Subject: WWII-L Digest - 21 Aug 1993 to 22 Aug 1993

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 23 Aug 1993 00:00:31 -0400

There are 2 messages totalling 81 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. WWII Mysteries/Soviet Doctrine
  2. TAC: Lend-Lease relationship to Soviet Tactics

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Date:    Mon, 23 Aug 1993 00:09:42 +0200
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: WWII Mysteries/Soviet Doctrine

I think that it is incorrect to conclude in any way, from the fact that Germany
lost the war and the USSR and the allied won it, that the Blitzkrieg doctrine
was a 'dead end'. In the end, Germany was completely incapable to apply the
'Blitzkrieg' concept, partly because of the inferiority of its ground troops in
quantity but often also in quality, and partly because it had lost air
superiority.

It seems doubtful that even 'Barbarossa' was an operation in accordance with the
theory, because air support was diminutive, tank commanders were subordinated to
infantry commanders, deep movements behind the enemy lines were discouraged, the
decisions of local commanders were hampered by dictates from Berlin, and most
important, the target of the whole operation was not cutting the Read Army to
pieces, but conquering territory of economic value.  The Whermacht kept some
tactical superiority, and drove the Soviet Army forward to Moscow, which looked
like Blitzkrieg because it was fast. But it wasn't a true Blitzkrieg.

The critique on the 'Blitzkrieg' concept, in comparison with the 'deep battle'
concept, seems to be that it did not include a full-scale preparation of the
country for war. I wonder whether this was a consequence of the national
background. The USSR was a vast and relatively underdeveloped country, with lots
of unused resources; thus it was natureal to make large-scale preparations a
part of the plan. Germany was a relatively small but highly industrialized
nation with little natural resources; thus it was normal to take it for granted
that all preparations possible would have been made. But also to avoid very
long-term preparations, because the German industry would be unable to match the
production of an opponent like the USSR or the US anyway.

In the end, it seems that the 'Blitzkrieg' concept offered the German army a
possible, or a nearly possible, way to win a war with the USSR, while the
so-called 'deep battle' concept would have been inapplicable. On the on the
other hand, 'deep battle' offered the Soviets an almost certain victory in the
end, but a better understanding of the 'blitzkrieg' concept could have spared
them the dangerous defeats of 1941.

Last but not least, it should be noted that the Soviet tactics of 1944-1945 were
unacceptable to any other force, because of their wastefulness with 'human
resources'. Do you really see the US, or any other civilised nation, adopt a
tactical concept that multiplies losses by three? Even if this guarantees a
victory? It is far more logical to adopt the 'blitzkrieg' concept, a little more
risky but in general less wasteful, and back it up with a substantial economic
power.

Emanuel Gustin

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Date:    Sun, 22 Aug 1993 18:26:00 LCL
From:    Jeff Olson <[email-masked]>
Subject: TAC: Lend-Lease relationship to Soviet Tactics

>From a post by Robert Granvin on August 19, 1993--

>The USSR never did it alone.  The lend-lease program was in full swing
>and the USSR received many items from materials, aircraft, weapons,
>ammunition and vehicles from the west.  Without those supplies, the
>USSR could very possibly have not held out.  In some clear instances
>trucks were able to keep supply lines open for food, ammunition and

By the end of the war, Lend-Lease had supplied approximately 2/3 of
the trucks being used by the Soviet Union.  Also, US agriculture
ensured sufficient food supply for the majority of the Soviet Army.
That is, of course, in addition to the rest of Lend-Lease material
supplied to the Soviets and other countries.  IMO the Lend Lease
program is all that kept the allies afloat.  Without it we wouldn't
have had to think about...

>What would have happened to the Allied invasion plans if "the isles" had
>fallen during the Battle of Britain?
>How would the landings at Normandy have been affected or changed if
.

          Jeff
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 . 1st 1.11 #1611 . [email-masked]

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End of WWII-L Digest - 21 Aug 1993 to 22 Aug 1993
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