THE KATYN MASSACRE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE AS A PUBLIC AND HISTORICAL ISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1940-1993 A Thesis Presented to the Department of History Western Illinois University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts by Louis Robert Coatney December 1993 Copyrighted, 1993, by Louis R. Coatney. All rights reserved. THE KATYN MASSACRE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ITS SIGNIFICANCE AS A PUBLIC AND HISTORICAL ISSUE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1940-1993 An Abstract of A Thesis Presented to the Department of History Western Illinois University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts by Louis Robert Coatney December 1993 Copyrighted, 1993, by Louis R. Coatney. All rights reserved. Abstract The Katyn Massacre: A Assessment of Its Significance As A Public and Historical Issue in the United States and Great Britain, 1940-1993. The purpose of this research is to assess the public, political and historical, scholarly significance of the Katyn Massacre--the extermina- tion of 26,000 Polish officers, cadets, and other officials at Katyn and other killing sites in Russia in Spring 1940. Specifically, the study surveys the historical and contemporary treatment of the Katyn Massacre in the public press and scholarly literature of the United States and Great Britain, 1943-1993. The struggle to uncover and establish the truth about Katyn, in the face of denials, counteraccusations and/or equivocations by various Soviet governments and by some opinion leaders in Great Britain and the United States--including the leaders and bureaucracies of various Anglo- American governments--is, itself, significant. The Katyn Massacre and its coverup challenged the integrity of our political, academic, and media leaders and institutions. My thesis is that Katyn was obviously significant to those who knew the facts about it, and too many of those leaders and institutions remained indifferent to the issue and failed to grasp its importance. 1 2 Specifically, the Katyn Massacre's horrendous significance and the Soviet Union's responsibility for it was widely disbelieved or ignored, following the Second World War. Until Congressional hearings in 1952, a lack of public information about the massacre can be cited to explain and excuse the scanty coverage and widespread skepticism about Soviet guilt for the killings. After 1952--and certainly after the publication of Dr. Janusz K. Zawodny's book, Death in the Forest, in 1962--Katyn should not have been neglected as it was in many relevant studies: of of the politics and diplomacy of the Second World War; of the national diplomacies of Poland and the Soviet Union; or of the Cold War. Many journalists and scholars were unable or unwilling to report accurately on Katyn and its importance--even in the 1960s and 1970s--for reasons ranging from honest confusion or actual ignorance about the massacre and its implications to motivations that may have been rooted in ideological bias. I describe the implications of this oversight, in respect to the effectiveness and integrity--or lack thereof--of historians, journalists, and government officials in Great Britain and the United States. Chapter one describes the killings at Katyn. Chapter two deals with the discovery of the Katyn site as a Second World War war crimes issue. Chapter three analyzes its treatment as a postwar public and political issue in the United States and Great Britain. Chapter four considers Katyn's postwar historical and scholarly treatment in these countries. Chapter five summarizes the historical and political implications for the West of Katyn and similar episodes. A chrono- logical listing of Katyn-related books and articles is appended. APPROVAL PAGE This thesis, by Louis Robert Coatney, is accepted in its present form by the Department of History of Western Illinois University, as satisfying the thesis requirement for the degree Master of Arts. ________________________ Nicholas C. Pano Chair, Examining Committee ________________________ Sterling J. Kernek Member, Examining Committee ________________________ William L. Combs Member, Examining Committee ____________________ Date DEDICATION To Richard Wartman, my Russian professor at Augustana College (Rock Island, IL), 1971-72, who used wit and kindness to spark an appreciation for Russian language and history among his students, even though he had lost an uncle and cousin at Katyn ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank the members of my Western Illinois University thesis committee--committee chair Professor Nicholas Pano, a specialist in Eastern European and Albanian history and affairs; diplomatic history scholar Dr. Sterling Kernek; and German and Nazi history expert Dr. William Combs--for all of their time, criticism, and guidance. I also thank Polish-American leader Roman Pucinski, Soviet history authority Robert Conquest, U.S. State Department Soviet affairs strategic analyst Martha Mautner, Katyn scholars Dr. Janusz Zawodny and Robert Szymczak, and many others left unnamed for sharing their time, interest, and resources. Finally, I thank former Alaska Governor Steve Cowper for his unhesitating political courage on the issue of Katyn in Spring 1988. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii MAPS 1. KOZIELSK, OSTASHKOV, AND STAROBIELSK, WITH KILLING SITES . . . iv 2. KATYN AND GRAVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v 3. THE "CURZON" LINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii CHAPTERS 1. INTRODUCTION: THE KATYN MASSACRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2. KATYN AS A SECOND WORLD WAR ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3. KATYN AS A POSTWAR PUBLIC AND POLITICAL ISSUE IN THE WEST . . 40 4. KATYN AS AN HISTORICAL AND SCHOLARLY ISSUE IN THE WEST . . . . 81 5. THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF KATYN . . . . . .137 ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177 APPENDIX COVER PAGE OF L. BERIA'S 5 MARCH 1940 MEMORANDUM . . . . . . . . A-1 iii Map 1. Kozielsk, Ostashkov, Starobielsk and the killing sites iv Map 2. Katyn and graves* *U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, The Katyn Forest Massacre, Hearings before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session, on Investigations of the Murder of Thousands of Polish Officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, Part 6, (Exhibits 32 and 33 Presented to the Committee in London by the Polish Government in Exile, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 1742. v Map 3. The "Curzon" Line* *Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), 347. vi PREFACE Fifty-three years ago, over 4,000 prisoners of war were taken out into a forest in small groups where they were methodically murdered. The victims, encumbered in greatcoats and with their hands tied behind their backs, were forced face down onto the fresh corpses of their comrades, to be likewise shot through the back of the head. A younger few who attempted to resist had self-strangulation knots tied from their hands to their necks. Sawdust was rammed down the gullets of those who screamed and struggled, or their overcoats were tied down around their heads. The small groups became vast, neat stacks of human refuse.1 At the time, these men and 11,000 others who suffered the same fate at similar killing sites were only known to be missing. The victims were Polish officers and cadets, about half of whom were reservists from key civilian professions: doctors, lawyers, teachers, clergymen, and the like.2 They represented the leading, educated elements--"the best and the brightest"--of Polish society. The place and time of their slaughter was the Russian forest village of Katyn near Smolensk in the Spring of 1940. At that time, their families' contact with them (by mail, to the Soviet internment camps where they were being detained) ceased with no explanation. They simply disappeared, until their mass graves were discovered and publicized by the Nazi government, whose troops occupied the area in April 1943. vii viii The intended purpose of this study is not to condemn the Russian people (or any other former Soviet peoples) for the Katyn killings, or to promote the punishment of any surviving executioners. It should be remembered that over 30,000 of the best and most forwardthinking Soviet officers of the Red Army were similary exterminated in the late 1930s-- greatly facilitating the Nazi German invasion in 1941.3 Before the Katyn Massacre, the Russian people themselves had suffered far worse holocausts from Stalinism, numerically.4 Forcing the now-aged NKVD executioners to remember and relive the details of their crimes and victims is far more vital and justice-serving, historically and morally, than punishing them in the conventional sense. Nor, in an age of a cheapening surplus of human life which is critically over-burdening an increasingly exhausted and fragile natural environment, is it the primary purpose of this paper to condemn mass killing as an unnecessary and immoral instrument of state policy.5 Rather, the purpose of this study is to assess the public and political and the historical and scholarly significance of the Katyn Massacre and its prolonged coverup. Specifically, the study will survey the contemporary and historical treatment of the Katyn Massacre episode and will assess its significance, both in the public press and the scholarly literature of the United States and Great Britain. "Significance" can be defined in two ways. One interpretation of the "significance" of an event can be the public recognition of its importance. Some may claim that something is not significant if its importance is not generally known. It is easy to believe this in our present age which has been dominated by news media which seem so all- ix pervasive and omnipotent. "Damage control" and "spin control" have become essential, recognized survival skills for a political leader or institution. Until the early 1950s, for reasons described later in this study, Katyn's power and danger were realized only by the Poles, the Soviet leadership, and a few political and intellectual leaders around the world. It is true that there are episodes in history that become known and significant because they are politically useful and used. Some- times, it is difficult to tell whether history begets political events or political events beget history. (Indeed, the two often cannot be separated.) However, an event (and the truth about it) is sometimes so historically and politically powerful and compelling--intrinsically significant--that it cannot be controlled, contained, or ignored. The Katyn Massacre has proven to be a sterling example of this. Its nature and implications exerted this kind of inexorable power and impact on the peoples and institutions of Poland, of the Soviet Union and other nations under its control, and of the West. The Katyn Massacre was a politically motivated, mass ethnic killing that has important political relevance and ramifications, for academic as well as civic spheres. The struggle to uncover and establish the truth about Katyn, in the face of denials and counteraccusations by various Soviet governments and by some opinion leaders in the West--including leaders and bureaucracies of various Western governments--is, itself, significant. The Katyn Mas- sacre and its coverup challenged the integrity of political, academic, and media leaders and institutions in the United States and Great x Britain. In retrospect, we see that too many failed the test of Katyn. The horrendous significance of the Katyn Massacre and of the Soviet Union's responsibility for it was widely disbelieved or ignored during the immediate postwar years. Until Congressional hearings in 1952, a lack of public information about the massacre can be cited to explain and excuse the scanty coverage and widespread skepticism. After 1952-- and certainly after the publication of Dr. Janusz K. Zawodny's book, Death in the Forest, in 1962--Katyn should not have been neglected as it was in many studies of Poland or the Soviet Union; of the politics and diplomacy of the Second World War; of the national diplomacies of Poland, the Soviet Union, Germany, Great Britain, or the United States; or of the Cold War.6 I also intend to demonstrate that many reputable scholars were unable or unwilling to report accurately on Katyn and its importance-- even in the 1960s and 1970s--for reasons ranging from honest confusion or actual ignorance about the Katyn Massacre and its implications to motivations that may have been rooted in ideological bias. Finally, I shall describe the grave and enduring implications of this oversight, regarding the effectiveness and integrity--or lack thereof--of historians, journalists, and government officials in the West. CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: THE KATYN MASSACRE Documents found only recently, in 1992, have certified the identity of those who ordered the Katyn Massacre of April-May 1940. They point the finger of guilt to the collective membership of the Soviet Polit- buro, dominated by Communist dictator Iosif Vissarianovich Stalin. The killings resulted from the recommendation of Politburo member Lavrenti Beria, the dreaded chief of the Soviet secret police, the NKVD.1 There were a number of motives for the killings. Foremost was the "liquidation"--the Communist euphemism for extermination--of the social and intellectual leadership elites of Poland, as the initial step to eliminating that independent, anti-Soviet (and, historically, frequently anti-Russian) nation, permanently. In 1939, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had gloated, "One swift blow to Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of this bastard of the Versailles Treaty."2 Specifically, Beria suggested to the Soviet Politburo that the Polish officers be exterminated, since they were ". . . involved in anti-Soviet propaganda. Each of them is only waiting for his release from imprisonment in order to enter into a struggle against Soviet power."3 1 Indeed, the Poles were hardly model prisoners and imprudently ridiculed their Soviet guards and indoctrination cadre members to their faces.4 Their attitude now seems incredibly naive--even arrogantly stupid, considering that the Bolsheviks' record of atrocities was well known to them. Yet, the Poles apparently believed that the West-- specifically, the British and French--were actively concerned about them, being interested in their future usefulness, and would not abandon them. A "white paper" submitted to the 1952 U.S. Congressional hearings on Katyn by the Polish Government-in-Exile describes this misassumption: With a few exceptions, the morale of the prisoners at Kozielsk appeared to be good. Firmly believing in the ultimate victory of justice and trusting implicitly in Poland's Western Allies, the prisoners hoped for a quick release from Soviet captivity and the granting of facilities either to return to Poland or to make their way through a neutral state to join the forces fighting in the West.5 A rumour circulated in the camp that General Zarubin himself had said to one of the prisoners. "You have too many protectors, so you cannot go". The prisoners interpreted this remark as meaning that Britain and France did not want them to be returned to German-occupied Poland, as they were anxious to get them to the West. It was even said that Britain had asked the Soviets to send the Poles to the West and had offered to pay the expenses of their detention in Russia and that the Soviets were bargaining over the price. Rumours of this kind, which made the prisoners feel that they were an object of concern to the outside world helped considerably to keep up morale in the camp.6 Their faith in the West proved to be pathetically ill-advised. Although the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941-- "Operation Barbarossa"--forced Stalin to obtain material assistance from the West and concede the reestablishment of a postwar Poland independent in name (if not in fact), the extermination of the Polish intelligentsia facilitated another motive for the Soviet crime, the intended (and even- tual) Soviet subjugation of Poland. As former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in 1960, "The Nazi and Soviet extermination policies, which had decimated the Polish intelligentsia, the usual source of the political elite, had badly weakened the nation as a whole, decreasing its capacity for resistance."7 Stalin himself had a deep grudge against Poland and its intelli- gentsia. It stemmed in part from that nation's military victories over Bolshevik armies, to which Stalin was attached as a political commissar, in the Russo-Polish War of 1919-20.8 Another motive for the extermination of the Polish officers was Stalin's effort to appease his Nazi ally, Hitler. The second, secret protocol of the Hitler-Stalin Nonaggression Pact of 23 August 1939 had provided for the fourth partition of Poland, dividing it between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. While the Germans invaded Poland, in defiance of the British and French, and effectively began the Second World War on 1 September 1939, the Soviets did not attack the Poles until 6:00 AM, 17 September 1939.9 Although the Poles were by then already collapsing under the weight of the German onslaught, Polish Army units in the East fought, and in a few cases won, some pitched battles with the Red Army units advancing from the East. Against such over- whelming military odds, though, there obviously could be only one result, and Poland surrendered on 27 September 1939. While the British reaction to the German invasion of Poland had been to declare war, their reaction was noticeably more circumspect and indulgent toward the Soviet invasion. One example was this quote from The Times of London: Lloyd George, who had always been regarded by the Poles as hostile to their cause, justified his reputation with a suitable piece of invective in the Sunday Express. Under the heading "What is Stalin up to?" he criticized the "class-ridden Polish government" and praised the Soviet government for "liberating their kinsmen from the Polish yoke."10 At a somewhat later stage, on 11 November 1939, Picture Post captured the careful distinction fostered by many British officials, in referring to "The Nazi Army of invasion and the Russian Red Army of intervention . . . ."11 The Katyn Massacre occurred in the context of a Polish holocaust on a par with the Jewish Holocaust. It is estimated that 5,384,000 Poles, including Polish Jews, died during the German occupation through slave labor exhaustion, disease and starvation, repression of resistance, or outright extermination. The first victims of the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp were Polish. The first gassing at Auschwitz was performed upon 300 Polish and 700 Soviet prisoners of war.12 An estimated total of 6,028,000 Poles--22 percent of Poland's population--died in the Second World War. Half of the victims were Jewish.13 The Nazis launched a calculated campaign to exterminate the educated elite of Polish society and racially undesirable elements. The German Army perpetrated this massacre, as well as the more intently genocidal Nazi SS.14 There were plans to exterminate the Poles entire- ly, after they had outlived their usefulness and the Jews had already been annihilated. Polish children were not allowed to go to high school or college. The Catholic Church in Poland was suppressed.15 Ironi- cally, though, many of the Polish officers who were Jewish did avoid the Holocaust and survive the war, having been in the custody of the regular German Army Wehrmacht, rather than that of the Nazi SS.16 The method of capture, detention, and extermination of Poles by the Soviets is also important to consider. These victims were not just Polish officers and cadets who had surrendered to the Red Army in the field. They also included reservists and other officials who had been arrested in their homes in the Soviet-occupied zone of Poland.17 As it was, many Polish officers had been murdered immediately upon their capture, in spite of Soviet assurances of good treatment, particularly when their units had successfully battled against the Soviet invasion. Polish civilians suffered many Red Army atrocities as well.18 Conditions in the Soviet-held territories were so ghastly that some resident Jews actually petitioned--a few successfully, tragically--to be transferred to the German-occupied zone.19 In the Ukraine during the confusion of the changeover, Ukrainian nationalists occasionally took revenge on the ethnic Poles in their region. In time, these killings were investigated and punished by the Soviets who had as little use for Ukrainian nationalists as for Poles.20 Later, during the German occupation, the Ukrainians and Poles fought pitched battles against each other.21 There were approximately 15,000 Polish officers and cadets captured by the Soviets in September-October 1939. Many of them were reservists who in civilian life were professionals such as doctors, lawyers, college professors, etc. They were incarcerated in three internment camps: Kozielsk (southwest of Moscow), Ostashkov (between Moscow and Leningrad), and Starobielsk (southeast of Kharkov). At the Kozielsk camp there were 262 Poles of Jewish descent.22 There was also one woman, Polish aviatrix Janina Lewandowski. Of the captive Poles, only 448 seemed to the Soviets to be receptive to political collaboration. Initially, and during the winter (of 1939/40), the NKVD appeared to be trying to convert the Poles to Stalinist Communism. However, the interrogation and indoctrination sessions were too crude, dogmatic, and alien for most of the loyal, sophisticated Poles to accept. Eventually, the NKVD separated the potential collaborators from the thousands of loyal Poles. Then, in April-May 1940, having been given food and assurances that they were to be repatriated home, the Poles were shipped out by train, in groups of a hundred or so at a time. The destinations of most of these prisoners were three separate killing sites. Katyn was the terminus for the Kozielsk inmates. The other points were similarly railheads, near Kalinin for the Ostashkov prisoners and near Kharkov for the Starobielsk captives. Only recently have the locations of these other mass graves been verified.23 The 448 potential collaborators were transported by train to Pawlishtchev Bor, located between Kozielsk and Smolensk. The NKVD executioners were brutally efficient, having refined their methods on many thousands of Russian social, political, and military purge victims in the previous decades. It was simply an occupational routine for the killers, and some wore special attire, similar to that of butchers.24 Apparently, there were also a few especially vicious or fanatical thugs who took delight in sadistically abusing these members of the Polish elite, as they murdered them.25 Until Spring 1940, some of these officers' families had been corresponding with them. Thereafter, the families' mail was returned as undeliverable. Inquiries about the missing officer prisoners from the Polish Government-in-Exile, in London, and from the British government went unanswered by the Soviet government. In December 1940 (after the German overrunning of France in the Summer of 1940) at a reception for the leaders of the pro-Soviet Polish officers, NKVD chief Beria and his deputy, Vsevolod N. Merkulov, both enigmatically admitted that a "great mistake" had been made in the case of the other Polish officers.26 There had been meetings in March 1940, during which the Soviet NKVD shared its well-practiced terror and extermination technology with the Nazi SS. (The only Nazi "improvement" over Soviet extermination methods was the use of poison gas.) Professor George Watson has concluded that the fate of the interned Polish officers may have been decided at this conference, which according to him was held in Cracow.27 In his 1991 book, Stalin: Breaker of Nations, historian Robert Conquest stated that the conference had taken place at Zakopane in the Winter of 1939/40.28 While it may seem to be grimly amusing and fair justice that the Nazis would ultimately turn these extermination techniques against the NKVD, political commissars, and other Stalinists that they caught, the terminal horror suffered by so many millions of innocent Jewish, Slavic, and other European peoples as a result of this meeting of evil minds is an indelible stain on the history and integrity of Western "civiliza- tion," with all of its humanitarian pretensions.29 According to Watson, the fate of the Polish officers in Soviet custody was probably discussed during the conference. This would have been a significant factor in Stalin's decision to exterminate them, considering how slavishly he adhered to his pact with Hitler. (In spite of warnings from the British and Americans of imminent Nazi attack, trainloads of Russian raw materials were being faithfully sent to the Germans, right until the very moment of Hitler's 22 June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union.30 The NKVD even turned over, to the German Gestapo, German Communists who had been living in the Soviet Union.31) However, considering Stalin's predilection for mass murder as a political tool and his hatred of the Poles, he certainly would have had no hesitation about annihilating them, anyway. Even Stalin's daughter, Svetlana, noted his peculiar obsession with a much earlier forest death of Polish officers in the Russian folk opera, "Ivan Susanin."32 From Soviet-occupied Poland, Poles considered potentially subversive--including women and children--were shipped off in the 1940- 41 period to live in primitive camps in the Soviet Union. According to Polish sources, these captives numbered over a million. The categories of Poles considered potentially subversive even included stamp collec- tors and Esperantists.33 Two- or three-hundred-thousand Poles, an estimated quarter of the number exiled to the Soviet Union, perished in the Soviet Union.34 In contrast, in his recent, critical biography of Stalin, General Dmitri Volkogonov, quoted a 2 November 1945 NKVD memorandum to Stalin giving 494,310 as the figure of "former Polish citizens arrived in the Soviet Union." Later, the NKVD document mentioned 389,382 "men" being held in Soviet "prisons, camps and places of exile." Volkogonov added to this account that "None of the documents I have seen on Polish citizens, who were on Soviet territory at Stalin's will, contain accurate figures of those who were either killed or died."35 In any case, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov's remark about "wiping out all remains of this misshapen offspring of the Versailles treaty," during a session of the Supreme Soviet in October 1939, was indicative of the annihilatory nature of Soviet intentions toward the nation of Poland.36 Initiating the destruction of a nation by exterminating its leadership classes is consistent with the standard definition of "genocide."37 The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the resulting, initially desperate need for cooperation and assistance from Great Britain and the United States would later force Stalin to accept the continued existence of a Poland in some political form and in some westward, displaced location. However, the original, genocidal intent of the Katyn Massacre remains evident. The current Polish government apparently agrees, judging by the title, Katyn. Dokumenty Ludobojstwa (Katyn: Documents of Genocide), of its reprinting of the 1940 Soviet documents authorizing the massacre.38 CHAPTER 2. KATYN AS A SECOND WORLD WAR ISSUE Following the German invasion of the USSR on 22 June 1941, the Polish Government-in-Exile in London pressed on its new Soviet ally its inquiries about the location of its missing officers and cadets. In the Soviet Union itself, a Polish general who had been in Soviet custody, General Wladyslaw Anders, raised the issue in his efforts to staff a Polish army being formed from survivors of the Soviet labor camps. (The studied, smiling ingenuousness on Stalin's face, photographed as he received a list of 15,000 missing Polish officers from Anders and Polish Government-in-Exile chief, General Wladyslaw Sikorski, during their meeting with him 3 December 1941, is macabre.1) He told the Poles that he did not know what had happened to their officers, but he thought that they were last known to be in Manchuria. Such evasive Soviet answers to their questions about the men led General Anders to conclude in 1942, after leading an exodus of 70,000 Polish soldiers and 44,000 Polish civilians out of the USSR, that tragedy had befallen the vast majority of Polish officers in Soviet custody.2 On 27 April 1942, the U. S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Admiral William H. Standley, also formally requested the Soviet government to clarify the fate of missing Polish pisoners of war. The request was 10 received and rebuffed by no less a personage than Andrei Vyshinsky, who had been the Soviet prosecutor of the victims of the Stalinist purge trials of the late 1930s. Inquiries were also made by the British at this time.3 All these questions remained unanswered for another year. At every diplomatic opportunity, Stalin had been pressuring the Western Allies to recognize his demands for the western Soviet border with Poland to be moved farther west, to the 1941 border--the "Curzon Line." (See Map 3.) Stalin brought the matter to a crisis in January 1943 by declaring that all Polish residents who lived east of that 1941 border were Soviet citizens. Naturally, the Polish Government-in-Exile protested.4 General Sikorski was under heavy pressure. He knew that he would lose his countrymen's support--particularly that of the Polish underground army, the "Home Army"--if he did not resist the Soviets' efforts to move the Russo-Polish border westward from the 1939 boundary.5 Then, on 13 April 1943, Radio Berlin announced the discovery of a mass grave (at the Russian forest village of Katyn) of thousands of Polish officers who had been murdered, it stated, by the Soviet NKVD. After a two-day delay, the Soviet government responded on 15 April 1943, suddenly remembering and declaring that the Polish officers had been captured by the Nazis in late Summer 1941 and countercharging that the Germans had killed the Poles.6 Finally, on 16 April 1943, both the New York Times and the Times of London dutifully reported the dispute.7 Twelve days later, the Times editorialized on the damage this episode posed to Allied cooperation in the war against Nazi Germany.8 Nazi propaganda minister Josef Goebbels was gleeful about the divisive developments, noting in his diary, "One can speak of a complete triumph of German propaganda. Throughout this whole war we have seldom been able to register such a success."9 Indeed, Hitler was giving instructions that "the affair be given widest possible use."10 Under bitter pressure from its people within and outside of Poland, the Polish Government-in-Exile demanded an investigation and called on the International Red Cross to examine the site. The Red Cross agreed, but only on the condition that such an investigation would be acceptable to all governments. The Soviet government vetoed the proposal, of course, and broke off diplomatic relations with the London Poles on 25 April 1943, accusing them of "a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union."11 However, it should be noted that the Poles had not specifically accused the Soviets of the murders. They had only asked for an impartial inquiry. The Soviet reaction was excessive and suggestive of a guilty party attempting to bully and bluff its way out of an indict- ment: in effect it seemed self-incriminating. This was noted at the time by the British Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, who observed in official dispatches, "the anger and unconvincing terms of Russian denials suggests [sic] a sense of guilt."12 Moreover, Soviet credibility had already been undermined by revelations of the NKVD's acknowledged execution of two Poles who were leaders of the socialist Bund--the All Jewish Workers' Union--Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter. Because these men were Jewish, the Soviets would not recognize their Polish citizenship. Ehrlich and Alter had warned the Polish Embassy in Moscow of Soviet attempts to play off Polish Jews and Christians against each other. To justify killing Ehrlich and Alter, the Soviets accused them of being spies in the service of Polish and German(!) intelligence services.13 During 1943, a number of articles addressing Katyn and the border dispute appeared in American magazines. The 3 May article in Newsweek, "Row with the Reds," quoted the German propaganda accusation that the Katyn victims were executed by "Jewish OGPU Commissars."14 Newsweek's 10 May 1943 article, "Poles vs. Reds: Allied Unity Put to Test by Row over Officer Dead," described the effect of Katyn on the Allied war effort and was considerably more sympathetic toward the Russians than toward their Nazi-alleged victims, the Poles. For example, it offered the following speculation: The Poles' mistaken tactics may have been due to that curious trait of unrealism that led Polish lancers to charge German tanks and that still permeates Polish politics. The violence of the Russian reaction was probably due to the sensitivity of the Soviets in their dealings with foreigners.15 Time magazine's 10 May 1943 article was somewhat more considerate of the Poles. It described General Sikorski's moderate approach to the difficult task of attempting to reach a compromise between Poland's geo- political situation, on the Soviet Union's doorstep, and ultra-national- ist emigre elements. Time also understood Poles' anxiety about the possibility of a postwar political disappearance of Poland entirely.16 Ironically--considering it was a photograph magazine--Life's 10 May 1943 article was the most insightful, and it was startlingly candid. Life stated that the allegations needed to be investigated before any conclusions could be drawn, but pointedly observed that "Russians as well as Germans have shot plenty of Poles."17 Meanwhile, the London Poles were being accused by left-of-center commentators of using the Katyn atrocity to support their arguments with the Soviets over postwar Polish boundaries.18 In his 3 May 1943 "Back- stage of the War" column, Waverley Root--American journalist and international cookery expert--typically concentrated on the political implications of the Katyn-precipitated Soviet-Polish rift, maintaining that the Poles' principal motivation for demanding an investigation of Katyn was geopolitical, rather than moral or legal. He suggested: The Polish reason for agitating this issue was the desire dominant in the Polish government-in-exile to get an immediate pledge of the retention of Poland's eastern frontier. It saw in this incident a means of applying pressure to Russia. It neglected to consider the detail that one nation cannot apply pressure to another unless it possesses superior force--whether that force be military, moral, economic or psychological.19 "Progressive" Western intellectuals disputed the Nazi charges, and commentators in the West--such as Max Lerner, for example--agreed with the charge that the Polish Government-in-Exile had been duped into undermining the alliance with the Soviet Union by seconding the German call for an impartial investigation.20 Although British Prime Minister Winston Churchill did not dispute the Nazi charges, he told General Sikorski, "If they are dead nothing you can do will bring them back."21 American President Franklin D. Roosevelt was unwilling to accept the validity of the Nazis' charges. When Captain George Earle, a personal friend of Roosevelt and a former naval attache to Bulgaria, later expressed to the president his desire to publish evidence implicating the Soviets (which he had received in Sofia), Roosevelt gave him a written order not to do so. After Earle indicated he might "go public" about Katyn anyway, he was soon there- after abruptly and otherwise inexplicably posted to the Samoan Islands for the remainder of the Second World War.22 The Western Allies at this time were primarily concerned with keeping the Soviet Union in the war against the Nazis. The Soviets were maintaining the biggest land front against the Germans, and the Russians (and other peoples of European Russia) had suffered terribly. As importantly, in August 1939 Stalin had demonstrated that he was capable of doing a complete about-face in international relations, if it suited his ruthless and seemingly inscrutable interests.23 In his book, Allen Paul recently referred to this bewilderment of the Western Allies about Eastern Europe and Stalin's intentions toward it: The crisis dramatized how little the world knew about the plight of the Poles. The war had begun as a fight to preserve their independence. But by 1943 it had become a war to defeat Germany and the initial objective was rapidly falling from view. Polish leaders were certainly powerless to prevent such a fundamental change and the Katyn crisis demonstrated how little political latitude they had in adapting to it.24 Churchill's complicity in the Katyn coverup went deeper. On 23 April 1943, he assured Soviet Ambassador Maisky in London, "We shall certainly oppose vigorously any `investigation' by the International Red Cross or any other body in any territory under German authority. Such investigation would be a fraud and its conclusions reached by terrorism."25 This proved to be a strategic diplomatic error. An emboldened Stalin not only broke with the London Polish Government diplomatically on 25 April 1943, but he also followed this by beginning to practice diplomatic relations with the embryo of his own Communist Polish government, the "Union of Polish Patriots." This committee of Polish Communists had been officially created only a few weeks before the Katyn discovery.26 This was an indication that, with the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in Winter 1942/43, Stalin was beginning to feel less dependent upon the Western democracies' and less solicitous of their political aspirations for Eastern Europe.27 One of the most morally significant and saddening episodes in the Katyn affair was a lengthy, secret memorandum authored by the British Ambassador to the Polish Government-in-Exile, Sir Owen O'Malley. It was circulated among senior members of the British Cabinet and Foreign Office who attached cover comments, such as "This is a brilliant, unorthodox and disquieting despatch . . . ."28 It confronted the British government with a basic question about the moral integrity of its declaration and conduct of the Second World War. As Paul observed, O'Malley's memorandum stirred the consciences of senior statesmen deeply for two reasons. First, his evidence against the Soviets was overwhelming. And second, he developed a persuasive argument that the crime could cause the British enduring "moral repercussions."29 The memorandum pointed out that collaborating with the Soviets in the coverup of their atrocity would destroy the Allies' claim to moral ascendancy in their crusade against Nazi Germany and could compromise the moral credibility and the legitimacy of the expected postwar war crimes trials. Also--as importantly for Goebbels in his propaganda exhortations--the refusal by supposedly democratic and humanitarian Western countries to consider the evidence and condemn such a massive and hideous Soviet atrocity could serve as further proof of a special, persecutory malevolence toward the German people in the Allied prosecution of the war. Not only was the O'Malley document circulated in Britain, it was also circulated within the upper echelons of the U.S. government. In early September 1943, the White House staff confirmed President Roosevelt had been given the document.30 Whether or not the President actually took the time to read it has not been established. What Winston Churchill failed to understand, though, was that by this time in the war Britain had lost much of its power and credibility in Stalin's eyes, anyway. In 1935, according to Churchill in his 1948 volume of his history of the Second World War, The Gathering Storm, Stalin had openly scoffed at French Prime Minister Pierre Laval, "Oho! The Pope! How many divisions has he got?"31 In terms of manpower, industry, and technology, the United States was far outpacing Britain and, in the latter two categories, even the Soviet Union. Indeed, the most powerful weapon Britain had in the Second World War was its moral ascendancy. Along with France, it had met its moral and treaty obligations to Poland and had declared war on Nazi Germany's crusade of racist aggression. Britain had stood alone and battered, but unbending, in the darkest hours of the war, when the Soviet Union was Nazi Germany's ally. Britain had been a goading example and inspiration to Americans and to the rest of the world of a democracy which was prepared to fight and endure for its--for our--survival and moral principles. Stalin knew well the power of ideas and speech. In a 19 April 1923 speech, he declared, "Print is the sharpest and the strongest weapon of our party."32 If Churchill and Britain had roared outrage about Katyn, instead of mewing caution and restraint, the American public would have had to take notice and, after bitter debate, could have pressured Congress and Roosevelt to face the truth about Katyn and to get firm with the Soviets about Allied war aims at a critical juncture in the war, when the Soviet Union was still heavily dependent on any equipment and other help the Western Allies could provide. By this time in the war, also, not even Stalin could have made a separate peace with the Germans. The Soviet peoples were too consumed with rage and vengeance over German atrocities. With his capitulation on the truth about Katyn, Churchill and his government unnecessarily forfeited much of Britain's real power--its moral greatness. In fairness to Churchill (and Roosevelt), though, it should also be pointed out that at this time reports of the Nazi extermination of Jews and other Eastern Europeans, in the Warsaw Ghetto and elsewhere, were coming out of Occupied Europe. Any disruption in Allied effort--and a major row could have profoundly disrupted supply shipments, as well as military cooperation among the multi-tiered ethnic and political strata of Allied forces--would have given the Nazis additional time to extermi- nate these enslaved peoples and to rebound militarily and industrially. The Nazis exterminated half the Jews of Europe, as it was. As to the Poles' justification for demanding an investigation into the murder of 15,000 of their finest people, George Kennan (the famous diplomat and policy planner) offered an objective judgement in 1961: The German government, in announcing the discovery, asked for an investigation by the International Red Cross. The Polish government-in-exile, after some anguish, associated itself with this request. The Allies were furious at them for doing this, correctly fearing that it would anger the Russians. It is hard, in retrospect, to see how the Poles could have done less.33 The Germans saw their opportunity to disrupt Allied relations further and pressed on with an independent investigation conducted by leading forensics experts, principally from occupied Europe. These men were leaders in their field and were not coerced in their research. The Swiss representative, Professor Francis Naville, was a proven anti- Nazi.34 Following its inquiry, the Commission presented its findings. The men had been killed in their winter coats, indicating a cool season. Their uniforms were in relatively good condition at the time of their execution, indicating a period of captivity of months rather than years. Their hands had been tied behind their backs using rope of Russian manufacture. The mail and diaries left in their clothing indicated that their deaths had occurred during Spring 1940, when they were in Soviet custody. Several of the diaries even described the Poles' detraining at the railway station near Katyn and their growing concern about their impending fate.35 Local inhabitants testified that Katyn had been used by the NKVD as a killing site for years.36 The Poles executed at Katyn were all from the internment camp at Kozielsk. However, not all of Kozielsk's internees had been murdered, and those Polish officers who survived to join Anders' army had compiled sequential lists of the Spring 1940 departures of their campmates. The corpses identified at Katyn were buried in groups in the order of their departures from Kozielsk.37 Other evidence uncovered included tree saplings planted over the graves. Although they were five years old, biological analysis indicated they had been planted three years before the Spring 1943 German-sponsored investigation.38 The only evidence contrary to a conclusion of Soviet guilt was the ammunition used. It was 7.65 mm caliber and of German manufacture. One of the provisions of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 was a trade agreement whereby Soviet raw materials--especially oil--would be exchanged for finished German goods. Among the types of finished products the Germans traded to the Soviets were pistols and ammunition. German pistols and ammunition were preferred by the NKVD for their superior efficiency.39 While the Katyn controversy was in the news, the Nazis were exter- minating Jewish people in the Warsaw Ghetto. To prevent Katyn from be- ing used as a distraction from that atrocity, on 30 April 1943 a Polish Government-in-Exile delegate in London spoke out in support of the beleaguered Jews. On 5 May 1943, General Sikorski himself went on radio urging Poles "to give [Jews] all possible aid and to resist this terrifying barbarity." Indeed, some Polish Home Army guerrillas were meanwhile fighting pitched battles with the Nazis in Warsaw, attempting to break through the Ghetto's walls to the Jews.40 Meanwhile, in the United States, the large Polish-American community was slowly becoming agitated over Katyn. Polish-Americans distrusted Russians categorically. An article in reference to Katyn appeared in the 28 April 1943 Chicago Tribune, entitled "American and Polish Leaders Brand Russia a Nation of Liars and Old Conspirators."41 In Congress, members sympathetic to Poland entered items mentioning Katyn in the appendices of the Congressional Record. In the Record, itself, there is no direct mention of Katyn. There is, however, intri- guing mention of the Office of War Information (OWI) on 19-20 April 1943. On 19 April, Senator Robert Taft (R--Ohio) submitted a bill regulating the OWI's activities.42 On 20 April, Congressman Roy O. Woodruff (R--Michigan) asked for the floor for one minute. In his brief diatribe, he demanded an investigation into Communist infiltration of the OWI, concluding "the man in charge of the Polish Overseas Unit of O.W.I. has not lived in Poland for 15 years and has been active in French Communist circles, coming recently to America." More interesting were some of his earlier remarks: For 3 years the Polish Government in exile has been working to keep morale within Poland alive against the time of liberation. But now reports are constantly reaching me and other Members of Congress that the propaganda activities of the Polish Unit of O.W.I.'s Overseas Division are destroying rather than building the morale of the helpless Polish people. These reports tell us that much of this propaganda follows the American Communist Party line and is designed to prepare the minds of the Polish people to accept partition, obliteration, or suppression of their nation when the fighting ends. The same is true of Yugoslavia, where, I am told, the name of the great Mihailovitch is blocked out by O.W.I. radicals. If it is true that Communists have infiltrated into the O.W.I.'s Overseas Division and are following the party line in their propaganda to Poland, as well as other countries, then it is an outrageous violation of the faith that is reposed in Elmer Davis and Robert Sherwood.43 It is a significant coincidence that Woodruff would have made such animated accusations at the time when the U.S. Government was trying to control coverage of Katyn. It reflected the volatility of the atrocity as a political issue. It also demonstrated that at least one member of Congress concerned enough to speak openly about the implications and consequences of the OWI's ability to censor valid public issues during the war. The appendices of the Congressional Digest included copies of inserted newspaper articles, some of which mentioned Katyn. Congressman John Lesinski (D--Michigan) submitted articles from the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times-Herald on 16 April 1943. The first accused the Soviet Union of holding hundreds of thousands of Poles in the USSR hostage to its territorial demands. The second attacked a suspected attempt by British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden to get President Roosevelt's agreement to the postwar concession of Eastern Poland to Stalin.44 On 19 April, Lesinski confronted Congress with the 18 April 1943 Washington Times-Herald account of the Nazi charges and demands by the Polish Government-in-Exile that its prisoners in Soviet captivity be protected.45 On 29 April, Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D--Montana) submitted the Washington Times-Herald article of the same day, "Again the Polish Question." The article pointed out the logic of Soviet guilt for killing the Polish officers, considering past Communist use of "liquidation"--mass murder--in class warfare.46 There were indications at the time that some American politicians were willing to overlook a Soviet mass murder for the sake of wartime expediency. On 7 May, Congressman B.J. Monkiewicz (R-Connecticut) inserted the article "We'd Better Watch Him," which had been published in the Fort Wayne News-Sentinel. The paper quoted Wendell Wilkie's statement, "Russia is our ally, and . . . even if the Polish officers were murdered by Russia, we must have her help to win against Germany." The author of the article then went on to wonder when the Poles had become enemies of the Western Allies.47 Congressman Lesinski inserted another article into the Congressional Record. It was entitled "Stalin's Sweet Note," and it concluded with the following three significant and prescient points: 8. A tacit admission that we must flatter Russia out of fear that she may yet make peace with Hitler or Hirohito equals the whipping of public opinion, of American dignity and realism, into a Munich fever which undermines the morale and consciousness of Americans. 9. The propagated fear to criticise [sic] anything that Stalin does has created a temperature of hypocrisy and submission which may prove to be more harmful than it is apparent. 10. Russia should be helped--but should be informed now that she is only one of many elements of an allied commonwealth, equal and not ruling, interdependent and not isolated, responsible to the democratic world and not irresponsible.48 The Roosevelt Administration did whatever necessary to suppress the outcries. When a Polish-American radio announcer in Detroit quoted London Polish sources' evidence of Soviet guilt, he was silenced by the Foreign Language Division of the Office of War Information.49 Specifically, in a May 1943 meeting in New York, division chief Allen Cranston (lately a U.S. Senator from California), with the presence of FCC representative Hilda Shea, expressed concern about the anti-Soviet broadcasts to the station owner who then removed the commentator.50 The reaction in the Macomb, Illinois, daily newspaper was typical of a small town. There were many brief reports on local servicemen, and the news reflected a completely American perspective. Only on 27 April 1943, soon after the Soviet Union severed diplomatic relations with the London Poles, did syndicated war news columnist Donald MacKenzie mention (in that context) the "10,000" murdered Polish officers at Katyn.51 On the front page of the 29 April 1943 edition of the Macomb Daily Journal, an Associated Press article discussed British attempts to restore those relations and the implications of the breakoff.52 Facts on File, the annual news summary which had begun publication in 1941, included a number of items about Katyn in 1943. For 16 April 1943, it had the German report of the discovery of the mass grave of 10,000 officers "near Smolensk."53 Subsequent entries described the Soviet counteraccusations and the Soviet severance of diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile in London. This was followed, on 2 May, with a plaintively titled article, "Churchill Predicts Free Poland."54 Former Berlin correspondent and world affairs authority William L. Shirer wrote the introduction to Facts on File for that year. In Great Britain, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 4, 1940- 1943, contained a detailed rendering of the official statements made by the various governments at the time of the Katyn controversy and the rupture in Russo-Polish diplomatic relations. The documents republished in Keesing's, which included Polish Government-in-Exile releases, did not exonerate the Soviets, suggestively leaving the question of guilt to its readers to judge for themselves.55 After the Soviet retraction of recognition of their government, Free Poles were dealt another blow when General Sikorski died in a mysterious crash of his personal aircraft, on 4 July 1943, upon his departure from Gibraltar. To this day, many Poles and Polish-Americans are convinced Sikorski was assassinated by sabotage.56 On 12 November 1952, former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles stated, in regard to Sikorski's death, "I have always believed that there was sabotage."57 The questionable circumstances of Sikorski's death were even the subject of a book written by the iconoclastic British historian David Irving, Accident: The Death of General Sikorski.58 In seeking to account for Sikorski's untimely death, Katyn historian Allen Paul has also noted the coincidence of Kim Philby's responsibility for the British intelligence operations in North Africa at the time: A more likely explanation was that Stalin himself had issued Sikorski's death warrant. At the time of the crash, Soviet superspy Kim Philby was in charge of British security for North Africa. Philby's knowledge of Sikorski's route and schedule, as well as his contacts along the way, could have greatly aided any Soviet plot to engineer the crash. No evidence has ever been found to link Philby to Sikorski's death. . . . Coming when it did, only weeks after the discoveries at Katyn, Sikorski's death seemed too convenient. Evidence of sabotage was not found, but conclusive proof of an accident was not found either.59 Although there were many politicians and journalists in the West willing to defend the Soviets from incrimination, the Soviets felt compelled to hold their own investigation of Katyn in 1944, once the site had been retaken from the Germans. There was even a tour of Katyn conducted for interested Western journalists, including Kathleen Harriman--American envoy Averell Harriman's daughter.60 The Soviet investigating commission had only Russians as members.61 Predictably, it produced evidence--such as the testimony of local residents--to convince Miss Harriman and her friends at the time that August 1941 was when the Poles had been killed and that the Nazis had actually done the killing.62 Despite Soviet efforts to deny responsibility for Katyn, by Spring 1944 concern in the United States over Stalin's overall intentions toward Poland had become serious, as evidenced by Time magazine's republication of an appeal of some prominent Americans made to "Soviet Russia." Growing doubt about the fate of Poland was evident.63 Nevertheless, the Polish plight became the butt of humor for some editors. For example, such titles as "Poles Apart" and "Poles in a Hole" were given to 1944 Newsweek articles.64 In retrospect, the tone of these titles seems cruel and mocking. Just as Katyn would later become the emotional fuse to rally anti- Soviet sentiment in Poland and, in 1980, the political movement known as "Solidarity," it triggered the political mobilization of Polish-Ameri- cans in May 1944 in Buffalo, New York, when some 2000 delegates from twenty-two states met to plan efforts on behalf of Polish-Americans and Poles. The conference was highlighted by a parade of 25,000 Polish- Americans through the center of the city. Coincidentally, 1944 was an election year, and the Roosevelt Administration's OSS (Office of Strategic Services) intelligence service warned that the Polish American Congress (PAC) might be a serious political factor in the upcoming election.65 Nevertheless, President Roosevelt would not meet with Polish- American leaders until there occurred another tragedy as rending as the Katyn Massacre. This was the Warsaw Uprising, 1 August-2 October 1944. On 29 July 1944, the Soviet-backed Union of Polish Patriots, attached to Red Army units advancing on the city, broadcast to the people of Warsaw the exhortation that they rise up and throw out the Nazis before the latter could fortify the city.66 The Polish Underground and Home Army, under the command of General Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski did just that, expecting the Red Army to lift the Nazi siege of the city within a few days--much as Paris would be liberated by the Free French and American armies on 25 August 1944. However, despite the intense pleas of the Americans and British, the Red Army did not advance and the Nazis were allowed to shatter the Free Polish military and political groups that were attempting to defend the Polish capital and to establish a credible, independent government. Stalin claimed that the Vistula River was a tremendous obstacle, defying fording by tanks. It is true that the western banks of the rivers of Eastern Europe and European Russia are much higher than the east banks, and the Germans were defending the western banks. However, by this time the Red Army's "artcorps"---mobile, corps-sized massings of rocket and gun artillery-- could obliterate any German defensive strongpoint or concentration. Also, considering how bitterly Stalin had criticized his Anglo-American allies for waiting so long to launch the invasion across the English Channel, his protestations about crossing a river verge on mockery.67 More significantly, the Soviets would not cooperate in the Western Allies' efforts to supply the defenders of Warsaw by air. Crushed by its Nazi SS besiegers, the Home Army surrendered on October 5th.68 When the Red Army finally rolled into Warsaw, the NKVD rounded up and deported to slave labor camps or exterminated outright as many surviving members of the Polish Home Army as it could find.69 These events were duly noted in the American press. Newsweek publicized the Poles' accusation of duplicitous Soviet inaction in a 16 October 1944 article. Subtitled "Soviet Failure to Aid Bor[-Komorowski] Is Barrier to Rapprochement with Mikolajczyk Government," the article described the London Poles' accusations that the Red Army had called upon the Home Army to act, and the Soviets' accusations that the Home Army had acted without consulting the Red Army.70 Polish-Americans traditionally supported the Democratic Party-- being, for the most part, working class--and loyal to President Roosevelt, but they were now outraged. Nevertheless, during his visits with PAC leaders in October 1944, Roosevelt quickly and easily averted their new, naive political activism with a few of the vague, expansive presidential blandishments for which he was famous.71 The issue of Katyn faded with the progress of the war. The London Poles had lost political influence with the Western Allies, in spite of the valor displayed by their troops in Italy and Northwest Europe, and in spite of the large emigre communities long in the U.S. and growing in Great Britain. However, all this abuse of the Poles by the Soviets did not go as unnoticed by the American people as it was by their government. Before and during the war, there had been a number of attempts to gauge American public opinion about European affairs and Stalin's Russia. In January 1939, a poll was taken to ascertain whether Americans would prefer Germany or Russia to win a war between those two nations. Eighty-three percent of the respondents indicated that they wanted Russia to win.72 On the other hand, in a poll taken in March 1940, after Stalin's collusion with Hitler and the Soviet invasion and defeat of Finland and the Baltic republics, fully 34.2 percent of Americans considered Russia the "worst influence in Europe," second only to Germany which was censured by 55.3 percent.73 Nor did Americans have any charitable feelings toward Communists. In May, 1941, two-thirds of those surveyed wanted the U.S. Communist Party suppressed.74 In July 1941, soon after "Operation Barbarossa" had begun, another poll was taken of Americans' preference for a victor in that already- bloody war. This time, only 72 percent wanted Russia to win--11 percent fewer than in the January 1939 poll--while 24 percent were indifferent or undecided.75 More revealing about the U.S. popular attitude toward the nature of Stalinist Russia was the October 1941 poll wherein 32 percent considered the "Russian" government only slightly better than the "German" government, 35.1 percent thought the Soviet and Nazi governments equally bad, and 4.6 percent thought the Soviet government worse than the Nazi version--for a total of 71.7 percent considering the Soviet government to be only slightly better or worse than the Nazi government. Even in October 1941, with the Russians maintaining the biggest front against the Nazis, fully 19.8 percent of Americans were undecided which government was better or worse.76 However, polls taken in March 1942 and February 1943, and on 29 April 1943, showed the effect of Katyn on American public opinion about whether the USSR could be trusted to cooperate after the war was over. In March 1942, 39 percent trusted Russia, while 39 percent did not. In February 1943, at the time of Soviet victory at Stalingrad and general inter-Allied goodwill, 46 percent of Americans expected Russia's postwar cooperation, while only 29 percent did not. However, on 29 April 1943, after the controversy about Katyn and the Soviet breakoff of diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile in London, the number of doubters rose back to 34 percent (although the number of optimists remained at 44 percent). The inference that may be drawn is that the Katyn epidsode and the ensuing diplomatic controversy had catalyzed some previously undecided Americans into distrusting the Soviets.77 Katyn's significance as a public issue was cited in an article by Warren B. Walsh, "What the American People Think of Russia," in the Winter 1944-45 issue of Public Opinion Quarterly magazine.78 After describing the increase in trust of the Soviet Union, thanks to the Stalingrad victory, Walsh wrote: There was a minor increase in trust, soon reversed, and a greater increase in distrust with the curve of the latter rising ever more steeply as new shocks disturbed American-Soviet relations. Ambassador Standley accused the Soviet Government of concealing from its people the facts about American aid and supplies. On top of that, the Russians broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile over the masterly Nazi propaganda charges of mass murders in the Katyn forest. The dissolution of the Comintern in May, 1943, momentarily reversed the trust and distrust curves, but caused a sharp rise in the "no opinion" group. Many people did not know whether to take that dissolution at its face value or whether it was merely "another clever Communist trick."79 Walsh then went on to chart the ups and downs of Americans' trust of Stalin's Russia and concluded: Opinion has remained relatively stable in recent months. At the present writing (November, 1944), 47% believe that Russia can be trusted; 35% feel that she cannot; and 18% don't know. Neither the continuing Russo-Polish quarrel and the Papal condemnation of Communism on the one hand, nor the Red Army advances and Stalin's praise of the second front on the other hand, seem to have affected the American attitude materially.80 Among Walsh's closing analyses was the following point: There is a hard core of distrust about Russia. Roughly one out of three does not trust Russia, and this group clings stubbornly to its opinion. There is a smaller number--roughly one out of five-- which is more pliable and whose opinion can be changed.81 Apparently, Katyn and similar Soviet transgressions--such as the NKVD's executions of Henryk Ehrlich and Wiktor Alter, in March 1943--had helped solidify the anti-Soviet feeling of roughly one-third of Americans.82 The Facts on File volume for 1945 did not reflect this distrust of the Soviets and contributed another misleading entry on the Katyn mystery. A 27 June 1945 entry, titled "Massacre Fraud Disclosed," said "Stockholm reports that a close collaborator of Heinrich Himmler told Allied authorities in Germany two days ago . . ." that Katyn was actually a Nazi massacre contrived to appear as a Soviet killing for propaganda purposes.83 Neither the reporter nor the source was named. Journalist William L. Shirer was now officially responsible for world affairs entries. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945 (and later at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945), the future of Poland was a major point of discussion. At Yalta, Churchill and Roosevelt conceded that the Soviets had a right to ensure the safety of their western border with the Poles. Roosevelt agreed to the westward shift of Poland's borders, with the Curzon Line as the basis for the Polish Soviet border.84 Everyone agreed that postwar Poland should be "free and independent." Stalin, adeptly reversing his 1939 plans, even stated: That is why Russia today is against the Tsarist policy of abolition of Poland. We have completely changed this inhuman policy and started a policy of friendship and independence for Poland.85 Churchill and Roosevelt accepted Stalin's vague assurances of respect for an independent Poland. However, in April 1945, sixteen leaders of the Polish underground who had accepted Soviet invitations to conferences and cooperation were arrested, tortured, and (with one exception) forced to sign confessions of anti-Soviet subversion.86 Poland had become a political embarrassment to Western politicians, throwing into doubt the genuineness of the Allied victory for world peace and freedom--evidencing a half-finished crusade to rid the world of exterminatory totalitarianism. Uneasiness about Katyn bubbled to the surface of the American public's consciousness again, early in 1945. The American journalist, William L. White raised uncomfortable questions about Katyn in his travelogue, Report on the Russians.87 White pointed out the obvious inconsistency of the victims being found in winter clothing--even during the Soviet reinvestigation--according to the Soviet version that had set the time of their deaths as Summer 1941. He also wondered why the Soviets could not locate the Polish officers prior to the German invasion, when requested to do this.88 The reaction to White's book in the leftwing--"progressive"--press in the West was savage and shrill. Pro-Soviet Westerners signed a statement attacking White's book and accusing him of "warmongering"--a serious charge at a time when the issue uppermost in the mind of the American public was "bringing the boys home" as soon as possible. Also, as was recently observed by Roman Pucinski of Chicago, Chief Investiga- tor of the Congressional Katyn hearings in the early 1950s, the United States and its people were utterly exhausted by the Second World War by mid-1945 and did not want any confrontation with the Soviet Union.89 Most reviews of White's book--which was remarkably prescient concerning the impending, souring fate of Soviet-American relations--were hostile.90 Three reviews specifically mentioned White's coverage of Katyn in his book. In his Saturday Review of Literature review, author John Hersey castigated White for comparing the wartime plight of the Russians to an American standard of living. He then went on to say, "His account of the Katyn Forest massacres is obviously from sources sympathetic to the London Poles, and makes no pretense at being impartial; it sounds very much like the Berlin radio."91 (Note that Hersey did not attempt to defend the Soviets from the Nazis' charge about Katyn: he only faulted White for repeating it.) Interestingly, in his own, lead review in the Saturday Review of Literature coverage of White's book, renowned- -and recently returned--Moscow correspondent Louis Fischer omitted any reference to White's treatment of Katyn in his generally favorable analysis of the book. In its otherwise critical review of the book, The Christian Science Monitor stated, "Sometimes the author is evidently trying to be fair- minded--even in the chapter on the disturbing affair of the Katyn atrocities, which is surely an inflammable topic to broach on such a mission as this."92 The description of Katyn as a "disturbing affair" epitomized its place in Western consciousness at this point in time. The hideousness of the charges against the Soviets and the confidence with which the Nazis obviously levelled them had profound and ominous implications about the true nature of the Soviet regime and the postwar world. In the New Republic, journalist Bruce Bliven's coverage of White's treatment of Katyn was similarly ambivalent. In regard to the famous case of the 10,000 Polish officers who were murdered in the Katyn Forest, either by the Germans or the Russians, White gives at great length all the arguments in favor of the theory that they were killed by the Russians, and no evidence whatever on the other side. Then, with a poker face, he announces that the evidence is overwhelming that the Germans did it. Anyone who has no other information on the subject than this book is bound to believe that White in his final verdict was under some sort of pressure--or had suddenly gone off his head.93 This is not an accurate description of White's treatment of Katyn. White did outline the Soviets' arguments in their defense. He did not "announce that the evidence is overwhelming that the Germans did it." What White did say was: The evidence of German guilt gathered by the Soviet Commission is detailed, complete, damning, and it answers all questions but this one: if the Polish officers were still alive in the summer of 1941 and could be captured by the Germans, why were the Poles not told this at once? A few lines later, White stated that the evidence of German guilt, as presented by the Soviet commission, was overwhelming, not that the objective evidence was. He pointed out that spring being the time of execution was more consistent with the victims' heavy clothing than late summer would have been, and he wondered why the Soviets had said nothing about a German execution of the Poles until the discovery of the victims in 1943. Otherwise, White left his readers to draw their own conclusions.94 White's credentials were too sound for him to be accused of being pro-Nazi or fascist. His father, William A. White, was one of the most influential journalists of the 1930s. The elder White was also the director of the CDA, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. On behalf of the Roosevelt Administration, this organization had taken the offensive in the public forum against the America First Committee, which had sought to discourage the United States from aiding the Allies and from getting involved in another world war in any way.95 The elder White died in 1945.96 Perhaps in reaction to White's book, which had been pre-released in condensed, two-part article form in the Reader's Digest--omitting his coverage of Katyn, incidentally--a flurry of books were soon published defending the Soviet Union and, in a few cases, directly criticizing White's book.97 One outstanding example is Edmund Stevens' 1945 account, Russia Is No Riddle. Stevens and his books are worth examining in detail, because of the complete about-face which he, as a journalist, took--or, because of increasingly anti-Soviet public opinion, he had to take--between his 1945 and 1950 books. At the beginning of the 1945 book, Stevens mentioned his Russian wife's adjustment to America. Later, he described his January 1944 trip with Kathleen Harriman to Katyn and presents the Soviet version of Katyn, even mentioning the "537th Construction Battalion" as being the duplicitous designation of the Nazi extermination unit. His description of his acknowledged Soviet friends--"the distinguished looking chairman, Alexander Potyomkin, scion of a famous Russian family" and "Chief of the Commission . . . Nikolai Burdenko, Surgeon General of the Red Army and one of the world's most distinguished brain surgeons"--reeked of cronyism. (Nonetheless, in 1946 Burdenko confided to a close friend that the Polish officers had obviously been murdered in 1940--i.e., by the NKVD.)98 At the end of Stevens' book, in a chapter entitled "Friendship or Else," he condemned White's account of the Soviet Union by concluding that the "abuse of Soviet hospitality is the shabbiest aspect of the White episode."99 He did not, however, mention White's own treatment of Katyn, specifically. A startling contrast, then, was Stevens' 1950 book, This Is Russia: Uncensored. In his preface to the book, retired U. S. Army general Walter Bedell Smith stated, "Years have passed since the first book on the Soviet Union by the young correspondent, Edmund Stevens, appeared in print. These have been years of disillusionment.100" In his 1950 book, Stevens was even more critical of the Soviet Union than White had been in 1945. Although Katyn went unmentioned this time, Stevens' description of an NKVD arrest in his Moscow apartment house which he witnessed during the purges of the late 1930s is searing: My most vivid recollection is that of a young mother. Across the years, I still can hear her screams as they took her two-month-old baby away from her and she and her husband were led off to the "Black Crow"--Russian equivalent of the "Black Maria," or police wagon. Only three weeks previously her husband had returned from an assignment to Japan with all sorts of lovely presents for his wife and child.101 Stevens then concluded the purges had "undermined public morale and impaired the country's economic and military strength."102 Later, in the chapter "Will the Slaves Revolt?," Stevens opined, with character- istic sympathy and optimism, It is essential that the West learn to distinguish between the police state and the Soviet people, for if the former are implacable foes, the latter, unless stupidly antagonized, are potential friends and allies. And it is they who eventually will decide their country's destiny.103 While these words were all very impressively prescient (in light of the political developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s), Stevens himself certainly hadn't helped Westerners to make that vital distinc- tion between terror state and Russian people when it counted, in 1943- 45. Indeed, in his 1945 book he had written: Even people in America who are strongly opposed to the Soviet system, if not blinded by prejudice, must admit that in its preparation for the Nazi attack and in its conduct of the war, the Soviet Government has shown considerable foresight and a capacity for leadership. It is impossible, as some writers attempt, to distinguish in this respect between the Government and the people. Without this preparation and leadership, not all the heroism of the Russian people would have availed against the Nazis.104 That he could write this while at the time he personally knew what the purges were like--and must have known how they had decimated the Red Army officer corps (and decapitated the Red Army) immediately prior to the Nazi invasion--was reflective of the sympathetic predisposition many Western commentators had toward the Soviet Union in 1945. However, by 1950 (Stevens') anticommunism was fashionable, unlike in 1945 when William L. White's measured questions about our Soviet allies unleashed such a torrent of abuse from his pro-Soviet colleagues. Indeed, White's treatment by his fellow journalists provoked The Saturday Evening Post to print an article in May 1945 examining the significance of the episode. The following excerpt addresses this anti- White crusade by some journalists: This almost unanimous chorus of denunciation alarmed us a little, for two reasons. The first is that there seems to be a disposition to put Russia in a special category as the nondiscussible Ally. . . . The other reason why the anti-White "line" taken by critics and intellectuals worries us is that it suggests that too many of the people who tell the public what kind of books it ought to read are a little touchy about having the nature of the Communist setup understood by the rank and file of Americans.105 In the following year, 1946, the Soviets attempted to raise Katyn as a Nazi war crimes issue at Nuremberg. The Soviets formally charged the Nazis with the Katyn Massacre and put it on the agenda for prosecution. They may have assumed, after the apparent acquiescence of the West on the matter of Katyn during the war, that the court would be inclined to support the Soviet position regarding this episode. In any case, a Nuremberg finding of German guilt for Katyn would thereby make the Western powers officially subscribe to the lie. As Sir Owen O'Malley had foreseen, the Katyn episode at Nuremberg did indeed become a particular embarrassment, especially for the Western Allies who were actually claiming to believe in the humanitarian ideals for which violation the Nazi war criminals were being prosecuted. The Nuremberg war crimes trials, with their condemnation of mass murder and other totalitarian and/or criminal misdeeds had been intended to be a moral cornerstone of the postwar world. However, Katyn would reemphasize the trials' one-sided nature and leave an inescapable impression of hypocrisy. The handling of Katyn made evident the fact that the trials certainly did not uphold the ideal of "justice for all." Hermann Goering and Rudolf Hess removed their headphones in disgust and many of the other Nazi war criminals laughed in derision as the judicial triumvirate (which included a Soviet prosecutor, General Rudenko) solemnly intoned against the German defendants for planning military aggression against Poland in 1939--which they had indeed done, with the active collaboration of their Soviet cosignators to the 1939 Stalin- Hitler Pact.106 A leading witness for the Soviet case was Dr. (M.D.) Markov from Bulgaria, who had served on the German-sponsored "International Commis- sion" which had investigated Katyn.107 Since the Soviet takeover of Bulgaria, Dr. Markov had recanted his previous opinion that the Soviets were guilty of Katyn. Coincidentally, the death sentence which had been decreed for Dr. Markov by the Soviet-backed Bulgarian government was suspended. At Nuremberg, Dr. Markov claimed his earlier statements indicating Soviet responsibility for the crime had been made under Nazi coercion.108 The German defense attorney produced testimony from other members of the German commission that their findings had not been made under German intimidation. Even more embarrassing for the Allies, there voluntarily appeared at Nuremberg Colonel Ahrens, the former commander of the German communications unit--the 537th Signal Regiment--accused of performing the Katyn Massacre by the Soviets. He quickly and convinc- ingly denied the Soviet charges of his guilt, proving that he was not commanding the unit or even in the area at the time of the killings alleged by the Soviets. When the Soviets then tried to accuse his predecessor, Colonel Bedenk, that gentleman also promptly appeared to deny and refute his guilt with equal alacrity. The only alternative to the Germans being guilty for Katyn was embarrassingly obvious, and, significantly, Katyn was omitted from the list of Nazi war crimes in the final Nuremberg judgement.109 Nonetheless, the 1946 Facts on File coverage of the issue of Katyn at Nuremberg only described the Bulgarian Dr. Markov's pro-Soviet testimony.110 CHAPTER 3. KATYN AS A POSTWAR PUBLIC AND POLITICAL ISSUE IN THE WEST With the conclusion of the Second World War in Europe, Soviet behavior toward Eastern European peoples and German civilians raised concerns about the actual intent of our Soviet ally in these areas. The 17 June 1946 issue of Time magazine included an article entitled "`You Cannot Shoot Us All.'" Time documented the Communist-dominated Polish government's intensifying campaign of terror against the Polish Peasant Party led by Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who had taken over the Polish Government-in-Exile after General Sikorski's death in July 1943. According to Time, Mikolajczyk had sent the following message to his wife and son in Britain, "You may let them know that I do not know what can happen to me. I may be killed. I may be deported."1 Mikolajczyk was actually quoted telling Communist Vice Premier Wladislaw Gomulka, "You cannot shoot us all." This was rather rash, considering that he must have been aware that Stalin's exterminatory methods had already obliterated millions of Russians, as well as hundreds of thousands of his fellow Poles. However, like Katyn, such massive murders had been disputed in the Western press by its Moscow correspondents.2 Also appearing in 1946 was the third volume of Waverley Root's The 40 Secret History of the War, entitled Casablanca to Katyn. Root devoted forty-six pages to defending the Soviet version of Katyn.3 Gamely, Root even included Merkulov's admission that a "great blunder" had been made concerning the Poles, rationalizing that Merkulov was referring to the Poles being left behind to the advancing Germans.4 However, Root had already betrayed his naivete about the Soviets when he stated: According to the German report, bodies of Russian civilians were found beneath those of the Poles. Was it the German contention that the Russians had murdered their own nationals as well? Russians might be expected to murder Poles, perhaps, but not Russians. Germans had systematically murdered both.5 During the war, in his 3 May 1943 "Backstage of the War" column, Root had been only slightly more responsible when he concentrated on the political implications of the Katyn-precipitated Soviet-Polish rift--as noted on page 14 of this study. Whatever the opinion of Western journalists and the confusion among their publics back home on the issue, the staff at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow after the war well knew that the Soviets had killed the Poles at Katyn, according to Martha Mautner, a new foreign service officer assigned to the Moscow post at the time.6 In 1947, the book The Dark Side of the Moon, authored by General Sikorski's widow, Helena Sikorska, was published. It was her account of the suffering of Polish people in Soviet custody and exile, written and completed in manuscript form during the war. Although the mystery of the missing Polish officers was mentioned, Sikorska did not accuse the Soviets of the crime.7 Only in the "Epilogue," authored by "an Englishman," was Katyn mentioned--and then only to defend General Sikorski's request for the Red Cross investigation.8 Nonetheless, the victimization of Polish captives by the Soviet regime was compellingly portrayed. Then, in 1948, I Saw Poland Betrayed, a book by former U.S. Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane, was published. In his initial coverage of Katyn, Lane did not directly accuse the Soviets of the Katyn Massacre. The identity of the perpetrators of the outrageous massacre of Katyn, contrary to all laws of war and of humanity, has never been definitely established. Perhaps it never will be. But I was to obtain evidence in Poland from Poles whose veracity I had no reason to distrust, which leads me to question seriously the sincerity of the outburst of Soviet indignation over the Polish Government's approach to the International Red Cross.9 Later in the book, Lane finally and directly challenged the Soviet denials of guilt, stating: Even though the Soviet Government has tried to avoid responsi- bility for the Katyn incident, with violent protestations of innocence, the accusing finger of public opinion in Poland is still pointed at the Kremlin; for that liquidation of ten thousand Polish officers would be consistent with the Soviet policy of systematically destroying all elements representative of Polish nationalism. Not only were the Nazis and Soviets in agreement on the annihilation of the Polish state, but they employed similar police-state measures to snuff out the spirit of Polish independence.10 There were also postwar accounts by Polish survivors of Soviet captivity, such as Lieutenant General Wladyslaw Anders and Josef Czapski, who directly challenged Soviet denials of guilt for Katyn.11 The Nazis and the Soviets had not succeeded in eliminating all the Polish intelligentsia, and the survivors fought back with the one, very potent weapon they had: the pen. Also in 1948, the wartime memoirs of Polish Peasant Party leader Stanislaw Mikolajczyk were published. He had escaped Poland and death at the hands of the NKVD, after all. In The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression, Mikolajczyk devoted an entire chapter to Katyn, leaving no doubt that he was convinced that Stalin was guilty of the executions, saying, "But the order--`Liquidate'--was signed by Stalin himself." He based this contention on remarks made by a Red Army military attache in London.12 In his 1949 book, An Army in Exile: The Story of the Second Polish Corps, General Anders recounted his reconstruction of the Polish Army from the labor camps of the Soviet Union and its subsequent political betrayal by the Allies. Time magazine titled its review of Anders' book, "Polish Tragedy." Without mentioning Katyn, the review described Stalin's "feigned innocence" as he accepted from Anders and General Sikorski the list of "4,000" missing Polish officers, many of whom were later disinterred at Katyn.13 This was not necessarily in reference to the Katyn Massacre itself, but to the aforementioned list of missing officers.14 Later in the book, Anders had mentioned the total number of 15,000 missing Polish officers in detail, and described his growing anxiety about them as he left the Soviet Union.15 In Anders' book, the chapter titled "The Katyn Murders" clearly indicated his certainty that the Soviet Union was guilty of Katyn: On April 13, 1943, the Germans broadcast a report that the corpses of thousands of Polish officers had been found buried at Katyn. The German radio was naturally suspect, but nevertheless we were already well aware that something dreadful had happened to the missing officers; our efforts to trace them in Russia had been unavailing, and the Russians had been suspiciously silent about their fate. There was therefore unfortunately only too much reason to believe the German report, for we well knew the Russians were quite capable of committing a crime of such magnitude.16 Anders later cited Stalin's anti-Semitism and a Soviet attempt to smear Poles with the taint of anti-Semitism (during the evacuation of Polish refugees from the Soviet Union in 1942).17 Nonetheless-- remarkably, considering the fact that that his son was missing somewhere in Eastern Europe--Anders was trying to accept the situation as positively as possible: I and other Polish soldiers had, in spite of our personal experiences, entertained some hopes at first that after the defeat of Germany, Russia, free from any menace from the West, would not only change her attitude towards her neighbours but transform her internal regime into a more liberal and democratic one. We were influenced by the pledges given by the heads of the N.K.V.D., though we received these with natural caution. We wanted to forget the past. But our confidence resulted not only from a kind of wishful thinking, but also from our insufficient knowledge of Russia and our tendency to judge things in Russia by European standards.18 Also in 1949, the book The Katyn Wood Murders, by Joseph Mackiewicz, was published in London. Mackiewicz, a Polish journalist, was brought by the Germans (with the approval of the Polish underground) to Katyn in 1943, to record the disinterment. Among other items, Mackiewicz described the eighth, and last, mass grave which contained the final one hundred officers murdered in May 1940. These victims were distinguished by their lighter, warm-weather clothing. German propagandists, unaware of the other two killing sites, had claimed there were ten to twelve thousand Polish officers buried at Katyn, and the total figure of 4,243 was an embarrassment to their case.19 Mackiewicz's book is interesting in that it detailed the murders of Polish, Lithuanian, and Ukrainian civilians by the NKVD at the time of the Soviet withdrawal from the German invasion in Summer 1941. The NKVD was even executing Soviet airmen, presumably in retaliation for the successful German knock-out attacks on the Red Air Force early in the invasion.20 (Like the execution of commanders of the Western Special Military District, this may have been to eliminate embarrassing wit- nesses, since the NKVD had been responsible for airfield construction and preparedness on the USSR's western frontier.) This was further, important evidence that the NKVD's extermination of the Polish officers and cadets was consistent with Soviet policy toward captured territories and populations. At the end of the book, Mackiewicz theorized that if the Germans had murdered the Poles at Katyn in August 1941, they would have attempted to accuse the Soviets of the crime immediately, to confuse their own crime with the Soviet atrocities they were discovering. Furthermore, he went on--bravely, in a book published during Stalin's lifetime--to observe: But for once, with the Katyn crime, the Germans did not need to conceal any clues. They were not guilty and they were only too anxious that the world should know the truth. It is a strange paradox and a very sad conclusion that this truth is still unbelieved or wholly unknown. Furthermore such ignorance contains a danger for the future. Because if the culprit of such a crime [Stalin] is not brought to the dock--what will his next crime be? Or should we not rather ask--who will be his next victim?21 Also in 1949, journalist Julius Epstein assembled a private committee--with former Ambassador Lane as president--to conduct public hearings on Katyn, collecting any evidence and testimony possible about Katyn.22 In addition to Epstein and Lane, the committee included such notables as former OSS chief William Donovan, former foreign intelli- gence operative Allen Dulles, Polish American Congress president Charles Rozmarek, and journalists Max Eastman and Clare Booth Luce, among others.23 Although the committee gathered much testimony and evidence, its credibility suffered from a lack of legal procedure. In 1950, the fourth volume of Winston Churchill's wartime memoirs and history of the Second World War, The Hinge of Fate, was published. Churchill, presumably mindful of British national secrecy and Foreign Office credibility, did not directly declare the Soviets guilty of the Katyn Massacre. He instead candidly stated that General Sikorski had a "wealth of evidence" to support the German accusation against the Soviets and that, in reply, he told Sikorski, "If they are dead nothing you can do will bring them back."24 Discussing the credibility of the 1944 Soviet re-investigation of Katyn and counter-charge that the Nazis killed the Poles, Churchill ruefully commented: This version, to be believed, involves acceptance of the fact that nearly 15,000 Polish officers and men, of whom there was no record since the spring of 1940, passed into German hands in July, 1941, and were later destroyed by the Germans without one single person escaping and reporting, either to the Russian authorities or to a Polish Consul in Russia or to the Underground Movement in Poland. When we remember the confusion caused by the German advance, that the guards of the camps must have fled as the invaders came nearer, and all the contacts afterwards during the period of Russo-Polish co-operation, belief seems an act of faith.25 Even after the war, in the late 1940s, the U.S. State Department (as well as the British Foreign Office) continued to suppress official mention of the Katyn Massacre.26 Nonetheless, interest in Katyn and its significance began grew in the West during the early 1950s. On 18 September 1951 the U.S. House of Representatives unanimously adopted House Resolution 390, which created the "Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation and Study of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre." There were three apparent motives for the resurrected Congressional interest in Katyn. First, Communist atrocities against U.S. prisoners of war in Korea had enraged the American people and were similar in method to the Katyn killings.27 Second, the Epstein-Lane committee's investigation of Katyn had raised national concern and a sense of guilt about America's postwar betrayal of East Europeans. Finally, Democrat Congressmen needed a 1952 election year issue to prove their opposition to Leninist-Stalinist Communism to American voters who had seen the loss of Eastern Europe and China to Communism under Democrat administrations.28 It also gave supportive Republicans a chance to court American voters of East European descent.29 The Katyn hearings began, unexpectedly, on 11 October 1951.30 John J. Mitchell--no relation to Attorney General John Mitchell of the Nixon Administration--was chief counsel. Young lawyer Roman C. Pucinski of Chicago, Illinois, was the committee's chief investigator. Congress-man Ray J. Madden (D--Indiana) was the chairman. Hearings were to be held in Washington DC, Chicago, London, Frankfurt, Berlin, and Naples. The London hearings were held, despite resistance and difficulties presented by the British Foreign Office.31 Scores of witnesses were interviewed, exhibits studied, and depositions taken. Additional revelations had occurred during the hearings. During their investigation, the Germans had brought in captured American and British officers to verify the forensic conclusions. U.S. Army Lieu- tenant Colonel John H. Van Vliet, Jr.--a fourth-generation West Point graduate, Class of 1937--was the senior American prisoner-of-war taken to Katyn by the Germans to witness their investigation. Immediately upon his arrival in Washington, D.C., on 22 May 1945, after his release from German captivity, Van Vliet had filed a personal report with Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Major General Clayton Bissell. Bissell immediately classified the report "Top Secret" and, at Van Vliet's own request, issued him an order not to discuss the report with anyone. Sometime after that, the report vanished--inexplicably.32 The input of the American Army officers was termed "the most significant testimony of the independent witnesses."33 Van Vliet stated that although he hated the Germans, he was convinced of the 1940 killing date by the excellent condition of the victims' boots at the time of their original burial. Personal experience had convinced these American prisoners of war that boots could not survive more than a few months of prison camp life in such fine condition.34 The suppression of Van Vliet's judgement was given larger, strategic implications in the second conclusion of the Committee's Final Report: "In justifying his actions for designating the Van Vliet report "Top Secret," General Bissell said he was merely carrying out the spirit of the Yalta agree-ment.35" and, later, ". . . this committee believes that had the Van Vliet report been made immediately available to the Department of State and to the American public, the course of our governmental policy toward Soviet Russia might have been more realistic with more fortunate postwar results."36 Despite the Committee's efforts, no link could be established between General Marshall and the disappearance of the Van Vliet report. General Bissell's responses to intensive questioning do raise doubts about this, though. After having acknowledged that he classified the report "Top Secret," because it was a potential political bombshell which might wreck U.S.-Soviet relations and disrupt Soviet cooperation in the final military defeat of Japan, General Bissell stated, concerning the report: There is a possibility that I may have mentioned it to General Marshall or to the Secretary [of War]. I have no distinct recollection of having done so, and I don't see much reason why I should have.37 Such studied credulity from a career intelligence officer sorely tested the good faith and patience of his Congressional listeners, and his questioning was the bitterest of the hearings.38 Van Vliet has always supported General Bissell's decision to suppress the report, in consideration of the Soviets' contribution to victory over the Nazis and the overriding need for their pinning of the powerful Japanese forces in Manchuria in 1945.39 However, it is well beyond credence that General Bissell would permanently suppress such a strategically political report on the basis of his own judgement and authority alone, without consulting the political judgement of General Marshall or someone else. In its final report published on 22 December 1952, the Committee concluded, on the basis of all the evidence amassed and "beyond any question of reasonable doubt," that the Soviet NKVD "committed the mass murders of the Polish officers and intellectual leaders in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia." The Committee was "equally certain" that the 11,000 other Polish officers had been similarly murdered by the NKVD elsewhere.40 The relevance to the Korean War was emphasized in the sixth, and final, conclusion of the Committee: 6. This committee began its investigation last year, and as the committee's work progressed, information, documents, and evidence was submitted from all parts of the world. It was at this same time that reports reached the committee of similar atrocities and violations of international law being perpetrated in Korea. This committee noted the striking similarity between crimes committed against the Poles at Katyn and those being inflicted on American and other United Nation troops in Korea. Communist tactics being used in Korea are identical to those followed at Katyn. Thus this committee believes that Congress should undertake an immediate investigation of the Korean war atrocities in order that the evidence can be collected and the truth revealed to the American people and the free peoples of the world.41 American news magazines recorded the progress of the hearings. A photograph used by the magazines was of a hooded witness holding a pistol to the back of the neck of a man whose hands were held behind his back, to describe how the prisoners had been "bound and shot." In an article which pointed out that 6,000 American soldiers were missing in Korea, a Special Committee member was quoted as saying that "Katyn may well have been a blueprint for Korea."42 One typical article, titled "Who Is Guilty of the Katyn Massacre?," appeared in the July 1952 issue of The Readers Digest In this piece, Oxford history professor G.F. Hudson, whose April 1950 scholarly article on Katyn is described in the following chapter, assessed the evidence and pronounced the Soviets guilty of the crime. As to the significance of Katyn, he concluded: No one knows better than the Communist leaders how deeply the truth about this bestial crime can hurt their cause. But the more the Soviet Union obstructs the uncovering of the truth, the more certain it becomes that the men who lie dead in Katyn Forest lie also on the conscience of the Soviet Union.43 Coverage of the Katyn hearings, even the one held in London, was much more circumscribed in Britain. No journal article on this matter was listed at all in the (British) Library Association's Subject Index to Periodicals annual volumes for 1951, 1952, and 1953. The Times of London did publish several small articles, particularly in 1952. One was on 21 April 1952, a week after the London hearing, and was titled, "Katyn Forest Massacre: Alleged Statement by Mr. Stalin's Son." It referred to a Polish emigre's claim that Yakov Stalin had told him that the Polish officers had been "liquidated" and that doing so "was necessary, but that the Russians would do it in a humane way."44 Facts on File covered the development of the Katyn case in the early 1950s. In the 1950 volume, the 18 September 1950 publication of Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's report by the Department of the Army was recorded.45 The 1951 volume recorded the unanimous 18 September 1951 U.S. House of Representatives vote authorizing the hearings.46 The 1952 volume covered the Committee's visit to Europe, the Soviet counter-charges of U.S. germ warfare in Korea, and the acknowledgement (to some Allied officers) of Stalin's responsibility for Katyn by Stalin's own son (Yakov) in a German prisoners-of-war camp. More sensational was Congressman Thaddeus H. Machrowicz's charge that Anglo- American commander (and 1952 Republican Presidential candidate) Dwight D. Eisenhower had ignored reports of Katyn. (Eisenhower was recorded as promptly replying on 29 April 1952 that he had been "fairly busy" with other matters at the time of the political, diplomatic controversy wrought by Katyn.)47 What would be the last coverage of Katyn in Facts on File until 1988 was the report of the Committee's unequivocal findings that the Soviets were responsible for the Katyn Massacre.48 Also interestingly, even though Committee hearings were held in London and throughout Western Europe, the British-published Keesing's Contemporary Archives would continue to omit any mention of Katyn until 1988. After the Congressional hearings and final report, little transpired in the Katyn case. The Soviets and the pro-Soviet Polish government continued to attempt to blame the Germans for the massacre. Under Soviet occupation, the Polish people seethed with hatred and frustration about Katyn and other Soviet atrocities and injustices. In 1956, the Polish people's uprising against a hardline Communist regime was motivated in part by continuing anger about Katyn. In a chapter entitled "Legacy of Hate," Anglo-Polish author Konrad Syrop described in his 1957 book, Spring in October: The Story of the Polish Revolution, 1956, the significance of Katyn for Poles enduring Soviet Cold War domination: The horrible crime at Katyn became a symbol of Polish-Soviet relations. In vain the Russians tried to shift the blame for it on the Germans; they failed to produce any convincing evidence to support this charge and the International War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg made no reference to Katyn in its findings. . . . In any case the responsibility lay in the cruel and ruthless Soviet system, and the mass graves at Katyn containing the bodies of more than four thousand Polish officers strengthened the already existing wall of hatred between Poles and Russians.49 At the moment of the Poles' victory--evidenced by a Soviet agreement to a more moderate Polish leadership--the "insistent" chant, "Katyn! Katyn!" was heard in the streets.50 Also in 1956, the popular, influential book, Deliver Us from Evil, by U.S. Navy doctor Tom Dooley, was published. Dooley chronicled the atrocities inflicted on Vietnamese by Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh Communists during the Communist takeover of North Vietnam in the early 1950s. Dooley described such Viet Minh barbarities as the ripping off of left ears of children of a Catholic province who were caught listening to the "evil words" of the Lord's Prayer.51 Dooley's description of the bungling attempts by an International Control Commission (CIC) to enable refugees to escape safely from the Communist North contained an echo of Katyn. He wrote: Within the CIC committees there arose the same problems that arise in all conference bodies containing representatives of Communism. The Poles seemed determined to be stumbling-blocks and I personally witnessed their obstructive tactics many times. I would take a refugee to the CIC, a refugee who had been horribly beaten up by the Viet Minh. There would be a council meeting. The refugee would tell his story. After hours of wrangling, he would be sent back to the camp. It seemed that the Polish representatives always wanted proof that obviously was unobtainable. Certainly this poor peasant had been beaten--that could not be denied--but what hard-and-fast proof did he have that the bullets which had torn into his arm were Communist bullets? The peasant would have to present something substan-tial in the way of proof, which of course he couldn't do, and not just his maimed body and feeble voice.52 Perhaps a proven ability to rationalize away Communist atrocities against fellow Poles--as in the case of Katyn--uniquely qualified these Polish Communists for their membership in the CIC, to represent Communist interests. In 1960, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities produced for the public record the illustrated booklet, Lest We Forget! A Pictorial Summary of Communism in Action, to remind Americans of the methods of terror practiced by the Soviets. In addition to commentary and photographs of the Ukrainian Famine of the early 1930s, of the starved condition of Polish survivors of Soviet Siberia, and of the political exterminations hastily executed by the NKVD during the 1941 Soviet withdrawal from the Baltic states, Katyn was included with the following comments by the principal author and researcher, Klaus Samuli Gunnar Romppanen: May I call your attention to exhibit No. 49, which is a view of an incident, if we can call it an incident, that the free world has long known but appears to have quickly forgotten. (P. 35.) It is the view of the mass graves in the Katyn Forest, where 4,242 Polish Army officers were murdered, not in armed conflict on the field of battle, but murdered in cold blood because they were not regarded as trustworthy by the Communists.53 In the West, Polish emigre communities observed the anniversary of Katyn. In journal articles and books, a few writers pieced together more testimony and evidence as it became available. The carefully researched book about Katyn which is usually cited as the most credible, scholarly source is Janusz Zawodny's Death in the Forest, published in 1962. In popular reviews, it was well-received. For example, in Saturday Review of Literature reviewer H.C. Wolfe opined: An objective, painstakingly documented report that, unless additional information is revealed some day from Moscow's secret files, will remain the definitive work on the subject. . . . Scrupulously sifting every shred of available evidence from far- flung sources, interviewing numerous survivors of Polish prison camps in Russia, and weaving a tortuous way through tangled wartime politics and propaganda, Dr. Zawodny pieced together a mosaic of facts that shaped themselves into a finger of accusation. . . . The murder victims were . . . the very men who would have provided leadership for postwar Poland. Their loss was tragic both for their families and the new Poland. Dr. Zawodny's findings indict the Kremlin.54 Further discussion of Zawodny's book appears in the following chapter of this study which deals with academic coverage of the issue in the West. In 1962, New York Herald Tribune journalist Seymour Freidin mentioned Katyn in his book, The Forgotten People. Freidin's description of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe included this introductory passage about Poland: The man, now in Britain, was not a Jew. On the cinders of the old Ghetto, however, it was hard to reconcile anti-Semitic feelings with the Polish plight. Under the Germans, they had both suffered as inferior peoples. There also was the concentration camp, Auschwitz, in Poland, which will live forever infamous in man's memories. At the same time, Poles, even the younger ones, never forget that their officer corps was liquidated in the Katyn Forest during the war. "The Russians did it, of course," Polish students have told me repeatedly. "It was the Nazis, but they left a suspicion of doubt," was the way a Polish [Communist] central committee member described the episode to me.55 More significant to the public record was the U.S. Government's 1963 publication of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. III, Diplomatic Papers. These documents revealed that even before the Katyn controversy, U.S. State Department officials had been aware of anti-Polish Soviet activities. Concern about the Soviets breaking off diplomatic relations with the London Polish government had been expressed by General Sikorski, and President Roosevelt had felt moved to send him, on 12 April 1943, a letter reassuring him of American support.56 The Katyn affair, itself, consumed many pages. Its diplomatic repercussions were felt through the summer of 1943. Significant was President Roosevelt's 26 April 1943 telegram to Stalin, wherein he stated, "In my opinion Sikorski has in no way acted with the Hitler gang but instead he has made a mistake in taking up this particular matter with the International Red Cross."57 Russia at War: 1941-1945, by wartime Moscow correspondent Alexan- der Werth, was published in 1964. Werth clearly indicated his opinion that it was "more than probable, if not absolutely certain" that the Soviets had been responsible for Katyn. Werth was strongly sympathetic to the wartime suffering of the peoples of the Soviet Union, and his verdict about Katyn carried considerable weight.58 In 1965, an English translation of the 1948 book, The Crime of Katyn: Facts and Documents, was published in London by the Polish Cultural Foundation. The 1948 preface and 1965 foreword were both written by General Anders. In careful detail, the book reviewed the sequence of events and evaluates the evidence of the German and Russian investigative commissions. It contained first-person testimonies, including that of one Ivan Krivozertzev, a local Katyn resident who had worked as a laborer for the occupying Germans. Krivozertzev first drew the Germans' attention to the Polish graves, in 1943. He later fled the returning Soviets and in Autumn 1946 finally arrived in Ancona, Italy, at Polish 2nd Army Corps headquarters, where he reported his experience. (In 1947, he was found hanged in a barn outside a "displaced persons"-- refugee--camp in Britain.)59 The 1965 edition of The Crime of Katyn includes material not in the 1948 version. For example, the testimony from U. S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet during the Congressional committee hearings is mentioned. In 1971 there appeared Khrushchev Remembers, the first volume of the memoirs of post-Stalin Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev. Although Khrushchev refrained from any mention of Katyn, a prefatory note by Sovietologist Edward Crankshaw to the "Advance into Poland" subchapter mentioned the NKVD's killing of the Poles at Katyn and the deportation of hundreds of thousands of Polish people to Siberia.60 A veritable crusader on the issue of Katyn was Louis Fitzgibbon, who had a number of books published in the 1970s bringing forth the contemporary evidence accumulated. In 1971, his book Katyn presented some of the most graphic and compelling evidence of Soviet guilt. While he acknowledged the Western Allies' reluctance to embarrass their Soviet ally with an inquest about Katyn during the war, Fitzgibbon's comment on the postwar silence in the West reflected the Soviets' continuing, extreme sensitivity to the issue: After the war Russia greatly increased its strength, its territorial possessions and its potential danger to the other powers in Europe. It would have seemed, and still does appear, imprudent to irritate or provoke so powerful a country, and further mention of Katyn would have done just that. So a conspiracy of silence descended on the matter, and various efforts, presented as appendices to this book, have failed to produce a clear and positive international proclamation of the truth.61 In 1972, British Foreign Office records declassified (after the standard thirty-year waiting period) included wartime British Ambassador to Poland Owen O'Malley's secret report on Katyn. This resulted in a Time magazine article titled, "Poland: Death in Katyn Forest," describing the moral significance of the Western Allies' wartime coverup of the Soviets' killings.62 Also in 1972, journalist Louis Fischer's new book, The Road to Yalta, devoted an entire chapter to Katyn, "Murder in the Forest."63 Fischer left no doubt about his conviction that Stalin was guilty of the crime. This is especially significant, since Fischer was a respected Sovietologist who had been sympathetic to Stalinism in his reporting as a correspondent in Moscow during the 1930s and the early part of the war. Along with New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty, Fischer was later accused of having had omitted reports of the Ukrainian Famine in the early 1930s, to maintain his favored status with the Soviet regime.64 Two books by Soviet emigres appeared in 1972, as well. Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars was written by Peter Deriabin, a former NKVD counterintelligence officer. Deriabin mentioned Katyn, in the context of the wholesale deportations and exterminations of Poles in 1940-41. However, he used the inaccurate Nazi figure of 10,000 as the toll of victims at Katyn.65 Boris Levytsky, who dedicated his book--The Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Police, 1917-1970--to his liquidated parents and brothers, murdered by the Soviets, did not mention Katyn, even though he did describe the incarceration, suffering, and eventual release (of some) of the Polish deportees. One interesting postwar development--viewed by some commentators as an example of how far the Soviets would go in their attempts to blot out the memory of Katyn--was the erection of the Soviet war memorial at "Khatyn," to 149 Russian villagers massacred by Nazi German troops in Spring 1943--the same time of the announcement of Katyn by the Germans.66 This was chronicled in (the 1983 English translation of) the 1978 edition of The Great Soviet Encyclopedia. The "Khatyn" article gave the opening date of the "complex" as 5 July 1969. Its centerpiece statue, "The Defiant Man," won a Lenin Prize in 1970.67 There was, of course, no mention of Katyn--as a geographical place or even as the site of a "fascist atrocity"--in the Encyclopedia. In 1974, U. S. President Richard M. Nixon--attempting to salvage his tottering presidency with a collegial visit to Soviet leader Brezhnev at Minsk--visited the Soviet Khatyn memorial and obligingly refrained from any mention of Katyn, on up the road to Moscow, which could have embarrassed his hosts and hampered continued progress toward detente. Nonetheless, and to its credit, the New York Times felt constrained to point out the difference in a separate article.68 Of the hundreds of villages massacred by the Nazis, it was suspicious that the Soviets chose one having a name so similar to Katyn for their memorial. In 1987, the accusation was made that "Khatyn" was, in part, "an Orwellian memory hole" intended to disinform the Western tourists and peace activists taken to it by their Soviet guides.69 In September 1976, the erection of a Katyn memorial in London was boycotted by the British government, because it had the inscription, "Katyn, 1940," indicating Soviet guilt. The British weekly, The Economist, acidly observed, "Last week the British foreign office made a diplomatic but ill-judged and unsuccessful attempt to protect the reputation of Joseph Stalin."70 An accompanying article indicated The Economist's own opinion with the title, "Almost Certainly by Russia."71 Even the Royal British Legion, a veterans' organization, was refused permission to send a bugler, until protests by a "Mr. Winston Churchill MP"--the former Prime Minister's grandson--proved compelling.72 Katyn became an issue of controversy again during 1980. In the Gdansk shipyards, according to British journalist Timothy Garton Ash, its mention epitomized and steeled the uncompromising anger which produced Polish Solidarity.73 A Solidarity monument to Katyn, speci- fying the date of the killings as 1940--and, therefore, the guilt for it being the Soviets'--was raised in Warsaw and then torn down by the Polish Communist government.74 Indeed, the Soviet massacre of the Polish leadership in 1940--of which Katyn was only one instance, albeit the best known--was the crime which underlay and made illegitimate Poland's Soviet-installed Communist government. Katyn's memory (or, worse yet, any Soviet admission of it) was a direct threat to that government's continued existence. Realizing this, an earlier Polish leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, had once even declined Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's offer to admit Soviet responsibility for Katyn.75 Katyn was the "Achilles Heel" of Soviet domination of Poland, and control of Poland was the keystone of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.76 The 1982 book, Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, by former Polish Army counterintelligence officer Michael Checinski, described the postwar persecution of Jews by the Polish Communist regime and by anti-Communist rebels who held Jews responsible for the Communist takeover. Checinski estimated that the takeover cost as many as 100,000 lives, and that 8,000 pro-Communists--about 20 per cent of whom were innocent Jews--were killed in return or revenge.77 As to the reset- tlement of some of the lands Poland lost to the Soviet Union, Checinski wrote: True to the Stalinist doctrine of collective guilt and organized genocide, over 150,000 civilian Ukrainians were forcibly deported from their land and "resettled" in the Recovered Territories in western and northern Poland. During this "resettlement action," known as "Operation Wisla," thousands of children, women, and old people were killed, sometimes being burned alive in their villages.78 In his only reference to Katyn, Checinski wrote that the Polish Army officer corps had been so decimated by Katyn and postwar Stalinist purges, that "some 15,000 Soviet officers, including at least 40 generals, served in the Polish armed forces."79 The coincidence of that number with the military toll of Stalin's Spring 1940 massacres of Polish officers at Katyn and elsewhere is noteworthy. Nonetheless, the Polish people nurtured the memory of Katyn. On pages 166-67 of the 1982 picture book, Portrait of Poland, there was a photograph with the caption, `Poland is not yet lost . . .'--the first line of the national anthem stands over the patch of grass in the Warsaw municipal (and formerly military) cemetery which in 1981 was spontaneously made into an unofficial memorial to the victims of the Katyn massacre. A cross that was set up here was removed overnight by the secret police, and the Mayor of Warsaw thereupon issued a public appeal for donations to institute an official memorial. The bodies of more than 4000 Polish officers were found in 1943 in a mass forest grave at Katyn (now in Soviet territory). [Actually, Katyn has always been in Russian-Soviet territory.] The officers had been captured by Soviet forces when they occupied Eastern Poland in October 1939, and the Russians stand accused of the massacre; but they have never, even in periods of de-Stalinization, acknowledged responsibility. The Poles have not forgotten.80 In August 1982 some Scandinavian peace marchers, who were sympathe- tic to the Polish Solidarity movement, had the moral courage to boycott the Soviet "Khatyn" memorial, citing "unanswered questions" regarding Katyn. This enraged their Soviet hosts, including propagandist Yuri Zhukov, who accused the Scandinavian peace group of containing "Nazi sympathizers" who had instigated the boycott.81 Typically, though, American visitors were more naive and pliant. An example of this was a 1984 account of a visit to the Soviet memorial at Khatyn, by Reverend James O. Watkins Jr. of the Presbyterian Peace- making Program.82 Subsequently informed about Katyn and requested to distinguish between the two placenames in his "Peace Notes" column, he only did so under considerable political pressure. In the 1984 book Fearful Warriors, author Ralph K. White bewailed the probability of thermonuclear war and had challenged the motives and mindsets of the opposing Western and Eastern blocs, much as English author A.A. Milne had done in his book Peace with Honour, in the 1930s. After beginning the book with a chapter entitled "Empathizing with the Soviet Government," White rendered his version of a comparative history of the East-West conflict. Although he mentioned the border dispute between the London Polish government and the Soviets, he omitted any mention of Soviet guilt for the Katyn Massacre or of Soviet inaction during the Warsaw Uprising being two of the early causes of anti-Soviet feeling in the West.83 However, the Poles were carefully escalating their opposition to the Soviets, and in 1985 Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev agreed to respond to some Polish concerns, in an attempt to defuse the anti-Soviet rancor. During a meeting with Polish First Secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski, Gorbachev agreed to set up a joint Russo-Polish historical commission to examine what Solidarity leaders had called the "blank spots" of their two nations' mutual histories. Items to be studied included Stalin's 1938 extermination of the Polish Communist Party leaders, the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact which eliminated Poland, mass deportations of Poles to Siberia and other regions of the Soviet Union in 1939-40, and the Red Army's failure to relieve the siege of Warsaw in August 1944. The blank spot initially considered too sensitive to examine was Katyn.84 This ill-advised omission only infuriated the Poles. Finally, in March 1988, one member of the Polish national political assembly, the Seym, even had the audacity to break the taboo against the use of the word "Katyn." Even more explosively, Ryszard Bender raised the Katyn issue as a test of "Glasnost"--Soviet leader Gorbachev's new policy of openness--demanding to know, in regard to the unknown fate of the other Polish officers, "Where are their graves? Do we have `glasnost' or not?"85 Bender specifically stated that the truth about the Katyn Massacre had to be divulged before Poland and the Soviet Union could have genuinely friendly relations.86 Meanwhile, in February 1988, fifty-nine prominent Polish dissidents had submitted a letter to the principal Soviet press agencies, demanding an open Russo-Polish investigation of Katyn and the truth.87 At the same time, Soviet members of the historical commission became noticeably more intractable on the issue of Katyn. Responding to its people, and to the heat of their outrage, the Polish government stopped blaming the Germans for Katyn in March 1988.88 At the Poles' instigation, Katyn became a formal agenda item for the "blank spots" commission. Polish commission members simply demanded more documents from the Soviets about the Polish officers and cadets who had been in their care. The Katyn issue had now become the "blank spots" commission's most important issue.89 On his June 1988 visit to the Soviet Union, Polish Cardinal Glemp emphasized the importance of the truth about Katyn to Russo-Polish relations. As RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior analyst, Thomas S. Szayna, commented: In doing so, he cut to the very heart of the matter: as horrible as the massacre was, it was not so much the event as the deceit, the lies, and the official falsification of history surrounding it that caused Polish bitterness toward the Russians.90 The book Katyn Killings: In the Record, by U.S. Marine officer John H. Lauck, appeared in 1988. This was largely a compilation of facts and documents which had been previously published, particularly pertinent excerpts from the Congressional hearings.91 The issue of Katyn was so powerful and compelling that it could be utilized as a potent political weapon even by an individual citizen. This was demonstrated when I used it to temper the anti-military, pro- Soviet fervor in Alaska in 1988. On 21 April 1988, the very day before the arrival in Juneau of longtime Gorbachev friend and "glasnost" spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, the Juneau Empire published my article, "Sunday, April 24th: A Day to Remember Katyn." Basically, I asked my fellow Alaskans to pause to consider that despite Soviet promises of good will and good faith--epitomized by the "Glasnost" concept of openness--the Soviets still had not admitted their responsibility for Katyn.92 The article was well received and, with local support, Alaska Governor Steve Cowper--a Democrat--responded by issuing his back-dated 1 April 1988 executive proclamation making 30 April 1988 "A Day to Remember Katyn" in Alaska.93 Chicago Alderman Roman Pucinski called Governor Cowper to express his thanks. (Copies of both the article and proclamation followed Mr. Gerasimov back to Moscow.) One method used by some journalists and intellectuals in the West to dispute Katyn and other examples of Communist exterminations--thus assisting the coverup of such atrocities--was to demand unnecessarily high standards of proof. Typical of "experts" who have rationalized their denial of the extent of Stalin's crimes is Alexander Cockburn. In his 3 March 1989 New Statesman and Society article, "Purging Stalin," Cockburn mocked Russian historian Roy Medvedev's claim that 20 million people died in Stalin's purges and exterminations. Cockburn contrasted that with revisionist historians' claims that the dead from collectivi- zation were as few as 3.5 million--half the conservative figure--and vaguely surmised that an estimate of "tens of thousands" of 1930s political purge victims (which he attributed to George Kennan), rather than (many) more than a million, was "quite conceivable, maybe even probable." While Cockburn attempted to trivialize the importance of total numbers, he also claimed "Evil though he was, Stalin did not plan or seek to accomplish genocide, and to say that he and Hitler had the same project in mind (or as right-wing German historians now argue, that somehow Lenin and Stalin put Hitler up to it) is to do disservice to history and truth." Cockburn specifically attacked the contention of "Bukhtain" [sic]--Bukharin--biographer Stephen Cohen that "Judged only by the number of victims, and leaving aside important differences between the two regimes, Stalinism created a holocaust greater than Hitler's."94 What is at stake is the still-significant question of whether or not mass murder on the basis of race or nationality--the classic definition of genocide--has killed significantly more people in this century than mass murder on the basis of political correctness. For example, more people were murdered in Cambodia by their own fanatically Maoist-Communist Khmer Rouge countrymen than have been murdered by the ethnic strife in what was Yugoslavia--so far. Cockburn's own working figure is reflected in his statement "The task is obviously to arrive at truth, but many such estimates evidently have a regulatory ideological function with an exponential momentum so great that now any computation that does not soar past ten million is somehow taken as evidence of being soft on Stalin."95 Nevertheless, Soviet leader Gorbachev still refrained from mention- ing Katyn, as hoped, during his July 1988 visit to Poland. Gorbachev's own position in the Soviet Union could have been jeopardized by a premature concession of the truth about Katyn, now--finally--recognized as a pivotal act of Soviet terror.96 Evidence of Soviet guilt continued to accumulate, inside and outside the commission. In September 1988, the U. S. government disturbed its silence on Katyn when the National Endowment for the Humanities agreed to fund a printing of a translation into Polish of Janusz K. Zawodny's book, Death in the Forest--for mass, covert distribution within Poland, apparently.97 Eventually, international media pressure on Jaruzelski and Gorbachev proved overwhelming. In February 1989 the official Polish weekly magazine, Odrodzenie, published evidence of Soviet guilt in an article titled, "Report from Katyn: The Confidential Report of the Polish Red Cross," and early in March 1989 the Polish government publicly blamed the Soviet Union for the massacre.98 Once again, Katyn had again become a public issue in the West. In addition to coverage by the larger newspapers, small town papers were running articles about it. The Macomb Journal published the Associated Press article, "Historian: Soviets behind Massacre," on 22 August 1989. The article quoted Polish co-chairman of the Polish-Soviet "blank spots" historical commission, Jarema Maciszewski, officially stating there was "no doubt" the Soviets were responsible for Katyn.99 By summer 1989, even Soviet officials were beginning to acknow- ledge, unofficially, Stalin's responsibility for Katyn. In March 1990, The Moscow News quoted Soviet historian Natalya Lebedeva's findings that all 15,131 Polish officers and cadets had been executed by the NKVD between April and May 1940. She also stated the apparent motives. She cited Stalin's longstanding grudge toward the Polish officer caste that had defeated the Bolsheviks in 1920. She further noted the intent to erase Poland as a nation. Finally, she discovered that the Soviets also needed the detention camps to house leadership-class prisoners of the newly occupied Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.100 In early April 1990, in a "Special Report," the May 1990 issue of the internationally circulated Reader's Digest had another article on Katyn, concluding with a call to Soviet President Gorbachev to acknow- ledge Soviet responsibility and express his regret. The article included a map and color illustrations, with one drawing graphically depicting a bespectacled Soviet executioner pointing his pistol at the back of the head of a bound and hooded prisoner kneeling at the edge of a corpse-filled pit.101 Also in April 1990, U.S. Senator Allen Cranston's role in the Office of War Information's wartime suppression of the facts of the Katyn Massacre was detailed in the conservative political magazine, The American Spectator.102 (Under attack for a number of reasons, including the savings and loan scandal, Cranston did not run for re-election in 1992.) Finally, on 13 April 1990, President Gorbachev handed over to Polish President Jaruzelski some indirectly incriminating NKVD documents and officially acknowledged Stalin's responsibility for the Katyn Massacre with an expression of regret.103 After fifty years of Soviet denial, stonewalling, and disinformation, the historical truth of the Katyn Massacre had finally won out--but not completely. While Soviet credibility recovered a bit, with Gorbachev's revela- tion, the British Foreign Office was severely criticized by reporters for its complicity in the Katyn coverup. In the 15 April 1990 Sunday Times, the well-respected Oxford historian Norman Stone emphasized the central importance of Katyn by titling his article, "Katyn: The Heart of Stalin's Darkness," and stating, "Katyn . . . became the greatest symbol of Polish-Soviet enmity."104 In the 23 April 1990 Times, columnist Bernard Levin's article, "Britain's Complicity in a Chronicle of Shame," censured Foreign Office handling of Katyn during and after the Second World War. Levin charac- terized that handling as "giving off each time a stink of appeasement that could make a hippopotamus retch half a mile upwind." Wrote Levin: I have not the smallest doubt that the FCO is at this moment urging the Foreign Secretary to say nothing on the subject; after all, Kaganovich, the very last of Stalin's closest entourage, is still alive at the age of 98, and he might be greatly offended.105 Late in 1991, a popular, but well-documented account of the effect of Katyn on three Polish families, Katyn: the Untold Story of Stalin's Polish Massacre, was published. Author Allen Paul produced a well- researched account of the massacre and of its manifold implications. Commenting on the diplomatic rift directly caused by Katyn, Paul wrote: Both men [Churchill and Roosevelt] were accustomed to constant quarreling between the Poles and the Soviets, but neither expected a rupture. Its timing was particularly disturbing. The war had barely taken a favorable turn and dangerous distractions were to be avoided at all cost. The Soviet break with the Poles was the first such rift within the United Nations and had the potential to cause great embarrassment. The war effort might suffer.106 Paul also attempted to expand public understanding of the significance of Katyn: This book is an attempt to present the crime in a complete context. To do that, the murders must be examined as part of a massive effort to Sovietize Poland. The executions at Katyn came to symbolize that effort in all its horrible consequences, for two reasons. First, the Katyn murders were the most dramatic and clear-cut example of the brutal methods Stalin used to eliminate Poland's educated class; . . . . Second, Stalin cleverly manipulated the circumstances in which the Katyn murders were finally discovered in 1943 to deal the legitimate government of Poland a lethal blow. . . . Katyn thus became a complex symbol of Polish suffering at the hands of Stalin. Existing work on the subject does not, in my view, approach the crime in this manner.107 The 6 October 1991 issue of the London Observer contained a lengthy feature article by journalist Nicholas Bethell, titled "The Cold Killers of Kalinin." It described NKVD execution methods at the final killing site identified: Kalinin--previously, and now again, named "Tver"--to the northwest of Moscow.108 (In his 1993 book, Vladimir Abarinov specified the site as "Mednoye near Tver."109) Bethell's article also described Red Army investigators' efforts to interrogate the surviving NKVD commanders and executioners responsible. That Katyn remained a delicate, explosive issue for the Polish people was a fact apparent from the May 1992 public outcry in Poland at the omission of any mention of Stalinist crimes against the Poles and Poland, discovered in the draft of a Russian-Polish friendship treaty. The 22 May 1992 New York Times article reporting the uproar to Western readers described the essence of the debate between Poles who do not want the grim Russo-Polish past forgotten and other Poles who want a new beginning in Russo-Polish relations.110 The book Truman was published in 1992 and was authored by American historian David McCullough. McCullough quoted the opinions of others, regarding Truman's performance at the Potsdam Conference in July-August 1945: . . . Kennan, who was not present at Potsdam, would later despair over Truman's naivete. Harriman, who was present throughout, found himself so shut out of serious discussions by Byrnes that he decided it was time for him to resign.111 As to Katyn, McCullough described the episode where Truman had raised the question of what had happened to the Polish officers, Stalin had icily replied, "They went away." McCullough then wrote: Still--still--Truman liked him. "I like Stalin. He is straightforward," he wrote to Bess near the windup of the conference. Stalin could be depended upon to keep his word, he would later tell his White House staff. "The President," wrote Eben Ayers, "seemed to have been favorably impressed with him and to like him." Stalin was a fine man who wanted to do the right thing, Truman would tell Henry Wallace. Furthermore, Truman was pretty sure Stalin liked him. To Jonathan Daniels, Truman would say he had been reminded of [Kansas City, MO, political boss] Tom Pendergast. "Stalin was as near like Tom Pendergast as any man I know."112 British journalist Mark Frankland's book, The Patriots' Revolution: How Eastern Europe Toppled Communism and Won Its Freedom, was published in 1992. Katyn was mentioned most poignantly in reference to an invita- tion extended by Poland's last Communist Prime Minister: . . . The Communists' contribution to the resistance, the Armia Ludowa (People's Army), had been puny by comparison. For many Poles the Communists were usurpers who could never be forgiven, and the bitterness scarcely faded over the years as was shown in early 1989 when Poland's last Communist Prime Minister, Miecz-slaw Rakowski, invited a ninety-eight-year-old hero, General Stanislaw Maczek, to return to Poland from exile in Britain to attend ceremonies marking the fiftieth anniversary of the war's outbreak. Maczek and others like him who had fought on the Western side in the war had been pronounced traitors by the post-war Polish Government. The General had been wronged, Rakowski now wrote in his letter, but he himself had always considered Maczek "a paragon of a patriot and a soldier." If he came back he would be greeted "with all due reverence, as a national hero." The old soldier's family declined politely. "What did Rakowski expect? A general fraternisation? It's impossible," was the comment of Jozef Czapski, who as a survivor and then researcher of the long-denied Soviet massacre of Polish officers at Katyn was an authority on truth that is told too late.113 Later in the book, Frankland noted Poles' disappointment in "Gorbachev's avoidance of the matters that interested Poles, above all the Soviet NKVD's massacre of the Polish officer corps at Katyn, . . ." during his July 1988 visit to Poland.114 Still missing was any actual document, signed by Stalin (or Beria), which directly authorized the killings of the Polish officers. It was not until 15 October 1992 that this was discovered. At that time, Russian President Boris Yeltsin took over the office buildings which former Soviet President Gorbachev's "foundation" had been allowed to use after his departure from office. Documents embarrassing to Soviet Communism, including Stalin's 1940 approval of the extermination of "20,000" Polish officers and officials in Soviet internment camps like Katyn, were found.115 Again, Katyn's power as a political weapon was demonstrated: According to [Russian presidential spokesman Vyacheslav] Kostikov, Mikhail Gorbachev has long known about the real organizers and instigators of the tragedy. Kostikov said that the Sixth Division of the Central Committee archives, which held documents relating to the Katyn tragedy, had become Gorbachev's personal archive. But Gorbachev kept silent and thus helped delude public opinion. Moreover, Kostikov quoted some papers of recent years, including the ordinance of the Soviet President of March 3, 1990, in which he instructed the Procurator General's office and the K.G.B. to continue investigations although he knew where all the archival documents were kept and what was in them.116 A 26 October 1992 Newsweek article amplified the importance of these final revelations about Katyn: But that was what made the lie about Katyn all the more infuri- ating: the authorities insisted on it while knowing perfectly well that no one believed them. As Vaclav Havel spelled out in his early dissident essays, the communist system was based on lies that did not have to be believed, so long as people felt compelled to participate in public rituals that affirmed accep-tance of those lies. It is no exaggeration to say that Eastern Europeans liberated themselves once they summoned the courage to proclaim historical truths in public as well as private.117 Concluding, author Andrew Nagorski quoted a Czech emigre's gloomy observation that ultimately everyone lets everything be forgotten. Nagorski, in contrast, quoted a poem by Polish emigre poet, Czeslaw Milosz: You who wronged a simple man Bursting into laughter at the crime, Do not feel safe. The poet remembers. You can kill one, but another is born. The words are written down, the deed, the date. It was all there last week--the deed, the date. For Poles and everyone else who fought against the system of lies, this was the ultimate moral victory.118 As 1992 drew to a close, Katyn continued to make headlines, and finally in Russia itself. The Constitutional Court, judging (among other things) whether or not the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) committed sins so grave as to deny it eligibility for political participation in the new Russian state, was examining the alleged coverup of Katyn by former Soviet Communist President Gorbachev.119 In her January 1993 article, Radio Free Europe analyst Louisa Vinton made a number of observations on the contemporary significance of Katyn: For Poles, Katyn thus became what Polish President Lech Walesa has called a "test of truth," a measure of Soviet willingness to respect Polish sovereignty. In the years after Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of power as the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), it became an international litmus test for his policies of glasnost and perestroika. Without an unequivocal admission of Soviet responsibility for Katyn, Gorbachev's efforts to fill in the "blank spots" in the history of relations between the two countries remained little more than hollow declarations. Gorbachev's eventual acceptance of Soviet responsibility for Katyn--in April 1990--came only after the communist system had collapsed in Poland, and thus after the admission had lost much of its political relevance. Moreover, Gorbachev's was only a partial admission that limited blame to the NKVD. The official admission of the communist party's responsibility had to wait two years.120 Citing the approving signatures of Stalin, Voroshilov, Molotov, and Mikoyan on the first page of the memorandum from Beria which proposed the extermination of the Poles--actually, 25,700 in number--Vinton echoed the Yeltsin government's accusation that the true guilt lay not just with Stalin and his henchman, Beria, but with the Soviet hierarchy and system itself.121 Russian President Boris Yeltsin had accused Com- munist leader and former President Gorbachev of concealing the memoran- dum to conceal the responsibility of the CPSU for the Katyn killings. This accusation seems unfair and overeager. Any Politburo member refusing to sign the memorandum could have confidently expected to have been "liquidated" by Stalin. Katyn was the actual responsibility of Stalin and Beria--the partnership which produced "Stalinism" at its homicidal worst--alone. A more relevant accusation or question might be about whether or not Stalinism itself is an inevitable culmination of Marxist-Leninism. Vinton drew further analogies to contemporary affairs: What made the Katyn massacre so horrifying was not simply the total loss of life but what the killings revealed about the nature of Soviet policy toward Poland. The 1940 documents offer further evidence to support the theory that Stalin was, to use contemporary terminology, engaging in a combination of "ethnic cleansing" and "class cleansing." The object of this policy was to dispose physically of an entire elite dedicated to the reemergence of an independent Polish state. . . . Moreover, only the Poles among the 18,632 prisoners of various nationali-ties in Poland's occupied Eastern territories were marked for death.122 As to the history of the Katyn issue and the question of Soviet guilt, Vinton claimed (questionably), "It is important to note that the facts of the case were indisputable as early as 1943; the truth was accessible to anyone willing to contemplate the possibility of Soviet guilt." Vinton then described reports indicating that the NKVD's individual personal files of the Poles exterminated in Spring 1940 were apparently destroyed by the KGB in late 1959 with Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's permission.123 Vinton asserted that the recently released documents, concerning Katyn, were significant because they portrayed the breakdown of the Katyn coverup and the desperate, defensive political maneuvering of the Gorbachev government. She described a futile Soviet effort to transform Katyn into an "archival"--academic--question, rather than to allow it to continue to grow out of control as an emotionally charged political issue. The Soviet moves were transparent to the Polish people and actually only aggravated Polish outrage.124 While such Polish unrest and impudence would have been ruthlessly suppressed by Stalin--and possibly even by Khrushchev or Brezhnev, at that advanced stage--Vinton noted that "Gorbachev's passive acceptance of Poland's transformation did indeed represent a major departure in Soviet policy."125 She then went on to quote selections from a 6 March 1989 report by Soviet Communist Party International Department chief, Valentin Falin: The Katyn problem has grown more acute. A majority of Poles is certain that the death of the Polish officers came at the hands of Stalin and Beria and that the crime itself was committed in 1940. . . .126 Also concerned that an emotional issue like Katyn could become a personal threat to the members of the Polish Communist Party, Falin specifically stated, "The problem nonetheless remains. In the event of a further complication of the domestic political situation in Poland, the Katyn problem could become a pretext for settling accounts."127 Vinton also described a 22 March 1989 report co-authored by a special CPSU Central Committee subcommittee on Katyn composed of Falin, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov. Their joint recommendation was to reconsider the usefulness of the Katyn coverup, in view of the worldwide knowledge of Soviet guilt. As to the importance of the Katyn issue in that spring of 1989, they wrote: The Katyn topic is now artificially forcing into the back- ground even questions associated with the outbreak of World War II and the German attack on Poland. The subtext of the campaign is obvious--to suggest to the Poles that the Soviet is not better, and perhaps even worse, than the Germany of the time; that it has no less responsibility [than Nazi Germany] for the outbreak of the war and even for the military defeat of the Polish state of the time.128 The committee members then outlined a schedule of half-truths and semi-revelations to acknowledge indirectly Soviet guilt for Katyn and to slow down the pace and intensity of the issue. These phases went into action in early 1990, so that Gorbachev could acknowledge the basic truth of Katyn on its fiftieth anniversary, in April 1990. However, Vinton then described how in Summer 1992 an information "leak" from members of the Russian Memorial Association (serving as experts in the Russian Constitutional Court's hearings on the CPSU) discovered evidence of Politburo Resolution 144 of 5 March 1940, which was the document that directly sealed the fate of the Polish officers.129 Vinton concluded her article by noting the growing importance of Katyn to the Russian people's own efforts to face a terrible past: In contrast to his predecessors, Yeltsin had understood that revealing the full truth about the criminal nature of communism [with the example of Katyn] was essential in order to keep moving forward and forestall nostalgia for the past. "The truth about Katyn and the concept of reformed socialism are incompatible," Walesa said.130 Also published in 1993 was the English translation of a 1991 Russian book by Literaturnaya Gazeta special correspondent Vladimir Abarinov, The Murderers of Katyn. Abarinov's chronicle of the Katyn killings from the perspective of the Soviet NKVD was based on his research of Soviet archives. His book included the sensational allegation that U.S. State Department functionary Alger Hiss was "the Soviet agent" who "lost" Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet's report.131 In contrast, the memoirs of Reagan Administration Secretary of State, George P. Shultz, published in 1993, include no mention of the significance of Katyn in the breakdown of Soviet control over Poland and Eastern Europe generally. The omission is inexplicable.132 Katyn-related articles continued in the public press with Bernard Levin's 13 April 1993 follow-up article in the Times of London, "Stalin's Authorised Massacre." Levin hammered home the significance of Katyn's reflection of flawed Western institutions: The British Foreign Office had had sufficient evidence of the truth since 1943, and possessed conclusive proof by 1952. But the traitors there (what, you thought Philby, Burgess and Maclean were the only ones, you dear sweet innocents?) sat tight, and as decade followed decade, and the baton was handed on, the story and the mendacity marched shoulder to shoulder, saying every time: there is insufficient evidence to decide the matter. True, 25,421 murders are nothing when put beside Stalin's hecatombs, which ran into many millions, but somehow this crime stands out from the rest; it was so cold-blooded and so wicked, and so ghastly were the words used to order the massacre. Some time ago, I told in detail the infinitely shameful story of how both Tory and Labour governments, together with the Church of England, conspired to stifle the truth, and to prevent any commemoration of the 25,421 Poles slaughtered by the communists. . . . Then, when Gorbachev admitted the truth, claiming that he had just discovered it (he had known it since 1970), the Foreign Office told its most monstrous, final lie, in these words: "We have long called for everyone to be open about this incident. We therefore now welcome the revelations from Moscow." (Yes, they did call the slaughter of 25,421 innocent men "this incident.")133 The subtitle to Levin's article, "History Will Not Believe That Men of Our Century Could Organise Mass Murder in Cold Blood as the Russians Did at Katyn," seems fanciful, considering the many other, graver holocausts of this century. In that same month, there was an article in Time magazine about the discovery of a North Vietnamese report in Communist Party archives in Moscow, which indicated that more than 600 American POWs had disappeared while in North Vietnamese custody. The similarity to Katyn was noted: When news of the report's discovery broke last week, several old Vietnam hands, including former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezin- ski, said they were impressed with its apparent authenticity. Brzezinski went even further, publicly speculating that the Vietnamese were guilty of a massacre similar to the infamous execution of 4,500 Polish officers by the Soviet secret police in the Katyn Forest in 1940.134 Finally, there appeared in the 26 August 1993 New York Times a photograph of Russian President Boris Yeltsin kneeling before a Polish priest and kissing the ribbon of the wreath he had lain at the foot of the Katyn Cross in Warsaw. According to the accompanying article, Yeltsin and Polish President Walesa issued a joint statement pledging that the perpetrators of Katyn would be punished and that families of the victims would receive compensation.135 As to any news summary coverage since 1952, only the final, recent developments of the case of Katyn have been covered. In 1988, thirty- five years after the last coverage of Katyn during the Congressional hearings, Facts on File noted the significance of Gorbachev's refusal to acknowledge Katyn during his visit to Poland of that year.136 In 1989, it reported the Polish government's accusation that Stalin was respon- sible for the crime.137 In 1990, it described the Soviet government's admission and expression of regret for Stalin's massacre of the Poles, and it included the discovery of the second mass grave in a forest outside Kharkov.138 The 1991 volume of Facts on File described the article in the British newspaper Observer about the executioners of Kalinin, the third killing site to be identified.139 In 1992, there was an article about Russian President Yeltsin's release of Stalin's Katyn execution order. Significantly, it was titled "Polish Genocide Orders Revealed."140 Most recently, in 1993, Facts on File described Yeltsin's visit to the Katyn Memorial in Warsaw and his laying of the memorial wreath as "a symbolic gesture of Russian penance."141 In Britain, Keesing's Contemporary Archives also resumed its coverage of Katyn in 1988, with coverage of the Russo-Polish historical commission's treatment of Katyn. In the case of Keesing's, the gap of coverage of Katyn had been forty-five years. The article gave the wrong number of victims at Katyn. The most controversial matter to be investigated was the massacre at Katyn Forest near the Soviet city of Smolensk, where more than 14,000 [sic] Polish officers were executed and buried in many graves, apparently by their Soviet captors in 1940.142 In 1989, Keesing's reported the Polish government's official accusation of Soviet NKVD guilt and, in 1990, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's acknowledgement of Stalin's responsibility for the execu- tions.143 Ironically, there is no mention of Katyn--not even of the historically important Observer article published in Britain--in Keesing's in 1991. However, the 1992 Keesing's, described Polish President Lech Walesa's visit to the Katyn shrine, while he was in Russia in May, and the October release of the Katyn execution order bearing Stalin's signature.144 The sparseness of coverage of Katyn by these news summaries, Facts on File and Keesing's, in the intervening years typified most Western journalists' general lack of understanding of Katyn and its political and historical significance, until the 1980s when the Polish people themselves would no longer accept the lies about Katyn, and its coverup. In retrospect, though, special mention should be given to the reporters and editors of The New York Times. While the newspapers of Chicago, Detroit, and other major cities with a large Polish-American population could be expected to publish articles about Katyn periodi- cally, The New York Times has long been the newspaper of national record in America. From 1974 on, it consistently published significant articles about Katyn, in contrast to its rival, The Washington Post. CHAPTER 4. KATYN AS AN HISTORICAL AND SCHOLARLY ISSUE IN THE WEST The consideration of the Katyn Massacre as an intellectual and scholarly issue in the West is important for three reasons. First, it raises serious questions about the integrity and effectiveness of intellectual and scholarly discourse and institutions in the United States and Great Britain. Indeed, in their sympathy toward Soviet "social engineering" some Western intellectuals became virtual accessories to Soviet genocide.1 To quote Vladislav Krasnov, Regardless of whether Stalin was a true Marxist-Leninist or a bona fide criminal (or both), it was the Marxist sanction of violence that not only opened the bloodgates for his reign of terror, but also assured the applause or consenting silence of the only influential group whose protest could have staved it off or minimized it--the Western intellectuals. Alas, the lat-ter were more interested in the "progressive" march of history than in the fate of their Russian counterparts, much less in the fate of Russia's "ignorant and reactionary" masses. (Kozhinov was right that Western intellectuals shared responsibility for Stalin's crimes, but he did not explain why.)2 This bitterness about the gullibility and de facto collaboration of Western intellectuals is fully shared by author and Great Terror expert Robert Conquest.3 In his recent book, Stalin: Breaker of Nations, Conquest says, But the Marxist, or at least "socialist," phraseology was also the instrument by which Stalin's dupes, foreign and local, were so easily conditioned to accept his delusional universe. 81 And how easily the spell often worked! C.S. Lewis wrote of "the stupidity of evil," and if one is to use this phraseology, it clearly could apply in some sense to Stalin. But of his dupes in the West--and in particular when one thinks of the results of their infatuation--one might surely speak in terms of "the evil of stupidity."4 The second reason for the importance of the Katyn Massacre is that it was one of the most disturbing seeds of suspicion sown in the minds of Western peoples and political leaders, from Spring 1943 onward, about the Soviet Union's nature and objectives. This accumulating doubt, distrust, and--finally--fear served as the foundation of our side of the "cold war." In the case of the Soviet Union, for anyone having an humanitarian value system, coming to know it meant coming to fear and loathe it. Moreover, the Soviets themselves immediately and clearly understood the importance of Katyn as a revelation of Soviet intentions and methods in Poland and Eastern Europe, even if Western leaders were slow to do so. To quote George Kennan, The Western governments never did willingly acquiesce in this new Soviet bid to dominate entirely the political life of the future Poland. They seem in fact never to have realized how burning a challenge the Katyn charges were for Moscow, for the effect they had on Soviet diplomacy.5 Third, now that the truth and significance of Katyn is becoming known and acknowledged, it is a good "reality check" by which we can judge what our reactions in the future should be to similar allegations of genocide and other atrocities, no matter how unpopular or politically inexpedient such concerns may be at the time. In many areas of life, humanity must become more objective and effective. Because of the power and waste of advancing technology, we can no longer wait for hindsight from which to learn terrible lessons. Katyn's role in the postwar world was being considered by scholars as early as 1945. In their short 1945 book, Poland and Russia, 1919- 1945, Columbia University professors James T. Shotwell and Max M. Laserson (on behalf of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) considered Katyn as one of the wartime incidents leading to the wartime diplomatic crisis and postwar East-West confrontation over the fate of Poland. They considered Katyn as a sensational revelation which brought to a crisis the deepening disputes over the political and territorial future of Poland. Although they did not specifically state that the Soviets were guilty of the killings, Shotwell and Laserson included this quotation from a statement made in early 1944 by the Polish Government-in-Exile as an apparent attempt to explain why it had joined the Nazis in demanding an investigation in Spring 1943: Had this [16 April 1943 Soviet] explanation of the capture of the Polish officers by the Germans near Smolensk been given to the Polish authorities at any time during the many conversations and diplomatic exchanges in 1941 and 1943, Poland's appeal to the International Red Cross [for an investigation] would not have been made.6 The April 1950 issue of the British journal, International Affairs, contained an article about the Katyn Massacre titled "A Polish Chal- lenge: A Review Article." Author G.F. Hudson made a very strong case for the significance of Katyn for Americans and Britons: It is natural to think that the question of responsibility for the Katyn massacre is of interest primarily to the Poles; the rest of the world has plenty of other things to think about and cannot share the emotions of the nation which was the victim of this atrocity, by whomsoever it was committed. But what the world thinks about Katyn must inevitably affect what the Poles themselves think about it, and there is a reason why public opinion in Britain and America, at any rate, has a moral obliga- tion to consider the evidence on the subject. In 1943 the behaviour of the British and American Governments, albeit in extenuating cirmcumstances, amounted to what is called in criminal law conspiracy to defeat the ends of justice. . . . The British and American Governments at this point definitely sided with Russia against Poland, both diplomatically and through officially inspired publicity. . . . But the adverse attitude of the British and American Governments was due not to a simple faith in Russian innocence or to doubts about the International Red Cross--this was the first and last time that either its impartiality or its competence for an investigation concerning prisoners of war was called in question by the Western Allies--but to the information in their possession, not then available to the public, showing how strong was the prima facie case against Russia.7 Noting the significance of Katyn to wartime and postwar diplomacy and implying a reason for a thorough investigation, Hudson wrote: . . . Relations between the Kremlin and the London Polish Government, once broken off, were never resumed, and Britain and America, having once endorsed the Russian case against the Polish Government, found no firm ground on which to stand until they were driven to their final betrayal of the Polish national cause at Yalta. Thus the Katyn case was decisive for the whole course of events concerning Poland from 1943 onward, and Poland suffered a double disaster, first in having had several thousands of officers and other prisoners of war massacred, and secondly in being universally condemned for suggesting that the matter called for impartial investigation. Now that the war is over, however, the question of responsibility for the massacre still remains, and it is hardly decent to argue that the truth which it was in 1943 too dangerous to seek is today of too little importance to be worth discussing.8 Without specifically accusing the Soviets of being guilty of the crime, Hudson then went on to describe the absurdity of the Soviet claim at Nuremberg that the Germans were responsible: . . . If Russia was innocent of the Katyn massacre, it can only be explained on the assumption that the man chosen by the Soviet Government to prosecute at Nuremberg was a complete fool, incapable of appreciating the legal bearing of evidence. If, on the other hand, Russia had anything to hide, then the Russian prosecutor's selection of witnesses can be easily explained on the sound principle that it is unsafe to submit perjured wit-nesses with too definite stories to skilled cross-examination.9 and, later: . . . It only remains to add that in August and September 1941, when the Germans are supposed to have killed the prisoners, great battles were being fought between Smolensk and Moscow, and a signal regiment on active service would have had other calls on its time than shooting 11,000 men individually with revolvers in the back of the head, a sure, but extremely leisurely, method of mass execution much more suitable for the inhabitants of a N.K.V.D. "rest home" in time of peace.10 Hudson finished his examination of the massacre, compellingly: . . . Fortunately for Russia, [Katyn] turned out less embarrassing than might have been expected. The Nazis' many known atrocities and the notorious mendacity of the German Propaganda Ministry rendered the new Russian version plausible, and the western democracies, engaged in a life and death strug-gle with Germany, were not interested in ascertaining the truth, but only in covering up an inconvenient scandal. The danger that the Polish Government would raise the matter again after the war was averted by the Yalta Conference, which abolished the Polish Government and transferred international recognition to Soviet puppets. Nevertheless, even now Russian virtue is not quite safe from critical questioning, least of all among Poles. The unquiet dead of Katyn still walk the earth.11 The development of Katyn as a scholarly issue was greatly assisted by the legal nature and the concern with objective proof of the U.S. Congressional hearings. Despite possibly being motivated for political reasons, in part, the hearings established Soviet guilt for the massacre through due process and beyond a reasonable doubt. Thereafter, most academic examinations of Katyn in the West were in the context of the discussion of wartime diplomacy, the origins of the Cold War, and the rightness or wrongness of the West's prosecution of it--rather than any debate about whether or not the Soviets were responsible for the crime. One of the most credible books to question how the Cold War began-- or, as asked by William H. McNeill, "How did the Grand Alliance break up?"--was first published in 1953, and then again in 1970, as part of the Royal Institute of International Affairs' "Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946" series.12 This was America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946, which Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., cited in 1970, saying, "Every student of the Cold War must acknowledge his debt to W.H. McNeill's remarkable account. . . ."13 The 1953 edition included a laudatory introduction by Arnold Toynbee, the editor of the series, who pointed out that McNeill was one of the first recipients of the overseas scholarships intiated by U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright (D--Arkansas). McNeill devoted most of a page (of the book's 819 pages) to Katyn. He put Katyn in its wartime diplomatic context, saying The outbreak of a new, public quarrel between the Poles and the Russians at the end of April 1943 did not at the time seriously affect the newly cordial relations between the Allied Great Powers. This was at least partly due to the fact that the German radio and propaganda services played a critical role in precipitating the Russo-Polish dispute. When the Germans announced that they had discovered a mass grave at Katyn . . . .14 In the footnotes, however, McNeill made the Soviet responsibility for the crime very clear: At the time there was a strong tendency in America and Britain to discount the Katyn affair as the work of German propaganda, but, in light of post-war records and reticences on the part of the Russians, there seems much less doubt that the Russians were in fact responsible for the slaughter. A fuller account of the Katyn affair will be found in the Survey for 1939-46: The Realignment of Europe.15 Accordingly, that book appeared in 1955, coedited by the famous British historian, Arnold Toynbee.16 Citing the works of Sikorska, Mackiewicz, and Hudson, Professor Toynbee traced the development of the Katyn issue in wartime diplomacy. In footnotes, he described the key affidavit of Col. Van Vliet that the Soviets had committed the crime, as reported by the New York Times in September 1950.17 Finally, Toynbee quoted the findings of the U.S. Congress select committee on Katyn that the evidence "proves conclusively and irrevocably the Soviet NKVD . . . committed the massacre of Polish Army officers in the Katyn Forest . . . ."18 In 1957, Professor Herbert Feis mentioned Katyn, without definitely declaring the Russians guilty, in his lengthy book, Churchill, Roose- velt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought. However, judging from his description of the "Soviet schemers" and their intent to gain postwar control over Poland, the omission may have merely been an oversight.19 Feis' series of books on the Cold War was later des- cribed by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., as "brilliant and indispensable . . . ."20 An early contribution to the question was Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland, a 1958 book by Edward J. Rozek, a political science professor at the University of Colorado. Rozek described the Soviet government's maneuvering to discredit the Polish Government-in-Exile in London and presented the diplomatic confrontation about Katyn as a decisive moment. Rozek detailed the efforts of the Polish government to locate its missing officers and then to verify the circumstances of their execution by the Soviets, once their corpses had been found at Katyn. 21 In evaluating the Polish government's decision to pursue an investigation of Katyn, Rozek wrote: The Poles were convinced, however, that the Soviets were guilty of this crime. They were prepared for the worst. If the Polish Government in London had chosen any other course of action, it would have been immediately repudiated by all Poles at home and abroad. It had no choice.22 In the book's conclusion, though, Rozek pointed out that Katyn was one of many acts of Soviet perfidy which should have opened the eyes of Churchill and Roosevelt before the Yalta conference of February 1945, wherein the political fate of Eastern Europe was essentially entrusted to Stalin. Rozek's bitterness is apparent: Against such a background, it is difficult to understand how Churchill and Roosevelt could believe in Stalin's promises to carry out the terms of the agreement, for both Churchill and Roosevelt had unrestricted access to the Soviet record. The enslavement of Poland was the price the Western Powers had to pay for their belief that Soviet verbal promises could be trusted.23 George Kennan's 1961 book, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, noted the importance of Katyn, as described above. Also published in 1961 was the book by an Hungarian academic and government official during the 1956 uprising, Dr. Ferenc Vali. (In September 1961, after he had escaped Hungary, Vali became a professor of government at the University of Massachusetts.) Vali described Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev's secret 24-25 February 1956 speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow and the lack of impact it had on the status of the Soviet-dominated Eastern European countries, such as Hungary and Poland. Though Khrushchev gave full details of the paranoic misdeeds of his former master against loyal Party members after World War II (omitting those committed during the Great Purges of 1934- 1938), he made no accusations against Stalin for terroristic mass arrests, tortures, and executions in Hungary, Czecho-slovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Albania, ordered or at least approved by the Soviet leader. Neither did he say anything with regard to the rigged trials (Rajk, Kostov, Slansky, and others) organized by General Bielkin under the orders of Beria and, naturally, the orders of Stalin himself. This silence is most significant. Stalin's crimes in the international field, such as the Katyn affair and the actions in the Baltic states, Finland, and the East European satellite area, were not to be mentioned, for the sake of Soviet international prestige and for reasons of foreign policy. It was left to the individual Communist bosses in the satellite countries to cope as best they could with the analogies drawn from Stalinist excesses. The Soviet Union and the Soviet Party were not to be blamed for whatever sins had been committed at the behest of Stalin and his lieutenants. This concept of irresponsibility for acts committed outside the Soviet Union, acts for which Stalin might have been blamed, eventually led Khrushchev to a contradictory position: anti-Stalinism within the Soviet Union, and neo-Stalinism in most of the satellite countries. The neo-Stalinism was to become particularly manifest after the events in Hungary in the fall of 1956.24 Later, Vali signaled the relevance of Katyn to Soviet-occupied Hungary in describing the political killing of the deviant Communist, Laszlo Rajk. . . . The Politburo decided to act swiftly and to arrange the reburial of the victims of the anti-Titoist campaign in Hungary. But first the bodies had to be found. They had been buried by the AVH [the Hungarian version of the NKVD] in a deserted forest clearing near the town of Goedoelloe. A party, guided by a former major of the AVH (who had selected the original burial ground) and including members of the victims' families, proceeded there. Rajk's dentist was able to identify his skeleton; similarly other corpses were recognized in this Hungarian Katyn.25 D.F. Fleming's "revisionist" interpretation of Cold War history, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, was also published in 1961.26 Historian Norman Graebner reviewed favorably: Without question this massive endeavor is a significant contribution to the study of American diplomacy in the twentieth century. Its tendency to explain all conflict in terms of Western aggressiveness toward the Soviet Union creates an ines-capable impression that the USSR comprises really no military threat at all. This reduces the cold war to a conflict of attitudes and words. . . . Undoubtedly the conflict is more persistent than this. Even by traditional standards the rivalry between great, ambitious, and expanding nations cannot be exorcised that easily. Perhaps these volumes are more cumbersome and detailed than a study of the cold war and its origins require [sic]. The research is adequate without being meticulous. . . . At any rate, Professor Fleming has placed the burden of proof on his detractors, for they will find it difficult, given the fog that continues to hover over Soviet intentions, to document with equal profusion any competing concept of the cold war.27 In 1962, Professor Zawodny's book, Death in the Forest, addressed the reality and implications of Katyn in a scholarly manner. In the preface to the excerpts of reviews of his book in Book Review Digest, 1963, Zawodny was described as "a former Polish anti-Nazi underground fighter, now associate professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania."28 In reference to the year of 1943, which was pivotal on the Russian Front, Zawodny made it plain that he was not anti- Russian: "During this time the Red Army had been repulsing the German invaders. It is not important whether the Red Army soldier fought as a communist or a Russian; he fought magnificently."29 Probably Zawodny's most disturbing conclusion was his depiction of the reaction of President Roosevelt and his administration: Viewing Roosevelt's attitude toward the Soviet Government from the narrow sector of the Katyn affair, one is forced to the conclusion that the President decided not to be concerned with the truth of the matter. The policy of muzzling those who blamed the Soviet Government for Katyn extended downward. . . .30 Zawodny then went on to describe the efforts of the Roosevelt administration's Office of War Information, to suppress any examination of Katyn which was unfavorable to the Soviets in the American press.31 Zawodny's book ended in an appeal for the humane treatment of prisoners-of-war, describing that issue as the "lesson of the Katyn affair." He concluded: Perhaps in the future, nations will have the courage and wisdom to establish a court to examine all crimes--those of the victorious as well as the defeated. It may be that this is the only means of insuring the protection of prisoners-of-war.32 Zawodny's was the most important book, scholarly or otherwise, to be published about Katyn. Reviews were highly respectful and complimen- tary. For example, Charles Morley, a professor of history at Ohio State University in 1963, wrote: Professor Zawodny's book is far from pleasant reading. New, incredible details are revealed in this gruesome narrative of the liquidation of between four thousand and five thousand Po-lish prisoners of war, mostly officers, in the forest of Katyn. . . . Only the discovery of new Katyns or the opening of the NKVD archives will make it possible to tell the full story. Until then Death in the Forest will serve as a grim reminder of one of the worst crimes of the Stalin era--a crime, incidental-ly, that Khrushchev failed to mention at the Twentieth Party Congress.33 In the September 1963 issue of Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, reviewer Simon Wolin wrote: [Dr. Zawodny] has combined factual and political analysis of the material, realizing, as have earlier students of the case, that both Germany and the Soviet Union might have been prompted by the same motive: the desire to exterminate Polish intel-lectuals, who constituted the majority of the officer corps and were the potential leaders of a Polish fight for independence . . . . Dr. Zawodny's presentation and analysis of the material throws important light on the case and proves Soviet guilt.34 In the September 1963 edition of American Political Science Review, Radio Free Europe staff member R.V. Burks had much more to say about Zawodny's book: Death in the Forest is surprisingly dispassionate, considering the subject matter and the national origin of the author. It is based on careful study of official and unofficial sources in four languages and reviews for the first time the formal positions of all the governments involved. . . . The event itself will for many years to come serve quietly to poison and inflame international relations. Death in the Forest leaves the reader with three lessons. The first--if indeed he needs to learn it--is that the deed was done (as the Nazis asserted) by the Soviet security police, the NKVD. The evidence presented and evaluated by Zawodny convinces far beyond any reasonable doubt. . . . (In May 1940, the governor of the Ukraine was N.S. Khrushchev. Was he aware of or involved in the slaughter?) The second lesson is a moral one. Zawodny points out that the Soviet regime had considered the death of three millions of its own citizens as an acceptable price for the collectivization of agriculture. Why should it hesitate to exterminate a mere 15,000 prisoners of war, aliens and Poles at that, if in so doing it could eliminate the flower of the professional classes of an hereditarily inimical nation? The USSR was not even a signatory to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1929. Zawodny makes clear that the treatment of the prisoners prior to execution was relatively--we stress the word-- humane. Before being loaded onto railway trains for their final journey they were provided a special hot meal! The third and most profitable lesson concerns the political stupidity of the Soviet leadership. The prisoners were shot in April and May of 1940. At that time the Soviet leaders could not have foreseen that three years later an invading army would stumble on one of the three impromptu burying grounds. But apparently neither did they conceive, and this was their blunder, that in a year's time their relationship to the Nazis would change from one of alliance to one of war, automatically awarding the Polish government-in-exile the status of an ally entitled to recover its prisoners. Already in the fall of 1941 Moscow was having to manufacture lame explanations as to the fate of the 15,000.35 More recently, the credibility of Zawodny's Death in the Forest has been attested not only by the U.S. government's 1988 decision to print Polish-language copies for distribution in Poland, but also by its continuing citation as a principal source in the most recent books and articles, such as in analyst Louisa Vinton's 22 January 1993 article, "The Katyn Documents: Politics and History."36 In 1965, Yale professor Gaddis Smith, in his book American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941-1945, clearly cited the Soviet Union for its guilt for the Katyn Massacre. In April 1943 a major crisis erupted when the Germans announced to the world the discovery of mass graves in the Katyn forest containing the bodies of 8000 Polish officers allegedly murdered in 1940 by the Russians who held them prisoners. The charge was crude German propaganda, but the Poles suspected correctly that it was true. . . After the Katyn crisis, the issue of Polish frontiers became less important than the question of who would rule in postwar Poland: a Soviet satellite regime or freely elected successors to the London exile government.37 Martin F. Herz's oft-cited book, Beginnings of the Cold War, was published in 1966. Herz devoted an entire chapter to the critical importance of Poland in the origins of the Cold War, entitling it "Poland: Roots of Conflict." Herz stressed that Stalin was continu- ously pushing Western leaders to move the eastern borders of Poland to the west. Herz described the Katyn controversy and pointed out the feebleness of the Soviet attempts to blame the atrocity on the Germans. He then described how Katyn was used by the Soviets as an excuse to break off diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile.38 However, there is nothing about Katyn in the 1966 book by John Lukacs, New History of the Cold War. More startling is that Katyn is mentioned only once, in a footnote, in Zbigniew Brzezinski's 1960 book, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict.39 One interpretation of the neglect of Katyn in these books could be that their authors considered it to be only a subsidiary issue. It is also possible that they were hesitant to include Katyn, concerned that the significance of Katyn was generally unappreciated in the West and that doing so would be considered ethnocentric and compromise their credibility. In conversation with me, Dr. Zawodny noted that his own interest in Katyn was frequently attributed by others to his Polish heritage, rather than to the killings' historical significance itself.40 From 1967 and on, revisionist historian Walter LaFeber's text America, Russia, and the Cold War has been published. In this book LaFeber has made no mention of Katyn or of the Warsaw Uprising as causes of Western distrust toward Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe.41 In 1967, in one of the more influential books about the Cold War, The Cold War as History, author Louis Halle stated, in regard to Katyn, "Even today we still do not know conclusively whether it was Stalin's Russians or Hitler's Nazis who did the deed."42 Why Halle stated this is left unexplained and is highly questionable, considering the U.S. Congressional hearings and the 1962 publication of Zawodny's book. In 1970, there appeared the intriguing book American Images of Soviet Foreign Policy: An Inquiry into Recent Appraisals from the Academic Community, by William Welch. The author attempted to systematically categorize, by approach and degree, the various accounts of Soviet external behavior. He did not mention Katyn, or much else of history, but instead attempted to document and classify the rationales with which selected authors analyzed the motives and methods of Soviet foreign policy. In Welch's book, the first of the authors mentioned under the chapter, "The Ultra-Hard Image: The Great Beast," was Elliot Goodman. In his "ultra-hard" 1960 book, The Soviet Design for a World State, Goodman had nonetheless omitted any mention of Katyn. Another of the books so categorized by Welch was Protracted Conflict, by Robert Strausz-Hupe (and others), published in 1959. Katyn was not mentioned in that book either. However, the Soviets' cynical encouragement of the Poles to begin the Warsaw Uprising (in 1944), so that the Germans could crush the Polish Home Army, was described and deplored.43 Neither did Katyn appear in Bertram Wolfe's 1961 book, Communist Totalitarianism: Keys to the Soviet System. The omission of Katyn by principal detractors of the Soviets would undermine the thesis that one reason for the omission of Katyn from appropriate studies was (leftwing) political bias, except that the Soviets understood the danger of Katyn better than most people in the West. Accordingly, those intellectuals sympathetic to them in the West would better understand Katyn's significance as well. The 1970 republication of William H. McNeill's book, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946, was additionally important for its new introduction which commented on the condition of Cold War scholarship at that time. McNeill cited Fleming's The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1950 as "the first of the revisionist histories to be published in the United States; revisionist in the sense that it challenged the official United States interpretation of world events by arguing that the Cold War arose in large part from American fears and American aggressiveness."44 McNeill went on to describe how, to justify their political opposition to the Vietnam War specifically and to the Cold War in general, many American scholars began questioning the causes of and need for the Cold War. McNeill noted the change in understanding and attitudes of the American public from 1948-50 to 1968-70. He then wrote One obvious explanation was the stupidity and/or moral degradation of everyone over thirty; and many youthful rebels felt satisfied with this explanation. Others were attracted to interpretations that cast either big business or American militarism or both in the role of villain. Such historians as William A. Williams, Walter LeFeber, and Gar Alperovitz conveyed the message that powerful special interests had thrown up a smoke screen of propaganda and half-truths, misleading the American public in order to forward their own, narrowly conceived, private advantage.45 In 1971, the book The Rivals: American and Russia since World War II, by Harvard professor and eminent Sovietologist Adam Ulam, was pub- lished. In describing the 1943 break in Soviet-Polish relations, Ulam wrote, "While the direct cause of the breach was the notorious Katyn Forest massacre of Polish officers and men by Soviet forces, the original cause was the Poles' unwillingness to acquiesce in the loss of their eastern lands."46 Also in 1971 The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretation and Documents, edited by Walter LaFeber, was published. LaFeber saw the Cold War developing from "the tensions that developed between the United States and Russia during the first half of that [Twentieth] century and particularly during the 1941-1947 period."47 Apparently, he considered Katyn a significant factor in these tensions. In his prefatory comments to "Chapter IV: Poland, the Symbol," he mentioned Polish evidence of Soviet guilt for Katyn and Stalin's use of the diplomatic episode regarding Katyn to sever relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile.48 In 1972, Princeton former Ambassador George F. Kennan's second (1950-1963) volume of memoirs was published. Although he had not mentioned Katyn in his first (1925-1950) volume, even in the context of wartime diplomacy, Kennan now noted the Congressional hearings on Katyn were apparently one reason for the particularly vicious Soviet propa- ganda attacks against the United States in 1952 (during Kennan's tenure as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union). Kennan wrote: After the issuance in February 1952 of the report of a committee of the House of Representatives, in Washington, on the Katyn Massacre, a report which threw the blame for this incredible act of cruelty squarely on the Soviet police authorities, where it belonged, the anti-American propaganda was further stepped up. A high point of sorts had been reached in April, the main theme being already the charge that we were conducting bacteriological warfare in Korea. . . .49 John Lewis Gaddis' 1972 book, significantly titled The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, included a brief, obligatory mention of Katyn, also in the context of the Soviet break in diplomatic relations with the London Polish Government-in-Exile.50 However, there was no mention at all of the impact on Western govern- ments and peoples of the Soviet nonsupport of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. Also published in 1972 was The Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain, and Russia, 1941-1943, by University of Maine history professor Robert Beitzell. Covering Katyn's role as a temporary irritant in Allied relations, Beitzell alluded to the British government's message to Washington on 26 April 1943--citing Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Vol. III--that its Moscow ambassador was of the opinion that the Soviet government had broken off diplomatic relations with the London Polish government to cover up its guilt for the Katyn massacre.51 Finally, Oxford professor John Wheeler-Bennett and historian Anthony Nicholls co-authored the book The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War, published in 1972. In describing the context of Katyn, the authors wrote Now `Fascism' was the great enemy, and it could plausibly be argued that the Poles were not free of an anti-democratic taint. This criticism of the Polish Government, together with a human if not altogether heroic desire to avoid difficulties with Russia, contributed to a Press campaign in London against the Poles. The intransigent behaviour of some exiled Polish leaders did not improve matters. The Russians well knew how to exploit this situation. When, in 1943, the Nazis made known the horrifying details of the Katyn massacres, Polish demands for an independent inquiry were used by the Soviet authorities as a pretext to withdraw recognition from the Polish Government in London.52 They clearly indicated Soviet guilt, writing "There seems little doubt that the murders were, in fact, the work of the Russian security forces." The aggressiveness of the Soviets was typified by their 23 June 1944 demand that the Polish Government-in-Exile accept the Soviet position on the Curzon Line as their border and that it publicly acknowledge Soviet "innocence" of the Katyn Massacre.53 That was, of course, politically impossible for the London Poles to do. In 1973, the significance of the treatment of Katyn by historians was assessed by Professor Robert James Maddox in his seminal and controversial book, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War. Maddox pointed out that while one leftist historian seethed about the "naked repression" of Communists in Greece during the civil war there, another actually disputed the Soviet motives and responsibility for the Katyn Massacre.54 Maddox was referring to the treatment of Katyn in Canadian professor Gabriel Kolko's 1968 book, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945. Kolko was downplaying the moral importance of Katyn as a crime. Ignoring the human anguish of the victims' families and the Poles as a people, Kolko accused the Poles of cynically using Katyn as a device to press their demands for their 1939 territorial borders to be respected after the war. This accusation--a frequent assumption in other books--reflects its source's own cynicism. To claim that an outcry against a mass murder, particularly of countrymen who may include friends or relatives, was actually motivated by political or economic self-interests is contempt- ible. Would Kolko then claim that the outrage of Jews (and of humanity in general) about the Jewish Holocaust is primarily motivated by a cynical intent to establish the moral and legal justification necessary to petition for monetary or territorial compensation for the vast wealth and property confiscated by the Nazis from the murdered European Jews or to obtain continued aid for Israel? To attack the morality of the Polish case, Kolko accused the London Poles of having racist and class-conscious motives for their concern about the missing officers: Whoever destroyed the officers at Katyn had taken a step toward implementing a social revolution in Poland, and on the basis of class solidarity, the London Poles felt one officer was worth many Jews or peasants.55 Incredulously, Kolko then claimed: Yet insofar as Soviet culpability is concerned, of the by now endless lists of complaints the Poles made about the treatment of their nationals in Russia, mass murder was not one of them. Indeed, the U.S.S.R. permitted a much more formidable Polish military force to organize with Soviet weapons, and then finally to leave, and no one ever attributed a similar incident to the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe during the period 1940-1945. German mass liquidation, by contrast, was a common occurrence.56 That, to me, seems culpably dishonest. Edward Rozek's book, which Kolko actually cited in his footnotes, included frequent statements like the following description of the Soviet political conquest of Poland in 1944-5: Next the [Polish Home Army] commanding officers and their staffs were arrested. . . . Then the officers would usually be shipped to concentration camps located either in the U.S.S.R. or in Poland. In many cases the unit commanders were shot or hanged. . . . Soviet treatment of the civilian population followed a similar pattern. Those people who had assisted the Home Army were subjected to various forms of terror, often being arrested. Officials of the underground government, especially mayors, were arrested by the NKVD as soon as they revealed their status . . . . The NKVD concentrated its prisoners in the notorious Nazi death-factory at Majdanek, often beating and otherwise maltreating its prisoners. . . . It was obvious that the Soviets were eliminating the Home Army as an organized force and taking steps to liquidate or nullify all actual or potential anti-communist leadership . . . .57 Similarly, the NKVD massacres of thousands of politically suspect Eastern Europeans, at places like Lvov and Riga during the Red Army's withdrawal--rout--from the frontier regions in 1941, were highly publicized by the "liberating" Germans and by Baltic and Ukrainian emigre organizations, at the time of the crimes and since. Of course, in political or academic debate the extremism of a Kolko can be useful to lend more moderate proponents of his spectrum credi- bility by comparison. Maddox included Fleming in this book about New Left revisionist historians. However, he stated that he did so not because he thought Fleming to be ideologically leftwing, but because much of what Fleming had written was used by the New Left historians.58 (This was a contrast to the opinion of McNeill, described above.) Fleming's coverage of Katyn in his 1961 book, The Cold War and Its Orgins: 1917-1960, did not contradict Maddox's assessment of him. To his credit, or maybe to appear moderate, Fleming allowed that the Poles' desire for an investigation was understandable. He wrote: In their defense the Polish officials maintained that Polish opinion all over the world was in such a high state of indigna- tion that they simply had to take some action. Undoubtedly they felt that way, but the action taken could have no good result for the Polish cause.59 However, he then disregarded the contemporary preponderance of testimony and evidence pointing toward Soviet guilt for Katyn, even entitling a subchapter, "Who Was Guilty?" In that, Fleming invoked Waverley Root's book, The Secret History of the War: Vol. 3, Casablanca to Katyn, containing the specious defense of the Soviet version of events. Fleming also quoted an Hungarian who claimed to be an eye- witness to the "machine-gunning"--which Fleming acknowledged was wrong-- of "10,000" Polish officers at Katyn by the Germans. Fleming gives little space to all the testimony and evidence compiled by Polish exiles and the U.S. Congress, subsequent to Root's commentary, other than to state that U.S. Army witness Lieutenant Colonel Van Vliet had offered no "positive evidence."60 Indeed, Fleming's obfuscation of the truth about Katyn and of its significance to the advent of the Cold War was epitomized by his state- ment that "Root's examination of Death at Katyn and other literature published by the Poles also elicited no direct or credible evidence of Russian guilt."61 Obviously, the only "direct," satisfactory evidence of Soviet guilt for Fleming would have been the detailed admission of the crime by the Soviet perpetrators themselves, and these individuals did not feel compelled to such candor for another thirty years, until their interrogation by Red Army investigators in 1991. If the shallowness of research and the lack of balanced judgement Fleming displayed about a significant wartime East-West episode like Katyn reflects his overall treatment of other key episodes of the Cold War and its advent, it becomes difficult to take him seriously as a Cold War scholar. Another historian scrutinized by Maddox was David Horowitz. Horowitz's 1965 tome, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War, omitted entirely any mention of Katyn. Horowitz also overlooked other wartime Soviet atrocities against Poles and other Europeans that created the climate of fear in the West which motivated and justified the Cold War confrontation. Similarly, University of Chicago professor Gar Alperovitz made no reference to Katyn in his 1965 study of the origins of the Cold War, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. Although Alperovitz invoked the importance of Poland as a divisive issue between the Allies, and although he devoted an entire, 27-page appendix to the details of "the Polish question," he said nothing about Katyn, the Soviet military inaction during the Warsaw Uprising, or the various Soviet atrocities in Eastern Europe being causes of Western suspicion, distrust, and defensiveness toward Stalin's Soviet Union. Although Lloyd C. Gardner briefly mentioned the Warsaw Uprising in his 1970 book, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949, Katyn was left unmentioned. Ignoring the impact of revelations about Communist atrocities in the Korean War and the Congressional hearings on Katyn in the early 1950s, Gardner made the odd statement that "There was a growing feeling in the early 1950s that while Russia was obviously responsible for most of the evil in the world, American mistakes and shortsightedness had brought on the Cold War." Gardner's apparent intent was to find culprits responsible for the "mistakes" in Western governments, which he proceeded to do, oblivious to sound reasons (like Katyn) for the distrust of Stalin and the Soviets by Western peoples.62 Finally, William Appleman Williams, in his 1962 edition of The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, said nothing of Katyn and little of Allied differences about Poland and Eastern Europe contributing to the onset of the Cold War. Williams questionably emphasized Western economic motives as the cause of the Cold War and could see little else. Neither had there been mention of Katyn or the Warsaw Uprising, even in the context of the substantial treatment of Poland as a wartime Russo- American issue, in Williams' 1952 book, American Russian Relations: 1781-1947. Lynn Etheridge Davis's 1974 book, The Cold War Begins: Soviet- American Conflict over Eastern Europe, began with quotes from other authors who shared Davis's opinion that conflict over the future of Eastern Europe--specifically Poland, according to Adam Ulam--triggered the Cold War.63 In the chapter, "Poland 1941-1943," Davis had described the role of Katyn in the disruption of diplomatic relations between the London Polish government and the Soviet Union. Davis pointed out that, in their diplomatic correspondence, neither the Americans nor the British seriously questioned the Nazi charges that the Soviets were guilty of the crime.64 Considering their highly selective treatments of the causes of the Cold War, Maddox's impatience with "revisionist" historians is understandable. However, in fairness, Katyn was also omitted by most of the mainstream, more conservative Cold War historians listed as such in Kenneth W. Thompson's thin 1978 book, Interpreters and Critics of the Cold War. (Thompson discussed few specifics about the Cold War and omitted any mention of Katyn or the Warsaw Uprising.) Neither, for example, was there any mention of Katyn in Paul Seabury's 1967 book, Rise and Decline of the Cold War. Nor was there any in Marshall Shulman's influential little 1966 book, Beyond the Cold War. In keeping with the presumption reflected by its title, Herbert Feis omitted any mention of Katyn from his 1970 book, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950. Even Hans J. Morgenthau and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.--along with Lloyd C. Gardner--omitted any reference to Katyn in their respective papers which composed the 1970 book, The Origins of the Cold War. Adam B. Ulam again mentioned the Katyn incident in his biography, Stalin: The Man and His Era, published in 1973.65 Ulam also included mention of Katyn in his second, 1974 edition of Expansion and Coexis- tence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73. He left no doubt as to the importance and role of the Katyn Massacre in wartime diplomacy, as indicated by the following quote from the two pages he devoted to it: The actual breach of relations between Moscow and the Polish government-in-exile occurred in April 1943. Its direct cause was the Germans' discovery, in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, of the corpses of thousands of Polish officers who had been captured by the Russians in 1939 and kept in prisoner-of-war camps. . . . A careful weighing of the evidence [Ulam here cites Zawodny's book in a footnote] leads to an almost unavoidable conclusion that the murders had been committed by Soviet security forces in the spring of 1940.66 British researcher Bill Jones, in his book The Russia Complex: The British Labour Party and the Soviet Union (based on his "doctoral thesis"), described the significant impact of Katyn on the British Left. He credited Katyn with schocking Aneurin Bevan, the editor of the "left- wing" weekly journal Tribune into becoming "the most prominent and out- spoken critic of the Soviet Union." Moreover, Tribune's concern [about the Soviets' postwar political and territorial intentions] was shared by the Socialist Commentary and by a body of Labour MPs with Bevan's friend Richard Stokes to the fore in the debate on the Teheran proposals in February 1944.67 In 1978, Richard Lukas' book, The Strange Allies: The United States and Poland, 1941-1945, was published. Lukas chronicled the ups and downs of U.S.-Polish wartime relations. The importance of Katyn as a provocative incident is cited throughout the book. Lukas described the pressure exerted on General Sikorski by the Polish emigre community, to expose the truth about the genocidal policies of Stalinist Russia.68 He also described the concurrent dissolution of the Comintern--the Communist International administrative apparatus promoting worldwide revolution--as a sop to Roosevelt Administration envoy Joseph E. Davies and the Western Allies, with the qualification: Actually, the dissolution of the Comintern was totally meaningless. The functions of the Comintern were simply turned over to the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party [sic] and George Dimitrov remained in charge. About the only tangible thing Davies came back to Washington with was the information that Stalin shared Roosevelt's desire to meet as soon as possible.69 Also in 1978 another book by John Lukacs, 1945: Year Zero, discussed the leaders, foreign relations, and events of the year of the conclusion of the Second World War and the beginning of the postwar world. Lukacs examined the physical and character weaknesses of the Western leaders, in particular Roosevelt. In the chapter, "Roosevelt near Death," he wrote: He did not merely procrastinate; he refused to admit the existence of certain problems as such.70 Both his denial of the existence of the problem and his procrastination were the results not of naivete or of feebleness but of calculation--not of his inability but of his unwillingness to recognize them. He was--very much unlike Churchill, but very much like the entire circle of his friends--loath to change his mind. There is the accepted legend according to which Roosevelt was on the verge of changing his mind about Stalin, of getting tough with Stalin, when death cut him down. There is very little evidence for this. Most of the evidence, literal and circumstantial, points to the contrary.71 There was no mention of Katyn in Lukacs' book, even in the context of plans for postwar Poland. In 1979, presumably on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Afghani- stan, the Institute for Policy Studies published a book authored by (University of California) Berkeley "visiting scholar" Alan Wolfe. He concluded his The Rise and Fall of the `Soviet Threat': Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus with the pulsating words, "If Americans wake up to the danger posed from those within their midst who would destroy the best features of their country in order to militarize it against an illusory enemy, they have a chance to create the kind of future that they will then deserve."72 There was, of course, no mention of Katyn nor of any other unsavory Soviet practices toward conquered peoples. It is grimly amusing, considering the timing of the book, that Wolfe had previously written, "I will argue that in the past, U.S. perceptions of hostile Soviet intentions have increased, not when the Russians have become more aggressive or militaristic, but when certain constellations of political forces have come together within the United States to force the question of the Soviet threat onto the American political agenda."73 [Italics his.] In the case of the Congressional hearings about Katyn, held during (and partially in reaction to) the Korean War, this shaky proposition seems to fail completely. While the Katyn hearings may have enabled Democrats to assume an anti-Communist posture in the 1952 election year, the atrocities against American prisoners of war in Korea and the other tension points with the Soviets were sufficient motivation for the American public's concern about this example of Soviet intentions and methods. It is worth considering that Americans might have indeed gotten the world we deserved, if we had followed Wolfe's lead, discounted the Soviet threat, and de-militarized our society further at the onset of our great strategic confrontation with the Soviet Bloc in the 1980s. In contrast, Professor Vojtech Mastny authored a 1979 book, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945. He described the Soviets' use of Katyn to break off diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile.74 About the perplexed reaction of the American and British peoples and governments toward Soviet unhelpfulness to the Poles during the Warsaw Uprising, Mastny wrote "As in the case of Katyn, the British and Americans did not come to grips with what was happening to Warsaw because they did not want to."75 Mastny also attacked revisionist historians and their attempts to blame the U.S. for the Cold War. He described how they overlooked many of the Soviet transgressions which precipitated the Cold War by claim- ing, on the basis of their own linguistic or research shortcomings, that verification of Soviet culpability lay in "sources beyond reach."76 In 1980, Yale University professor Piotr S. Wandycz's book, The United States and Poland, was published. Katyn appeared as a signifi- cant episode in the subchapter, "The Road to Teheran." The attitude of President Roosevelt was portrayed as sympathetic to "the OWI [Office of War Information] and OSS [Office of Strategic Services] memoranda, reinforced by opinions of [Harry] Hopkins, Jonathan Daniels, and [Joseph] Davies," which "represented the [Polish] government in London as a clique of reactionaries and inveterate russophobes who sought to arouse the Polonia [the Polish-American community] against Roosevelt's Russian policy."77 Wandycz described the role of these organizations in influencing presidential thinking and U.S. policy. After 1980, once Polish Solidarity had again made Katyn an active, public political issue, the "Battle of Katyn" continued apace in scholarly circles. University of Surrey professor Roy Douglas' 1981 book, significantly titled From War to Cold War, 1942-48, described the Soviet-Polish political rift of 1943 as an origin of the Cold War, and Katyn as the incident which actually precipitated the diplomatic confrontation and rupture.78 His accounts of the reactions of Churchill and other members of the British government at the time clearly reflected the realization of those gentlemen in 1943 that the Soviets were guilty of the atrocity. Meanwhile, Stalin's Secret War, by Russian-born researcher Nikolai Tolstoy, was published in that same year. Tolstoy emphasized the high priority of Katyn for Stalin's regime: The Katyn Massacre, for example, was more than just a hideous example of Soviet barbarity. It was a para-military operation, involving a month's large-scale disruption of major sections of the Soviet strategic railway system . . . .79 Tolstoy devoted an entire chapter to the Katyn Massacre, and titled it "Forest Murmurs."80 Later in the book, although not specifically mentioning Katyn, he quoted Khrushchev's description of how all Eastern European matters were decided entirely by Stalin himself.81 Tolstoy also discussed in detail the Soviet anti-Allied effort to subvert and sabotage the French war economy in 1940.82 Even British prisoners-of-war who escaped German custody to a supposedly neutral Soviet Russia found themselves brutalized and imprisoned by the NKVD.83 These were some of the lengths the Soviets were prepared to go in their collaboration with the Nazis. Kenneth W. Thompson's 1981 book, Cold War Theories, Volume I: World Polarization, 1943-53, described how the Soviet government used Polish outrage about Katyn as an excuse for its moves against the pro- Western Polish Government-in-Exile. Thompson agreed that the Soviets were responsible for Katyn, and referenced Janusz Zawodny's book Death in the Forest for corroboration in a chapter entitled "Historic Origins of the Cold War."84 Scholar Terry H. Anderson fleetingly mentioned Katyn, in his 1981 book The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947, as one of the wartime anti-Polish Soviet acts which the United States attempted to overlook as it planned and prepared the postwar world order and organization.85 Judging from his book's title, though, Anderson apparently did not classify Katyn as a Cold War incident. There was no mention of Katyn at all in the 1981 collection of papers, titled Soviet-East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition, and Consent, edited by British professors Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson.86 In 1982, Russian-born scholars contributed to the historical research on Stalin's Russia. Authors Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, at the beginning of their lengthy book, Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present, began by quoting British writer George Orwell that "Whoever controls the past controls the future."87 In a chapter titled "The Katyn Tragedy," after summarizing the information available at the time regarding the NKVD's extermination operation at Katyn, they concluded with the observation that: The Katyn massacre was entirely in keeping with Stalin's political aims--to purge Poland of all patriotic elements, to wipe out the intelligentsia, and thus to clear the ground for a pro-Soviet regime. This was the policy he later pursued, at the time of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944 and after that, when the Red Army was extending its control over all of Polish territory.88 In his book about Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War, also published in 1982, Amherst professor William Taubman mentioned Katyn only in the context of the Polish-Soviet boundary dispute. In this context, he observed, "The London Poles triggered the next step themselves by requesting, in April 1943, that the Red Cross investigate Nazi charges . . . ."89 Thomas T. Hammond, University of Virginia history professor, authored a collection of writings, titled Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War and published in 1982. In his introduction, Hammond outlined the purpose of his book and described the controversy raging between the revisionist historians who put the principal blame for the Cold War on the West and traditionalist historians who held the Soviet Union responsible for this development because of its despotic designs and policies toward Europe. Hammond quoted Vojtech Mastny's observation that the revisionists' strength was in (criticizing) American foreign policy and behavior, whereas their knowledge of Soviet history, motives, and methods was weak.90 Hammond also emphasized the importance of Eastern Europe as a precipitating factor in the onset of the Cold War: A second point of contention between the revisionists and the traditionalists--one that we are particularly concerned with in this book--has to do with Eastern Europe. Both sides tend to see the conflict between Russia and the West over Eastern Europe as the most important factor in triggering the Cold War, but they differ completely as to which side was more at fault.91 However, Katyn went unmentioned in Hammond's book, by him or in any of the works he chose for his collection. In 1983, Soviet responsibility for Katyn was not made clear in the second volume of University of Edinburgh Professor John Erickson's military history of the Russo-German campaign, Road to Berlin. Erickson was at that time the premier authority in the West on the Red Army and Soviet military affairs and a confidant of retired Red Army generals. His treatment of Katyn was ambivalent, describing the German accusations and the diplomatic consequences, but also confining his examination of evidence to the fact that the pistol cartridges used were German.92 A possible reason for this stance may have been reflected by his later discussion of Soviet inaction during the Warsaw Uprising. Referring to Stalin, Erickson wrote: It is possible that he thought the rising in Warsaw would be quickly liquidated or else would peter out when only rifles were available against tanks; his minimizing of the rising seems to suggest this. What is clear is that the very fact of a large- scale rising in Warsaw, a general rising, came as a surprise to the Soviet command . . . .93 Erickson's expertise and research emphasis were in Soviet military history, not political or diplomatic affairs. He may also have been mindful of his position of trust among the Red Army generals and marshals who had befriended him in his research on The Great Patriotic War--the Russian Front in World War II. In 1983, the book Hungary, 1956, Revisited: The Message of a Revolution--A Quarter of a Century Later was published. Australian scholars Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller elaborated on the significance of the Hungarian Uprising. They noted that, typically, the stimulus which triggered the revolt in Hungary was the Poles' successful demand for a liberalized regime.94 Later in the book, describing the historical illegitimacy of the Soviet satellite regimes in Eastern Europe, they traced this back to Katyn: To begin with, it was the Soviet government who, after being publicly accused by the Polish Government-in-Exile (in London) of perpetrating the Katyn massacres of 1940, after the Germans had uncovered the corpses of murdered Polish army officers, undertook in consequence of these developments to break off all relations with the representatives of a Poland fighting in a common cause. That government might not necessarily have been reelected, but it undoubtedly stood in a relationship of some legitimacy with the Russians.95 One would think so, since Poland--unlike Hungary--was a Soviet ally from very early in The Great Patriotic War (1941), as well as a Soviet victim. The authors were incorrect, of course, in their contention that the Polish Government-in-Exile had actually accused the Soviets of the crime during the war. The book American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations, by Jerald Combs, was also published in 1983. There was one mention of Katyn in Chapter Nineteen, "Cold War Historiography in the Age of Vietnam." Describing the thinking of "new revisionists" in the American diplomatic history, Combs wrote: The new revisionists were in general agreement on several basic propositions. They saw the United States rather than Russia as the primary villain in the origins of the Cold War. . . . Thus, according to the new revisionists, American warnings of Russian expansionism had been nothing but a smoke screen to disguise the expansionism of the United States. America was seeking to open the world's markets and resources to its own trade and investment. . . . Thus, revisionists saw the imposi-tion of a full-fledged Russian dictatorship in Eastern Europe as Stalin's response to American aggression rather than as a pre-conceived Russian plan. Revisionists mitigated or deemphasized Russian conduct in the Katyn Forest massacre, the Warsaw uprising, the arrests of Polish underground leaders sympathetic to Britain, and the other actions that defenders of Western policy had seen as justification for distrust and containment of the Soviet regime.96 In the 1983 collection of papers, titled Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in the 1980s: Trends and Prospects, edited by Michael J. Sodaro and Sharon L. Wolchik, Katyn was mentioned in the article "Intellectuals and Their Discontent in Hungary," by Rudolf L. Tokes. He wrote: . . . The trauma of 1956 still seems to dim the hopes of the Hungarian dissidents. In Poland armed struggle, military defeat and foreign occupation were avoided in 1956 and at least twenty- five years thereafter. In the absence of recent first-hand experience with bloodshed and direct foreign rule, nationalistic anti-Soviet sentiments in Poland still focus on the Katyn massacre and Stalin's abandonment of the heroic fighters of the Warsaw uprising in August 1944.97 Bernard A. Weisberger briefly mentioned Katyn, as occurring in "1944" and as being a source of East-West tension, in his 1984 book Cold War, Cold Peace. Weisberger did not confirm Soviet guilt for Katyn in his book, which had an introduction by longtime journalist and commen- tator on Soviet affairs, Harrison Salisbury.98 The journal Polish American Studies published Polish-American historian Robert Szymczak's article, "A Matter of Honor: Polonia and the Congressional Investigation of the Katyn Forest Massacre," in spring 1984. The article documented the belated effort of Polish-Americans to have the truth about Katyn recognized by the world and to force the American people and government to face their responsibility for and the consequences of the wartime coverup of the Katyn Massacre and betrayal of the Poles at Yalta.99 Significantly, Szymczak--who has made Katyn a research specialty-- described Katyn, in this 1984 article, as "an inflammatory if short- lived Cold War issue and a potentially destructive weapon in the American propaganda arsenal against the Soviet Union in the early 1950s."100 This was before the developments of 1988 (and after). For even Szymczak to view Katyn as having limited importance at that time emphasizes the significance of the Katyn issue to the controversy about it which was soon to arise within Poland and the Soviet Union. In his 1985 book, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II: Imperial and Global, Alvin Z. Rubinstein described the significance of Katyn as the precipitating incident which directly led to the break in Russo-Polish diplomatic relations. On the other hand, he indicated that the more important factor in that breach was the Soviet-Polish border dispute. Rubinstein did, however, clearly state that the Soviets were guilty of the crime.101 In 1986, Richard C. Lukas authored another book related to wartime Poland. Titled The Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles under German Occupation, 1939-1944, it emphasized German atrocities. It mentioned Katyn, however, in the context of the Soviet Union's political threat to Polish independence. Also, Lukas made a special effort to challenge postwar accusations that the Poles as a nation had collaborated with the Nazis in the extermination of the Jews.102 Also in 1986, Canadian scholar Martin Kitchen's book, British Policy towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War, appeared. Katyn figured significantly in the discussion. In discussing what he considered to be the bewilderment of the British government in its dealings with the Soviets during the war, Kitchen wrote: Churchill now believed that Stalin was his friend, but this was not a view shared by all of the British delegation. Colonel Jacob, a sound judge of character, remarked that making friends with Stalin was like making friends with a python, and he was unable to forget the story that General Anders had told him. When Anders asked Stalin what had happened to some 8000 Polish officers who had been imprisoned in 1939 he shrugged his shoulders and suggested that they all had run away. The discovery of the mass grave at Katyn in April 1943 was soon to reveal the grim truth. The British delegation were also unable to decide who was really in charge in the Soviet Union. Desmond Morton told Dalton that he was convinced that Stalin was merely the tool of the Politburo, and Churchill frequently put this view forward whenever he wished to explain away some of Stalin's more outrageous behavior. The British were thus as mystified as ever by the behaviour of the Russians, and the attempt to explain their behaviour by thinking of them as a bunch of peasants who had not had the good fortune to be educated at either Eton or Harrow did little to clarify the situation.103 Later in the book, describing the pro-Soviet British Foreign Office Research Department's 1944 denial of nonpublic Polish accusations of Soviet culpability for Katyn, Kitchen described Ambassador O'Malley's fierce denunciations of the coverup. Kitchen included a quote invoked by O'Malley, "What in international affairs is morally indefensible generally turns out in the long run to have been politically inept."104 Early in 1987, in the scholarly journal East European Quarterly, there appeared an article by authors Crister S. and Stephen A. Garrett of the Monterey Institute of International Studies entitled "Death and Politics: The Katyn Forest Massacre and American Foreign Policy." The Garretts conclusion was: . . . that the ostensible American commitment to Eastern European interests and that of Poland specifically has always been a hostage to larger concerns. This phenomenon presents itself not only in the contest [sic] of Katyn--the United States was essentially a passive bystander to the Russian crushing of the Hungarian revolt in 1956, and President Johnson was only dissuaded with great difficulty from going ahead with a planned visit to the Soviet Union shortly after Moscow's intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The essential gap between American aspirations for Eastern Europe and the felt constraints on American policy toward the region does not, however, provide much consolation to the Poles who still vividly recollect one of the most calculated and tragic assaults on their national identity. Perhaps symptomatic of the sensitivity of Katyn for the Polish nation is the effort by the Soviet Union itself to erase the historical memory of Katyn.105 The Garretts then went on to describe the Soviets' peculiar selection of "Khatyn" as the site of their war memorial to massacred Soviet villages. They pointed out the doubts about the placename's wartime existence and the fact that it was the only one of 9,200 Belorussian villages leveled--and the only one of 136 entirely massacred--so lavishly memorialized. The Garretts monitored the existence of "Khatyn," after its unveiling in 1969, as follows: 1954--A map of the Minsk Region in the Large Soviet Encyclopedia does not show Khatyn at all.106 1956--A map of the Smolensk area in the Large Soviet Encyclopedia shows Katyn. 1959--A large atlas of the USSR shows neither Khatyn nor Katyn. 1974--A map of the Minsk Region in the Large Soviet Encyclopedia shows Khatyn but not Katyn.107 In fairness to the Soviets, I should point out that "Khatyn" had been identified as a village placename, 60 kilometers North-Northeast of Minsk, on a 1:1,000,000 British War Office map published in 1954.108 The Garretts' credibility was not helped by their statement that-- according to former Roosevelt aide John F. Carter--President Roosevelt had told Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles on or about 15 April 1943 that he believed that a German-born intelligence analyst's appraisal (that the Nazis were telling the truth about Katyn and that the Soviets were therefore guilty of Katyn) was "on the level."109 The Garretts' next sentences read: One year later, however, the President's opinion seemed altogether different. Presidential aide George Earle presented Roosevelt with evidence suggesting once again Russian guilt. Roosevelt commented, according to Earle, that "this is entirely German propaganda and a German plot. I am absolutely convinced the Russians did not do this."110 Actually, Carter had testified to the Select Committee on 13 November 1952 that Sumner Welles had told him that both Welles and Roosevelt believed that the analyst was "on the level," in the sense of the analyst reporting what he--the analyst--believed to be the truth. There was no confirmation, by Carter or Earle, that Roosevelt himself agreed with the analyst's report--in 1943 or later.111 Nonetheless, the Garretts began their following paragraph "Whatever Roosevelt's private views eventually were with respect to the Katyn affair, . . . ," as though Roosevelt had changed his mind before talking with Earle. However, contrary to the Garretts' misrepresentation of Roosevelt's public and private statements about Katyn, there is no evidence that he ever really admitted Soviet guilt for Katyn, to himself or to anyone else. Whatever the motive, Roosevelt had closed his mind on this matter, and he would never allow it to be reopened. Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-46, by Hugh Thomas of the London-based Centre for Policy Studies, was published in 1987. It included a number of references to Katyn, citing its importance as a wartime issue. Although the title of Thomas' book reflected his opinion of when the Cold War started, he related the obscure incident at Potsdam which may have irritated Soviet-American relations significantly. On July 17, 1945, at Potsdam, new U.S. President Harry S. Truman was frustrated by Stalin's refusal to discuss international access to inland waterways, like the Volga River system. Truman then had the gall to ask Stalin to his face what had happened to the Polish officers at Katyn. Stalin, unaccustomed to having to account for his homicides, coldly answered, "They went away."112 Thomas confirmed Soviet responsibility for Katyn in his book, giving 1940 as the year and describing the plight of the persecuted Poles in the Soviet Union prior to the German invasion. He noted that captured members of the pro-Western Polish Home Army were being incarcerated by the Soviets in Maidanek, the old Nazi death camp, as early as summer 1944.113 Also in 1987, the carefully researched book, In the Shadow of Auschwitz: The Polish Government-in-Exile and the Jews, 1939-1942, appeared. Author David Engel accused the London Poles of treating Polish Jews as a secondary priority, both during the evacuation from the Soviet Union and in the beginnings of the Holocaust. Engel was particu- larly critical of the Polish generals Anders and Sikorski, and the word "Katyn" appeared only in the index.114 His depiction of a latent Po- lish anti-Semitism later seemed to be verified during the September 1990 Jewish-Catholic strife about the Carmelite convent near Auschwitz.115 A vengeful hostility toward the Poles and their suffering, on the part of some Jews--justified or not--may have been one factor in the de- emphasis of Katyn as a significant East vs. West postwar issue. It is true that Polish Jews lost everyone in the Holocaust. However, Jewish resentment of Christian Poles should not be allowed to distract from the true perpetrators of the Holocaust or from all Poles' suffering. More- over, the temptations to blame Bolshevism and its atrocities on Jews, in whole or in part, were considerable for other Europeans. Throughout history, the Germans and Russians played off the Poles, Ukrainians, Jews, and other Eastern European peoples of the borderlands against each other. Some of these peoples--as, for example, the Polish commander of the Cheka, Feliks Dzerzhinskii, or Lenin's Latvian guard-- proved to be useful as political troops or police and apparently enjoyed personal revenge on Russian people for their own past suffering. As Harvard University professor Richard Pipes wrote in his 1990 book, The Russian Revolution, Dzerzhinskii was a Pole, and many of his closest associates were Latvians, Armenians, and Jews. [There was also a certain, high-ranking Georgian!] . . . Latvians were considered more brutal and less susceptible to bribery.116 Having suffered persecution and pogrom killings at the hands of Russians and Ukrainians, some Jews welcomed Communism in Russia, in view of its anti-racist doctrines. Jews were prominent in the Soviet leader- ship: Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoniev, to name a few. In his book, Pipes noted that at one point three-fourths of the Kiev Cheka were Jewish. It is thus understandable, unhappily, how many Ukrainians--who had suffered their own, NKVD-administered holocaust in the early 1930s--and some Poles could be led so easily (by their early impressions of Jewish col- laboration with Bolshevism and by subsequent Nazi propaganda exploiting those impressions) to support or participate in the persecution and even extermination of Jews. The vast majority of Jewish people were entirely and tragically innocent of any interethnic wrongdoing, of course.117 In 1988, Canadian historians Lawrence Aronsen and Martin Kitchen pointed out the importance of Katyn in their book, significantly titled The Origins of the Cold War in Comparative Perspective: American, British, and Canadian Relations with the Soviet Union, 1941-48. They observed that the Soviets indirectly used the Katyn episode to pressure the Polish Government-in-Exile to accept the Curzon Line as the eastern border of a postwar Poland, thus conceding to the USSR the substantial lands of Eastern Poland. They also noted how the Soviets refused to re- establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-in Exile after its wartime capitulation on the Katyn issue, until their territorial demands were accepted.118 One startling revelation in the book was that Canada's Prime Minister Mackenzie King was generally unsympathetic to Poland. King felt that the Poles shared responsibility for starting the war, because they had not been as amenable to Hitler's territorial wishes in 1939 as he felt they should have been!119 Also in 1988, Edward Mortimer's book, The World that FDR Built, was published. In a footnote, Mortimer makes clear his conviction that the Soviets were responsible for Katyn, quoting wartime British diplomat Sir Frank Roberts' observation that Katyn was one of the causes of Churchill's disappointment with the Soviets about Poland.120 Robert James Maddox's book, From War to Cold War: The Education of Harry S. Truman, also appeared in 1988. Consistent with the importance he had attached to Katyn in his 1973 critique, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (discussed previously), he described its significance for the wartime negotiations concerning the future of Poland: Talks about Poland revealed a dilemma that would plague Roosevelt. The Atlantic Charter he and Churchill had issued in August 1941 condemned territorial changes imposed by force and endorsed the right of all peoples to choose their form of government. Although Stalin had given a hedged endorsement of the charter, Roosevelt understood he was adamant about retaining Polish territory occupied in 1939--roughly corresponding to the Curzon Line--and also meant to establish a "friendly" government. How could FDR agree without incurring the criticism, particularly from voters of Polish extraction, that he had betrayed the charter to placate Stalin? Roosevelt took refuge in silence. He said little in discus- sions during which Churchill and Stalin agreed that Poland should be compensated for losses in the east by gaining German territory up to the Oder River. They were far apart on who would govern Poland. Churchill hoped to work out an arrangement between the London-based Polish government in exile and the Soviets, but their relations had been poisoned six months earlier when the former publicly accused the USSR of murdering nearly 5,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest in 1940. FDR told Stalin privately that he was sympathetic to Soviet desires, but that he could not be a party to any agreements until after the 1944 elections because he was afraid of alienating the Polish vote. Stalin said he understood.121 There were a couple of questionable points in Maddox's coverage of Katyn. The London Poles had not accused the Soviets of the crime; they had only asked for an impartial, Red Cross investigation. Also, in fairness to Roosevelt, he seemed to think he could better the chances of the nonaligned government that Churchill (and Polish-Americans) wanted by privately reassuring Stalin with a sympathetic attitude. Emory University professor Jan T. Gross's book, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, was published in 1988. The book was originally based on thousands of surveyed personal accounts of the ordeals of Poles in Soviet captivity. Most of the accounts were destroyed by Soviet authorities upon the Polish exodus from the USSR in 1942. The following quote indicates the Poles' determination to get the rest of the completed forms out to the West: Indeed, the Soviet authorities tried to intercept the archives accompanying the Polish ambassador as he was boarding a ship to Iran. This loss was prevented only by the determination of a junior officer escorting the ambassador's luggage, Lieutenant Ksawery Pruszynski, a famous writer, who drew a gun in defense of the papers in his custody.122 Uninterested in Katyn's role as a disruptive factor in wartime diplomacy and border-bargaining, Gross mentioned Katyn only in the context of the killings of Poles (which he estimated to be as high as 115,000) in Soviet-occupied territory from 1939 to 22 June 1941. (He estimated another 300,000 Polish dead in Soviet labor camps.) Contrasting the death toll of Poles from Nazi versus Soviet killings, Gross wrote: These very conservative estimates show that the Soviets killed or drove to their deaths three or four times as many people as the Nazis from a population half the size of that under German jurisdiction. This comparison, I repeat, holds for the first two years of the Second World War, the period before the Nazis began systematic mass annihilation of the Jewish population.123 In a footnote to this passage, Gross quotes author Stephen Cohen that, "judged only by the number of victims and leaving aside important differences between the two regimes, Stalinism created a holocaust greater than Hitler's."124 (This, of course, was the conclusion Alexander Cockburn was trying so hard to discredit in his New Statesman and Society article.) Gross was troubled to discover that he had to be careful when using the typed copies of the personal survey, because the junior member of the wartime Polish Army transcription team had persuaded his superior to let him embellish the accounts, in order to promote the Polish Govern- ment-in-Exile's cause. In this connection, Gross noted: This is precisely the kind of creativity that a historian can do without. Regrettably, Major Swiecicki seems to have yielded to [Lieutenant] Telmany's arguments. . . . How weak the relative merits of the Polish case must have seemed to these misguided defenders of the Polish "vital interest" who were ready to commit forgery for its sake! The Soviet claims to the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia were founded on lawlessness and outright lies. No doctoring of the original testimonies was necessary to make the point. . . .125 In 1989, the Transactions of the Royal Historical Society contained University of Liverpool professor Phillip M.H. Bell's article, "Censorship, Propaganda and Public Opinion: The Case of the Katyn Graves, 1943." Bell's article noted the pressure on General Sikorksi to request an International Red Cross investigation and to do it publicly. The Polish government for its part faced the grim evidence of the list of names, which tallied with names on their own rolls of those missing in Russia. Already, through diplomatic channels, by direct appeal to Stalin, and by the tireless investigations of Captain Czapski, the Poles had done all they could by private enquiry to trace their missing officers. They now had to face the reaction of General Anders' army in Iraq, which had only recently left the Soviet Union and in which these officers were known as comrades in arms and fellow prisoners. There were already ominous reports from the British authorities in the Middle East that Anders' troops were losing confidence in the Polish government; and the Foreign Office believed that, with the news of Katyn, there was danger of serious trouble among these troops. These warnings were known to the Polish government. Recent reports reaching London from Poland indicated that any concessions by the Polish government to the Soviet Union would mean that it no longer represented the nation: these referred to territorial questions, but were likely to apply equally strongly to the Katyn graves. In Britain, General Sikorski, the Prime Minister, was already under attack from those who claimed that he was unduly compliant towards the Russians. In these circumstances the Polish government had to be seen to be taking action to investigate the stories about Katyn. Inquiries behind the scenes would not do. So the Poles acted publicly, rapidly and independently.126 Because Goebbels had made Katyn a public issue, the responses by the Polish, Russian, and British governments had to be public in return, according to Bell: Whatever the real reason [for severing diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile], the Soviet government moved swiftly to publish a decision which could have been kept quiet for a time, to give British diplomacy a chance to find a way out of this phase of the Soviet-Polish problem. The three governments all used publicity as a weapon, and the British were caught in the crossfire of statements and accusations. Their problem was very public, and its handling had to be a matter of publicity.127 Writing about the British government's efforts to muzzle the domestic and Polish emigre press, Bell indicated mixed success, stating, "In effect, the tone of the Polish papers seems to have been generally moderate in May and June; but that was due to diplomacy and self- restraint, not to new regulations."128 The Poles were quartered in Scotland, and Bell described a very pro-Polish treatment of Katyn by the Scotsman (Edinburgh) newspaper: There was some dissent. The Polish case attracted strong sympathy in the Scotsman, which on 27 April published a long leading article pointing out that some one-and-a-half million Poles had been carried off to concentration camps in Russia, because Stalin did not want them in his new territories. The whereabouts of most of them, and of 10,000 officers, remained unknown. While this article attributed no specific responsi- bility for Katyn, its inference was unmistakeable; and it also strongly supported the Polish case on the frontier question.129 Bell's comments on the overall treatment of Katyn by the British government and press were illuminating. He specifically cited the previously discussed 1 May 1943 New Statesman and Society article which did not deny Soviet responsibility and which stated, "this is not to say that many Polish officers may not have been shot or relegated to Siberia by the GPU . . . the Soviet Government, often with reason, would regard the landed aristocracy and the officer class of Poland in the light of Fascists and class enemies."130 Bell wrote: This chilling comment illustrates a striking fact about the general attitude of the British press: the almost complete absence of a moral stance. This was in sharp contrast to the treatment of the deal with Admiral Darlan a few months earlier, when the press wrote freely of honour and dishonour, of the ideals for which the Allies were fighting and how they were tarnished by association with a quisling. On Katyn and Polish-Soviet relations, on the other hand, the press spoke the stern language of realism and power politics. . . . It is said that the British press is subject to periodic fits of morality, sometimes induced by stories of massacres. On this occasion, there was a concentrated attack of Realpolitik.131 Bell concluded his article with the insightful assessment: Damping down remained the order of the day, and indeed the crisis passed, as most crises do. In the long run, however, damping down was not so easy. Katyn reappeared in 1944; then at the Nuremberg trials; and later still in the question of a memorial to its dead. The story of censorship, propaganda and public opinion in relation to Katyn has not ended yet.132 In 1989, Zbigniew Brzezinski's book, The Grand Failure, described the meteoric rise and fall of Communism in the twentieth century. Discussing Gorbachev's 1988 de-Stalinization efforts, Brzezinski noted the omission of any "glasnost" revelations about the 1939 partition of Poland or the 1940 Katyn Massacre and mass deportations of Poles to Siberia.133 He also chronicled a joint statement by Polish- Czechoslovakian "oppositionist groups, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia" demanding that the sovereignty of Warsaw Pact nations be respected by the Soviet Union and that documents be published about the Katyn Massacre and other examples of Soviet repression of Eastern Europeans.134 There was mention of Katyn in Walter LaFeber's 1989 American diplomatic history textbook, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750, as well as of Soviet unrespon- siveness to the Warsaw Uprising.135 Perhaps the recent media coverage of Katyn had finally prompted LaFeber to appreciate its significance. The 1 June 1990 English-language issue of the Soviet monthly journal, International Affairs, contained Russian historian Natalya Lebedeva's article about the Katyn-related documents in the Soviet archives which implicated the NKVD as responsible for Katyn. The article had a preface by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of General History director, Alexander Chubaryan, who described Katyn as "one of the grave crimes perpetrated by the Stalin regime."136 In 1990, P.M.H. Bell authored the book, John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. Bell described and analyzed the manipulation of British public opinion toward the Soviet Union during the Second World War. Bell devoted an entire chapter to Katyn, discussing it as a case study of a public relations crisis which imperiled pro-Soviet sentiment during the war. As he stated, "The subject of this chapter is not the graves themselves nor the issue of who killed the officers; though it must be said at once that the evidence of Soviet guilt leaves no room for doubt."137 Later in the book, Bell (again) mentioned the "chilling" nature of the article in the 1 May 1943 New Statesman.138 Bell traced a prior wartime concern about Soviet trustworthiness, expressed in a British Broadcasting Corporation audience research inquiry conducted in September 1942. The Katyn episode could have touched off a public explosion about the matter in Britain and else- where. However, Britain's Political War Executive (PWE), the watchdog agency which (like our OWI) combatted internal political divisiveness on war issues, stated in a 28 April 1943 directive, "It is our job to help to ensure that history will record the Katyn Forest incident as a futile attempt by Germany to postpone defeat by political methods."139 In Bell's judgement, the PWE was entirely successful: The threat posed by the revelation of the Katyn graves to the Anglo-Soviet alliance was almost entirely averted. The episode appears to have had little effect on British opinion about the Soviet Union. There were already doubts and anxieties set against the general popularity of the USSR, which were sharpened by Katyn, but only partially brought into the open: only a few elements in the press raised public questions, and MPs remained quiet.140 It should be noted that, while Bell maintained that Katyn was neutral- ized as a wartime issue by government influence over the British media, he acknowledged Katyn's importance as a reinforcement to the underlying, longterm public distrust of the Soviets. That distrust was the basis of the Western democracies' Cold War response to the postwar Soviet political and military threat. When contrasting the Katyn issue against the public furor in Britain in 1942-43 about the Western Allies' cooperation with Vichy French Admiral Darlan, Bell concluded: Public opinion was much more obviously stirred by the Darlan deal than it was to be by Katyn a few months later. . . . The main reason for this was presumably the overwhelming nature of the need for the Soviet alliance . . . . This aspect was certainly real; but it is also tempting to speculate as to whether most of the press allowed a greater moral latitude in dealings with the Soviet Union than in those with Darlan--or even with the United States.141 . . . . It is of some interest that, in the affair of Admiral Darlan, the government (including Churchill) was more willing to deflect public hostility against the United States than they ever were to do so against the Soviet Union. If this were generally true, it would raise some intriguing questions.142 Princeton University historian Robert C. Tucker's 1990 book, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941, included an obligatory mention of Katyn--albeit inaccurate in detail. Tucker also quoted a Moscow News article, claiming Soviet prisoners of war were also mass- murdered at Katyn: Special note must be taken of one Stalinist crime that received worldwide attention when, in 1944 [sic], the then retreating German occupants announced their discovery in the Katyn forest near Smolensk mass graves containing the remains of 4,443 executed Polish officers (the fates of another 10,000 Polish officers interned after Soviet conquest of eastern Poland in 1939 are still unknown). . . . The Katyn forest was the mass grave not only for those murdered Polish officers, but also for thousands upon thousands of Soviet terror victims whom the NKVD transported there, from 1935 to 1941, for execution, and for 135,000 Soviet prisoners of war executed by the Nazis during the occupation.143 Also in 1990, the second edition of British professor Karen Dawisha's book, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge, was published. The reference to Katyn was the same as it had been in the first edition: The Poles' hatred of Russians and their cynicism about Soviet intentions were reinforced by the experiences of World War II, when, for Poland, Hitler was not the only aggressor. The Soviet counterinvasion of Poland in September 1939, the probable Soviet responsibility for the massacre in the Katyn woods of almost the entire Polish officer corps, and the slowness with which the Soviets liberated Warsaw (first allowing indigenous resistance to be crushed) are all deeply felt and widely discussed in Poland. Dawisha went on to quote a sermon delivered by a Polish bishop on the thirty-seventh anniversary of the outbreak of the war. The bishop said: In August 1939, an infamous Ribbentrop-Molotov pact was signed, that meant the fourth partition, pre-planned by Hitler and Stalin. . . . And we know how Molotov triumphantly said "the bastard of the Versailles Treaty has disappeared from the earth's surface." We all remember that, and the Nation remem-bers and waits for the grievance to be repaid. . . . We remember those who were killed, we remember concentration camps, we remember removals, we remember Katyn.144 Despite the building interest in Katyn in the late 1980s, Washington and Jefferson College history professor James L. Gormly omitted mention of Katyn from his 1990 book, From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three Diplomacy, 1945-1947. Gormly's portrayal of the Soviet Union during the war was apologist. Rationalizing Stalin's pro-German about-face on the eve of the war, he wrote "Finding little willingness on the part of France and Britain to stand firm against the Nazis, he hastened in August 1939 to associate the Soviet Union with Fascist Germany."145 Gormly's very next sentence was "He [Stalin] hoped that his nonag- gression pact with Hitler would keep his country out of the war, at least temporarily."146 This is an embarrassingly obvious self-contra- diction, unless Gormly was trying to claim that the intent of Britain and France to declare war on Nazi Germany (when it invaded Poland)-- which Gormly was also claiming Stalin knew and believed--was "little willingness . . . to stand firm against the Nazis . . . ." While Gormly mentioned the divisive importance of the 1944-45, wartime Russo-Polish disputes about the Polish borders, he downplayed the poisonous impact of the Soviets' own 1939 invasion and partition of Poland with the Nazis and of the other pre-1945 Soviet behaviors which laid the foundation for the Cold War--as previous historians had pointed out. Specifically and indefensibly, he entirely omitted any mention of the Katyn Massacre, the Polish Government-in-Exile, and the events surrounding the Soviet suspension of diplomatic relations with the legitimate Polish government in London. Indeed, the Gormly book does not add to a balanced understanding of the origins of the Cold War, even within its narrow chronological scope. Even within his own 1945-1947 parameters, Gormly's 1990 exclusion of any mention of Katyn is a particular oversight. Stalin would have regarded Truman's needling of him at Potsdam about the "missing" Polish officers as a serious personal provocation, judging from Stalin's own fixation with Katyn (as described by his daughter), his cold response to Truman at the moment, and the later, enraged Soviet reaction to the Congressional hearings on Katyn. Katyn was just one of the more earthshaking "glasnost" revelations coming out of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Desperately, the academic Left in the West tried to counterattack. For example, in 1990, the Great Terror bodycount issue resurfaced in some scholarly journals. In 1990 issues of Soviet Studies, Sovietologist Alec Nove and British professor S.G. Wheatcroft estimated Soviet 1930s deaths at approximately 10 and 6 millions, respectively. Wheatcroft contrasted his "professional, objective" methods with what he described as the more "literary" approaches of Robert Conquest and various other Sovietologists.147 Conquest immediately replied in Soviet Studies, tracing his sources and tallying of the 20 million dead figure. He also pointed out that Wheatcroft's "professional, objective" sources were official, Stalinist government sources of far more dubious objectivity and credibility.148 In the 1991 translation of his 1988 biography of Stalin, the anti- Stalinist, "revisionist" Russian military historian, General Dmitri Volkogonov--briefly Boris Yeltsin's Minister of Defense--confirmed the existence of documents proving NKVD responsibility for the Katyn Massacre. However, in Volkogonov's account of Stalin's mass murders, Katyn's mention was comparatively brief.149 That same year, the sixth edition of Peter Calvocoressi's book, World Politics since 1945, was published. Although the wartime Katyn controversy was not in the book's announced scope, Calvocoressi mentioned it in the background of his chapter, "Communist Europe." He wrote, "The discovery in April 1943 of the Katyn massacre (only implausibly ascribed by the Russians to the Germans) reminded the Poles that, for them, the choice between Russians and Germans was a hopeless one, but the Germans were at that time the present pest from which the Russians were future liberators."150 Also in 1991, Hoover Institution researcher Arnold Beichman's book, The Long Pretense: Soviet Treaty Diplomacy from Lenin to Gorbachev, described the inherent inability of a totalitarian state to deal honestly with the rest of the world. Although his book was devoted to criticism of all Soviet regimes, Beichman specifically censured Allied governments' collaboration in the coverup of Katyn.151 Another 1991 book of note, The Soviet Takeover of the Polish Eastern Provinces, 1939-41, edited by Keith Sword, cataloged Katyn as just one of the Soviet atrocities against Polish residents of the area occupied by the Red Army in 1939-41. Red Army scholar John Erickson (mentioned above), in his contributed narrative of the military events of September 1939, clearly stated that "Polish officers were separated from their men, isolated in their own prison-barracks though their final destination proved to be the mass graves of Katyn."152 Further references to Katyn by other authors appeared in other contributions. Career diplomat Thomas W. Simons, Jr., authored the book Eastern Europe in the Postwar World, also published in 1991. In describing the background to postwar Eastern Europe, Simons described the massacre of intellectuals by both Nazis and Soviets. Regarding Katyn, Simons wrote: The Soviets helped: all of the nearly 15,000 Polish officers butchered in 1940 by the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, had the matura that marked the intellectual. At the most famous site, in Katyn Forest, 4,200 fell.153 Later in the book, describing Hungary's efforts to keep pace with the political emancipation of Poland in 1989-90, Simons wrote: The Hungarians were in the midst of a phase of politics from which the Poles were emerging. Of course the Poles had not worked the historic issues through to the end either, for there is never an end. The issue of the Katyn massacre of 1940, for instance, did not end with Gorbachev's admission of Soviet guilt in April 1990. Some Poles will insist that the guilty be specifically named and punished. But by 1989 the Poles had sufficient experience with the politics of history and morality to shift toward a politics of programs, constituencies, bargaining, and compromise.154 In a collection of writings about Eastern Europe, Bronislaw Gere- mek--Solidarity floor leader in both houses of the Polish legislature and historian of medieval France--observed the place and importance of Katyn to the democratic, anti-Soviet revolution which had taken place in Poland: . . . When in addition the experiences of the last war are considered--the secret protocols to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, the invasion of Poland by the Red Army on September 17, 1939, the mass deportations of Poles, not to speak of the crimes committed on the Polish population, the best known, perhaps, the Katyn forest massacre of several thousand interned Polish officers that has become such a symbol in recent years--the Polish attitudes take on a new meaning. . . . . . . . Still, the rank injustice of the post-Yalta order, the memory of the Katyn massacre, the agony of the Warsaw uprising, fought in complete isolation, could never disappear from the Poles' social consciousness. . . .155 Accounting for Poles' postwar submission to Soviet rule, Geremek made another, very insightful observation: The attitudes of Polish society toward the new political order, especially among opinion-making circles and intellectual groups, reflected not only a feeling of resignation, stemming from the fact that Poland had been deserted by her Western allies, but from the conviction that it was absolutely necessary to change the country's social and political structures.156 In the meantime, Katyn's status as a significant historical event was certified by its inclusion in the basic reference source, Facts on File Encyclopedia of the 20th Century, published in 1991.157 In 1991, there was a spate of Poland-related articles in the Russian journal, International Affairs. N. Lebedeva authored another article, "Documents: Stalin, Sikorski, et al," appearing in the January 1991 issue.158 These were Soviet transcriptions of the 1941 Moscow meetings described previously. When, on 14 November 1941, Polish Government-in-Exile Ambassador Kot offered Stalin a list of the missing Polish officers known to have been at Starobielsk, Ostashkov, and Kozielsk, Stalin irritably brushed him aside with the (counter-)accu- satory retort that the Soviets had "released all the Poles, even those who had been coming to the USSR as Sikorski's agents to blow up bridges and kill Soviet people." Kot hastily changed the subject.159 Later, on 3 December 1941, after vaguely claiming to Sikorski and Anders that the missing Polish officers and cadets were somewhere in Manchuria and accepting a list of their names, Stalin said, "I am a bit of a brute, not a diplomat."160 Stalin's glibness is all the more remarkable, considering that the Battle for Moscow, 1941--and his own fate--was being decided only a dozen miles away, as he well knew. The January 1991 issue of International Affairs also included an article titled "View from Warsaw," by Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time. This was an analysis of current Soviet-Polish relations and what was necessary to improve them. Skubiszewski observed: It is in the interest of Polish-Soviet relations to relieve them of problems burdening them. A major advance in this respect was the Soviet Union's statement recognising [sic] Soviet responsibility for the military crimes committed against Polish military officers, in particular for the Katyn crime.161 In the June and May issues, Stepan Radevich's two-part series of articles, "The Case of Sixteen," was published. This dealt with the sixteen high level members of the Polish Government-in-Exile who were arrested, tortured, and imprisoned in 1945.162 Later, in December 1991, Radevich had his own article about Katyn in International Affairs, "`Mute Witnesses' Speak Up."163 Such interest in Polish affairs and reconciliation in a Russian foreign policy journal indicates Russians' clear recgonition of the vital significance of these contentious matters and the need to reconcile them. In 1992 the book The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, by Telford Taylor, was published. Taylor had been Chief Prosecutor for the Nuremberg war crimes trials and has since been a practicing attorney and Columbia Law School professor.164 Taylor spent a number of pages describing how the defense attorneys for the Nazi German defendants defeated Soviet efforts to convict their clients of guilt for the Katyn Massacre.165 According to Taylor, the Russian Chief Prosecutor, General R.A. Rudenko, even accused the Nuremberg Tribunal of "gross error" and violating its duty by allowing German defense attorneys to bring in witnesses to clear their nation of responsibility for Katyn. In fact, Rudenko so incensed the Tribunal's Western judges that the American judge, Francis Biddle, suggested that such language would have been cause for Rudenko being cited for contempt of court in the United States and that Rudenko should have been sent to prison for his impudence. Such an unexpectedly truculent Western defense of due process shocked the Russians and enabled the Germans to mount their successful effort to stalemate the Katyn charge.166 To understand in quantitative terms the recent realization of the importance of Katyn to 20th Century Polish and Soviet history and to the history of wartime and postwar foreign relations, a cursory survey of Katyn-related scholarly articles abstracted in the index Historical Abstracts is illuminating. Prior to the late 1980s, an article on Katyn appeared only once every five or so years. In the first half of 1992, alone, ten articles were indexed and abstracted.167 One of the most intriguing--and heartening--of these titles was "Niurnbergskii Bumerang [The Nuremberg Boomerang]," which appeared in Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal [Military History Journal] in 1990, written by a pair of Red Army military historians.168 Red Army military historians attacked Stalin's regime for its legal attempt at Nuremberg to bury the truth about the extermination of 15,000 Polish officers and cadets. Although this was consistent with much earlier revelations about and condemnations of the purges of the Red Army officer corps in the late 1930s, the historians' concern for victimized Poles was note- worthy. So, as we have seen in this and the previous chapters, the recognized significance of Katyn continues to grow in importance and widen in scope. It is important to note that the "historical revisionists'" sin has not been that they protested incompetent and/or criminal American con- duct in, for example, Vietnam or (more recently) in Central America--in those instances when it has occurred. (Doing so is no sin, of course, unless they have exaggerated or distorted--or falsified or uncritically disseminated falsifications of--such instances.) As long as any histo- rian sincerely seeks historical truth and finds it--no matter how ugly it may be--s/he has done credit to historical scholarship and his/her society and may also be helping to prevent recurrences of tragedy. However, in cases of which Katyn and Indochina are but two examples, some modern revisionist commentators and historians in the West (for political or other ulterior reasons, possibly) have uncon- scionably ignored, denied, or discounted--and thereby abetted-- calculated evils perpetrated by Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries and totalitarians. At best, in the case of Katyn, they may have overlooked a significant historical event because it seemed at the time of their writings to be only incidental, or for the same reason they may have used whatever information about it seemed most convenient to their concessionary theses. At worst, those historians who did understand the facts and impor- tance of Katyn, and were knowingly attempting to deny or undermine them, were consciously assisting the coverup of a heinous crime against a noble and victimized Western nation--and against humanity, in general--a coverup which was to become an intrinsic part of the crime itself and instrumental to its effectiveness. CHAPTER 5. THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF KATYN For the West, the Katyn Massacre was a signal, inceptive incident in the wartime doubt in Western minds about the motives and methods of the Soviet Union. The visualized image of prisoners-of-war, bound and gagged, being forced down onto stacks of fresh corpses of their murdered friends--heaped like so much garbage--then to be shot through the back of their heads was a specter which could not be comfortably or complete- ly ignored and forgotten. Such wartime disturbance and distrust served as a foundation for the postwar East-West antagonism which became known as "the cold war." Katyn was also important for its subsequent, periodic use as a compelling example of Marxist-Leninism's threat to liberal, Western society and institutions. Finally, it was significant as a professional, ethical challenge to Western intellectuals and to their institutions of inquiry. There is as well a perceptible parallel (and there may be a direct link) requiring further study, between the West's official and intellec- tual abandonment of Poland and indifference to the ultimate fate of its prisoners of war and the United States' similar abandonments of the Indochinese, the cause there for which so many young Americans died, and, possibly, of our MIAs, both in Korea and Vietnam.1 Particularly 137 poignant is the comment of former Soviet interrogators of American Korean War POWs: . . . Korotkov says he twice interrogated Americans, mainly about their backgrounds. He remembers talking to one American for over an hour: "Our plain goal was to try to recruit him, to get him to work for us. We didn't have any luck with the Americans. They were very secure and were sure they would be rescued and get back to the States."2 In most cases, these Americans' security and faith in their country would prove to be as false and ill-advised as that of 25,700 Poles in similar straits a decade earlier. Judging by the newest revelations about the apparent fate of many of our POWs in Vietnam and by how much political and economic expediency and self-interest drive American politics and policy, young American prisoners of war in the future can expect to be similarly abandoned and forgotten: victims of this perceptible pattern of coverup and betrayal. As Sir Owen O'Malley had profoundly observed in his June 1943 memorandum, when morality becomes separated from a nation's policies--in the name of Realpolitik and expediency--that nation loses its sense of purpose and legitimacy.3 (Indeed, one basic reason for the Nazis' dramatic, initial political and military successes was their strong sense of "moral purpose," albeit a transvalued one.) The coverup of Katyn--and, as Czech dissident intellectual (and later President) Vaclav Havel has realized and written, the coercion of subject peoples to repeat such lies, whether or not they actually believed them--came to be an integral part of the grisly crime itself.4 The knowing complicity of the West's governments, media, and intelligentsia in suppressing the truth about Katyn during the war and in often evading confrontation with the Soviets about it afterwards, for various reasons of expediency, was a conscious collaboration in the coverup--and, therefore, in the crime. It is worth speculating that much of the postwar Communist aggres- siveness and inhumanity--possibly not just against prisoners of war-- might have been deterred, if we in the West had earned Stalinists' respect by more assertively standing up for the human rights of the Poles, amidst the Second World War, as only we were able to do. There has been a perceptible pattern in the written interest in the Katyn Massacre in the West, described in the preceding sections of this thesis. Among Polish exiles in the West, interest in--rather, outrage at--the Soviets' extermination of their "best and brightest" was high, continuous, and well-documented in English as well as Polish sources.5 Among Poles in their own country, the interest was also intense and continuous, but until the late 1980s it was unwritten, except for pre- vious Soviet Bloc documents and publications accusing the Nazis of the killings.6 With the exception of a few anti-Stalinist intellectuals, Soviet responsibility for Katyn was generally disbelieved or unknown by Russians until "glasnost" and democracy forced a moral and public reckoning with the truth of that and other Stalinist exterminations. In the West, public interest in Katyn was high in 1943 (with the initial shock of the killings and their diplomatic implications), during the U.S. Congressional hearings in 1952, and from 1980 onward, when Katyn became a Polish Solidarity issue and an ultimate test of the credibility of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's program and promise of "Glasnost." However, from the mid-1950s to 1979--despite Professor Janusz Zawodny's seminal book, Death in the Forest, published in 1962-- Katyn, the truth about it, and its importance were largely forgotten or ignored by the public and even by many historians. In Britain, there was the momentary interest in the early and middle 1970s, when the O'Malley memorandum was declassified and when the Labor Government refused to send a representative to attend the unveiling of the Katyn memorial in London. It was not until the late 1980s, when Katyn became the "litmus test" of the credibility of Gorbachev's policy of "Glasnost," that the pivotal, political (and therefore historical) significance of this 1940 massacre finally came to the fore and was fully understood and estab- lished. Indeed, it was in March 1989 that the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union recognized the powerful and profound threat to their crumbling empire posed by the truth of Katyn. Desperately, they created the special committee of Falin, Kryuchkov, and Shevardnadze to deal with Katyn by attempting to keep it an "academic" issue. Indeed, on 20 October 1992 Polish President Lech Walesa described on Polish television how Katyn had become a "test of truth," indicating the sincerity of the Soviets in their relations with the Poles.7 Katyn was so powerful an issue that it could even be readily and effectively used at the level of local American politics for educating and cautioning citizens about Soviet methods and intentions.8 In fact, Katyn may be an example of a "domino effect" of history affecting subsequent political movements and affairs, rather than the record of history being written according to the desires and expedi- encies of subsequent political powers and intellectual fashions. The efforts of Communist governments and the 1960s and 1970s generation of "revisionist" historians to minimize or deny the truth of Katyn failed completely. Indeed, the apparent ploy of "Khatyn," actually backfired. In the case of the Katyn Massacre, the past proved to be too powerful to be censored or otherwise "controlled." As a scholarly issue in the West, Soviet guilt for the Katyn Massacre was thoroughly investigated and conclusively established as a Soviet atrocity by Professor Zawodny's book in 1962. Thereafter, Katyn was mentioned in insightful and/or comprehensive treatments of Second World War diplomacy, histories of Soviet foreign policy, and surveys of the origins of the Cold War--by many "traditionalist," and even some "revisionist," historians. However, even when the latter type of histo- rians actually tried to deny, confuse, or minimize Soviet responsibility for Katyn (and the implications of it), their efforts to do so were only substantiating the massacre's moral and historical significance. To their everlasting discredit, there was never any genuine, concerted demand by Western historians and other intellectuals for any Soviet--or even Western!--government to tell the truth of Katyn. Moreover, as attested by public opinion polls, a significant percentage of the peoples of Great Britain and the United States--at the time of the massacre--suspected the Soviets were capable of such killings and of further such behavior, far sooner and more realistically than many of their politicians and intellectuals. Indeed, the apparent attempt by certain "revisionist" scholars in the West to deny or obscure--to thereby collaborate in the coverup of-- the truth of Soviet guilt for Katyn qualifies them, in my view, for consideration as "accessories after the fact" in a moral and intellec- tual (if not legal) sense. The Soviets could not have gotten away with their coverup of Katyn for as long as they did without their active (or passive) complicity. Whether or not these "revisionist historians" approved of mass murder, for whatever political cause, their disservice to the scholarly pursuit of truth was most grave. In the case of Katyn, the Soviets were simply operating (ruthlessly, covertly, and duplici- tously) in accord with their Marxist-Leninist principles; whereas complicitous Western intellectuals were apparently betraying theirs. Many in the West, particulary scholars, may feel smug that the historical truth about--if not justice for--Katyn has finally won out. However, Katyn (with the other, related killings in the Soviet Union, totalling 26,000 Polish victims) was a very effective NKVD extermination of a significant portion of the anti-Communist, nationalist leadership element of Polish society--thoroughly in keeping with Marxist-Leninist theory and practice about the "liquidation" of class enemies. Since the Soviet NKVD's elimination of the backbone of Poland's prewar, anti- Soviet leadership at Katyn facilitated the Soviet subjugation of Poland for more than forty years, it seems to have been a highly successful genocidal act of statecraft as well. As writer Mark Frankland said, Katyn indeed was, for too many, "a truth that is told too late." Although references to Katyn in the context of Hungary's struggles have been documented in this study, further research will be required to substantiate my hypothesis that the NKVD extermination of the Polish intelligentsia in 1940 was significant not only to the postwar subjuga- tion of Poland, but also served as the unspoken and understood example to would-be anti-Communist activists throughout the Soviet empire of the grim, anonymous fate that awaited them if they misbehaved. The Bloc-wide intimidating effect of the Katyn Massacre, and the importance of the enforcement of its coverup by the Soviet NKVD/KGB, is indirectly evidenced by the issue's key role in undermining the politi- cal credibility of the Polish Communist government and Soviet political and military control over Poland after the Poles realized they no longer had to fear retribution for raising the issue. By summer 1989, the Polish people had thus succeeded in defying Soviet terror and had regained their moral and political sovereignty, and the rest of the Eastern European satellites could no longer be contained. Even the Germans realized they could then reunite with impunity. For the West, however, Katyn serves as a grim indicator of the moral weakness and practical impotence of the West's political and intellectual leaders and institutions in dealing with a careful, calculating totalitarian regime prepared to use mass extermination as a tool. In the United States, Katyn eventually became one of many grim goads and reminders which provoked the successful resistance to and containment of Soviet Bloc aggressions. However, if democratic, humanitarian leaders and institutions are to be productive and respected--if they (and we) are to survive with our open societies and market economies--they must be able to recognize and to punish or prevent injustices and injury against humanity and, no less importantly, against the environment. Katyn, and unremitting episodes of genocide as have since occurred in Cambodia and in what was Yugoslavia, bear more bleak witness that the West's liberal philosophy and institutions, and its leadership of the world, may be inadequate to address effectively the increasingly critical challenges and crises confronting us. Indeed, the true moral horror of the Katyn Massacre (for those who may subscribe to humanitarian values) is that, as an active measure to exterminate permanently a nationalist Polish leadership class trouble- some to the Soviet empire--and later, to compromise the integrity of Western authorities by gaining their collaboration in the coverup of that--Katyn was so entirely effective and successful. Only in the 1980s, when the Soviet juggernaut had been coincidentally halted by Western solidarity and force in places like Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua--as well as in the European nuclear confrontation--did Soviet repression of Eastern Europe weaken to the extent that truth and freedom could finally win out. The Katyn episode has been symptomatic of how the West's ethical crisis is rooted in the intellectual professions' misvaluation of argu- mentation and form over truth and content. In some cases, ulterior political motives may have prompted demands for unreasonably high stan- dards of proof in the case of Katyn--demands which paralyzed any momen- tum toward a recognized consensus on the facts of the historical case. Only recently, in the outrage against "revisionists" who have attempted to minimize and deny the Jewish Holocaust, have we seen an increase in concern about the ethical and social dangers of irresponsible history. Katyn also demonstrates a lack of concern about the fate of (Allied) military professionals on the part of Western intelligentsia and governments. Our society's apparent, subsequent abandonments of American MIAs in Korea and Indochina for the sake of political expedi- ency were entirely consistent with our ready, wartime abandonment of the Poles.9 A society cannot long survive the realization, by its defenders and/or allies, that betrayal will be their ultimate reward--nor does it deserve to. With the developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s and the advantage of hindsight, it should now be obvious to anyone that the Katyn Massacre was significant enough that its mention is merited in forthcoming studies of twentieth century Poland or the Soviet Union, of the politics and diplomacy of the Second World War, of the national diplomacies of Poland, the Soviet Union, Germany, Great Britain, or the United States, or of the Cold War. It is also apparent that this should have been realized much sooner, after the 1962 publication of Janusz Zawodny's book, Death in the Forest. As to the final significance of Katyn for the Polish and former Soviet peoples themselves, Louisa Vinton eloquently observed: . . . the purifying power of the final truth about the Katyn Massacre. Yeltsin's gesture [of releasing the conclusive Katyn documents] may have begun transforming Katyn from a negative symbol of oppression and deception into what [Polish President] Walesa has called a positive "symbol of sincerity between our nations."10 NOTES PREFACE pp. vii-xi 1. Louis Fitzgibbon. Katyn. (New York: Scribner's, 1971), 102- 3. 2. Stewart Steven, The Poles, (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 135; and Allen Paul, Katyn, The Untold Story of Stalin's Polish Massacre, (New York: Scribner's, 1991) 224. 3. David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 88-90. 4. The most reputable estimate, thus far, was done by Dr. Iosif (Joseph) Dyadkin, a geophysicist in Kalinin, in 1976. From birth and death rates, Dyadkin conservatively estimated that up to twenty million people had died of political persecution from 1927 to 1940. The post- Soviet examination of NKVD/KGB archives may drive that figure up much higher. Iosif G. Dyadkin, Unnatural Deaths in the USSR, 1928-1954, (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Books, 1983), 60. For his statistical efforts, Dr. Dyadkin was sentenced in 1981 to three years in a labor camp. In the conclusion of his introduction, Nick Eberstadt--a translator of Dyadkin's little book and a faculty member at the Harvard Center for Population Studies--observed, "Iosif Dyadkin has become a victim of the terror apparatus whose results he attempted to quantify." Ibid., 9-10. 5. Specifically, this author believes that the relative priority of worldwide concern about human rights and (economic and social) jus- tice will decline precipitously, as our environmental and social crises (resulting from human overpopulation and wantonness) become more acute. 6. Janusz K. Zawodny, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre, (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame, 1962). CHAPTER 1. Introduction: The Katyn Massacre pp. 1-9 1. Vera Tolz, "The Katyn Documents and the CPSU Hearings," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, No. 44, 6 November 1992, 27- 38. 2. Isvestiya, 1 November 1939; as quoted in Paul, 64. 3. Tolz, 31. 4. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. The Katyn Forest Massacre, Hearings before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session, on Investigations of the Murder of Thousands of Polish Officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk, Russia, Part 6, (Exhibits 32 and 33 Presented to the Committee in London by the Polish Government in Exile, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), 1651. 5. Ibid., 1651. 6. Ibid., 1651n. 7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 9. 8. "Stalin also hated the Poles. They had defeated Lenin in 1920 when the Red Army had been humiliated before Warsaw and forced to retreat far into White Russia and the Ukraine." (Norman Stone, "Katyn: The Heart of Stalin's Darkness," The Sunday Times [London], 15 April 1990.) 9. Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy: A Pattern in Poland, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), 34. By invading Poland, the Soviets violated their 1932 nonaggression pact with Poland (which had been extended to 31 December 1945), as well as the 1929 Treaty of Paris, outlawing war, which they had signed. Ibid., 18-9, 35. 10. Times (London), 23 September 1939, as cited in Keith Sword, "Soviet Occupation of Eastern Europe," Slavonic and East European Review, January 1991, 93. 11. Sunday Express, 24 September 1939, as cited in Keith Sword, "Soviet Occupation of Eastern Poland," Slavonic and East European Review, January 1991, 81-101. 12. Lukas, Forgotten Holocaust, 38. 13. Richard C. Lukas, The Forgotten Holocaust: The Poles under German Occupation, 1939-1944, (Lexington KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1986, 38-9. 14. Ibid., 8-9. 15. Ibid., 5. 16. Simon Schochet, An Attempt to Identify the Polish-Jewish Officers Who Were Prisoners in Katyn, (New York: Yeshiva University, 1989), 16. 17. Zawodny, 5. 18. Wladyslaw Anders, An Army in Exile, (London: Macmillan, 1949), 10-1. 19. Rozek, 50. 20. Israel Goldfliess, "Outbreak of the German-Russian War," in B.F. Sabrin, Alliance for Murder: The Nazi-Ukrainian Nationalist Partnership in Genocide (New York: Sarpedon, 1991), 44. 21. Joseph Einleger, "The Annihilation of the Trembowla Jewish Community," in Sabrin, 138-9. 22. Schochet, 3. 23. Robert Conquest, interview by Louis R. Coatney, 18 June 1992. 24. Nicholas Bethell, "The Cold Killers of Kalinin," The Times (London), 6 October 1991, 23. 25. Eugenjusz Andrei Komorowski, Night Never Ending, (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1974), 120. 26. Zawodny, 149-50. 27. George Watson, "Rehearsal for the Holocaust?," Commentary, June 1981, 60. Watson was a Cambridge University history professor. 28. Robert Conquest, Stalin: Breaker of Nations, (New York: Viking, 1991), 229. 29. A couple of the principal histories of the Russian Front--The Great Patriotic War, as the Russian people remember it--provide interesting contrasts, regarding the order to execute captured Soviet political commissars: "The directive dated May 12, 1941, requiring instant killing of all captured political workers, is one of the most disgraceful documents issued by the German High Command." P.N. Pospelov and others, eds., Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945: A General Outline (Moscow: Progress, 1974), 28; "The liquidation of the commissars, communist intelligentsia, gypsies, Jews and civilian hostages in the early stages of the war was to be followed by Fuehrerbefehle, . . . . The Soviet High Command and Red Army troops were of course equally guilty of similar barbarity. Never in modern times was a war to be waged so piteously." Albert Seaton, The Russo- German War 1941-45 (New York: Praeger, 1970), 55. Stalin's prewar trials and executions or enslavements of "enemies of the people" were no secret, particularly to those who supported him-- in the Soviet Union or in the West. 30. John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 107n. 31. Boris Levytsky, The Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Police, 1917-1970, (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1972), 150. 32. Svetlana Alliluyeva, Only One Year, (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 390. 33. Rozek, 39. 34. Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-1941, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 612. 35. Dmitri Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, edited and translated by Harold Shukman, (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), 360- 1. 36. Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present, (New York: Summit Books, 1982), 341-2. This quotation is an interesting contrast to another, similar one by Molotov on Page 1 of this study. 37. "1: the use of deliberate systematic measures (as killing, bodily or mental injury, unlivable conditions, prevention of births) calculated to bring about the extermination of a racial, political, or cultural group or to destroy the language, religion, or culture of a group . . . ." Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, (Springfield MA: Merriam-Webster, 1986. 38. Katyn. Dokumenty Ludobojstwa (Katyn: Documents of Genocide), (Warsaw: Instytut Studiow Politycznych PAN, 1992); as cited in Louisa Vinton, "The Katyn Documents: Politics and History," Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Report 2, January 1993, 19n. CHAPTER 2. Katyn as a Second World War Issue pp. 10-39 1. Polish Cultural Foundation, The Crime of Katyn: Facts & Documents, with a Foreword by General Wladyslaw Anders, (London: The Foundation, 1965), facing 80, 87. 2. Polish Cultural Foundation, vi-vii. 3. Zawodny, 10. 4. Martin F. Herz, Beginnings of the Cold War, (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1966), 43. 5. Martin Kitchen, British Policy towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War, (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), 152-3. 6. Zawodny, 15. 7. "General Sikorski with Mr. Churchill," The Times, (London), 16 April 1943, 3; and "Nazis Accuse Russians," New York Times, 4. 8. "Russia and Poland," [editorial], The Times, (London), 28 April 1943, 5. 9. As quoted in Paul, 224. 10. Zawodny, 31. 11. Rozek, 128. 12. Clark-Kerr to Foreign Office, 21 April 1943, FO 371/34569, fo. 64; quoted in Roy Douglas, From War to Cold War, 1942-48, (New York: St. Martin's, 1981), 18. 13. Rozek, 98-101. 14. "Row with the Reds," Newsweek, 3 May 1943, 44. 15. "Poles vs. Reds: Allied Unity Put to Test by Row over Officer Dead," Newsweek, 29 May 1943, 29. Actually, surprise cavalry attacks on unsupported German tank formations by gasoline bomb-toting cavalry troopers were often successful and not at all as absurd as conventional wisdom assumed. 16. "Lesson in Maneuver," Time, 10 May 1943, 35. 17. "Soviet-Polish Break: Old Border Quarrels Should Not Tempt Us to Turn Our Back on Europe's Problems Again," Life, 10 May 1943, 30. 18. Waverly Root, The Secret History of the War, Vol. 3, Casablanca to Katyn, (New York: Scribner's, 1946), 445-7; and, much later, Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945, (New York: Random House, 1968), 104-6. 19. As quoted in Root, (1946), 447. 20. William L. O'Neill, A Better World: The Great Schism: Stalinism and the American Intellectuals, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 98-99. 21. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 759. 22. Paul, 314-15. 23. Rozek, 133. 24. Paul, 227. 25. As quoted in David Irving, Accident: The Death of General Sikorski, (London: William Kimber, 1967), 33. See the following chapter for Churchill's comments on Katyn in Hinge of Fate, vol. 4 of his history of the Second World War. 26. Zawodny, 38. 27. Rozek, 132-82. 28. As cited in Paul, 303. 29. Ibid., 302. 30. "One week later, the White House staff confirmed that the document had been handed to Roosevelt." Ibid., 307. 31. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 1, The Gathering Storm, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 135. Churchill presented this tidbit in The Gathering Storm, writing that it had been "heretofore" unknown. He didn't say when he heard it or from whom. However, later in that same volume, he described his discussion of Russia's prewar defense treaty maneuvering in depth with Stalin during their August 1942 meeting in Moscow. Ibid., 391. 32. John Bartlett, comp., Familiar Quotations: A Collection of Passages, Phrases, and Proverbs Traced to Their Sources in Ancient and Modern Literature, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 766. 33. George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, (Boston MA: Little, Brown, 1961), 360. 34. Fitzgibbon, 155-8. 35. Zawodny, 91-3. 36. Ibid., 110, 114. 37. Ibid., 91. 38. Ibid., 90-1. 39. Michael Binyon, "Katyn Veteran Tells of Secret Police Murders," The Times, 7 October 1991, 8. 40. Lukas, 179. However, see the commentary later in this study on the recent books by David Engel, for a different view of Polish- Jewish relations. 41. "American Polish Leaders Brand Russia a Nation of Liars and Old Conspirators," Chicago Tribune, 28 April 1943, 19. 42. U.S. Congress. Senate. Congressional Record (19 April 1943), 3543. 43. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Congressional Record (20 April 1943), 3607. 44. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Congressional Record (16 April 1943), A1885. 45. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Congressional Record (19 April 1943), A1933-4. 46. U.S. Congress. Senate. Congressional Record (29 April 1943), 2067. 47. U.S. Congress. Senate. Congressional Record (7 May 1943), A2247. 48. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Congressional Record (7 May 1943), A2309. 49. Zawodny, 184. 50. Buck Long and Lawrence V. Cott, "Allen Cranston's Big Lies," The American Spectator, April 1990, 16-8. Cranston's pro-Soviet behavior in this and other episodes was recently chronicled, although he adroitly evaded censure during the Congressional hearings in 1951. Hearings, Pt. 7, 2022-35, 2174-96,2272-93. 51. Donald MacKenzie, "The War Today," Macomb Daily Journal, 27 April 1943, 4. 52. "British Try to Patch up Polish-Red Rukus," Macomb Daily Journal, 29 April 1943, 1. 53. "Foreign Affairs," Facts on File, 1943, 123K. 54. "Churchill Predicts Free Poland," Facts on File, 1943, 140D. 55. "A. SOVIET UNION--POLAND.--Detailed description," Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 4, 1940-1943, 5731. 56. Roman Pucinski, interview by Louis R. Coatney, 20 March 1992. 57. Hearings, 2080. 58. David Irving, Accident: The Death of General Sikorski, (London: William Kimber, 1967). 59. Paul, 239. 60. "Russia: A Day in the Forest," Time, 7 February 1944, 27-8. 61. John H. Lauck, Katyn Killings: In the Record, (Clifton NJ: Kingston, 1988), 79. 62. Zawodny, 82. 63. "Russia Must Choose," Time, 20 March 1944, 20. 64. Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature, July 1943-April 1945, 1307. 65. Szymczak, 145. 66. Rozek, 235. 67. Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 389. 68. Lukas, 218-9. 69. Rozek, 263-4. 70. "Defeat of Patriots at Warsaw Widens Polish-Russian Breach," Newsweek, 16 October 1944, 48. 71. Zawodny, 152-3. With similar, disarming alacrity in Spring 1942, Roosevelt had easily deflected reporters' questions about the source of the Dootlittle Raid on Japan with a charmingly airy reference to "Shangri-La." 72. Public Opinion Quarterly, October 1939, 600. 73. Public Opinion Quarterly, June 1940, 357. 74. Public Opinion Quarterly, Fall 1941, 471. 75. Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter 1941, 675. 76. Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1942, 152. 77. Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1943, 334. 78. Warren B. Walsh, "What the American People Think of Russia," Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter 1944-45, 513-22. Dr. Walsh was at the time Assistant Professor of History at Syracuse University and Chairman of its Board of Russian Studies. 79. Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter 1944-45, 518. 80. Ibid., 520. 81. Ibid., 522. 82. Rozek, 98-102. 83. "Massacre Fraud Disclosed," Facts on File, 1945, 207M. The index entry read "fake Russian massacre;" Facts on File, 1945, Annual Index, 60. 84. Rozek, 338-9. 85. As quoted in Rozek, 340. 86. Rozek, 370-1. 87. White had already authored They Were Expendable, the definitive wartime account of early U.S. Navy patrol torpedo (PT) boat operations in the Pacific War. 88. William L. White, Report on the Russians, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1945), 127-34. 89. Roman Pucinski, interview with Louis R. Coatney, 20 March 1992. 90. O'Neill, 90-2. 91. Saturday Review of Literature 28, 14 April 1945, 21. 92. Christian Science Monitor, 20 March 1945, 12. 93. New Republic 112, 19 January 1945, 392. 94. White, 133. 95. Charles F. Croog, "FBI Political Surveillance and the Isolationist-Interventionist Debate, 1939-1941," The Historian 54, Spring 1992, 455. 96. There is further indication that William L. White himself was no rightwing extremist. In 1948, his book Lost Boundaries was published. It was the anti-racist account of the effect on a youth of his discovery that his family was Black. 97. William L. White, "Report on the Russians," in two parts, Reader's Digest, December 1944, 102-22, and January 1945, 106-28. 98. Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present, (New York: Summit Books, 1982), 407. 99. Edmund Stevens, Russia Is No Riddle, (New York: Greenberg, 1945), 294-5. 100. Edmund Stevens, This Is Russia--Uncensored, (New York: Didier, 1950), vii. 101. Ibid., 98. 102. Ibid., 99. 103. Ibid., 196. 104. Stevens, 1945, 299. 105. "Why Young Bill White Became Expendable," Saturday Evening Post, 26 May 1945, 112. 106. Zawodny, 65. 107. There is confusion about Dr. Markov's first name. Not even intials are given in the Polish Government-in-Exile's report to the Select Committee. Hearings, pt. 6, 1733. Furthermore, the photograph of his signature on the German-sponsored forensics commission document of findings shows no first name or initials, as reproduced in S.L. Mayer, Hitler's Wartime Picture Magazine: Signal, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), sixth (unnumbered) page from the end. In The Murderers of Katyn, Vladimir Abarinov lists his name as "Marko" Markov. Vladimir Abarinov, The Murderers of Katyn, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1993), 298. In The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, Telford Taylor lists Markov's first name as "Antonov." Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 471. 108. Fitzgibbon, 175-7. 109. Zawodny, 64-74. 110. "July 2: Nuremberg," Facts on File, 212K-L. CHAPTER 3. Katyn as a Postwar Public and Political Issue in the West pp. 40-80 1. "`You Cannot Shoot Us All,'" Time, 28-9. 2. See James William Crowl, Angels in Stalin's Paradise: Western Reporters in Soviet Russia, 1917 to 1937, A Case Study of Louis Fischer and Walter Duranty. Washington DC: University Press of America, 1982. 3. Root, 419-64. 4. Ibid., 459. 5. Ibid., 456-7. 6. Martha Mautner, interview with Louis R. Coatney, 20 May 92. 7. Helena Sikorska, The Dark Side of the Moon, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), 226. 8. Ibid., 277-8. 9. Arthur Bliss Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed: An American Ambassador Reports to the American People, (Belmont MA: Western Islands, 1948), 19. 10. Ibid., 255. 11. Wladyslaw Anders, An Army in Exile: The Story of the Second Polish Corps (London: Macmillan, 1949); and Josef Czapski, The Mystery of Katyn (Bombay: The Indo-Polish Library, 1946). 12. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland, (New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill, 1948), 38. 13. "Polish Tragedy," Time, 25 July 1949, 82. 14. Anders, 85. 15. Ibid., 119-20. 16. Ibid., 140. 17. Ibid., 90, 112-3. 18. Ibid., 118. 19. Joseph Mackiewicz, The Katyn Wood Murders, (London: Hollis & Carter, 1951), 168. 20. Ibid., 56. 21. Ibid., 230-1. 22. Robert Szymczak, "The Unquiet Dead: The Katyn Forest Massacre as an Issue in American Diplomacy and Politics," Ph.D. diss., (Carnegie- Mellon University, 1980), 189. 23. Zawodny, 196n. 24. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 759. 25. Ibid., 760. 26. Zawodny, 186. 27. Ibid., 187, 190; and Szymczak, 195, 198. 28. Szymczak, 212. 29. Zawodny, 257-66. 30. This was sooner than February 1952, as planned, because testimony had to be taken hurriedly from Lieutenant Colonel Donald Stewart before he left for duty in Japan; Hearings, Pt. 1, 1. 31. Roman Pucinski, Interview by Louis R. Coatney, 20 March 1992. 32. Van Vliet's lineage was determined from the Register of Graduates and Former Cadets of the United States Military Academy, (West Point NY: Association of Graduates, 1990), 447, and my 6 November 1992 telephone interview of him. Some of General Bissell's comments on the mysterious loss of the 22 May 1945 Van Vliet report are in the Hearings, Pt. 7, 1850-4. 33. Final Report, 29. 34. Ibid., 29. 35. Ibid., 8. 36. Ibid., 11. Interestingly, though, Van Vliet himself still supports Bissell's 1945 decision to bury the report in the files. According to Van Vliet, the overriding concern of that moment was the million or so troops the Japanese had in Manchuria, with which they could have made an invasion of the Japanese home islands even more prohibitively expensive than they would have been anyway. The Soviet land invasion of Manchuria, to pin these troops down--the Soviets did indeed annihilate the supposedly elite Japanese "Kwantung Army" in a textbook operation of mobile, armored, "deep battle" that would have gladdened purged Red Army Marshal and theoretician M.N. Tukhachevsky-- was seen as vital to the success of the impending United Nations seaborne invasion and to the moderation of Allied casualties. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., interview with Louis R. Coatney, 6 November 1992. 37. Hearings, Pt. 7, 2309. 38. Paul, 312. 39. Van Vliet, John H., Jr., Interview by Louis R. Coatney, 6 November 1992. 40. U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation and Study of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, Final Report, 82d Congress, 2d Session, 1952, House Report No. 2505, 37. 41. Ibid., 12. 42. "Katyn Killings: The Real Story," U.S. News and World Report, 5 December 1952, 22. 43. G.F. Hudson, "Who Is Guilty of the Katyn Massacre? Examination of the Evidence Leaves Little Room for Doubt," The Readers Digest (July 1952): 127-30. 44. "Katyn Forest Massacre: Alleged Statement by Mr. Stalin's Son," Times (London), 21 April 1952, 5b. 45. Facts on File, 1950, 212P. For reasons he still does not understand, Van Vliet had been ordered in 1948 or 1949, while stationed at Fort Lewis, WA, to rewrite his report on Katyn for the Department of the Army. John H. Van Vliet, Jr., interview with Louis R. Coatney, 6 November 1992. 46. Facts on File, 1951, 297F. 47. Facts on File, 1952, 78M, 125L, 135L-M. 48. Ibid., 206J-L. 49. Konrad Syrop, Spring in October: The Story of the Polish Revolution, 1956, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), 4. 50. Ibid., 146. 51. Tom Dooley, Dr. Tom Dooley's Three Great Books: Deliver Us from Evil, The Edge of Tomorrow, The Night They Burned the Mountain (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1970), 17-18. 52. Dooley, 78. 53. Ibid., 33. 54. H.C. Wolfe, Saturday Review of Literature 45, 24 November 1962, 39; as quoted in Book Review Digest, 1963, 1106. 55. Seymour Freidin, The Forgotten People, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962), 24. 56. United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume III, Diplomatic Papers, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 372-4. 57. Ibid., 395-6. 58. Alexander Werth, Russia at War: 1941-1945, (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1964), 662. 59. Polish Cultural Foundation, 229-40. 60. Edward Crankshaw in Khrushchev Remembers, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 136. 61. Fitzgibbon, 183. 62. "Poland: Death in Katyn Forest," Time, 17 July 1972, 31. 63. Louis Fischer, The Road to Yalta: Soviet Foreign Relations, 1941-1945, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 76-89. 64. Crowl, op. cit. 65. Peter Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror: Russian Bodyguards from the Tsars to the Commissars, (New Rochelle NY: Arlington House, 1972), 218. 66. Crister S. and Stephen A. Garrett, "Death and Politics: The Katyn Forest Massacre and American Foreign Policy," East European Quarterly 20, Winter 1986, 443. 67. "Khatyn," The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Vol. 28 (New York: Macmillan, 1983), 577b. 68. "Nixon Sees Khatyn, a Soviet Memorial, Not Katyn Forest," Time, 2 July 1974, 3. 69. Joseph O. Douglass, Jr., "Soviet Strategic Deception," in Raymond S. Sleeper, Mesmerized by the Bear: The Soviet Strategy of Deception (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1987), 225-6. 70. "Katyn Memorial: Cover up," The Economist, 25 September 1976, 26-7. 71. "Almost Certainly by Russia," The Economist, 25 September 1976, 26. 72. "Katyn Memorial: Cover up," The Economist, 25 September 1976, 26-7; and Who's Who, 1993: An Annual Biographical Dictionary (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 353. 73. Timothy Garton Ash, The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, (New York: Scribner's, 1983), 40. In the preface to his 1988 book, The World that FDR Built, Edward Mortimer specifically thanked Ash whose spoken and written views on Germany and Eastern Europe he found to be "immensely illuminating as well as entertaining." Edward Mortimer, The World that FDR Built, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), ix. 74. John Darnton, "Polish Dissidents Quietly Mourn Wartime Massacre," New York Times, 4 May 1980, 3. 75. Thomas S. Szayna, "Addressing `Blank Spots' in Polish-Soviet Relations," Problems of Communism, November-December 1988, 50. 76. In his 15 April 1990 Sunday Times article, Oxford University Professor of Modern History Norman Stone wrote, regarding the importance of Katyn after its discovery, "Katyn then became the greatest symbol of Polish-Soviet enmity." Norman Stone, "Katyn: The Heart of Stalin's Darkness," Sunday Times [London], 15 April 1990. 77. Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism, Nationalism, Anti- Semitism, (New York: Karz-Cohl Publishing, 1982), 64. 78. Ibid., 65. 79. Ibid., 59n. 80. Jan Krok-Paszkowski, Portrait of Poland: With 78 Color Plates, Photographs by Bruno Barbey (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1982), 166-7. 81. John F. Burns, "Soviet Union Irked by Nordic Visitors: Some in an Antinuclear Group Boycott Rally over Link to World War II Massacre," New York Times, 1 August 1982, 4. 82. James O. Watkins, Jr., "Presbyterian Peacemaking Program," Auke Talk, October 1984, unp. 83. Ralph K. White, Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of U.S.-Soviet Relations, (New York: Free Press, 1984), 230-1. 84. Szayna, 38. 85. Andrew Tarnowski, "Poles Challenge Soviets to Open Files on Katyn Massacre," Washington Times, 23 March 1988. 86. Charles J. Gans, "Polish Official Raises Issue of World War II Massacre," Juneau Empire, 11 March 1988. 87. "For a Polish-Russian Dialogue: An Open Letter," New York Review, 28 April 1988, 60. 88. Tarnowski. 89. Szayna, 53. 90. Ibid., 55. 91. John H. Lauck, Katyn Killings: In the Record, (Clifton NJ: Kingston, 1988). 92. Louis R. Coatney, "Sunday, April 24th: A Day to Remember Katyn," Juneau Empire, 21 April 1988, 5. 93. Steve Cowper, Governor of Alaska, "Executive Proclamation: A Day to Remember Katyn, 1 April 1988" (Juneau AK), [30 April 1988]. 94. Alexander Cockburn, "Purging Stalin: Revisionists Are out to Bump up the Number of Stalin's Victims. Alexander Cockburn Recounts the Millions," New Statesman & Society, 3 March 1989, 17. 95. Ibid., 17. While Cockburn may not have the scholarly stature of a D. F. Fleming, or even a Gabriel Kolko, his article was published in a widely read magazine. In fact, he had stirred up enough contro- versy with his views that, in October 1989, commentator Christopher Hutchins wrote an article appearing in Nation magazine, purporting to defend Cockburn from accusations of Stalinism. Christopher Hutchins, "Minority Report, " Nation, 9 October 1989, 375. 96. William Echikson, "Katyn: The `Blank Space' Soviet Leader Did Not Fill," Christian Science Monitor, 12 July 1988, 7. 97. Robert Pear, "Book on Massacre of Poles Gets U.S. Funding," New York Times, 18 September 1988, 4. During our interview, Dr. Zawod- ny--who has refrained from direct, partisan involvement in the political issue of Katyn--shared his scholar's sense of sublime satisfaction that his book needed no correction for inaccuracies, whatsoever, for its republication. There was a minor addendum, describing more recent information on the location of the killing sites for the prisoners from the other two internment camps, but Zawodny's objective rendering of the facts of Katyn known in 1962 had proven to be definitive. Dr. Janusz K. Zawodny, Interview by Louis R. Coatney, 13 December 1993. 98. "Soviets Blamed in '42 [sic] Massacre," Chicago Tribune, 17 February 1989, 4. The title was in Louisa Vinton's article, "The Katyn Documents: Politics and History," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 4, 27n. 99. "Historian: Soviets behind Massacre," Macomb Journal, 22 August 1989, 11. 100. "Moscow Paper Blames Soviets in 1940 Deaths," New York Times, 23 March 1990, A9. 101. Rudolph Chelminski, "Katyn: Anatomy of a Massacre," Reader's Digest, May 1990, 73. 102. Buck Long and Lawrence V. Cott, "Allen Cranston's Big Lies," The American Spectator, April 1990, 16-8. The political assessment of The American Spectator is made in Magazines for Libraries: Seventh Edition, by Bill and Linda Sternberg Katz, eds., (New Providence NJ: R.R.Bowker, 1992), 859. 103. Paul, 339. 104. Although Stone's article was generally accurate, there were mistakes in detail. For example, he wrongly associated the Inter- national Red Cross with the Germans' "international commission." Norman Stone, "Katyn: The Heart of Stalin's Darkness," Sunday Times (London), 15 April 1990. 105. Bernard Levin, "Britain's Complicity in a Chronicle of Shame," Times (London), 23 April 1990, 12. 106. Paul, 219. 107. Ibid., xi. 108. Nicholas Bethell, "The Cold Killers of Kalinin," Observer (London), 6 October 1991, 23. 109. Abarinov, 329. 110. "Pact with Russia Angers Some Poles: Draft Is Silent on Questions of Stalin's Acts during War," New York Times, 22 May 1992, A7. 111. David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 451. 112. Ibid. 113. Mark Frankland, The Patriots' Revolution: How Eastern Europe Toppled Communism and Won Its Freedom (Chicago IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1992), 33. 114. Ibid., 163. 115. Celestine Bohlen, "Russian Files Show Stalin Ordered Massacre of 20,000 Poles in 1940," New York Times, 15 October 1992, 1,6. 116. "Moscow's Statement on Katyn Massacres," 6 October 1991, New York Times, 6. 117. Andrew Nagorski, "At Last, a Victory for Truth: Moscow Admits to an Infamous Massacre," Newsweek, 26 October 1992, 41. 118. Ibid. 119. Tolz, 27-33. 120. Vinton, 19. 121. Ibid., 20. 122. Ibid., 21. 123. Ibid., 24. 124. Ibid., 25-6. 125. Ibid., 26. 126. Ibid., 27. 127. Ibid. 128. Ibid., 28. 129. Ibid., 29. 130. Ibid., 31. 131. Vladimir Abarinov, The Murderers of Katyn (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1993), 287. 132. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, (New York: Scribner's, 1993). 133. Bernard Levin, "Stalin's Authorised Massacre: History Will Not Believe That Men of Our Century Could Organise Mass Murder in Cold Blood as the Russians Did at Katyn," Times (London), 13 April 1993, 14. 134. "Said Delores Apodaca Alfond, president of the National Alliance of Families, and organization that has long accused both Washington and Hanoi of duplicity on the POW-MIA issue: `Finally, we've found the smoking gun. It all seems to be falling into place now.'" Stanley W. Cloud, "Who Was Left Behind? A Newly Discovered Document Fuels the Argument over the Fate of American POWs," Time, 26 April 1993, 39. 135. Jane Perlez, "Yeltsin Seems to Accept Polish Bid for Role in NATO," New York Times, 26 August 1993, 3. As to what may be the longterm political effect of the sight of a Russian president kneeling before a Polish priest, that remains to be seen. 136. Facts on File, 1988, 543B-D2. 137. Facts on File, 1989, 149A-C1. 138. "Poland," Facts on File, 1990, 468D-E2. 139. Facts on File, 1991, 804E-G3. 140. Facts on File, 1992, 883E2. 141. Facts on File 53, No. 2752, 26 August 1993, 636B3. 142. Keesing's, 1988, 35655-6. 143. Keesing's, 1989, 36535; and Keesing's, 1990, 37383-4. 144. Keesing's, 1992, 39155. Chapter 4. Katyn as an Historical and Scholarly Issue in the West pp 81-136 1. Institute of Contemporary Studies researcher Stephen Schwartz had also noted the sociopolitical "heartlessness of intellectuals" in his 1988 New York Times Book Review article about actual espionage on behalf of the Soviet NKVD in the late 1930s by Dr. Max Eitingon, one of Sigmund Freud's closest associates, and other European intellectuals-- often against other intellectuals. In one episode, Eitingon recruited into NKVD service White Russian General N.V. Skoblin. In 1937, Skoblin served as the link between the NKVD and Nazi SD (intelligence service) chief, Reinhard Heydrich, in the joint effort to implicate politically the Red Army's high command in preparation for the purge of the Red Army officer corps. Stephen Schwartz, "Intellectuals and Assassins--Annals of Stalin's Killerati," New York Times Review of Books, 24 January 1988, 3, 30-31. 2. Vladislav Krasnov, Russia beyond Communism: A Chronicle of National Rebirth, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1991), 187. 3. Robert Conquest, interview with Louis R. Coatney, 18 June 1992. 4. Conquest, Stalin, 321. 5. Kennan, 360. 6. Polish Facts and Figures, No. 2, March 25, 1944, 21-2; quoted in James T. Shotwell and Max M. Laserson, Poland and Russia: 1919-1945, (New York: King's Crown Press for The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945), 34. 7. G.F. Hudson, "A Polish Challenge: A Review Article," International Affairs, London (April 1950): 215-16. 8. Ibid., 217. 9. Ibid., 219. 10. Ibid., 220. 11. Ibid., 221. 12. William H. McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941-1946, Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946 (New York: Johnson Reprint Company, 1970), 4. 13. Lloyd C. Gardner, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau, The Origins of the Cold War (Waltham MA: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), 44. 14. McNeill, 276. 15. Ibid., 276n. 16. Arnold and Veronica M. Toynbee, eds., The Realignment of Europe, Survey of International Affairs (London: Oxford University Press, 1955). 17. Ibid., 145n. 18. Ibid., 147n. 19. Feis, Churchill, 192-3. 20. Gardner, Origins, 44. 21. Rozek, 82-133. 22. Ibid., 127. 23. Ibid., 442. 24. Ferenc Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism and Communism, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 213. 25. Ibid., 247. 26. D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, (New York: Doubleday, 1961). 27. Norman A. Graebner, "The Cold War," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1962, 40. Later in this study, I comment further on Fleming's book, in relation to its treatment in a critical survey in 1973 as well as its questionable merit, as reflected by its coverage of Katyn. 28. Dorothy P. Davison, ed., Book Review Digest, 1963: Fifty- ninth Annual Cumulation (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1964), 1106. 29. Zawodny, 45. 30. Zawodny, 183. 31. Ibid., 183-4. 32. Ibid., 191. 33. Charles Morley, American Historical Review 68, July 1963, 1059; as quoted in Book Review Digest, 1963: Fifty-ninth Annual Cumulation (New York: H.W. Wilson, 1964), 1106. 34. Simon Wolin, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 349, September 1963, 205; as quoted in Book Review Digest, 1963, 1106. 35. G.V. Burks, American Political Science Review 57, September 1963, 712; cited (but not quoted) in Book Review Digest, 1963, 1106. 36. Vinton, 24. 37. Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy during the Second World War, 1941-1945, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), 70. 38. Martin F. Herz, Beginnings of the Cold War, (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 1966), 45-6. 39. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 9n. 40. Janusz K. Zawodny, interview by Louis R. Coatney, 15 December 1993. 41. Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1967, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967). 42. Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 60. 43. Robert Strausz-Hupe, and others, Protracted Conflict, (New York: Harper, 1959), 156-8. 44. McNeill, 1970, 1-2. 45. Ibid., 2. 46. Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia since World War II, (New York: Viking, 1971), 42. 47. Walter LaFeber, The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretations and Documents, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), 1. 48. Ibid., 85. 49. George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963, Vol. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), 122-5. Interestingly, Kennan incorrectly gave the time of the Germans' announcement of their Katyn discovery as "February 1943." Ibid., 122n. 50. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 135. 51. Robert Beitzell, The Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain, and Russia, 1941-1943, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 157. 52. John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War, (New York: St. Martin's, 1972), 94-5. 53. Ibid., 195. 54. Robert James Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 7-8. 55. Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945, (New York: Random House, 1968), 105. 56. Ibid., 105-6. 57. Rozek, 263-4. 58. Maddox, 39. 59. D.F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960, (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 229. 60. Ibid., 230. 61. Ibid., 229. 62. Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books,1970), vii. 63. Lynn Etheridge Davis, The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American Conflict over Eastern Europe (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 3. 64. Ibid., 44-46. 65. Adam B. Ulam, Stalin: The Man and His Era (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 583. 66. Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974), 343. 67. According to Jones, the Teheran proposals (which were hotly challenged by Labour Party members in a Parliament debate in February 1944) provided that Poland be "shunted to the west at Germany's expense and to Soviet advantage." Bill Jones, The Russia Complex: The British Labour Party and the Soviet Union, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), 90-1. 68. Richard C. Lukas, The Strange Allies: The United States and Poland, 1941-1945, (Knoxville TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1978), 38. 69. Ibid., 40. 70. A footnote now described how Roosevelt prematurely claimed to Churchill, on the basis of obviously false reports of the collapse of the Warsaw Uprising in early September 1944, that eleventh-hour airlifts to the Polish Home Army were "unfortunately . . . solved"--were too late. John Lukacs, 1945: Year Zero, (Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1978), 100n. 71. Ibid., 100-1. 72. Alan Wolfe, The Rise and Fall of the `Soviet Threat': Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus (Washington DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1979), 89. 73. Ibid., 2. 74. Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 99-100. 75. Ibid., 186. 76. Ibid., xiv. 77. Piotr S. Wandycz, The United States and Poland (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 266. 78. Roy Douglas, From War to Cold War, 1942-48 (New York: St. Martin's, 1981), 17-9. 79. Nikolai Tolstoy, Stalin's Secret War (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981), xiv. 80. Ibid., 163-83. 81. Ibid., 349. 82. Ibid., 187. 83. Ibid., 188. 84. Kenneth W. Thompson, Interpreters and Critics of the Cold War (Washington DC: University Press of America, 1978), 85. 85. Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947 (Columbia MO: University of Missouri Press, 1981), 180. 86. Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson, Soviet-East European Dilemmas: Coercion, Competition, and Consent (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1981). 87. Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present (New York: Summit Books, 1982), 9. 88. Ibid., 403-7. 89. William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 53. 90. Thomas T. Hammond, Witnesses to Origins of the Cold War (Seattle WA: University of Washington Press, 1982), 7. 91. Ibid., 10. 92. John Erickson, Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin's War with Germany (Boulder CO: Westview, 1983), 88-9. 93. Ibid., 282. 94. "Once again the ultimate catalyst was Poland." Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, Hungary 1956 Revisited: The Message of a Revolution-- A Quarter of a Century After (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), xiv. 95. Ibid., 4. 96. Jerald A. Combs, American Diplomatic History: Two Centuries of Changing Interpretations (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 1983), 322-3. 97. Rudolf L. Tokes, "Intellectuals and Their Discontent in Hungary: Class Power or Marginality?," in Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in the 1980s: Trends and Prospects, ed. Michael J. Sodaro and Sharon L. Wolchik (New York: St. Martin's, 1983), 177. 98. Bernard A. Weisberger, Cold War, Cold Peace: The United States and Russia since 1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984), 31. 99. Robert Szymczak, "A Matter of Honor: Polonia and the Congressional Investigation of the Katyn Forest Massacre," Polish American Studies, Spring 1984, 25-65. 100. Ibid., 25-26. 101. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II: Imperial and Global, 2d ed. (Boston MA: Little, Brown, 1985), 38- 39. 102. Lukas, 179. 103. Kitchen, 139-40. 104. Ibid., 184. 105. Crister S. and Stephen A. Garrett, "Death and Politics: The Katyn Forest Massacre and American Foreign Policy," East European Quarterly 20, 443. 106. Presumably, the encyclopedia's title can also be translated Great Soviet Encyclopedia. 107. Ibid., 443. 108. Great Britain, War Office, "Vilnyus-Minsk," 1:1,000,000 map on one sheet, (np: Survey Production Centre, Royal Engineers, 1954). 109. Ibid., 435. 110. Ibid. 111. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on the Katyn Forest Massacre, The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings before the Select Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, 82d Congress, 1st and 2d Session, 1951-1952 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952), pt. 7, 2248. 112. Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-46 (New York: Atheneum, 1987), 124. 113. Ibid., 241. 114. David Engel, In the Shadow of Auschwitz: The Polish Government-in-Exile and the Jews, 1939-1942, (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 272. Another book by Engel has just been published: Facing a Holocaust: The Polish Government-in-Exile and the Jews, 1942-1945 (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993). According to reviewer G.P. Blum of the University of the Pacific, Engel maintains that despite worldwide warnings in late 1942 about the Nazis' genocidal intent toward the Jews, the Polish Government-in-Exile did not readily respond to appeals for it to help rescue Jews. According to Blum, Engel alleges the motive for this inaction was Jewish reluctance to support Polish efforts (against the Soviet Union) to guarantee its 1939 borders. Choice, July/August 1993, 1824. This is a serious, significant charge of political extortion which, if true, would compromise much of the moral integrity and credibility of the Polish Government-in-Exile. 115. Robin Knight, "Pluralism's Bitter Fruit: Blaming the Jews," U.S. News & World Report, 10 September 1990, 56. 116. Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1990), 802. 117. Pipes, 824. 118. Lawrence Aronsen and Martin Kitchen, The Origins of the Cold War in Comparative Perspective: American, British, and Canadian Relations with the Soviet Union, 1941-1948 (New York: St. Martin's, 1988), 23. 119. Ibid., 159, 201-2. 120. Edward Mortimer, The World That FDR Built: Vision and Reality (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), 49-50, 50n. 121. Robert James Maddox, From War to Cold War: The Education of Harry S. Truman (Boulder CO: Westview, 1988), 5-6. Roosevelt's conversation with Stalin was drawn from Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), 594. 122. Jan T. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland's Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), xvi. 123. Ibid., 229. 124. Stephen Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 95; as quoted in Gross, 229n. 125. Ibid., xix. 126. P.M.H. Bell, "Censorship, Propaganda and Public Opinion: The Case of the Katyn Graves, 1943," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 39, 1989, 65-6. 127. Ibid., 66. 128. Ibid., 76. 129. Ibid., 78. 130. New Statesman, 1 May 1943, 1; as quoted in Bell, 79-80. 131. Ibid., 80. 132. Ibid., 83. 133. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), 84. 134. Ibid., 131. 135. Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 405, 413. LaFeber also touched on the Ukrainian Famine of the early 1930s, without mentioning the word "Ukrainian." LaFeber seemed to be explaining Stalin's attempt to exterminate the Ukrainians and their nationalism by putting the Famine only in the context of collectivi- zation, saying the "peasants fought to hold their private plots." Ibid., 362. 136. Natalya Lebedeva, "The Katyn Tragedy," International Affairs, (Moscow), 1 June 1990, 98. 137. P.M.H. Bell, John Bull and the Bear: British Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and the Soviet Union, 1941-1945 (New York: Edward Arnold, 1990), 109. 138. New Statesman, 1 May 1943; as quoted in Bell 1990, 124. 139. Bell, 109. 140. Ibid., 126. 141. Ibid., 201-2. 142. Ibid., 202. 143. "Tainy katynskogo lesa," Moskovskie Novosti, 6Aug89; as quoted in Tucker, 612. 144. Bishop Ignacy Tokarczuk of Przemysl; quoted in Robert Zuzowski's paper, "The Dissenting Intelligentsia and the Church in Contemporary Poland" (Brisbane, Australia: Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, August 1986); quoted in Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge, 2d ed. (New York: Cambridge, 1990), 71. 145. James L. Gormly, From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three Diplomacy, 1945-1947 (Wilmington DE: Scholarly Resources, 1990), 5. 146. Ibid. 147. Alec Nove, "How Many Victims in the 1930s?, Part I," Soviet Studies, April 1990, 369-73; "Part II," October 1990, 811-4. Nove estimated the Ukrainian Famine as 6 million dead, the Kazakhstan famine as 1.75 million dead, and purge and other deaths at over 3 million dead, for his total of 10 million deaths from Stalinism in the 1930s. S.G. Wheatcroft, "More Light on the Scale of Repression and Excessive Mortality in the Soviet Union in the 1930s," Soviet Studies, April 1990, 355-367. 148. Robert Conquest, "Excess Deaths and Camp Numbers: Some Comments," Soviet Studies 43, No. 5, 949-52. 149. Volkogonov, 360. 150. Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics since 1945, 6th ed. (London: Longman, 1991), 233. 151. Arnold Beichman, The Long Pretense: Soviet Treaty Diplomacy from Lenin to Gorbachev (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Books, 1991), 83-4. 152. John Erickson; as quoted in Keith Sword, ed., The Soviet Takeover of the Polish Eastern Provinces, 1939-41 (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 21. 153. Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Eastern Europe in the Postwar World (New York: St. Martin's, 1991), 40. 154. Ibid., 206-7. 155. Bronislaw Geremek, "Between Hope and Despair," in Eastern Europe ... Central Europe ... Europe, ed. Stephen R. Graubard (Boulder CO: Westview, 1991), 100-101. 156. Ibid., 101. 157. John Drexel, ed., Facts on File Encyclopedia of the 20th Century (New York: Facts on File, 1991), 504. 158. N. Lebedeva, "Documents: Stalin, Sikorski, et al," International Affairs (Moscow), January 1991, 116-32. 159. "Transcript of Cde [Comrade] J. V. Stalin's Conversation with the Polish Ambassador to the USSR, Kot," International Affairs, January 1991, 125. 160. "Transcript of Cde Stalin's Conversation with Wladyslaw Sikorski, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Poland," International Affairs (Moscow), 129. 161. Kryzysztof Skubiszewski, "View from Warsaw," International Affairs (Moscow), January 1991, 56. 162. Stepan Radevich, "The Case of Sixteen," International Affairs (Moscow), May 1991, 114-27; June 1991, 107-18. 163. Stepan Radevich, "`Mute Witnesses' Speak Up," International Affairs (Moscow), December 1991, 120-34. 164. Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 705. 165. Ibid., 466-72. 166. Ibid., 469. 167. Historical Abstracts: Part B, Twentieth Century Abstracts, 1914-1992 43, 1992, . 168. Ibid., 43B: 4032. Chapter 5. The Historical and Political Implications of Katyn pp. 137-145 1. There were 6,472 American MIAs left in North Korea-- considerably more than the 600 MIA discrepancy concerning Vietnam. American authorities "had firm knowledge of at least 500 sick and wounded POWs who were not returned by the North Koreans." "About 80 Soviet specialists were involved in direct interrogations of Americans." Douglas Stanglin and Peter Cary, "Secrets of the Korean War: Forty Years Later, Evidence Points to Stalin's Deep Involvement," U.S. News & World Report, 9 August 1993, 47. 2. U.S. News & World Report, 9 August 1993, 47. 3. Paul, 306. 4. Nagorski, Newsweek, 26 October 1992, 41. 5. Speaking of Poles' wartime realization that they (and their dead at Katyn) were about to be betrayed by the Western Allies, Allen Paul wrote, "And the Poles reacted as would any people who discovered that the murder of their best and brightest was about to go unpunished." Paul, 315. 6. For the purposes of this paper, "Soviet Bloc" is defined as the Soviet Union and any country over which it exerted decisive military and political control. 7. Lech Walesa, Polish television, 20 October 1992; as quoted in Vinton, 19. 8. This was demonstrated by my own use of it in Juneau, Alaska, in 1988. 9. The disappearance and ultimate fate of these Polish prisoners has renewed relevance to the United States. The general lack of Western concern and action about the mistreatment and extermination of Allied prisoners of war by the Soviet Union during the Second World War did nothing to discourage such practices from continuing through the Korean War and later. (The Associated Press, "U.S. Report Says Airmen Taken to Soviet Union," Springfield Star Journal-Register, 28 September 1993, 2.) During the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam, Communist Viet Cong massacred a thousand or more South Vietnamese civilians, members of the intelligentsia, in Katyn-like fashion. (Alje Vennema, Viet Cong Massacre at Hue, (New York: Vantage Press, 1976), 136, 152.) When the United States deserted its Indochinese allies, over a million pro- Western (and/ or educated) Cambodians and an estimated 65,000 Vietnamese, principally military officers and other members of the South Vietnamese intelligentsia, were exterminated for their political uncooperativeness. (Edward Doyle, Terrence Maitland, and the Editors of Boston Publishing Company, "Indochina Blood Baths," The Vietnam Experience: The Aftermath, 1975-85, (Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985), 24; and William J. Duiker, Vietnam since the Fall of Saigon: Updated Edition, (Athens OH: Ohio University, 1989), 85.) In 1992, Boris Yeltsin and General Volkogonov disclosed that some Americans captured during the Vietnam War may have disappeared into the Soviet GULAG slave labor camp system, never to return. ("Yeltsin Acknowledges Soviets Held U.S. Prisoners during Vietnam War," Macomb Journal, 16 January 1992, 8.) In 1993, Harvard University researcher Stephen Morris discovered in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee's archives a document indicating that the North Vietnamese had 600 more American prisoners of war (POWs) than they had admitted, expecting to use these men as bargaining chips in their negotiations with the United States. With the collapse resulting from our precipitous abandonment of the South Vietnamese, the need for these men disappeared--as, apparently, did they. (Stephen J. Morris, "The `1205 Document:' A Story of American Prisoners, Vietnamese Agents, Soviet Archives, Washington Bureaucrats, and the Media," The National Interest, Fall 1993, 32.) This article is Morris's convincing refutation of attacks on the document's authenticity made by various members of American media and academia and of the Clinton Administration. If the latter are, as the author describes, engaging in a heinous coverup of North Vietnamese--and, possibly, Soviet-- atrocities, the political consequences could be seismic. 10. Vinton, 31. SOURCES CONSULTED Interviews Charmley, John. Interview by Louis R. Coatney, 30 January 1993. Conquest, Robert. Interview by Louis R. Coatney, 18 June 1992. Mautner, Martha. Interview by Louis R. Coatney, 20 May 1992. Pucinski, Roman. Interview by Louis R. Coatney, 20 March 1992. Valkanier, Elisabeth Kridl. Interview by Louis R. Coatney, 20 May 1992. Van Vliet, John H., Jr. Interview by Louis R. Coatney, 6 November 1992. Zawodny, Janusz K. Interviews by Louis R. Coatney, 13 and 15 December 1993. Documents Cowper, Steve. Governor of Alaska. "Executive Proclamation: A Day to Remember Katyn" [30 April 1988]. Juneau AK: 1 April 1988. Great Britain. War Office. "Vilnyus-Minsk." 1:1,000,000 map on one sheet. np: Survey Production Centre, Royal Engineers, 1954. Khatyn. Minsk: B'elarus, 1982. 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