Subject: WWII-L Digest - 18 Aug 1993 to 19 Aug 1993

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 1993 00:00:26 -0400

There are 10 messages totalling 525 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. WW II Mysteries (blitz => sitz)
  2. USAAF 19 AUG 43
  3. WWII Mysteries/Soviet Maneuver Theory (5)
  4. WW II Mysteries (2)
  5. weap: destroiers

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Date:    Thu, 19 Aug 1993 11:43:14 EET
From:    "F.Baube[tm]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW II Mysteries (blitz => sitz)

> Date:         Wed, 18 Aug 1993 13:37:01 EDT
> From: "William B. Thacker" <[email-masked]>

But first, more on Finland ..

> > 1) When exactly did the Sovjet-Union enter the war, and why?
>
> [..] For the Baltic State
> and, especially, Finland, the claimed motivation was to improve the
> defensability of Soviet territory, that is, the Baltic coast and
> Leningrad.

Soviet pre-war demands centered exactly on this issue.
A book "Cold Will: The Defense of Finland" says that
Finland botched it in the negotations that led to war,
by standing on ideals when a certain amount of *real-
politik* was called for.  Over the course of the nego-
tiations Stalin's demands softened *considerably*.
It was an avoidable war.  I asked a poli sci prof here
his opinion of the thesis, and he said he can't judge,
that the author of Cold Will had access to official
Finnish records closed to all others.

And now the juicy part ..  :-)

> > 6) Why were the German soldiers not equipped for the Russian winter?
>
> The plans called for the effective defeat of the Red Army in about six
> weeks, to be followed by a more leisurely occupation of the western USSR
> (the only part considered worth controlling, everything west of the Volga).
> Given that the French Army had been defeated in less time than that and
> that the Russians were believed to be even less capable than them, and
> assuming that the masses were eager to rebel against the Communists (which
> was Hitler's assumption), this did not seem entirely unreasonable.  In the
> event, by six weeks into the campaign the Germans had essentially met their
> objectives; they destroyed as much of the Red Army as they had thought
> would be necessary to defeat the USSR.
>
> In other words, they underestimated Russia, and found themselves fighting
> months after they thought the affair would be concluded.  By that point,
> the supply lines were fully utilized just keeping the units at the front in
> marginal supplies; no capacity was available for winter equipment.
>
>
> Has anyone on the list read _Hitler's Panzers East_ ?  It claims to be an
> historical analysis and reconstruction; changing some key decisions, it
> apparently argues that Germany could have defeated the USSR. [..]

I raised this a couple of months ago but no-one rose to take the bait ..

I have not read the book, but have gone over two accounts:
Stolfi wrote an article in "Command" magazine (wargaming),
and hia book was heavily critiqued in an issue of "Europa"
magazine (ditto).

Stolfi's idea is that the fantastic accomplishments of
blitzkrieg were an unexpected surprise in every case, and
that his plan for the Soviets *was* to take enough territory
to become economically self-sufficient: a "siege" mentality.

Thus Stolfi explains the apparently otherwise inexplicable,
like long waits in the autumn.

Stolfi maintains that the war was lost for Germany not
in 1939 or 1942 or 1943, but in July and August of 1941.

With this in mind I put out questions about finding maps
and other materials re. the pre-war locations of essential
resources (POL, metals, etc), and it seems that most libra-
ries in the US should be well-stocked with maps distributed
by the US gov't after the war.

There was a long, long "Germany Wins!" thread on CONSIM-L.

/fred

--
* Fred Baube (tm) GU/MSFS/88 [email-masked]
* #include <disclaimer.h>
* Glasnost for the FBI
* Free Leonard Peltier

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Date:    Thu, 19 Aug 1993 07:07:16 -0400
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: USAAF 19 AUG 43

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCE
THURSDAY, 19 AUGUST 1943
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-36, North American Apache
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  F-4, Lockheed Lightning
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force): Brigadier General Howard C Davidson
becomes Commanding General Tenth Air Force.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): VIII Bomber Command Mission 85:
Three Luftwaffe airfields in The Netherlands are targetted:
  1. 125 B-17's are dispatched to Gilze-Rijen and Flushing Airfields; 38
B-17's hit Gilze-Rijen at 1802-1814 hours and 55 hit Flushing at 1756
hours; they claim 29-1-2 Luftwaffe aircraft; 4 B-17's are lost and 42
damaged; casualties are 9 WIA and 41 MIA; this mission is escorted by 175
P-47's who claim 9-2-4 Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 P-47 is lost and the pilot is
listed as MIA.
  2. 45 B-17's are dispatched to Woensdrecht Airfield but weather prevents
them hitting the target.
  VIII Air Support Command Missions 27A, 27B and 28: Three Luftwaffe air-
fields in France are targetted:
  1. 36 B-26's are dispatched to Amiens/Glisy Airfield; all hit the target
at 1129 hours; they claim 1-0-2 Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 B-26 is damaged
beyond repair and 9 are damaged; casualties are 2 WIA.
  2. 36 B-26's are dispatched to Poix/Nord Airfield; 35 hit the target at
1218 hours; 1 aircraft is damaged; there are no casualties.
  3. 36 B-26's are dispatched to Bryas Sud Airfield but the target is
obscured by cloud and the mission is aborted.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Ninth Air Force): About 70 B-24's bomb the marshal-
ling yard at Foggia, Italy. P-40's fly coastal reconnaissance over the toe
of Italy and bomb roads and buildings.

  WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Northwest African Air Force): In Italy, 150+
Northwest African Strategic Air Force (NASAF) B-17's bomb the Foggia
marshalling yard, while almost 100 medium bombers hit marshalling yards at
Sapri and Salerno; the bombers, and escorting P-38's claim 34 enemy planes
shot down, against 8 losses; Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF)
A-36's attack the Cantanzaro marshalling yard; P-40's on sweeps over the
Italian toe attack a train near Melito di Porto Salvo and strafe a small
number of trucks.
  The 12th Photographic Squadron (Light), 3d Photographic Reconnaissance
and Mapping Group, ceases operating from Gela/Ponte Olivo, Sicily with
F-4's and returns to it's base at Ariana, Tunisia.
  The 86th and 97th Bombardment Squadrons (Light), 47th Bombardment Group
(Light) transfer from Torrente Coumunelli to Gerbini, Sicily with A-20's.

SOUTH PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Thirteenth Air Force): In the Solomon
Islands, B-25's, operating in pairs and with fighter escort, hit barges at
Timbala Bay on Vella Lavella Island, Kakasa radio station on Gill Island,
and a beached vessel in Paraso Bay. From this date through 28 Aug, Japanese
airplanes attack Allied forces in the Barakoma area of Vella Lavella
Island, losing a considerable number of aircraft (claims total about 50) to
Allied fighters and ground fire without doing any great damage to the
Allies.
  HQ 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) transfers from Espiritu Santo Island,
New Hebrides Islands to Guadalcanal Island, Solomon Islands.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Fifth Air Force): In New Guinea,
B-24's attack Manokwari, sink a small craft near Babo, and bomb Larat and
Saumlakki in the Tanimbar Islands. On Timor Island, B-25's hit Koepang,
Fuiloro, and Lautem.
  HQ 375th Troop Carrier Group transfers from Port Moresby to Dobodura, New
Guinea.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

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Date:    Thu, 19 Aug 1993 09:15:01 CDT
From:    John Hirvela <John=Hirvela%EMC=Srvc%Eng=[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WWII Mysteries/Soviet Maneuver Theory

Shawn Robert Woodford spake:

>For those with a certain fascination for the "Wehrmacht Mystique" I would
>like to point oery 6 German combat casualties in World War II came on the
>Eastern Front.  The Germans were defeated in World War II by the Soviets,
>plain and simple--and with a combat doctrine far more sound than blitzkrieg.

Shawn's comments brought up a counterpoint in my mind that may be an urban
legend, but I recall reading somewhere that in every battle on the Eastern
Front the Soviets actually had more casualties than the Germans, even in
battles the Soviets won.  Would that be a criticism of Soviet combat
doctrine?  I agree, though, that WWII was won/lost on the Eastern Front.

Regards,
John
john=hirvela%emc=srvc%eng=[email-masked]

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Date:    Thu, 19 Aug 1993 11:48:10 -0400
From:    "M. Joseph Barone" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WWII Mysteries/Soviet Maneuver Theory

> For those with a certain fascination for the "Wehrmacht Mystique" I
> would like to point out that 5 of every 6 German combat casualties
> in World War II came on the Eastern Front.  The Germans were defeated
> in World War II by the Soviets, plain and simple...

This statistic is meaningless without some associated context.  For
example, what was the capture ratio on the two fronts?  (I don't know
the answer, I'm just asking to illustrate the 5 out of 6 ratio doesn't
mean much by itself.)  How about casualty/capture relationships? Is
there a comparison of casualties to territory captured?  Also, the
conclusion doesn't take into account the fact that the Luftwaffe
wasn't as active on the Eastern Front since much of it was defending
Germany from strategic bombing.  Without the western Allies, I'm not
sure who would have won a purely Soviet-German slugfest.  By 1945,
the Soviets were scraping around for troops just as the Germans were,
just not to the extent that the Germans were.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
I'm not interested in defenders, I'm interested in hotels, OK?  Hey,
look, you have to think of us as tourists.  I don't want any military
information, I just want to know which hotel is the most comfortable.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 19 Aug 1993 19:25:32 +0200
From:    Allan Myrvang <[email-masked]>
Subject: WW II Mysteries

If people should like to send me an answer, I hope they send the
answer to the list first and foremost, WITH a COPY to my private
address. My problem is that I cannot receive every day's total
discussion. I cannot simply pay the telephone bill.

Allan

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 19 Aug 1993 14:34:06 BRA
From:    "Silvio E.G. Melo" <[email-masked]>
Subject: weap: destroiers

    I need some information about the following class os destroiers:
- Horace A. Bass (US)
- Furitsuki (JAP)
- Hatsume (JAP)
- Yung Hsiang (Ex-JAP)
    Anyone may be help me? Tank's in advance.
                                   Silvio E. G. Melo

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Date:    Thu, 19 Aug 1993 13:03:00 CDT
From:    Shawn Robert Woodford <[email-masked]>
Subject: WWII Mysteries/Soviet Maneuver Theory

Two responses here: 1.  The combat casualty figure of 5 of 6 Germans going down
on the Eastern Front (not including the Balkans) includes K,W,MIA, POW and is
merely intended to illustrate that the back of the Wehrmacht was broken by the
Red Army, not by the Allies, or by the Combined-Bomber Offensive.

2.  As to the casualty ratio between German and Soviet losses on the Eastern
Front, the "urban myth" is quite valid--the Soviets took somewhere between two
and three times the combat casualties the German did.  I would agree that this
can be used to support the contention that the German's were indeed far more
effective at the tactical and operational levels.  Yet, for all of the German
Army's prowess, the panzer divisions seldom won any decisive operational
successes after the fall of France.  Case Barbarossa was spectacularly
effective, but blitzkrieg fell short at Moscow, Stalingrad, Alem Halfa, Kursk,
Bastogne, etc...

Conversely, after Manstein's "Miracle of the Donets" in the Spring of 1943, the
Red Army ran up an impressive string of operational successes that the Soviet
High Command translated into a decisive strategic advantage.  The Soviets were
painfully aware that they could never hope to attain anything like the German
Army's combat effectiveness.  If you become familiar with the works of M.
Tukhachevskii and V. K. Trinadfillov, who provided the theoretical background
to the Red Army's WWII doctrine, the key in warfare was adequate resources. So
to offset the German superiority, the Soviets outmached them in material, human
as well as industrial.  They also tailored their tactics and operations to
their limitations as well as strenths, within the framework of their strategic
goals and theoretical foundations.  Deep Battle was far more integrated in this
context than Blitzkrieg, which only worked for the Germans when everything went
well for them.  The Soviets created the conditions for their victory, rather
than relying on military opportunism, like the Germans had to.

It is for this reason I find those who see the Wehrmacht as the epitome of
military success to be way off base.  Ultimately the Germans lost, not because
of things beyond their control, but because they went to war banking on the
innate quality of their troops and the superiority of German military thought.
When they encountered a system with a sounder way of making war, they were
defeated, not overwhelmed.

Shawn Robert Woodford, Kansas State
[email-masked]

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Date:    Thu, 19 Aug 1993 16:15:14 -0400
From:    "Mr. Scott Hannon" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WWII Mysteries/Soviet Maneuver Theory

Shawn Robert Woodford wrote:
> For those with a certain fascination for the "Wehrmacht Mystique" I would
> like to point out that 5 of every 6 German combat casualties in World War
> II came on the Eastern Front.  The Germans were defeated in World War II
> by the Soviets, plain and simple--and with a combat doctrine far more
> sound than blitzkrieg.

I disagree at least somewhat with two ideas/opinions expressed above

(1): The USSR defeated Germany.

That "5 of every 6 German combat casualties in WW2 came on the eastern
front" does not, to me, equate with cause of defeat.

Perhaps a similiar argument might be advanced for the asian/pacific
portion of the war by saying: X of 6 Japanese combat casualties occured
in China; thus China defeated Japan. I don't know what X is...maybe 3
or so I'd guess, but the number isn't my point. Its just that I do not
find casualties to be a good measure of cause of defeat.

I'd agree the USSR played the major role in the defeat of Germany, but I
don't think the USSR could have done it alone (say, if Britain dropped out
of the war after Dunkirk as expected by Hitler). IMO, the decisive factors
in Germanys defeat were:

 a) industrial resource shortage: Germany was out-produced. See the book
    _Brute Force_ for a discussion. Apart from Gemany's limited natural
    resources, the Allied naval blockade and Combined Strategic Bombing
    campaigns were also a part of this. As was sabotage and destruction
    before capture of those resources in conquered territory. Germany
    captured much resources, but was unable to use them effectively.
    All this made much worse by poor industrial policy.

 b) military manpower shortage: yes, just like Shawn suggested  :^)
    Partially offset by: German's use of slave labor to free German men
    for military use; German's virtual drafting of racial Germans in
    occupied territories; use of willing allies. Germany's policy WRT
    some ethnicities turned what might have been allies into enemies.

 c) too many enemies on too many fronts: this exasperated the resource and
    manpower problems, particularly WRT the western allies. Germany had to
    keep many troops away from the eastern front (the main front of the
    German army) to protect the conquered territories and Germany. The
    vastness of the USSR (and its under-developed transport net) also hurt.

 d) Loss of Air Superiority: An army that can't maneuver because of enemy
    air attacks is doomed to nearly static warfare. In static war, the
    side with the most/biggest guns wins. Germany's edge against the USSR
    and western allies was flexibility in mobile warfare. Without it, the
    attrition tactics of the allies and USSR became effective.

To wrap up, it was Shawn's "plain and simple" comment that bugged me  :-)

---
Now on to the Shawn's other opinion:
(2): The USSR's triumph was due to a better combat doctrine.

I disagree. The USSR won battles because they overwhelmed the enemy with
firepower and numbers. It was attrition that destroyed the German military,
not fancy maneuvers. I would agree the USSR *developed* a good combat
doctrine, but I don't see much evidence that it was put into substantial
real use in WW2. The "Russian Steamroller" was descriptive.

Scott.

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Date:    Thu, 19 Aug 1993 16:25:29 EDT
From:    "William B. Thacker" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW II Mysteries

Neal Parsons writes:
> On Tue, 17 Aug 1993, Allan Myrvang wrote:
>
>  > 4) How was the Sovjet-Union equipped with tanks compared to
> >    Germany's tanks divisions? The technical standard was better
> >    in Germany???
>         I'll assume you mean around the time of Barbarossa and perhaps over
> the next year.  The main German tank was the Panzer IV F2 which came onto
> the Eastern front in 1942 (24tons, 25mph, 50mm max armour, armed with long
> 75 mm gun and 2 mg.), also there was the Panzer IVG which was slightly
> upgraded IVF2.  These fine battle tanks were in for quite a shock when the
> began to meet the famous T-34 and less known KV1 and KV2.

The timeline here is a bit muddled.  As Neal says, the Pzkw IV F2 didn't
reach the eastern front until 1942.  This was the first of the
long-barreled Pzkw IV's; all versions previous (i.e., all those in service
in 1941) carried the short 7.5cm L/24, with limited armor piercing
capability.  By the time these tanks saw service, the T34 was no longer a
surprise.  (In fact, the PzIV G was on par with the T34/76; arguably superior
in many respects,  especially gunnery.)

In 1941, the main German battle tank was the PzKw III.  The current version
carried a 5cm gun; these were mostly of 42 caliber length, although the
superior L/60 gun was carried by the latest J model.  Still, a large number
of the PzIII's in service carried only a 3.7cm gun; including the very
large quantities of PzKw 38(t) still in service, the 3.7cm was Germany's
main tank gun for Barbarossa.  Worse, PzKw II's (with 2cm guns) still made
up a significant part of the panzer forces.

It was these tanks that had to overcome the first encounters with T34's and
KV's.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bill Thacker             AT&T Network Systems       attmail!att!cbemf!wbt
(614) 860-5294           Columbus, Ohio              [email-masked]
          "Giving money and power to government is like giving
         whiskey and car keys to teenage boys." - P.J. O'Rourke

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 19 Aug 1993 16:40:59 CDT
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WWII Mysteries/Soviet Maneuver Theory

> I disagree at least somewhat with two ideas/opinions expressed above
>
> (1): The USSR defeated Germany.
>
> That "5 of every 6 German combat casualties in WW2 came on the eastern
> front" does not, to me, equate with cause of defeat.

It also has to be kept in mind that in the combat theaters on the ground,
where much of these casualty figures come from, that the USSR was in
physical combat with the Germans much longer and earlier than the allies.

The Germans had "little" trouble going through relatively undefended
Europe, but the Allies (sans USSR) didn't really hit the Germans hard
until Normandy, 1944.

I'd like to see the breakdown of casualty figures for air crews.  It
would be quite obvious that it could be argued that the U.S. and
Britain, primarily, was the sole cause of the defeat of the Luftwaffe
because of the high percentage of casualties in those theaters.  However,
if the Luftwaffe had not been kept busy in other areas as well (including
the Eastern Front), the results may have been different.

> I'd agree the USSR played the major role in the defeat of Germany, but I
> don't think the USSR could have done it alone (say, if Britain dropped out
> of the war after Dunkirk as expected by Hitler). IMO, the decisive factors
> in Germanys defeat were:

The USSR never did it alone.  The lend-lease program was in full swing
and the USSR received many items from materials, aircraft, weapons,
ammunition and vehicles from the west.  Without those supplies, the
USSR could very possibly have not held out.  In some clear instances
(Don't ask me to cite them... :-) there were cases where U.S. built
trucks were able to keep supply lines open for food, ammunition and
troops -- supplies that would otherwise have been carried in by hand,
making the situation bleak(er) or simply impossible.

The Allies were involved in the Eastern Front from the beginning even
though troops weren't necessarily there.

> To wrap up, it was Shawn's "plain and simple" comment that bugged me  :-)

Nothing is plain and simple.  Everything has a lot of connections.

If the Luftwaffe had not had to defend against the Allied air attacks,
what would freeing those resources have done at the Eastern Front, for
a simple example?

What would have happened to the Allied invasion plans if "the isles" had
fallen during the Battle of Britain?

How would the landings at Normandy have been affected or changed if
Rommel had been successful in capturing and securing North Africa?

There is a LOT of cause and effect in warfare -- especially World
Warfare.

> Now on to the Shawn's other opinion:
> (2): The USSR's triumph was due to a better combat doctrine.
>
> I disagree. The USSR won battles because they overwhelmed the enemy with
> firepower and numbers. It was attrition that destroyed the German military,
> not fancy maneuvers. I would agree the USSR *developed* a good combat
> doctrine, but I don't see much evidence that it was put into substantial
> real use in WW2. The "Russian Steamroller" was descriptive.

The Soviets, like the British, were basically beaten more than once.

In the British case, Hitler (et. al.) simply didn't recognize it.  In
the Soviet case, being able to survive a brutal winter with open supply
lines meant survival -- sticking it out better than the enemy.  All of
these things were the result of many different items linking together to
create a final result.  The most important, perhaps, being willpower,
patience and sacrifice.

--
Robert J. Granvin                                    Southern Minnesota Wing
[email-masked]                                       Confederate Air Force
  You know you've made a gear-up landing when it takes full power to taxi.

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End of WWII-L Digest - 18 Aug 1993 to 19 Aug 1993
*************************************************