Subject: WWII-L Digest - 6 Oct 1993 to 7 Oct 1993

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 8 Oct 1993 00:01:09 -0400

There are 20 messages totalling 647 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Source: Help! Need 1st volume 5th Army history
  2. USAAF 7 OCT 43
  3. Doolittle Raid (3)
  4. Nimitz's hopes for a big battle in the South Pacific (4)
  5. INF: 135th Infantry
  6. Doolittle Raid boosted Allies morale? (4)
  7. FW: Timewatch - Kursk
  8. Query: French Paratroopers in D-Day
  9. (Old topic) Luftwaffe organization
 10. Mother of All Battles - Kursk
 11. Have we examined/discussed/critiqued Con Crane's book yet?
 12. Doolittle Raid -- Provocation atrocities

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Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 07:50:56 AST
From:    Joanne Brown <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Source: Help! Need 1st volume 5th Army history

I can try to find a xeroxable copy for you, what is the author and
title of the book?

Joanne Brown
UNBSJ
Saint John, N.B.

                   Joanne Brown, Reference Department
Bibliotheque Ward Chipman Library         E-Mail     [email-masked]
University of New Brunswick               Tel (506)  648-5710
Saint John, N.B. Canada                   Fax (506)  648- 5701

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 07:04:01 -0400
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: USAAF 7 OCT 43

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
THURSDAY, 7 OCTOBER 1943
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  C-47, Douglas Skytrain
  P-40, Curtiss

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ANTISUBMARINE OPERATIONS (First Air Force): The 14th Antisubmarine
Squadron (Heavy), 25th Antisubmarine Wing, transfers from Otis Field,
Massachusetts to Biggs Field, Texas and is transferred to the Second Air
Force.

  CARIBBEAN (Sixth Air Force): The 35th Bombardment Squadron (Medium), 25th
Bombardment Group (Medium), transfers from Zandery Field, Surinam to Vernam
Field, Jamaica, British West Indies with B-25's. The detachment operating
from Atkinson Field, British Guiana also transfers to Vernam Field.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  CHINA (Fourteenth Air Force): 4 B-25's attack a 2,500-ton freighter 100
miles (160 km) S of Amoy, China scoring 3 direct hits; the vessel is left
burning and listing. 9 B-24's and 22 fighters hit a cement plant at
Haiphong, French Indochina causing heavy damage to the kiln building.
  The 26th Fighter Squadron, 51st Fighter Group, transfers from Dinjan,
India to Kunming, China with P-40's.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): VIII Bomber Command Mission 110.
During the night of 7/8 Oct, 4 B-17's drop 240,352 leaflets over Paris at
2257-2307 hours; no losses or casualties.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): HQ 434th Troop Carrier Group and
it's 71st, 72d, 73d and 74th Troop Carrier Squadrons arrive at Fulbeck,
England from the US with C-47's.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): Bad weather
cancels many operations. In Italy, Northwest African Tactical Bomber Force
(NATBF) medium and light bombers strike roads, railway, junction, and town
areas in the Capua and Guglionesi regions. Royal Air Force (RAF) Desert Air
Force (DAF) fighter-bombers hit trucks in the Termoli-Vasto areas.
  HQ 57th Bombardment Wing transfers from Lentini, Sicily to Naples, Italy.
  HQ 64th Fighter Wing transfers from Milazzo, Sicily to Frattamaggiore,
Italy.

SOUTH PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Thirteenth Air Force): The 72d
Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy), based on
Espiritu Santo Island, New Hebrides Islands with B-24's, begins operating
from Guadalcanal Island, Solomon Islands.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Fifth Air Force): In the Bismarck
Archipelago, a B-24 on patrol bombs Umboi Island, scoring damaging hits on
several buildings.
  HQ 374th Troop Carrier Group transfers from Port Moresby, New Guinea to
Townsville, Queensland, Australia.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
 Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

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Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 08:59:35 EST
From:    Crane Conrad LTC <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid

John,
     Your account is well argued, though it differs significantly from
Spector's and I can't independently confirm either.  I do think you are greatly
underestimating the morale effects of the raid, and the importance of the
operation to US attitudes and perceptions.

                                             Con Crane

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 09:41:02 -0500
From:    John Lundstrom <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Nimitz's hopes for a big battle in the South Pacific

Lou,
        I don't want to beat the issue of the impact of the Doolittle Raid
to death, but I think our odds of victory at Coral Sea in May with 4 CVs and
300 aircraft against 2 Japanese CVs and 1 CVL with 140 carrier aircraft were
a lot better than what occurred in June with 3 US CVs and 221 aircraft vs
4 Japanese CVs and 249 aircraft (including the 21 Zeros intended for Midway).
I also think a big US victory in the South Pacific would have raised Allied
morale pretty high as well.

        Nothing I say is intended in the least way to reflect upon the courage
and skill of the Doolittle raiders nor the sailors who took them to within
650 miles of Japan. I think General Doolittle was one of the finest men who
ever lived. Yet there were big implications of tyoing up 50 percent of the
Pacific Fleet's offensive power for a crucial 6 weeks.

        As for weather, it is a fickle ally. Just north of Midway was a weather
front that hid Nagumo's carrier forces on the way in (that's why the Midway
search didn't spot them on 3 June). Had that front come south, then things
really would have been interesting. With the Battle of Midway itself, the
"what ifs" are so mind-boggling, it is difficult to remain rational when
considering them.
                        All the best
                                        John

John B. Lundstrom  Milwaukee Public Museum
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 10:48:22 EDT
From:    "William B. Thacker" <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 135th Infantry

My roommate Andrew visited his grandmother yesterday, and she took him to
his grandfather's grave.  It turns out that he had been something of a war
hero, one of three brothers who went off to WWII. Two joined the air force,
the third, the infantry.  Two of the brothers died in 1944; the third,
Andrew's grandfather, was taken off combat duty at that point, and he
survived the war.

One of the brothers was in the "135th Infantry" and was killed in
September, 1944.  Checking my references tells me there was no 135th Inf.
Division, so I presume it must have been the 135th infantry regiment.  This
was part of the 34th Infantry Division, which fought in North Africa and
Italy.  It was part of the Anzio operation, and would have spent September,
1944, approaching, breaching, and exploiting the Gothic Line.

What seems out of place with this is that Shelby Stanton's _Order of
Battle_ lists the 135 Inf. Rgt. as a Minnesota Natl. Guard Unit, and I'm
pretty certain this soldier was an Ohio native.  I figure he wouldn't have
been part of this unit when it mustered, but might perhaps have been
assigned to it as a replacement.  Does that seem reasonable?

Assuming that the 135th Rgt. is right, can anyone point me toward more
information?  Where would I go to find out exactly when and where this man
joined the regiment?

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bill Thacker             AT&T Network Systems       attmail!att!cbemf!wbt
(614) 860-5294           Columbus, Ohio              [email-masked]
                      Humpty Dumpty was pushed!

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 10:17:13 CDT
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Nimitz's hopes for a big battle in the South Pacific

John,

     Midway offered the bigger -- 4 IJN fleet carriers -- victory
opportunity without (with hindsight!) the weather/luck factor.

     My understanding of the front NW of Midway is that it is the
North Pacific air mass moving toward Alaska (with which I was intimately
acquainted in Juneau) and that that is much more stable/predictable than
the tropical air systems down near the Solomons.

     I don't mind beating this discussion to death, since I think I'm
winning it.

     Again, putting all (4) of our (CVF) eggs in one less predictable/
stable basket would have had a greater potential of mega-disaster than
our calculated risks at Midway.

Lou Coatney, WIU

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 11:26:36 EDT
From:    "William B. Thacker" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid

LTC Crane writes:

> >John Lundstrom writes:
> >
> >I agree.  If you look at an overall disposition of forces, the strategic
> >effects of the raid were zero (apart from giving the US newspapers something
> >good to write about).
> >
>
>     Those of you taking this line of argument are ignoring the facts and being
> very presentist.  I suggest you look at Ron Spector's EAGLE AGAINST THE SUN,
> page 155.  There were three key effects of the raid.  It was a tremendous
> psychological boost for the American public at a time when all news was bleak.
> It was a tremendous psychological blow to the Japanese that embarrassed the
> military and eliminated any resistance(which had been strong) to the Midway
> operation.

I think even this analysis short-changes the raid.  America wasn't the only
nation who needed a morale boost; the Japanese had also been kicking
Britain and the Commonwealth about the Pacific.  Australia was in fear for
its very existance, and China was watching her allies pushed further and
further away from being able to offer effective support.  And while the
USSR knew well that Japan intended no threat to them, we didn't know they
knew; the need to impress the USSR that America meant business must have
been great.

I wasn't alive then, but it seems to me that Doolittle's raid did more than
boost *our* confidence, it showed the entire world that America and the
Allies were not going to allow the Japanese to control the course of the
fight.  It also seems to me the exact thing needed for the benefit of our
armed forces; a retreating army's morale is lower than one that can expect
to receive orders to attack.

That's the up side.  I also feel people have been ignoring a major facet of
the down side.  I've read estimates in the hundreds of thousands for the
number of Chinese civilians killed by the Japanese in reprisal for the
raid.  That weighs heavily against any moral gains of the raid.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bill Thacker             AT&T Network Systems       attmail!att!cbemf!wbt
(614) 860-5294           Columbus, Ohio              [email-masked]
                      Humpty Dumpty was pushed!

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 10:35:52 CDT
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: Doolittle Raid boosted Allies morale?

How about it WWII-L?  We (still) have any "Allies" out there to give us
  your more expert opinion?  Ever hear of the Doolittle Raid?

(Good post, Bill.)

Lou Coatney, WIU, Macomb, IL, USA

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 10:45:38 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Nimitz's hopes for a big battle in the South Pacific

Lou,

It must not be forgotten that the Japanese had a blind sight to their
planning. They were convinced that their codes were unbreakable, that
the Americans would react according to Japanese expectations, and
that their occupation of Midway would not be discerned from the
Japanese attempt to occupy Kiska and Attu. It was this thinking that
led to their downfall.

Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 16:51:18 U
From:    Roland Hamblin EOS <[email-masked]>
Subject: FW: Timewatch - Kursk

________________________________________________________
From: Roland Hamblin EOS on Thu, Oct 7, 1993 10:52 am
Subject: Timewatch - Kursk
To: WWII-L

I videoed the program to watch at a later date, so perhaps this leads to some
comment.

If anyone would like to 'borrow' my copy, please let me know.

Roland
[email-masked]

                                             /O\
                               \______[|(.)|]______/
                                     o ++    O    ++ o
                                 Phantoms Phorever

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 15:04:43 EDT
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Query: French Paratroopers in D-Day

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  07-Oct-1993 03:04pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Query: French Paratroopers in D-Day

    I have been looking through the Cornelius Ryan Collection here to
    provide information for a TV production company working on a two hour
    documentary which will be broadcast on the Discovery Channel on the
    50th anniversary of the OVERLORD invasion.

    While reading a Ryan manuscript entitled "D-Day Plus 20" I ran across
    something new to me and possibly significant.  He claimed he learned
    since writing his book _The Longest Day_ that 32 groups (seven men and
    one officer in each group) of Frenchmen were parachuted into France
    that day to hook up with the Underground between Brittany and Paris.
    They were carrying a great deal of explosives and other material with
    the intention of delaying German troop movements to the beachhead,
    especially the rail system which required paralysis for at least 15
    days.  Ryan does not cite any sources.

    I have long been aware of the OSS Jedborogh (sp?) operations whereby
    agents were dropped to the Underground for much the same reason.  But,
    I never heard of 256 Frenchmen being dropped as well.  Has anyone out
    there heard of this operation?  What sources might there be to confirm
    such a drop?  If this operation did happen, what was the result?  Was
    it a British or American fronted operation?

    From the context of Ryan's manuscript I wonder if these were dropped
    very early on D-Day and might have been the first to land, adding a new
    wrinkle to the old argument of who was the first to hit the Continent -
    a Brit or a Yank.  Since we're playing with the Carpetbaggers at the
    moment, could the 8th's special unit acted as the delivery system?

    BTW, I found in a file on a soldier in the 1st Division a group of
    photo negs which have been unknown all these years and unpublished.
    There are several shots of Gen. Wyman and another officer at the
    embarkation point.  Also safely in England are shots of one of the
    made-famous-by-Ryan London Fire Brigade ladders topped with BARs for
    use in the Pointe-du-Hoc attack.  Perhaps the most interesting are two
    shots, taken from a prone position - one to the left and one to the
    right, of Omaha Beach Easy Red sometime after H+110.  It is well known
    that most of the photos taken during the early part of the landings
    that day were destroyed by a careless photo lab person in England.
    That, I believe, makes the above described photos very rare.  Also in
    the same file are original carbon copies of messages written by Wyman
    to be radioed to the command ship.  One pleads for the H+215 wave to be
    sent in immediately.  An earlier message reports the situation confused
    and serious.

    Ah, archives work is so fun.

    Doug McCabe
    [email-masked]

Received:  07-Oct-1993 03:04pm

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 15:02:20 LCL
From:    Tom Shirhall <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid boosted Allies morale?

Date: Wed, 06 Oct 1993 17:09:33
From: tshirhal (Tom Shirhall)
To: [email-masked]([email-masked])
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid
Message-ID: <QCB3340E@tshirhall-pc>

Date: Wed, 06 Oct 1993 17:04:00
From: tshirhal (Tom Shirhall)
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid
Message-ID: <QCB332C1@tshirhall-pc>
In-Reply-To: <[email-masked]>

LTC Con Crane said
>     Those of you taking this line of argument are ignoring the facts and
>being very presentist. It was a tremendous psychological boost for the
>American public at a time when all news was bleak.

I was nine at this time. It may be news to you, but we weren't sure
that we were going to win the war. Submarines were sinking U.S. ships
in sight of the U.S. mainland. Germany was chewing up the Soviet Union,
Fortress Europa seemed impregnable, and Australia appeared to be going the
way of Singapore. We were saving animal fat in cans, old tires, tinfoil,
and growing Victory Gardens. Cigarettes, meat, and gasoline were rationed,
and their were no civilian goods being manufactured.

First came the raid, then Midway, and then Guadalcanal, and things started
to look brighter.

Tom Shirhall            [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 14:46:04 -0400
From:    "Dennis E. Sparks" <[email-masked]>
Subject: (Old topic) Luftwaffe organization

While reading Donald L. Caldwell's book "JG 26: Top Guns of the
Luftwaffe" (ISBN 0-8041-1050-6), I ran across some information
that someone had asked for a few weeks ago, the organization of
the Luftwaffe in WWII.  Having deleted the original post, I've
elected to post it to the entire list.

The Germans experimented with formations of three fighter aircraft
(kette) during the Spanish Civil War.  They abandoned this in
favor of a four plane element, the schwarm, composed of two pairs,
or rotte.  (The RAF started the war with four three-plane elements
making up a squadron, but converted to six pairs.)

A Jagdstaffel consisted of three schwarm, or twelve aircraft, at
the start of WWII, but was increased to four schwarm in 1943.
(A staffel would be the equivalent of a USAAF squadron.)

A Jagdgruppe (JGr) was comprised of three or four Staffeln, plus
a Stab, or staff flight, and therefore 40-68 aircraft. (Equivalent
to a USAAF group.)

Three or four gruppen formed a Jagdgeschwader (JG), with 124-208
aircraft.

Four JG formed a Jagdfliegerfuehrer, or Jafue; a fighter command,
which was attached to a Luftflotte, the equivalent of a numbered
US air force.  A Luftflotte could also contain heavy fighter units,
Zerstoerergeschwader (ZG), usually with Bf 110s; bomber units, or
Kampfgeschwader (KG) with Ju 88s, He 111s, Do 217s; and attack or
dive bomber units, Stukageschwader (StG).

Note that all of the quantites of aircraft quoted were authorized
strengths, not actual strengths.  Luftwaffe units were chronically
understaffed and underequipped, with shortages becoming more acute
as the war progressed.

Dennis E. Sparks
[email-masked]
Lexington, Kentucky

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 14:12:27 -0500
From:    John Lundstrom <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Nimitz's hopes for a big battle in the South Pacific

Lou,
        If you would have preferred fighting with the odds Fletcher and
Spruance faced in June at Midway than what Halsey with four carriers
would have enjoyed in early May in the Coral Sea, then my hat is off
to you. Your more stable air front at Midway slipped down over the island
on 10 June and completely socked the place in; a couple of planes were
lost due to bad weather.
        Too often the real freak nature of the American victory at Midway
is under-estimated. Midway is far different than the other 1942 carrier
battles. In no other battle were the Americans able to sink Japanese carriers
by bombs alone; that is because in all instances they caught the Japanese
with armed and fueled planes on deck. For Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz,
I recommend seeing my book The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign, which
the Naval Institute is releasing next month.

John Lundstrom - Milwaukee Public Museum

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 15:35:18 EDT
From:    "William B. Thacker" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Mother of All Battles - Kursk

Richard Kirby writes an excellent summary of the BBC program (thanks,
Richard!)
>
> At Stalingrad the German Army suffered their first major defeat -
> 91000 6th Army soldiers taken prisoner, with < 10% seeing Germany
> again. But the Germans soon rallied and attacked again under von
> Mansteins leadership, decimating three soviet armies, and recapturing
> Kharkov (the 4th largest city).
>
> Von Manstein's ADC during '42-'44 is still alive, and was interviewed.
> He said that Hitler had made a mistake in forcing von Manstein to stop
> this succesful offensive, his second major mistake since letting the
> BEF off the hook at Dunkirk. He claimed Hitler was obsessed with
> numbers, production figures, and new technology. He thought in
> quantities, and wanted to wait for new tanks and then have a gigantic
> tank battle to eliminate the salient at Kursk, and cutting the main
> rail link between the North and the South.

This doesn't sound right, to me.  First, I thought Manstein's
counteroffensive, aka "the Miracle on the Donetz," aka his "backhand blow,"
was stopped by the onset of the spring thaw.  Hitler's meddling, as I
understood, came later; Manstein wanted to resume the attack as soon as the
ground was firm, but Hitler kept delaying the battle while bringing in more
forces and waiting for the Panthers to be ready.  I've read Manstein's
memoirs... perhaps I'm misremembering this?

I would offer that it's entirely melodramatic for the ADC to suggest that
any decision regarding Kursk was Hitler's "second major mistake since...
Dunkirk."  Hitler's moves re: Guderian's panzerkorps during the Barbarossa
offensive were more important decisions and had greater impact on the
course of the war.  The outcome on the Eastern front had already been
decided before the battle of Kursk began; all that remained to be
determined was the timetable.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bill Thacker             AT&T Network Systems       attmail!att!cbemf!wbt
(614) 860-5294           Columbus, Ohio              [email-masked]
                      Humpty Dumpty was pushed!

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 15:30:33 EST
From:    Crane Conrad LTC <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid

Bill Thacker writes of the Doolittle Raid:
>That's the up side.  I also feel people have been ignoring a major facet of
>the down side.  I've read estimates in the hundreds of thousands for the
>number of Chinese civilians killed by the Japanese in reprisal for the
>raid.  That weighs heavily against any moral gains of the raid.

Bill, I don't understand your logic.  Perhaps if we had known about the retalia
tions that the raid would bring,that might lessen the moral impact, but we cann
ot be held responsible for unexpected enemy excesses in response to military ac
tions.  Besides, I think your numbers are considerably exaggerated.  As far as
I know, the response of the Japanese Army in China was to conduct a campaign to
 eliminate possible air base areas instead of a considered program of retaliati
on.  That's based on what Toland says.  Even so, blaming us for any atrocities
in response to the raid is like blaming the Allies who fought to free Kuwait fo
r the fact that Saddam Hussein destroyed Kuwait's oil wells.

                                                  Con Crane

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 15:27:19 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid boosted Allies morale?

Lou,

The Doolittle raid was a propaganda victory for this country. There
is no doubt about it. It forced the Japanese to maintain substantial
air forces at home to prevent a reoccurrence, and, in a tactical
sense, it forced them to move up their timetables which led to the
Coral Sea and Midway battles.

I don't think General Doolittle had the slightest inkling of the
repercussions that his raid would and did have on the Japanese
Empire. His sole purpose was to prove to the American public that,
despite the somber news of the war at that stage, America still had
the capacity and will to project its fighting power all the way to
the heart of the Jap Empire. Everything else that transpired was of
secondary importance, at least from the standpoint of the Doolittle
raiders.

Any rebuttals?

Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 17:04:55 CDT
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: Have we examined/discussed/critiqued Con Crane's book yet?

Has anyone seen Con's new book on the history of U.S. bombing campaigns yet?

Lou Coatney, WIU

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 17:33:55 CDT
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid boosted Allies morale?

No rebuttals, Terry.  I thought you and I were in agreement.

Lou

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 7 Oct 1993 17:39:17 CDT
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doolittle Raid -- Provocation atrocities

Maybe it wasn't such a good post, Bill.  Did you say THAT?

Are you really saying that the harder we fought the war, the more we were
  provoking -- justifying? -- atrocities?

Lou Coatney, WIU

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 6 Oct 1993 to 7 Oct 1993
***********************************************