Subject: WWII-L Digest - 17 Apr 1994 to 18 Apr 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 19 Apr 1994 00:00:53 -0400

There are 50 messages totalling 1710 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. BARBAROSSA (2)
  2. INF: USAAF 18 APR 44
  3. Daimler-powered Spitfire photo
  4. TRV: Uniforms
  5. Kasserine
  6. Rheinbote
  7. Balkins
  8. Re[2]: Russian front, end of war...? (5)
  9. TAC: Patton's phantom army (5)
 10. 20 July 1994: 50 year commemoration?? (3)
 11. Operation Sea Lion: A Costly Mistake (7)
 12. USAAF Shuttle-Bombing (2)
 13. Walter Boerner book, question
 14. Definition of MOS (10)
 15. von Stauffenberg memorial? (2)
 16. INFO-Ultra signals/Public Record Office, London (2)
 17. INFO-1942 DIEPPE RAID-Personal research
 18. INFO-BARBAROSSA
 19. Sea Lion (the RN part)
 20. Rheintochter
 21. Walter Boerner lecture .vs. autobiography

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 17 Apr 1994 10:03:38 -0400
From:    Christopher Morton <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: BARBAROSSA

>
> HI there,  Dmitri Volkogonov's book was to be the first volume of a new
> multivolume history of the Great Patriotic War. It only was the opening part
> but was denounced by the top generals and was withdrawn. As far as Iknow it
> has not been published so far. For the opening phase of the war Bryan
> Fugate's book on Operation Barbarossa is the best.  There are quite a few
> books out now by David Glantz covering specific operations or phases. The two
> books by John Erickson are good and Earl Ziemke's book on Stalingrad to
> Berlin covers the last half ofthe war. Glanz wrote two books published by the
> Army on the campaign in Manchuria. james Jucas has a book called War on the
> eastern Front, that is s study of the German soldiers. Harold Shukman
> published _Stalin's Generals_. Christopher Duffy has a book on the final

Volkogonov's essay on Voroshilov in "Stalin's Generals" is very interesting.
The book is worth the price almost for that alone.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 08:48:12 BST
From:    Stephen Baldwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: BARBAROSSA

Emery Ford writes...
>       I was wondering if anyone out there might know where I can find a good
>       book on the Russo-German conflict.  I've read BARBAROSSA by Alan Clark,
I have a supplementary question: I too have this book. How well would
you rate it?
Also - would Alan Clark be the same Alan Clark who was a government
minister under Mrs. Thatcher a few years back?

steve baldwin
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 07:18:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USAAF 18 APR 44

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
TUESDAY, 18 APRIL 1944
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): 3 B-24s fly armed reconnaissance over Matsuwa,
Onnekotan, and Paramushiru Islands; cloud cover and lack of moonlight permit
only bombing of Kashiwabara Airfield and the Banjo Cape area.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA (CBI) THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 7 B-24s bomb an oil plant at
Yenangyaung while 5, along with 7 P-38s, hit Ywataung; 6 B-25s score numerous
hits on the Mandalay-Shwebo railroad; and 15 B-25s and 4 P-51s bomb Kamaing
and hit the Myitkyina-Bhamo road.

  CHINA (Fourteenth Air Force): HQ 33d Fighter Group moves from Karachi,
India to Shwangliu, China.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 306 Part 1: 776 bombers
and 634 fighters are dispatched to hit airfields and aviation industry
targets in Germany; the AAF claims 33-5-19 Luftwaffe aircraft; 19 bombers and
5 fighters are lost; due to poor weather, several units bomb targets of
opportunity in the Berlin area; details are:
  1. 275 of 280 B-17s hit aviation industry targets at Oranienburg, Perleberg
Airfield, Wittenberge and targets of opportunity; 3 B-17s are lost and 90
damaged; 29 airmen are MIA.
  2. 210 of 221 B-17s hit Oranienburg, Brandenburg, Luneburg Airfield,
Rathenow and targets of opportunity; 14 B-17s are lost and 94 damaged;
2 airmen are KIA, 12 WIA and 139 MIA.
  3. 248 of 275 B-24s hit Brandenburg, Rathenow, Cuxhaven, Wittenberge and
targets of opportunity; 2 B-24s are lost and 20 damaged; 5 airmen are WIA and
20 MIA.
  Escort is provided by 119 P-38s, 296 P-47s and 219 Eighth and Ninth Air
Force P-51s; 1 P-38, 1 P-47 and 3 P-51s are lost; 3 P-38s are damaged beyond
repair and 7 P-38s, 3 P-47s and 18 P-51s are damaged; 4 pilots are MIA.
  Mission 306 Part 2: 12 of 12 B-24s hit V-weapon sites at Watten, France; 1
B-24 is damaged; escort is provided by 36 P-47s without loss.
  Mission 307: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 2.56 million leaflets on Stavanger, Oslo,
Bergen and Trondheim, Norway at 2336-0041 hours without loss.
  HQ 492d Bombardment Group (Heavy) arrives at North Pickenham, England from
the US.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): 277 B-26s, including 24 dropping
Window, and 37 A-20s bomb gun positions and marshalling yards at Dunkirk,
Calais, and Charleroi/Saint Martin, France.
  XIX Air Support Command is redesignated XIX Tactical Air Command and
becomes operational and IX Air Support Command is redesignated IX Tactical
Air Command.
  Unit moves in England: HQ 440th Troop Carrier Group from Bottesford to
Exeter; 423d Night Fighter Squadron, IX Tactical Air Command, arrives at
Chormy Down from the US with A-20s, the squadron mission will change to photo
recon and they will fly their first mission on 6 Jun and be redesignated
155th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron on 22 Jun.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): In Italy, P-38s and P-47s
strafe Udine and Aiello Airfields and targets of opportunity in the
Basiliano, Sant' Andrea Island, and Cervignano del Friuli areas and in Golfo
di Panzano; other fighters fly cover for the strafing missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, P-47 fighter-bombers cut
several rail lines in the Florence and Arezzo areas and strafe trains and
motor transport; P-40s and P-47s hit Itri and a rail bridge and fuel dumps as
the campaign against communications continues.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA, Seventh Air Force): First Seventh Air Force attack
on the Marianas Islands takes place as B-24s escorting US Navy (USN)
photographic airplanes on a reconnaissance mission from Eniwetok Atoll bomb
Saipan Island. Other B-24s staging through Eniwetok Atoll hit Truk Atoll.
B-25s from Tarawa Atoll bomb Ponape Island; B-24s from Kwajalein Atoll bomb
Wake Island after failing to find shipping reported in the area; and B-25s
from Abemama Island bomb Jaluit and Maloelap Atolls, using Majuro Atoll as a
shuttle base between strikes.
  19th Fighter Squadron, 318th Fighter Group, moves from Kualoa Field to
Bellows Field, Hawaii with P-47s.

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA (SOPAC, Thirteenth Air Force): 14 B-24s bomb the airfield
at Satawan Atoll; on New Britain Island, 23 B-25s, weathered out of
Vunakanau, bomb Tobera Airfield; 12 others and 9 fighter-bombers which fail
to reach Rapopo bomb the airstrip at Keravat; Wunapope is hit by about 40
fighter-bombers, with considerable damage to the supply area.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA (SWPA, Fifth Air Force): The newly created (11 Apr)
Thirteenth Air Task Force (Provisional) commanded by Major General St Clair
Streett and temporarily composed of elements of the Thirteenth Air Force
(which is being moved to the SWPA), a few Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)
squadrons, USN Seventh Fleet air units, and Fifth Air Force units in the
Admiralty Islands and New Britain Island, is placed under operational control
of Fifth Air Force Advanced Echelon. Operating out of Momote Airfield, Los
Negros Island, B-24s of Thirteenth Air Task Force bomb Woleai Atoll and
Mariaon Island, Caroline Islands.
  In New Guinea, B-24s of the Fifth Air Force hit Manokwari and Babo; and the
Madang area is hit by fighter-bombers.
  HQ 54th Troop Carrier Wing moves from Port Moresby to Nadzab, New Guinea.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 07:42:01 -0400
From:    Bob Smart <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Daimler-powered Spitfire photo

> Regarding my earlier posts about the Spitfire that was captured
> by the Germans and re-engined with a Daimler Benz engine....
>
> I finally found a photograph of the aircraft.  It's in volume one
> of William Green's "Famous Fighters of the Second World War".
> The text mentions that the aircraft was stripped of armament,
> and a 1475 hp DB605A engine installed, with the resulting aircraft
> weighing in at 6000 lbs, compared to 6417 lbs for an operational
> Spitfire V, from which the hybrid was derived.  At 22,000 feet,
> the aircraft acheived 379 mph, compared to the 385 mph for a
> similarly powered Bf 109G at the same altitude.
>
> I promise that this is the last time I'll mention the aircraft
> on this list.  Unless, of course, someone else brings it up first!
> :-)

Consider it brought up any time you want :-) The interesting thing would be if
the DB engine solved the one failing the Spits had. It should have solved the
fuel feed problem during Negative G's. Also what was the speed of a standard
Mk V at that altitude ( my references are at home) did the DB engine hurt or
improve it. I don't find a 6 MPH  differance significant. There may have been
almost that much difference between individual planes off of the assembly line.

Also is the Mk V the contemporary of the 109G or would a Mk 9 be a more evan
comparison?  I know the Mk 9 started as a quick upgrade of a Mk V airframe with
a more powerful Merlin to counter the FW 190 but I don't know which 109 was the
most direct comparison.  Also I wonder how the fuel consumption compared.
Did the DB engined Spit use more or less gas than the 109 for a similar
mission? What about compared to a Merlin engined Spit? I think this could be
more significant than the speed difference ( But not as important as flyability
& manueverability.)

Thanks for being tenacious and finding the source. I think we have that book in
the local library, I'll have to get it. I know that when I finally find a
refererance that I knew I had seen 'a long time ago' and that I brought up on
the list I feel much better. I hope you have the same feeling of satisfaction.
Not that anyone on the list ever felt that it hadn't been seen before. It just
raises your self confidence when you know you aren't slowly losing your mind
:-)

Bob Smart ([email-masked])
> Dennis E. Sparks
> [email-masked]
> Lexington, Kentucky

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 07:57:38 -0400
From:    Warren Thompson <[email-masked]>
Subject: TRV: Uniforms

In the book by Airey Neave, NUREMBERG, the photograph facing p.240 shows
Goering's wedding party. There are two helmeted figures presenting arms.
They appear to be wearing army uniforms, yet they each have armbands (possibly
with swastikas, not normally worn by the military).

Can anyone identify these figures?

-- Warren Thompson
LEABANON VALLEY COLLEGE
Annville PA 17003

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 07:44:19 EDT
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Kasserine

On Thu, 14 Apr 1994 09:14:00 EST Don Bowden said:
>. . . . In the great scheme of
>things the Kasserine Pass battle was a tactical defeat at the divisional,corps
>level for the Americans in their first large scale action in WWII.My recollec-
>tion is that it pretty well trashed one or two combat commands of a US armored
>division and several thousand prisoners were taken by the Germans. The strate-
>gic impact was nil and probably had the positive effect of winnowing out some
>of the less effective American officers.

Well, it was a bit bigger than that, I think.  The Germans got stopped pretty
much at the last ditch--it was a near thing.  For various reasons Rommel
was not able to/did not procede further to the west before hooking north; had
he done so, he probably would have knocked out Allied supply lines to most of
Tunisia & compelled the Anglo-American armies to pull back several hundred
miles well into Algeria.  In fact, there were plans ready to do just that.
Whatever the material effects of the battle--and it was virtually bloodless
for Rommel, while knocking out 1 and roughing up another US division--it
acted as a hanging & concentrated wonderfully the collective command mind
of the American army.  It also inspired a certain amount of British distrust
of American fighting ability & disdain for its ally--certainly a stratego-
political gain for the Germans.

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 07:02:55 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Rheinbote

Hello, Gudmundur!

Here goes with some more info.

                     Rheinbote (Rhein Messenger)

Also known as RhZ-61/9, this was a long-range surface-to-surface
missle developed to meet an artillery demand to carry 40kg of high
explosive  to a range of 160 km. Design started in 1942 using
assisted take-off rockets to furnish data. The final design was a
multi-stage rocket in four stages using solid diglycol propellant,
launched from a rail type projector mounted on a single trailer.
Length overall: 11.4m, weight at take-off: 1715 kg., max. velocity:
1640m/second and max. range: 220 km. Capable of being fired at a rate
of 1 round in 30 minutes, 220 were made and fired at Antwerp early in
1945.

    More later.

    Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 08:14:47 EST
From:    Aldo <[email-masked]>
Subject: Balkins

A subject I have not yet seen broched here is the Balkins.  I've just
started reading Balkin Gosts & have ordered a copy of Black Lamb, Grey
Dove by Reb. West.  It seems from what little I've read so far, they
are still fighting WWII (and centuries of other conflitcs) all over.
I do try & get the NYT regularly, but I was wondering if anyone A)
has seen any good articles recomendable (or books, but I doubt
I'll have tim to read them) & B) had any thougths on the Balkins (as
they pertain to the list's subject).

Thank You,

Aldo

Aldo M. Hubert
                                           [email-masked]
University of North Carolina at Greensboro
800 Oakland Ave.
Greensboro NC 27412

Sic Friatur Crustum Dulce

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 09:03:35 EDT
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Re[2]: Russian front, end of war...?

On Sat, 16 Apr 1994 09:21:28 PST Jones, Scott T. said:
>     As an additional question, why were the beaches of Normandy chosen as
>     the point of attack? Why not closer to Berlin or Paris? To what extent
>     did supplies logistics play into this decision? What was Spain doing
>     at this time?

The indirect approach.  Calais was expected; why attack into the teeth of
the defense?  Bad luck for the Allies that Rommel had his suspicions of
Normandy, too.

However, I have a map of Germany on my wall.  The Dutch coast has caught
my eye during this thread.  Why not invade from Amsterdam to Frisia?  The
barrier islands couldn't have been too strongly defended; the coast would
have been flat & easily dominated by naval gunfire; good ports would have
been much closer at hand; and you're 300 miles closer to Berlin.  I
conclude tentatively that aircover would have been poorer & the sea supply
route more hazardous, but I think it would have been so much easier to
gain/exploit a lodgement that this would have been outweighed.  Does
anyone have a definitive answer as to whether this was even considered?

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 06:47:01 -0700
From:    "Office TH325, Extension 3566" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Patton's phantom army

Bognar Attila

>In a message somebody wrote that one of the reasons for Hitler
>anticipating the landing in the Pas de Calais was the phantom army
>that Patton had. Was that not General McNair who had the phantom army
>in the decisive project?
>
>All the best,
>
>Attila  [email-masked]
>

Patton had the phony army until July when he was in France and General
McNair was brought in to continue the deception.  He was
killed in late July during operation Cobra when Amerian bombs fell on
their own lines.  Two weeks later his son was killed on Guam.

John Riegsecker
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of Puget Sound

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 09:47:36 EDT
From:    Chuck Weckesser <[email-masked]>
Subject: 20 July 1994: 50 year commemoration??

Does anyone happen to know if the German authorities are planning a
commemoration of any sort at the statue in Berlin honoring Colonel
Stauffenberg??

I cannot think of a more appropriate commemoration ceremony and am wondering
what the rest of you think. For those who do not know, on 20 July 1944
Stauffenberg made the _best_ (but obviously still unsuccessful) attempt to kill
Hitler.

Stauffenberg, who had faught with great courage on the Eastern Front, had lost
an arm and had to set the bomb in his suitcase with just one hand. He quietly
slid the suitcase as close to Hitler as possible.

He then left the daily conference on the pretext of a telephone call from
Berlin. The attache case bothered someone who in turn moved it away from his
feet, and in so doing, sparred Hitler's life who miraculously survived the
incredible blast of the bomb.

At first, everyone thought that the Allies had found Wolf's Lair (in East
Prussia) and attacked it. It wasn't for some time befor someone realized that
Stauffenberg was missing who in turn was in route to Berlin to finish "Operation
Valeykrie."

Disgustingly, Gen. Fromm panicked when news arrived that Hitler had survived.
The only one to do his part was the Army in Paris who promptly placed the SS
under arrest.

Goebbels must be given full credit for saving the situation.

Just three hours after the assassination attempt, Mussonlini - by coincidence -
arrived at Wolf's Lair for his last meeting with Hitler. Hitler told Mussolini
that the fact that he had survived while so many others had died was "proof from
Providence that his work just and his mission sanctioned by the hand of God."

Hitler probably believed what he was saying. Who wouldn't after surving that
inferno???

I think who ever said only the good die young may have been telling the truth.

Question: When did the statue honoring Stauffenberg finally get erected in
Berlin? Do most young Germans even know about Stauffenberg? Is this taught in
German schools?

I would bet my life that if I pulled 1,000 Americans at random off of the
streets of America not one of them could tell me who Claus von Stauffenberg was.

Anyone disagree with that?

Regards,

Chuck

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 10:04:31 EDT
From:    Chuck Weckesser <[email-masked]>
Subject: Operation Sea Lion: A Costly Mistake

        I believe that the National Socialists would have won the war if
Barbarossa had never been launced, or at least delayed, until after launching
Sea Lion, which the German Navy under Doenitz insisted would not work.

        I disagree. I believe it would have worked although there would have
frightful casualties. On the whole, Ribbentrop, Hitler's "second Bismark," was a
pathetic political hack who was unfit to hold the post he did but he quite
correct in insisting that England had to be neutralized before "lebensraum"
could be realized.

        If Germany had placed its economy on a total war footing in 1940
(contrary to popular belief, Hitler insisted the economy could produce both
bullets and butter and accordingly, the German economy was never placed on a war
footing until 1944) and diverted all resources toward smashing England the
outcome of the war would have been decidedly different.

        Yet despite Hitler's fondness of quoting Napolean, who described Britain
as a "nation of shopkeepers," Hitler harbored a secret fondness for Britain and
her empire. I believe this is the reason he allowed the B.E.D. to escape at
Dunkirk. His intent was to send a message to Whitehall that he was willing to be
reasonable. It was one of his greatest blunders.

        Question: Does anyone on the list believe that if Hitler had bought to
England to its knees - had he forced England to lie prostrate in front of him -
could Barbarossa _then_ have been launched with success?

        Terry, what do you think in particular? Should the Armed Forces - despite
the cost - diverted all of its resources to bringing England to its knee's,
including building a a staggering number of U-Boats to sink needed tonnage?

Regards,

Chuck

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 10:37:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: USAAF Shuttle-Bombing

SUBJ:  AIR FORCE NEWS SERVICE FEATURES
ELECTRONIC BULLETIN BOARD FILENAME:  94apr15
                             &    &    &
                             &    &    &
                             &    &    &
050.  Army Air Forces' shuttle bombing missions -- 1944
by Edward T. Russell
     The idea of shuttle bombing, where bombers take off from a base
in one country, bomb a target, and fly on to a base in a second
country, appealed to American airmen as early as 1942.
     They theorized that by acquiring bases in the Soviet Union they
could attack Germany from different directions, have a choice of exit
routes, and force the Germans to disperse their fighter defenses.
After months of negotiations between the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin,
and the American ambassador, W. Averill Harriman, Stalin authorized
the use of bases at Mirgorod, Piryatin and Poltava, located east of
the Dnieper river and southeast of Kiev.
     On June 2, 1944, Gen. Ira C. Eaker, Fifteenth Air Force commander,
led four groups of B-17s of the 4th Combat Bombardment Wing and a
reinforced group of P-51s of the 306th Fighter Wing from bases in
Italy on a bombing mission to Drebrecen, Yugoslavia.  After
successfully bombing the marshaling yards, the Americans flew on and
landed at Poltava.  On June 6, flying from Poltava, the heavies bombed
an airfield at Galatz, Romania.  Later, on June 11, the Americans
returned to Italy.
     The Eighth Air Force flew its first shuttle mission out of England
June 21, 1944.  A force of 114 B-17s from the 3d Bomb Division escorted
by 70 P-51s from VIII Fighter Command bombed a synthetic oil plant
south of Berlin, and proceeded to the Russian bases.  Undetected by the
Americans, a German aircraft followed them to Poltava, and the pilot
reported the location to his superiors.  Later that night the Germans
struck, bombing and strafing the airfield.  The Eighth lost 43 B-17s
and 15 P-51s.  The enemy also set off American ammunition dumps and
ignited 450,000 gallons of gasoline.  The elated Germans returned the
next night to bomb the other shuttle sites.
     In the aftermath of the Poltava disaster, the Soviets refused to
allow American night-fighters to defend the bombers' bases, insisting
that air defense was their responsibility.  Realizing that the Soviets
could not adequately protect the heavy bombers from night raids, the
Americans abandoned plans to permanently station three heavy bomber
groups on Soviet airfields.  To keep the project alive, the Americans
next shuttled P-38 and P-51 fighters to the Soviet Union, but after
balancing losses and battle damage against the value of the targets,
the American leaders at the Soviet bases discontinued the fighter-
bomber operations.
     Though the American heavy bombers flew a few more shuttle
missions, logistical problems and growing Soviet intransigence forced
the cancellation of shuttle bombing in late-1944.  The failure of the
shuttle mission had minimal effect on the Combined Bomber Offensive,
but the Soviet reluctance to allow the U.S. units to operate from its
territory was a harbinger of the ill-will that would plague post-war
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
(Russell is a historian with the Air Force Historical Research
Agency at Maxwell AFB, Ala.)
                             &    &    &
                             &    &    &
                             &    &    &
##################################################################
##################################################################
##                                                              ##
##  Although the following article is not about WWII I thought  ##
##  I would include it because it is nice to read a pleasing    ##
##  article once in awhile!                                     ##
##                                                              ##
##################################################################
##################################################################

047.  Commentary:  A kind patriot
by Capt. Brian E. King
     In anticipation of spending a nice Thanksgiving at home with
family, my wife, Lisa, promptly picked me up from work.  To save
time, I told my wife that I would wear my uniform as the drive was
less than three hours.  Traveling from Dayton to Toledo on I-75
can always bring construction and delays.  This trip was different.
We arrived at Lima, the halfway point, for a dinner stop with the
children at our favorite place, The Cracker Barrel.
     Once inside, we were seated at a large round table.  I sat
between Brian and Paul, my 5- and 4-year-olds.  Lisa sat across
from me next to Adam, the 18-month-old toddler.  I sat with my
back to the rest of the patrons.  I braced myself as I peered into my
cash-poor wallet.  The credit card flashed a smile and seemed to
say, "Eat what you want."  Lisa and I ordered our favorite meal, the
vegetable platter.  The older children shared chicken tender meal.
Adam got some of everything.  The children behaved unusually
well for this restaurant.  Lisa and I enjoyed the time to pause and
plan our turkey day rush between families.
     We finished our meal and before I was able to stand, the
manager approached.  He was carrying a note with him.  I was
immediately nervous. My thoughts were that someone had hit my
car in the parking lot and needed to see me.  Perhaps I was in
violation of some uniform requirement.  I could feel my heart
pound.  Something was wrong.
     The manager told me an anonymous patron paid for our meals
and not to look for the person as he had left already.  Then he
handed me the note.  I read aloud:  "Dear Captain and family,
Thank you for serving our nation and for serving in the United
States Air Force.  May God bless your Thanksgiving and may his
blessings be yours for years to come for your family.  (Signed) A
Friend in Christ."
     My eyes instantly welled up as did my wife's.  We were
shocked.  When our speech returned, we thanked the manager.  On
the way out to the car I explained to the children what had just
occurred.
     I told the children that a very nice person had just paid for our
meal.  I prayed a prayer of thanksgiving in the parking lot for the
blessing just received and blessings for the anonymous patriot.  It
was an unsolicited and undeserved kindness that I could never
repay.  History will not record but I never forget the kindness of a
patriot who changed our holiday.  (King is assigned to the Air
Force Institute of Technology at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.)

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 10:14:00 -0400
From:    DAVID WILMA 415-744-2485 <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Walter Boerner book, question

          Is it possible that the French would accept a German turncoat,
          less than 17 years old, to fly combat missions?  I know that the
          war was chaos, but this seems to be a major flaw in personnel.
          Can anyone clarify this?

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 09:40:11 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Definition of MOS

This is probably the wrong place to ask this question, but I know that
there are some Leathernecks out there who might be able to help me.

A ex-marine student of mine used the term MOS in a recent essay.  I knew
what he was speaking of, but I asked him to give the actual words instead
of using MOS.  This way even people unfamiliar with the Corps would
understand what it was he was refering to.  He did not know what MOS was
short for and neither do I.  Could someone out there help us with this
problem.

Many thanks,

C.K. Bryant
[email-masked]
*******************************************************************
"The Riskier the road, the greater the profit."    / C.K. Bryant
        The 62nd Rule of Acquisition               / W.I.U. English
*******************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 09:45:13 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: von Stauffenberg memorial?

Great idea, Chuck!

Even if the Germans don't commemmorate it, the actual site (of the
  Fuehrer Bunker) should be in ... Poland?  I would think the
  Poles would help see something built, if it hasn't been
  already.

Lou Coatney

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 09:36:25 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Re: TAC: Patton's phantom army

On Mon, 18 Apr 1994, Office TH325, Extension 3566 wrote:

> Patton had the phony army until July when he was in France and General
> McNair was brought in to continue the deception.  He was
> killed in late July during operation Cobra when Amerian bombs fell on
> their own lines.  Two weeks later his son was killed on Guam.
>
> John Riegsecker
> University of Puget Sound
>

I am just curious why the ruse continued into July.  The phantom army was
created primarily as a smoke screen to hide the actual site of the
planned invasion, which began June 6, 1944.

Any insight into this would be aprreciated.

C.K. Bryant
[email-masked]
*******************************************************************
"The Riskier the road, the greater the profit."    / C.K. Bryant
        The 62nd Rule of Acquisition               / W.I.U. English
*******************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 09:00:58 PDT
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Re[2]: Russian front, end of war...?

The reasoning behind the selection of Normandy as the Allied Invasion
point is well examined in:  WE PLANNED THE SECOND FRONT, by Major John
Dalgliesh, Collanz Publishers, London, 1945.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 09:08:16 PDT
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 20 July 1994: 50 year commemoration??

You say von Stauffengerg was wounded on the Eastern Front.
I always thought he was wounded in North Africa.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 12:48:15 EDT
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Operation Sea Lion: A Costly Mistake

On Mon, 18 Apr 1994 10:04:31 EDT Chuck Weckesser said:
>        I disagree. I believe it would have worked although there would have
>frightful casualties. On the whole, Ribbentrop, Hitler's "second Bismark," was
>a
>pathetic political hack who was unfit to hold the post he did but he quite
>correct in insisting that England had to be neutralized before "lebensraum"
>could be realized.

I don't think Sea Lion would ever have worked, although it is just possible
the attempt would have more or less destroyed the Royal Navy stopping it.
The Germans simply didn't have a plan in place in the summer of 1940, and
the German army didn't have a clue as to how to make a successful amphibious
invasion--invading on a 250 mile front would most likely have gotten them
defeated in detail, at least from the sea perspective.

>        If Germany had placed its economy on a total war footing in 1940
>(contrary to popular belief, Hitler insisted the economy could produce both
>bullets and butter and accordingly, the German economy was never placed on a
>war
>footing until 1944) and diverted all resources toward smashing England the
>outcome of the war would have been decidedly different.

Also dubious.  One does not simply "place the economy on a war footing"
with a stroke of the pen; we use the phrase as a cliche, but it takes time
to convert economies to anything.  Starting the conversion in 1940 would
have made a difference to Barbarossa, but even Stalin would have blinked
had he seen the Germans re-arming on a massive scale prior to June, 1941.
And by the time the economy would have been converted, Britain would have
already made good the damage of 1940 and then some.  So it might have
lengthened the war, but the German economy was in no way sufficient to
overwhelm the economies of the countries arrayed against it by 1942.

>        Yet despite Hitler's fondness of quoting Napolean, who described
>Britain
>as a "nation of shopkeepers,"Hitler harbored a secret fondness for Britain and
>her empire. I believe this is the reason he allowed the B.E.D. to escape at
>Dunkirk. His intent was to send a message to Whitehall that he was willing to
>be
>reasonable. It was one of his greatest blunders.

I've seen the first mentioned several times; it's at least plausible.  No
argument with the last sentence.

>        Question: Does anyone on the list believe that if Hitler had bought to
>England to its knees - had he forced England to lie prostrate in front of him-
>could Barbarossa _then_ have been launched with success?

Define success.  IMHO, Hitler couldn't beat Russia.  The question is whether
Russia could become so tired it would sue for peace.  As far as the Russians
were concerned, they never faced less than 60% of the German machine, and
for several years, probably more like 80% or more.

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 18:44:39 +0100
From:    "H.G. Henry" <[email-masked]>
Subject: INFO-Ultra signals/Public Record Office, London

---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date: Mon, 14 Mar 1994 20:28:03 -0600 (CST)
From: Joe Churman <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Thesis assistance/Ultra signals/Public Record Office, London

Request for assistance to History-ihr List members:

My thesis project will examine British inderdiction of Axis shipping to
North Africa 1941-43, an effort that many military historians agree was
profoundly influenced by the Ultra signals from Bletchley Park.
Quantifying or measuring this influence is the tricky part.(The attendant
impact on the land campaign will be Part Two). I'm planning to visit the
Public Record Office in May/June or September/October this year to study
the relevant signals in class DEFE 3 (series OL, MK, MKA, QT, VM, and ML),
and various RAF and RN operational records. Does anyone know if any of
these files have been purchased on microfilm by any archival/academic
institutions in North America, and if so, are they accessible? Even
better, are there private individuals or institutions out there who have
any of these signals in paper (photocopy/facsimile) or, dare I dream,
digital form?

I'd also like help locating a comprehensive source for German/Italian
shipping data to North Africa in these years that lists or infers
departure date, cargo, intended course and defensive measures (air/naval
cover), and arrival at destination or, if lost at sea or bombed in
harbour,"last position." I need to find a library that holds the 18 (22?)
vol. Italian Official History "La marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra
Mondiale," and the 1992 edition of Rohwer/Hummelchen's "Chronology of the
War at Sea,1939-1945. And, is anyone familiar enough with the "Captured
German Documents" in the Military Archives Division of the National
Archives in Washington to know whether the trip would be worthwhile?

As far as the Public Record Office in Kew goes, does anyone have any
information in the category of "nice-to-knows," or any recommendations on
accomodations in the area (good OR bad) that won't bankrupt a researcher
with limited funds.

Of course, I'm open to any and all suggestions or ideas on locating other
relevant primary sources. Just E-mail or write. And if anyone knows of any
former RAF or RN intelligence briefers or reconnaissance aircrew from this
period, their names and addresses would be of great value to me. Or in the
interest of maintaining their privacy, please pass my address on to them,
with details of my project and a request that they contact me.

Thanks for now,

Lt. Joe Churman (Canadian Air Force)
191 Ubique Crescent
Winnipeg, MB
Canada
R3N 1W3

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 13:49:14 -0400
From:    Jim Broussard <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Patton's phantom army

>> Patton had the phony army until July

>> John Riegsecker
>> University of Puget Sound
>>

>I am just curious why the ruse continued into July.  The phantom army was
>created primarily as a smoke screen to hide the actual site of the
>planned invasion, which began June 6, 1944.

>C.K. Bryant

        Even after June 6, Hitler withheld substantial forces from Normandy,
        keeping them in the Pas de Calais because he thought Normandy was a
        feint for several weeks.  So the purpose of the phantom army was not
        only to screen the site of the landings but to discourage the Germans
        from concentrating all their forces even after the landings.

        Jim Broussard

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 18:40:46 +0100
From:    "H.G. Henry" <[email-masked]>
Subject: INFO-1942 DIEPPE RAID-Personal research

I have just joined the group. I am researching the 1942 Dieppe raid for my
doctoral thesis under the supervision of Professor Sir F. H. Hinsley. I am
focusing on the political/strategic background, decision-making,
planning,intelligence, execution and aftermath.

At the moment I am putting together a 'Dieppe database'(using Endnote
Plus f Bibliographical and Database program), comprising relevant
secondary and primary sources from the National Archives (Ottawa),
the the Directorate of History of the Department of National Defence,
(Ottawa), Imperial War Museum, National Maritime Museum and Public Record
Office (London). I have also over 1500 post-raid German photos, the majority
from the Bundesarchives (Koblenz) and ECPA (French Military Archives, Paris).

Last year in conjunction with AFTER THE BATTLE, I authored *DIEPPE THROUGH
THE LENS OF THE GERMAN WAR PHOTOGRAPHER.London: Battle of Britain Prints
International Ltd, 1993.* This gives a large-format photo and a tactical
account of each one of the Calgary Regiment tanks that landed during the
raid. Documents as well as interviews, from at least one crew member of each
tank, were used.

I have been in contact with Dieppe authors Brig-Gen Denis & Shelagh
Whitaker, Professors Brian Villa (U of Ottawa) and John P.
Campbell (U of McMaster), besides all the relevant regimental and unit
veteran organizations. I have many interviews but am always looking for other
veterans to talk to.

I would be pleased to receive any information on the operation and
details on Dieppe veterans anybody might know.

Yours sincerely

Hugh G. Henry Jr, MA

St John's College
University of Cambridge
Cambridge
CB2 1TP
UNITED KINGDOM
voice: (223) 357345
fax: (223) 337720

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 13:17:00 -0400
From:    DAVID WILMA 415-744-2485 <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Operation Sea Lion: A Costly Mistake

          One of those fascinating what ifs.  Certainly without Britain as
          a base, the liberation of Europe would have taken years.  The
          question might better be approached from the view of how did a
          Western Front affect the war in the east.  Was the Soviet Union
          that dependant on U.S. materiel support?  Could that same support
          have been provided via Siberia (which some was)?  Were those
          units tied up by the U.S. and the British needed in the East?

          I suspect that without a Britain as a base, FDR would have had to
          formulate a strategy to retake the Island, perhaps via Eire or
          Iceland.  That would have taken years, as long as the Soviets
          held out.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 18:50:48 +0100
From:    "H.G. Henry" <[email-masked]>
Subject: INFO-BARBAROSSA

Forthcoming academic book is *Erickson, John & Dikes, eds. David.
BARBAROSSA, THE AXIS AND THE ALLIES. University of Edinburgh Press, 1994.*
This is a collection of recently written essays by such prominent people
as the editors as well as F. H. Hinsley and Gabriel Gorodetsky.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 13:53:50 -0400
From:    Jim Broussard <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Definition of MOS

>A ex-marine student of mine used the term MOS in a recent essay.  I knew
>what he was speaking of, but I asked him to give the actual words instead
>of using MOS.  This way even people unfamiliar with the Corps would
>understand what it was he was refering to.  He did not know what MOS was
>short for and neither do I.  Could someone out there help us with this
>problem.

>Many thanks,

>C.K. Bryant
>[email-masked]

        Well, when I was in the Army in charge of the office
        writing several MOS tests, I always thought it meant
        "Military Occupational Specialty."

        Jim Broussard

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 10:52:04 PDT
From:    Alan Hepburn <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Definition of MOS

C. K. Bryant asks: ...what does MOS mean...?"

Military Occupational Specialty

---

Alan Hepburn            "Freedom is increasingly defined as the accumulation
National Semiconductor   of rights and entitlements, and as a license for any
Santa Clara, Ca          form of self-gratification."
[email-masked]                                       Zbigniew Brzezinski

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 14:30:17 -0400
From:    Steven VEST <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: USAAF Shuttle-Bombing

     I have a bit of a follow up on both halves of your postings.  My
uncle was one of the pilots that flew B-17 shuttles to Russia.  He said
that another real problem they had was that the Russians stole them
blind.  Not individually but as a state sponsored act.  The soviet army
was responsible for base security and they ran a very tight ship.
However, more than once they would awake in the morning to find that
EVERYTHING of any material value would disappear from a portion of the
base.  One morning they awoke to find that every Russian ground crew
member on the entire base was missing (not to be seen again) along with
every tool, spare part and provision.  He felt certain, that this was a
policy of the Soviet military to obtain materials through a very informal
"lend lease".

     I was touched by your story of the Airman, but not as surprised as
most.  I'm originally from Ohio and (God willing) I'll return there soon
;'). People in that state tend to take the military and its role in our
country very seriously.  We tend to be a patriotic bunch.

==========================[email-masked]===========================
= Steven Vest: Head, Off Campus Lib. Services: Nova University, Ft. Ldl, FL =
="You know that these are not the best of times.                           =
=                But they're the only times I've ever known."    Billy Joel=
================No statements made here reflect Nova University==============

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 19:23:12 +0000
From:    Gudmundur Helgason <[email-masked]>
Subject: Sea Lion (the RN part)

        Would The RN have brought in their massive fleet (especially the
Cruisers and Battleships) in to halt the Sea Lion? I mean it would
likely have been decimated by Luftwaffe's torpedo bombers (30.000ton
battleship is not that agile).

        Had the RN brought in their fleet and had it been largely sunken
or badly damaged then the Battle of the Atlantic would have been in
pretty bad shape I think. RN assistance in defence of Sea Lion would
likely have resulted in lifting a part of the blockade on Germany.

        Does anyone have the RN plans in the event of Sea Lion?

Gudmundur J. Helgason                      E-mail:    [email-masked]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Patriotism is the arrogance of assuming that your country is the greatest
 one there is, simply because *you* were born there".
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 15:16:54 EDT
From:    MR SKIP WILDER <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Definition of MOS

Cheryl,
        MOS = Military Occupational Specialty

Regards,
 -----------------------------------------------------------
 |    Skip Wilder              |                           |
 |    [email-masked]      |"The road to hell is paved |
 |    FAX (703)528-2103        | with good intentions."    |
 |    McLean, Virginia, U.S.A. |                           |
 -----------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 15:42:13 EDT
From:    Lowe Barrett MAJ <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Definition of MOS

CK,

MOS = Military Occupational Specialty

Bear

>This is probably the wrong place to ask this question, but I know that
>there are some Leathernecks out there who might be able to help me.
>
>A ex-marine student of mine used the term MOS in a recent essay.  I knew
>what he was speaking of, but I asked him to give the actual words instead
>of using MOS.  This way even people unfamiliar with the Corps would
>understand what it was he was refering to.  He did not know what MOS was
>short for and neither do I.  Could someone out there help us with this
>problem.
>
>Many thanks,
>
>C.K. Bryant
>[email-masked]
>*******************************************************************
>"The Riskier the road, the greater the profit."    / C.K. Bryant
>        The 62nd Rule of Acquisition               / W.I.U. English
>*******************************************************************
>

Barrett F. Lowe               RANGERS LEAD THE WAY!
MAJ, IN
Dept of Physics, West Point  (e-mail:  [email-masked])

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 15:42:15 EDT
From:    Ingalls Steven MAJ <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Definition of MOS

The term MOS is not specific to the Marine Corps and stands for Military
Occupational Specialty, or the skill each soldier or marine would specialize in
while serving.

MAJ Stephen Ingalls
USMA, West Point
FLY ARMY!

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 15:43:49 EDT
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Patton's phantom army

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  18-Apr-1994 03:43pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Re: TAC: Patton's phantom army

    The way I understood it, the phantom army of Patton's was held in
    England at least until July 1944 to continue to freeze the German
    Fifteenth Army so it could not be sent to support the German Seventh
    Army in Normandy.  Just because the Allies were established on the
    Continent did not mean they wished to have more German divisions
    opposing them than necessary.

    That the false invasion plan (FORTITUDE, wasn't it?) worked so well for
    so long is quite an endorcement for deception plans.  One would guess
    that one of the main reasons it was effective for so long was that the
    combination of Patton and the narrowest point in the Channel were too
    enticing.

    BTW, anyone read _The Year of the Rat_, a book purporting that the
    false invastion plan was delivered to the Germans by a look-alike
    double.

    Doug McCabe

Received:  18-Apr-1994 03:43pm

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 12:45:10 -0700
From:    "Office TH325, Extension 3566" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Patton's phantom army

>On Mon, 18 Apr 1994, Office TH325, Extension 3566 wrote:
>
>> Patton had the phony army until July when he was in France and General
>> McNair was brought in to continue the deception.  He was
>> killed in late July during operation Cobra when Amerian bombs fell on
>> their own lines.  Two weeks later his son was killed on Guam.
>>

>I am just curious why the ruse continued into July.  The phantom army was
>created primarily as a smoke screen to hide the actual site of the
>planned invasion, which began June 6, 1944.
>
>Any insight into this would be aprreciated.

I don't know if I have any insight, but Bradley, in "A General's Life"
says:

     Patton arrived secretly in France on Jyly 6, as our breakout was
     failing.  He was still much under cover, part of the Fortitude plan
     to keep the Germans thinkng he would lead the fictional First Army
     Group ashore at Pas de Calais.  We would endeavor to continue that
     fiction, even after Patton's Third Army became operational in
     Normandy.  Lesley J. McNair was en route to England to "replace"
     Patton in command of the fictitious First Army Group.

John Riegsecker
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of Puget Sound

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 14:44:25 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Operation Sea Lion: A Costly Mistake

Hello, Chuck!

>         I believe that the National Socialists would have won the war if
> Barbarossa had never been launced, or at least delayed, until after launching
> Sea Lion, which the German Navy under Doenitz insisted would not work.

    Which war do you mean? If England had been beaten, then it would
have taken the Germans a long time to 1) consolidate their gains and
pacify the country, 2) build up forces for the push against Russia.
Then you must ask yourself the question, what would be the posture of
the US? This country would most certainly have come to the aid of
the Soviets, if that had been possible. The war against the Soviets
would not have been a certain win for Hitler, and I don't think that
Hitler, in the end, would have been victorious without some basic
revision in his attitude toward the "Untermenschen" and he would have
most certainly faced failure going to war against Stalin without a
just and well-defined Eastern policy.

>         I disagree. I believe it would have worked although there would have
> frightful casualties. On the whole, Ribbentrop, Hitler's "second Bismark," was a
> pathetic political hack who was unfit to hold the post he did but he quite
> correct in insisting that England had to be neutralized before "lebensraum"
> could be realized.

    That is questionable, but you are right in that the casualty
figures would have been horrible, as they were anyway.

>         If Germany had placed its economy on a total war footing in 1940
> (contrary to popular belief, Hitler insisted the economy could produce both
> bullets and butter and accordingly, the German economy was never placed on a war
> footing until 1944) and diverted all resources toward smashing England the
> outcome of the war would have been decidedly different.

    Really not until 1942 was the German economy placed on a full-
time war footing.

>         Yet despite Hitler's fondness of quoting Napolean, who described Britain
> as a "nation of shopkeepers," Hitler harbored a secret fondness for Britain and
> her empire. I believe this is the reason he allowed the B.E.D. to escape at
> Dunkirk. His intent was to send a message to Whitehall that he was willing to be
> reasonable. It was one of his greatest blunders.

    Perhaps, but that question has never been resolved and probably
will never be. That is only one interpretation to what happened at
Dunkirk.

>         Question: Does anyone on the list believe that if Hitler had bought to
> England to its knees - had he forced England to lie prostrate in front of him -
> could Barbarossa _then_ have been launched with success?

    See above.

>         Terry, what do you think in particular? Should the Armed Forces - despit
> e
> the cost - diverted all of its resources to bringing England to its knee's,
> including building a a staggering number of U-Boats to sink needed tonnage?
>
    England may have been beaten or forced to sue for peace if the U-
boat situation had been more favorable for the Germans, but it would
have taken much longer. I really think that invasion of the British
Isles had been possible and more than likely successful, if the BEF
had been forced to surrender intact on the continent, and an
immediate invasion of the British Isles thereafter. There would have
been nothing to stop the Germans from occupying the country. Six
weeks is all it would have taken, if the Germans had gained a
foothold on the island. That is a guestimate on my part, but the
Brits would have had it.

    All the best.

    Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 14:49:55 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 20 July 1994: 50 year commemoration??

Hello, again, Chuck!

> Does anyone happen to know if the German authorities are planning a
> commemoration of any sort at the statue in Berlin honoring Colonel
> Stauffenberg??

    Not to my knowledge, but there are some monuments already in
existence in Berlin honoring the conspirators. One is Ploetzensee
Prison, the place where the conspirators were slowly strangled on
piano wire, the Bendlerstrasse also has a plaque on the wall of the
spot on which von Stauffenberg, Merz von Quirnheim, Werner von
Haeften were shot.

> I cannot think of a more appropriate commemoration ceremony and am wondering
> what the rest of you think. For those who do not know, on 20 July 1944
> Stauffenberg made the _best_ (but obviously still unsuccessful) attempt to kill
> Hitler.

    Agreed.

> Goebbels must be given full credit for saving the situation.

    And Major (later Generalmajor, promoted Colonel on the spot by
Hitler) Otto Remer.

> Question: When did the statue honoring Stauffenberg finally get erected in
> Berlin? Do most young Germans even know about Stauffenberg? Is this taught in
> German schools?

    No. Not specifically.
> I would bet my life that if I pulled 1,000 Americans at random off of the
> streets of America not one of them could tell me who Claus von Stauffenberg was.

    I would second that.

>
> Anyone disagree with that?

    I don't.

    Hope this helps.

    Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 14:53:03 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: von Stauffenberg memorial?

Hello, Ken and Chuck!

> Even if the Germans don't commemmorate it, the actual site (of the
>   Fuehrer Bunker) should be in ... Poland?  I would think the
>   Poles would help see something built, if it hasn't been
>   already.

    The Fuehrerbunker at Rastenberg, East Prussia is a favorite
tourist attraction in that part of the world. What better monument to
those conspirators, as well as Ploetzensee Prison.

    Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 15:56:29 EDT
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Re[2]: Russian front, end of war...?

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  18-Apr-1994 03:45pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Re: Re[2]: Russian front, end of war...?

    The Allies did give some little thought to the problems of the bocage
    country.  Note the plows mounted on the front of Sherman tanks,
    intended to plow through the hedgegrows.  Still, as Joe well mentions,
    OJT was the operable method of fighting.  (Even if there had been
    hundreds of Sherman plows there would have the problem of bottlenecks
    and chokepoints at the hedge breaches.

    Is it possible that a minor priority of OVERLORD was to serve as a
    cover to the deception plan?  Here I mean that attacking Normandy (with
    all its disadvantages - tactical, logistic, and such) could still fool
    the Germans into believing (until too late) the main attack was to be
    at the Pas de Calis.  Calculated risk which barely worked since the
    Allies were 'way behind schedule before the breakout leaving the
    Germans plenty of time to counterattack from the east and north.

    Doug McCabe

Received:  18-Apr-1994 03:56pm

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 14:55:50 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Definition of MOS

Hello, Cheryl!

MOS stands for Military Occupational Skill.

Hope this helps.

Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 16:09:31 -0400
From:    "Steven Pudlo, Dept. Computer Svcs." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Operation Sea Lion: A Costly Mistake

IMHO, the "retaking" of Britain would not be a subject of interest to many
Americans, should the isles fall into German hands. The logistics of such a
huge endeavor would be daunting enough without the Pacific conflict to think
of. We didn't have the resources.

Just think of trying to maintain a huge assault force across an unfriendly
ocean!

The time this would have bought the Germand would have allowed them to continue
production of the various V-type rockets and missles listed in earlier posts,
while giving the German heavy water project more time to develop the bomb.

Methinks we were closer to nuclear holocaust then and there (though the bombs
were not yet invented) then anytime since. We certainly would have used them
in Europe, and the Germans would have placed them atop their missiles and
pointed them at New York.

Thinking back historically, it was better the war in Europe ended before
somebody used the bomb. Had either side had it, it may be safe to say they
would have used it. Nobody knew exactly what they had at the time, and the
potential is ghastly.

MTC (My Two Cents)
                                                                Steve

P.S. Don't forget the cost of diverting resources to Europe would have meant
        in the Pacific theatre!

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 15:27:56 GMT-6
From:    Terry Moore <[email-masked]>
Subject: Rheintochter

Hello, Gudmundur!

Here goes with some more info.

                      Rheintochter

A ground-launched sub-sonic anti-aircraft rocket, developed by
Rheinmetall-Borsig and launched from a ramp based on a converted 88mm
Flak 41 anti-aircraft gun carriage. The missle was guided by radio
command, using optical tracking aided by flares attached to the
missle. Take-off weight was 3850lbs and weight on arriving at the
target was 1650 lbs, the balance being expended fuel. Both the boost
and sustainer motors used solid fuel in the form of diglycol
propellant sticks. The warhead contained 330 lbs of high explosive
and was fitted with the Kranich (q.v.) accoustic proximity fuze.

The project began when (in 1942) Rheinmetall received an order to
develop a solid-fuel anti-aircraft rocket with a ceiling of 8km. Test
began in August 1943 at Libau near the Baltic and by 5 Jan 1945, some
82 had been fired of which only 4 had failed. Up to July 1944, 34 had
been fired and it seems that after that date, it was treated as a
development and test vehicle for Rheintochter 3 and there was no
intention to place it in service as a weapon. On 6 Feb 1945,
development was stopped, though there are unconfirmed reports of a
demonstration which was to have taken place on 20 Feb 1945 in which
20 missles were to be fired.

More tomorrow.

Terry

Terry Moore, Professor of German and French, Amarillo College
P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, Texas 79178, voice 806-371-5077
fax 806-371-5370

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 17:48:02 -0400
From:    James Stuht <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Definition of MOS

>
>A ex-marine student of mine used the term MOS in a recent essay.  I knew
>what he was speaking of, but I asked him to give the actual words instead
>of using MOS.  This way even people unfamiliar with the Corps would
>understand what it was he was refering to.  He did not know what MOS was
>short for and neither do I.  Could someone out there help us with this
>problem.
>
>Many thanks,
>
>C.K. Bryant
>[email-masked]

When I was in the service (late 60's), we understood it to mean "Military
Occupational Specialty".
+===========================++=============================================+
|    James L. Stuht         ||                                             |
|    UW - Madison           ||   "History is a set of lies agreed upon"    |
|    School of Music        ||                                             |
|                           ||                                             |
|    [email-masked]    ||                  Napoleon                   |
| [email-masked] ||                                             |
+===========================++=============================================+

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 16:12:56 EDT
From:    "Jonah Triebwasser, Adjunct Instructor,
         Marist Coll" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INFO-Ultra signals/Public Record Office, London

There is a wealth of WWII material which I understand is open to
view by appointment at the FDR Library. I believe that access is
for scholars only, but why not write to them at their e-mail
address of [email-masked] and see what they can do for
you. Regards-

Jonah Triebwasser
Adjunct Instructor
Marist College
Dyson Building (Adult Education)
Poughkeepsie, New York12601
Tel: (914) 575-3331, ext. 7037
E-Mail: [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 16:42:23 -0500
From:    GEORGE BAUER <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Definition of MOS

In the army, it was Military Occupational Specialty.  I assume it is the same.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 15:45:14 PDT
From:    Alan Hepburn <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Definition of MOS

It was written:

"The term MOS is not specific to the Marine Corps and stands for
Military Occupational Specialty, or the skill each soldier or marine
would specialize in while serving."

It was my experience that the MOS was the skill that the government
spent thousands of dollars educating the troops for, so they could
assign them to some arbitrary position once training was complete!

---

Alan Hepburn            "Is life so dear or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at
National Semiconductor  the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God!
Santa Clara, Ca          I know not what course others may take, but as for me,
[email-masked]     give me liberty or give me death!"    -- Patrick Henry

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 19 Apr 1994 01:06:31 +0200
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Re[2]: Russian front, end of war...?

On Mon, 18 Apr 1994, Ken Koester wrote:

> However, I have a map of Germany on my wall.  The Dutch coast has caught
> my eye during this thread.  Why not invade from Amsterdam to Frisia? The
> barrier islands couldn't have been too strongly defended; the coast would
> have been flat & easily dominated by naval gunfire; good ports would have
> been much closer at hand; and you're 300 miles closer to Berlin.

Part of the problem is the 'flatness' of this coast, on both sides of the
coastlines. The water is shallow, with obvious dangers for an invasion
fleet; especially around these 'barrier islands' large pieces of land
surface only at ebb.  The land is also flat, and large parts of it
are/were below sea level; they can easily be flooded, making life easier
for the defender. The Dutch defence of 1940 was based on the 'waterline'
and the Germans and Canadians also made good use of it in 1945.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 19 Apr 1994 01:36:59 +0200
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Operation Sea Lion: A Costly Mistake

On Mon, 18 Apr 1994, Chuck Weckesser wrote:

>         Question: Does anyone on the list believe that if Hitler had bought to
> England to its knees - had he forced England to lie prostrate in front of him -
> could Barbarossa _then_ have been launched with success?

The advantages in defeating England first, in 1941, would have been for
the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. The British army was not strong enough for
more than some limited attacks in the Mediterranean.

Especially the Luftwaffe suffered from the continuing war with Britain;
from 1942 onwards the RAF increased the pressure and gained some
superiority over the Luftwaffe. The 1000-aircraft attack on Cologne,
'Operation Millenium', was on 30 May.  The need to defend the 'Reich' and
to have units in the Mediterranean reduced the air support for Barbarossa;
if I remember well the attack was pursued with less than 2500 aircraft on
the eastern front. Without a war on the Western front the Luftwaffe
probably would not have lost air superiority in the East.

For the Kriegsmarine it would have been much easier to stop the convoys of
lend-lease goods to the USSR with the British fleet much reduced in
strength, or moved to bases in Canada. If the British had gone for peace,
and because the US fleet was busy in the Pacific, Raeder and Doenitz could
have controlled the Atlantic. In that case the supplies for the USSR could
only have been shipped to Vladivostok! As it was, the routes from Germany
to the North Atlantic were watched by the RN, and the submarine bases in
France were under constant (if ineffective) attack from the RAF and USAAF.

The consequences of all this are difficult to judge, however. The problem
is that German strategy and tactics on the Eastern front were determined
by Hitler, and he soon cared little about logic or common sense. Maybe
there would have been a Stalingrad anyway.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 19:37:00 -0400
From:    DAVID WILMA 415-744-2485 <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Operation Sea Lion: A Costly Mistake

          In reply to Steve Pudlo's comments on the fall of Britain:

          The retaking of Britain need not have involved a strike all the
          way from North America.  It could be considered as part of an
          island hopping campaign ala Pacific Iceland, Ireland, Britain.

          As far as resources, the U.S. did not have the resources in 42,
          but that was before the Industrial Miracle.

          Nuclear weapons on missiles?  That is a bit of a reach.  Even the
          U.S. going all out could produce only two airplane dropped
          weapons by the middle of 1945 and then that was it.  All gone.
          To expect that of Germany would be too much.  Besides, even with
          Britain in Allied hands, Hitler was so confident of victory that
          he discouraged things like new fighter development as a waste of
          time.

          Loss of Britain would have been catastrophic, but not decisive.

          Dave Wilma

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 14:19:54 -0400
From:    "Dennis E. Sparks" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Walter Boerner lecture .vs. autobiography

David Wilma asks if the French would have accepted Boerner,
allowing him to fly combat missions.

This was another part of his book that I found puzzling.
His account of flying for the French was taken from the lecture
at Wright Pat.  His book contains no mention of any such thing.

According to his lecture, he escaped prison in Berlin after it was
damaged during an American bombing raid.  He made his way towards
Switzerland, but decided enroute that the border was too heavily
guarded to escape via that route.  Turning west, he ran into the
French (1st Army?).  After interrogation and recovering from his
ordeal, he requested to be allowed to fly as an artillery spotter.
He reported that he flew a Stinson L-5 with a French artillery
onboard.  After some time, he told his captors that he really
admired the P-47 Thunderbolt, and cadged an unofficial flight
in one, and bombed a German ammo dump.  On the strength of this,
he was given made a non-commisioned pilot officer in the French
Air Force.  Again, this is all from his lecture.

His autobiography makes no mention of any of this.  In this account,
Boerner was shot in the leg by a German patrol.  His hiding place
was overrun by the French, who took him to a field hospital.  There
is no mention of flying for the French AF.  The postscript, written
by Maj. Wallace C. Upson (USAF, ret.), says only that the war in
Europe ended soon after Boerner was released from the hospital.
While the two accounts are not mutually exclusive, why not tell of
his later experiences in the book?

Dennis E. Sparks
[email-masked]
Lexington, Kentucky

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 18 Apr 1994 18:33:33 PDT
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Re[2]: Russian front, end of war...?

That device attached to tanks in the bocage was an on-the-spot invention
by an ingenious US Army sergeant.

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 17 Apr 1994 to 18 Apr 1994
*************************************************