Subject: WWII-L Digest - 11 Nov 1993 to 12 Nov 1993

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 13 Nov 1993 00:00:29 -0500

There are 34 messages totalling 1247 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. PTO movies
  2. RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment (14)
  3. USAAF 12 NOV 43
  4. Shuttle Bases In USSR
  5. REF Re: Navajo code-talkers
  6. RAF vs USAAF/ Me ??? Nightfighters
  7. Navajo code-talkers (2)
  8. Guy Sajer
  9. GEN RE: WWII movies
 10. Veterans' Day, 1993. (2)
 11. USAAF 13-14 NOV 43
 12. tank naming
 13. David Irving
 14. US tank naming
 15. REF/Re: West Point Card Catalog
 16. "Hoax of the Twentieth Century"
 17. "In Harm's Way" ??!!
 18. Robert Clary speech
 19. Veteran's Day

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 11 Nov 1993 20:57:28 CST
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: PTO movies

I(

I'll go with THIN RED LINE, TORA x 3, TASK FORCE (the one with Gary Cooper
  as the naval air officer, anyway), and FATHER GOOSE!!

Lou Coatney, WIU

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 12:02:18 +0200
From:    Chris Scogings <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

>From Lou Coatney

>Extenuating considerations on behalf of British "area bombing:"
>[stuff deleted]

Lou, I agree with your reasons here, but it all sounds a bit weak, doesn't
it.  "They bombed us so we'll bomb them" is not the most defensible argument
- esp. against the USAAF reasons of accuracy, minimising civilian
casualties, etc.  There must be something else....

Chris
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Scogings                      Voice: (27) 331 955645
Computer Science Dept                 Fax: (27) 331 955599
University of Natal
Pietermaritzburg                   E-Mail:[email-masked]
----------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 07:18:25 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: USAAF 12 NOV 43

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
FRIDAY, 12 NOVEMBER 1943
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss

CENTRAL PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Seventh Air Force): HQ 30th Bombardment
Group (Heavy) and it's 38th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) transfer from Hickam
Field and Kahuku, Territory of Hawaii respectively to Nanumea Island in the
Ellice Islands with B-24's. The 38th will fly it's first mission on 16 Nov.
  The air echelon of the 26th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 11th Bombardment
Group (Heavy), based on Nukufetau Island in the Ellice Islands begins
operating from Canton Island in the Phoenix Islands with B-24's. The squadron
will fly it's first mission on 14 Nov.
  The 819th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 30th Bombardment Group (Heavy),
transfers from Barking Sands to Wheeler Field, Territory of Hawaii with
B-24's. The 819th supplies the group with replacement crews and aircraft.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 2 B-24's mine the Rangoon River
during the night of 12/13 Nov.

  CHINA (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 10 B-25's and 24 P-40's attack
Yoyang, hitting the warehouse area, railroad yards, and AA positions; 5 B-25's
bomb the Yangchi Kang waterfront area and attack waterfront targets at Puchi;
6 B-25's and 12 fighters hit targets at Yoyang; 15 P-40's and a B-25 on armed
reconnaissance hit several targets of opportunity in the Lungling area and
between Yang-Chia-Kang and Sichai.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): HQ Ninth Air Force issues Tables of
Organization for the IX Fighter Command, authorizing 2 air support divisions,
5 fighter wings, 1 reconnaissance group, 21 fighter groups, and 65 fighter
squadrons. 3 combat wings are activated for the IX Bomber Command: the 97th
Combat Bombardment Wing (Medium) at Marks Hall which will control light bomber
groups; the 98th Combat Bombardment Wing (Medium), formerly the 3d Bombardment
Wing, at Earls Colne; and the 99th Combat Bombardment Wing (Medium), formerly
the 44th Bombardment Wing (Heavy), at Great Dunmow.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): In Italy, B-26's attack railroad
bridges and tracks in the Montalto di Castro and Orbetello areas, but heavy
cloud cover prevents effective hits on the targets. P-38's fly an air-sea
rescue patrol off the mouth of the Semeni River in Albania.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, Northwest African
Tactical Bomber Force (NATBF) light bombers hit guns, troops, and railway
facilities near Palena, the town of Atina, and the road at Acquafondata.
Medium bombers hit the Berat/Kucove airfield and an oil refinery in Albania
after failing to locate targets near Athens, Greece. In Italy during the night
of 12/13 Nov, light bombers attack the Arezzo marshalling yard and Perugia
airfield; fighter-bombers of the XII Air Support Command and Royal Air Force
(RAF) Desert Air Force (DAF) continue to provide close support to the US Fifth
and British Eighth Armies, blasting gun positions and motor transport, and
also attacking targets (aircraft, guns, rail yards, bridge, and trains) around
Bracciano Lake, Orbetello, Rieti, Sant'Elia Fiumerapido, Opuzen, Ancona, and
Iesi.

SOUTH PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Thirteenth Air Force): On Bougainville
Island in the Solomon Islands, 18 B-25's bomb Tarlena; 6 others bomb the
Matchin Bay area; and 8 P-38's strafe Bonis airfield.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Fifth Air Force): In New Guinea,
B-25's and B-26's bomb villages between Finschhafen and Saidor. B-24's attack
targets on Java and on Amboina Island in the Moluccas Islands. On this date,
following a series of damaging allied strikes, the Japanese remove their
carrier aircraft from Rabaul, New Britain Island, which afterwards ceases to
be a serious threat to Allied forces.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 07:37:59 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Shuttle Bases In USSR

Several days ago, someone asked about the bases in the USSR used by
the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Force heavy bombers on shuttle raids
from England and Italy respectively.  I had some time last night
and I found three bases in the Ukraine listed for the missions
during the summer/fall of 1944.  According to my atlas, all three
are essentially on a straight line running SSE from Kiev.  The
bombers used Mirgorod, 130 miles (208 km) SSE of Kiev, and Poltava,
200 miles (320 km) SSE of Kiev.  The escorting US fighters used
Piryatin, 80 miles (128 km) SSE of Kiev.  (All distances are
approximate!)

Hope this helps.  I am also trying to determine if any Polish areas
were targetted in 1945 but it may take some time to complete this
review.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 10:02:35 -0330
From:    Shawn Kenny <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

>
> >From Lou Coatney
>
> >Extenuating considerations on behalf of British "area bombing:"
> >[stuff deleted]
>
> Lou, I agree with your reasons here, but it all sounds a bit weak, doesn't
> it.  "They bombed us so we'll bomb them" is not the most defensible argument
> - esp. against the USAAF reasons of accuracy, minimising civilian
> casualties, etc.  There must be something else....

Although I do not profess to have great knowledge in this area I agree
that there must be something else.. and I think it would be the
availability of long range fighters to escort the bombers which would be
essential for daylight raids.  Also, not untill the Germans developed the
Me-?? night fighter did they encounter any major losses - the losses were
still great but it is must be viewed on a comparative basis.
Incidentally, what was the difference in accuracy between day and night
bombing raids?

--
"Life is full of surprises, but never when you need one."
                        [email-masked] St. John's, NF Canada

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 08:46:19 -0500
From:    "Sidney W. Kitchel" <[email-masked]>
Subject: REF Re: Navajo code-talkers

        This is a follow-up to the question seeking info. about the
Navajo Code Talkers. Here are the two books I have:

        Doris A. Paul, _The Navajo Code Talkers_, Pittsburgh: Dorrance
                Publishing Co., [1973].  ISBN: 0-8059-1870-1
                (I bought this at the Information Center at Canyon de
                 Chelly National Monument.)

        Kenji Kawano, _Warriors: Navajo Code Talkers_, [Flagstaff]:
                Northland Publishing Company, [1990].
                ISBN: 0-87358-513-5

The inventor of the NCT idea was Philip Johnston, who at age 4 moved
with his missionary parents to the Navajo Reservation. Philip grew up
speaking Navajo and sold the Marine Corps on the idea of using Navajos
as talkers.
                                                        --Sid
--
Sidney W. Kitchel           [email-masked], [email-masked]
Data Parallel Systems, Inc.  ============||  DPSI  ||===============
4617 E. Morningside Drive                             (812) 334-8100
Bloomington, Indiana,  47408  USA               FAX:  (812) 334-8121

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 09:02:36 EST
From:    Mike Long <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF/ Me ??? Nightfighters

On Fri, 12 Nov 1993 10:02:35 -0330 Shawn Kenny said:
>essential for daylight raids.  Also, not untill the Germans developed the
>Me-?? night fighter did they encounter any major losses - the losses were

This leads me to ask which of Germany's nightfighter types was the most
successful. Me110? Ju88? I know they used Me110s Me210s Me262s Ju88s; what
other types were used? Who was the most successful nightfighter pilot?

Mike Long
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
196 AUDITORIUM ROAD, U-138    |   BITNET: [email-masked]
STORRS, CONNECTICUT, USA      | INTERNET: [email-masked]
                   06269-3138 |    PHONE: (203) 486-1352

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 08:39:23 -0600
From:    Glenn Millard <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

If I remember past books I have read the British tried daylight bombing for
a short while and determined it was too costly, the Battle of Britian was
also a good example. That is one of the main reasons they switched to night
bombing. Because of the inaccuracy of night bombing they aimed at cities,
industrial cities mainly. The industry consists not only of the buildings
but also the people that work there.
The British also tried to convince the USAAF to give up daylight bombing and
help them with night bombing. However, USAAF leaders were confident with
their aircraft and the Norden bombsight and would not give up their
concept.
One consideration to include is how much commitment the German air force
had to make to counter daylight and night bombing. I am sure the daylight
commitment was much greater than that to night bombing. In the long-term,
daylight bombing did more to bring down the Luftwaffe than night bombing
ever did. Agree with this or disagree?

Glenn Millard
Academic Computing
Stephen F. Austin State University
Internet: [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 09:46:21 EST
From:    Charles Reace <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

> Incidentally, what was the difference in accuracy between day and night
> bombing raids?

I have heard numbers suggesting that the circular error probable (CEP),
which is the radius at which 50% of the bombs would be within from the
target point was on the order of *two miles* for the British night
bombing attacks.  As bad as this sounds, the US *precision* daylight
bombing supposedly had a CEP of about 1 mile.

I'm quoting these numbers off the cuff from hearsay.  Does anybody have
any reliable numbers on this, preferably not from USAAF/RAF studies, but
some relatively independent source?

  __|  __|  __|  |  Charles Reace <[email-masked]>
_|   _|   _|     |
 |       | |     |  Computer Sciences Corp., Integrated Systems Div.
 ___|____/ ___|  |  304 W. Rte. 38, Moorestown, NJ 08057

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 15:37:46 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

> A student friend of mine has been tasked with defending in a debate
> the RAF's heavy bombardment tactics in Europe, while others in the
> class will defend the USAAF's tactics.  I suggested to him that he
> should be prepared to discuss target selection, bombing tonnage and
> accuracy, civilian casualties and effect on morale, and aircraft
> defensive capabilities and loss rates.  He has a week or two to
> prepare for the debate.

* The British flew at night because they had experienced heavy losses at
  day. This was correct. The U.S. belief that bombers like the B-17 and
  B-24 could defend themselves was entirely mistaken. No long-range escort
  fighters were available at the time.

* The British nor the US offensive had much effect on the German
  production, until late in 1944. The greater accuracy of day bombardments
  was wasted because of the problems with the identificantion and
  selection of targets.
  Typical are the Schweinfurt and Regensburg raids, that were planned
  on incorrect information: these factories were important but not
  essential.

* The British bombers carried more and heavier bombs than the US ones. At
  a cost per bomb weight basis, the British offensive was more effective.
  The heavy armament carried by the USAAF day bombers contributed to
  restrict their bomb load.

* Night flying did not require close formations. When the low-level
  marking technique was introduced late in the war, this allowed night
  bombardments to be more precise than high-level daylight attacks.

* Night attacks allowed a better use of the Allied superiority in radar
  development. Twin-engined night fighters with a crew of two or three
  and radar equipment were most costly to the German war effort than
  single-seat day fighters.

Any other ideas?

Emmanuel.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 09:49:47 -0500
From:    "M. Joseph Barone" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Navajo code-talkers

"Sidney W. Kitchel" <[email-masked]> writes:
> ... They [Cherokee communicators] were used in Italy
> to foil German wiretaps of US tactical phone lines. As far as I know,
> the Thunderbird Div.'s use did not involve inventing an actual code.
> They merely put a Cherokee speaker on each end of the phone line and let
> them give details in Tsa-la-gi. Both the Germans and Japanese
> apparently found breaking this system impossible.

        Does the US military still consider the various Amerind languages
as secure or was this practice ended with WWII?

        Also, I should mention that I have been receiving multiple copies
of Sid's messages.  The only differences are in the header fields.  Is
there a runaway mailer at DPSI.COM?  Thanks.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
To a New Yorker like you, a hero is some kind of weird
sandwich, not some nut who takes on three Tigers!

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 09:40:54 CST-6CDT
From:    "Walter Bell, U. of North Texas" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Guy Sajer

Many thanks to Bill Huber, Barrett Lowe, and Terry Moore for their
help on my questions about Guy Sajer. The Patron went away happy.
Thanks again!

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 08:42:00 CDT
From:    Roger Safian <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GEN RE: WWII movies

Greetings,

    I'd have to say my favorite PTO movie is "Bataan".  (I hope that's
the title...shouldn't do this without coffee!)  It's the story of
a rag-tag group of US service me trying to hold off the Japanese
advance.  As a historical movie, it's so-so at best, but as a period
piece, it's classic.  I can see where this one would really get everyone
to buy an extra Victory stamp or bond on the way out of the theatre.

    Another one, along the same lines, is "Know your enemy - Japan".
Here's a movie, put together by Frank Capra and the U.S. government,
that gives a nice, even handed, strictly neutral, view of the war.

                                          NOT!!!

                                                   Roger

P.S.

    Yes, they are both out on video.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 10:57:13 EST
From:    Crane Conrad LTC <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

>>
>> >From Lou Coatney
>>
>> >Extenuating considerations on behalf of British "area bombing:"
>> >[stuff deleted]
>>
>> Lou, I agree with your reasons here, but it all sounds a bit weak, doesn't
>> it.  "They bombed us so we'll bomb them" is not the most defensible argument
>> - esp. against the USAAF reasons of accuracy, minimising civilian
>> casualties, etc.  There must be something else....
>
>Although I do not profess to have great knowledge in this area I agree
>that there must be something else.. and I think it would be the
>availability of long range fighters to escort the bombers which would be
>essential for daylight raids.  Also, not untill the Germans developed the
>Me-?? night fighter did they encounter any major losses - the losses were
>still great but it is must be viewed on a comparative basis.
>Incidentally, what was the difference in accuracy between day and night
>bombing raids?
>
>
>
>--
>"Life is full of surprises, but never when you need one."
>                        [email-masked] St. John's, NF Canada

The issue of accuracy in WWII bombing is a complicated one.  Early in the war
the RAF was appalled to find that most of their bombs were falling five miles
or more from aiming points.  While they achieved remarkable accuracy on some
Mosquito raids, RAF results were never close to American bombing.  But AAF
bombing was not putting ordnance down smokestacks either.  Units bombing in
formation with settings to disperse bombs up to 400 feet apart usually hit
their aiming point, but the bombs also obliterated wide areas.  In general, the
AAF over Europe did the best they good with the technology available.  In
Williamson Murray's words, "Precision Bombing was, and is, a sledgehammer not a
rapier."  Despite press releases to the contrary, AAF leaders knew the
limitations of their accuracy.  In 1941, American experts expected to get 40%
of bombs within 1500 feet of targets.  By 1945, they were getting 44% within
1000 feet of targets, and 73% within 2000 feet.  Considering flak, fighters,
weather, smokescreens, and chance, that's really pretty good. But it is not
pinpoint.
                                        LTC Con Crane
                                        USMA

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 18:06:37 +0200
From:    Chris Scogings <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

Extracts from The Designer Notes of the simulation game "Luftwaffe"
produced by the Avalon Hill Games Company:

USAAF         (European Theatre Only)   RAF
-----                                   ---
1,461,864     Tons of bombs dropped     1,235,609
  754,818     Bomber sorties flown        687,462
  991,750     Fighter sorties flown     1,695,049 (incl. Battle of Britain)
    9,949     Bombers lost                 11,965
    8,420     Fighters lost                10,045
    7,177     Max. bomber strength          6,956
    6,203     Max. fighter strength         7,728

Most USAAF bomber losses occurred in 1942/1943.
Most RAF bomber losses occurred in 1943/1944.

Greatest losses in a single mission:
------------------------------------
USAAF: Schweinfurt Aug 17 1943, 60 bombers lost, 100 damaged.
       Schweinfurt Oct 14 1943, 62 bombers lost,  53 damaged.
RAF:   Nuremberg   Mar 30 1944, 107 bombers lost, 59 damaged.

Accuracy
--------
USAAF: 31% of bombs were dropped within 1,000 feet of the target.
RAF:   40% of bombs were dropped within   425 feet of the target.

(It is important to note that a "target" for the USAAF was usually a
 building, eg: a factory.  The "target" for the RAF was a CITY!!!
 - I kid you not.)

There's a bit more of this stuff if anyone wants it.

Chris
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Chris Scogings                      Voice: (27) 331 955645
Computer Science Dept                 Fax: (27) 331 955599
University of Natal
Pietermaritzburg                   E-Mail:[email-masked]
----------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 08:07:28 PST
From:    Alan Hepburn <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Veterans' Day, 1993.

Lou Coatney writes:

"A nice post, Larry, even for those of us who only defended the Ft. Bliss
  Post Laundry with our very lives, Christmas Eve, 1967.

So why am I working?"

We veterans in the private sector are required to work on OUR day
so we can pay taxes to support the non-veterans in the public
sector who see this as an opportunity for a long weekend.  Some
of the people who get a holiday don't even know why they get the
holiday; it's just another day off to them...

---

Alan Hepburn     "If history repeats itself, and the unexpected always happens,
National Semiconductor   how incapable must Man be of learning from experience.
Santa Clara, Ca
[email-masked]                              George Bernard Shaw

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 08:46:13 PST
From:    Peter Trott <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

>>From Lou Coatney
>>
>>Extenuating considerations on behalf of British "area bombing:"
>>[stuff deleted]
>
> Lou, I agree with your reasons here, but it all sounds a bit weak, doesn't
> it.  "They bombed us so we'll bomb them" is not the most defensible argument
> - esp. against the USAAF reasons of accuracy, minimising civilian
> casualties, etc.  There must be something else....

What I hear Lou saying (see him typing?) is that the British felt no
compunction about tossing aside the Marquis of Queensberry rules, when
their opponent in the ring was taking every opportunity to knee them
in the metaphorical groin.

The British night-bombing of German cities bouyed the spirits of the
British populace in the same way that Doolittle's raid on Japan bouyed
the spirits of the U.S. populace.  It was getting back at the enemy
"in kind" for what they had done to us.  And justice was on our side,
because they had done it first.

Peter Trott ([email-masked])

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 12:04:55 EST
From:    Charles Reace <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

> [Glenn Millard] . .  . In the long-term,
> daylight bombing did more to bring down the Luftwaffe than night bombing
> ever did. Agree with this or disagree?

I would agree that by '44-'45 this was so, but when the British went to
night bombing it was the USAAF bombers who were being brought down by the
Luftwaffe.  As the P-47's showed up with their drop tanks, it started be-
coming dangerous for the German fighters, and when the P-51 joined the
fray along with improved tactics, it was downright dangerous to respond
to the US bombing attacks.  But don't forget the impact the Spitfires and
Yaks made on the attrition of experienced German pilots!

By the way, there's an interesting book out by a British night fighter
pilot (I think it's called _Night_Fighter_ ) which discusses both the
interception of German bombers, and later in the war flying with the
British bomber streams as night escort.

  __|  __|  __|  |  Charles Reace <[email-masked]>
_|   _|   _|     |
 |       | |     |  Computer Sciences Corp., Integrated Systems Div.
 ___|____/ ___|  |  304 W. Rte. 38, Moorestown, NJ 08057

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 12:34:31 EST
From:    "Denis Ouellette, Indiana Univ" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

One point to keep in mind is the relatively smaller size bombs and
bomb loads dropped by US bombers.  Being on target doesn't help much
if the munition isn't having much impact. (This point was made previosly
with respect to the fact that the Germans found that many factories hit
sustained only damage to the structure but most of the machine tools were
left untouched - the reason - the inadequate 500 pound bombs used by the
USSAF)

Denis Ouellette

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 14:21:23 -0500
From:    "Sidney W. Kitchel" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Navajo code-talkers

M. Joseph Barone writes:
|->
|-> "Sidney W. Kitchel" <[email-masked]> writes:
|-> > ... They [Cherokee communicators] were used in Italy
|-> > to foil German wiretaps of US tactical phone lines. As far as I know,
|-> > the Thunderbird Div.'s use did not involve inventing an actual code.
|-> > They merely put a Cherokee speaker on each end of the phone line and let
|-> > them give details in Tsa-la-gi. Both the Germans and Japanese
|-> > apparently found breaking this system impossible.
|->
|->         Does the US military still consider the various Amerind languages
|-> as secure or was this practice ended with WWII?

        I have not heard of their use recently. Anyone know stories
from Korea and Vietnam?? I would think that they are relatively secure
even today for tactical messages. However, I'd guess that US forces
rely more on electronic scrambling of tactical messages.

|->         Also, I should mention that I have been receiving multiple copies
|-> of Sid's messages.  The only differences are in the header fields.  Is
|-> there a runaway mailer at DPSI.COM?  Thanks.

        Possible. But more likely it was the famous Sid error. I
wasn't receiving my own messages sent to the list because of a machine
down at IU, so I resent some messages.
                                                        --Sid
--
Sidney W. Kitchel           [email-masked], [email-masked]
Data Parallel Systems, Inc.  ============||  DPSI  ||===============
4617 E. Morningside Drive                             (812) 334-8100
Bloomington, Indiana,  47408  USA               FAX:  (812) 334-8121

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 15:11:49 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: USAAF 13-14 NOV 43

                  COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

SATURDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 1943

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  Beaufighter, Bristol
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  P-70, Douglas

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ZONE OF INTERIOR: HQ AAF issues an order redesignating Reconnaissance
Squadrons as Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons.

CENTRAL PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Seventh Air Force): The air attack for
Operation GALVANIC (the assault on the Gilbert Islands) begins. 18 B-24's from
Funafuti Atoll in the Ellice Islands bomb Tarawa Atoll in the Gilbert Islands;
1 B-24 is lost.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, a single B-24 mines the Rangoon
River during the night of 13/14 Nov.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): VIII Bomber Command Mission 130: 79
of 159 B-17's, 61 of 109 B-24's and 3 of 4 B-17 PFF aircraft hit the port area
at Bremen and targets of opportunity in the Kiel-Flensburg area at 1120-1145
hours; 100+ aircraft abort the mission due to weather; they claim 20-14-13
Luftwaffe aircraft; 3 B-17's and 13 B-24's are lost; 3 B-17's and 3 B-24's are
damaged beyond repair and 12 B-17's and 10 B-24's are damaged; casualties are
21 KIA, 26 WIA and 162 MIA. The bombers are escorted by 45 P-38's (all the way
to the target) and 345 P-47's; they claim 10-3-6 Luftwaffe aircraft; 7 P-38's
and 3 P-47's are lost; 2 P-38's are damaged beyond repair; 5 P-38's and 2
P-47's are damaged; casualties are 9 MIA.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): HQ 354th Fighter Group and it's 353d,
355th and 356th Fighter Squadrons transfer from Greenham Common to Boxted,
England with P-51's. They will fly their first mission on 1 Dec.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Weather limits operations to
air-sea rescue patrols which are hampered by overcast.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, Northwest African
Tactical Bomber Force (NATBF) light bombers hit Palena and Atina and later
bomb Civitavecchia harbor and a road W of Terracina; XII Air Support Command
fighter-bombers, along with Royal Air Force (RAF) Desert Air Force (DAF)
airplanes, bomb Giulianova harbor and shipping, roads leading to the battle
zone, and landing grounds of Aquino, Frosinone, and Marcigliana; fighters hit
train and trucks in the Pescara-Rieti area.

SOUTH PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Thirteenth Air Force): In the Solomon
Islands, 17 B-24's pound AA positions, dispersal areas, and runway at Bonis
airfield on Bougainville Island. 6 B-25's carry out a low-level raid on the
airfield on Buka Island. Night fighters harass the Shortland Island and Kahili
and Bonis airfields on Bougainville, claiming 4 grounded airplanes destroyed
at the latter.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Fifth Air Force): In New Guinea,
nearly 120 B-24's and B-25's pound Alexishafen, and P-40's strafe the area.
Other B-24's hit Gasmata Island off New Britain Island and Kaukenau and
Timoeka, New Guinea. B-25's and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Beaufighters
claim the sinking of a small freighter off Tanimbar Island in the Moluccas
Islands.

SUNDAY, 14 NOVEMBER 1943

CENTRAL PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Seventh Air Force): 9 B-24's from
Nukufetau Island in the Ellice Islands bomb Tarawa Atoll in the Gilbert
Islands; 9 from Nanumea Island in the Ellice Islands hit Mille Atoll in the
Caroline Islands.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): NATBF) B-25's, escorted by
Fifteenth Air Force P-38's, bomb the Sofia, Bulgaria marshalling yard; the
P-38's claim 5 enemy aircraft destroyed. In Italy, XII Air Support Command
operations are curtailed by weather, and only battle area patrols are flown;
RAF DAF fighter-bombers hit trains on the E coast of Italy near Avezzano,
along the Dalmatian coast SE of Metkovic, Yugoslavia, and at Sarajevo,
Yugoslavia; fighters strafe the airfields at Furbara and Tarquinia, Italy.
  The 428th Bombardment Squadron (Medium), 310th Bombardment Group (Medium),
ceases operating from Oudna and returns to it's base at Menzel Temime, Tunisia
with B-25's.

SOUTH PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Thirteenth Air Force): In the Solomon
Islands, P-70 night fighters hit the Shortland Island-Faisi Island area,
claiming a seaplane and 2 barges destroyed.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC THEATER OF OPERATIONS (Fifth Air Force): B-25's attack a
supply and bivouac area W of Sio, New Guinea.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 15:21:59 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: tank naming

In your message you write:
>>...why name them after generals...?
>
>        From what I remember reading about British habits in naming their
>vehicles, the pattern depended on the tank's role.  Recon, or real armor.
>The pattern I recall involved light to medium tanks with C names: Cromwell,
>Crusader and Comet.  The Churchill obviously doesn't fit here, but that may
>have been a popular rather than official designation.
>
>        As for the "Wolverine" that was a TD and not a tank.  What I'd like to
>know, is why the British came up with "Priest" and "Bishop" for self-propelled
>guns?
>
>                                        Richard Kaplan
>
>My vote for better movie about the PTO is the one with Jimmy Cagney portraying
>Admiral Halsey; but I forget the title (is it Above and Beyond)?
>
>I also like the John Wayne pic about Frank "Spig" Wead; has eagles in the
>title.
>
Richard,

The John Wayne movie about Frank "Spig" Wead was, I believe,
called "Wings of Eagles."  Good movie!!

Jim Irwin
Defense Personnel Support Center
Philadelphia PA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 14:23:08 -0600
From:    WILLIAM HUBER - SCDR <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: David Irving

In Terry Moore's message he says:
>
> I was aware that David Irving was regarded as a radical of the right,
> but I wasn't  aware that he had "flipped out", as this article
> suggests. I can't believe that he has taken that position! :-(. I
> have read several of his books, and have been most impressed with his
> research, particularly those of his earlier works.
>
> However, with regard to David Irving, I can't believe that he has
> fallen so low and into such disrepute. The German Government is right
> to ask him to leave the country, and his adherence to such an
> attitude is a disgrace to all concerned, and it does no honor to his
> credentials.

Hi folks,

First let me say that this topic is covered regularly and well
on alt.revisionism and there is an excellent archive for anyone
wanting additional data on Irving available through Ken McVay.  He
runs a listserver at oneb.almanac.bc.ca that contains this archive.
You can reach him directly at [email-masked] and he can get
you into the archive.

Having said that, I'll add that Irving has been sued in German court
and fined for his calling the gas chamber at Auschwitz an "attrape"
(mock up).  A German law forbids denying the holocaust and he was hit
with a 15,000 DM (as I recall) fine for his public comments.  He
appealed the decision and the judge hearing the appeal quadrupled the
fine (yea! Justice prevails!).   Last I heard he was forbidden from
entering Germany but would sneak across the boarder from Austria to
attend rallies of neo-nazis where he is quite well thought of.

His position, as I understand it, is that Hitler was not aware of any
attempts at murdering the Jews of Europe and he bases that opinion on
the lack of any document signed by Hitler ordering executions.  He
also says that there were no gas chambers at Auschwitz or anywhere
else and that nobody was gassed to death in Nazi Germany.  He has to
ignore literally tons of documentary evidence to cling to this
opinion.  He has a following in virtually every country on the planet
not just Germany.

Irving got in trouble on the Auschwitz gas chamber because the one on
display there was reconstructed by the Russians.  He claims that it is
a total fake and that it had been a bomb shelter.  He is partly right.
It was a bomb shelter but prior to that it had been an experimental
gas chamber used to kill prisoners.  Once experimentation was completed
(quite successfully) the cremas in the Birkenau complex (5 total) were
built and begun operation full scale.  These were destroyed by the
retreating SS in 1944 to hide their crimes.  The experimental chamber
was made into an air raid shelter after Birkenau came on line and was
left that way when the SS pulled out.  The Russians and Poles
discovered traces of cyanide gas in the concrete walls of the shelter
and restored the chamber to what it must have looked like before it
was made into an air raid shelter.  Even the rubble of the 5 destroyed
cremas contains traces of cyanide gas (zyklon B) but the deniers claim
that these were chambers used for delousing clothing.  They maintain
that nobody was wearing the clothing as it was being deloused....

As I said, Ken's archive explodes all the "undeniable facts" that
Irving and his crew are spewing.  If this topic interests you I urge
you to check out his material.  It will settle any debate on the
subject.

Sorry, Larry, for continuing a Holocaust thread.  I'm trying to steer
it to the correct platform.  I've read your netiquette for WWII-L :-)
Roger, will comply!

Cheers, Bill Huber
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 15:26:15 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: US tank naming

In your message you write:
>>On Tue, 9 Nov 1993 16:08:54 EST Larry & Kim Jewell said:
>>>TWIHI (The Way I Heard It) was that a British tanker drove a recently arrived
>>>Stuart around for a while, and pronounced that it was a "real honey" so they
>>>named them Honey tanks. I've always thought the nicknames had more recognition
>>>value than the "official" names.
>>
>> Crisp's driver, reported in =Brazen Chariots=.
>
>  Thanks, I knew I'd read it somewhere, but lost track of the source. Do you
>have the author, publisher, etc.?
>
>> ken koester
>> [email-masked]
>
>Larry J
>
Larry,

The copy I have is Robert Crisp, "Brazen Chariots," Ballantine
Books (paperback), the 1966 edition.  It was part of the
Ballantine books history of World War II series at the time.

Jim Irwin
Defense Personnel Support Center
Philadelphia PA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 14:34:00 -0600
From:    WILLIAM HUBER - SCDR <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: REF/Re: West Point Card Catalog

In Charles Reace's message of 11 Nov 1993 at 1704 CST, he writes:

> Has anybody been able to connect to the West Point library card
> catalog per the earlier message.  I've tried telnet'ing to the explicit
> address 129.29.90.100, and also tried telnet'ing to LIBRARY.USMA.EDU,
> which I got from GOPHER and which tries the above address as well as
> two others.  I always get a "host unreachable" message for each address
> and never connect.  Am I missing something, or has nobody else been
> able to connect?

I get timed out on my attemts at telnet(ing).  I tried 5 times
yesterday at different times but no luck so far.

Cheers,
Bill Huber

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 10:25:54 CST
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: "Hoax of the Twentieth Century"

Terry,

     This book was by Arthur Butz, an (electrical?) engineering prof at
Northwestern University (in Evanston IL).  According to a mutual acquain-
tance, Arthur is a nice fellow and good teacher.  Everyone went into shock
when his book came out, claiming that the Holocaust was gross exaggeration
and Allied propaganda.

     (Didn't I discuss this already, or was that on MILHST-L?)

     I have suggested that anyone attempting to falsify history so
obscenely should be pilloried by their appropriate professional/historical
association.  (That wouldn't apply to Arthur, of course.  Someone else
wondered whether any academic who played so fast and loose with Truth
shouldn't be in trouble with his professional association of whatever
discipline.)

     What is this net's consensus on whether or not we should be
professionally/historically ACCOUNTABLE for really flagrant violations of
historical truth?  How do we keep "historically correct" from going to
the extremes of "politically correct?"

Lou Coatney, Western Illinois University

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 10:34:21 CST
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: "In Harm's Way" ??!!

'Nice models in "In Harm's Way," but the rape/suicide/suicide-mission
  subplot was squalid and misrepresentative.

'An interesting portrayal of command politics, though.

It was too much a "John Wayne" movie for my taste.

Lou Coatney

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 15:58:30 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

In reply to the mail from <[email-masked]>...
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Received: from ubvm.cc.buffalo.edu by dpsc.dla.mil (5.61++/1.34)
>       id AA02915; Thu, 11 Nov 93 22:13:20 -0500
>Message-Id: <[email-masked]>
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>   with BSMTP id 7906; Thu, 11 Nov 93 22:10:19 EST
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> UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU (LMail V1.1d/1.7f) with BSMTP id 6729; Thu,
> 11 Nov 1993 20:21:41 -0500
>Date:         Thu, 11 Nov 1993 18:45:46 CST
>Reply-To: World War II Discussion List <[email-masked]>
>Sender: World War II Discussion List <[email-masked]>
>From: Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
>Subject:      Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment
>To: Multiple recipients of list WWII-L <[email-masked]>
>In-Reply-To:  <[email-masked]>; from "Dennis E. Sparks" at
>Status: RO
>
>Dennis,
>
>     Extenuating considerations on behalf of British "area bombing:"
>
>1. The Germans had indiscriminately terror-bombed them (and countless other,
>more innocent, peoples).
>
    Do two wrongs make a right?

>2. Feeling the consequences of mass (terror-)bombing themselves was the one
>  best way for the Germans to learn what the war they were waging on others
>  was really like.  (Bellicosity is difficult when you are trying to put
>  the fire in your own house out.)
>
    Did terror bombing shorten the war, break the will of the
German people to resist?

>3. According to Speer, the Hamburg firebombing DID break the will of the
>  Hamburgers for some months and Germany's morale could have faltered if
>  Germany's morale could have faltered if the mass bombing had been
>  extended to other cities.
>
   How many more do you want?

                Nuremburg
                Berlin
                DRESDEN

   How about the morality of "deliberately" creating firestorms,
killing hundreds of thousands of civilians with no pretense that
"military targets" were being attacked?  Or are morality and war
contradictions in terms, an oxymoron if you will?

>4. Hitting back in kind was vital to Allied morale.
>
    What kind - what Allied cities were firebombed?  Yes, London
suffered, as did Coventry and Rotterdam.  But, hundreds of
thousands suffocated and burned at one time, I don't think so.

>5. The Germans were forced to expend resources to the extent that we had a
>  Second Front (which the Soviets were screaming for) in the air.
>
   What second front?  Terror bombing didn't force a release of
German divisions to the West, thus easing the pressure on Soviet
forces.  In the words of Uncle Joe, "#@#%%$#$%^^%%$." (expletive
deleted)

>More, later.
>Lou Coatney, WIU
 Jim Irwin

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        [email-masked]
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-8760
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-8760

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 15:07:19 CST
From:    "[email-masked]. --Scherrer,
         Tim A." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Robert Clary speech

Robert Clary will be making a speech in the Ryle Hall Main Lounge, on
the campus of Northeast Missouri State University (this is about 100
meters from my office) on 24 January, 1993 at 8pm.  He will be speaking
on his family's experiences during the Holocaust.

Clary is a well known actor who is currently on the Soap Opera "The Bold
and the Beautiful".  We all probably recognize him better from his role
on the 1960's TV series "Hogan's Heros" as La Beau, the French POW who
was a master chef and sabatage expert.

I plan on attending and will try to get an interview for the WWIIHRS
newsletter, The Point, about his time on Hogan's Heros.

If anyone wants anymore details, please contact me.

Tim

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 16:19:16 EST
From:    Charles Reace <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Veterans' Day, 1993.

> We veterans in the private sector are required to work on OUR day . . .

I for one am glad we've always had plenty of people in this country
ready to put their lives on the line in its defense.  Each of you
certainly deserves one day off each year for such service.  But, if you
think about it, maybe it would be better if we just had the day but
let no one at all off from work.  It seems that when you make something
into a holiday, it starts to demean it -- at least in the US.  It becomes
an excuse to have special sales at the stores, barbecues, parties,
etc.  Just look at Christmas, or at Memorial day (which is supposed to
honor those who *died* for our country, while we drink beer and eat
BBQ'ed hot dogs!)

So each year, on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh
month; pause at whatever you're doing and imagine a lone bugler in the
distance playing Taps, and give a profound "Thank you."

  __|  __|  __|  |  Charles Reace <[email-masked]>
_|   _|   _|     |
 |       | |     |  Computer Sciences Corp., Integrated Systems Div.
 ___|____/ ___|  |  304 W. Rte. 38, Moorestown, NJ 08057

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 14:49:41 EST
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

On Fri, 12 Nov 1993 12:34:31 EST Denis Ouellette, Indiana Univ said:
>One point to keep in mind is the relatively smaller size bombs and
>bomb loads dropped by US bombers.  Being on target doesn't help much
>if the munition isn't having much impact. (This point was made previosly
>with respect to the fact that the Germans found that many factories hit
>sustained only damage to the structure but most of the machine tools were
>left untouched - the reason - the inadequate 500 pound bombs used by the
>USSAF)

Possibly, although I would suspect it is more a matter of needing direct
hits to do much more than superficial damage.  Bombarding armor with
155s instead of 75s doesn't get many more hits, for example; the same is
likely true of machine tools.  I'd like to find a study sometime.

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 10:56:29 CST
From:    Lou Coatney <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

Chris,

     "Deterrence" means, "If you bomb us, we will bomb you (in kind)."
Maybe Hitler didn't use gas against Britain, because he knew he'd get it
back in kind (and he had bad memories of gas from WW I).

     We (Americans) didn't get bombed, and retaliation in kind would have
been harder to justify.

Lou

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 19:10:05 EST
From:    Crane Conrad LTC <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RAF vs USAAF heavy bombardment

>One point to keep in mind is the relatively smaller size bombs and
>bomb loads dropped by US bombers.  Being on target doesn't help much
>if the munition isn't having much impact. (This point was made previosly
>with respect to the fact that the Germans found that many factories hit
>sustained only damage to the structure but most of the machine tools were
>left untouched - the reason - the inadequate 500 pound bombs used by the
>USSAF)
>
>Denis Ouellette

I want to reinforce what Denis said.  The 500 pound bombs were really not the
right weapon for German factories.  They did, however, prove effective against
German transportation, and brought the German National Railway to standstill by
early 1945.  British bomb loads, especially the big bombs 4000 pounds or
higher, were better for factories.  The problem there was that the British
bombers carrying the bombs did not have the ceiling to fly high enough to
survive in daylight, because of the weight of those same bombs.  By 1943, the
AAF and the RAF were both locked into their  strategies by technology.  B-17s
weren't effective at night, and Lancasters could not survive during the day.
Also British bombsights  were far inferior to the Norden, and their bombers
were very unsteady bombing platforms. On the other hand, B-17s carried too few
bombs for area raids, and had no flame dampers to avoid easy detection at
night.  Ira Eaker thought that the Americans could reconfigure their aircraft
and train crews for night bombing in about six months, but the British never
reconsidered day bombing until the Luftwaffe was gone from daytime German
skies.  By early in 1945, it was safer to bomb by day than by night, since
German fighters could roam around in the dark without being hunted by Mustangs.

                                        LTC Con Crane
                                        USMA

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 12 Nov 1993 23:03:27 EST
From:    Richard Kaplan <[email-masked]>
Subject: Veteran's Day

I kind of like what Israel does.  There is no Veteran's Day as such, but there
is Memorial Day for the military fallen, and a Holocaust Rememberance Day.
Neither day is a holiday, though some people obviously stay at home, pray, and
visit grave sites or memorials.  On both days, the entire country comes to a
complete halt for 60 seconds, as sirens are sounded simultaneously around the
country.  Buses stop, traffic stops, pedestrians halt, work stops and everyone
observes a moment of silence.  Memorial day is the day before Independence
Day, and as the somber atmosphere of Memorial Day ends in the evening, Inde-
pendence Day is ushered in as a festive historical day.

                                        Richard Kaplan

ps. Such are the advantages of one time-zone.

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 11 Nov 1993 to 12 Nov 1993
*************************************************