Subject: WWII-L Digest - 14 Jul 1993 to 15 Jul 1993

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 16 Jul 1993 00:00:39 -0400

There are 4 messages totalling 388 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. USAAF 15 JUL 43
  2. GEN: France late 44 (2)
  3. ok

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 15 Jul 1993 07:18:56 -0400
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: USAAF 15 JUL 43

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
THURSDAY, 15 JULY 1943
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  L-4, Piper Cub
  L-5, Stinson Sentinel
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-39, Bell Airacobra
  P-40, Curtiss
  Wellington, Vickers (RAF)
  Zeke, Mitsubishi A6M, Navy Type 0 Carrier Fighter

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force)
    In the Aleutian Islands, 1 B-24 and 2 P-39's fly reconnaissance over
Kiska and Segula Islands. 9 B-24's and 14 B-25's bomb Kiska Island
targets including AA batteries at North Head, Jeff Cove and Gertrude
Cove. Fires are started. 1 bomber turns back with 3 engines and jettisons
bombs, another crashes on return. AA fire damages a B-25.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force)
    The 71st Liaison Squadron is activated at Ondal, India, assigned to
the Tenth Air Force. The squadron will be equipped with L-4's and L-5's
and enter combat in Oct 43.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Ninth Air Force)
    B-24's strike the main airfield and 2 satellite fields at Foggia,
Italy.  In Sicily, B-25's bomb Palermo, Cape Gallo, Salina Island, and
Cape Zifferano; and P-40's patrol over the Licata area.

  WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Northwest African Air Force)
    During the night of 14/16 Jul, Wellingtons of the Northwest African
Strategic Air Force (NASAF) hit airfields and docks at Naples, Italy
while Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF) light and medium
bombers bomb Palermo, Sicily and fly armored reconnaissance, attacking
roads and convoys, over extensive areas of Sicily. During the day, NASAF
medium bombers bomb Vibo Valentia, Sicily, while heavy bombers hit Villa
San Giovanni, Italy. NASAF fighters fly numerous strafing and bombing
missions against trains, road junctions, radar installations, truck
convoys, railway stations, and targets of opportunity throughout Sicily.
Northwest African Coastal Air Force (NACAF) airplanes fly sea patrols,
reconnaissance, convoy escort, and hit shipping off the W coast of
Corsica and E coast of Sardinia.

SOUTH PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Thirteenth Air Force)
  In the Solomon Islands, B-25's, P-40's, and P-38's strafe 2 barges NE
of Ganongga Island, leaving them sinking. A large enemy force, estimated
at 27 bombers and 40-50 Zekes, is intercepted over Vella Lavella Island
by USAAF and other Allied fighters, which claim 15 bombers and 30 Zekes
destroyed, against 3 losses.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Fifth Air Force)
  In New Guinea, A-20's hit positions along the Orodubi-Komiatum Track.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

----------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop      |  Those who have long enjoyed such privileges |
|  Bellcore           |  as we enjoy forget in time that men have    |
|  Piscataway, NJ     |  died to win them.     FDR                   |
|  USA                |  [email-masked]                        |
----------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 15 Jul 1993 10:09:28 EDT
From:    "William B. Thacker" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GEN: France late 44

> As France was #2, Britian #3 and US #1 in troops at the front, you'd might
> expect the French would get a significant say in devising stategy for said
> troops. They did not.

Which was form for the time.  The Indians, New Zealanders, South Africans,
and Australians probably lodged the same complaint at the times they
outnumbered the British in the 8th Army.  Number of troops isn't the only,
or even best, measure of war contribution.

For example, the British fleet was a major asset throughout the war;
without it, the war would have been lost.  The French fleet... well, it
shot at us when we launched Op. Torch, so I guess you could say it was a
negative contribution to the Allies.

Then there was the RAF, who provided air cover and strategic bombing
through '44 and '45.  The French equivalent?  Well, there was a French
squadron flying for the Germans earlier in the war, in the Middle East, I
guess.  More seriously, I'm sure there must have been a few French
squadrons, but how much did they help?

Strategic bases?  OK, the French can't be blamed for not owning anything as
important as Gibraltar.  Still, we put more work into helping de Gaulle
occupy more useless chunks of Vichy turf...  Madagascar, even.  We didn't
need these places, but de Gaulle did, and we had to help take them to gain
his cooperation.  And the Vichy troops guarding the French Mediterranean
coast and French North Africa freed up dozens of German divisions for
killing Russians.

And of course, while Britain bankrupted herself producing war materiel, and
the US stretched its economy to the limit, France did not.  Her position
was no different from that of Poland; conquered, she could provide nothing
but manpower and a sleazy government-in-exile.  As the saying goes, beggars
can't be choosers.  Having seen the results of French strategic planning in
1940, I think we were wise to ignore de Gaulle as often as possible.

Quite frankly, after their collaboration with the Germans, the French
should be happy we didn't just consider them enemies and install an
entirely new government at gunpoint.

> IMO, France was too important a part of the Allied collition to lock out
> of the decision making process in late 1944. The US/UK didn't have to like
> them (heck, the French didn't like each other!), but not seeking the input
> of a major ally is just plain unwise.

Any my point is that, despite the manpower provided, France wasn't a major
ally.  There were nowhere near being in Britain's league in terms of total
contribution to the war effort.  The French Army sided with the Germans
until it was obvious they were going to lose, then threw in with the
Allies.

> Also, Strasbourg was an important city to the French people (taking 2nd
> place only to Paris)...in large part as a symbol of resistance to Germany.
> To abandon this symbol to the Germans without a fight would be viewed as
> a major disgrace...something that might so damage the prestige of de Gaulle
> that his shakey gov't would probably collapse and lead to civil unrest (if
> not civil war).

The exact same concerns were voiced regarding Kiev, Kharkov, and
Stalingrad.  At Kharkov, Hitler ordered the SS Panzer Korps to defend the
city to the last bullet; fortunately for the Wehrmacht, Hausser disobeyed
that order.  Even since the war the Germans have been ridiculed for
Hitler's "we have to hold this city at any cost" approach; why should that
argument be any more credible coming from de Gaulle?

I don't know the French people.  It's difficult to believe that the people
who declared Paris an open city and quietly went along with the Armistice
in 1940 would revolt over the temporary loss of Strasbourg.

> De Gaulle agreed that from a military perspective Eisenhowers plan made
> sense, but from a practical viewpoint it was *out of the question*. The
> potential cost in French lives and civil unrest was just too great.

Sounds to me like the issue wasn't the loss to France, but the loss to de
Gaulle.  France would have survived the civil unrest, but de Gaulle would
have been history.

In the event, we held Strasbourg and won the battle.  Had that gone the
other way and the Allies suffered a bloody defeat, Ike would have been
rightly ridiculed for listening to de Gaulle, and history might have
painted de Gaulle as the villain for risking thousands of lives for his own
political interests.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bill Thacker             AT&T Network Systems       attmail!att!cbemf!wbt
Quality Engineer            Columbus, Ohio              [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 15 Jul 1993 16:35:32 EDT
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: ok

          ok

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 15 Jul 1993 18:43:36 -0400
From:    "Mr. Scott Hannon" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GEN: France late 44

Yet more of the thread that won't die...   :^)

me:
>> As France was #2, Britian #3 and US #1 in troops at the front, you might
>> expect the French would get a significant say in devising stategy for said
>> troops. They did not.

Bill:
>Which was form for the time.  The Indians, New Zealanders, South Africans,
>and Australians probably lodged the same complaint at the times they
>outnumbered the British in the 8th Army.  Number of troops isn't the only,
>or even best, measure of war contribution.

True, numbers are not everything, but:
 The above allies were all part of the Commonwealth
 They were not fighting on their homeland
 While their advice might be ignored, it was heard and considered.

Note that Australia behaved much the same as France WRT Alsace when Britain
seemed to be ignoring their interests. They pulled their troops out of north
Africa and told the British where they could file their complaints.

>[The French fleet]...was a negative contribution to the Allies.
>[France had few strategic bases of use to the allies]
>[France's economy didn't help the allies]

Agreed. Britain was a more important partner in the war than France.
Even in 1945.

I was speaking purely of the situation present around Jan 1, 1945, WRT
combat along the western front. Things had changed. Things like Gibralter,
strategic bombers, and a big UK navy no longer mattered much WRT finishing
the defeat of Germany. Troops to clear and occupy Germany were what was
needed.

I'm not saying that France should've replaced the UK as the US's main
partner, nor had a significant say in overall war stategy. Just that they
should not have been almost completely locked out from those decisions
directly affecting both their nation and their troops. The allies had not
only not consulted the French about abandoning Alsace, they had not even
informed them of the decision. The French were supposed to find out about
it when it happened.

Ike's withdrawl order was made against the advice of 6th Army Group's
commander, Devers, who wanted to hold. In fact, he delayed implementing
the order so much so that Ike was quite angry with him.

This crisis came as rather a surprise to those concerned, as usually
Eisenhower was quite adept at considering the political and national
interests at work in collition warfare. Here, he just screwed up IMO.
My guess is he was too preoccupied in recovering US prestige after the
Bulge disaster to give the Alsace matter much thought. "I like Ike",
but here I think he erred.

>Then there was the RAF, who provided air cover and strategic bombing
>through '44 and '45.  The French equivalent?

Yes, the French operated there own tactical airforce by Jan 1, '45. It
supported 1st French Army. I forget how many squadrons...about a dozen?
But no stategic bomber force.

>Madagascar [,etc]...We didn't need these places, but de Gaulle did.

I thought Madagascar had more to with anti-Japan strategy than pleasing
de Gaulle. But I may well be wrong.

Don't underplay the political value of having a slice of national territory
upon which to set up a gov't-in-exile. The Japanese 1944 U-Go offensive in
Burma was in large part based on a desire to grab a worthless slice of India
upon which to set up Bose and his anti-British gov't-in-exile. Bose too had
the "de" gaul to declare co-belligerence status for his small Nat Lib Army :-)

>Having seen the results of French strategic planning in
>1940, I think we were wise to ignore de Gaulle as often as possible.

Yes, 1940 was a disaster, but not of de Gaulle's making.
For some sarcasm, replace "French" with "US", "1940" with "1941",
and "de Gaulle" with "Eisenhower".   :-)

As Devers agreed with de Gaulle about Alsace, a decision to stay and fight
would not have reflected purely "French strategic planning".

>Quite frankly, after their collaboration with the Germans, the French
>should be happy we didn't just consider them enemies and install an
>entirely new government at gunpoint.

Fair enough, if that is restricted to known collaborators and not the
average people.

And the Vichy were not exactly pro-Axis except for few genuine pro-axis
leaders..Laval as you've mentioned, but not Petain as a counterexample.
Most seemed to just be trying to keep as much of France and its territories
intact as possible...at the cost of honor and decency. This issue is still
sensitive in France I'm told (pragmatists or traitors).

>my point is that, despite the manpower provided, France wasn't a major
>ally.  They were nowhere near being in Britain's league in terms of total
>contribution to the war effort.

I agree about the total contribution. But by 1945 France had what the western
allies most needed to finish the war against Germany: manpower in ground
troops. In that sense, they were a major ETO ally in '45, IMO.

>It's difficult to believe that the people
>who declared Paris an open city and quietly went along with the Armistice
>in 1940 would revolt over the temporary loss of Strasbourg.

It was a very different situation. The allies could not save Paris in 1940;
the only decision to make was how to lose it. Many belligerents when faced
with this choice opt for an open city.

The situation in Alsace in early 1945 was very different.
1) Strasbourg was recaptured by the French (2 DB). It was French blood split
  liberating the city. To have the US turn it over to the Germans without a
  fight (and not allow the French to try and defend it themselves) would mean
  all those lives were lost in vain. Very bad for French morale (already low).
2) Abandoning Alsace/Strasbourg was a *choice* (unlike Paris in 1940), made
  so that operations in other sectors of the front wouldn't be hampered (the
  reduction of the Bulge). There was little question of being unable to stop
  Nordwind if the allies wanted to.

Devers thought (correctly) he could do a good job of stopping (or at least
slowing) the Germans without needing a lot of help. The French agreed with
Devers; together 6th Army Group could make a good show of defending Alsace.
Abandoning Alsace might well lead to political disaster because all France
would known:
   US/UK/allies ignores French concerns...they can't be trusted
   De Gaulle is a wimp and incompetent for allowing this to happen
This may have been excuse enough for many disgruntled ex-partisans and their
political backers to start civil unrest. De Gaulle would fall as the last
unifying force in France. Vichy vs communist vs Gaullists vs this click vs
that click. Chaos. France was a mess barely being held together by de Gaulle
and it wouldn't take a lot to shatter. It was more than his ego speaking
when de Gaulle talked about himself being France.

I am only vaguely familiar with French politics of the time, so I am unfit
to make any reasonable judgement about the true likelyness of the Alsace
withdrawl leading to civil unrest. But those few opinions I've read suggest
it was likely.

Political chaos would likely lead to some French army mutinies and other
civil unrest. The French could no longer continue as major active combatant
against Germany as most of the army would be needed to supress rebellions.
[Yeah, this is heading off into unsupported speculation, but...]
This would mean the US/UK/allies would have to take over 100+ miles of new
(ex-French manned) front...there's a drain of a ~10 divs. Plus the rear
area in France will need some garrisoning to protect allied supply lines,
bases, etc...there's another few divs. Suddenly the US/UK/allies are facing
the Germans along a longer front with a lose of ~15 divs and unsecure
supply lines to boot. Not good.

This is mentioned in a none too convincing fashion in Charles Whiting's
book _Operation Norwind_ of a couple years ago. I was inclined to dismiss
it as hype, but furthur readings about the military side of things do seem
to suggest its not as crazy as it sounds. I do think its rather a worst
case scenario, but not pure fantasy.

---
And in another message...
[No more talk about "the French transport system", please :-) ]

Sidney asks:
>Just how did the French and British stack up in terms of effective fighting
>formations and equipment?

As I've mentioned, most French units (after 1943) were clones of American
formations: much the same structure, training, and equipment. Thus its easier
to compare US - French effectiveness than French - British. In general terms
the UK army (ie excludes India, NZ, Canada, etc) was pretty much in decline
by late '44. Too many casualties that could no longer be made good. They
were starting to cannibalize to maintain effectiveness (disband a div and
redistribute the troops as replacements for other divs).

While the north African contingent of the French army (which was the main
fighting part in late '44) was also in decline, the Euro-France portion
was fast growing, so in numbers the French army as a whole was growing.
By the end of the year, the UK and France had roughly the same size army
deployed against the Germans. In terms of quality, the UK maintained a
slight edge (due to all those new/green French ex-FFI units).

Where to substantiate this? This whole thread started with my whining about
the lack of an easily available good book on this subject. If you are a
wargamer, a game covering the fall of Germany shoul at least point out
the who had what where aspects. As for an concise operational book, you're
out of luck (unless you happen to find de Lattre's book from the '50s).

[BTW, it was Churchill who cleared up the crisis between de Gaulle and Ike]

Scott.

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 14 Jul 1993 to 15 Jul 1993
*************************************************