Subject: WWII-L Digest - 5 Oct 1993 to 6 Oct 1993

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 7 Oct 1993 00:00:27 -0400

There are 24 messages totalling 912 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Doolittle Raid (8)
  2. Veterans
  3. USAAF 6 OCT 43
  4. Experimental Power Plant
  5. GEN: Frank Wisner and OSS
  6. REF: "Carpetbaggers"
  7. Mother of All Battles - Kursk (3)
  8. Help reaching a list member
  9. WW2 Urban Legends/Folklore
 10. <No subject given>
 11. Source: Help! Need 1st volume 5th Army history
 12. Doolittle Raid -- missed Coral Sea opportunity?
 13. Rats!
 14. Nimitz's hopes for a big battle in the South Pacific
 15. WW2 Urban Legends/Folklore #

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Date:    Tue, 5 Oct 1993 23:18:42 CDT
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid

> We sometimes think that the raid on Tokyo by General Doolittle merely
> 'irritated' Japan and bolstered the U.S. morale when, according to
> Griffith's _The Battle for Guadalcanal_, that raid so embarrassed the
> Japanese Navy and especially Yamamoto, that it resulted in the decision
> to occupy Midway Island.  Prior to that raid, there was little
> likelihood that the naval general staff would have approved the
> occupation.  So...How do you suppose the worm would have turned
> without the raid and subsequest decision to occupy Midway?

Midway was ALWAYS a prime target -- What Yamamoto did was convince
the General Staff that the risks at that time were worth the potential
gain.

The overall big picture was simple:  Eliminate the U.S. Pacific Fleet
at Pearl Harbor, significantly weakening the U.S. threat.  Following
that action, the taking of Midway would provide the Japanese fleet and
air force a forward base for operations throughout the Pacific.  By
holding on to this strategic location, the Japanese Fleet could plan
for a full-scale attack and invasion of the Japanese islands, placing
the entire western United States in jeapardy.

The intent was not necessarily to invade and conquer the U.S. -- that
would simply be too big a challenge at that time.  But, by corralling
the U.S. fleet and military capability, the Japanese empire could
control the entire Pacific and negotiate a favorable peace with the
isolationist United States population.

This was also in the days when the Battleship was still believed to be
the key to war -- the aircraft carrier was seen by many as a major
waste of time and resources.

Many failed gambles later, the exact opposite is what happened.

The main result of the Doolittle Raid was not embarassment of the
Japanese General Staff making them more prone to rash action -- in fact,
they became much more conservative.  The action forced them to pull
many of their units back to the home islands to defend her shores.  This
reduced the overall strength of the Japanese military capability in the
Pacific which benefitted the Allied war effort at a time when the Allied
strength in the Pacific was dangerously weak and getting worse.

--
Robert J. Granvin                                    Southern Minnesota Wing
[email-masked]                                       Confederate Air Force

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 10:15:56 +0200
From:    Chris Scogings <[email-masked]>
Subject: Veterans

Thanks to William Huber for his message which included:

>It makes me sick the way Viet-Nam Vets got treated and I make it plain
>that anybody valuing their current dentition should keep to themselves
>any disparaging remarks about men (and women) who put it all on the line.

I sympathise with the Vietnam vets as I was part of the South African army
which invaded Angola in 1976.  We were all conscripted, we were 18 years
old, and at the time it was a big adventure.  I'm now told we were part of
the colonial and racist exploitation of Africa - I think that's how a
visiting (white) American put it.

Several of my friend are still there in unmarked graves - no memorials,
naturally.  Two had both legs blown off by mines, one had severe burns from
bailing out of an armoured car which had been hit by a T34.  Some of them
have joined the white extremist movement in South Africa.

Well, back to WWII.  My uncle was at Monte Casino with the 6th SA Div.  He
passed away 4 years ago, so won't be attending a reunion.  His two main
memories of the battle are (1) living for 2 weeks about 10 yards from a
rotting mule carcass (they couldn't move it due to the terrain and constant
shelling) and (2) being heavily bombed by both the Luftwaffe and the USAAF!

Chris
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Scogings                      Voice: (27) 331 955645
Computer Science Dept                 Fax: (27) 331 955599
University of Natal
Pietermaritzburg                   E-Mail:[email-masked]
----------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 07:30:14 -0400
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: USAAF 6 OCT 43

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
WEDNESDAY, 6 OCTOBER 1943
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-36, North American Apache
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  F4U, Vought Corsair (USN)
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-39, Bell Airacobra
  P-40, Curtiss
  Zeke, Mitsubishi A6M, Navy Type 0 Carrier Fighter

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  CHINA (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 7 P-40's from Suichwan intercept
an attacking force of 27 bombers and 21 Zekes; 1 bomber and 1 fighter are
shot down, and the attackers retire in the direction of Canton without
dropping their bombs.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, XII
Bomber Command B-17's bomb the Mestre marshalling yard while B-26's hit a
highway chokepoint at Isernia, the highway at Mignano, and road junction at
Formia; P-38's strafe Araxos Airfield in Greece; Northwest African Tactical
Bomber Force (NATBF) planes on road-blocking missions hit targets at Teano,
at Alfedena, between Cassino and Capua, and near Sessa Aurunca; XII Air
Support Command P-40's and A-36's attack roads and vehicles N of the US
Fifth Army battle zone and patrol the Naples area. The US Fifth Army reaches
the S bank of the Volturno River; Capua falls to British units.
  HQ 61st Troop Carrier Group and it's 14th Troop Carrier Squadron transfer
from Licata to Sciacca, Sicily with C-47's.

SOUTH PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Thirteenth Air Force): In the Solomon
Islands, 8 P-39's and 8 US Navy F4U's strafe barges off the W coast of
Choiseul Island. 24 B-25's and 14 P-38's carry out a low-level strike
against Kahili Airfield on Bougainville Island, damaging or destroying
several parked aircraft.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Fifth Air Force): In the Bismarck
Archipelago, B-25's sweep along coastal areas of New Britain Island and
through islands to the N and W, bombing and strafing targets of opportunity.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
 Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 04:32:10 -0700
From:    John Hightower <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Experimental Power Plant

Terry,
I think what you are asking about is magnetohydrodynamics. I can't give
you any specifics about the source you mentioned but maybe this will help.

John

On
Tue, 5 Oct 1993, Terry Moore wrote:

> This may not have much to do with WWII, but I am curious about
> something I saw several months ago.
>
> I would like to find out about an experimental power plant that uses
> a liquid metal that is heated and circulated in a closed system to
> make electricity. I saw a TV program several months ago in which is
> unit had been built and was in operation. I don't know the name of
> the university, but it was in Israel. Any info on construction and
> materials would be greatly appreciated.
>
> Thank you.
>
> Terry Moore
>
> Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
> P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
> fax 806-371-5370

=============================================================
=John Hightower          | [email-masked]                 =
=Hightower & Associates  | (404) 370-1574 voice             =
=237 Derrydown Way       | (404) 370-1574 fax               =
=Decatur, GA  30030-3815 |                                  =
=============================================================

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Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 06:49:22 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GEN: Frank Wisner and OSS

Dear Richard,

I will check on this for you. I have several books that deal with
various personalities of the OSS.

Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 06:50:57 -0500
From:    robert doyle <[email-masked]>
Subject: REF: "Carpetbaggers"

Some time back there was a question about a book called "The
Carpetbaggers" by Ben Parnell. I've obtained a copy via
interlibrary loan. My local library, in Alexandria, VA, was able to
borrow it from the Kenton County (Kentucky) Library. It is hard to
find, although if your library has Infonet you should be able to
find two or three sources.

The book is subtitled "America's Secret War in Europe, a Story of
the World War II Carpetbaggers, 801st/492nd Bombardment Group (H),
U.S. Army, Eighth Air Force"; Eakin Press: Austin, Texas, 1987. The
author is a Texas banker who wrote the book as a tribute to his
brother who flew with the Carpetbaggers and did not survive the
war. It's the author's first book and as such is a little rough
around the edges. However, it is thoroughly researched, includes a
war log, a combat crew roster, many photographs, end notes, and a
bibliography.

Carpetbaggers was the code name for units of the Eighth Air Force
that supported OSS operations in Europe including insertion,
extraction, and resupply. They used specially modified B-24s. I'm
sure that those interested in aviation will find the author's
description of the aircraft fascinating. The book contains numerous
stories of successful operations as well as those that were far
less than successful. There is also considerable space devoted to
contacts with the Maquis - another subject about which there were
several questions a month or two ago.

I have to return the book tonight. But I have it with me today in
case anyone would like to e-mail me a question or two.

Bob
Robert J. Doyle, Jr.
Naval Research Laboratory
Washington, DC
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 08:49:30 -0500
From:    John Lundstrom <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid

Dear Robert,
        I feel that the principal result of the Doolittle Raid for the U.S.
was to deny the Pacific Fleet two of its four carriers at a time when it
could have inflicting a crushing defeat on the Japanese in the Battle of
the Coral Sea. By mid April 1942 Adm. Nimitz had learned through radio
intelligence that the Japanese were committing powerful forces in the
Southwest Pacific, but he could deploy only Yorktown and Lexington to the
area. VAdm. Halsey with Enterprise and Hornet cleared Pearl and headed
south as fast as they could, but they were too late to fight at Coral Sea.

John B. Lundstrom
Milwaukee Public Museum
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 15:48:55 +0100
From:    Richard Kirby <[email-masked]>
Subject: Mother of All Battles - Kursk

Notes taken about the Timewatch program,
         Mother of All Battles - Kursk July/August 1943
shown on BBC2, Wednesday, 29/9/93

[Comments in square brackets like this are mine - this document is a
mixture of facts, and anecdotes, so may have a little of something for
everyone]

First off, I misread the emphasis in the program listing. I thought it
was going to claim that Kursk wasn't as big as history claims.
Actually, they were coming from the angle of being little known in the
West, but it was actually the biggest in the War:

- More troops than the D-Day landings,
- More aircraft than fought in the Battle Of Britain,
- 3 times as many tanks as at Al Elamein,
- The battle area was as large as Wales,
- Lasted 7 weeks.

Up until Perestroika the exact numbers of casualities were kept quiet
by the communists since they were far higher than could safely be
admitted, but now some secret Read Army documents recently released
give the figures as:
254, 470 Russians killed
608, 833 Russians wounded

and from German sources, we have ~100000 Germans killed.

The combined death total is comparable to the total British frontline
losses of the whole war!

[The lead up to the battle]

At Stalingrad the German Army suffered their first major defeat -
91000 6th Army soldiers taken prisoner, with < 10% seeing Germany
again. But the Germans soon rallied and attacked again under von
Mansteins leadership, decimating three soviet armies, and recapturing
Kharkov (the 4th largest city).

Von Manstein's ADC during '42-'44 is still alive, and was interviewed.
He said that Hitler had made a mistake in forcing von Manstein to stop
this succesful offensive, his second major mistake since letting the
BEF off the hook at Dunkirk. He claimed Hitler was obsessed with
numbers, production figures, and new technology. He thought in
quantities, and wanted to wait for new tanks and then have a gigantic
tank battle to eliminate the salient at Kursk, and cutting the main
rail link between the North and the South.

During the Summer of '43, the Germans transported 500,000 (half a
million) wagon loads of men and materials to the Kursk salient - a
remarkable logistical feat. Unfortuantely the radio traffic required
for this gave the game away to the Russians, via the Ultra project at
Betchley Park, Britain.

The plans for Operation Citadel (as the German offensive was called),
was decoded by us [us being the British, since this is a British
program, although they probably meant the Western Allies, and not
Russia]. By the 13th April we knew the name, and by the 19th we knew
that at least an attack on the northern part of the salient was
intended, but we didn't pass this on to the Russians straight away.
First our top generals sat on the information deciding what it meant,
and they finally sent a summary to the Russians with no indication of
where the information had come from.

Now, Stalin did not trust our data, without corroboration. A NKVD
officer interviewed, said that the info from Britain was always late,
and never the raw data, just a summary. Very often it was not easy to
check or believe the intelligence.

Stalin relied on Ken Cross who worked at Betchley Park, to feed more
data to the Russians. By mid April they had worked out the Germans
plan of attack (using a grand Pincer movement). Also Stalin had a fair
idea of the scale and the location of the forces arrayed against them.

By late June the German force had built to 900,000 troops, 2600 tanks,
and 1500 aircraft.

The Russian generals persuaded Stalin to set up a defence rather than
his preferred method of attacking first. They set about constructing a
single track rail line 60 miles long in 30 days to help bring men and
supplies into the defence around Kursk.

300,000 local people helped dig 8 lines of trenches, dugouts and tank
traps measuring 3500 miles in total. 500,000 mines were laid, some
still there. Young girls and women helped making the defences, and
then refused to evacuate, often hiding in their houses, with soldiers
telling the officers that they have moved off.

By early Summer, well over a million Russian troops were in defence,
including several thousand women fighting in all arms. There was even
an all female fighter squadron! Not only the pilots, but the mechanics
were women. They interviewed a Tamara Pamyatnikh, who was a pilot in
the 586th Fighter Squadron (the all-woman one). She said that the
hardest job was carrying the compressed air cylinders, which each
weighed 70 kilos. She also said that the women were better educated
than the men, having been through higher education - "Sometimes, we
even had to show the male engineers how to do things because they got
things wrong". Another amusing anecdote she had was that the women
were not allowed to shower in the open, but the authorities wouldn't
build them a shower, so one summer evening they staged a protest -
they undressed and showered in the middle of the street. They soon had
a shower built!

Next the program interviewed a woman tank driver - Ekatarina
Petluk. She said that they had no such luxuries. She was the only
woman in her battalion (part of the 3rd Tank Army). It was easy for
some of the men to distract her whilst the others went off to do their
business, but how could she slope off for five minutes to find a quiet
hedge. She talked about some of the hardships she faced, such as
soaking her shirt in petrol and cutting her hair short to ward off
lice. Her worst times were her monthly periods, there was never enough
cotton wool and bandages, and of course she was young and very shy -
"I had to keep my dignity and my feminity, surrounded by so many men".

[Next we saw some footage of quite a few (like over a dozen) King
Tigers (Henschel turrets). At least thats what they look like,
compared with all the pictures I have, but that doesn't make any sense
since King Tigers weren't around until '44! Does anyone have an image
(just about any format acceptable, since I have access to PCs, Macs,
and all X formats) of a Panther A, D, or G, and King Tigers, so I can
compare. Of course it is not unknown to show the wrong footage...]

Hitler believed that the fate of Nazi Germany would be decided at
Kursk. By June, he had committed most of the elite divisions of the
German Army. The commentator claimed that the Pz IVs were the state of
the art, and there were more than 2000 at Kursk - "the cannon was
lethally accurate at 1 mile". A german tank crewman (radio operator)
said that the Pz IV main advantage over the T34 was its motorised
turret. Also the front armour was very tough, but the flank armour
very thin, and on rough ground the tracks came off far more easily
than the T34s.

They had a PzIV (not sure which mark), and a T34 actually driving
about. Next they interviewed a Russian tank commander - Ivan Sagun
who was in the 2nd Tank Army, and he illustrated the main problem with
the T34 (that of poor communications) with his anecdote: "I directed
the driver by tapping him on the shoulder with my foot: on the right
shoulder meant Go Right, on the left shoulder meant Go Left. A prod in
the back meant Stop. That was the simple steering system we had. As
for the gunner, I'd signal to him through all the noise: thumb meant
armour-piercing shell, two fingers mean shrapnel shell. Those were out
signals, primitive but effective".

On July 1st, Hitler summoned von Manstein and the other Generals to a
rather theatrical meeting in Munich, where he stood with his generals
around him, looked at each man in turn in the eye, from left to right,
and then declared "Gentlemen, I hereby give the order that Operation
Citadel shall begin on 5th July. Almighty God, bless out weapons", and
that was the end of the meeting! He also sent a message to the troops
saying "This would be a victory to light up the World".

[The battle]

Just before dawn of the 5th July, the German artillary opened up. In
less than an hour they hurled more shells than they had used in
conquering both Poland and France.

Russian penal battalions were in the front line, with commisars ready
to shoot them if they tried to retreat. Made up of soldiers who had
failed on some mission, or who had shot themselves to get out of
fighting. To get out of a penal battalion, you either had to show
great courage, or be badly wounded, or killed.

A Russian sapper interviewed commented that the Russian mines were so
badly made that they were nearly as dangerous to them when being laid,
as to the Germans. They prefered to use German mines. They would crawl
into the German minefields and steal the mines.

The program claimed that the minefields stopped the Germans.

There was constant artillary and air attacks even if not actually
fighting at that moment.

A German tank man who was in the Waffen SS, said that his unit was
afraid of being captured due to the Russian treatment of prisoners
(which was understandable given what the Germans had done to Russian
civilians and prisoners) - no Geneva Convention here!

A group of Waffen SS have recently returned to the battleground - none
admit to witnessing war crimes. Claimed that they were fighting troops
always at the front, and didn't know what went on behind the lines,
and that the concentration camps were only rumours to them, and that
any atrocities committed by the SS was not done by the Waffen SS - "We
were soldiers, just simple soldiers".

Tamara (the woman tank driver above) said that all Russian soldiers
knew of the atrocities committed by the Germans, but she thought that
perhaps some were innocent, and that those who had committed
atrocities should thank god that they have got away with it.

Stalin ordered the removal of all traces of the German invasion from
Russian soil after the war, including any war graves which were dug
up. The Waffen SS group above were returning in the spirit on
conciliation to pay their respects to their comrades. Their wreath had
the legend "To our fallen comraders, and our courageous opponents".
They met up with some Russian vets who didn't seem to bear any
grudges.

[Some footage of a tank battle, but rather strange since it had
closeups of both Russian and German tanks - brave camara man!]

On 12th July, the Waffen SS tank divisions broke through to the south
of the salient at Prokhorovka and met the 5th Guards Tank Army. 800
Russian tanks vs 400 German tanks faced each other at dawn, and then
charged at each other, closing to point blank range and mixing
together. This one action saw the loss of 600 tanks destroyed in 18
hours. The air was thick with smoke - tank crews were poisoned from
the shell fumes from constant firing. One Russian Tank commander
described how the 65 tanks of the 170th Tank Brigade closed with the
Germans and destroyed about 60 tanks before being themselves
completely destroyed in 10 minutes of fighting.

Finally the Germans withdraw their decimated tank divisions back to
Italy to face the Allied invasion there.

[It was here that the tape ran out, although only about a minute or
two short - hope you enjoyed reading it].

Richard.

ANY MISTAKES ARE OF COURSE MINE.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 17:22:33 +0200
From:    Chris Scogings <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid

John Lundstrom writes:

>        I feel that the principal result of the Doolittle Raid for the U.S.
>was to deny the Pacific Fleet two of its four carriers at a time when it
>could have inflicting a crushing defeat on the Japanese in the Battle of
>the Coral Sea.

I agree.  If you look at an overall disposition of forces, the strategic
effects of the raid were zero (apart from giving the US newspapers something
good to write about).

Chris
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Scogings                      Voice: (27) 331 955645
Computer Science Dept                 Fax: (27) 331 955599
University of Natal
Pietermaritzburg                   E-Mail:[email-masked]
----------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 11:15:54 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid

Date sent:      Wed, 6 Oct 1993 08:49:30 -0500
Send reply to:  World War II Discussion List <[email-masked]>
From:           John Lundstrom <[email-masked]>
Subject:        Re: Doolittle Raid
Originally to:  [email-masked]
To:             Multiple recipients of list WWII-L <[email-masked]>

Dear Robert,
        I feel that the principal result of the Doolittle Raid for the U.S.
was to deny the Pacific Fleet two of its four carriers at a time when it
could have inflicting a crushing defeat on the Japanese in the Battle of
the Coral Sea. By mid April 1942 Adm. Nimitz had learned through radio
intelligence that the Japanese were committing powerful forces in the
Southwest Pacific, but he could deploy only Yorktown and Lexington to the
area. VAdm. Halsey with Enterprise and Hornet cleared Pearl and headed
south as fast as they could, but they were too late to fight at Coral Sea.

John B. Lundstrom
Milwaukee Public Museum
[email-masked]

Dear John,

I will have to research this, but the Doolittle raid was represented
the second time Japan had been assaulted from the air. You are
correct in what you say, but the Doolittle raid simply cemented the
Japanese attitude to retain substantial forces to defend the homeland.

The other attack I am referring to occurred some months before, when
a small bomber force was sent to bomb a large Japanese naval base on
Hokkaido having taken off from Alaska. I will have to consult my
reference on that, but the Japanese were attacked before Doolittle's
raid. His was the first to assault the homeland proper.

Will get back to you to confirm.

Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 11:13:51 CST
From:    "[email-masked]. --Scherrer,
         Tim A." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Help reaching a list member

I am trying to contact our member in Bloomington, IN.  I believe that is
Sidney Kitchel.  Please contact me direct--thanks.  Tim

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 17:40:06 +0100
From:    Richard Cummings <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Mother of All Battles - Kursk

Great reading Richard...I wish I could have seen the program.  Thanks
for posting the details.  Regards from Munich.  Richard.

--==oo00oo==--
[email-masked]
RFE/RL Inc
Munich,Germany

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 11:58:45 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Mother of All Battles - Kursk

Richard,

That is excellent!! If you hear of any export of that segment to the
US, please let us all know. I know that there have been many
interesting items produced there that have not made it to here, most
notably, a series dealing exclusively with the secret war that
existed between the Allies and the Axis.

Thank you very much for the detail, and I, personally will keep an
eye for it.

Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 13:20:03 -0400
From:    "Mr. Scott Hannon" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid

>John Lundstrom writes:
>>        I feel that the principal result of the Doolittle Raid for the U.S.
>>was to deny the Pacific Fleet two of its four carriers at a time when it
>>could have inflicting a crushing defeat on the Japanese in the Battle of
>>the Coral Sea.

Chris Scogins writes:
>I agree.  If you look at an overall disposition of forces, the strategic
>effects of the raid were zero (apart from giving the US newspapers something
>good to write about).

Hmmm. I think this down-plays the effects on morale. Battles that lead to
almost no change in the overall military situation may still have a large
effect upon US support for a war. For proof, take a look at what happened
in Somalia within the last few days, and the repercussions in the USA.

As the US learned (?) in Vietnam, wars are not necessarily won by winning
the battles; resolve has a lot to do with it too. The Doolittle B-25 raid
did insignificant damage to the Japanese military/economy, but had a large
impact on US/Allied morale (and perhaps Japanese as well). The US had a
another bunch of heros at a time when we we not winning many battles.
Japan had been bombed...it wasn't invunerable. Americans were proud of the
acheivement. In short, it was a big boost in US morale, and that in
itself is important.

Scott.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 13:46:33 EST
From:    Crane Conrad LTC <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid

>John Lundstrom writes:
>
>>        I feel that the principal result of the Doolittle Raid for the U.S.
>>was to deny the Pacific Fleet two of its four carriers at a time when it
>>could have inflicting a crushing defeat on the Japanese in the Battle of
>>the Coral Sea.
>
>I agree.  If you look at an overall disposition of forces, the strategic
>effects of the raid were zero (apart from giving the US newspapers something
>good to write about).
>
>Chris
>----------------------------------------------------------------------
>Chris Scogings                      Voice: (27) 331 955645
>Computer Science Dept                 Fax: (27) 331 955599
>University of Natal
>Pietermaritzburg                   E-Mail:[email-masked]
>----------------------------------------------------------------------

     Those of you taking this line of argument are ignoring the facts and being
very presentist.  I suggest you look at Ron Spector's EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN,
page 155.  There were three key effects of the raid.  It was a tremendous
psychological boost for the American public at a time when all news was bleak.
It was a tremendous psychological blow to the Japanese that embarrassed the
military and eliminated any resistance(which had been strong) to the Midway
operation.  Concerning the Coral Sea Battle, the reaction to the Doolittle raid
forced Admiral Inoue to move his timetable to take Port Moresby up to May,
he was limited to only two large carriers instead of six, and his hasty
preparations left him exposed to American air attacks.  So while the Doolittle
raid might have taken two carriers from US forces available for Coral Sea, it
really denied the Japanese four, which had to undergo accelerated training for
a now top priority Midway operation.  Despite what problems the raid caused the
Japanese, it was probably worth the risk just for what it did for our own
morale.

                                        LTC Con Crane
                                        USMA

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Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 15:30:50 EDT
From:    Allan Janus <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW2 Urban Legends/Folklore

I'm reminded of an anecdote of the Duke of Wellington - he was boring his
friends at dinner one night with a story of something that deeply impressed
him during the Peninsular campaign; a Spaniard who displayed live rats living
in bottles.  A toad at the table tried to ruin the story by saying "I suppose,
your Grace, that they were rather small rats in rather big bottles."
Wellington, enraged, replied "No, sir!  Damn big rats, and damn small
bottles!"

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Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 15:25:00 EST
From:    "W. C. (RUSTY) DIVENS" <[email-masked]>
Subject: <No subject given>

>I agree.  If you look at an overall disposition of forces, the strategic
>effects of the raid were zero (apart from giving the US newspapers something
>good to write about).

Unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately) STRATEGIC results are not the
only ones of value.  If the 'impenetrability' of the homeland was
shown to be a myth early on in the war, the disposition of forces
subsequently would be affected.  Who can say what would have happened
had the Imperial forces not had to keep a large reserve of aircraft on
the Home Islands to meet a threat that existed in their imagination?

Remember that the raid was publicized early on, but the METHODOLOGY
remained a secret.  Few people knew of a carrier-based launch.

Therefore, strategically it was not much...but the overall effects
seem to have justified the action.

Bill
[email-masked]

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Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 16:04:28 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid

Con,

I agree completely.

Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

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Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 16:39:49 -0500
From:    John Lundstrom <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid

Regarding Col. Crane's comments on the effect of the Doolittle Raid on Japanese
strategy, please see my book The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet
Strategy Dec. 41-June 42 (Annapolis, 1976). I believe Japanese sources show:
        1) the Naval General Staff caved into Yamamoto's pressure and agreed
on the Midway offensive on 5 April 1942 (formal directive issued on 5 May 1942)
Thus the Doolittle Raid only added to the urgency to attack Midway, but didn't
create it
        2) Inoue (C-in-C 4th Fleet) wanted to attack Port Moresby & Tulagi in
late May with 2 carriers. On 5 April he was given only Kaga & Shoho; on 12
April Shokaku & Zuikaku were added in place of Kaga, and the operation was
pushed up to early May, because Yamamoto wanted all six of his big CVs for
the Midway operation in June.
        3) US radio intelligence picked up hints of Port Moresby offensive
(first clue, noted carrier Kaga tied up with Inoue; by mid April Nimitz
thought there would be a major enemy South Pacific offensive against not
only Port Moresby & Tulagi, but possibly also Fiji, Samoa, & New Caledonia.
He wanted to meet them head-on, hence would commit all four available
carriers. The Doolittle Raid ruined this plan, led to piecemeal deployment
of US carriers.
        4) raids can be spectacular but often counterproductive to overall
strategy; note especially Evan Carlson's Makin Raid on August 1942 (USMC
raiders brought in on subs; to be a diversion for Guadalcanal landings). Its main
main result was to show the Japanese how vulnerable Tarawa was and cause
them to fortify it.

        Sorry for the long winded reply.

John B. Lundstrom
Milwaukee Public Musem
[email-masked]

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Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 14:56:37 EDT
From:    rod holmes <[email-masked]>
Subject: Source: Help! Need 1st volume 5th Army history

Howdy,

        I'm trying to find a copy of the first volume of the 5th Army
History from WWII to purchase. My school library will not get it
inter-library loan for me because I'm an undergraduate student. I
only need chapters three and four so photocoping these chapters might
also be an option.

Thanks,
Rod Holmes
[email-masked]

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Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 20:40:47 CDT
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid -- missed Coral Sea opportunity?

Well, it is sobering to think I am going to disagree with the author of
  the best book on naval air combat in the South Pacific, BAR NONE --
  John Lundstrom, author of THE FIRST TEAM -- but here goes:

What determined the overall outcome of the Coral Sea was the weather.
  The opposing carrier groups almost came within visual range of each
  other, in spite of air searches, but didn't know it.

With luck, we damaged Shokaku and Zuikaku, the IJN fleet carriers.  With
  better weather we obliterated/annihilated/atomized -- creamed -- light
  carrier Shoho, covering the Port Moresby invasion force advancing from
  the North, but we didn't need more carriers to do that.

With the chaotic weather, Coral Sea was a throw of the dice, and more U.S.
  CVFs could have easily been just more victims.

By contrast, Midway was a carefully planned and timed -- calculated --
  operation.

I'm glad and grateful Hornet and Enterprise were off terrorizing those
  Japanese picket boats -- and that Jimmy Doolittle so shocked the
  Japanese and so heartened and re-galvanized all Americans.  It was a
  dramatic, heroic, all-American play.  Roosevelt certainly appreciated
  its decisive political importance.  America was hitting back!

Godspeed, Jimmy Doolittle.

Lou Coatney, WIU

     Terry, I'd really appreciate the info on that "first strike" from
Alaska.

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Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 20:46:19 CDT
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: Rats!

Reminds me of the scene in the Captain's cabin in the "Pirates"(?)
  film, starring Karl Malden.

Lou Coatney, WIU

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Date:    Wed, 6 Oct 1993 20:52:23 CDT
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: Nimitz's hopes for a big battle in the South Pacific

John,

     It was also lucky, then, that the big battle came up at Midway.  The
Japanese had all those bases in the South Pacific (to provide longrange
recon, etc.).  Up at Midway (in the North Central Pacific) they stuck
their necks way out -- without adequate, CRUCIAL recon.  Once it was
apparent they weren't going to be using Midway as an anchorage, they had
to go all the way back.

     The phenomenal range of land-based Zeros was also negated.

Lou Coatney, WIU

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Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 03:48:00 -0400
From:    "Helena M. Menezes 30935" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW2 Urban Legends/Folklore #

          There is also a P-61 at the Air & Space Museum's Paul Garber
          Facility (The Enola Gay is also there) in Maryland waiting for
          its turn (Restauration). If you like WWII planes, go visit this
          place, you won't regrat.

          Claudio

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End of WWII-L Digest - 5 Oct 1993 to 6 Oct 1993
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