Subject: WWII-L Digest - 17 Aug 1993 to 18 Aug 1993

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 19 Aug 1993 00:00:49 -0400

There are 8 messages totalling 546 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. WW II Mysteries (3)
  2. USAAF 18 AUG 43
  3. WW II Mysteries (fwd)
  4. WW II Mysteries (Finland, again)
  5. WWII Mysteries/Soviet Maneuver Theory
  6. REF: Barbarossa and later.

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Date:    Wed, 18 Aug 1993 09:42:07 EET
From:    "F.Baube[tm]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW II Mysteries

> Date:         Tue, 17 Aug 1993 14:05:31 +0200
> From: Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
> Subject:      Re: WW II Mysteries

Not to critique Emmanuel's remarks, just expand
on them, and provide info about the Winter War ..

> > 1) When exactly did the Sovjet-Union enter the war, and why?
>
> [..] but after the defeat of Poland the USSR was not at war until 1941.

[Tell that to the Finns !]

> > 2) Why were there so many Russian soldiers at the Sovjet-German
> >    border in June 1941?

There is a revisionist theory developing that Stalin
planned a sneak attack of his own later in 1941.
Apparently the historical evidence for this is
interesting but not persuasive.

> > 4) How was the Sovjet-Union equipped with tanks compared to
> >    Germany's tanks divisions? The technical standard was better
> >    in Germany???
>
> [..] the Red Army had no tank
> divisions; tanks were scattered over all units. There was no theoretical basis
> for a fast 'blitzkrieg' war; the Soviet generals had to learn this from their
> German counterparts. What they did admirably fast.

I recall reading that some Soviet military thinkers had
actually developed some theories of lightning armored
warfare, and had tried them in exercises, but that it
had fallen on deaf ears, and perhaps been lost completely
in the purges.  Can anyone else recall reading this ?

> > 5) Why was it so easy for the German armies to cross the sovjetrussian
> >    border? (It had not been an easy task for the Red Army to invade
> >    Finland!)
>
> [..] The USSR attack on Finland was problematic
> because a badly organized army attacked a prepared enemy on very difficult
> terrain.

The terrain is not *that* difficult.  Forests and
thousands of shallow glacial lakes.  The *climate*
however is deadly if you're not prepared for it.

But some of the problems for the Soviets:

1) overconfidence: captured documents showed that the units
   operating in middle Finland planned to cut the country
   in two in a week or two

2) units not prepared for the climate, e.g. units from the Ukraine

3) the Finnish civil guard units knew their home terrain

4) Soviet units were largely road-bound, while Finnish units
   had superior tactical mobility (bicycles and skis).

Superior tactical mobility enabled a Finnish tactic that
worked like so: to allow a Soviet formation to string out
along a forest highway, and then separate it into pieces,
not incidentally isolating the food and logistical elements
from the rest of the group.  Then, a change to a defensive
stance allowed the climate to do much of the work in exhausting
the Soviet formations.

Anyone interested might read "The Unknown Soldier"
by Vaino Linna.  Reads something like the book on
Viet Nam, "Dispatches" by Michael Herr.

/fred

--
* Fred Baube (tm) GU/MSFS/88 [email-masked]
* #include <disclaimer.h>
* Glasnost for the FBI
* Free Leonard Peltier

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Date:    Wed, 18 Aug 1993 07:10:10 -0400
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: USAAF 18 AUG 43

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCE
WEDNESDAY, 18 AUGUST 1943
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  P-40, Curtiss

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): VIII Air Support Command
Missions 25A and 25B: Two Luftwaffe airfields are targetted:
  1. 36 B-26's are dispatched to Lille/Vendeville Airfield in France;
because of mechanical trouble with communications equipment and the
bombsight in the lead plane, 22 aircraft bomb the Ypres/Vlamertinge Air-
field in Belgium at 1016 hours; 23 aircraft are damaged; there are no
casualties.
  2. 36 B-26's are dispatched to Woensdrecht Airfield in the Netherlands;
32 hit the target at 1032 hours; 8 aircraft are damaged; there are no
casualties.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Ninth Air Force): In Italy, P-40's attack motor
transport between Scilla and Bagnara, and bomb shipping off Scilla.

  WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Northwest African Air Force): In Italy, Northwest
African Strategic Air Force (NASAF) fighters and medium bombers hit
barracks and railroad at Gonnesa, sink a small vessel in the Golfo di
Sant' Eufemia and bomb and strafe a railway station, bridge, and tracks
at Soverato, bridges and a road junction at Angitola, and highway and road
junction at Staletti. Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF) air-
planes hit gun positions and road and rail transport in S Italy.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Fifth Air Force): In New Guinea,
70+ B-24's, B-25's, and B-17's, with cover of almost 100 fighters, blast
airfields at Wewak, Boram, Dagua, and But. The midmorning attacks cause
heavy destruction of Japanese airplanes on the ground, and US fighters
and bombers claim 30+ enemy aircraft shot down.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

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Date:    Wed, 18 Aug 1993 09:29:18 -0400
From:    "Mr. Scott Hannon" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW II Mysteries

>1) When exactly did the Sovjet-Union enter the war, and why?

Ignoring the invasion of the Baltic states (as everyone except the
Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians seems to do)...

Mid-September 1939, when the USSR invaded Poland from the west while Germany
was finishing off most of te Polish army in the east. Germany and the USSR
had a non-aggression pact with a secret protocol calling for the spliting
of Poland between them (oh, and the Baltic states too).

The USSR again attacked at the end of 1939, this time Finland was the
target. Although the USSR initially met with failure and suffered heavy
casualties, in the end victory was attained. The western allies (France,
Britain, and Polish survivors) were to have intervened in spring 1940, but
by then it was hopeless for Finland, and the troops were diverted to
invade/assist Norway.

Yes, it was nearly a three way way: Germany vs USSR and west; USSR vs
Germany and west; west and USSR vs Germany. If Germany had not been so
sucessful in France, it is interesting to guess what Italy might have done
(Italy considered war with Germany over Austria just a couple years before!).
So it is easy to see why there were so many US isolationist until 1941:
European politics was crazy!

It wasn't until Germany invaded the USSR in June 1941 that the USSR became
a reluctant (not so friendly) ally to the western Allies.

>2) Why were there so many Russian soldiers at the Sovjet-German
>   border in June 1941?

This is a bit controversal. Some say it was because Stalin was planning an
invasion of his own (probably true IMO, but not in 1941....maybe 1942).
Others say it was due to Red Army doctrine of defense by offense....when
attacked, counterattack. Others say it was to guard against the Germans.

>3) Why did they defend themselves so badly?

1) poor training 2) inexperience 3) the purges (most officiers had been
executed in 1930s) 4) army undergoing re-organization 5) the Germans
were very skilled at war 6) defenses not fully prepared 7) deployment
not very good for defense (more like offense)

Scott.

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Date:    Wed, 18 Aug 1993 11:28:37 -0300
From:    Neal Parsons u <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW II Mysteries (fwd)

        I first sent this directly to Allan, now I send to all.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Wed, 18 Aug 1993 09:18:25 -0300 (EDT)
From: Neal Parsons u <[email-masked]>
To: Allan Myrvang <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW II Mysteries

On Tue, 17 Aug 1993, Allan Myrvang wrote:

> Hei anybody who would like to give a helping hand!
>
> I feel that World War II is still a mystery, so I need help.
>
> 1) When exactly did the Sovjet-Union enter the war, and why?
        This is a point of contention.  For me the answer is that the
Soviets entered the war in September 1939 when they took part in the
invasion of Poland. >
> 2) Why were there so many Russian soldiers at the Sovjet-German
>    border in June 1941?
        There is a lot of thought (reasonable) that the Soviets were in the
process of preparing for an invasion of Germany at some distant time (not
too distant)>
 > 3) Why did they defend themselves so badly?
        As incredible as it may seem, the aforementioned offense preparations
seemed to have taken up a large portion of Soviet thinking.  It also
helped that Stalin had recently put most of his top officers in gulags.>
 > 4) How was the Sovjet-Union equipped with tanks compared to
>    Germany's tanks divisions? The technical standard was better
>    in Germany???
        I'll assume you mean around the time of Barbarossa and perhaps over
the next year.  The main German tank was the Panzer IV F2 which came onto
the Eastern front in 1942 (24tons, 25mph, 50mm max armour, armed with long
75 mm gun and 2 mg.), also there was the Panzer IVG which was slightly
upgraded IVF2.  These fine battle tanks were in for quite a shock when the
began to meet the famous T-34 and less known KV1 and KV2.  The T-34 is
considered the finest tank of the war (by some) :26.3 tons, 32mph, 75mm
max armour [in a sloped form], 76.2mm gun and 2 mg.  The KV1 was the heavy
tank:  43.5 tons, 25mph, 90mm armour max [sloped] 76.2mm gun, 3 mg.  KV2
was the assault gun version of the KV1:  52 tons, 12 mph, 110mm armour
max, armed with 152mm gun and 3 mg.
 > 5) Why was it so easy for the German armies to cross the sovjetrussian
>    border? (It had not been an easy task for the Red Army to invade
>    Finland!)
        Little discussed fact about Finland - the initial Russian attack
utilized poor quality troops.  The Russian theory of defence (massed human
bodies) is easier the cross with armour.  Stalin was not concerned with
the human loss that massed defence entailed, the USSR had enough men and
resources to suffer huge losses and still maintain a force.>
> 6) Why were the German soldiers not equipped for the Russian winter?
        In danger of being too flip but, Hitler was an idiot.  He felt the
Soviets would be suing for peace by September, so, why prepare for a
winter campaign -- not exactly the way to run a campaign.>
> I think these questions are enough for this time. Looking forward to
> interseting answers and I thank you in advance!
>
> Allan
>
        Allan:  I hope  my answers have helped, they are mostly off the
top of my head (tank details did come from a handy book).  Thank you for
such interesting questions.  I've read this group for a month but this is
the first time I've ever wanted to respond to anything.  Let me know if
you think my answers should go out across the whole group, right now I've
just sent this to you.

        Neal Parsons, MA history (WW2), WLU University, Waterloo Canada >
################################################# > #                #
> #  Allan Myrvang                  #
> #  Sildegrend                  #
> #  N - 5590 ETNE                  #
> #  Norway                   #
> #  Phone number 04 75 65 33               #
> #  Internet <AMyrvang@Oscar@No  192.124.156.38>#
> #################################################
>
>
> PS I tried yesterday to send this letter to the list, but due to
>    system problems it must have been illegible. Excuse me so much!

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Date:    Wed, 18 Aug 1993 18:55:13 EET
From:    "F.Baube[tm]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW II Mysteries (Finland, again)

> Date:         Wed, 18 Aug 1993 09:29:18 -0400
> From: "Mr. Scott Hannon" <[email-masked]>
> Subject:      Re: WW II Mysteries
>
> >1) When exactly did the Sovjet-Union enter the war, and why?
>
> The USSR again attacked at the end of 1939, this time Finland was the
> target. Although the USSR initially met with failure and suffered heavy
> casualties, in the end victory was attained.

In a manner of speaking.  Stalin's demands shrank
as his failure to overwhelm Finland became more
and more glaring to the rest of the world.

> The western allies (France,
> Britain, and Polish survivors) were to have intervened in spring 1940, but
> by then it was hopeless for Finland, and the troops were diverted to
> invade/assist Norway.

A book entitled "The Request That Never Came" (I think)
(or "Plea" ?) asserts that if the Finns had made a formal
request for aid, which they were under some pressure from
the Allies to do, it would have come, but that the Finnish
government of the day decided against it, for reasons having
to do with (1) the likely (lack of) value of the aid, and
(2) how it would affect the political situation that would
develop after the war.

(And as it turned out, after the war the Allies left Finland
to sort out its affairs with the Soviets by itself, and Stalin
showed some generosity in their bilateral dealings.)

--
* Fred Baube (tm) GU/MSFS/88 [email-masked]
* #include <disclaimer.h>
* Glasnost for the FBI
* Free Leonard Peltier

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 18 Aug 1993 11:00:00 CDT
From:    Shawn Robert Woodford <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WWII Mysteries/Soviet Maneuver Theory

On the subject of Soviet maneuver theory before and during WWII, the Soviets
did indeed have a very fertile line of thinking going on concerning tank
warfare.  The leading lights were Mikhail Tukhachevskii & V. K. Triandafillov.
They devised a concept known as Deep Battle, which was far more solid and
conceptually grounded than the mish-mash of ideas retroactively coined
"blitzkrieg."  Tukhachevskii was a charismatic leader, a throwback to the Tsar-
ist Army, both factors contributing to his demise in 1936 in Stalin's purges.
Stalin, being deranged but not stupid, kept several of Tukhachevskii's
proteges around should he need to revive the Deep Battle concept, one of these
being one Georgii Zhukhov.  Around the time of the Finnish War, the Soviet Army
was dominated by conservative infantry-oriented thinkers, like Klimenti
Voroshilov, who dismembered Tukhachevskii's tank corps, and pushed doctrinal
concepts far more "politically correct" than militarily effective.  As a result
of the Finnish debacle and the obvious success of the German's the Red Army was
in the process of ressurecting large tank formations when Hitler launched "Fall
Barbarossa" in June 1941.  As for the notion that the Red Army was being
concentrated for a lunge into German-held Poland, I would suggest a look at the
maps of the dispositions of 22 June 1941.  The Red Army was spread out between
the frontier and the old border, protected by the so-called "Stalin Line."
These reflected a battle of concepts going on within the Soviet High Command as
how best to deal with a German attack--meet it on the border, or utilize a
variant of "elastic defense."  Despite Stalin's suicidal counter-attack-at-all-
costs orders of the fall of 1941, the Red Army did indeed manage to halt the
Wehrmacht at Moscow.  By then the ressurrection of Tukhachevskii's Deep Battle
was in full swing, with its first great success occuring in Zhukov's "Operation
Saturn" at Stalingrad in November 1942.  After that it was the governing
doctrine that destroyed the Wehrmacht and brought Stalin to Berlin by 1945.
For those with a certain fascination for the "Wehrmacht Mystique" I would like
to point out that 5 of every 6 German combat casualties in World War II came on
the Eastern Front.  The Germans were defeated in World War II by the Soviets,
plain and simple--and with a combat doctrine far more sound than blitzkrieg.

For more information on the Soviet style of war, I reccommend *Race to the
Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare* and *Deep Battle: The Brain
child of Marshal Tukhachevskii* both by Brigadier Richard Simpkin.  The former
is simply the best treatise on military theory since Bernard Brodie's *The
Absolute Weapon*.  For more on the politics of the Soviet High Command, I
suggest John Erickson's venerable but excellent *The Soviet High Command*.  On
the Soviet pre-war dispositions and debate, I think Bryon Fugate's flaky but
detailed *Operation Barbarossa* does a relatively good job of examining the
available evidence, although his contention that the outcome of Barbarossa was
all according to Stalin's plans is, well, ludicrous.

Shawn Robert Woodford, Kansas State
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 18 Aug 1993 13:37:01 EDT
From:    "William B. Thacker" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW II Mysteries

> 1) When exactly did the Sovjet-Union enter the war, and why?

The dates have mostly been pointed out (BTW, the German invasion was June
22, 1941, not July).  The reasons: ostensibly, the occupation of eastern
Poland was the reclamation of what was rightfully Soviet territory and the
rescue of abused Ukrainian and Byelorussian minorities in that area.  I.e.,
pretty much the same motive that the Germans claimed.  For the Baltic State
and, especially, Finland, the claimed motivation was to improve the
defensability of Soviet territory, that is, the Baltic coast and
Leningrad.  A chunk of Romania was grabbed, more diplomatically, for the
same reason.

> 2) Why were there so many Russian soldiers at the Sovjet-German
>    border in June 1941?

The theories have all been stated.  One nuance that was omitted was the
concept of a spoiling attack; it is possible that Stalin intended, upon
receiving word of imminent German invasion, to launch an attack of his own
before the Germans got moving.

> 3) Why did they defend themselves so badly?

Also well-covered by others.  The ponderous chain of command, with Stalin
at its head, played the biggest role.  They were also fighting the most
skilled and efficient army in the world.  They certainly fought no worse
than, say, the French.

> 4) How was the Sovjet-Union equipped with tanks compared to
>    Germany's tanks divisions? The technical standard was better
>    in Germany???

In 1940 and 1941, the Soviets had the best tanks in the world.  In 1941,
they also had 22,000 tanks, about half of which actually ran. 8-)  While
there were a number of technical problems with even the best Soviet armor (no
radios, 2-man turrets, poor visibility, etc) the deciding factors in
their early defeats were:

 - the skill and experience of the German tankers
 - the flexibility allowed by the German system of command
 - the well-practiced combined arms tactics of the Germans, especially
        the dominance of German airpower

This last point is not to be underestimated; it is quite comparable to the
situation in France in 1944, where Allied airpower neutralized the
technical superiority of German armor.

The Soviets had, in fact, been one of the early innovators of the concept
of the Tank Corps (a large formation of tanks and supporting arms).  Their
pioneer was Marshal Tuhkachevsky, one of the most important figures in the
Red Army.  The tank corps died with him in Stalin's Purge.

(A sideline on the Purge; _The Great Patriotic War_, recently published,
claims that as a result of the Purge one Siberian division found itself
commanded by a lieutenant, the highest-ranking officer left.)

By the time of the German invasion, the new crop of officers was beginning
to recommend the formation of large tank units, and orders to that effect
were given in the fall of 1941  (by which time there weren't enough tanks
available to fill the demands for a tank corps).

> 6) Why were the German soldiers not equipped for the Russian winter?

The plans called for the effective defeat of the Red Army in about six
weeks, to be followed by a more leisurely occupation of the western USSR
(the only part considered worth controlling, everything west of the Volga).
Given that the French Army had been defeated in less time than that and
that the Russians were believed to be even less capable than them, and
assuming that the masses were eager to rebel against the Communists (which
was Hitler's assumption), this did not seem entirely unreasonable.  In the
event, by six weeks into the campaign the Germans had essentially met their
objectives; they destroyed as much of the Red Army as they had thought
would be necessary to defeat the USSR.

In other words, they underestimated Russia, and found themselves fighting
months after they thought the affair would be concluded.  By that point,
the supply lines were fully utilized just keeping the units at the front in
marginal supplies; no capacity was available for winter equipment.

Has anyone on the list read _Hitler's Panzers East_ ?  It claims to be an
historical analysis and reconstruction; changing some key decisions, it
apparently argues that Germany could have defeated the USSR.  I thumbed
through a copy in a bookstore, but put it down as I have little interest in
paying for someone else's crackpot "what if" ideas (I generate quite enough
of my own, for free! 8-)   It could be of value, though, if it presents a
lot of factual evidence as a starting point; i.e, "In August, the Germans
had xxxx tanks running, with yyy replacements being received each month and
fuel for zzzz miles."

Finally, many thanks for the very informative responses to my question
about historical jeeps!

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bill Thacker             AT&T Network Systems       attmail!att!cbemf!wbt
(614) 860-5294           Columbus, Ohio              [email-masked]
          "Giving money and power to government is like giving
         whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." - P.J. O'Rourke

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 18 Aug 1993 16:48:20 EST
From:    Larry & Kim Jewell <[email-masked]>
Subject: REF: Barbarossa and later.

Here's an interesting study on the Eastern Front, covering the early period
of planning and attack:

THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA, PLANNING AND OPERATIONS (1940-1942)
Center for Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C.
CMH Pub 104-21.

"The purpose of this study is to describe German planning and operations
in the first part of the campaingn against Russia.  The narrative starts
with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time
of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle of Stalingrad.
A subsequent volume will depict the course of events from the Russia
counteroffensive in November 1942 to the capture of Berlin in April 1945

"The material for this study was obtained from German military records now
in the custody of The Adjutant General, Department of the Army.  Monographs
by former German general officers who had an active part in the planning and
operations provided additional information.  The authors of these mono-
graphs, prepared for the Historical Division, United States Army, Europe,
include Generaloberst (Gen.) Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army
from 1938-1942; Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, a former corps, army, and
army group commander on the Russian front; and several others."

You might also want to check out the facimilies of Directive 21 and the
text of the Soviet-German Non-aggresion Pact (plus some additional infor-
mation) available from Marshall University's ftp site BYRD.MU.WVNET.EDU.
(Do I need to repost the instructions for FTP and HNSource again?)

Larry J

#L.W. Jewell WWII-L Listowner [email-masked]
#"Sunday's horoscope is note worthy because of its strange, sudden and wholly
#unpredictable and inexplicable occurrences, affecting all phases of life."
#"Your Horoscope" L.A. Evening Herald Express, Sat, 12/06/41

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End of WWII-L Digest - 17 Aug 1993 to 18 Aug 1993
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