Subject: WWII-L Digest - 10 Oct 1993 to 11 Oct 1993

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 12 Oct 1993 00:00:30 -0400

There are 12 messages totalling 862 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Jimmy Doolittle
  2. USAAF 11 OCT 43
  3. 350th Fighter Group
  4. GEN: Frank Wisner and OSS
  5. WWII 4th Armored Division (fwd)
  6. Part 1: WWIIHRS NATIONAL BATTLE
  7. Nimitz's hopes for a big battle in the South Pacific (2)
  8. INF: More on Ryan Collection
  9. Recreation Groups
 10. Part 2: WWIIHRS NATIONAL BATTLE
 11. Division of Japanese forces bad?

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 11 Oct 1993 07:12:46 -0400
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Jimmy Doolittle

The following is from the Air Force News Service

739.  Doolittle buried in Arlington
                             &    &    &
                             &    &    &
                             &    &    &
739.  Doolittle buried in Arlington
by TSgt. Sarah L. Hood
Air Force News Service
     WASHINGTON -- Family, friends, comrades and admirers filled the
Fort Myer Chapel in Arlington, Va., Oct. 1 to pay tribute to Gen. James
H. "Jimmy" Doolittle.
     Doolittle died Sept. 27 at the age of 96 and was buried with full
military honors in Arlington National Cemetery, Va.
     While well-known as an aviation pioneer and Medal of Honor
recipient, Doolittle was described by his son as a very modest and
generous man.
     "He never tooted his own horn," retired Col. John Doolittle told
Air Force News Service recently.  "Very seldom did he talk about his
exploits.  He would normally talk more about the people who were with
him and what others had done."
     But his accomplishments were many and vital to the development of
aviation as it is today.
     Master's and doctoral degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology and a succession of aviation feats, such as record-making
historic and experimental flights, were among the general's many
achievements.
     He became the first to fly across the United States in a day when
he flew the 2,163-mile route from Florida to California with just one
refueling stop in 1922.  Doolittle earned the MacKay Trophy in 1925 for
winning the Schneider Cup Race with an average speed of 232 mph in a
Curtiss Navy racer equipped with pontoons, the fastest a seaplane had
ever flown.
     "Dad said the main thing is to do what you're going to be happy
doing.  It's awfully difficult to try to make a living at something you
don't enjoy," said the colonel.
     He said integrity and honesty were the "keynotes of living"
stressed at home while he was growing up.
     "Dad's philosophy was very good and that was 'we're put on this
earth for a purpose.'  That purpose is to make it, within our
capabilities, a better place in which to live.  He tried to do what was
right, tried to do things you would not be ashamed of doing."
     The elder Doolittle had the vision to recognize what he thought
would be important, his son said.  "He achieved things by, I think they
called it the calculated risk.  He never did anything right off the top
of his head.  It was always well analyzed, well thought out."
     Perhaps best known for organizing the first aerial bombing raid on
Japan, he volunteered to lead the attack of 16 B-25 medium bombers, a
group which came to be known as Doolittle's Raiders.
     While their numbers have dwindled to 38, 22 of the original
raiders reported for duty Oct. 1, saluting smartly and biding a last
farewell to their former commander.
     A fly-by in his honor drew the crowd's attention at the gravesite.
Last to pass the field was a fully restored B-25 Mitchell, lifting the
spirits of the mourners and drawing from them a round of applause.
     In a documentary made several years ago, "Jimmy Doolittle:  An
American Hero," he said there was one way he wished to be remembered --
with the respect of his fellow man.
     Judging by the multitude gathered at his gravesite, his wish was
granted.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 11 Oct 1993 07:17:13 -0400
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: USAAF 11 OCT 43

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
MONDAY, 11 OCTOBER 1943
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-36, North American Apache
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force): HQ 311th Fighter-Bomber Group transfers
from Nawadih to Dinjan, India.

  CHINA (Fourteenth Air Force): 8 B-24's bomb the town areas of Tengchung,
China, and Sadon and Myitkyina, Burma.
  The 75th Fighter Squadron, 23d Fighter Group, transfers from Kunming to
Kweilin, China with P-40's.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): XII Bomber Command
B-25's bomb Garitsa Airfield, Greece and P-38's hit a vessel in the Corfu
harbor on Corfu Island. In Italy, XII Air Support Command and Northwest
African Tactical Bomber Force (NATBF) operations are cancelled or aborted
due to weather, but Royal Air Force (RAF) Desert Air Force (DAF) fighters
hit trains, trucks, and gun positions near Montesilvano and Vasto.
  The 381st and 428th Bombardment Squadrons (Medium), 310th Bombardment
Group (Medium), based at Menzel Temime, Tunisia with B-25's begin operating
from Oudna, Tunisia.
  Detachments of the 512th, 513th and 514th Bombardment Squadrons (Heavy),
376th Bombardment Group (Heavy), which have been operating from Bengasi,
Libya with B-24's, return to their base at Enfidaville, Tunisia.
  The 527th and 528th Fighter-Bomber Squadrons, 86th Fighter-Bomber Group,
transfer from Sele Airfield to Serretella Airfield, Italy with A-36's.

SOUTH PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Thirteenth Air Force): In the Solomon
Islands, 22 B-24's join 30+ US Navy dive bombers in pounding Kahili
Airfield on Bougainville Island and the nearby area. Hits are scored on the
airstrip, fuel dumps, supply areas, gun positions, bridges between Rangu
and Jakohina, barges at the mouth of the Uguima River, and several other
targets. The B-24's and the US Navy and AAF fighters covering the attack
claim 12 Japanese airplanes downed.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Fifth Air Force): In New Guinea,
B-24's attack the towns of Manokwari, Bira, and Fak Fak and score hits on a
small vessel at Fak Fak. During the night of 11/12 Oct, B-25's bomb Cape
Chater Airfield and Lautem on Timor Island.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
 Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 11 Oct 1993 07:31:38 -0400
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: 350th Fighter Group

On Friday, Bill Thacker asked about the 350th Fighter Group of the
USAAF during WWII.  A brief check of my files on Friday night
revealed the following.

First, the "normal" organizational structure of the USAAF in WWII from
top to bottom was:

  Air Force
  Command
  Wing
  Group
  Squadron

There was a 350th Fighter Group that served in the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations from Jan 43 to Jul 45.  However, there was no
345th Wing in the entire USAAF during WWII however, there was a 345th
Fighter Squadron which was assigned to the group.  According to the
information I have, the 350th was assigned to the following wings:

  63d Fighter Wing, 1943-44
  62d Fighter Wing, 1944-45

Anyway, this is what I found out.

The 350th Fighter Group was activated by the Eighth Air Force at
Bushey Hall, England on 1 Oct 42.  The group's three squadrons, the
345th, 346th and 347th Fighter Squadrons, were activated at the
same time.  The air echelons of all four units were in England; the
ground echelons were at Harding Field, Baton Rouge, Louisiana and
remained there until departing for North Africa on 2 Nov 42.
Sometime in Oct, Group HQ and the 345th moved to Duxford, England;
the 346th moved to Coltishall, England; and the 347th to Snailwell,
England.  The 350th and 81st Fighter Groups were to be equipped
with Bell P-39 Airacobras for service with the Twelfth Air Force in
Northwest Africa.  Their aircraft, diverted from a Soviet
consignment, were of the P-39D-1-BE and P-400 vintage, types
currently proving inferior aagainst the Japanese in the Solomon
Islands.  (The P-400 was the export version of the P-39 for the RAF
that the RAF had rejected and consigned to the Soviet Union.)  The
VIII Air Force Service Command, without spare parts or mechanics
familiar with the aircraft, lagged far behind the schedule for the
assembly and modification of the aircraft which were in crates.
Because of this delay, pilot training suffered because there were
insufficient aircraft.

The ground echelons of the four units arrived At Casablanca on 19
Nov 42 but the air echelons were still in England.  The 347th moved
to Kings Cliffe, England on 8 Dec 42 and continued assemblying and
training.  In early Jan 43, 62 P-39's with belly tanks left England
for the 1200 mile flight to Port Lyautey, French Morocco.  The
flight took 7 hours.  One aircraft landed in Spain, two disappeared
without a trace, ten were forced down in Portugal and 49 landed at
Oujda, French Morocco.  The group began flying combat missions in
in Jan 43 and during the North African campaign moved to Algeria
in Feb 43 and remained there until Nov 43.  When the Northwest
African Air Force, a unified USAAF/RAF command, was formed on 18
Feb 43, the 350th was assigned to the Northwest African Coastal Air
Force (NACAF) which was charged with the air defense of North Africa,
air-sea reconnaissance, antisubmarine operations, protection of
Allied convoys and destruction of enemy convoys.  The 350th were
used for convoy escort, patrol and scrambles, but their P-39's
could not intercept the high-flying Axis reconnaissance aircraft.
To rectify this situation, two P-38's were assigned to each squadron
in mid-May 43.  By the end of May, the 347th had three P-38's and
26 P-39's.  On 19 Jun 43, Lt. Kitt McMaster of the 347th took off
in a P-38 after a Ju 88 recon aircraft over Algiers, caught it at
30,000 feet, and shot it down.  This was the first victory for the
squadron in their 5 months in North Africa.  By the end of 1943,
the 347th had six confirmed kills, all in P-38's.

During the invasion of Sicily in Jul 43, NACAF was responsible to
provide air protection over the assault convoys from the time they
left the normal routes across the Mediterranean up to last light of
D-1.  On and after D-Day, NACAF would protect shipping to within 40
miles of the beaches.  At this time, HQ 350th Group and 346th Squadron
were at Maison Blance, Algeria, the 345th was at Bone, Algeria and the
347th was at Djidjelli, Algeria.  During the period 17 Jul-17 Aug,
the group flew 620 operational missions covering ports and convoys. The
group continued air defense duties in Algeria during the summer and
fall of 1943.

In the fall of 1943, the 350th, still equipped with P-39's, moved to
Sardinia and Corsica.  The 350th, 345th and 346th went to Sardinia on
5 Nov, 18 Nov and 28 Oct respectively.  The 347th remained in
Algeria and moved to Corsica on 6 Dec 43.  On 26 Nov 43, the enemy
launched an attack in Bougie Bay, Algeria.  Two P-39's of the 347th
probably destroyed one He 177 and damaged another.

In Feb 44, the 350th moved to Corsica; the 345th remained based in
Saridina but operated from Corsica during Feb and Mar; the 346th
remained in Sardinia and send a detachment to Tunisia during Feb-Jun 44;
and the 347th, based in Corsica, began operating from Italy during
Feb-Mar 44.  The 350th had modified their P-39's so they could
undertake full combat operations during Operation Strangle, the air
operation to interdict the movement of enemy supplies in Italy.  By this
time, the group was operating well-worn P-39N's and with extra wing
tanks (giving them 120 gallons of fuel), they had been equipped to
carry one 500-pound or one 1,000-pound bomb.  On 6 Apr 44, the 350th
flew ten missions, comprising 75 sorties, and in the face of intense AA
fire destroyed one highway and two rail bridges, two air warning
installations, one barracks building and two trucks while inflicting
many casualties on enemy personnel and damaging other structures and
vehicles.  One flight of six P-39's was dive bombing bridges in the
Grosseto-Pisa area when it was jumped by some ten Bf 109s and Fw 190s.
Ten top cover P-39's engaged the German fighters and managed to shoot
down five and damage two.  For this action on 6 Apr, the group and all
three squadrons were awarded a Distinguished Unit Citation (DUC).

In the summer of 1944, the group covered the Allied landings on the
island of Elba. Starting in Jun, the four units transferred to Italy;
the 350th to Tarquinia on 8 Sep; the 345th to Pomigliano on 1 Jun and
Tarquinia on 25 Jun; the 346th to Pomigliano on 25 Jun with a
detachment operating from Piombino 7 Jul-24 Aug; and the 347th to
Tarquinia on 15 Sep.  AND FINALLY, the group transitioned from P-39's
to Republic P-47 Thunderbolts in Aug-Sep 44.

The group remained based in Italy until Jul 45 providing close air
support for ground troops.  The group returned to the U.S. in
Jul-Aug 45 and was inactivated on 7 Nov 45.

On 24 May 46, the 350th Fighter Group was redesignated the 112th Fighter
Group and the 345th Fighter Squadron was redesignated the 146th Fighter
Squadron (Single Engine) and both were allotted to the Pennsylvania Air
National Guard.  The 146th was extended federal recognition on 18 Jun
48; the 112th on 22 Apr 49.  Since that date the units have been based
at the Greater Pittsburgh Airport and have never been called to active
duty.  Its initial mission aircraft were F-47N Thunderbolts.  On 1 Nov
50, the 146th became the 146th Fighter-Bomber Squadron and in May 51,
converted to North American F-51H Mustangs.  On 1 Oct 52, the squadron
was redesignated the 146th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron with a mission
of providing air defense for the eastern U.S. but was again designated
a fighter-bomber unit on 1 Dec 52.  In Jun 54, four North American
F-86A's were assigned but the conversion from F-51H's to F-86A's was
soon cancelled.  The squadron converted to Republic F-84F Thunderstreaks
in Oct 54 and was redesignaed the 146th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron on
1 Jul 55.  In Dec 57, it converted to the all-weather North American
F-86L Sabre; to the Convair F-102A Delta Dagger in Nov 60; and to the
LTV A-7D Corsair II in Apr 75 becoming the 146th Tactical Fighter
Squadron on 12 Apr 75. In the summer of 1991, the squadron began
transitioning to the Boeing KC-135E Stratotanker becoming the 146th Air
Refuelling Squadron on 16 Oct 91.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 11 Oct 1993 07:00:24 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GEN: Frank Wisner and OSS

Richard,

I will post some info for you this afternoon on Frank Wisner.

Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 11 Oct 1993 07:26:10 EST
From:    Larry & Kim Jewell <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WWII 4th Armored Division (fwd)

Dear Mr. Jewell,

Thanks very much for your offer to post my inquiry to WWII-L.  Please
forward the following message to the list:

        My father, a former member of the 10th Armored Infantry Battalion of
the 4th Armored Division, is looking for information on the history of
the division during World War II.  He is particularly interested in the route
of the battalion through France, and the names of any other members of the
battalion who were with him there in 1944.  He also asked me to inquire
whether the 4th Armored Association is still in existence and, if so, how
to contact it.

        We would be very grateful for any help.  Please respond directly
to me by e-mail at [email-masked].

        Thanks very much for your help.

        Iver Kern
        <[email-masked]>

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 10 Oct 1993 20:40:47 CST
From:    "[email-masked]. --Scherrer,
         Tim A." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Part 1: WWIIHRS NATIONAL BATTLE

I returned from the 1993 WWIIHRS National Battle with all the signs of a
good event---hands torn up from sticker bushes, and sore back and the
beginnings of a cold.  Overall it was a good event, and lived up to my
expectatation despite several difficulties that had to be overcome.

It was attended by approx. 250 German and 200 Allied reenactors.  I met
people from Florida, and rode in a Kubelwagen that traveled 40 hours
from Los Angeles to Camp Atterbury to participate.

The event had the most impressive number and variety of any vehicles
I've seen at a reenactment.  The Allies had 7 jeep, a Dodge 3/4 ton
Weapons Carrier, a Weasel, a unWWII but very useful 2 1/2 ton truck, a
tracked tank minus the turret that name escapes me, and 2 Stuart tanks.
The German side was the best ever assembled, and included 4 Kubelwagens,
5 motorcyclew with sidecars, 1 75mm PAK cannon (complete
reproduction--unbelievable and well done), 3 trucks, 2 Sdkz 222 armored
cars (both reproductions), and the 11th Panzer's Hetzer, nicknamed Geli.

The weekend weather was very European.  The temperatures ranged from
highs in the low 50's to night time lows of the mid 30's.  Saturday
afternoon had a temperature drop of about 15 degrees.  It rained on and
off from about 11pm on Friday night until about the time the troops
returned from the field, 5pm on Saturday.

Friday kicked off with the unit leader's meeting, which became a roller
coaster.  The event coordinator for the past two years who coordinated
with the Camp Atterbury personnel did not pass significant information
to the participants, or anyone else.  When the 1993 event coordinators
arrived the Army had a laundry list of problems from the previous year
which all came as a suprise to all reenactors involved.  The rules were
not any different than any other Army post, however we had never been in
formed of them by the reenactor in charge (who is no longer permitted to
come to any WWII event for a number of reasons) in 1991 and 1992.  It
seemed to most in the units that the Army was changing the rules,
however once everyone understood what was occuring, everyone adjusted
and we went forth.

The Sunday morning National HRS meeting was another rollercoaster, as
they always tend to be.  Most of it surrounded the member who planned
the previous events, and created many problems for the WWIIHRS that will
take a while to all be resolved.  Other topics of discussion included
enforcement of authenticity standards using unit commanders and peer
pressure, units who did not take responsibility for their barracks
cleaning and how that should be handled in the future, and general
housekeeping business like Secretary's report, Treasurer's report, Allie
d and Axis representatives reports about authenticity standards, and
safety concerns.  The meeting concluded with the traditional awarding of
the National Battle Streamers to all units involved.

The vendor's show was quite interesting this year.  There were a pretty
good collection of vendors, selling uniforms, accoutrements, books, and
odds and ends.  The most interesting table I saw was a gentleman selling
Russian equipment and uniforms at reasonable prices.  He made a trip to
Russia and set up suppliers there.  The most interesting and unusual
thing I saw was a shield that looked like, at least to me, that came off
the top of a STUG III or IV that protected the machine gunner.  It was
picked in a backyard of a farmer in either Leningrad or Stalingrad (I
can't remember).  I would probably have paid closer attention, except he
was asking $800 for it.  It was all there but very rusty and probably
rated as a relic.  It was still there when the show closed this morning.

I will send a second post tommorrow that covers the tactical scenario,
and how it worked.

Tim, Obergefreiter, 11th Panzer Div, WWIIHRS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 11 Oct 1993 09:23:19 GMT+800
From:    Joseph Boeke <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Nimitz's hopes for a big battle in the South Pacific

I came to this discussion a little late, but I would like to point
out a couple of things (I apologize if this ground has already been
covered).

Lou Coatney typed:

>      Midway offered the bigger -- 4 IJN fleet carriers -- victory
> opportunity without (with hindsight!) the weather/luck factor.

It must also be remembered that the bulk IJN Combined Fleet was
enroute or just arriving from Nagumo's Indian Ocean raids to the Home
Islands when the Doolittle raiders struck Tokyo et.al.  In April '42
their next operation was far from obvious...

The IJN & IJA had actually beaten their own time table for the
conquest of the Malay Barrier and SE Asia (although the resistance in
the Philppines lasted longer than expected).  They were unpreparred
for the "next phase" of the conflict and the old friction between the
IJN & IJA began to emerge.  Roughly speaking, they had three
operations which were vying for contention:

    1) Continue to advance into the Indian Ocean/Burmese Theater and
       attempt to link up with the German & Italian forces in Africa.
    2) Complete the conquest of New Guinea and begin the investment
       of Austrailia (including the occupation of the Naru Islands,
       American Samoa, Gualdalcanal, Espiritu Santo & New Caledonia).
    3) An advance in the Central Pacific (leading towards Pearl
       Harbor).

Yamamoto knew that the USN while injured, was far from being
destroyed (despite the universally quick success that the IJN & IJA
were enjoying against the Allies).  So he favored #3 (the idea to
bring the US fleet carriers to battle and destroy them was an add on
as a result of the Doolittle raid).

The IJA favored operations into the Indian Ocean.  Because
Yamamoto did not believe that the Navy could support IJA operations
in India (and defend the newly established perimeter against the
USN) the South Pacific campaign became the comprimise solution.

Therefore, the Doolittle raid besides being a "morale boost" focused
the IJN on the need for a decisive battle with the remnants of the
USN.  In essence it set the stage for Midway, which probably wouldn't
have happened in June 1942 if it wasn't for Doolittle's raid.

Terry Moore typed:

> It must not be forgotten that the Japanese had a blind sight to their
> planning. They were convinced that their codes were unbreakable, that
> the Americans would react according to Japanese expectations, and
> that their occupation of Midway would not be discerned from the
> Japanese attempt to occupy Kiska and Attu. It was this thinking that
> led to their downfall.

While all of these factors are true, I think that the USN was still
extremely lucky at Midway.  They were still out-numbered in all the
quantitative aspects of the battle.  Not only were they using
inferior equipment (look at the torpedos & aircraft specs) but the
relative qualities of the crews (both aviators & sailors alike) was
below that of the IJN.

All in all, Yamamoto had every reason to be confident of success
(even if he knew his codes had been broken).

The difference in the battle was in leadership at all levels.  At the
tactical level, the VT squadrons pushed on despite the odds.  All of
the squadron commanders (with the notable exception of the Hornet's
VB, VS & VF squadrons) realized that Nagumo's TF turned NW away from
Midway after the initial strike.  At the operation level, Fletcher &
Spruance (especially the later) made tough decisions, like launching
the initial strike at **extreme** range, which paid off for them.
Finally, at the strategic level, Nimitz had the confidence to rely on
his staff (especially the SigInt aspects) and stand up to the brass
in Washington, D.C.

On the Japanese side, the most telling "leadership error" was
Nagumo's not Yamamoto's.  Nagumo's indecision on how to arm the
second strike cost him the battle & maybe Japan the war.  I remember
going through my U.S. Army training.  The thing that the TAC officers
drummed into my head was "make a decision -- any decision, just make
it."  It is better to make an incorrect decision and rectify it
later, than to make no decision an get caught with your shorts down...

John Lundstrom wrote:

>         If you would have preferred fighting with the odds Fletcher and
> Spruance faced in June at Midway than what Halsey with four carriers
> would have enjoyed in early May in the Coral Sea, then my hat is off
> to you. Your more stable air front at Midway slipped down over the island
> on 10 June and completely socked the place in; a couple of planes were
> lost due to bad weather.

While I agree that the four carriers at Coral Sea would have given
the USN an advantage (maybe even sinking both the Shokaku & Zuikaku),
the edge wouldn't have been as large as we have been led to believe
(IMHO).  Remember that until Midway all of the US carriers were
flying SBD-2/3s and F4F-2s  neither of these planes had self-sealing
fuel tanks & they didn't have the better engines or longer ranges of
the next models down the line.

So, you say big deal right?  Well, remember that the Yorktown &
Lexington aircrews were pretty chopped up from the Coral Sea battle
(not as bad as the Japanese aircrews), had Halsey's aircrews also
been involved they probably would have been pretty beat up as well
(wasn't the Yorktown's airgroup made up of the survivors of both the
+Lex's and her own airgroup -- I' can't remember).

Given the fact that many of the "First Team" were Naval Reservists,
with little combat experience, the loss of some of the Enetrprise &
Hornets aircrews may have made a big difference at Midway.

> I recommend seeing my book The First Team and the Guadalcanal
> Campaign, which the Naval Institute is releasing next month.

It is good to see the Guadalcanal book being released (I really
enjoyed _The First Team_, BTW -- an excellent book).  Do you have
another in the works?

- Joe

+====================================================================+
| Joseph R. Boeke                  |                                 |
| Research Coordinator             | "Towering genius disdains a     |
| University of California, Irvine |  beaten path, it seeks regions  |
| Telephone:  (714) 856-8668       |  hitherto unexplored."          |
| FAX:        (714) 856-8666       |                                 |
| Internet:       [email-masked]  |          -- Abraham Lincoln     |
| America Online: [email-masked]  |                                 |
+====================================================================+

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 11 Oct 1993 13:28:13 EDT
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: More on Ryan Collection

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  11-Oct-1993 01:28pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  INF: More on Ryan Collection

    I have just received permission to write a new collection development
    statement for supplements to the Cornelius Ryan Collection.  For the
    most part the Collection has been static since we received it a few
    years after Ryan died in 1974.  Obviously, with the 50th anniversary of
    OVERLORD, MARKET-GARDEN, and the last operations in the ETO coming up,
    this is a timely topic.  Our intention is to revive and keep active the
    Collection to increase researcher interest and (selfservingly) to
    broaden the public awareness of the Collection, this archives, and Ohio
    University.

    The Ryan Collection now consists of his complete research materials and
    personal library collection revolving around his books _The Longest
    Day_, _A Bridge Too Far_, and _The Last Battle_.  He also wrote
    numerous articles about the early American space program through
    contacts with von Braun and co.

    In thinking about what we would like to do here, I have come up with a
    preliminary list of collection focus priorities:

    1.   Published and unpublished materials, in any language, specifically
    related to the topics related to the three battles upon which his books
    focus.  These materials include manuscripts, diaries, letters,
    documents, photographs, books, pamphlets, etc.  We are not interested
    in memorabelia.

    2.   The same kinds of materials relating to ETO operations, primarily
    from Normandy to Germany.

    3.   The same kinds of materials relating to foreign and war
    correspondents, primarily in the ETO.  (Ryan was a correspondent who
    spent most of his time with Patton's 3rd Army although he did fly over
    the beaches on D-Day and spent a little time in the PTO at the very
    tail end of the war.)

    4.   The same kinds of materials relating to concepts of the American
    space program during its formative years.

    As a University Archives, we do not have lots of funds for such
    projects and, of course, would prefer to collect materials through
    gifts and donations.  We are also obligated to make our collections
    available to the general public (the whole idea anyway if we want folks
    to remember their history).  There are, however, funds available
    through grants and such, but we usually have to specify exactly what it
    is we want to buy before we go for the money.

    So here comes the part where you all can help.  First, please critique
    this collection strategy: does it make sense?  any additions or
    deletions?  Second, if you know of materials we might seek out please
    let me know with as much information as you can supply.

    I don't suppose this needs to be said to this List, but I'll say it
    anyway.  If we don't try to collect these things now while people are
    thinking about it, we risk losing valuable archival materials of
    benefit to future generations.  Let's get this stuff into reputable
    repositories now, before it's too late!

    Doug McCabe
    [email-masked]

Received:  11-Oct-1993 01:28pm

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 11 Oct 1993 13:34:58 EDT
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Recreation Groups

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  11-Oct-1993 01:28pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Re: Recreation Groups

    Has anyone heard of the group "Keep 'em Rollin'," a Dutch organization
    which has a collection of restored American 82nd and 101st Airborne
    Jeeps and other vehicles?  I hear they plan to parade 400-500 of these
    vehicles for the 50th anniversary of MARKET-GARDEN and run up the
    "Hell's Highway" corridor from the Belgium border to Nijmegen on
    September 17, 1994.  Anyone know more about this group?

    Doug McCabe
    [email-masked]

Received:  11-Oct-1993 01:34pm

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 11 Oct 1993 18:08:21 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Nimitz's hopes for a big battle in the South Pacific

On Mon, 11 Oct 1993, Joseph Boeke wrote:

> Terry Moore typed:
>
> > It must not be forgotten that the Japanese had a blind sight to their
> > planning. They were convinced that their codes were unbreakable, that
> > the Americans would react according to Japanese expectations, and
> > that their occupation of Midway would not be discerned from the
> > Japanese attempt to occupy Kiska and Attu. It was this thinking that
> > led to their downfall.

...

> On the Japanese side, the most telling "leadership error" was
> Nagumo's not Yamamoto's.  Nagumo's indecision on how to arm the
> second strike cost him the battle & maybe Japan the war.  I remember
> going through my U.S. Army training.  The thing that the TAC officers
> drummed into my head was "make a decision -- any decision, just make
> it."  It is better to make an incorrect decision and rectify it
> later, than to make no decision an get caught with your shorts down...

...

Well, Nagumo made an error. But Yamamoto and his staff made some errors too.
With hindsight, we can say that the whole Japanese planning for Midway was
bad.

The first error was dividing their fleet in small parts: the Attu & Kiska
strike force, a waste of resources; the traditional battleship & cruiser
fleet, that did not get an opportunity to enter combat; and the troop
transport fleet. It is clear that in this scheme, the carrier units were
secondary forces with several secondary tasks (creating a diversion,
attracting the US fleet, and soften up Midway) that reduced their
effectiviness and made their position known to the US.  On the other hand,
the battleship force was kept ready and intact, presumably to destroy the US
fleet if it appeared. A strange concept, because Yamamoto knew very well how
vulnerable his ships would be without air cover -- it is difficult to imagine
how he intended to use them.

If the IJN had been more up-to-date (or ahead of their time) in their
thinking, they would have cancelled the Attu & Kiska strike, added the small
carriers to their battleships as additional air cover, and used _this_ force
for the secondary task of supporting landings on Midway. Then the large
carriers would have been kept ready in the background to finish off the US
fleet.

The second error was the neglect of adequate reconaissance. An attempt to get
air coverage of Pearl Harbour failed, the submarine lookouts were too late,
and reconaissance from the carrier fleet was careless. By attacking Midway
the IJN carriers made their presence known, while they did not know were the
US fleet was. That was stupid, because it offered the US fleet the
initiative. Of course the situation was even worse, because the Japanese
codes had been broken.

Emmanuel

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 11 Oct 1993 20:15:44 CST
From:    "[email-masked]. --Scherrer,
         Tim A." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Part 2: WWIIHRS NATIONAL BATTLE

The tank that I couldn't remember the name of in the prebious report was
the Locust.

The battle scenario for the National Battle was effected greatly by the
Army's rules and limited the options available.  They left the armor
limited to the three main roads, unlike the planned scenario, which
would have allowed a realistic armor on armor battle in tank country,
versus the woods we used.

The training area given for the event consisted of a big box,
approximately 7km by 5km.  The northern 2/3 of the terrain was rolling
hills, and heavily wooded, while the southern end was flat.  The
southern flat area was either off limits due to it being an impact area
in one corner, and restrictions in the rest of the available southern
end placed upon the armor.  Three main roads lined the area.  Two
running parallel N-S, and one joining both at the southern tip to form a
U.  Four E-W roads connected the main roads, however these were not
gravel surfaced, and were very muddy due to the rain.

The overall scenario coordinator tried to keep the scenario simple so
both sides would run into each other quickly and accross the entire
front.  He briefed to both sides the opposite side's positions just to
make sure we ran into each other.  The scenario was simple---German's to
the North, Allies to the South.  Allies attack first, and German's
counterattack and the whole thing is off and running.  The plan was
simple and effective.  This plan was used in lieu of other plans used in
the past that caused people to go on wild goose chases, and march around
all day not making contact.  Nobody like to drive 8 hours and not fire a
shot!

The only fly in the ointment was the British Airborne were to be
droppedto the east of the eastern main N-S road (dropped off is a better
description).  From there they were to fight their was to link up with a
llied lines and join the effort.

The scenario went much as planned, with the allies probing up both
roads, with the armor situated on the western road.  By noon, the battle
had broken loose on the western road.  Although I missed it, an armor on
armor clash occured involving the two Stuarts vs the Hetzer and the 75mm
PAK.  By 2pm, most everyone was situated on this road.  Several attacks
and counterattacks had occurred with no side gaining any true advantage.
It was decided at about 2:30 to have the Germans do an attack to push
the allies down the road into the loading area at the end of the battle.
The allies were to conduct a fighting withdrawl.  This scenario lasted
up until about 4:30, with everyone ending up in a big gaggle at the
loading area, exactly as planned to transport people from the field.

My personal experience of the day went like this.  I was moved to the
field in Kubelwagen from 1st SS LAH.  We were dropped off on the eastern
road.  We were order to patrol the road to the northern gate of the
training area to counter the Brit airborne drop.  We conducted the 5km
patrolto the gate supported by a Sdkz 222 armored car.  About 15 of us
were on the patrol.  On the way back, a hellacious firefight broke out
to our front.  We discovered the Brit airborn had arrived, and the rest
of the unit was dealing with them.  That fight ensued for about a half
hour, before ending.  We then took a short break, and were ordered to
find our Hetzer, and support it.

We moved out to the west to reach the western road.  The area is
dominated by a large hill, which we skirted the edge.  Not knowing where
the Hetzer would be, we marched cross country.  We ended up in a huge pa
tch of thorns.  When we emerged we were not only in the allied rear, but
had the allied command group eating lunch right in front of us.  We set
up an ambush, and executed it, causing a lot of confusion in the allied
rear.  After that we marched to join our tank.  We then joined in a push
up the road, which survived about 1km and stalled.

This was the point were the allied withdrawl to the pick-up location sta
rted.  A squad of us 11th Panzer types worked the west side of the road
on the far flank.  We ended up overshooting our forces and ended up in t
he allied rear again.  We heard the whining sound and track noises.  We
moved up close enough to get a grenade toss at the tracks of a Stuart,

which launched an infantry assualt against us that destroyed the squad.
We waited in this position, and joined the Hetzer when she moved forward
and supported her until we reached the end of the road, the pick-up poin
t.

Overall, I thought it was a good event, and as the WWIIHRS President sai
d at the National meeting--being politically correct--all units destroye
d all other units, and all objectives were taken on both sides.  He was
joking at the way reenactors like to brag about their day's achievements
.  We all knew that with real ammo, the National meeting would have been
an empty room.

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 11 Oct 1993 21:27:19 CDT
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: Division of Japanese forces bad?

One of the most common criticisms of the Japanese conduct of the Battle
  of Midway is that

     1. Their plan was to complex and narrowly timed, and
     2. They split their forces before knowing exactly where their
       enemy was or would be -- an old military bogey.

Maybe.  On the other hand, the Japanese nearly annihilated our Leyte
  invasion force with exactly such a complicated, carefully timed plan.

Knowing Halsey's aggressive personality, they played him perfectly --
  faking him out of the main/battleline action completely.  If Kurita
  hadn't lost his nerve at the critical moment, our losses could have
  been disastrous, and -- with the shock of Kamikazes -- we might have
  reconsidered our "unconditional surrender" campaign against the
  Japanese islands proper.

Comments?  John?  Con?

Lou Coatney, WIU

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 10 Oct 1993 to 11 Oct 1993
*************************************************