Subject: WWII-L Digest - 2 May 1993 to 3 May 1993

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 4 May 1993 00:00:20 -0400

There are 8 messages totalling 1240 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Philippine Funeral
  2. Memphis Belle Museum
  3. OVERLORD Digest
  4. Directive to Eisenhower
  5. Festung Europa: March '42
  6. Festung Europa: Nov., '43
  7. Axis Force Distribution, 6 June, '44
  8. L O C I S

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Date:    Mon, 3 May 1993 01:55:15 -0400
From:    Lydia Fish <[email-masked]>
Subject: Philippine Funeral

Forwarded from vwar-l@ubvm

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Subj:   Old Glory
Date: 03 May 1993 14:38:00 -0500 (EST)
From: PAT RICHARDSON <[email-masked]>

The drive between Subic Bay Naval Base and the San Miguel housing area
usually took about 45 minutes give or take.  I used to love the commute
though others usually complained about it and made the same run in about
25 white knuckled minutes.  I always saw something different, uniquely
Philippine during the trip, drove at about 35 to 50 MPH, a relatively
safe speed for a rural two lane road constantly in need of repair and
clogged with pedestrian, bicycle, tricycle (50cc honda with sidecar
attached, Philippine cyclo's), bus, truck and caribou traffic, often
used as a basketball court between passing vehicles, and the preferred
surface for drying rice prior to milling off the husks.  I guess my
'slow down and smell the roses' attitude comes with comfortable ageing,
but God I do love Asia and try to savor every day.

On this particular day sometime in 1989 or so, (don't digest this stuff
so have to rely on ever fading memory), on a Saturday I believe, I was
nursing my '70 Vdub bus through the tour, out the Kalakalan gate, past
the graveyard (any old WESTPACers out there remember this?), through
Barrio Barretto, (bars for the retiree's and mellow folks, a stark contrast
to the blaring disco's on Maksaysay street in Olongapo City), then through
Matain and Subic City (famous in it's own right), on up the grade through
a small pass where a 50 foot high Virgin Mary whose right foot stands on
a snake, remains ever vigilant, she's nicknamed "Our Mother of the
Garbage Dump", because sadly, she overlooks a common dumping site, then
on through a few easy turns, where I spotted a small procession on my side
of the road.  I slowed down to overtake them.

It was a small funeral procession.  An old dilapidated Caribou cart creaked
along with five old men, two walking on either side and one leading the old
buffalo.  They were poor and dressed as farmers, T-shirts, cut off pants and
shower clogs for shoes.  Their backs were permanently bent from untold seasons
of planting rice. Their faces were dark and creased with lines and white hair
bristled from beneath their straw hats, with determination and pride in their
step, they ambled on.  It was a long way to the cemetery and already hot in
the morning sun.  As I slowly passed I glimpsed within the cart the end of
a rough pine home made coffin.  It was draped with an American not Filipino
Flag.  The final honor to their comrade in arms, fallen now, not to hostile
fire, but to our common enemy to which we all must some day succumb.  I pulled
off the road some 50 feet or so ahead and got out of the van.

I've passed many a funeral procession in the P.I..  Four or five in some weeks.
Most often they are noisy affairs with brass band and sometimes hundreds of
family and mourners walking behind a station wagon converted into a hurst.
Passengers in passing cars drop coins on the street to the surviving family
out of respect for the living more than for the dead.  The reception after
a funeral can be very costly.  I've never stopped for a funeral before.

I remember watching their slow approach, and they watching me in return.
What hero's tales over cold beer and tuba (coconut milk fermented for about
three days), these men must of shared.  Perhaps survivor's from the horrible
march of death from Bataan to Tarlac, some 130 miles under the blistering
Philippine sun after the numbing siege at Corrigador.  Fearing, but at home
in the jungles of the Philippines they defended their country and our's, but
that American flag bore testimony to their final allegiance and touched my
heart.  Their friend's and allies, the Americans, now gone.  They were smiling
and their eyes were gleaming when they passed me, I bowed my head and whispered
a prayer, "rest in peace now old soldier, you have stood your watch, now is
time for you to rest, God bless".  I pressed a hundred peso note into the hand
of the last man, his touch dry and leathery, "buy cold beer for the boy's" I
said as his hand hesitated, he didn't want to let go, a slight squeeze, "Thank
you" he said and they marched on.  I was a hot morning, and a long way to the
cemetery.

Pat Richardson

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 3 May 1993 07:54:15 EDT
From:    "[email-masked]. --Scherrer,
         Tim A." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Memphis Belle Museum

On May 8-9, the Memphis Belle Museum is having the 50th Celebration of
the Memphis Belle.  It is located on the Mud Flats along the Mississippi
river.  I am not sure what the 50th celebration is for--maybe 50th
Anniversary of the 25th mission.  Unfortunately, Bob Morgan, pilot of
the Belle, will be in Europe.

I found out about it through some WWII reenactors who've formed an
organization to provide displays with WWII aircraft.  They are going to
be the Memphis Belle "aircrew" for the weekend, in proper flight gear.

You now know all the details I know about the Celebration.  For further
information, I suggest you call the Memphis Belle Museum in Memphis.

Tim

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 3 May 1993 14:04:16 EST
From:    Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Subject: OVERLORD Digest

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: The European Theater of
Operations, CROSS CHANNEL ATTACK, by Gordon A. Harrison, Office
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C., 1951

(1)DIGEST OF OPERATION "OVERLORD"

1.  The object of Operation "Overlord" is to mount and carry out
an operation, with forces and equipment established in the
United Kingdom, and with target date the 1st May, 1944, to
secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive
operations can be developed. The lodgment area must contain
sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty-
six to thirty divisions, and enable that force to be augmented
by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of
additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of three
to five divisions per month.

    Selection of a Lodgment Area.

2.  In order to provide sufficient port facilities to maintain
these large forces, it will be necessary to select a lodgment
area which includes a group of major ports.  We must plan on the
assumption that ports, on capture, will be seriously damaged and
probably blocked.  It will take some time to restore normal
facilities.  We shall thus be forced to rely on maintenance
over beaches for an extended period.

3.  A study of the beaches on the Belgian and Channel coasts
shows that the beaches with the highest capacity for passing
vehicles and stores inland are those in the Pas de Calais, and
the Caen-Cotentin  area.  Of these, the Caen beaches are the
most favorable, as they are, unlike the others, sheltered from
the prevailing winds.  Naval and air considerations point to the
area between the Pas de Calais and the Cotentin as the most
suitable for the initial landing, air factors of optimum air
support and rapid provision of airfields indicating the Pas de
Calais as the best choice, with Caen as an acceptable
alternative.

4.  Thus, taking beach capacity and air and naval considerations
together, it appears that either the Pas de Calais area or the
Caen-Cotentin area is the most suitable for the initial main
landing.

5.  As the area for the initial landing, the Pas de Calais has
many obvious advantages such that good air support and quick
turn round for our shipping can be achieved.  On the other hand,
it is a focal point of the enemy fighters disposed for defense,
and maximum enemy air activity can be brought to bear over this
area with the minimum movement of his air forces.  Moreover, the
Pas de Calais is the most strongly defended area on the whole
French coast.  The defenses would require very heavy and
sustained bombardment from sea and air: penetration would be
slow, and the result of the bombardment of beach exits would
severely limit the rate of build-up.  Further, this area does
not offer good opportunities for expansion. It would be
necessary to develop the bridgehead to include either the
Belgian ports as far as Antwerp or the Channel ports Westwards
to include Havre and Rouen. But both an advance to Antwerp
across the numerous water obstacles, and a long flank march of
some 120 miles to the Seine ports must be considered unsound
operations of war unless the German forces are in a state not
far short of final collapse.

6. In the Caen-Cotentin area it would be possible to make our
initial landing either partly on the Cotentin Peninsula and
partly on the Caen beaches, wholly in the Cotentin or wholly on
the Caen beaches.  An attack with part of our forces in the
Cotentin and part on the Caen beaches, is, however, considered
to be unsound.  It would entail dividing our limited forces by
the low-lying marshy ground and intricate river system at the
neck of the Cotentin Peninsula; thus exposing them to defeat in
detail.

7.  An attack against the Cotentin Peninsula, on the other hand,
has a reasonable chance of success, and would ensure the early
capture of the port of Cherbourg. Unfortunately, very few
airfields exist in the Cotentin, and that area is not suitable
for rapid airfield development.  Furthermore, the narrow neck of
the Peninsula would give the Germans an easy task in preventing
us from breaking out and expanding our initial bridge head.
Moreover, during the period of our consolidation in the Cotentin
the Germans would have time to reinforce their coastal troops is
the Caen area, rendering a subsequent amphibious assault in that
area much more difficult.

8.  There remains the attack on the Caen beaches. The Caen
sector is weakly held; the defenses are relatively light and the
beaches are of high capacity and sheltered from the prevailing
winds.  Inland the terrain is suitable for airfield development
and for the consolidation of the initial bridgehead; and much of
it is unfavorable for counter-attacks by panzer divisions.
Maximum enemy air opposition can only be brought to bear at the
expense of the enemy air defense screen covering the approaches
to Germany; and the limited number of enemy airfields within
range of the Caen area facilitates local neutralization of the
German fighter force.  The sector suffers from the disadvantage
that considerable effort will be required to provide adequate
air support to our assault forces and some time must elapse
before the capture of a major port.

After a landing in the Caen sector it would be necessary to
seize either the  Seine group of ports or the Brittany group of
ports.  To seize the Seine ports would entail forcing a crossing
of the Seine, which is likely to require greater forces than we
can build up through the Caen beaches and the port of Cherbourg.
It should, however, be possible to seize the Brittany ports
between Cherbourg and Nantes and on them build up sufficient
forces for our final advance Eastwards.

Provided that the necessary air situation can first be achieved,
the chances of a successful attack and of rapid subsequent
development are so much greater in this sector than in any other
that it is considered that the advantages far outweigh the
disadvantages.

    The Lodgment Area Selected.

9.  In the light of these factors, it is considered that our
initial landing on the Continent should be effected in the Caen
area, with a view to the eventual seizure of a lodgment area
comprising the Cherbourg-Brittany group of ports (from Cherbourg
to Nantes).

  Opening Phase up to the Capture of Cherbourg.

10. The opening phase in the seizing of this lodgment area would
be the effecting of a landing in the Caen sector with a view to
the early capture and development of airfield sites in the Caen
area, and of the port of Cherbourg.

11.  The main limiting factors affecting such as operation are
the possibility of attaining the necessary air situation; the
number of offensive divisions which the enemy can make available
for counter attack in the Caen area; the availability of landing
ships and craft and of transport aircraft; and the capacity of
the beaches and ports in the sector.

12.  Although the strength of the G.A.F. available in 1944 on
the Western front cannot be forecast at this stage, we can
confidently expect that we shall have a vast numerical
superiority in bomber forces.  The first-line strength of the
German fighter force is, however, showing a steady increase and
although it is unlikely to equal the size of the force at our
disposal, there is no doubt that our fighters will have a very
large commitment entailing dispersal and operations at maximum
intensity.  Our fighters will also be operating under serious
tactical disadvantages in the early stages, which will largely
offset their numerical superiority.  Before the assault takes
place, therefore, it will be necessary to reduce the
effectiveness of the G.A.F., particularly that part which can be
brought to bear against the Caen area.

13.  The necessary air situation to ensure a seasonable chance
of success will therefore require that the maximum number of
German fighter forces are contained in the Low Countries and
North-West Germany, that the effectiveness of the fighter
defense in the Caen area is reduced and that air reinforcements
are prevented from arriving in the early stages from the
Mediterranean.  Above all, it will be necessary to reduce the
overall strength of the German fighter force between now and the
date of the operation by destruction of the sources of supply,
by the infliction of casualties by bringing on air battles, and,
immediately prior to the assault, by the disorganization of
G.A.F. installations and control system in the Caen area.

14.  As it is impossible to forecast with any accuracy the
number and location of German formations in reserve in 1944,
while, on the other hand, the forces available to us have been
laid down, an attempt has been made in this paper to determine
the wisest employment of our own forces and then to determine
the maximum number of German formations which they can
reasonably overcome.  Apart from the air situation, which is an
over-riding factor, the practicability of this plan will depend
principally on the number, effectiveness, and availability of
German divisions present in France and the Low Countries in
relation to our own capabilities.  This consideration is
discussed below (paragraph 35).

15.  A maximum of thirty and a minimum of twenty-six equivalent
divisions are likely to be available in the United Kingdom for
cross-Channel operations on the 1st May 1944.  Further build-up
can be at the rate of three to five divisions per month.

16.  Landing ships and craft have been provided to lift the
equivalent of three assault divisions and two follow-up
divisions, without "overheads," and it has been assumed that the
equivalent of an additional two divisions can be afloat in
ships.

17.  Airborne forces amounting to two airborne divisions and
some five or six parachute regiments will be available, but,
largely owing to shortage of transport aircraft, it is only
possible to lift the equivalent of two-thirds of one airborne
division simultaneously, on the basis of present forecasts.

18.  Even if additional landing ships and craft could be made
available, the beaches in the Caen area would preclude the
landing of forces greater than the equivalent of the three
assault and two follow-up divisions, for which craft have
already been provided.  Nevertheless, an all-round increase of
at least 10 per cent. in landing ships and craft is highly
desirable in order to provide a greater margin for contingencies
within the framework of the existing plan.  Furthermore,
sufficient lift for a further assault division could most
usefully be employed in an additional landing on other beaches.

19.  There is no port of any capacity within the sector although
there are a number of small ports of limited value.  Maintenance
will, therefore, of necessity be largely over the beaches until
it is possible to capture and open up the port of Cherbourg.  In
view of the possibilities of interruption by bad weather it will
be essential to provide early some form of improvised sheltered
waters.

20.  Assuming optimum weather conditions, it should be possible
to build up the force over the beaches to a total by D plus 6 of
the equivalent of some eleven divisions and five tank brigades
and thereafter to land one division a day until about D plus 24.

Proposed Plan.

Preliminary Phase.

21.  During the preliminary phase, which must start forthwith,
all possible means including air and sea action, propaganda,
political and economic pressure, and sabotage, must be
integrated into a combined offensive aimed at softening the
German resistance.  In particular, air action should be directed
towards the reduction of the German air forces on the Western
front, the progressive destruction of the German economic system
and the undermining of German morale.

22.  In order to contain the maximum German forces away from the
Caen area diversionary operations should be staged against other
areas such as the Pas de Calais and the Mediterranean Coast of
France.

Preparatory Phase.

23.  During this phase air action will be intensified against
the G.A.F., particularly in North-West France, with a view to
reducing the effectiveness of the G.A.F. in that area, and will
be extended to include attacks against communications more
directly associated with movement of German reserves which might
affect the Caen area.  Three naval assault forces will be
assembled with the naval escorts and loaded at ports along the
South Coast of England.  Two naval  assault forces carrying the
follow-up forces will also be assembled and loaded, one in the
Thames Estuary and one on the West Coast.

The Assault.

24.  After a very short air bombardment of the beach defenses
three assault divisions will be landed simultaneously on the
Caen beaches, followed up on D Day by the equivalent of two tank
brigades (United States regiments) and a brigade group (United
States regimental combat team).  At the same time, airborne
forces will be used to seize the town of Caen; and subsidiary
operations by commandos and possibly by airborne forces will be
undertaken to neutralize certain coast defenses and seize
certain important river crossings.  The object of the assault
forces will be to seize the general line Grandcamp-Bayeux-Caen.

Follow-up and Build-up Phase.

25.  Subsequent action will take the form of a strong thrust
Southwards and South-Westwards with a view to destroying enemy
forces, acquiring sites for airfields, and gaining depth for a
turning movement into the Cotentin Peninsula directed on
Cherbourg.  When sufficient depth has been gained a force will
advance into the Cotentin and seize Cherbourg.  At the same time
a thrust will be made to deepen the bridgehead South-Eastwards
in order to cover the construction and operation of additional
airfields in the area South-East of Caen.

26.  It is considered that, within fourteen days of the initial
assault, Cherbourg should be captured and the bridgehead
extended to include the general line Trouville-Alencon-Mont St.
Michel.  By this date, moreover, it should have been possible to
land some eighteen divisions and to have in operation about
fourteen airfields from which twenty-eight to thirty-three
fighter-type squadrons should be operating.

Further Developments after Capture of Cherbourg.

27.  After the capture of Cherbourg the Supreme Allied Commander
will have to decide whether to initiate operations to seize the
Seine ports or whether he must content himself with first
occupying the Brittany ports.  In this decision he will have to
be guided largely by the situation of the enemy forces.  If the
German resistance is sufficiently weak, an immediate advance
could be made to seize Havre and Rouen.  On the other hand, the
more probable situation is that the Germans will have retired
with the bulk of their forces to hold Paris and the line of the
Seine, where they can best be covered by their air forces from
North-East France and where they may possibly be reinforced by
formations from Russia.  Elsewhere they may move a few divisions
from Southern France to hold the crossings of the Loire and will
leave the existing defensive divisions in Brittany.

It will therefore most probably be necessary for us to seize the
Brittany ports first, in order to build up sufficient forces
with which we can eventually force the passage of the Seine.

28.  Under these circumstances, the most suitable plan would
appear to be to secure first the left flank and to gain
sufficient airfields for subsequent operations.  This would be
done by extending the bridgehead to the line of the River Eure
from Dreux to Rouen and thence along the line of the Seine to
the sea, seizing at the same time Chartres, Orleans and Tours.

29.  Under cover of these operations a force would be employed
in capturing the Brittany ports; the first step being a thrust
Southwards to seize Nantes and St. Nazaire, followed by
subsidiary operations to capture Brest and the various small
ports of the Brittany Peninsula.

3O.  This action would complete the occupation of our initial
lodgment area and would secure sufficient major ports for the
maintenance of at least thirty divisions.  As soon as the
organization of the L. of C. in this lodgment area allowed, and
sufficient air forces had been established, operations would
then be begun to force the line of the Seine, and to capture
Paris and the Seine ports.  As opportunity offered, subsidiary
action would also be taken to clear the Germans from the Biscay
ports to facilitate the entry of additional American troops and
the feeding of the French population.

Command and Control

31.  In carrying out Operation "Overlord" administrative control
would be greatly simplified if the principle were adopted that
the United States forces were normally on the right of the line
and the British and Canadian forces on the left.

Major Conditions Affecting Success of the Operation.

32.  It will be seen that the plan for the initial landing is
based on two main principles-concentration of force and tactical
surprise.  Concentration of the assault forces is considered
essential if we are to ensure adequate air support and if our
limited assault forces are to avoid defeat in detail.  An
attempt has been made to obtain tactical surprise by landing in
a lightly defended area-presumably lightly defended as, due to
its distance from a major port, the Germans consider a landing
there unlikely to be successful.  This action, of course,
presupposes that we can offset the absence of a port in the
initial stages by the provision of improvised sheltered waters.
It is believed that this can be accomplished.

33. The operation calls for a much higher standard of
performance on the part of the naval assault forces than any
previous operation.  This will depend upon their being formed in
sufficient time to permit of adequate training.

34.  Above all, it is essential that there should be an over-all
reduction in the German fighter force between now and the time
of the surface assault.  From now onwards every practical method
of achieving this end must be employed. This condition, above
all others, will dictate the date by which the amphibious
assault can be launched.

35.  The next condition is that the number of German offensive
divisions in reserve must not exceed a certain figure on the
target date if the operation is to have a reasonable chance of
success.  The German reserves in France and the Low Countries as
a whole, excluding divisions holding the coast, G.A.F. divisions
and training divisions, should not exceed on the day of the
assault twelve full-strength first-quality  divisions.  In
addition, the Germans should not be able to transfer more than
fifteen first-quality divisions from Russia during the first two
months.  Moreover, on the target date the divisions in reserve
should be so located that the number of first-quality divisions
which the Germans could deploy in the Caen area to support the
divisions holding the coast should not exceed three divisions on
D Day, five divisions on D plus 2, or nine divisions by D plus
8.

During the preliminary period, therefore, every effort must be
made to dissipate  and  divert  German  formations, lower their
fighting efficiency and disrupt communications.

36.  Finally, there is the question of maintenance.  Maintenance
will have to be carried out over beaches for a period of some
three months for a number of formations, varying from a maximum
of eighteen divisions in the first month to twelve divisions in
the second month, rapidly diminishing to nil in the third month.
Unless  adequate  measures are taken to provide sheltered waters
by artificial means, the operation will be at the mercy of the
weather.  Moreover, special facilities and equipment will be
required to prevent undue damage to craft during this extended
period.  Immediate action for the provision of the necessary
requirements is essential.

37.  Given these conditions-a reduced G.A.F., a limitation in
the number or effectiveness of German offensive formations in
France, and adequate arrangements to provide improvised
sheltered waters-it is considered that Operation "Overlord" has
a reasonable prospect of success. To ensure these conditions
being attained by the 1st May, 1944, action must start now and
every possible effort made by all means in our power to soften
German resistance and to speed up our own preparations.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1, 30th July, 1943

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 3 May 1993 14:05:09 EST
From:    Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Subject: Directive to Eisenhower

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: The European Theater of
Operations, CROSS CHANNEL ATTACK, by Gordon A. Harrison, Office
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C., 1951

(2) DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the
forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of
Europe from Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied
Expeditionary Force.

2.  Task.  You will enter the continent of Europe and, in
conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations
aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed
forces.  The date for entering the Continent is the month of
May, 1944.  After adequate channel ports have been secured,
exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will
facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

3.  Notwithstanding the target date above you will be prepared
at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable
circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy on your front, to
effect a reentry into the Continent with such forces as you have
available at the time; a general plan for this operation when
approved will be furnished for your assistance.

4.  Command.  You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of
Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the
diagram at Appendix.  Direct communication with the United
States and British Chiefs of Staff is authorized in the interest
of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary
logistical support.

5.  Logistics.  In the United Kingdom the responsibility for
logistics organization, concentration, movement and supply of
forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with
British Service Ministries so far as British Forces are
concerned.  So far as United States Forces are concerned, this
responsibility will rest with the United States War and Navy
Departments.  You will also be responsible for coordinating the
requirements of British and United States Forces under your
command.

6.  Coordination of operations of other Forces and Agencies.  In
preparation for your assault on enemy occupied Europe, Sea and
Air Forces agencies of sabotage, subversion and propaganda,
acting under a variety of authorities are now in action.  You
may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem
to you desirable.

7.  Relationship with United Nations Forces in other areas.
Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff for
supplying information relating to operations of the Forces of
the U.S.S.R. for your guidance in timing your operations.  It is
understood that the Soviet Forces will launch an offensive at
about the same time as OVERLORD with the object of preventing
the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the
Western Front.  The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean
Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your
operation, including the launching of an attack against the
south of France at about the same time as OVERLORD.  The scope
and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff.  You will establish contact with him and submit
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff you views and recommendations
regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your
attack from the United Kingdom.  The Combined Chiefs of Staff
will place under your command the forces operating in Southern
France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command.
You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this
regard.

8.  Relationship with Allied Governments -- the re-establishment
of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories and the
administration of enemy territories.  Further instructions will
be issued to you on these subjects at a later date.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 3 May 1993 14:06:32 EST
From:    Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Subject: Festung Europa: March '42

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: The European Theater of
Operations, CROSS CHANNEL ATTACK, by Gordon A. Harrison, Office
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C., 1951
(3) Fuehrer's Directive on defense of Western Europe, 23 March
1942

Fuehrer Headquarters
23 March 1942                             Top Secret
The Fuehrer
and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces         25 Copies
                                                  Copy No.
OKW/WFSt/Op.Nr.:001031/42 g.Kdos.

               Directive No. 40

Subj: Command Organization on the Coasts

1.)  General Situation:

In the days to come the coasts of Europe will be seriously
exposed to the danger of enemy landings.

The enemy's choice of time and place for landing operations will
not be based solely on strategic considerations.  Reverses in
other theaters of operations, obligations toward his allies, and
political motives may prompt the enemy to arrive at decisions
that would be unlikely to result from purely military
deliberations.

Even enemy landing operations with limited objectives will-
insofar as the enemy does establish himself on the coast at all-
seriously affect our own plans in any case.  They will disrupt
our coastwise shipping and tie down strong Army and Luftwaffe
forces which thereby would become unavailable for commitment at
critical points.  Particularly grave dangers will arise if the
enemy succeeds in taking our airfields, or in establishing
airbases in the territory that he has captured.

Moreover, our military installations and war industries that are
in many instances located along or close to the coast, and which
in part have valuable equipment, invite local raids by the
enemy.

Special attention must be paid to British preparations for
landings on the open coast for which numerous armored landing
craft suitable for the transportation of combat vehicles and
heavy weapons are available.  Large-scale parachute and glider
operations are likewise to be expected.

II.)  General Tactical Instructions for Coastal Defense:

1.)  Coastal defense is a task for the Armed Forces, and
requires particularly close and complete co-operation of all the
services.

2.)  Timely recognition of the preparations, assembly, and
approach of the enemy for a landing operation must be the goal
of the intelligence service as well as that of continual
reconnaissance by Navy and Luftwaffe.

Embarkation operations or transport fleets at sea must
subsequently be the target for the concentration of all suitable
air and naval forces with the object of destroying the enemy as
far off our coast as possible.

However, because the enemy may employ skillful deception and
take advantage of poor visibility, thereby catching us
completely by surprise, all troops that might be exposed to such
surprise operations must always be fully prepared for defensive
action.

Counteracting the well-known tendency of the troops to relax
their alertness as time goes on will be one of the most
important command functions.

3.) Recent battle experiences have taught us that in fighting
for the beaches--which include coastal waters within the range
of medium coastal artillery--responsibility for the preparation
and execution of defensive operations must unequivocally and
unreservedly be concentrated in the hands of one man.

All available forces and equipment of the several services, the
organizations and formations outside of the armed forces, as
well as the German civil agencies in the zone of operations will
be committed by the responsible commander for the destruction of
enemy transport facilities and invasion forces.  That commitment
must lead to the collapse of the enemy attack before, if
possible, but at the latest upon the actual landing.

An immediate counterattack must annihilate landed enemy forces,
or throw them back into the sea.  All instruments of warfare-
regardless of the service, or the formation outside of the armed
forces to which they might belong-are to be jointly committed
toward that end.  Nevertheless, shore-based Navy supply
establishments must not be hampered in their essential
functions, nor Luftwaffe ground organizations and Flak
protection of airfields impaired in their efficiency, unless
they have become directly affected by ground combat operations.

No headquarters and no unit may initiate a retrograde movement
in such a situation.  Wherever Germans are committed on or near
the coast, they must be armed and trained for active combat.

The enemy must be kept from establishing himself on any island
which in enemy hand would constitute a threat to the mainland or
coastwise shipping.

4.)  Disposition of forces and improvement of fortifications are
to be so made that the main defensive effort lies in the coastal
sector that are the most probable sites for enemy landings
(fortified areas) .

Those remaining coastal sectors that are vulnerable to coups de
main of even small units must be protected by means of a
strongpoint type of defense, utilizing, if possible, the support
of shore batteries.  All battalions of military and military-
economic importance will be included in that strongpoint defense
system.

The same rules apply to offshore islands.  Coastal sectors that
are less endangered will be patrolled.

5.)   The several services will establish a uniform definition
of coastal sectors, if necessary on the basis of a final
decision on the part of the responsible commander named in III.)
1.) below.

6.)   By means of proportionate allocation of forces,
improvement of positions  (perimeter defense), and stockpiling
of supplies, the fortified areas and strongpoints must be
enabled to hold out even against superior enemy forces for
extended periods of time.

Fortified areas and strongpoints are to be held to the last.
They must never be forced to surrender because of a shortage of
ammunition, ration, or water.

7.)  The commander responsible according to III.)  I.)  below,
issues orders for coastal security, and assures a speedy
evaluation, collation, and dissemination to authorized
headquarters and civil agencies of intelligence procured by all
the services.

Upon the first indication of an imminent enemy operation, that
commander is authorized to issue the necessary orders for
unified and complementary reconnaissance by sea and air.

8.)  All elements stationed in the vicinity of the coast,
whether headquarters or units of the Armed Forces, or
organizations or formations outside of the Armed Forces, will
forego the niceties of peacetime protocol.  Their quarters,
security measures, equipment, state of alert, and utilization of
local resources will be governed solely by the necessity of
countering every enemy raid with the utmost speed and force.
Wherever the military situation demands, the civilian population
will be evacuated at once.

III.)  Command:

I.)  The following authorities are responsible for the
preparation and conduct of defense on coasts under German
control:

a)  in the Eastern Theater of Operations  (excluding Finland),
the army commanders designated by OKH;

b)  in the  coastal sector under the control of Army Lapland,
the commanding General of Army Lapland;

c)  in Norway, the Armed Forces Commander, Norway;

d)  in Denmark, the Commander of German Troops in Denmark;

e)  in the occupied West (including the Netherlands), the
Commander in Chief West;

In matters pertaining to coastal defense, the commanders
mentioned in categories d) and e) above are under the direct
control of OKW.

f)  in the Balkans (including the occupied islands) the Armed
Forces Commander Southeast;

g)  in the Baltic and the Ukraine, the Armed Forces Commanders
Baltic and Ukraine;

h)  in the Zone of Interior, the commanding admirals.

2.)  Within the framework of coastal defense missions, the
commanders designated in III.) I.) above, will have command
authority over tactical of the services, the German civil
authorities as well as units and organizations outside the armed
forces that are located within their respective areas.  In
exercising that authority, the commanders will issue tactical,
organizational, and supply orders necessary for coastal defense,
and insure their execution.  They will influence training to
whatever extent is necessary for preparing their forces for
ground operations. The required data will be put at their
disposal.

3.)  Orders and measures implementing this directive will give
priority to the following:

a) inclusion within fortified areas or strongpoints of all
installations important militarily or to the war economy,
particularly those of the Navy (submarine bases) and the
Luftwaffe;

b)  unified direction of coastal surveillance;

c)  infantry defenses of fortified areas and strongpoints;

d)  infantry defenses of isolated installations outside of
fortified areas and strongpoints, such as coastal patrol and
aircraft warning stations;

e)  artillery defenses against ground targets (in installing new
shore batteries and displacing those in position, the
requirements of naval warfare will receive priority) ;

f)  defense preparedness of fortified establishments, their
structural improvement, and the stockpiling of reserve supplies,
as well as defensive preparedness and stockpiling of supplies in
isolated installations outside of those establishments
(including supply with all weapons necessary for defense, mines,
hand grenades, flame throwers, obstacle material, and similar
items);

g)  signal communications;

h)  tests of the state of alert as well as infantry and
artillery training within the framework of the defensive
missions.

4.)  Similar authority will be vested in the commanders of local
headquarters down to sector commands, insofar as they have been
made responsible for the defense of coastal sectors.

The commanders enumerated in III.) I.) above, will generally
confer such responsibilities on commanding generals of army
divisions that are committed for coastal defense, and in Crete,
on the Fortress Commander Crete.

In individual sectors and subsectors, and particularly in
establishments that have definitely been designated as air or
naval bases, the local Luftwaffe or Navy commanders are to be
put in charge of the entire defense, insofar as their other
missions permit them to assume those responsibilities.

5.)  Naval and strategic air forces are subject to the control
of the Navy or Luftwaffe, respectively. However, in case of
enemy attacks on the coast they are -- within the framework of
their tactical capabilities -- bound to comply with requests
from the commanders responsible for defensive operations. For
that reason they must be included in the exchange of military
intelligence, in preparation for their future employment. Close
contact must be maintained  with their respective higher
headquarters.

IV.)  Special missions of the several services within the
framework of coastal defense:

1.)  Navy:

a)  organization and protection of coastwise shipping;

b)  training  and  commitment  of  the  entire  coastal
artillery against sea targets;

c)  commitment of naval forces.

2.)  Luftwaffe:

a)  air defense in the coastal areas.

This mission does not affect the right of local defense
commanders to direct the assembly of Flak artillery suited and
available for commitment against enemy invasion forces.

b) improvement of the Luftwaffe ground organization and its
protection against air and surprise ground attacks on airfields
that have not been sufficiently protected by their inclusion in
the coastal defense system.

c)  commitment of strategic air forces.

Instances of overlapping control resulting from those special
missions must be accepted as unavoidable.

V.)  As of 1 April 1942, all instructions and orders not in
agreement with the present directive are rescinded.

New combat directives issued by the responsible commander
pursuant to my directive will be submitted to me through OKW.

                                                     signed:
Adolf Hitler

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 3 May 1993 14:07:18 EST
From:    Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Subject: Festung Europa: Nov., '43

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: The European Theater of
Operations, CROSS CHANNEL ATTACK, by Gordon A. Harrison, Office
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C., 1951

(4) Fuehrer's Directive on defense of Western Europe, 3 November
1943

Fuehrer Headquarters
                                              3 November 1943
                           Top Secret
The Fuehrer
OKW/WFSt/Op.No. 662656/43 g.K. Chefs
                                                    27 Copies
                                                    Copy No.

                   Directive  No.  51

For the last two and one-half years the bitter and costly
struggle against Bolshevism has made the utmost demands upon the
bulk of our military resources and energies.  This commitment
was in keeping with the seriousness of the danger, and the over-
all situation.  The situation has since changed. The threat
remains, but an even greater danger looms in the West: the
Anglo-American landing!  In the East, the vastness of the space
will, as a last resort, permit a loss of territory even on a
major scale, without suffering a mortal blow to Germany's chance
for survival.

Not so in the West!  If the enemy here succeeds in penetrating
our defenses on a wide front, consequences of staggering
proportions will follow within a short time.  All signs point to
an offensive against the Western Front of Europe no later than
spring, and perhaps earlier.

For that reason, I can no longer justify the further weakening
of the West in favor of other theaters of war.  I have therefore
decided to strengthen the defenses in the West, particularly at
places from which we shall launch our long-range war against
England.  For those are the very points at which the enemy must
and will attack;  there -- unless all indications are misleading
-- will be fought the decisive invasion battle.

Holding attacks and diversions on other fronts are to be
expected.  Not even the possibility of a large-scale offensive
against Denmark may be excluded.  It would pose greater nautical
problems and could be less effectively supported from the air,
but would nevertheless produce the greatest political and
strategic impact if it were to succeed.

During the opening phase of the battle, the entire striking
power of the enemy will of necessity be directed against our
forces manning the coast.  Only an all-out effort in the
construction of fortifications, an unsurpassed effort that will
enlist all available manpower and physical resources of Germany
and the occupied areas, will be able to strengthen our defenses
along the coasts within the short time that still appears to be
left to us.

Stationary weapons (heavy AT guns, immobile tanks to be dug-in,
coast artillery, shore-defense guns, mines, etc.) arriving in
Denmark and the occupied

West within the near future will be heavily concentrated in
points of main defensive effort at the most vulnerable coastal
sectors. At the same time, we must take the calculated risk that
for the present we may be unable to improve our defenses in less
threatened sectors.

Should the enemy nevertheless force a landing by concentrating
his armed might, he must be hit by the full fury of our
counterattack.  For this mission ample and speedy reinforcements
of men and materiel, as well as intensive training must
transform available larger units into first-rate, fully mobile
general reserves suitable for offensive operations.  The
counterattack of these units will prevent the enlargement of the
beachhead, and throw the enemy back into the sea.

In addition, well-planned emergency measures, prepared down to
the last detail, must enable us instantly to throw against the
invader every fit man and machine from coastal sectors not under
attack and from the home front.

The anticipated strong attacks by air and sea must be
relentlessly countered by Air Force and Navy with all their
available resources.  I therefore order the following;

A)  Army:

1.) The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Inspector
General Staff and the Inspector General of Panzer Troops will
submit to me as soon as possible a schedule covering arms,
tanks, assault guns, motor vehicles, and ammunition to be
allocated to the Western Front and Denmark within the next three
months. That schedule will conform to the new situation.  The
following considerations will be basic:

a) Sufficient mobility for all panzer and panzer grenadier
divisions in the West, and equipment of each of those units by
December 1943 with 93 Mark IV tanks or assault guns, as well as
large numbers of antitank weapons.

Accelerated reorganization of the 20 Luftwaffe Field Divisions
into an effective mobile reserve force by the end of 1943.  This
reorganization is to include the issue of assault guns.

Accelerated issue of all authorized weapons to the SS Panzer
Grenadier Division Hitler Jugend [In this month (November 1943)
this division was converted to a Panzer division (12th SS)], the
21st Panzer Division, and the infantry and reserve divisions
stationed in Jutland.

b)  Additional shipments of Mark IV tanks, assault guns, and
heavy AT guns to the reserve panzer divisions stationed in the
West and in Denmark, as well as to the Assault Gun Training
Battalion in Denmark.

c)  In November and December, monthly allotments of 100 heavy AT
guns models 40 and 43 (half of these to be mobile) in addition
to those required for newly activated units in the West and in
Denmark.

d)  Allotment of large numbers of weapons (including about 1,000
machine guns)  for augmenting the armament of those static
divisions that are committed for coastal defense in the West and
in Denmark, and for standardizing the equipment of elements that
are to be withdrawn from sectors not under attack.

e)  Ample supply of close-combat AT weapons to units in
vulnerable sectors.

f)  Improvement of artillery and AT defenses in units stationed
in Denmark, as well as those committed for coastal protection in
the occupied West.  Strengthening of GHQ artillery.

2.)  The units and elements stationed in the West or in Denmark,
as well as panzer, assault gun, and AT units to be activated in
the West, must not be transferred to other fronts without my
permission.  The Chief of the Army General Staff, or the
Inspector General of Panzer Troops will submit to me a report
through the Armed Forces Operations Staff as soon as the issue
of equipment to the panzer and assault gun battalions, as well
as to the AT battalions and companies, has been completed.

3.)  Beyond similar measures taken in the past, the Commander in
Chief West will establish timetables for, and conduct maneuvers
and command post exercises, the procedure for bringing up units
from sectors not under attack.  These units will be made capable
of performing offensive missions, however limited.  In that
connection I demand that sectors not threatened by the enemy be
ruthlessly stripped of all forces except small guard
detachments.  For sectors from which reserves are withdrawn,
security and guard detachments must be set aside from security
and alarm units.  Labor forces drawn largely from the native
population must likewise be organized in those sectors, in order
to keep open whatever roads might be destroyed by the enemy air
force.

4.)  The Commander of German Troops in Denmark will take
measures in the area under his control in compliance with
paragraph 3 above.

5.)  Pursuant to separate orders, the Chief of Army Equipment
and Commander of the Replacement Army will form Kampfgruppen in
regimental strength, security  battalions, and engineer
construction battalions from training cadres, trainees, schools,
and instruction and convalescent units in the Zone of the
Interior.  These troops must be ready for shipment on 48 hours'
notice.

Furthermore, other available personnel are to be organized into
battalions of replacements and equipped with the available
weapons, so that the anticipated heavy losses can quickly be
replaced.

B)  Luftwaffe:

The offensive and defensive effectiveness of Luftwaffe units in
the West and in Denmark will be increased to meet the changed
situation.  To that end, preparations will be made for the
release of units suited for commitment in the anti-invasion
effort, that is, all flying units and mobile Flak artillery that
can be spared from the air defenses of the home front, and from
schools and training units in the Zone of the Interior.  All
those units are to be earmarked for the West and possibly
Denmark.

The Luftwaffe ground organization in southern Norway, Denmark,
northwestern Germany, and the West will be expanded and supplied
in a way that will -- by the most far-reaching decentralization
of own forces -- deny targets to the enemy bombers, and split
the enemy's offensive effort in case of large-scale opera- tons.
Particularly important in that connection will be our fighter
forces. Possibilities for their commitment must be increased by
the establishment of numerous advance landing fields.  Special
emphasis is to be placed on good camouflage.  I expect also that
the Luftwaffe will unstintingly furnish all available forces, by
stripping them from less threatened areas.

C) Navy:

The Navy will prepare the strongest possible forces suitable for
attacking the enemy landing Fleets.  Coastal defense
installations in the process of construction will be completed
with the utmost speed.  The emplacing of additional coastal
batteries and the possibility of laying further flanking mine
fields should be investigated.

All school, training, and other shore-based personnel fit for
ground combat must be prepared for commitment so that, without
undue delay, they can at least be employed as security forces
within the zone of the enemy landing operations.

While preparing the reinforcement of the defenses in the West,
the Navy must keep in mind that it might be called upon to
repulse simultaneous enemy landings in Norway and Denmark.  In
that connection, I attach particular importance to the assembly
of numerous U-boats in the northern area.  A temporary weakening
of U-boat forces in the Atlantic must be risked.

D) SS:

The Reichsfuehrer-SS will determine what Waffen-SS and police
forces he can release for combat, security, and guard duty.  He
is to prepare to organize effective combat and security forces
from training, replacement, and convalescent units, as well as
schools and other home-front establishments.

E) The commanders in chief of the services, the Reichsfuehrer-
SS, the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Commander in Chief
West, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the
Replacement Army, the Inspector General of Panzer Troops, as
well as the Commander of German Troops in Denmark will report to
me by 15 November all measures taken or planned.

I expect that all agencies will make a supreme effort toward
utilizing every moment of the remaining time in preparing for
the decisive battle in the West.

All authorities will guard against wasting time and energy in
useless jurisdictional squabbles, and will direct all their
efforts toward strengthening our defensive and offensive power.

                                           signed: Adolf Hitler

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 3 May 1993 14:08:09 EST
From:    Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Subject: Axis Force Distribution, 6 June, '44

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II: The European Theater of
Operations, CROSS CHANNEL ATTACK, by Gordon A. Harrison, Office
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army,
Washington, D.C., 1951

(5) Divisons Available to Germany on 6 June 1944 (Based on
German Situation Maps)

Theater                 Inf type       Pz type       Misc
----------------------------------------------------------------
Denmark                   2             1 + 2 Brig    3
Norway                   11
Finland                  10
Eastern Front           122            25 + 1 Brig   17 + 1 Brig
OB SUEDOST  (Balkans)    20             2             3
OB SUEDWEST  (Italy)     17 + 1 Brig    7             1
OB WEST (France and
         Low Countries   41 + 1 Rgt    11             9
Zone of Interior          3 + 1 Brig    1 + 2 Brig    4 + 2 Brig
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total German Divisions  226 + 2 Brig,  47 + 5 Brig   37 + 3 Brig
                              1 Rgt

AXIS SATELLITES
Finnish, Eastern Front   14 + 8 Brig    1             1 Brig
 and Finland
Romanian, Eastern Front  17 + 5 Brig    1             2
 and Romania
Hungarian, Eastern Front  9 + 2 Brig    2             5
 and Hungary
Bulgarian, Occupation    11
 Duty in Balkans and
 Bulgaria
Italian, In Zone of       4
 Interior
----------------------------------------------------------------
Total Axis Satellite     55 + 16 Brig   4             7 + 1 Brig
 Divisions

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 3 May 1993 10:55:58 PDT
From:    bob pasker <[email-masked]>
Subject: L O C I S

in case folks havent yet seen this, the library of congress information
system (LOCIS) is now on-line:

         L O C I S :  LIBRARY OF CONGRESS INFORMATION SYSTEM

          To make a choice: type a number, then press ENTER

  1   Library of Congress Catalog              4   Braille and Audio

  2   Federal Legislation                      5   Organizations

  3   Copyright Information                    6   Foreign Law

 *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *     *

  7   Searching Hours and Basics
  8   Documentation and Classes
  9   Library of Congress General Information

 12   Comments and Logoff

 --------------------
it can be reached via telnet locis.loc.gov

-- bob

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 2 May 1993 to 3 May 1993
***********************************************