, it obviously seems more difficult to entertain this possibility. In spite of this objective limit, Telespazio is now conducting initial exploratory studies to determine which civil components might be integrated as auxiliary - but financially important - elements in specialised military systems and what modifications would have to be made. First, to some extent it seems possible to make significant economies by reorganising the tasks of the ground sectors of space systems. For instance, Fucino, Telespazio's operational space station, can, subject to minor adaptations, carry out support missions for anti-missile surveillance and strategic alert tasks in general, as follows: - in-orbit monitoring of satellites in normal and peak situations; - auxiliary system for the military data transmission system; - accelerated pre-processing station for image data. Telespazio's systems capability also allows it to define dual-use systems that can be integrated in military surveillance networks, e.g.: - aerostat platforms equipped with military and civil apparatus that can be completed by satellite and airborne means; - auxiliary optical and communications mini-satellites to increase the density of surveillance and communications networks; - observation by SAR (Synthetic Aparture Radar) for military surveillance purposes. Our research work is still at an early stage, particularly in respect of support systems for anti-missile defence. For these reasons and so as not to make too many demands on this prestigious audience by embarking upon a promotional operation, I will not dwell on the details. Just allow me to affirm that there is certainly a possibility of intelligent integration of technology; such integration will allow Europe to draw on its vast reserves of experience of civil systems in order to reduce the cost of building specialised military systems; it is these which, in future, will allow Europe to be more autonomous in managing its own security and that of the West. Impact of ballistic missile defence on European military space programmes Mr. RODOTA (General Manager, Alenia Spazia SpA). The international scenario In the early seventies, the United States developed a defence architecture designed to detect nuclear explosions and ballistic missile launches, primarily from the former USSR territory. The space segment of that architecture was based on early warning (EW) satellites, developed under the defence support programme (DSP), and on air force and navy communications satellites, required to route raw data to processing and decision centres and to broadcast the related missile launch warnings to missile batteries. To meet the increasing communications demand, it was necessary to use during the Gulf war, in addition to the mentioned communications assets, the NASA tracking data relay satellite (TDRS), which has a specific capability of relaying high volumes of traffic. Pushed by the Gulf war experience, the United States initiated the design of the next generation of early warning satellites, the follow-on early warning system (FEWS) and gave consideration to the advantages of the Brilliant Eyes satellites (an early warning low orbiting satellite constellation), designed in the past under the strategic defence initiative programme. A large number and variety of ballistic missiles are now in the inventories of several developing nations which continue to procure ballistic missiles for their increasing offensive effectiveness: longer range, shorter flight time and flexible payloads, which can vary from conventional to nuclear. All of Europe can be considered under threat of the medium- /long-range ballistic missiles in the inventories of neighbouring potentially hostile developing countries. The southern European nations are particularly threatened because they are within the ranges of the short-range ballistic missiles also. At present in Europe, some nations and the European Space Agency (ESA) are developing military communications, data relay and surveillance satellites which could be the components of a ballistic missile defence architecture. Space components of the ballistic missile defence architecture For their capability to detect missile launches from the hostile territory, the Gulf war demonstrated that early warning satellites are the capstone of a ballistic missile defence architecture. The related processing and decision centre and the communication satellites performing, respectively, the analysis of the data received and ensuring the timely flow of data collected and the subsequent distribution of warnings to missile batteries are both of vital importance to the ballistic missile defence architecture. In addition, the role that can be played by surveillance and imagery satellites is of crucial importance as they can provide the intelligence information necessary to prevent or neutralise the missile before its launch. The ballistic missile defence requirement is surfacing in a European scenario where many military and civilian national and international space programmes have been launched (no one of which appears dedicated to ballistic missile defence) and where a full co-ordination of space activities is yet to be achieved. The design of the European ballistic missile defence architecture For the high cost and for the technological capability required, no European nation has the possibility to field individually a credible ballistic missile defence system at the moment. Such a system could, in fact, be implemented only through a joint European effort. To achieve that, the Assembly of Western European Union should take the lead, establish co-operative strategies and initiate the carrying out of joint European studies. Under the WEU aegis, European nations' designers, developers and operators have to meet with the aim of: - Establishing the performances of the early warning satellite system. Based on United States experience, the group should identify the coverage required, the missile booster plume detection probability and the unavoidable false alarm percentage, the unacceptable delay in detecting the missile launches, the missile speed and the launch position. The group should, moreover, determine the volume of data transferred from the early warning system to the processing and decision centre and the communications capacity required to broadcast warnings to missile batteries. The group should identify also the most suitable and the most cost-effective orbital positions for the early warning satellites considering the geostationary and the low orbit approach, indicating the size of the constellation needed to meet the European early warning requirements. - Identifying the components required to complete the ballistic missile defence architecture. The WEU group should, moreover, study the remaining aspects of the ballistic missile defence, namely: . the most suitable location for the processing and decision centre, which could be collocated with the data relay satellite centre; . the information and the algorithm required to discriminate missile launchers from false alarms; . the data relay and communications capacity required by the system; . the format of warning signals required to permit their rapid distribution down to tactical forces for their possible self-defence actions; . weapon systems able to neutralise the incoming missile as far as possible from the European territory and their most suitable locations; . the surveillance and intelligence information and actions required to neutralise the ballistic missile before its launch. - Harmonising European national and international space programmes incorporating the early warning satellites and the related communications requirements. It appears that the various space programmes could contribute to ballistic missile defence although in most cases the programmes are designed to fulfil specific national or small group of nations requirements. A credible ballistic missile defence system, beyond its early warning dedicated satellite, should rely also on other space assets like imagery, surveillance, data relay and communications satellites. The problem of neutralising an incoming ballistic missile cannot be relegated to the detection of the ballistic missile launch and to the subsequent weapon reaction. Its solution requires the availability and the possibility of exploiting the capabilities of the other parent satellites. The group should therefore draft a survey of European military and civilian space programmes and consider, in particular, the benefits that can be brought to the ballistic missile defence system by the availability of intelligence information collected by remote sensing satellites and the communications capability available to the system on national, European and ESA data relay satellites. If the intelligence information obtainable and the capacity on communications and data relay satellites is not considered sufficient, the group, under the WEU aegis, should be able to request the appropriate modifications to accommodate the European ballistic missile defence requirements. - Exploring the possibility of carrying out co-operative efforts with the United States on the development of new enhanced systems and the way to achieve interoperability. The early warning satellites will probably have technological challenges that could be faced only with strong Euro-American co-operation. A European policy which would limit its research and development activities to Europe should, in fact, be refused. The group should therefore consider co-operative efforts with the United States on system components identified at technological risk and assess the convenience of participating, if invited, in the United States advanced programme, Brilliant Eyes, addressing the defence against the ballistic missiles of almost the entire world, particularly necessary when European armed forces are deployed outside the usual area of operations. To avoid overlapping between ballistic missile defence systems, the group should, moreover, act in co-ordination with United States and NATO groups addressing the same subject and carry out the actions required to achieve the system's interoperability. Conclusions In conclusion, the space component of a reliable and fast- reacting ballistic missile defence system, beyond the dedicated early warning satellites (in a geostationary position or low orbit), should rely on the information provided by deployed imagery and surveillance satellites and on communications capacity available on communications and data relay satellites. To provide Europe with such a system, WEU should take the lead and convene working groups formed by military and industrial experts tasked to address the abovementioned issues with the aim of designing, or jointly developing with the United States, a credible European ballistic missile defence system. For the programmes now under study and in-house development; namely, the surveillance satellite, Helios, the WEU remote- sensing satellite, the data relay satellite, Artemis, and the communications satellite, Sicral, Alenio Spazio is fully qualified and willing to contribute to the development of a ballistic missile defence system for Europe. That concludes my presentation and I thank you for your attention. Are there any questions? General STAINIER (Commandant of the Institut superieur de defense, Belgium) in response to interesting and convincing statements about European anti-ballistic missile systems, recalled that the United States was urging Europeans, particularly through NATO and the defence ministries, to join a worldwide system. The United States also believed that its solution was the only one which would help Europe. He therefore wondered what arguments that morning's speakers would put to the European ministers who would have to decide on the best system for Europe. Lord FINSBERG (Vice-President of the WEU Assembly) recalled that the first speaker had said that it would be possible to identify the starting point of a missile attack to within a few kilometres and this would allow the launching-site and, possibly, the command centre to be destroyed. As a politician, he wished to know what was meant by a few kilometres since this could be anything from three to fifty kilometres and this could mean that perhaps 100 000 people might be killed. Mr. ROCHE (Director, Systemes Matra Defense Espace, France) answered that the number of kilometres was in fact very few since with two stereoscopic positioned satellites, the launching-point could be determined from between three to five kilometres. The impact point depended mainly on the distance of the flight, be it 70, 100, 300 or 3 000 kilometres. To take an average Scud, with a range of 300 kilometres, the point of impact could be determined to within 40 to 60 kilometres. To make a counter-attack on the launching-site which was determined to within a few kilometres, it would be necessary to deploy tactical sensors such as airborne radar or Orchidee that was being built by Thomson-CSF in France or perhaps ground radars. The counter-attack would have to be launched as quickly as possible because mobile launchers could be moved. In answer to General Stainer, he said that co-operation with the United States should be made as simple as possible. The United States had spent 20 years modernising and developing their global system. The defence support programme already existed. One did not have to be extreme in the sense of procuring everything from the United States or doing everything oneself in Europe. The wisest course would be to do a minimum in Europe and have a maximum that was interoperational with the United States system. It was not essential to have a totally- integrated system and to have to always pass through that system. Each country could have its own part and other parts would be interoperational so that each country could retain political freedom to take the decision regarding interoperability between the national, European and United States systems. Europe had all the technology for its own early warning system. Spot, and Helios next year, provided the observation technology necessary for detecting launches and vast areas could be covered, although Europe did not need to survey the whole earth. Observation and surveillance could be conducted in specific areas near to Europe with a very high degree of precision and the Americans could draw upon our information input. Co-operation was necessary at all levels and while one partner might have a more complex and ambitious system than others, all participants should be able to benefit from all contributions. Dr. PAYNE (Professor of National Security Studies, Georgetown University, President of the National Instutute for Public Policy, United States) wished to specify the United States' position towards co-operation in a global protection system. It encouraged a very flexible approach to co-operation including the possibility of having an indigenously developed European system, interoperable with United States components, even including the provision of DSP data to indigenously developed European systems. Unless the United States' position had changed very recently, it was very compatible with the flexible interoperable approach to common western defence presented this morning. Mr. NATIVI (Editing Director, Rivista Italiana di Difesa (RID)) believed the industrial attitude to Europe's true ability to raise the necessary financial resources was rather optimistic. Did Europe have anything like $14 billion for a European anti-ballistic missile defence programme at a time when defence budgets were being reduced everywhere? He had hoped that industry would have been more realistic in terms of the present economic situation. Was there any point in duplicating what had already been done in the United States or in the Soviet Union? A comprehensive programme should be developed to achieve short-term low-cost results to meet the real threat that existed, rather than thinking about duplicating on a smaller scale what had already been done in the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. RODOTA (General Manager, Alenia Spazio SpA, Italy) agreed with Mr. Nativi and felt that it was not right to launch a major programme from the very start. Present industrial capability and the programmes already under way had to be examined in terms of the existing threat and the serious budgetary problems of all European countries. Money had to be spent wisely. Defence budgets had to be concentrated on current threats rather than on nebulous threats. To be flexible, maximum investment was not necessary immediately but some funds should be made available so that industry could make a careful analysis of the situation. Mr. ROCHE (Director, Systemes Matra Defense Espace, France) wished to clarify the figures he had given. The sequence of investment should be progressive and the sum necessary for early warning, communications and detection would initially be only $240 million, not $10 billion. He could provide the technical characteristics if necessary. The latter figure related to global protection for the whole of Europe which he thought was totally unrealistic. There was a whole range of possibilities between the maximum and minimum figures for developing counter- attack systems and this would cost about $400 or $500 million. To develop local theatre protection would depend on how much money each country wished to invest. Industry was realistic because it had to pay its way. It was always ready, however, to provide the necessary technical, scientific and financial information regarding its research. Mr. MINICUCCI (Amministratore Delegato, Telespazio, Italy) in view of all the budgetary difficulties in Europe Italy was advocating greater integration of investment in outer space for civilian purposes. Although Europe invested over 50% for civilian purposes, this was less than half the figure for the United States with which co-operation should be developed. Since European investment was only 5% of United States investment, Europe could never reach that level. Not even the Soviet Union had been able to do so. All such matters had become global as illustrated by the problem of Yugoslavia. All aspects of defence should therefore be integrated. (Mr. Lenzer, Vice-Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee, took the Chair) Conditions for a European anti-missile defence policy ----------------------------------------------------- Strategic lessons of the Gulf war General STAINIER (Commandant of the Institut superieur de defense, Belgium). Introduction I have been asked to deal with the strategic lessons of the Gulf war, concentrating, of course, in the context of this symposium, on defence against ballistic missiles. In point of fact, in the absence of Iraqi combativeness and in view of the disproportion between the forces present, there are on the whole no really new strategic, operational or tactical lessons to be learned, merely confirmation of rules and principles taught in all military academies. The new lessons are technological. Warning Great caution is required in trying to draw lessons from the war in Kuwait. In point of fact, the coalition benefited from exceptionally favourable conditions: - The coalition of about thirty nations, led by the United States, the only superpower, and including inter alia two great European powers (France and the United Kingdom), had a far greater economic, technological and military potential than Iraq, a small country with only fifteen million inhabitants and heavily in debt after ten years of war against Iran. - The coalition forces had six months in which to deploy their forces, train them and even improve the specifications of certain equipment (desert camouflage, protection of rotor blades and control panels against sand, speedier introduction of higher-performance software for certain Patriot units, etc.). - The coalition forces were quantitatively and qualitatively superior in both equipment (aircraft, helicopters, guided munitions, space means, etc.) and personnel (a majority of well-trained professionals). - The coalition had widespread international support thanks to the provocations of Saddam Hussein and the exceptionally favourable attitude of the United Nations Security Council (weakness of the Soviet Union, China's passivity and search for respectability). - Finally, Iraq put up only passive resistance. In the absence of Iraqi combativeness, it is dangerous to compare the performances of weapons systems or to assess the effectiveness of tactical procedures. - Some lessons, particularly regarding the effectiveness of Patriot, are still classified. In trying to draw lessons from the war, we Belgians, who did not play a direct part in the operations, must be even more cautious than those who took part. Strategic aims (1) Two-thirds of world oil reserves are in the Middle East. Iraqi reserves represent 10% of the world total, as much as in Kuwait. Saudi Arabia has 25%. By taking over Kuwait, Saddam Hussein probably wanted to: - settle an old territorial dispute; - eliminate a troublesome debt by absorbing the creditor; - occupy a position of force on the oil market. On the other hand, the United States, the leader of the anti-Iraqi coalition, had the following aims: - to ensure respect for international law by forcing Iraq to evacuate Kuwait, an independent state; - to prevent Iraq from producing nuclear weapons; - to destroy Iraq's conventional military potential which was a threat to the Saudi ally and to the emirates; - to provide better guarantees for world supplies of low- cost oil; - to reaffirm its leadership over the western world after the uncertainty following the end of the East-West confrontation; - to remove Saddam Hussein and change the Iraqi regime. Assessment of the coalition strategy All strategies seek to achieve goals by the optimum use of the means available, account being taken of the opponent's capabilities. The leadership of the coalition (MM. Bush, Baker, Cheney, Powell, Major and Mitterrand) clearly defined the political and military aims and obtained the support of the United Nations and a wide coalition. The coalition forces unhesitatingly called the American doctrine the air/land battle. Similarly, the unity of military command and NATO procedures were widely used by all the coalition parties, although there were a few incidents and shortcomings. Allied military personnel, mostly career personnel, showed discipline, courage and professional capability. The air strategy applied by the coalition parties was planned in three successive stages: - gaining mastery of the sky, essential before starting any offensive operation by ground forces. This was attained mainly by destroying command, communications and radar observation networks; - neutralising the enemy's second echelon. The first two stages lasted thirty-nine days. - direct intervention to help the ground forces. Coalition air forces, consisting of 2 000 fighter aircraft from ten different nations under centralised command, made about 3 000 sorties a day, in all more than 110 000 sorties against Iraq, with very few losses (forty-six aircraft and helicopters). This good result is due to the sophistication and accuracy of western weapons systems and their better survival capability. The single command, level of training and standardisation of procedures are all factors which contributed to victory. Air superiority allowed all the coalition forces total freedom of action. Ground operations by the coalition forces were conducted with numerical and quantitative superiority and under single command, deploying numerous means by surprise along the flank and to the rear of a static, passive Iraqi opponent, demoralised by bombing and the breakdown in supplies and communications. Scud B and Al Hussein missiles Initially, Scud was a tactical missile developed mainly to carry a nuclear weapon. It has a range of 300 km. It is an inaccurate missile with a CEP of about 1 500 m). Third world countries with no nuclear capability procure a version of Scud with a payload of 900 kg of explosive. They do this: - for reasons of prestige; - in order to have a means of delivery when they manage to obtain their own nuclear weapons; - so as to have a weapon of terror, mainly for use against civilian populations. Thus, during the war between Iran and Iraq, more than 600 missiles were fired, in no way changing the course of military operations but adding to hate between the two countries. In Afghanistan, three Scuds fired on a small town killed more than 300 persons and wounded hundreds. - to have a basic means of delivery whose performances they hope to improve. Thus, Iraq developed two longer-range versions but this was at the expense of the power of the missile's explosive payload and accuracy. ______________________________________________________________ Type Warhead Range CEP ______________________________________________________________ Scud B 900 kg 300 km < 1 km Al Hussein 400 kg 600 km 2 to 3 km Al Abbas 150 kg 900 km 5 to 10 km ______________________________________________________________ After the conflict, no non-classified source was able to confirm whether Iraq's means of delivery were really able to carry a chemical or nuclear warhead. At the end of the war between Iran and Iraq, Iraq had about 400 Scud Bs and some 40 mobile ramps. Some of these Scud Bs were progressively modified. The coalition's response to the Scud threat was threefold: - observation and detection by means of aircraft, satellites and units of the special forces; - attack on fixed and mobile Scud ramps by aircraft and helicopters; - terminal defence based on the Patriot system. Observation, detection and destruction of ramps While the fixed ramps were destroyed practically at the outset of hostilities, the search for and destruction of mobile ramps provided difficult. It is believed that only about ten mobile ramps were destroyed. Patriot The Patriot weapons system was an important element in the fight against Iraqi Scuds. Although it succeeded in attaining the political goal for which it was used (keeping Israel out of the war, preserving the coalition's cohesion and avoiding too heavy losses), doubts have been expressed about its military effectiveness. The Patriot missile was initially developed to ensure the protection of military sites against subsonic aircraft and cruise missiles. In 1988, a first improvement in the software and radar system gave Patriot a capability against short-range tactical missiles (Frog and SS-21). A second improvement, to the battery tracking radar and the release and fragmentation rocket of the missile's explosive warhead, had been planned for January 1991. The introduction of this improvement was brought forward when the crisis started in August 1990. It was to make Patriot capable of destroying tactical missiles with a range of less than 500 km. During the war, American engineers were able to draw lessons from the first operations: range of Al Husseins over 500 km, hypersonic terminal speed greater than expected and fragmentation of the missile into several pieces, unintentionally creating decoys. With absolutely extraordinary speed, the producer was able to modify the software to take account of these new parameters, test the modified software during a firing and make two modifications to the software on 4th and 18th February 1991. Sequence of interception The search for the Al Husseins was carried out by allied means of observation including observation satellites, AWACS radar aircraft, TR-1s, E-8 Joint Stars and reconnaissance patrols. The infrared image of the launching of a missile was detected by a DSP observation satellite and relayed via Air Space Command communications satellites to the ground station at Alice Springs (Australia) and the United States Space Command Missile Warning Centre. American computers analysed the trajectory of the missile to determine the probable point of impact. Information was relayed to Patriot batteries in Saudi Arabia and Israel. Since the Al Hussein missile has a flight time of seven minutes, the battery had about two minutes in which to react. The system calculated automatically which Patriot launcher had the best chance of intercepting the missile. Interception took place at between 30 and 10 km. The Patriot exploded near the Al Hussein and destroyed it or changed its trajectory. Debris, sometimes large, then fell to the ground, causing damage and victims. In the meantime, allied aircraft tried to destroy the launcher before it returned to its shelter. According to United States Army estimates, more than 80% of warheads were destroyed in Saudi Arabia. The United States Army had had time to prepare the deployment of batteries carefully. The crews of the weapons system knew their equipment well and were well trained. After a few days, operators learned to distinguish the warhead from the other large pieces of debris from the missile. Failure to intercept a missile caused the death of twenty-eight United States military in Dharan. This was due to a fault in the software of a Patriot unit which had been out of operation for some time. The weapons system was adapted in record time to the characteristics of the specific threat from the Al Hussein missile. In Israel, Israeli personnel in Patriot units had training in the United States. They were brought back to Israel on 21st January and put into action the next day without having had the time to complete their training. The density of the population made optimum deployment impossible. To avoid a high consumption of Patriots and low-altitude interceptions, the Israeli authorities decided, on 25th January, to abandon the automatic mode for interceptions, which would have further increased the number of failures. By using recordings of firings effected and stricter criteria than those applied by the Americans, the Israelis believe they attained a level of effectiveness of more than 50%. Lessons 1. In the Kuwait crisis, deterrence did not work. This example is a timely reminder that deterrence works only between well-informed and rational opponents. In the next ten years, crises may well bring western countries into conflict with ill-informed opponents who might be insensitive to western logic. This observation should encourage Europeans to start thinking about nuclear doctrine. 2. Crisis management implies a correct assessment of the possibilities and intentions of the enemy. In this connection, the abundant sophisticated means of gathering information used by the coalition did not play the expected role: - prior to 2nd August 1990, the Americans observed the Iraqi deployment but did not wish to believe it was intended to invade Kuwait; - prior to 17th January 1991, the coalition vastly overestimated the size of Iraqi forces deployed in Kuwait; - the coalition was aware of the existence of an improved version of Scud but was surprised by the political importance of a weapons system of which neither the number of mobile launchers nor the number of available missiles was known. If it is not to take decisions blindly or have decisions imposed by others, it is vital for Western Europe to have a global system for gathering information. 3. Introduction of new weapons systems The new equipment used by coalition ground forces allowed well-trained professional soldiers to fight non-stop, night and day, and to attack the Iraqi forces in depth (GPS navigation systems, night-vision equipment, MLRS, Apache, etc.). 4. Importance of deception and secrecy for achieving a surprise Everything was done to make the Iraqis believe that a front- line operation was being prepared against their troops deployed in Kuwait, backed by an amphibious operation: landing exercises and embarkation of a division of marines that was kept off the shores of the emirate. Furthermore, the flanking move by the United States Seventh and Eighth Corps and the French division over 250 km was concealed from the Iraqis thanks to the total air superiority of the coalition. This secret deployment was the basis of the operational surprise when the coalition's left flank made a circling movement towards the Euphrates, with a prolongation towards Basrah. 5. Logistic support No nation, even the United States, has enough air and naval military transport capability to deploy a large-scale intervention force. The deployment of combat, combat support and logistic support means was possible only thanks to the prior period of six months that was available and the chartering of civil aircraft and ships, the latter at a cost about 40% higher than the normal cost. Thus, merchant vessels transported more than a third of the total American tonnage. 6. Crisis management generally implies action by several coalition countries and, in each of them, the deployment of units from the three armed forces. Co-ordinated actions require joint planning that only a well-trained combined staff headquarters is capable of ensuring. This will be either an inter-allied headquarters of long- standing (NATO type) or the national headquarters of the leader of the coalition (United States), reinforced as and when necessary by personnel and units from other coalition countries. 7. Support for any war effort now depends on the attitude of the media. The coalition managed an exemplary media manoeuvre designed at one and the same time to meet the need to keep the public informed and to ensure the secrecy of military operations. 8. For the time being, only the United States is able to prevent the Middle East, an area of great strategic value, being dominated by a hostile power. This is because it alone has the capability to intervene militarily anywhere and against any opponent. However, the fact that the United States had to finance its intervention in Kuwait with the assistance of Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia and other friendly countries and the budgetary difficulties of the United States make some people air the view that Desert Storm was in reality beyond the means of the United States. 9. For the first time, the importance of the mastery of space was confirmed. The role played by satellites, mainly American, in intelligence, communications, navigation and surveillance was decisive. Inter alia, they allowed industrial and strategic targets to be planned and the overall Iraqi defence system to be pinpointed. 10. The use of advanced technology weapons systems was the key to success: satellites, spy aircraft, jamming, guided munitions, etc. However, it should be pointed out that such weapons are very expensive. The development and production of such advanced weapons systems is often beyond the means of any individual European nation. 11. It is neither easy nor rapid to seek and destroy mobile launchers, even if one has total air superiority and can deploy large numbers of sophisticated and varied weapons systems and means of detection. The overall effort made to destroy the Al Husseins was out of all proportion with the military effects of those missiles. Light ballistic missiles and mobile launchers which leave a shelter or place of concealment for a brief span of time are still of interest. 12. Rudimentary tactical ballistic missiles, which are relatively inaccurate, are within the reach of many countries, some of which may be governed by authoritarian, unscrupulous leaders insensitive to the logic of deterrence. The fact that a growing number of politically unstable states have chemical or even nuclear capabilities, coupled with ballistic missiles, may eventually represent a risk of strikes against cities of Western Europe. 13. Success of Patriot: The deployment of Patriot was a success, with an interception rate of more than 50%. The Americans managed, in a very short lapse of time, to make significant improvements to what was a local anti-aircraft defence system, transforming it into a system of defence against tactical ballistic missiles. It almost certainly allowed many human lives to be saved. Patriot thus preserved the unity of the coalition against Iraq. It contained Israel's desire to retaliate to the Scud attacks. An Israeli retaliation might have led to the withdrawal of Arab countries from the coalition, thus transforming the conflict into a confrontation between Iraq and the West. 14. The American decision to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system: After the collapse of the communist regimes in Europe and the implosion of the Soviet Union, the political situation became more unstable, the outbreak of regional crises became more probable and threats to European values and interests became more numerous. It will be possible for crises to occur suddenly and develop in an unforeseeable manner and in unexpected places. For the United States, the war in Kuwait confirmed that, in such a dangerous situation, it is important to have a defence capability against ballistic missiles which might carry weapons of mass destruction. On 29th January 1991, President Bush announced, in his State of the Union Message, that the strategic defence initative was to be refocused. The 1991 Missile Defence Act in turn explained the United States' aim in this area, i.e. to establish a global system of protection against limited strikes (GPALS): - a system of detection comprising ground-based sensors and others in space, capable of following any ballistic missile from launching to interception; - ground-based interceptors in the United States or deployed with American intervention forces or on allied territory, or possibly on that of the new Russian friends. Moreover, it proposed industrial co-operation with its NATO allies and the Russians; - space-based interceptors, which could allow any ballistic missile with a range of more than 500 km to be intercepted. The United States planned the development of the whole system and, inter alia, earmarked funds for improving Patriot. In the short term, improvements will be made to the range of detection and the tracking capability of unit radars, the possibility of separating launchers from the unit calculation centre and speedier loading on to the launcher. In the longer term, improvements will include a further increase in unit radar capability, the inclusion of on-board radar, software, the ability to distinguish between warheads and decoys, etc. All these modifications should lead to a twentyfold increase in the area covered and a twofold increase in the maximum interception altitude. It should be recalled that the Russians have an anti-ballistic missile system. 15. By agreeing not to retaliate themselves to Iraqi attacks and to depend on American detection, calculation and communications systems and weapons to ensure active defence, Israel accepted the relinquishment of part of its independence. Furthermore, a few weeks later, the United States obliged a very reticent Israeli Government to take part in an international conference on peace in the Middle East. Similarly, if Europe wishes to have an independent decision- taking capability, it cannot rely totally or permanently on others for essential aspects of its defence. 16. On the basis of systems that already exist or are being studied, it is possible to develop an effective anti-missile capability. However, the number and nature of the means to be deployed (detection and communications satellites, data- processing systems, weapons systems proper), as well as their cost and the definition of the zones to be protected, rule out a purely national programme for Europeans. Conclusions 1. Objections to the creation of a European anti-missile system Some Europeans reproach the United States for focusing the strategic debate on the highly technological subject of anti- missile defence and urging participation in the GPALS project. The Americans are accused of wishing to prove that European security cannot be ensured outside American leadership: "By announcing the idea of a defence system that only it could control, the United States is making an indirect attack on the first steps towards a European defence identity about which it is so worried (2) . Admittedly, a few objections have been made to the development of an anti-missile defence system by Europeans: - To establish an anti-missile defence system would show very little faith in the pursuit of western attempts to prevent all nuclear, chemical and ballistic proliferation. - Any defence system can be diverted, saturated or penetrated. Hence, if the enemy has weapons of mass destruction, is it satisfying to know that some 90% of its ballistic means of delivery would be destroyed if that meant that Italian, German or Belgian towns would in any event be wiped out? Would not the possession of nuclear weapons by a paranoiac dictator reigning over a country on the borders of Europe change the rules of the game and make vain any defence system, which is inherently imperfect? - Will not the production of an anti-missile defence system encourage potential enemies to increase the number of offensive means of delivery, which are relatively cheap, in the hope of saturating defences, thus giving rise to another arms race which might exhaust Europe? - For the time being, no country to the south of Europe or the United States is capable of threatening its northern neighbours with ballistic missiles. Very few of our southern and eastern neighbours are believed to have the intention of doing so. Conversely, these southern countries reproach us for having threatened and occupied them throughout the last century. They accuse us of having forces, weapons and means of delivery that would allow us to intervene on their territory at will. "A defence system deployed for the benefit of the United States, its European allies or even the entire North would create the image of a rich, fortified world, excluding and perhaps threatening, that the South would certainly perceive as being disastrous." (3) 2. The choices The choices that Europeans have to make are as much political and strategic as technological. After the politico-strategic upheavals of 1989 that terminated the order established in Yalta, during the present transitional period we must define new relationships between Western Europe and neighbouring geostrategic areas: Eastern Europe as far as Tashkent and Vladivostok, Africa, Islam, North America. These now unstable relationships might tip towards co- operation and solidarity or towards confrontation. On the one hand, risks emerging from conflicts between Europe and its southern and eastern neighbours must be defused, not exacerbated. On the other hand, out of caution, Europe must have no hesitation about defining an autonomous security policy which includes a defence policy with a space aspect that is not limited to anti-missile defence. Europe will then have to give concrete shape to this policy and get down to work. The main choice will have to be between integration in the American project and co-operation between Europeans. To do nothing would be the worst attitude. In this connection, there must be common thinking among Europeans on defining the system that is best adapted to our needs, corresponds to our ambitions and is accessible through our resources. Bibliography 1. Dominique David, "Defense antimissiles : les enjeux", Liberation, 13th April 1992. 2. Robert M. Stein, "Patriot ATBM experience in the Gulf war", supplement to International Security, 13th January 1992, page 28. 3. Reuven Pedatzur and Theodor Postol, The Patriot in no success story", Defense News, 2nd December 1991, page 24. 4. "La guerre du Golfe", seminar minutes, IRSD, 1992. 5. Max-Pierre Moulin, "Reflexion sur le conflit du Golfe : durcissement, mobilite, camouflage", Revue de Defense Nationale, 1991. 6. Executive Intelligence Review, Volume 7, Nos. 14-15, 8th April 1993. 7. Clifford Beal, "Racing to meet the ballistic missile threat", International Defense Review, 3/1993, pages 209-213. Anti-missile defence in a global European strategy Mr. LEIRA (Counsellor to the Secretary of State for Defence, Spain). Introduction The now usual confrontation between offensive and defensive weapons, between guns and armour, has been a constant phenomenon throughout history backed by means that are continuously being developed by science and technology. The twentieth century, almost the whole of which we can contemplate now that we are in its last decade, has witnessed and been the theatre of many such confrontations: it should be recalled that it is during this century that, for better or for worse, weapons of mass destruction appeared in all their brutality. I refer to chemical, nuclear and biological weapons. Just as chemical weapons were developed during the first world war, nuclear weapons were developed during the second, making use of new knowledge of atomic physics; their effects, which put an end to the war, led to a precarious but effective balance between the United States and the Soviet Union in the context of the cold war. We are now witnessing a spectacular breakthrough in biology and genetic engineering which may allow the production of biological weapons of even greater devastating consequences than their predecessors. A growing number of countries, whose political reliability is, to say the least, dubious, are known to have or to be about to have one or more of these three types of weapons; however, it is also clear that the latter are only a limited threat if their holders do not have the necessary means of reaching targets outside their territory. Weapons or other devices of mass destruction may reach the territory of a country by surprise, but in a conflict situation it is most probable that means of delivery such as aircraft, cruise missiles or ballistic missiles would be used; a characteristic of the latter is that, once they have been launched towards their target, they can no longer be stopped except in the case of an internal defect or their complete destruction by an anti-missile system. The end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion of political and religious movements which consider the West - and Europe in particular - to be at the origin of all their ills have modified the notion of a threat stemming only from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, replacing it with a range of scattered, changing risks situated mainly to the east and south of Europe and including possible attack by ballistic missiles carrying nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. To add to the confusion, one might also imagine the accidental launching of missiles from the former Soviet Union as a result of a mistake or an unauthorised action, defective servicing, a weakening of the political and military hierarchy or because a terrorist group had managed to get hold of one of these missiles and use it in an unforeseeable manner. This is the shifting, complex situation in which the questions to be discussed at this symposium are set: is there a real risk for Europe due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles? If there is a risk, what would be the appropriate means of countering it? Would political measures be enough? Should an anti-missile system be set up? If so, should this defensive system be worldwide, national or local? In what time-scale and what form should this system be deployed? How much would it cost? There is obviously no definite answer to these various questions but it seems perfectly possible to obtain partial answers and guidelines as to the course to be followed. Analysis of Europe's environment A study of the technological and industrial capabilities of the countries surrounding Europe leads to the conclusion that, at present and in the near future, there is no certain risk of a deliberate attack on populations or targets in Europe by states possessing ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Conversely, the fact that, by the beginning of the next century, six or more countries in the world may have ballistic missiles with ranges of between 3 000 and 5 500 km is reason for concern, particularly if one thinks of the time it takes to develop and deploy an anti-missile system. Yet we should not forget that a premature European initiative might start an arms race between Europe and countries that might have long-range ballistic missiles. The alternative might be to eliminate or reduce the threat by political means or by localised preventive measures. Although the treaties banning certain types of weapons, for instance the nuclear non-proliferation treaty have so far proved to be of only limited effectiveness, equivalent controls must be introduced for chemical and biological weapons. The missile technology control regime (MTCR), introduced in 1987, can help to reduce the risk of proliferation of ballistic missiles if measures to apply it are intensified. In parallel, technological, economic and industrial co-operation, the creation of reciprocal commercial interests and the accession of countries which might be sources of conflict to international institutions and treaties are channels that should be explored before setting up a costly, complex anti-missile defence system whose effectiveness is yet to be seen. In 1992, the President of the United States, George Bush, invited his European colleagues to study a co-operative programme for the development of global protection against limited attacks (GPALS), derived from the strategic defence initiative (SDI), and he proposed holding consultations on this matter in the Atlantic Alliance. The Europeans' favourable response allowed the discussion to be opened and an ad hoc group was set up in NATO to study in detail the various aspects of the problem: possible risks, choice of solutions, technological consequences, cost, etc. Furthermore, still in 1992, the Presidents of Russia and the United States, Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Bush, analysed the bi-and multilateral aspects of the problem together "in a constructive, open spirit" and agreed to set up three bilateral groups to study a global protection system (GPS) with the participation of any countries which so wished, particularly European countries. The United States' anti-missile concept developed from the strategic defence initiative (SDI) to the global protection system (GPS): starting from the ambitious space shield which was to replace deterrence by intimidation by deterrence by invulnerability, it became a multilateral system that would make use of the large sums invested. At the same time, and this is not the least of the objectives, encouragement was to be given to political and military co-operation with Russia, committing it to join in a major joint undertaking with the West. However, Europe must not forget that there is some degree of incompatibility between measures of political control and co- operation and the establishment of a defensive system which neighbouring countries might consider to be a threat. The policy of the new President, Bill Clinton, does not seem to differ radically from this programme since the 1991 anti- missile defence programme act was supported by both Democrats and Republicans. However, it cannot be ruled out that budgetary difficulties may delay the building of the first GPALS base, planned in principle for 1997; it may be delayed until 2000 or even later, since it is stipulated in the 1993 budget that the building of the first base will depend on the evolution of the threat and the progress made in the projects. European opinions In Europe, reactions to the United States proposals have been very diverse. First, countries with nuclear weapons (France and the United Kingdom) have expressed doubts about the complementarity between a vast anti-missile defence system and a credible deterrent, nuclear response; simultaneously, the far more general problem arose of the future of the world strategic situation and the possible status of the nuclear weapons of those two countries in the European Union, a problem which will have to be discussed when the time comes, prior to the introduction of a common European defence policy. In Western European Union (WEU), protection against ballistic missiles had not been considered particularly urgent, although the Assembly had decided that it should be examined, in spite of reservations by certain countries which believed political measures to be more effective than military measures in view of current risks of proliferation. This was generally considered to be a complex matter whose various aspects deserved separate analysis, priority being given to political rather than technical and industrial aspects. The Assembly's Technological and Aerospace Committee conducted a study of anti-ballistic missile defence, the Rapporteur for which was Mr. Lenzer, and presented to the Assembly a recommendation to the Council and an order on the same subject that were adopted as Recommendation 533 and Order 83. In Mr. Lenzer's study the views of various European countries are described and I think they are worth summarising: France: the deterrence by intimidation exercised by the European military arsenals is more effective than an anti- missile shield. An answer to possible risks is to be found more in fighting proliferation than in deploying new defence systems. United Kingdom: The effectiveness of current means of deterrence is perhaps doubtful; consequently, anti-missile defence systems would be a considerable advantage, particularly for protecting troops deployed abroad to defend important but not vital interests. Present strategic stability must not be compromised. Germany: The threat is not perceived as being targeted on German territory but on the alliance's southern flank. Anti- missile defence would be necessary only for theatre missile defence (TMD). Italy: The threat of ballistic missiles is not considered a matter of priority; action should be concentrated on fighting proliferation. Although the opinions summarised above cannot be considered conclusive, they show that it would be difficult, in the short term, to reach a consensus among WEU countries on participation in the GPALS or GPS programmes; this does not mean we cannot agree to pursue the study of the American proposals and observe the progress of the talks with Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the industries of a large number of European countries have taken part in the strategic defence initiative programme, the development of American systems such as THAAD (theatre high altitude area defence) and European programmes such as the family of future surface-to-air missiles (FSAF), now being developed by France and Italy. On the possibility of setting up an independent anti-missile system with cinetic energy interceptors, European industrialists believe the necessary technology already exists or is now being developed in Europe and that a co-operative European programme would have considerable chances of success. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that, on the European mainland, only Russia has anti-missile systems and that the United States has expressed the wish to obtain technology available in that country, which they consider most important for the development of future systems, for instance liquid-fuelled propellants, electric rotors, space-based nuclear enegy generators using uranium as a fuel instead of plutonium, tacitron switches, neutral particle beams, high-power lasers, etc. Cost In this context, economic parameters are particularly critical for taking decisions. In the absence of detailed data but in order to give some idea of the order of magnitude, it will be recalled that, in the framework of the strategic defence initiative, the United States invested $28 000 million in a programme that was devoted exclusively to research and development and that, during the financial year 1993, $4 500 million were earmarked for the anti-missile defence programme. According to the Congress Bureau of the Budget, GPALS might cost between $27 and 87 000 million to be invested over a period of ten years, the most accurate estimate probably being $41 000 million. The cost of deploying a ground-based interception system on a single site would vary between $16 and 18 000 million while the deployment of a complete system with six different bases would be $35 000 million. According to estimates, in Europe, a system for the protection of specific objectives in France and Italy would cost about F 50 000 million. Recapitulation It may be concluded that, at present, an attack by ballistic missiles carrying weapons of mass destruction is not perceived by Europe as being an immediate risk and this risk will become a real threat only in ten to fifteen years' time; this lapse of time might be prolonged thanks to the control of technology transfers and co-operation and confidence-building measures committing the Soviet Union and countries on the shores of the Mediterranean and in Eastern Europe. Although the development and production of an anti-missile defence system, be it European or the result of co-operation with other countries, may lead to very large-scale industrial and technological mobilisation that should be studied in depth, one should nevertheless not forget the considerable economic investment, the burden of which would have to be shared between participants in accordance with criteria that are very difficult to determine for the time being. It is alleged that a delay in taking decisions might face Europe with the fait accompli of a GPS developed in co-operation by the United States and Russia, leaving Europeans out, but at present it seems that completion of the study and the preliminary analysis stage of the GPS is behind schedule. The development of an independent European system not linked to the GPS does not seem viable at the present juncture but, since it is planned to set up a European armaments agency under the aegis of WEU, whose main aim would be to co-ordinate military research in Europe and to encourage co-operation between member countries, consideration might be given to instructing this agency to study the technical and economic viability of developing a European system and of Europe participating in GPALS and GPS. The European earth observation system which WEU is promoting and which might come into service between 2000 and 2010 would require total investment, including maintenance, of some $7 600 million. This system would allow risks and threats to be assessed and followed and would pave the way for an anti-missile defence system to be built later. The opposition between political and military measures will be overcome only when relevant technical and strategic studies are available, but it is most certainly possible to advance at political level without delay by strengthening the missile technology control regime (MTCR), taking appropriate decisions to avoid the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, analysing the obstacles that the ABM Treaty may place in the way of a bi- or multilateral system in which the United States and Russia would participate and studying the juridical provisions relating to the use of outer space as a permanent base for weapons or anti-missile interceptors. Finally, by examining these three aspects of the problem - political, military and economic - the following conclusions may be drawn: Politically: Europe must take part in the international debate and keep open the internal debate since it is a matter of greater importance for its security. The process of consultation must be continued in the Atlantic Alliance and WEU. Militarily: Europe is not threatened by ballistic missiles but this situation may evolve in the next ten to fifteen years. Consequently, whether or not it is decided to adopt a system of protection, the fight against proliferation must be continued, as must the control of technology transfers. Economically: The technological development that will accompany the design and production of an anti-missile system is a major stimulus to its establishment, but the budgetary restrictions that are becoming general in Europe make one wonder seriously how a programme of this type can be fitted into current defence priorities. In the United States, similar economic difficulties are forcing delays in the time-table laid down in the 1991 anti-missile defence programme act: it would therefore seem that Europe will have some time in which to ponder on these problems. Anti-missile defence for Europe an industrial perspective Mr. BURNHAM (British Aerospace Defence, Ltd., United Kingdom). British Aerospace Defence Ltd. is grateful for this opportunity to address the symposium. Representatives of industry rarely have the opportunity to speak to an international gathering not only of fellow industrialists but also of politicians and their military and technical advisers. To make the best use of this opportunity this talk will consider a number of issues which are fairly clear, as issues, to industry but which need political decisions if they are to be resolved. Except for some of the more modern shorter-range ballistic missiles developed by the former Soviet Union, such missiles are not sufficiently accurate to be useful weapons, when fitted with conventional warheads, to be a means of neutralising military targets. There would be some effect on the functioning of a military target, if it were thought sufficiently likely that a chemical or biological warhead were fitted to the missile for precautions to be taken at each ballistic missile alert, since the precautions themselves reduce the efficiency of whatever activity is taking place at the military target. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see what, during a war for example somewhere in the Middle East, would be the military value to our adversary of attacking a military target for example in the United Kingdom. Paragraph 93 of the WEU report on anti-ballistic missile defence says "since a threat to civilians cannot be ruled out following experience in the Gulf war ...". I wish to draw attention to another experience; that of the 2600 ballistic missiles which landed in England in late 1944 and early 1945. The accuracy of their missiles was known to the sender. If any were aimed at a military target it cannot, I suggest, have been so aimed with any serious expectation that this target would be damaged. It thus appears that paragraph 93 may be a serious understatement; that the reality is not so much a matter of not ruling out the attack of civilians but that civilians, and so centres of population, may well be the primary targets, so far as future ballistic missile attack on Western Europe is concerned. I raise this matter not from a desire to dissect the detail of the WEU report but because the size of the area which an ABM/ATBM is required to defend, its footprint in ABM/ATBM jargon, is a key issue in the system design. A system designed to protect a military target such as an airfield would not be a very efficient way of protecting a large city. It may in this regard also be useful to observe that the laws of physics imply that the larger the footprint of an ABM/ATBM system the closer would it come to the possibility of its deployment being regarded as in breach of the ABM treaty. It also follows from the above that it seems unlikely that nations would invest in the development of an ABM/ATBM system unless this were capable of defending against missiles carrying chemical, biological or nuclear warheads. "Defending against" could be taken to mean that the damage to the defender is likely to be very much less than would be expected to result from a missile attack against which no defence were offered. A defensive system which killed the ballistic missile during the boost phase, a kind of defensive system which might be feasible at least in some circumstances even without the use of weapons in space, would thus be attractive in that the debris would land on the territory of the aggressor. Before anyone reaches a conclusion that boost phase kill is the most desirable solution, I would draw attention to two issues of an essentially political nature that arise in relation to it. First, that it may be more difficult to make useful boost phase kill systems which attack the ballistic missiles in later stages of their flight. Secondly, that, for boost phase kill to work, the decision would have to be made to attack something which the adversary had launched and the attack committed very quickly after launch, I speak of seconds not minutes, before the likely target of a ballistic missile could be deduced from its trajectory or indeed before it were known that the device which had been launched was a ballistic missile; it might, for example, be a meteorological rocket or a space launcher. The WEU report on anti-ballistic missile defence rightly draws attention to the need for studies if Europe is to adequately determine the way ahead. There are two existing studies which should be mentioned in this regard. Both are taking place under the aegis of NATO. The first is essentially government activity, but with very active participation from European industry, being carried out by the NATO Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) and which reports in a formal sense to the NATO Conference of National Armaments Directors. Both are due to report around the end of this year. It is not appropriate for me to discuss these studies in detail. I mention them to register the fact that European industry is already working actively together, and with colleagues from the United States and Canada, on the topic of this symposium. These studies should provide a good foundation on which later work can be based. Also, when the results are examined, it may be found that the studies provide an indication of the willingness of the United States to share its experience and plans, in working detail, with its European partners. The United States has spent very much more than has Europe on research and technology for defence against ballistic missiles. It is therefore no surprise that the depth of knowledge and experience of United States industry in this area is greater than that of our own industry in Europe. This does not mean that European industry knows nothing. Work funded by its own governments, by the United States SDI programme and in some cases work which European companies have funded with their own money, has led to a good level of knowledge in most if not in all relevant areas. However, given the ratio of United States to European funding it should be no surprise that there are very few areas in which European companies are significantly ahead of those in the United States. History suggests that only when European companies have a significant technical lead are they likely to obtain work on United States national defence programmes. The current low level of European industrial involvement in the constituent programmes of the United States GPALS activity is thus what might be expected. When governments collaborate on weapon development and production each government will usually insist that an amount of money roughly equal to its national contribution is spent in its own industry. This can usually be achieved even when a country enters a programme at a late stage of development. In that situation, however, there is clearly no way in which the country or its industry could be involved in the early key decisions. The possibility of obtaining work, at the edge of technology would be much reduced. An industry, sometimes even a government, may want high tech work for reasons of pride; it would be unlikely to seek high tech work if it were seeking to maximise profits in the shorter term. Industry is interested in high tech work mainly because, if it missed out on one generation of equipment, it would be very difficult to play a leading part in the next. Governments may have their own ideas about what it is they most want to achieve from their workshare; maximising employment is one possibility that comes to mind. In the end, the decisions which are important in determining the quantity and quality of national workshares in international projects are usually made by governments. In situations in which a government is running a competition for a particular type of equipment among equipments which can be said to exist, the national industry can be relied on to make its own links. The recent United Kingdom MSAM competition is an example. What is new concerning ballistic missile defence is that within a given class there will almost certainly be only one existing product to buy. The choice will be between taking what the United States has on offer, or some agreed adaptation of it, and developing a system oneself or in collaboration with others. I note that the arguments in favour of a buy off the shelf policy usually assume that a reasonably even-handed competition is possible between at least two contenders. Industry can help governments in evaluating the options, but the difficult decisions on ballistic missile defence are almost all political decisions. Interoperability and co-operation requirements of anti-missile defence (Copyright 1993 by C.J. Rhodes) Mr. FOXWELL (Ferranti International System Integration, United Kingdom). 1. Abstract For the foreseeable future a growing emphasis will be placed upon the need to address out-of-area operations and limited threats from a number of sources including tactical ballistic missiles. Central to this need will be the achievement of an interoperable multinational TMD C3I infrastructure. Recent work, in developing methods for the testing of interoperability within systems, has suggested ways of developing the concepts of the ISO/OSI 7 layer model into a profile or system model capable of describing system interoperability and development requirements. Making extensive use of modern analysis and development techniques such as object oriented analysis (OOA) and development (OOD), the approach also reflects modern management techniques notably those developed for total quality management (TQM). 2. Introduction With the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the traditionally accepted threat to the West has declined and is now of less direct relevance to the way that defence operations should be managed, although the fundamental principles remain unchanged. Under these conditions it is reasonable for national and international defence strategy to address a more ill-defined threat than previously, rather than a specific axis. For this and other well-documented reasons, a complete reappraisal of western defence needs is evolving and for the foreseeable future a growing emphasis will probably be placed upon theatre missile defence (TMD), including ballistic missile defence (BMD). This reflects the proliferation of ballistic missiles and the possibility of limited missile strikes from a variety of sources. In addition, such weapons can also represent a serious threat to out-of-area operations. It also recognises the increasing availability and affordability of TMD and BMD systems and the fact that deterrence alone is unlikely to be effective against much of the modern ballistic missile threat. Additionally, new and possibly radical uses for platforms may be found, such as the use of naval vessels as BMD units. This changing perspective is typified by the change in emphasis of the United States SDI programme from esoteric space weapons and platforms to the global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) programme. Although it is too early to define precisely what the requirements of such programmes and developments will be, they will clearly be reliant upon robust and sophisticated C3I infrastructures. These can be more accurately described as "super-systems" made up of a number of autonomous systems reliant upon the achievement of interoperability for their successful integration. To help avoid costly rectification programmes, assessment of these interoperability needs is required at the beginning of the development life-cycle. Once identified, these needs should form an integral part of the system requirement specification. In 1983 the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) published a reference model for describing data communications architectures. This has subsequently been redrafted as CCITT X.200, more generally known as the open system interconnection (OSI) layer model. The advances in technology and use of communications systems and the need to address problems associated with the achievement of interoperability within super-systems is now widely recognised. The adoption by many authorities of the concepts of the ISO/OSI 7 layer model to help address similar problems is a reflection of a common need. The purpose of this paper is to examine how these concepts may be applied to assist in establishing integrated super- systems, such as those required to support TMD, by recognising, and hence addressing at an early stage in the development cycle, such a system's interoperability needs. It considers the problems confronting the specifiers and developers of new systems, the importance of interoperability and the means for developing models of proposed systems to ensure that user requirements are fully understood and ultimately reflected in a detailed design specification. 3. Background It is an unfortunate fact that new systems, particularly large distributed ones, have invariably been either late, over budget or did not perform. Although there have been many reasons for this the most usual were: - the user needs were not understood; - ever-increasing complexity of systems; - the systems were inflexible to changing requirements; - a lack of traceability from customer to developer; - unrealistic or increased expectations. Within the new environment described earlier, this is a situation that is likely to deteriorate further unless appropriate remedial action is taken. Because changing requirements (i.e. in response to a changing political environment) are to be expected, it is becoming recognised that the specification of new systems cannot be fixed at their inception in the form that is currently accepted. This is particularly true of systems requiring an extended (e.g. more than 3 years) development cycle. Our perception, therefore, of what constitutes a completed system will require modification. For example, large integrated systems such as conceived for GPALS will, probably, never be completed in the accepted sense. Rather they will continue to evolve in capability as defence needs likewise evolve and change. This evolution will be such that systems entering service could in time possess none of their original component sub-systems. However, cost estimates for new systems or for modifications to existing systems often have to be made before a full understanding of system requirements is obtained. There exists, therefore, a conflict between addressing changing system requirements and the need to estimate acquisition costs well in advance of system development and procurement. Such conflicts can be resolved through the use of "cost-plus" contracts. However, these can and have sometimes been used as an excuse to develop ever more complex systems, irrespective of whether such a need existed. Alternatively, fixed-price contracts can address the problem by the use of "change-engineering" instructions. However, both these solutions, and particularly the latter, are still reliant upon the availability of funding set aside on the basis that such changes were predicted during the original cost estimating. Experience has shown that such funding has invariably underestimated the requirement. To resolve the conflict of frequent change within a strict budget there is a need to develop a procurement strategy based upon the concept of evolving system capability rather than "one- off" acquisition. Such an approach need not require the development of "new" sub-systems, but whenever possible the integration of existing systems. Obtaining the maximum utility from what already exists, procuring proven sub-systems when required and developing "new" only after these alternatives have been explored offers the potential of true cost-effective system procurement. This approach provides the potential for maximum benefit with minimum cost and performance risk to supplier and customer alike. Nevertheless, the evolutionary approach is still not without risk. It can increase severely the risk of ambiguities appearing in requirements, of systems having only rudimentary capabilities and of development costs continuing to run out of control. Containing these risks requires a shift in emphasis when carrying out requirement analysis and in particular system design. It is no longer acceptable to carry out such analysis only on the basis of known technology. Rather it is necessary to determine a system framework that can support long-term and undefined needs whilst at the same time providing the capability for absorbing new requirements and technologies as they arise. If such an approach is to be successful it must necessarily address interoperability issues at the outset. Failure to make such provision will inevitably lead to major over-runs in both costs and in-service dates. The most fundamental of the changes required to our current mode of working is to make the development process more user accessible. At present, once an initial statement of requirement has been made, the customer can be effectively isolated from the development process. Any interim documentation presented for his approval can be incomprehensible to him and protected by complex contractual conditions. Once the means for basic communication between the customer and supplier is lost then the opportunity for developing a satisfactory system is likewise lost. Important though greater user awareness is, so too is the provision of improved communication of the user need to the system developers. As the user perception of his requirement is usually expressed in functional terms (i.e. what service the system is to provide) whilst the engineer's perception is in object terms (i.e. what is required to provide the service), a simple translation of the two perspectives is required. To take advantage of changes in technology and to enable rapid response to changing needs, new systems require to be based upon an open system architecture. Where possible such an architecture should take full advantage of available international standards. To help ensure maximum cost-benefit, greater emphasis needs to be placed upon the determination of priorities, both operational and technological, and regular reviews of these priorities should become a major feature of the system development process. Recognition of these problems in achieving system integration and the need for practical solutions has led directly to the approach offered in this paper. 4. Super-systems For many years, there has been a tendency for large-scale distributed systems to be conceived and built as an amalgamation of a number of smaller systems. Such "systems of systems" appear to be merely extensions of the normal engineering situation where most systems are usually composed of a number of sub-systems which can often operate independently to perform a complete function of some sort and so be properly defined as smaller systems in their own right. Given this, why do the large "systems of systems" or "super-systems" seem to produce a disproportionate number of problems when compared to their smaller counterparts? One of the main reasons is that in unitary systems the component sub-systems are chosen to fit into the overall design. With super-systems, however, we often have the situation where the component systems are already in place, and may be performing their specific design functions quite adequately, so that the designer has no real choice over the main components of his super-system. Another characteristic of super-systems is that the component systems have often been procured by different agencies and at different times and, even when intended for the same type of operation, often work in quite dissimilar ways. The problem in evolving the super-system is how to integrate component systems so that they work as a combined whole, and in our new world of change how this can be maintained as new requirements are identified. The answer lies in achieving and maintaining interoperability between them and experience, much of it in military systems, is that this has very rarely been as successful as intended. The increasing size, power and complexity of super-systems, as proposed for GPALS, is such that complete comprehension of these systems is probably beyond the intellectual capability of any one individual to understand. If this is so, then it is difficult to see how such systems can be specified without a careful analysis of the operational requirement (what do we want to do and what information do we need to do it?), and its subsequent breakdown into smaller and understandable "problem domains". That this was true before the need to provide the flexibility required to respond to frequent changes in requirement serves to stress the problems now faced by system specifiers, analysts and developers. Operational needs, whether fixed or evolving, are, in human terms, functionally oriented, whilst the equipment required to satisfy them is object oriented. The need to translate evolving functional needs into evolving object specifications without losing sight of the original operational concept indentifies yet another problem that must be overcome if system interoperability is to be fully addressed. A two-tier analysis is proposed; the first a functional analysis of user requirements, the second an object oriented analysis of the system required to satisfy the former. The result of this analysis is a model that unambiguously translates the user needs, both current and projected, into a system specification capable of being adapted to meet evolving needs. Command and control Command and control can be summarised by the information, decision, action (IDA) cycle (Figure 1a) which is based upon the standard management decision cycle of discover, choose, and act. In this cycle, actions are determined by decisions based upon available information, the results of which are used to update the information available for subsequent decision-making. Figure 1a Operationally, the C3I infrastructure supporting super- systems mirrors this cycle by performing tasks of the type illustrated in the generic command cycle shown in Figure 1b. Figure 1b To perform any given operation it is necessary to have a clear understanding or picture of the current situation. By assessing this situation and taking into account any existing rules or policy, an appropriate response can be made. This response will generally fall into one of two categories: immediate action, or a plan for future action which will provide the direction for those implementing the response. The results of implementing the response will then be combined with additional information from other sources and historical or other information, such as resource availability held in a database, to provide a new situation picture, which in turn will be reassessed. However, for this cycle to function correctly, the information content and flow must support the operation required and be free of ambiguities. Irrelevant information will not only place an unnecessary load on the system, but it will also increase the risk of introducing ambiguities and chance confusion to operators and decision-makers. The need to reduce the level of information to only that needed to specifically support a particular operational need is fundamental. However, as described earlier, super-systems will be required to evolve and with this evolution the level of information available and required must be expected to increase. With time, therefore, the level of information required for effective decision-making will become greater than can be interpreted correctly by human operaters. This situation could be mitigated by the use of knowledge based systems (KBS) and artificial intelligence (AI). It is to be hoped that current research into these technologies will be sufficiently mature by that time to make their use a practical proposition. Extended air defence The command cycle described above, however, hides the complex system structure required to support such an activity. Figure 2 shows a stylised representation of a possible extended air defence (EAD) super-system to support operations of the type described earlier. The figure shows three operational levels, strategic, force tactical and tactical: Strategic (light grey) is represented by the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) command information system (CIS). This system has a number of local area networks (LAN) and associated data storage, management and retrieval facilities in addition to communication circuits to the individual service force tactical centres (NAVAL CCIS, LAND CCIS and AIR CCIS) and to higher national authority (HNA). Figure 2 Force tactical centres (dark grey) provide C2 to their tactical forces. In addition to their own LANs they have direct communication with their peer centres as well as with the JOC. Tactical (white) forces are shown communicating via tactical data link (TDL) nets. Three such forces are shown, naval operating on Link A, air force and the BMD units operating on Link B. The BMD units could be deployed out-of-area in which case they would, more realistically, report directly into an appropriate CCIS or the JOC CIS. Additional communications are provided by a ship-shore-ship- buffer (SSSB), which provides translation of naval Link A data into a format suitable for integration into an extended air defence ground environment (EADGE). An AEW is shown providing additional support for both the naval force and the EADGE. The naval "gateway" unit provides the means for exchanging tactical information between units belonging to the naval Link A and the air force Link B nets. Note that the naval units if appropriately equipped could provide a TMD capability in addition to that already provided by the BMD units. This diagram illustrates a complex, although common, scenario. Each of the constituent forces is, in its own right, operating a super-system of C3I sub-systems and the interconnection is an extension of the size and complexity rather than a totally new problem. In effect the EAD system is really a set of nested super-systems each of which will have similer types of interoperability requirements and problems. Whilst the EAD system is depicted here as "the" super-system, in the future this is unlikely to be so. Rather, it will be just one of a set of nested super-systems supporting a much larger multinational system such as could be conceived for the global protection against limited strike (GPALS) programme. This structure could equally represent the combination of command systems involved in a joint force on deployed operations. In this case, forces may well be multinational and interoperability requirements may have to consider language as well as other aspects of information exchange needs. Furthermore, the JOC may have to report to higher authority within more than one nation. It is important to stress that the overall performance of a super-system such as this relies just as much on human actions as it does upon the performance of its technical components and its effectiveness might only be able to be judged by the extent to which the operators manage to co-ordinate their activities. The human elements, therefore, have to be considered as integral components and not merely as external users of the super-system. 5. Interoperability Interoperability is a quality required by all inter- communicating systems. A formal dictionary definition for interoperability, viz. the quality of being mutually operated, can be derived from "inter", a prefix meaning together, mutually or reciprocally, and "operability", the quality of being operated. However, to understand what is necessary to achieve interoperability requires that this formal definition be refined to satisfy the specific needs of C3I. For this purpose, interoperability can more accurately be defined as the ability of a system to correctly exchange, by means of mutual operation, useful information with other systems in support of an operational task, where a system is a collection of one or more computers, associated software, peripheral equipment, communications equipment, physical processes, operators and users, etc. This definition is centred upon the need to exchange and act upon useful information. As C3I systems will invariably rely upon the performance of operators and the reaction of information users for the immediately foreseeable future, this definition implicitly requires that the presentation of information at the human computer interface (HCI) is in a form that supports the correct exchange of person to person information. It should be stressed, however, that this does not require that HCI's be identical for all participants within a "super- system". Rather, they should be in the form most suitable for the operator, taking into account such factors as natural language and culture. The use of graphical user interfaces (GUIs) can go a considerable way to achieving commonality, but even then tailoring to individual needs will still be required. In an ideal world it should be expected that agreed standards would be sufficient to achieve interoperability. However, in the real world, standards provide options, both technical and in information interpretation and usage, and a single standard may provide several equally valid options for a system implementation. Therefore, while use of common standards is fundamental, it cannot alone guarantee that compatibility, let alone interoperability, can be achieved within super- systems. Hard-won experience has shown the availability of options within a single standard makes it necessary to develop a method of directing this choice to that required to support a specific operational requirement. At their most basic, EAD systems will not function unless there is a genuine need and desire for co-operation. Service or individual insularity will prevent interoperability as effectively as any technical failure. This can be described as the interoperability problem domain (Figure 3). Figure 3 This diagram shows that the achievement of interoperability is based upon recognition of the need for co-operation in addressing a perceived problem. Analysis of how this is to be achieved defines the precise interoperability need. The next step is to determine the roles to be performed by the participants in terms of operational functions. In ascending order, system communication needs, organisational units or platforms required to intercommunicate and their individual tasks in terms of functions will be determined. Only after these stages have been completed will the detailed technical requirements be addressed. Of major significance, the illustration shows how much of the analysis is user oriented as opposed to subject or technically oriented. The system profile The apparent availability of choices or options within a single standard (Figure 4) makes it necessary to develop a tool capable of limiting this choice to that required to support a specific operational requirement and which meets agreed interoperability criteria. Figure 4 One such tool is the profile. Profiles are a selection of base standards in support of a particular application along with the specification of selected options, parameters, etc. As such they can serve as specifications for the level of implementation of the selected base standards (e.g. a NATO data link) in support of an operational role or roles. Figure 5 Figure 5 provides a representation of how a profile, by removing the uncertainty of choice, is used to generate a design specification that will wholly satisfy the user (operational) requirement. The final specification is based on one or more of the available options. The importance of the profile is such that the interoperability definition given earlier can have appended to it: "while operating under the requirements and constraints of the relevant base standard and profile". The purpose of the profile, therefore, is to generate an unambiguous statement of the requirement and standard(s) to be used in pursuit of the achievement of interoperability. 6. A system model Earlier work A majority initiative by the MOD to address the problems of interoperability within the United Kingdom air defence system (UKADS) was initiated in 1988. Although the full impact of the study's final report has yet to be seen, many of its recommendations are being implemented and its main guiding principles promoted. However, this paper represents the considered view of the author and should not be taken to represent United Kingdom MOD policy or practice. Although UKADS is an existing, although continually evolving, super-system, the problems it faces are just those described above; how to take existing and new systems and integrate them to make a successful super-system. The requirement analysis technique is based upon a functional decomposition of the operational requirements and functions of a total system drawn, at the highest level, as a three-dimensional matrix, representing operational functions, unit (entity) combinations and communication media (Figure 6). Each occupied element of the matrix is then decomposed to identify individual interoperability requirements (IORs) where an IOR is defined as an operationally recognisable activity or sequence of activities with a definable initating action, a definable concluding action and which involves the exchange of information between two entities. An IOR may decompose into further, lower level, IORs but it is important to note that each IOR, at whatever level, explicitly recognises the operational reasons for exchanging information. Also, at all but the lowest level, each IOR has supporting IORs, thus recognising the hierarchy of information exchange engendered by any complex, distributed information management system. At the highest level this exchange invariably takes the form of human to human exchange. Figure 6 Requirement analysis (Function and object orientation) These two fundamental features (recognition of operational requirements and the hierarchical requirements and the hierarchy of information exchange) allow the approach to be used as a powerful tool which will support designing for interoperability. When used in this way, IORs may be decomposed to provide that part of a system profile which provide interoperability specifications between entities. More generally, they provide an unambiguous statement of the requirement and the base standards and options to be implemented for interoperability. Whilst this decomposition is eminently suitable for requirement analysis and interoperability testing, a further enhancement is required before it can be fully applied as a profile for system specification. This refinement involves mapping the functions to the objects required to carry them out and the establishment of a formal relationship between the objects making up the system and the OSI 7 layer model. In this respect, it is necessary to recognise that operators and information users are also objects fulfilling functions within the system. The extended OSI model The decomposition of the matrix and subject to subject exchanges suggests a hierarchy of layers similar to the structure of the ISO/OSI 7 layer model. These layers can be formally identified and drawn as a model representing individual platforms making up a super-system (Figure 7). Figure 7 Figure 8 shows a simplified representation of the existing ISO 7 layer model communicating with the new model so providing the additional specification detail required to assist in achieving interoperability within an EAD or similar system. Because of this model's close relationship to the uppermost layer of the OSI model and because it specifically addresses the application needs of the user, it has been designated the "application model". Figure 8 The sixth layer of the OSI model is specifically identified and defined as protocol conversion. It is of particular relevance to systems such as an EADS as it represents the layer normally associated with front end processors within which the protocols for gateway operation have to be implemented. Within this layer, conversion between net protocols and internal (application) protocols will usually also be performed. Thus, the extended model consists of the ISO/OSI 7 layer model linked to the application model and addresses the needs of interoperability by showing the layers oriented to address the specific needs of the user (functionally oriented) and task and object system (object oriented) as described below: User oriented layers. The first of the "user" layers represents the problem domain and defines the command and control (functional) requirements of the subject system, e.g. airspace management. It should be noted that in the context of a super-system this represents a first level of decomposition into smaller (lower order) problem domains that are more readily understood. The second user layer defines the service(s) required to fulfil the C2 requirements specified within the problem domain. Task oriented layers. The "task" layers define the management of information necessary to provide the subject services. Each of the objects within the layers supports the functional information exchange determined during the requirement analysis phase (i.e. specific IORs). Three layers are identified here, although, depending upon the system being modelled, more or less may be required. System oriented layers. The system oriented layers include the objects that provide general system management and housekeeping, such as data bases and their associated management systems, together with the objects that are identified and described by the OSI 7 layer model. Within the application model, the objects which have to exchange information with the application layer of the OSI model are defined. 7. Application Although the approach proposed has been developed to simplify the method for determining operational/system requirements and flowing these through to system developers, it is still potentially a repetitive and time-consuming process. Clearly, in times of rapid change and uncertainty, speed of decision is of the essence. As with the MOD study, however, the approach taken has been viewed as being ultimately computer- based. The functional matrix is a structure that can be easily supported by a basis data base system. The use of modern CASE tools can facilitate the subsequent matric decomposition and system modelling required to generate representative system profiles. Ultimately systems developed to provide such facilities should be capable of linking to test systems and other facilities at home and abroad. Currently, there are a number of initiatives in this field, notably in the United States and in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom the development, by the MOD, of a requirement analysis tool (RAT) based upon the approach described in this paper is a notable and innovative first step in addressing interoperability as part of the requirement analysis process. It is to be hoped that this tool wll ultimately be integrated into a wider and more international distributed test and evaluation system. The proposed approach provides the basis for a through life implementation philosophy which can support configuration management and implementation planning for an entity through all phases of its life-cycle; specification, design, acceptance/test, and modification/enhancement. Also, by focusing upon the function rather than the unit or communications medium, the approach can, when appropriate, consider these independently of the individual units within a complex system. This means it can be used to support the evolutionary development of a super-system which embodies many component systems and individual operating units. Some of these already exist and others may yet have to be installed but all will be required to interoperate to satisfy the super-system's overall task. It is, thus, an approach that lends itself to the future evolution of GPALS. When incorporating existing systems into super-systems it is particularly important that the internal information exchange requirements and capabilities of component systems and operating units are fully analysed and defined. In these situations it is unlikely that there will be commonality in the HCIs of the component systems. Attention has therefore to be paid to the possibility of incompatibilities in the way information is presented to different operators resulting in different interpretations of that information and consequent lack of the shared understanding which is the basis of successful interoperation. Designing a new system to be incorporated into a super- system requires not only a clear understanding of the requirements of the system to be developed, but a clear understanding of the implementations of the systems with which it is to interoperate. The two-tiered approach (functional analysis of user requirements and object oriented analysis of the system required to support the former) proposed provides a framework or design shell to be completed as part of the requirement and design specification stages of system development. Figure 9 This will be in the form of a complementary system model based upon the requirement matrix and the application model. When complete it should provide the system profile and development process (Figure 9), and give an unambiguous statement of interoperability requirements and a definition/interpretation of the required base standards. Moreover, because it relates the functional operational requirements to the physical objects in the system, it offers a ready means of communication between the system users, system developers and system procurers at an early stage in the project life cycle and enables design changes to be easily, quickly and cost-effectively accomplished. In the context of acceptance and testing for interoperability, the approach defines unique IORs which can individually and collectively be measured for their ability to support the hierarchy of IORs required to satisfy particular operational requirements. From the descriptions given, it can be seen that the functional and object models, together used as a system profile, form a ready means of communication between the system developers and the system procurers. By showing functions and interfunctional relationships, the profile can identify what interoperability tests are required and the order in which they should be performed. When developing enhancements to super- system components, use of the approach ensures that account is taken of the requirements and constraints imposed by other component systems and media so that, as well as embodying design for interoperability, it assists in the identification of any possible side effects resulting from proposed design changes. Thus it provides an effective tool for use in configuration control within the super-system. The central role of the model to this process is illustrated in Figure 10. Projecting into the future this figure shows the profile as a central part of a test/reference system. Figure 10 8. System perspectives This paper has considered the benefits to be gained from adopting a total systems approach to the specification of extended air systems. The essential message is to keep it simple, even though the apparent complexity of such systems makes this directive appear naive. The approach proposed in this paper, however, shows that this can be achieved by decomposing the system into simpler and more easily-understood sub-systems. Furthermore, the approach accepts the limitations of the component sub-systems by concentrating on the whole systems needs. This requires that the component sub-systems are integrated in a way that maximises their collective performance, through the achievement of interoperability. An alternative approach that concentrates on the maximising of sub-system performance could and does result in costs accruing that are out of proportion to the gains accrued by the whole system. The goal in terms of performance, therefore, is that "the whole [system performance] is greater than the sum [of performances offered by all] of its parts". In March 1992, NATO held a symposium on crisis management. Interoperability was held up as a key issue. The conclusion was that standardisation is the key to the achievement of interoperability. As this paper has tried to show, standards are just one of many issues that must be addressed. Certainly without them interoperability cannot be achieved - and that has always been known. Also well known is the fact that even when standards are adhered to and even when the same engineered systems are used, interoperability continues to be a problem. That this argument is now over ten years old serves only to illustrate the fact that short-term and easily-understood problems are still the ones principally addressed whilst the real problems remain and continue to remain unresolved. Although the emphasis in this paper has been how collective system performance can be optimised, it has approached this primarily as a system engineering task. Consequently the need for integrated TMD has been assumed rather than evaluated. Improving collective performance through interoperability is, however, reliant upon organisation, human actions and collaboration as much as it is upon technology, no matter how user oriented that technology may be. There is, therefore, a need to investigate further how and to what level TMD integration is required. Although, ultimately, this is for the military planners and politicians to decide, a rigorous systems engineering approach, similar to that proposed in this paper, will help identify where such decisions are required. Equally, the techniques described are applicable to many different problem domains. They apply wherever interoperability is a requirement, and are not unique to EAD or TMD, or even military systems. The value of reference systems, test beds and simulation for the evaluation of complex systems has already been demonstrated by work in several countries, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States. How such facilities can be used to assist in the aforementioned decision-making process, the development of concepts of operations and subsequently act as a reference authority for onward system development can be deduced from Figure 8. For systems such as GPALS, the value of networking such facilities, to enable easy access for all potential participants, should likewise be given careful consideration. The gathering and dissemination of intelligence information will be a major factor in internationally integrated TMD. However, the widely distributed C3I required to support this may aggravate further the problem of maintaining security of classified information. Although outside the scope of this paper, the determination and resolution of these problems should be addressed as part of the analysis process already described. This section has raised topics associated with the wider issues of TMD rather than system integration as an engineering activity. However, as shown earlier these are as important to the achievement of the interoperability required to support TMD as the "pure" engineering topics. Consequently, ignoring them could have as deterious an effect on these programmes as poor engineering. These topics have further emphasised why system engineering should not be addressed in isolation from the real world. If this counsel is followed then the problems described at the beginning of this paper will be reduced. Ambiguities in requirements will be diminished, systems will be capable of evolving to meet changed needs, risk will be reduced and unnecessary costs removed. 9. Conclusions Super-systems constructed from successful component systems often fail to achieve their desired performance and this can very frequently be attributed to the fact that the component systems fail to interoperate. Normal design processes usually concentrate on the system interfaces which ensures inter- connectivity but does not ensure that a system receiving information is able to do anything with it. A particular problem is ensuring that the information actually reaches the operator who needs it and has to react to it, in a comprehensible and meaningful form. The proposed approach provides a means of ensuring that operational requirements for interoperability can be properly and consistently met in the design of the component systems, particularly in the presentation of information to the operators involved. The traceability of design back to requirement also provides an effective tool for configuration control during the through life development of super-systems. This enables it to be used for integrating existing systems or introducing new systems into super-systems. As a has been shown in this paper, interoperability is much more than the study of message standards and protocols, important though they are. It is rather about the achievement of system integration and for the future, therefore, it is within this context that interoperability should be approached. A worldwide, regional or national system implications of the choice Mr. BARTHELEMY (Sous-Directeur a la Delegation aux affaires strategiques, Ministry of Defence, France) I am about to present to you the politico-military analysis of the French Ministry of Defence of the implications of a global, regional or national choice for a possible system of anti-missile defence for Europe. First, however, I wish to return rapidly to three important points discussed here this morning. 1. First, the context for implementing such a defence system. In order to assess the expediency of anti-missile defence among other security means, I think a clear distinction must be drawn between the case of external interventions - for instance, humanitarian or peace-keeping operations in a multinational framework - and the case of an aggression or threat of aggression on national territory. The stakes are not the same, nor are the defence objectives; the possible role of defence systems will depend on them as will the risk of their being circumvented. 2. Second, the word "deterrence" has been used many times. There was even a reference to the failure of nuclear deterrence. I am afraid we do not all attribute the same meaning to this magic word. The Americans are fond of talking of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment. I think the existence of an effective anti-missile defence system - or even the technical and political capability to introduce one rapidly - comes under the heading of deterrence by denial. It may disturb the potential aggressor's procurement plans. He will perhaps find them of less interest if that really is the main reason urging him to equip himself. We are far from nuclear deterrence which, in the case of France, for instance, has a very precise meaning for the protection of our vital interests. We know French nuclear deterrence must be adapted to threats which evolve; the protection of vital interests is still necessary. Let us not ask nuclear deterrence to counter what it is not designed for (doctrine and means). NATO has been referred to many times by various people: NATO nuclear strategy, or United Kingdom nuclear strategy, is something quite different again. We must probably not overdo theory in a world that is changing fast, but I believe these precisions necessary. So be careful of the word deterrence, which may create confusion, like the words "theatre missiles" or "tactical defences". However, the balance between deterrence (in the wider sense) and defence must be adapted in terms of the strategic stakes, the capabilities available to us (in particular, technological and financial) and, finally, the credibility of the response to an aggression. It is clear that, between the protection of the territories of European countries and the protection of intervention forces, all these criteria differ. We should also talk about the means of taking refuge from nuclear blackmail. 3. Finally, I think everyone more or less agrees on the technical assessment of the maximum short- and medium-term threat and even on proliferation mechanisms. Conversely, little has been said about the motivations of the proliferating countries. They are probably mainly regional, in terms of prestige, power or security; there is sometimes also talk of aggressive sanctuarisation. This point is important in assessing the role and probable effectiveness of one or other means of fighting proliferation, ranging from co-operation, through regional security guarantees or confidence-building measures to defence systems (deterrence by denial). Ballistics must also be slightly demystified. This being said, no preventive system is guaranteed 100%, including possible global disarmament measures; hence the risk of having to face up to long-range weapons cannot be ruled out and, in any event, short-range missiles already exist. It is then a matter of priorities: either one takes out "insurance" against this risk to the detriment of other things or one "finesses" in favour of other defence policy aims, since one is working with limited budgets, as has perhaps not yet been said enough so far. European co-operation can probably reduce these constraints a little. I cannot unfortunately go any further today. As Mr. Soell, President of the WEU Assembly, recalled yesterday, governments are cautious on this subject. No doubt you know that the French Government has decided to draft a white paper that will certainly give some elements of an answer to this question: what is the possible place for defence systems in the fight against proliferation and its consequences and, vis-a-vis accidental firings, what should be given priority in defence aims and the corresponding means? This symposium, that France wanted and supports, will certainly help to make these choices clearer. I now turn to the subject announced. In order to determine our subsequent ideas and to provide firm foundations for our comparisons, let us concern ourselves with an early warning system that seems inevitable if we are to obtain all-round defence, including theatre defence which will cover intervention forces. The possible options for developing and implementing the system would be dictated by three types of criteria, as the Spanish speaker who preceded me said: political criterion, strategic criterion, economic criterion. From a political point of view, reference to such a system and its deployment has major diplomatic repercussions because of the very serious threats that it would have to meet. The fight against proliferation is an operation that mobilises a large number of countries and interventions outside national territory generally take place in a multinational context. In this context, it seems inconceivable for an individual European country to have its own anti-missile defence system. Conversely, while a regional system seems a logical answer to a security problem that is itself regional, the will of certain countries, including France, to respect their commitments wherever necessary would, in this case as in others, lead to regional systems being integrated in a worldwide architecture. Here we find the same ideas as for the French proposal in the United Nations for confidence-building measures in space (notification of ballistic missile firings and space launchers), with provision for worldwide processing of data that might be supplied by regional warning or observation satellites. However, we should not try to do everything at once. We must also have reliable means of assessing proliferation. Still from a political point of view, it is clear that a project like this one can be a powerful stimulus for the progressive formation of unified strategic views among European countries, at least because it means a joint analysis of security problems that each one perceives differently, as we have seen since yesterday morning, and because these questions must be analysed in the already existing framework of security policies that vary considerably from one country to another, as is the case for nuclear policy. Finally, a last factor would tip the balance towards the choice of a global system: the confidence- and security- building instruments must try to be as universal as possible if they are to be accepted and used effectively; this raises the question of access to data processed by early warning systems. From a strategic point of view, two notions have to be taken into account: a more or less high degree of dependence for operational implementation depending on the choice made, and the inevitable link between anti-missile defence systems and the deterrent systems to which I referred earlier. It is the problem of the stability of the offensive/defensive relationship that is involved, even if one avoids the framework of nuclear deterrence and even strategic relations. The more systems are controlled at regional or world level, the more I believe stability will be ensured. Nitze's criterion, i.e. the investment one forces a potential enemy to make by investing oneself in an offensive or defensive system of given effectiveness and cost, also applies in the case with which we are concerned. It is also to be feared that the shell and armour race may be renewed, not to speak of the problem of the circumvention of defences already mentioned. Here there is a real risk of an arms race and not only in space. We should also consider the risks of the proliferation of anti-missile defence systems and their possible impact on regional stability. The deterrent factor of the existence of one or other type of defence will, of course, be modulated by its procurement context: global, regional or national. Finally, from an economic point of view I believe we should be thinking in terms of constraints rather than of implications. It is each country's ability to finance and implement systems, if of course they consider this meets a security requirement, that will, to a large extent, determine its attitude vis-a-vis the possible choices. I think such a system would be possible only in co-operation and, moreover, the "first bricks" that now exist are being developed co-operatively, as has been seen. >From previous addresses, I note the possibility of progressiveness and the importance of the time-scale. In conclusion, I consider two channels might be explored which might help to answer the question of whether the choice should be global, regional or national. First, the "global-regional-national" classification is fixed neither technically nor in time. Some functions can be shared out at world level, others handled at national level, possibly at the cost of redundancies. Political co-operation may be global, the actual systems regional and, finally, nations can participate progressively in common defence systems. Second, the risks vary and will vary in time from one part of the earth to another; if one is interested in the security of national territories, this militates in favour of a largely regional approach, since interests are often governed by regional logical. Conversely, in the context of external interventions, this leads to a global approach, since such interventions are increasingly multinational. Only by setting the question of defence systems in the wider logic of preventing proliferation and limiting its consequences by various appropriate means will the right choice be found and priorities appropriately defined. (The sitting was closed at 12.58 p.m.) 1. See "L'importance politique et strategique de la guerre du Golfe", Major A. Stahel, Revue Militaire Suisse, No. 9, 1991. 2. "Defense antimissiles : les enjeux", Dominique David, Liberation, 13th April 1992. 3. "Defense antimissiles : les enjeux", Dominique David, Liberation, 13th April 1992. ------- For information, please contact: Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ | ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ | 43, avenue du President Wilson _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ | F-75775 Paris cedex 16 France _/_/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ | Tel 331-47235432; Fax 331-47204543 _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/_/_/ | E-mail: 100315.240@Compuserve.com