Subject: WWII-L Digest - 13 Jul 1993 to 14 Jul 1993

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 15 Jul 1993 00:00:46 -0400

There are 10 messages totalling 594 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. MISC: French army (2)
  2. USAAF 14 JUL 43
  3. WANT: 388th BG Alumni Assoc. Address
  4. REF:Elementary School Curriculum
  5. GEN: France late 44 (3)
  6. F.Y.I.
  7. German Combat Worth Catagories

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 14 Jul 1993 06:42:47 EDT
From:    Lowe Barrett MAJ <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: MISC: French army

Adding to Gardner's point below:

>On a related point:
>
>     In a theater near the top of l'Arc de Triumphe in Paris is a movie
>     detailing great moments in the life of the monument.  One feature
>     is the liberation of Paris [WWII] by the French Army.  It also
>     leads the viewer to the idea that the French Army also liberated
>     France.
      ...with just a little help from Ike, George Patton, Omar Bradley,
      the U.S. Army, and Monty and his crew.......   :-)

      I guess after getting their butts kicked by the Germans in 1940
      their politicians don't want to admit to too much help.

      However, after being on an exchange with a French parachute regiment
      (6eme RPIMA in Mont de Marsan) in 1983, their officers sure know
      and appreciate what we did.  In fact, my sponsor also had an
      American flag hanging in his office.

Bear

Barrett F. Lowe                    RANGERS LEAD THE WAY!
MAJ, IN
Dept of Physics, US Military Academy, West Point, NY 10996

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 14 Jul 1993 07:10:42 -0400
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: USAAF 14 JUL 43

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
WEDNESDAY, 14 JULY 1943
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  B-40, Boeing Flying Fortress
  C-47, Douglas Skytrain
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-51, North American Mustang
  Spitfire, Vickers Supermarine
  Wellington, Vickers (RAF)

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force)
  VIII Bomber Command Mission Number 73: Three targets are struck in
France, i.e.:
    1. 111 B-17's and 5 YB-40's are dispatched against the aircraft works
at Villacoublay, France; 101 hit the target at 0811-0815 hours; they
claim 15-7-16 Luftwaffe aircraft; 3 B-17's are lost and 67 damaged;
casualties are 1 KIA, 3 WIA and 21 MIA.
    2. 64 B-17's are dispatched against Amiens/Glisy Airfield; 53 hit the
target at 0742 hours; they claim 9-0-2 Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 B-17 is
lost, 3 are damaged beyond repair and 34 are damaged; casualties are 6
KIA, 3 WIA and 10 MIA.
    3. 84 B-17's are dispatched against LeBourget Airfield, Paris; 52 hit
the target at 0750-0820 hours; they claim 41-27-32 Luftwaffe aircraft; 4
B-17's are lost, 1 is damaged beyond repair and 50 damaged; casualties
are 16 WIA and 41 MIA.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Ninth Air Force)
    In Sicily, B-24's and Royal Air Force (RAF) heavy bombers hit rail-
road, marshalling yard, harbor, and oil storage facilities at Messina;
B-25's hit the Enna and Palermo areas; and P-40's patrol Licata and
attack the Lentini area.

  WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Northwest African Air Force)
    In Sicily during the night of 13/14 Jul, Northwest African Strategic
Air Force (NASAF) Wellingtons bomb Palermo and Messina, and C-47's drop
paratroops in advance of Allied troops to secure a bridge at Primosole.
Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF) aircraft hit ammo dumps,
trains, rail junctions, bridges, vehicle convoys, and other targets of
opportunity in the Sicilian countryside, and bomb several town areas
including Enna and Palermo during several raids throughout the night of
13/14 Jul and the following day. During the day, B-17's, B-26's, B-25's,
and fighters hit Naples, Italy and Messina, Enna, Marsala, and Randazzo,
and numerous targets of opportunity in Sicily. Northwest African Coastal
Air Force (NACAF) continues sea patrols, reconnaissance, and convoy
protection.
    On the ground in Sicily, British forces attempting to establish a
bridgehead at the Primosole bridge on the Simeto River near Lentini
continue to face strong opposition.
    The detachment of the 15th Photographic Squadron (Heavy), 3d Photo-
graphic Reconnaissance and Mapping Group, operating from Le Kroub,
Algeria with B-17's and F-5's returns to it's base at La Marsa, Tunisia.
    The air echelon of the 111th Reconnaissance Squadron (Fighter), 68th
Reconnaissance Group, transfers from Korba, Tunisia to Ponte Olivo,
Sicily with P-51's. The ground echelon will remain at Tunis, Tunisia
until Friday.
    The 307th and 308th Fighter Squadrons, 31st Fighter Group, transfer
with Spitfires from Gozo Island, Malta to Ponte Olivo, Sicily.

SOUTH PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Thirteenth Air Force)
  In the Solomon Islands, B-25's and P-40's strike small craft in Hunda
Cove and Beagle Channel off New Georgia Island; 2 barges and a small
vessel are claimed destroyed. B-24's and B-17's pound airfields on
Ballale Island and Buka Island, and at Kahili on Bougainville Island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Fifth Air Force)
  In New Guinea, A-20's bomb and strafe the Orodubi area; and a single
B-17 hits Lae. B-24's bomb Koepang on Timor Island.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

----------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop      |  Those who have long enjoyed such privileges |
|  Bellcore           |  as we enjoy forget in time that men have    |
|  Piscataway, NJ     |  died to win them.     FDR                   |
|  USA                |  [email-masked]                        |
----------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 14 Jul 1993 09:38:01 EST
From:    Crane Conrad LTC <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WANT: 388th BG Alumni Assoc. Address

>A question was posed my way, which I will now forward... :-)
>
>Does anyone know an address or phone number for the 388ths Bomb Group
>Alumni Association?
>
>--
>Robert J. Granvin                                    Southern Minnesota Wing
>[email-masked]                                       Confederate Air Force
>  You know you've made a gear-up landing when it takes full power to taxi.
>

8th AF Unit Contact for the 388th BG is Edward Huntzinger, 1925 SE 37 St., Cape
Coral, FL 33904.

                              Conrad Crane
                              LTC, USA
                              Dept. of History, USMA
                              Also Member of 8AFHS

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 14 Jul 1993 09:32:14 EDT
From:    Kurt L <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: MISC: French army

My wife grew up in France mostly in and around Nice.  She is very sensitive
about comments about the French.  I was talking to the Mother-in-Law the
other day about the Vichy Govt. and how the french in my opinion would
rather forget their involvement in cooperating with the Nazi German
controlled Vichy.  Who knows how many indictments and convictions were
obtained where the defendants were French working with^[for Vichy?
This topic is interesting and we may never know all.  I wonder how
many war criminals were British or American even.  Lets not leave out
the then Soviets.

Tally Ho! We Have Joy!   H. A. Kurt Luginbyhl
                         [email-masked]
                         National Museum of Natural History

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 14 Jul 1993 08:58:14 -0500
From:    Ellen Pedraza <[email-masked]>
Subject: REF:Elementary School Curriculum

Are there any elementary school teachers on this list who have
incorporated WWII History into their curriculum for Grades 2-6?

I am an academic librarian who will be teaching education majors about
Internet resources and electronic discussion groups.

We will be reading and summarizing this list for about 4 weeks this summer
as an exercise to introduce them to email and electronic discussion
groups.

I chose this list because the focus of their summer classes is on WWII and
minority and ethnic participation.

If you are an elementary school teacher who has used WWII as a theme for
your class curriculum (whether it was history, math, science, geography or
??) I would appreciate hearing about your projects.

Our students will also use traditional resources, like curriculum guides,
and journal literature, for ideas.

You may reply to the address above.  Thank you.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 14 Jul 1993 12:13:05 -0400
From:    "Mr. Scott Hannon" <[email-masked]>
Subject: GEN: France late 44

Bill Thacker writes:
>For the French to claim a significant participation in the liberation of
>their nation simply because they didn't object to our drawing supplies
>through their territory is ridiculous.  They granted virtually the same
>consideration to the Germans in 1940. (*) And to threaten to undermine that
>liberation effort is downright silly; they held themselves hostage.
...
>(*) While I'll agree that terrorist activities did hamper the operation of
>the French transport system, esp. railroads, from 1940-44, the overall
>effect of said resistance only became signficant in a few cases...

No one makes such a claim. The claim was that the French transport system
was a non-negligable contribution *in addition to the troops*. This is in
the same sense Britain had served as the base of operations for the US
troops, bombers, etc. Was that not a significant contribution?

The supply point seems to have taken off by itself...it is nearly irrelevant.
As France was #2, Britian #3 and US #1 in troops at the front, you'd might
expect the French would get a significant say in devising stategy for said
troops. They did not. Only #1 and #3 made the big decisions, even those with
large repercussions for France. While I'd agree this arrangement was proper
for summer '44, by the fall off '44 it no longer reflected military
participation or political realities.

French participation in the Normandy landings was indeed small. But that was
not the main effort of the French army (ignoring the FFI partisans) in
France's liberation...that came in the south with Dragoon, which came a
couple months [August] after D-Day. French 1st Army liberated much of
southern and eastern France. Usually the only French participation that is
remembered is the 2 DB's liberation of Paris, and that as an example of
allied charity (the allies specifically selected 2 DB to have the honor).

For military as well as political reasons, major French participation in
D-Day was impractical. [The French army was stuck in the Med. theater,
and anyways not-to-friendly with the British]. Nearly the only major
French unit coming thru Normandy was LeClerc's 2 DB in July, attached to
the US forces. Besides liberating Paris, it liberated much of Alsace,
including Strasbourg, in an amazing campaign in the fall.

The operations of French 1st Army are not well covered in most english
language WW2 histories, so France's contribution beyond 2 DB and the FFI
is generally not recognized. [For example, the US Army in WW2 series does
not cover Dever's 6th Army Group]. That 1st Army was mostly North African
may also work against its recognition (the "French" army contained rather
few Euro-Frenchmen until late 1944!).

The manpower of the French troops by Jan 1 1945 was much larger than that
of the Poles, or Canadians, New Zealanders, Dutch, etc. About equal to all
of those combined. While half the French units were brand-new ex-FFI units
barely fit for combat, the other half were seasoned veterans, as good or
better than the typical American div (2 DB may have been the best Allied
armored div of the war).

IMO, France was too important a part of the Allied collition to lock out
of the decision making process in late 1944. The US/UK didn't have to like
them (heck, the French didn't like each other!), but not seeking the input
of a major ally is just plain unwise.

>All told, given the choice between suffering a major
>defeat (=thousands of casualties) or having Charles de Gaulle and his
>supporters in a snit, I'd have given Chuckles the boot in a minute.

If this refers to Nordwind and the early January 1945 command crisis, I
disagree. This was not the choice Eisenhower faced.

[As it turned out, the German's had underestimated Allied strength and so
failed to acheive the desired breakthru and rout. While a few divs of
Allied reinforcments had to be committed, the effort in "the Bulge" was not
too seriously disrupted. But this is hindsight.]

As Alsace was a disputed area (claimed by both France and Germany), the
citizens were considered traitors by the Germans if they acted against
German interest. [BTW, the French had much the same policy. They executed
many Alsatians serving in the German military]. The whole area was deeply
divided...there would be no shortage of finger-pointers. The French were
thus deeply concerned about the region returning to the Germans/Gestapo.

Also, Strasbourg was an important city to the French people (taking 2nd
place only to Paris)...in large part as a symbol of resistance to Germany.
To abandon this symbol to the Germans without a fight would be viewed as
a major disgrace...something that might so damage the prestige of de Gaulle
that his shakey gov't would probably collapse and lead to civil unrest (if
not civil war).

De Gaulle agreed that from a military perspective Eisenhowers plan made
sense, but from a practical viewpoint it was *out of the question*. The
potential cost in French lives and civil unrest was just too great. They'd
go it alone if necessary, and were apparently serious with their threats
(de Gaulles orders to de Lattre are unambiguous...ignore Ike and do as de
Gaulle says *no matter what*).

This did not "threaten to undermine the liberation effort" of France (well,
not as much as Ikes plan), as the only bits not yet liberated were in French
sectors of the front (the fortress ports and part of Alsace). But
Eisenhower's retreat order *did* threaten the liberation in the sense that
Alsace was to be abandoned and civil unrest would likely ensue in most of
France and require the intervention of the French army (those parts that
stayed loyal). In short, Ike ignored political reality and made a purely
military decision...something Generals are wont to do.

Scott.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 14 Jul 1993 13:34:27 -0400
From:    Lydia Fish <[email-masked]>
Subject: F.Y.I.

Forwarded from vwar-l

********************************************************************************
   ************************************

>From the San Mateo Times, Tuesday, July 13, 1993.
Reprinted without permission.

"Women Army Vets invited to join up"
(dl San Francisco)
"The Women's Army Corps Veterans Association is seeking
women who served in the Army Corps between 1942 and 1978
to join the organization.
"The group meets the third Saturday of each month to
promot recognition and benefits for women veterans as well
as socialize.  For more information, call membership
chairwoman Ramona Chipman at (415) 897-2627."

I would assume that there are chapters in other cities.
If anyone would like me to call and see if Ramona has
information for your area, send me e-mail and I'll call.

CatWoman
([email-masked])

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 14 Jul 1993 15:38:55 EDT
From:    "William B. Thacker" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: German Combat Worth Catagories

Shawn Woodford writes:

> Although the Russians used large masses of artillery to rend holes in
> the German lines,Soviet artillery was notoriously slow to displace and calling
> for fire support was a quick way for a Soviet officer to end up in a penal
> battallion clearing minefields...

I've got a lot of questions about the Soviet use of artillery, and this
addresses some of them.  The image I've got is that the Red Army artillery
stuck to a pre-calculated fire plan and had little or no ability to be
directed from the battlefield.  That, mostly, from German accounts.  But
I've never read an actual description of Soviet artillery tactics and
control techniques; can anyone point me to a good reference?

Specifically, was it even practical for a field commander to request
artillery on a target of opportunity?  If so, at what levels (Battalion,
Brigade, etc) was such a mission requested and authorized?  How long would
it take to arrive?

> [The Soviets] were also among the first armies to equip their infantry
> formations with SMG's to bolster their firepower.

And, I would add, the only ones to use SMG's as the basic infantry arm for
large units.  Though I would maintain that this had as much to do with
simplifying training requirements as with increased firepower; the theory,
at least, was that a soldier could be effective with an SMG with much less
marksmanship training than required for a rifle.

> The upshot of this is that the Soviets relied on
> infantry and direct fire attacks where the Germans and Western Allies woud use
> massed and accurate artillery and air support.

As nearly as I can tell, the German artillery, while far ahead of
the Russian in terms of efficiency, was quite a distance behind the US and
Britain.  In part, that's a question of mass, the western Allies simply
having more tubes available.  But it was also a doctrine issue; the German
batteries tended to be parcelled out, whereas we maintained centralized
control so that entire artillery regiments could be called in on a single
target by a single forward observer.

> But this also brings up the question of why the Germans considered infantry
> combat on the Eastern Front as more destructive than facing the overwhelming
> air and artillery assets of the Allies on the Western Front in 1944-45...
> Massive amounts of firepower used against the enemy saved lives in
> avoiding costly infantry attacks.  Weren't the Germans taking huge casualties
> from this firepower in the West?  I tend to disbelieve this notion.  While the
> Allies viewed firepower as a killing tool, both the Germans and the Russians
> tended to see it as more of a suppresive tool.

I think it's important to distinguish artillery's offensive and defensive
applications.  I agree with everything you say above, with that
reservation.

On the offensive, artillery is not very effective for killing, unless the
defenders have no ability to take cover.  It can suppress (by driving them
to cover), but most of the casualties will be delivered in the first few
seconds of the barrage, when the enemy is caught unaware.  Hence the
attraction to rockets, which deliver a massive amount of firepower over a
few seconds.

Defensively, it's another matter.  An advancing attacker cannot take great
advantage of cover, and is likely to be caught in unprotected ground where
artillery casualties will be tremendous.  To accomplish this requires very
close cooperation, however, because you're trying to hit a moving target
with no advance notice.  This, apparently, was beyond the ability of the
Soviets, but the Germans became adept at it.  That alone, I submit, could
account for the quoted statistics:

> while German artillery inflicted on the order of 70-80% of
> Russian combat casualties, Soviet tubes accounted for only about 50% of German
> losses.

Of course, the nature of the Soviet infantry attack, especially in the
early portion of the war when human waves were common, made it particularly
vulnerable to artillery.  Further, I gather that the Germans did more
defending than attacking, particularly after 1943; if artillery is more
effective on the defense, then it would naturally account for an inflated
percentage of German-inflicted casualties, relative to the Soviets.

Returning, then, to the Western Front, we'd expect to find that the Germans
suffered fewer casualties from artillery, because they spent even less time
attacking.  Whenever we *do* find them attacking, however, it seems that as
often as not they were stopped by artillery.  From the very first
US-German encounter, Kasserine Pass, we find that the arrival of effective
Allied artillery support ended the German advance.  Survivors of the German
counterattacks against the Normandy beachheads speak of units being
decimated by artillery and naval gunfire, and other accounts of smaller
German attacks tell the same story; "We advanced, the artillery hit us, and
those still alive retreated."

Back to Kampfwert numbers:  I'd want to assign my poorest troops to places
where they'd never have to attack, or even be especially mobile.  That
means Italy or the Western Front, and Italy presents other problems.
Conditions in the east were more fluid, and demanded the best troops.

But if I needed to attack in the west, I'd be deathly afraid of the
American and British artillery, and only a combat-toughened unit would do.

I'd hasten to add that other considerations must have entered into the
decision to place poorer units in the West.  Psychologically, fighting on
the Eastern front was much more demanding; the sheer scale of the conflict,
the foreignness of the land, the weather, the stress, all would have been
debilitating to Volksgrenadiers and the like.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bill Thacker             AT&T Network Systems       attmail!att!cbemf!wbt
Quality Engineer            Columbus, Ohio              [email-masked]
          "Giving money and power to government is like giving
         whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." - P.J. O'Rourke

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 14 Jul 1993 16:38:33 -0500
From:    "Sidney W. Kitchel" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GEN: France late 44

        Sorry to seem a devil's advocate, but history training
sometimes gets in the way:

Mr. Scott Hannon writes:
|->
|-> Bill Thacker writes:
|-> >For the French to claim a significant participation in the liberation of
|-> >their nation simply because they didn't object to our drawing supplies
|-> >through their territory is ridiculous.  They granted virtually the same
|-> >consideration to the Germans in 1940. (*) And to threaten to undermine that
|-> >liberation effort is downright silly; they held themselves hostage.
|-> ...
|-> >(*) While I'll agree that terrorist activities did hamper the operation of
|-> >the French transport system, esp. railroads, from 1940-44, the overall
|-> >effect of said resistance only became signficant in a few cases...
|->
|-> No one makes such a claim. The claim was that the French transport system
|-> was a non-negligable contribution *in addition to the troops*. This is in
|-> the same sense Britain had served as the base of operations for the US
|-> troops, bombers, etc. Was that not a significant contribution?

        I think what I want to know is what "French transport system"
really means. I am interested in knowing the manpower and equipment
involved beyond the passive contribution (or accident) of the roads
and ports.

|-> The supply point seems to have taken off by itself...it is nearly irrelevant.
|-> As France was #2, Britian #3 and US #1 in troops at the front, you'd might
|-> expect the French would get a significant say in devising stategy for said
|-> troops. They did not. Only #1 and #3 made the big decisions, even those with

        Well, it's hard to second guess the folks on the ground at the
time. Maybe we would have made the same decisions, if we had to deal
with De Gaulle and some of the other French leaders. I think the French
were viewed for a long time as in the same category as Poland, the
Netherlands, and other occupied countries.
        I am very intrigued by the #2 vs #3 talk above. Just how did
the French and British stack up in terms of effective fighting
formations and equipment?

|-> The operations of French 1st Army are not well covered in most english
|-> language WW2 histories, so France's contribution beyond 2 DB and the FFI
|-> is generally not recognized. [For example, the US Army in WW2 series does
|-> not cover Dever's 6th Army Group]. That 1st Army was mostly North African

        Considering the amazement caused here among WWII buffs, you
have made a tremendous understatment.

|-> The manpower of the French troops by Jan 1 1945 was much larger than that
|-> of the Poles, or Canadians, New Zealanders, Dutch, etc. About equal to all
|-> of those combined. While half the French units were brand-new ex-FFI units
|-> barely fit for combat, the other half were seasoned veterans, as good or
|-> better than the typical American div (2 DB may have been the best Allied
|-> armored div of the war).

        How could an historian verify this claim??

|-> IMO, France was too important a part of the Allied collition to lock out
|-> of the decision making process in late 1944. The US/UK didn't have to like
|-> them (heck, the French didn't like each other!), but not seeking the input
|-> of a major ally is just plain unwise.

        Could Winnie have been at work here or maybe as alluded above
just the human reaction of people to De Gaulle et al.??

|-> As Alsace was a disputed area (claimed by both France and Germany), the
|-> citizens were considered traitors by the Germans if they acted against
|-> German interest. [BTW, the French had much the same policy. They executed
|-> many Alsatians serving in the German military]. The whole area was deeply
|-> divided...there would be no shortage of finger-pointers. The French were
|-> thus deeply concerned about the region returning to the Germans/Gestapo.

        Confusion by outsiders can still occur. Many Alsatian families
still speak German at home and French in public.

                                                        --Sid
--
Sidney W. Kitchel           [email-masked], [email-masked]
Data Parallel Systems, Inc.  ============||  DPSI  ||===============
4617 E. Morningside Drive                             (812) 334-8100
Bloomington, Indiana,  47408  USA               FAX:  (812) 334-8121

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 14 Jul 1993 17:44:00 EST
From:    Han Solo <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GEN: France late 44

        O.k.  I've been reading the 'France in WW2' letters and I think I'd
like to throw in my 2 cents.  The last letter I read mentioned that Ike
made a purely military decision instead of acknowledging a political reality.
I'd like to comment on this first.

        How were people to know what the 'political reality' in France was??
You said yourself that the French 'didn't like the French'.  There was a
deep division.  The French government FOR YEARS had collaborated with the
enemy.  They hadn't been a military factor in the war since the very
beginning, and even then, they were insignificant.  I realize that before
the war there were many political and social problems in France, and their
defenceshad really suffered.The point is, who ran the show for the Allies
in the west from '39 to '44?  Obviously the US/UK.  The French were so divided
as '44 went on, that the US/UK couldn't rely on any "leader" of France.  You
had "Chuckles" running around following the American forces declaring each
new town or city as "Free French" just after the Americans liberated it! How
could he be a viable leader?!?!  I don't see it.  Ike ran the show, and I
think he was the best man for the job, and he made the best decisions.  I
know that you weren't really saying he wasn't, but I just wanted to say that.

        I also think that probably the 4th Armored Division in Patton's
3rd Army was the best Allied Armor Division.  The 4th was the spearhead in
the relief of Bastogne.

                                                Don

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 13 Jul 1993 to 14 Jul 1993
*************************************************