Subject: WWII-L Digest - 8 Jan 1994 to 9 Jan 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 10 Jan 1994 00:00:33 -0500

There are 6 messages totalling 280 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Gen. Vlasov (2)
  2. GEN: REVIEW OF LETTERS HOME IN FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
  3. USAAF 4-9Jan44/ B-17 vs. B-24 question
  4. [email-masked]
  5. Question about naval warfare

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Date:    Sun, 9 Jan 1994 11:10:59 +0100
From:    Richard Cummings <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Gen. Vlasov

To Jon Stevens:  I found your posting very interesting and not long
at all.  I would like to read more after your Break is over, either
on the List, or direct.  I will be going nomail next weekend until
about 7 February when I return to Munich after a visit to the U.S.
Regards.  Richard.

--==oo00oo==--
[email-masked]
RFE/RL Inc
Munich,Germany

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Date:    Sun, 9 Jan 1994 10:09:41 +0100
From:    John Ausland <[email-masked]>
Subject: GEN: REVIEW OF LETTERS HOME IN FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

Review of LETTERS HOME: A WAR MEMOIR by John C.
Ausland, which appeared in the December 1993 FOREIGN
SERVICE JOURNAL.  It was written by Ward Thompson, a retired
American Foreign Service officer and Vietnam veteran.

In this era of Iraq and Bosnia, some might recall with nostalgia
the heyday of US military policy in the brief year from D-Day
to VE-Day.  John Ausland was with an Army artillery unit as
it landed on Utah Beach and fought its way to the Rhine.  His
dual perspective-in his letters as a young officer and his
commentary on them nearly 50 years later-giving us a timeless
and dispassionate personal view of a not-so-lovely war.

Ausland's letters convey the flavor of life in a unit close to the
front, through serious anecdotes on interpersonal relations and
battle logistics and lighter accounts of leaves spent in Paris and
Luxembourg.  They show the evolution of a callow American in
uniform-from naive bravado, to confusion, to frank reflection-
as the writer prepares in England for D-Day, experiences the
landing, witnesses American military blunders, and encounters
liberated French and defeated Germans.

Although they give us occasional glimpses of the war as we
know it from history books, the letters focus all too rarely on
either the big picture or the intimacy of battle.  They relate the
typical view of a soldier; thought the observations he sent home
were increasingly perceptive.  Ausland was naturally no more
able than other soldiers to influence events, remaining but an
unusually erudite cog in the machine.

Ausland as editor, while sticking to the script, adds just enough
context to the letters to make clear that the American war
machine, although magnificent, was less than well-oiled.  He
describes misguided tactics, needless loss of life on some
occasions, undue caution to avoid casualties on others,
exaggerated award citations, and flawed teamwork.
Commenting on a letter about a meeting with Omar Bradley, for
example, Ausland recalls the young, no-career officers laughing
at the general's description of the upcoming landing as historic,
noting Bradley's bemusement that they did not share the
professional soldier's enthusiasm for war.

There are other parallels to later wars: the American public's
lack of interest in the front, the bias of journalists (Ausland
crossed paths with both Hemingway and Ernie Pyle), the Army's
clumsy management of relations with Germany's civil populace,
even the brutal treatment of civilians by US soldiers.

These flaws are minor in the World War II scheme of things,
and it is never Ausland's intention to argue with success.  Five
decades have not shaken Ausland's faith in the letters' implicit
conclusion that military means, for all their ugliness and
inefficiency, may sometimes be the viable option.  END

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Date:    Sun, 9 Jan 1994 17:40:46 EST
From:    Crane Conrad LTC <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: USAAF 4-9Jan44/ B-17 vs. B-24 question

Lou,
     The B-24 vs. B-17 debate has always been a hot one among airmen. Basically
the B-24 was more versatile, used as a tanker and transport as well as a
bomber.  Coming five years after the B-17, the B-24 had initial advantages in
bomb load and range.  That made it the preferred heavy bomber for George Kenney
in the Pacific.  It also was the key aircraft to close the "bomber gap" in the
Atlantic that was exploited by German U-Boats.  However, in Europe, combat
experience showed that the B-24 lacked adequate armor and armament to fight the
Luftwaffe in daylight raids.  Attempts to remedy these and other shortcomings
added to the weight of the plane and amde it a less stable bombing platform.
Modifications to the B-17s eventually increased their range as well, and by
January 1945 Jimmy Doolittle had a clear preference for the B-17 in his Eighth
Air Force.  I think the modifications to the B-24 tended to reduce its ceiling
as well, since in most of the operations I've looked at the B-24s always tended
to get "low squadron" in bomb group formations.  That position would be more
vulnerable to flak, thus also increasing losses. (Excuse my misspelling of
"made" in line 9, I can't go back and fix it.)
                                                  LTC Con Crane
                                                  USMA

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Date:    Sun, 9 Jan 1994 20:31:58 EST
From:    Carl Wernke <[email-masked]>
Subject: [email-masked]

 Subject: EDU:RE: CARL-MOTIVES ? THE PEARL HARBOR PAPERS(3 OF 4) BUSHIDO SPIRIT
 X-To: [email-masked]
 To: MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS OF LIST WWII-L ([email-masked])

 Lou, et al,

 One of the primary weapons systems to be used was the Nakajima B5N2 (Kate)
 torpedo bomber, of which there were 144 assigned to the six fleet carriers
 in the fall 1941, and on which were mounted the new weapon designated the
 Type 91, Modification 2, Japan's latest in a series of upgraded torpedoes.
 This 1760-pound torpedo had new features which included a warhead 121 pounds
 larger than its predecessor (for a total of 452 pounds) and separate
 anti-roll stabilizersmounted directly on the aft body of the torpedo. The
 anti-roll stabilizers were an importantaddition because these appendages
 increased the chances of the torpedo running true to drop direction. In
 addition, the shallow-water drop altitude doubled, from 33 feet for the older
 torpedoes to 66 for the new one, with drop speeds at or below 160 knots.

 The Japanese considered their torpedoes to be highly reliable. They were
 superbly constructed and maintained. The torpedoes had to be specially tested
 and prepared for use at Pearl Harbor. Among other things, wooden extention
 fins were attached to the metalic horizontal and vertical tail fins of the
 torpedo.

 At this time in Tokyo, at a liaison meeting on 1 November 1941, Finance
 Minister Kaya repeatedly tried to get ADM Nagano,IJN chief of staff to say
 whether he thought the U.S.fleet would sortie against Japan in three years---
 if peace could be maintained that long--- and wheather the IJN would prevail
 if the Americans did come. The Military Secretary at that meeting wrote his
 notes: "[Kaya] could not very well ask the Supreme Command whether we would
 lose." Yet the evasive responses that the Finance Minister elicited do not
 mean that the military organization plunged heedlessly into hostilities in
 1941. The balance-of-strength equasion was very much on the minds of the army
 and navy planners. "We would not have gone to war," said an Army General Staff
 Operations staff officer, "if we had been convinced beforehand that we were
 going to lose." The highest level secret discussions of the summer and fall
 of 1941 are replete with references to psychological as well as tangible
 concerns. On 12 July, Foreign Minister Matsuoka asserted that the United
 States was regarding Japan as "Either her protectorate or her dependency; it
 is characteristic of Americans to be high-handed toward the weak . . . I
 think there is no hope." That time was working against Japan --- another
 repeated theme --- implies that there were consequences of failure. On
 24 July ADM Nagano, the IJN chief of staff, presented the navy's outlook on
 on the prospects for a war against the United States:
           Accordingly, as time goes by, the Empire will be put at a
           disadvantage. If we could settle things without war, there
           would be nothing better. But if we conclude that conflict cannot
           ultimately be avoided then I would like you to understand that as
           time goes by we will be in a disadvantageous position [This was
           also the belief of ADM Yamamoto].

 Home Minister Hiranuma had already given his opinion, on 12 July, that
 "If we let things go on this awy, we will be fighting on two fronts. Our
 resources will be exhausted, and we will probably be unable to continue a
 great war." The AGS Operations staff officer agreed: "Probably there would
 have been no war if the United States had not inflicted embargoes on Japan"--
 the freezing of funds, restrictions on the export of petroleum, and a cut-off
 of shipments of iron and steel scrap. "To put matters in the strongest terms:
 We went to war because our material stocks were being used up. Japan was
 compelled to resort to arms." The Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff wrote
 privately on 1 November, "One reaches the unavoidable conclusion that we
 must go to war."

 Duding the seventeen-hour marathon Liaison Conference of 1 November, and also
 the Imperial Conference of 5 November, War Minister Hideki Tojo observed that,
 though the early stages of hostilities posed no problem for Japan, by 1943
 there would be no petroleum for military use, and ships would stop moving.
 There was "No end of difficulties," but Tojo could think of no other method,
 under the circumstances. "I fear that we would become a third-class nation
 after two or three years if we merely sat tight." When the decision for war
 was finalized at the Imperial Conference of 1 December, Tojo asserted that:

                 The United States had not only belittled the dignity of our
                 Empire and made it impossible for us to harvest fruits of
                 the China Incident, but also threatened the very existence
                 of our Empire. In view of the enormous and increasing
                 economic and military pressure being applied to Japan by
                 the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and China, war
                 was the only answer in order to resolve the present crisis
                 and assure survival.

 Japan was quite prepared for a long war concluded Tojo.

 I have endeavored to answer the who, what, where, when, and why questions
 presented by Lou, Bill,Dan,et al .

 Primary source material for this paper was obtained from the following:
 PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES--Japan:1931-1941
 VOL II,THE PEARL HARBOR PAPERS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JAPANESE MILITARY
 ESTABLISHMENT IN THE WORLD WAR, and JAPAN'S DECISION FOR WAR:RECORDS OF THE
 1941 POLICY CONFERENCES.------If this post reaches the list (five others have
 not), I welcome any and all comments and questions. This paper  should offer
 an interesting thread. Fire your "main battery salvoes"-- I have endured
 many of those both at sea and on the beach.

 CARL WERNKE                808 Atley Lane                Tidewater Community
 [email-masked]    Virginia Beach,VA 23452-3904    College
                            Phone: (804) 486-4980          Portsmouth, VA
                                                                 23703

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Date:    Mon, 10 Jan 1994 02:06:22 GMT
From:    Gudmundur Helgason <[email-masked]>
Subject: Question about naval warfare

Hi, sir I am sorry to bother you but I just got you letter about the IJN
torpedoes on my server and since I am in need of very similar data I
thought that I could perhaps contact you. I am planning on writing semi-
fiction with historical foundation. I need almost all data available on
the German Kriegsmarine (U-boats especially) that I can get my hands on.
Among the data I need is on German torpedoes (especially if any were
designed to work with the XXI boat. I have very limited change to visit
any real archives here in Iceland :)

Can you imagine where I could get the following:

        A complete list of all u-boat commanders in the WWII
        A complete list of all U-boat operations (dates of sailing etc)

I have the Groener book "German warships... vol 2" but it has many typos
and I dont think that all in it is totally reliable. Also I could
contact Mr. Showell (u-boat author) but I dont think he will reply :)

Thank you for you time sir!

Gudmundur Helgason ([email-masked])

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Date:    Sun, 9 Jan 1994 20:30:52 -0500
From:    GEORGE BAUER <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Gen. Vlasov

To Jon and Richard:

Apparently there is some interest in General Vlasov.  I have been sending
messages to individuals, but in view of the general interest, I will
begin posting again to the list, and request that others do so also.

I confess to knowing very little, but to be very interested...

I still do not understand, if Vlasov's unit joined the German army why
he fought againsdt the Germans and assisted in the liberation of Prague
before the Red Army arrived.

My questions:

1.  Where was Vlasov before he entered Prague?  Campaigns? Opponents? etc.
2.  What was his role in the liberation of Prague?
3.  Where was the Red Army when Vlasov entered Prague?  When did they arrive?
4.  What happened to Vlasov after Prague?

That's enough for now...

Thanks...

  =========================================================================
  | DR.  GEORGE R. BAUER             | INTERESTS:                         |
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  | Recently returned from my second | Education:  Curriculum development.|
  |   extended stay in Prague.       |    International Education, TEFL.  |
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  | Working on second book about     |    economic, social, political     |
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  | E-Mail:                          | Free lance writing and editing.    |
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  =========================================================================

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End of WWII-L Digest - 8 Jan 1994 to 9 Jan 1994
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