USAMHI Military Policy, Natl RefBranch js Oct 90 THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT OF 1920: AN ESSAY ON SOURCES I. INTRODUCTION. In the history of civil-military relations, a tension has existed between the concepts of the professional army and citizen army.* The transformation from professional to citizen army can be viewed as either a corrective or a surrender to the military impulse within the general society. If the former: When standing professional armies begin to drain a nation's wealth and endanger its democratic principles, the genius of citizen armies is rediscovered. If the latter: After a society has been sufficiently militarized, say, by a war and its demobilized soldiery, it is willing to spread responsibility for defense throughout the citizenry. After the Vietnam War, the U.S. devised the total force concept and has increasingly placed reliance on its Reserve and National Guard capabilities in the years that have followed. A similar phenomenon occurred following the demobilization of the A.E.F. in 1919, at a time when Western societies were every bit as tired of wars and armies (or as militarized) as America was after the Vietnam War. The National Defense Act of 1920 reflects those anxieties. The history of the Act (henceforth referred to as NDA) extends from 1912, when 42-year old Captain John McAuley Palmer authored the "Organization of the Land Forces of the United States" for Secretary of War Henry Stimson, to 1944, when now-General Palmer again expressed his thoughts on the citizen army * A note on definition. In one sense "citizen army" is an oxymoron. A definition of "citizen" in the Oxford English Dictionary, 1989 edition, is "a civilian as distinguished from a soldier." In the sense in which "citizen" is used in this paper, "citizen soldiers" are defined as National Guardsmen or Army Reservists. See A Dictionary of Soldier Talk by John Elting and others (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, l984; RefColl). p.2 NDA 1920, Essay in War Department Circular 347. The focal point of these 33 years, of course, is the debate and passage of the Act in 1920, but it is important to recognize such other significant events as the passage of the original National Defense Act of 1916 and post-1920 amendments (especially 1933). It is important, too, to trace the size and structure of the prewar, Great War and postwar Army; the course of the universal military training debate; the relationships of the Regular Army, Organized Reserves and National Guard in this period; and the size of military budgets, year by year. The National Defense Act of 1920, which was in name only an amendment to the 1916 Act, was a successful piece of legislation not so much because it strengthened the citizen army concept but because it managed to serve the purposes of a myriad of constitu-encies. Its significance, thus, is largely in the eye of the beholder. The Regular Army spoke of having received a clear mandate for administrative control of a tripartite Army of the United States, recognition of the central role of the General Staff, and a logical promotion scheme. The National Guard saw its importance, as displayed in the recent war, recognized with representation on the General Staff and a semblance of command of its own fate in the Militia Bureau. The militarists won a sizable army (not the one-half million they sought and only on paper) and citizen military training. Anti-militarists saw their opposition to universal military training vindicated and creation of a more political War Council. Lastly, in establishment of a more powerful Assistant Secretary of War, businessmen believed that in procurement matters they had won a friendlier ear than they had found with the military officers of the General Staff during the war. This essay is a review of the literature on NDA, its historical background and its legacy. Also, some of the major historical themes or questions generated by the NDA debate are bibliographically reviewed. A procedural note: Since the sections of books that cover the Act are cited in the attached bibliography, specific page references are not provided in this essay, unless the reference follows a direct quote. p.3 NDA 1920, Essay II. PRECURSOR DOCUMENTS OF NDA. Henry Stimson encouraged reorganization of the Army in 1912, and Chief of Staff Leonard Wood, never unwilling to ruffle feathers, accommodated him by recruiting Capt. John McAuley Palmer to draft a Report on the Organization of the Land Forces of the United States. (53) It recognized the important roles of organized and unorganized militia, spoke of the historical basis of the citizen army, described a Regular Army that would have distinctively different roles at home and abroad, and envisioned a politically responsive war council on top and a soldier force of volunteers as a foundation. Here were the roots of Palmer's postwar NDA hearing testimony and the final Act itself. That same year Stimson solicited articles from other officers, who called for a more intelligent policy to deal with a truly national Army, that is, one that could serve as a tool of great geopolitical purposes, rather than a mere constabulary. (52) In these articles the spectre of the German Army first appears in NDA history. Hunter Liggett, in addressing the Army's alienation from the American people, saw in Germany (and Great Britain) brotherhood and unity where others saw pervasive militarism. Because of Germany's large military establishment, according to Liggett, every family had "a heart interest in the army -- a father, a husband, a son, or a brother." (p. 23). The last appearance of the German Army in the NDA debate (in Circular 347) (64) would be something quite different. The Army War College weighed in with a Statement of a Proper Military Policy in 1915 (published in 1916). (54) Palmer's recognition of the supreme importance of militia did not appear in this collection of studies. The War College solicited, instead, a strengthened Regular Army supported by a federal Organized Militia, which itself would be dissociated from the National Guard, a force ignored by the War College. The father of the Preparedness Movement of the years immediately preceding America's entry into the Great War was Leonard Wood. As a Progressive, he wished to instill order and reason in the turbulence of an American society heavily populated with immigrants. (32) Numerous pamphlets, articles and books are found in the Military History Institute (hereafter referred to as MHI) on efforts in these years to apply the Progressive reform impulse to both the form and the content of America's military. Writers and speakers offered ideas for reorganizing the Army and p.4 NDA 1920, Essay revitalizing the enfeebled citizenry. Huidekoper is but one example. (26) The Clifford study focuses on the Plattsburg Training Camp aspect of the movement. (7) A broader brush is applied by Pearlman. (48) Congress reflected the anxieties of the period and passed the National Defense Act of 1916, establishing a strong relationship between the Regular Army and National Guard that exists to this day. (50) (The National Guard had been "earning its stripes" nationwide as the disciplinarian of labor.) By removing restrictions on the federalized use of the Guard, the 1916 Act adroitly avoided the recommendations of Secretary of War Linley Garrison (and the Army War College), who had sought a large separate "continental army" reserve. The reorganization role of Secretary of War Newton Baker, who had replaced Garrison in 1916, is covered by Frederick Palmer. (41) Great War mobilization led to 1916-1919 revisions to the Act. They can be traced in published compilations by the War Department and Congress, with useful tables. (58, 63) In Washington during the war the General Staff strengthened its grip on the irrepressible War Department bureaus, while Congressmen observed difficulties in the procurement process that were debated in postwar NDA hearings. (21, 39, 56, 60) Meanwhile, in Europe, Palmer was assigned to a brigade command in the federalized 29th National Guard Division and learned in practice the validity of his theory -- the citizen army could serve as a main defense force. (24, 25) A similar pride about National Guard service in the A.E.F. was displayed by politicians like Henry Allen. (1) Palmer would call upon that enthusiasm in Congress to overcome War Department resistance. (15) III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NDA. As the massive Army demobilized rapidly in 1919, new defense policies were urgently needed to rationally restructure and reduce the size of the peacetime Army. (19) Chief of Staff Peyton March won Secretary Baker's approval of a bill that represented the first volley fired in the NDA tug-of-no-more-war. Seriously misjudging public opinion (or ignoring it), March felt this was a "golden moment" to strike for universal conscription. (37, p. 241) He also advocated a strong General Staff (thus strengthening his own Chief of Staff position) at the expense of p.5 NDA 1920, Essay bureau independence. Bureau opposition is reviewed in Nelson (39), while March's case is presented in the War Department Annual Report of 1919 and in his Nation at War. (68, 35) Historians who have looked at the bill are Coffman and Hammond. (8, 21) Three major counter proposals were introduced in Congress. Briefly, the four bills can be summarized as follows: 1. Baker/March - sought a larger Regular Army (one-half million men) and universal military training (henceforth referred to as UMT). 2. Senator Joseph Frelinghuysen and the National Guard - sought to remove the National Guard from the Chief of Staff's control and keep a citizen army. 3. Congressman Julius Kahn - no UMT; keep the National Guard as it was in 1916; set the Regular Army strength at 300,000. 4. Senator James Wadsworth and Colonel Palmer - a huge citizen army under federal control, a small Regular Army, and volunteer military camps; as a compromise with the Democrats the idea of UMT was dropped. (9) The legislative history of these bills is most thoroughly presented in Dickinson and Lee (13, 33), but summaries and commentary on the debate appear in House, Boylan, Coffman and Colby. House observes that March was defeated because of pent-up dislike of Regular Army officers (to whom the male public had been exposed during the war); because of its projected costs; and because of anti-militarism. Boylan notes that the Army and Congress disagreed on new policies, the former seeking central-ization and the latter, local control of the National Guard and the nearly autonomous bureaus. And, too, even within the Army as well as within Congress, there were strong currents of disagree-ment. (5) Coffman, making the best of March's defeat, concludes the Chief of Staff and Palmer both lost out to anti-militarism, reasons of economy and the urge toward "normalcy." (8) Finally, Colby highlights the tension between states' rights or local control and centralization or federalization. (9) The latter is also described as neo-Hamiltonianism by Huntington and, more importantly for this essay, Uptonianism by Palmer. (27, 42) Since Wadsworth and Palmer were forced to surrender on UMT, Colby believes it is not accurate to view the final NDA as a Wadsworth victory. (9) Derthick, too, in her National Guard study emphasizes Wadsworth's loss of UMT to the states' rights advocates of the American heartland. (12) p.6 NDA 1920, Essay The debate about federal use of the National Guard focused on a Constitutional question -- whether the Guard is legitimized by the militia clause or the army clause. In other words, whether the Guard should be primarily a state or national force and serve the other polity secondarily. (42, 9) The intransigence of the problem about the Guard's role, the failure to liberate it from the militia clause because of its political power, had been and continued to be responsible for the emphasis on a second, more federal reserve, at this time known as the Organized Reserves. (42) The most widely used memoir on the legislative history of the NDA is Palmer's America in Arms, which is essentially the story of the creation of the Wadsworth bill, with the implication that NDA was simply Wadsworth sans UMT. (42) He describes how he was recruited for bill drafting after providing testimony: As I was leaving the Capitol after my testimony, a messenger overtook me and informed me that Senator Wadsworth wanted to see me. He received me in his private office where, as nearly as I can remember his words, he said: "Colonel Palmer, a very remarkable thing has happened. Night before last, the subcommittee met at my house where we finally decided to reject the War Department bill. We then decided to write a bill of our own. We wrote down a few paragraphs outlining what we considered to be the basis of a sound military organization for the United States. And there we stopped. We didn't know how to expand these principles into a complete bill, and we didn't think we were likely to get much help from the War Department. And now, to our amazement, you have been before us two afternoons and have given us all the details of our own plan. The committee has therefore instructed me unanimously, to write to the Secretary of War to ask for your assignment as our military advisor. We are going to write down our own bill, and we want you to help us." A few days later the Secretary of War assigned me to special duty with the Senate Military Committee..." (pp. 168-169) The permutations of the Wadsworth bill (S.3792) are excellently revealed in a bound volume of Senate (and some House) bill amendments on file in MHI. (55) p.7 NDA 1920, Essay Hoping to influence the legislative process (and not, perhaps, recognizing the anti-Uptonian casts of the minds so assigned), the War Department sent to the House and Senate military affairs committees four officers, who were to assist in drafting the reorganization bills. Palmer and John Gulick were sent to the Senate and Thomas Spaulding and Thomas Hammond to the House. (42) As democracy in action, the hearings are notable for the breadth of opinion expressed on the future role of the military in the U.S. (56, 59, 60) The testimony reflects currents running through society that the military establishment often ignored. Those testifying to the House between September 3, 1919, and February 5, 1920, included Secretary Baker, General March, Assistant Secretary Benedict Crowell, the president of the Universal Military Training League, War Department bureau chiefs, Congressmen, members of the General Staff, the Training Camp Association, enlisted men seeking a pay increase, the American Legion, educators, pastors, the Society of American Indians, and Quakers and Brethren. Four bills were before the House Committee: H.R. 8287 to reorganize the Army; H.R. 8068 on UMT; H.R. 7925 on creation of a Department of Aeronautics; and H.R. 8870 on making "more effective provision for the national defense." A fifth bill, H.R. 9204 on increasing military pay, was also addressed. Meeting between August 7 and December 17, 1919, and again in early 1920, the Senate Committee heard testimony on UMT (S. 2691), creation of a Department of Aeronautics (S. 2693), and two bills on reorganization of the Army (S. 2715 and S. 3792). IV. CONTENTS OF NDA. Although devised as an amendment to the 1916 Act, NDA was actually a new law. (4) Passed on June 4, 1920, the last half (Chapters II and III) of the sixty-page NDA concerns the Articles of War and military justice system and is not covered in this discussion. Complete editions are found in Acts and Resolutions and War Department Bulletin No. 25, dated June 9, 1920. (63) p.8 NDA 1920, Essay Chapter I on Army organization has sections on the over-arching Army of the United States and its Regular Army, National Guard and Organized Reserves components. The strength and organization of officer, warrant officer and enlisted ranks, the General Staff, and various departments and bureaus are outlined, as are officer promotions and soldier enlistments. The chapter concludes with sections on the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, training camps, the enlisted reserve (never funded beyond tokenism), and federalization of the National Guard. The provisions are summarized by many, including Bernardo, Hewes, House, Spaulding, and the U.S. Infantry Association ( 4, 22, 25, 51). Among the features: the Army within the continental U.S. would be organized into tactical (rather than purely geographical) corps areas, with at least one National Guard or Organized Reserves division assigned to each. Total active Army enlisted strength would not exceed 280,000 (raised through volunteer enlistments) and 17,000- plus officers. As much of the National Guard and Organized Reserves lineage would be perpetuated as possible. A War Council would be created, consisting of the Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary, Chief of Staff, and General of the Army, the latter two positions becoming one when General Pershing ascended to Chief of Staff in July 1921. The General Staff, its size fixed by law, was given responsibility for national defense planning, while the Assistant Secretary of War assumed procurement responsibility. Several wartime branches received official recognition -- Air Service, Chemical Warfare Service, Finance, Medical Administration. [Weigley points out that one branch lost out. The Tank Corps was dissolved into the Infantry, encouraging a restricted view of its utility. (75)] Training of reserves would be accomplished via the ROTC and civilian military training camps. The Regular Army retained vital functions: garrisoning strategic bases abroad, maintaining effective combat divisions for contingencies, and training reserves at corps centers around the country. (42) To adapt to the new constraints and missions, officers in the combat arms pushed for branch-level reorganization in their own periodicals, such as Cavalry Journal and Field Artillery Journal. In the latter, "large" and "small" division reorganization scenarios were offered. (6, 16) p.9 1920 NDA, Essay There was a consolidating impulse in NDA -- a unified officer promotion list, rather than the separate lists in each branch, which had led to internecine politicking. On this subject, see the Thomas Spaulding testimony in the House hearings and the Cavalry Journal, (October 1920. (56, 6) Too, within the enlisted ranks grades were standardized in the wake of NDA. (10) In the immediate afterglow of the Act, Regular Army officers were enthusiastic. See, for example, Boylan and the Cavalry Journal, October 1920, page 303 (" . . . for the first time in its history, the army has been placed upon a sound organizational basis.") and the Infantry Journal, July 1920, page 71 ("The Army has cause to congratulate itself . . ."). (5, 6, 28) Each constituency measured its gains and losses. The National Guard archieved control of the Militia Bureau, but remained wary of the Organized Reserves. (12) To many in the Regular Army, the Act could not succeed since Congress had rejected compulsory service and a large increase in force size and funding, but at least NDA provided a "sounder basis for wartime mobilization than existed in 1917." (36, p. 365) The plan's most obvious deficiency was simple. It was just that -- a plan. In reality, it had no men. (37) The structure rested on a trained citizenry, but failed to provide for such a body, according to Pogue. (49) To another commentator, the NDA "enacted the rhetoric of greater civilian participation and preparedness without providing the means." (19) In summary, the NDA was a compromise in several directions. The citizen army role was recognized, but, lacking the impetus of mandatory service and follow-up appropriations sufficient to support a 280,000-man force, the bones were quite visible through the meager flesh. Yet to William Ganoe, "This legislation was by all odds the greatest provision for prolonging peace and the efficient control of war ever enacted by the Congress. It took into account lessons of the recent struggle and suited itself to the genius of our people." (18, p. 485) See also: milpoly2a (2d part of essay) milpoly2b (list of sources)