Subject: WWII-L Digest - 22 May 1994 to 23 May 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 24 May 1994 00:02:38 -0400

There are 29 messages totalling 1158 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. cOMPUTER GAMES
  2. INF: USN Chronology 05-23-94
  3. Once more into the breach, dear friends!
  4. {INF} USAAF 23 MAY 44
  5. B-24 (2)
  6. Criteria of Greatness
  7. First word on the Zero (2)
  8. WEAP: Anglo-American ArmoUr deficient? (5)
  9. GEN: Channel Islands (2)
 10. [SCI/POL/GEN/???] First word on the Zero. (2)
 11. INF: Regia Marina, Part 4
 12. INTRODUCTION-HUGH G HENRY
 13. Fw: Checking in,
 14. LCI(L)-758
 15. D-DAY: Which is it?
 16. <No subject given>
 17. MEDIA: CBS Reports
 18. AIRSHIPS (2)
 19. WEAP: Artillery (2)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 00:14:48 -0400
From:    Walter O'Hara <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: cOMPUTER GAMES

Keep looking.

If you want to pop for a commercial game, try the UTAH BEACH and
GOLD,JUNO, SWORD editions of V for Victory.

Walt O'Hara
[email-masked]
[email-masked]
[email-masked]

On Fri, 20 May 1994, Burt Knight wrote:

> Looking for the 'BEST' shareware game about DDay.  Any suggestions??

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 01:33:37 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 05-23-94

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1944
05/23 Tue. Aircraft from carrier task group (Rear Adm. A. E.
           Montgomery) bomb buildings and other targets on Wake
           Island.
            United States naval vessels damaged:
             Light cruiser PHILADELPHIA (CL-41), and destroyer
              LAUB (DD-613), by collision, Italian area,
              41 d. 11' N., 12 d. 30' e.
            Japanese submarine sunk:
             RO-104, by destroyer escort ENGLAND (DE-635), north
              of Bismarck Archipelago,
              01 d. 26' N., 149 d. 20' E.

Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 07:15:40 -0400
From:    Dan Ford <[email-masked]>
Subject: Once more into the breach, dear friends!

(The ragged lines comes from DowVision format)

CLINTON PROCLAIMS ARMED FORCES DAY, FOCUSES ON MILITARY
Source: NY      Date: May 22, 1994              Time: 10:41 pm

By DOUGLAS JEHL
c.1994 N.Y. Times News Service
   SACRAMENTO, Calif. - Two weeks before he will commemorate the 50th
anniversary of the allied invasion of Europe, President Clinton went out of his way
Saturday to put his own stamp on Armed Forces Day, a holiday first set aside by
President Harry S. Truman.
   Last year, Clinton neglected to issue a proclamation officially designating
the holiday, something each of his nine predecessors had done. But he made
amends Saturday in a celebratory appearance at McClellan Air Force Base here, an
installation barely spared from the latest round of base closings.
   ``The nation's peace and stability are in very capable hands,'' Clinton
declared in his belated proclamation of Saturday's holiday, which he signed before
a crowd of 6,000 and a flock of Air Force aircraft including an F-117 Stealth
fighter-bomber. ``We are deeply grateful.''
   Clinton, who avoided military service during the Vietnam War, has
encountered distrust and hostility from some in the armed forces since he became
commander in chief. His aides have expressed some apprehension that his background
could become an issue when he travels to Europe on June 1 to pay tribute to the
sacrifice of the Americans who helped to liberate Rome and led the D-Day landing
on Omaha Beach in 1944.
   But in advance of his trip, Clinton has taken pains to forge a better bond
with the military and its leaders, in part by drawing a firm line in warning
the House of Representatives against further cuts in military spending. The
president also invited Sheila Widnall, the Air Force secretary, to join him on his
two-day trip to California, and she introduced him here Saturday.
   In Washington, the White House was opened to military personnel and their
families in honor of Armed Forces Day. In the days before he leaves for Europe,
Clinton has also scheduled a further flurry of mili.
tary-oriented events,
including the posthumous presentation on Monday for heroism in Somalia of the first
two medals of honor issued since the Vietnam War.
   The president also will speak on Wednesday at commencement ceremonies for
the U.S. Naval Academy. Aides said that on next Monday, Memorial Day, he planned
to unveil a postage stamp honoring veterans who took part in the D-Day
invasion.
   22:41 EDT   MAY 21, 1994

Cheers - Dan     <[email-masked]>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 07:59:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: {INF} USAAF 23 MAY 44

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
TUESDAY, 23 MAY 1944
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-36, North American Apache
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-39, Bell Airacobra
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA (CBI) THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 12 P-38s bomb Tiddim road; 12
B-24s bomb the Indaw marshalling yard and Homalin; 16 P-38s attack Kangaung
Airfield; and 23 P-40s and 4 A-36s bomb gun positions, troops and supply
dumps in the Myitkyina area.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 364: 1,045 bombers and 562
fighters are dispatched to hit airfields and rail targets in France; 3
bombers are lost:
  1. 580 B-17s are dispatched to the marshalling yard at Metz (34 bomb),
Epinal (36 bomb) and Chaumont (54 bomb); airfields at Orleans/Bricy (17 bomb)
and Chateaudun (18 bomb); secondary targets hit are marshalling yards at
Saarbrucken, Germany (139 bomb), Bayon (12 bomb), the town of Neunkirchen,
Germany (37 bomb), Caen/Carpiquet Airfield (18 bomb) and 12 hit targets of
opportunity; 2 B-17s are lost, 2 damaged beyond repair and 50 damaged; 12
airmen are KIA and 4 WIA.
  2. 465 B-24s are dispatched to hit airfields at Orleans/Bricy (167 bomb),
Bourges (84 bomb), Avord (88 bomb) and Etampes/Mondesir (97 bomb); 1 aircraft
hits a target of opportunity; 1 B-24 is lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 33
damaged; 10 airmen are KIA and 10 MIA.
  Escort is provided by 96 P-38s, 142 P-47s and 324 P-51s; none are lost and
no Luftwaffe aircraft are claimed; 1 P47 is damaged beyond repair and 1 P-47
and 1 P-51 are damaged; 644 Ninth Air Force fighters also participate with
the loss of 2 P-38s and 2 P-47s.
  Mission 365: 103 P-51s are dispatched to bomb a railroad bridge at Hasselt,
Belgium; 75 bomb escorted by 14 acting as top cover; 1 P-51 is lost, the
pilot is MIA.
  Mission 366: 4 of 5 B-17s drop 928,000 leaflets on Belgium and The
Netherlands without loss.
  7 B-24s are dispatched on CARPETBAGGER operations.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In France, 15 B-26s bomb the
airfield at Beaumont-le-Roger in a predawn attack; during the afternoon 58
B-26s bomb coastal batteries at Etretat/Sainte-Marie-Au-Bosc, Maisy and Mont
Fleury; and 120+ P-38s strafe and bomb rolling stock in C France.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): In Italy, 300+ B-17s and B-24s
concentrate attacks on troop concentrations and communications in the rear of
the battle area, at Avezzano, Subiaco, Valmontone, Marino, Nemi and
Grottaferrata; P-38s and P-51s provide escort; other P-38s, covered by P-47s,
strafe the airfield at Ferrara.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, medium bombers abort
missions because of weather; light bombers hit communications between
Cisterna di Roma and Campoleone; fighter-bombers actively support the general
offensive of Allied ground forces in the Liri Valley and at Anzio where US
and British forces break out of the beachhead; fighters on armed
reconnaissance join in the attacks and numerous enemy vehicles, gun
positions, transport routes and personnel are hit hard in areas in and around
Terracina, Littoria, Norma, Marcigliana, Fara in Sabina, Borghetto, Arezzo
and Civita Castellena; and a marshalling yard on the Empoli-Siena line is
also hit.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA, Seventh Air Force): Makin Island-based B-25s strike
Jaluit Atoll. B-24s returning from Los Negros Island, where they landed after
the raid on Rota on 21 May, bomb Ponape Island.

SOUTH PACIFIC AREA (SOPAC, Thirteenth Air Force): On New Britain Island, 2
B-24s bomb Tobera, while 32 B-25s and 40+ P-39s, P-38s and P-40s attack gun
positions near Rabaul, near Lakunai and in the vicinity of Tunnel Hill Road.
On Bougainville Island, 51 P-39s and 8 P-40s attack huts, barges, bridges and
other targets of opportunity at several locations.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA (SWPA, Fifth Air Force): In New Guinea, B-24s hit
Manokwari while B-24s, A-20s and P-38s hit targets on Biak Island, including
trucks at Borokoe, AA positions and control tower at Mokmer Airfield, the
village of Sorido and offshore targets at Bransfari; P-40s hit troops on
Wakde Island and on the Biri River; P-38s support ground forces in the Aitape
area; A-20s, P-39s. B-24s and B-25s maintain bombing and strafing of the
Wewak-Hansa Bay area.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 08:16:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: B-24

I saw news coverage of President Clinton's trip to McClellan AFB, Sacramento,
California over the weekend.  I one film clip, there was a B-24 Liberator
behind him.  Does anyone have any info on this aircraft?

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 13:40:28 BST
From:    Stephen Baldwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Criteria of Greatness

Greetings Bill + all...

Bill Huber writes...
>       Regarding the question of what makes greatness in military command the
>       base line has to be accomplishing the mission.  It does no good to
>       keep casualties low if all you end up doing is delivering more
>       manpower to the enemy in terms of slave labor once they have defeated
>       your armed forces.
true. But the opposite is also true in that a commander who bleeds
his army for the sake of a single objective is not particularly clever,
and, in all probability, is a First World War commander...
How many casualties is "acceptable" depends on the politics of the
situation at home as much as "in the field"...

>
>       After the mission is accomplished then look to minimizing casualties,
>       saving time and using less logistics.  I think Americans like Patton
>       because he delivered his victories in minimum time and we tend to like
>       quick resolutions (Desert Storm is a good example).  If it drags out
>       we loose interest.  That is one reason we had trouble in South East
>       Asia.  The Vietnamese were prepared to fight a few more generations
>       where that sort of thing is counter to our idea of how to resolve a
>       conflict.
yes....although as I understand it, it was the politics of se asia that
played a large part in the US pull out...[ASIDE to our US colleagues
on the list - NO - this is not another excuse to have another re-run
of US s.e. asia policy...fascinating though it is to y'all :-)]

>
>       Speaking for myself, I like Patton because he felt that wars were won
>       on the offensive and that once you had them on the run you don't let
>       up.  Rommel was the same way.  He was an opportunist extraordinaire, a
>       master of exploiting situations on the battlefield as they developed
>       and taking advantage of every opportunity to its fullest.
T'would have been interesting to see how he would have fared on the
western front 1914-18 - 'cos it was exactly this offensive spirit
that drove the "donkey" generals to plan their ludicrous offensives...
[implication is _not_ that Patton was a donkey btw]
>
>       Rommel's personal leadership qualities are what make him on of my
>       favorite commanders.  In his book "Infantrie Greift An" he explains
>       that an effective commander is one that sees to it that his men are
>       provisioned, supplied, bedded down or whatever before he looks to his
>       own needs AND he sees to it that his men SEE that this is so.  This
>       accounts for Rommel's popularity among his own troops.
>
>       Rommel also took personal command when the mission was particularly
>       risky.  So, in essence, mission accomplishment and speed are primary
>       factors for greatness in command in my opinion.  Speed because quick
>       resolutions are cheaper in casualties than protracted efforts.
>
>       That's about all I can think of for a Friday at midnight....
good grief man. Home to bed immediately!

I guess it is not possible to get a general who is both a great
tactician and also personable, having a degree of compassion, and a
grasp of the politics of war. Different generals thrive under different
circumstances. As said previously, Monty seemed most at home in a
 slog, and Patton in a mobile battle. I wonder what would have happened
if Patton had been in front of Caen, and Monty in charge of the
"wrapping it up" department.... Ike (so I'm told) was not a
particularly outstanding tactician, but very few doubt the wisdom of
his appointment as the big cheese where his diplomatic skills were
indispenable.

maybe we have to subdivide "greatness"
into strategic/tactical/humane/diplomatic....

with the over-arching proviso that all of them won more battles than
they lost.

steve

BTW
a colleague has just passed me the Sunday Times whose News Review
section has a full front page of Alistair Horne's book "The Lonely
Leader, Monty 1944-45" published today....
Not exactly news though is it?? :-)

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 07:45:47 -0500
From:    John Lundstrom <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: First word on the Zero

With regard to the first word on the Zero, received in the U.S. in late
summer 1941, the high command might not have believed it. However, a lowly
USN fighting squadron commander (of VF-3), Lieut. John S. ("Jimmy") Thach,
in the Saratoga Air Group, certainly took note. In September 1941 after
reading of this new Japanese fighter in the Fleet Air Tactical Unit Bulletin,
he realized that it outperformed the Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat his squadron was
just receiving. Thus he devised the defensive tactics later christened the
"Thach Weave." So, not everyone was unprepared.
                John Lundstrom   Milwaukee Public Museum

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 08:35:15 EDT
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP: Anglo-American ArmoUr deficient?

On Fri, 20 May 1994 11:27:50 -0500 Louis R. Coatney said:
>A tank wasn't designed *just* for tank vs. tank use.  The Sherman
>  was an excellent, reliable, mobile -- indeed, FAST -- tank with
>  adequate armament.

Not really.  Its main gun was hopeless against Tigers & not much better
against Panthers.  The Sherman's biggest virtues were that it was robust
& cheap to mass-produce.

>True, at various times the Germans would pull ahead, but we caught
>  up soon enough, and in mass.  The American Grant tank was superior
>  to the Mark III Special at Gazala (Jun42).  The American Sherman
>  was superior to the Mark IVF/Special at El Alamein.

Debatable at best.  The Grant main gun was carried in a limited movement
hull sponson which limited its effectiveness.  (Aside from which,
coordinating everything going on in that beast must have given its
commanders schizophrenia!)

>The British Matilda was superior to the German tanks, until El
>  Alamein (when I believe it was withdrawn).

?  It was under-gunned & under-powered.  The armor was superior, but what
good is that if you can't get to the right place at the right time?

>The Sherman was regularly up-gunned:  75mm, 76mm, 90mm, and in
>  Israel, even 105mm (I believe)!  The latewar M26 Pershing
>  (with its generous armor and 90mm gun) was the equal of the
>  Tiger or Panther, and considerably more mobile/reliable.

The British up-gunned the Sherman, but the great majority of tanks in AA
service had the 75 or 76 gun, greatly inferior to the Tigers and Panthers.
The M26 never saw service in great quantity.

>Self-criticism is worthwhile, and an ever-better tank is always
>  desirable.  However, with the exception of the British medium
>  tanks, AA tanks (or at least tank destroyers) ultimately kept
>  pace and -- in the exploitative/cavalry sense -- outpaced
>  the Germans' menagerie.

No, they substituted quantity for quality.  Their quality was sufficient
to make this a good trade, from the AA point of view.

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 09:47:43 -0400
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: First word on the Zero

John Lundstrom writes:
> With regard to the first word on the Zero, received in the U.S. in late
> summer 1941, the high command might not have believed it. However, a lowly
> USN fighting squadron commander (of VF-3), Lieut. John S. ("Jimmy") Thach,
> in the Saratoga Air Group, certainly took note. In September 1941 after
> reading of this new Japanese fighter in the Fleet Air Tactical Unit Bulletin,
> he realized that it outperformed the Grumman F4F-3 Wildcat his squadron was
> just receiving. Thus he devised the defensive tactics later christened the
> "Thach Weave." So, not everyone was unprepared.
>                 John Lundstrom   Milwaukee Public Museum

I glommed this from sci.military a few years ago.  I now pass it along to
the list.  The original poster spelled the name "Thatch" using one of John's
books as reference so I'm sure John's spelling is correct.  Apologies for
potentially propogating a misspelling.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
A Sherman can give you a very nice edge.

>From [email-masked] (Charles K. Scott):

Jimmy Thatch conceived the weave in 1941 in reaction to an early report
of a Japanese fighter claiming performance advantages that, if true,
could pose a serious problem for the then standard Navy fighter, the
F4F Wildcat.  He didn't know for sure if the report was accurate, but
felt compelled to devise a defensive tactic just in case.  His
experiments were something he initiated personally and were unknown to
the Navy at that time.  Thatch experimented with match sticks on his
kitchen table late at night.   When he felt he had the tactic that
would work, he arranged for a mock battle with his close friend Butch
O'Hara.  Thatch briefed a wingman on the tactic and tied both his and
his wingman throttles so that neither aircraft could exceed half power
thus simulating the kind of performance differential suggested by the
report.  He then directed Butch to attack at will from any altitude or
direction.  When they landed, Butch was enthusiastic saying that he
couldn't attack from any angle without looking down the barrel of
opposing machine guns and being forced to shear off.  "This really
works Jimmy", he said.

Thatch realised that the problem was to keep enemy fighters of superior
performance or numbers off their tails, or to prevent them from getting
an accurate shot of sufficient duration to shoot them down.  Initially
he designed it for two pairs of fighters but it worked for one pair as
well.  The idea was to space the two pairs out in a loose line abreast.
 The pairs remained pairs; in other words there was to be a number one
with his wingman on one side, and number two with his wingman on the
other.  Each pair was to be spaced the minimum turning radius of the
fighter from the other pair.   The idea was to be able to maneuver out
of the way of the attacking fighters without unnecessary radio talk
because radios fail and sometimes there isn't time to key the mike and
report an attacking fighter.  Operationally, the two pairs were
supposed to turn in towards each other thus clearing their tails and
presenting the incoming fighter with a diminishing target at an ever
increasing deflection angle and at the same time the incoming fighter
is becoming a target himself from the two fighters that are turning
into him (or one fighter, whichever the case may be).  This maneuver
is also called a scissors because the four or two fighters cross each
others tails.  Once the enemy fighter has been brought under fire and
has either been shot down or forced to turn away to save himself, the
two pairs of fighters turn back to their base course but now on
opposite sides and again at the minimum turning radius distance.

You might note that this technique requires absolute attention to the
airspace about you, split second timing to begin the turn at the right
moment and highly accurate shooting to attack the enemy fighter in a
difficult tracking angle.  It is also important to note that EITHER
PAIR can initiate the scissors but usually it was the pair NOT BEING
ATTACKED that had the best view of attacker because the fighter that
was the object of the attack couldn't see directly behind themselves
very well.  It is also interesting to note that the Navy fighter
training had long stressed comprehensive deflection shooting and most
Navy fighter pilots were highly skilled and deadly accurate.

So here is a plausable scenario.  Two fighters are cruising in enemy
territory at combat spread (minimum turning distance).  Suddenly out of
the clouds dart several enemy fighters, they maneuver to attack from the
rear and roll over diving downward and angling towards the righthand
aircraft.  The left hand friendly fighter, observing the attack, delays
his turn until the enemy is committed to the attack then turns right
suddenly towards his wing man.  His wingman now alerted that the enemy
is near by this sudden maneuver drops his left wing and turns toward his
now rapidly approaching teammate and passes over him.  In the meantime,
the enemy fighter or fighters, instead of having a zero deflection tail
shot, have to whip up into a hard turn to stay with the quickly turning
target in order to keep it in their sights.  At this time they have no
shot as the deflection angle has increase and they haven't pulled
enough lead to allow for the turn.  The two friendly fighters pass each
other, the right one over the top and the bottom guy now opens fire on
the approaching enemy fighters in a near zero deflection head-on shot.
The enemy fighters must now either pull up exposing their bellies or
dive away losing their targets.

Some final notes.  This maneuver worked for the Americans because the
Wildcat held up well to combat damage and had good armament.  The
Japanese aircraft could certainly have employed this maneuver for
protection, but their guns were outranged by the .50 cal machine guns
of the Americans and they couldn't take the damage and survive.  Also,
the Japanese standard formations consisted of odd numbers of aircraft
in Vee's which was not as tactically maneuverable. Once the combat
reports were in, the Navy adopted the maneuver as a standard tactic, and
was used to successfully thwart Zero attacks in several specific
combats later on.  It became unofficially known as the Thatch Weave
later in the War.

Source: "The First Team", by Lundstrom, John B, appendix A

Corky Scott

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 10:03:37 -0400
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: GEN: Channel Islands

        I was flipping through the second volume of the Illustrated World
War Two Encyclopedia and came across an interesting photo of a Luftwaffe
officer talking to a British policeman (a bobby) in Jersey.  The caption
mentions this and continues:  "Almost five years were to pass before the
islands, and their starving populations, were liberated on the day after
the German capitulation."  Why did the Allies not try to liberate the
islands during the war (especially after D-Day)?  This was a German trophy
that I would think the British would want to reclaim for political reasons
and their prestige.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
Your crabs will leave you now!

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 09:46:14 CDT
From:    Robert Hohlt <[email-masked]>
Subject: [SCI/POL/GEN/???] First word on the Zero.

Was there anything similar (back in 1930s - 1940s) to the modern
world air shows where all the nations capable of manufacturing
and selling aircraft got together and showed off?

If there were such air shows the US Military powers should have
seen Japanese pilots flying their airplanes and realized
that the Japanese airplanes and Japanese flyers were very good.

During the early war years with Japan in China, our ambassadors
and spys, sent back reports on the capabilities of Japanese
aircraft and pilot skill right???

I doubt any amount of information would have changed any opinions.
You give them data on the Zero they dismiss it.  Show them that
(early) Japanese pilots were as skilled as anyone they dismissed
that too.

We percieved them as having inferior flying skills and machines
(being inferior humans) just as they greatly miscalculated our
resolve to wage war and defeat them.

Yep, thank GOD for Jimmy Thach/Thatch and US aircraft that could take
a beating.

Regards,

Robert Hohlt, Jr.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 10:45:24 -0400
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: Regia Marina, Part 4

        The collapse of Greece, following the German invasion, and the
occupation of Crete in May 1941, improved the Axis strategic situation
in the region.  British naval losses were high during these operations.
Italian fleet units were not involved in these operations due to a lack
of fuel and a reticence for combat after Matapan.  However, Italian light
forces did take part in the Crete operation which included the exploits
of the destroyer escorts "Lupo" and "Sagitarrio".  (No further info is
given on exactly what these exploits were, though.)

        The Axis now controlled the Eastern Mediterranean basin and the
passage of their convoys to North Africa was much more secure.  The Regia
Marina continued to escort all convoys to Africa while the British
continued their attempts to interdict this traffic by naval and air
attacks, frequently at night, relying on radar-equipped light cruisers
and destroyers, submarines and aircraft.  At the same time, Axis pressure
on Malta continued.

        In June 1941, the complexion of the war changed with the German
attack on the Soviet Union.  Many of the German aircraft used to attack
Malta were withdrawn for use against the Russians.  This reduced the pressure
on the island, so that more supplies got through.  The consequences were
immediate.  Malta again began offensive operations and Axis convoy losses
grew, to the point that in November 1941, losses were 63%!  This had the
effect of weakening Axis ground forces in North Africa, whose position
was already precarious due to reduced supplies.  The British in Africa
launched an offensive that took them past Benghazi (the start of the
"Benghazi handicaps").  The situation forced the Italian Navy to carry
troop reinforcements to Africa on destroyers and ruses were employed to
get supplies through.  The fuel situation was so severe that gasoline in
jerry cans was transported by cruisers!  This made the ships exceedingly
vulnerable and two were lost on such missions.

        The gravity of the situation was recognized and additional German
air units were assigned to the theater.  The Italian Navy began to use
their heavy units which expended valuable stocks of fuel, which were
already in short supply. This made the Italians even more dependent on
the irregular German deliveries of Rumanian oil.  These Italian measures,
though, especially the use of heavy units to screen convoys, proved
successful and supplies again were built up in Africa.

        In mid-December 1941, the situation in Africa had again deteriorated
for the Axis.  Following a British ground breakthrough, it was considered
urgent that a convoy get through to resupply the Axis forces.  A convoy of
four large cargo ships was organized, with an escort of eight destroyers.
A close screening force of "Duilio", three cruisers and four destroyers
was provided, with distant support based on "Littorio", "Doria", "Cesare",
two heavy cruisers and ten destroyers.  That such a large segment of the
fleet was involved emphasized the seriousness of the situation.

        Once again, the Italians were working with faulty reconnaissance.
They believed that a British force was steaming to intercept their convoy
when, in fact, the British were escorting their own convoy to Malta.  The
opposing forces met on December 17, 1941.  The British were ordered to
avoid combat until the tanker they were escorting was safe, at which time
a night attack was to be made against the Italians, who had been located.
The Italian distant-covering force was sent to intercept the British.
However, at about 5:00PM, Admiral Iachino decided to retire for two reasons.
The first was that the Italian convoy had been discovered and needed his
support.  The second reason was that he was loath to engage in a night
action against a radar-equipmented opponent when he lacked radar.  After
making this decision, lookouts noted the heavy anti-aircraft fire on the
horizon indicating that the British were under aerial attack.  Iachino
once again turned toward the British and as dusk fell, at 5:53PM, opened
fire, at a range of 32,000 meters, taking the British completely by
surprise.  The British immediately laid down smoke and the opposing
destroyers engaged in a gunnery duel.  By 6:04PM, it was dark and action
was broken off.  Throughout the night, to prevent an attack, Iachino
kept his forces between the British and the Italian convoy, which reached
its destination safely.

        Though there were no losses on either side, the results were
favorable to the Italians.  Significantly, the British had lacked carrier
support in this operation, further evidence of how indispensable these
ships were.  Despite their success, the Italian Navy was poorly served
by land-based air reconnaissance, as they had come upon the British more
by chance than by direction.  Though these ships had been located by and
were under Axis air attack, this information had not been passed on to
Iachino.  Had they located and engaged the British earlier, the Italian
ships might well have inflicted serious damage against the smaller British
ships.

        This action was the First Battle of Sirte.

        The next night, the most singular exploits of the war occurred.
An Italian submarine ferried three two-man torpedos to Alexandria.  They
penetrated the harbor and attached their warheads to the battleships,
"Valiant" (a veteran of Matapan) and "Queen Elizabeth" and a tanker.
The tanker sank when its warhead detonated and the two battleships were
put out of action for a considerable amount of time.  All six of the
Italian raiders were captured.

        These losses were added to the loss of "Barham" (another veteran
of Matapan) to a German U-boat in November and the losses of the "Prince
of Wales" and "Repulse" to the Japanese earlier in December.  These losses
stretched British resources very thin and swung the naval balance in the
Mediterranean in the Italians' favor.

        These factors contributed to Axis convoy traffic reaching Africa
with reduced losses and allowed an increased buildup of supplies.  Land
forces under Rommel stopped the British advance and in January 1942 launched
a counteroffensive, retaking Benghazi.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 10:00:48 CDT
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: B-24

> I saw news coverage of President Clinton's trip to McClellan AFB, Sacramento,
> California over the weekend.  I one film clip, there was a B-24 Liberator
> behind him.  Does anyone have any info on this aircraft?

Probably Tallichet's B-24, though it realistically could have been anyone's
if the other two are on tour in the area.  Otherwise, it is a static
aircraft.

Can you describe the aircraft?  Color, markings, etc.?

--
Robert J. Granvin                                    Southern Minnesota Wing
[email-masked]                                       Confederate Air Force

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 11:00:48 EDT
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: INTRODUCTION-HUGH G HENRY

Forwarded w/o permission, but I expect the author won't mind, given the
subject.  If you decide to reply to this fellow, mind the reply tag in
this note!

ken koester
[email-masked]
----------------------------Original message----------------------------
I have just joined the group. I am interested in Canadian involvement in
the Great War, although at the moment I am researching the 1942 Dieppe raid
for my doctoral thesis under the supervision of Professor Sir F. H.
Hinsley. I am focusing on the operation's planning, training
for, intelligence, execution and aftermath; within its
political/strategic context.

At the moment I am putting together a 'Dieppe database'(using Endnote
Plus f Bibliographical and Database program), comprising relevant
secondary and primary sources. Most come from the National Archives
(Ottawa), the the Directorate General History, Department of National
Defence,(Ottawa), Imperial War Museum, National Army Museum, National Maritime
Museum and Public Record Office (London). I have also over 1500 post-raid
German photos, the majority from the Bundesarchives (Koblenz) and ECPA
(French Military Archives, Paris).

Last year in conjunction with AFTER THE BATTLE, I authored *DIEPPE THROUGH
THE LENS OF THE GERMAN WAR PHOTOGRAPHER (London: Battle of Britain Prints
International Ltd, 1993)* This gives a large-format photo and a tactical
account of every one of the 29 Calgary Regiment tanks that landed during the
raid. Documents as well as interviews, from at least one crew member of each
tank, were used.

I have been in contact with Dieppe authors Brig-Gen Denis & Shelagh
Whitaker, Professors Brian Villa (U of Ottawa), John P.Campbell
(U of McMaster), and Brereton Greenhous (DG Hist, NDHQ, Ottawa),
besides all the relevant regimental and unit veteran organizations. I
have many interviews but am always looking for other veterans to talk to.

I would be pleased to receive any information on the operation and
details on Dieppe veterans anybody might know.

Yours sincerely

Hugh G Henry MA

St John's College, University of Cambridge
Cambridge CB2 1TP  UNITED KINGDOM
voice: (223) 357345
fax: (223) 337720

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 10:16:13 -0500
From:    "WILLIAM L. HUBER - SAA" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Fw: Checking in,

     Bill, here is a short story that might be worth posted to WWII-L.
I would be happy if you could post this in place of me.
     Later,

akira

Subject: TRV: Japanese humor at Kiska

>From _Weekly Asahi_  Issue June 3rd 1994

     Successful retreat of Japanese armed forces from Kiska in 1943
should be familiar to you WWII-L listers.  But here is a story that
might be of interest to you:

     2 weeks after retreat, 35,000 US troops landed on Kiska.  An
advance troop found a wooden post which said 'Pest Patient Camp'.
Donald Keen, a famous Japanese literature researcher, was then a
language officer and translated that signpost.  Astonished, he reported
to the medical officer and care was taken to keep soldiers away from
the desease.

     But the whole thing was a joke!  Japanese naval surgeon Rensuke
Akasu and Shin'ichiro Kobayashi made that signpost to surprise
US Navy just before retreat.  Some (and amusing) booby trap!  Earlier
Japanese had a plan to leave a time bomb, but it was dropped due to
a failure of experiment.

References:
  an article by Masaru Ida in _Suikou_, May 1994
  _Nihon tono deai_ (encounter with Japan)  Donald Keen, 1975
  Shin'ichiro Kobayashi's privately published book, 1985
--
      Akira Takiguchi  VP, ATSON, Inc.  (a subsidiary of the Asahi Shimbun)
             CANAL TOWER  9-3 Nihonbashi-Koamicho Chuo-ku Tokyo 103  Japan
   +81 3 3666 2881(voice) 2882(fax)  EMAIL TO <[email-masked]>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 10:22:50 -0500
From:    "Louis R. Coatney" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Anglo-American ArmoUr deficient?

Ken,

     While there were cases like the 3 Jagdpanthers annihilating
and entire battalion of British tanks in Normandy, the Germans
envied our mechanical reliability and mobility.

     In head-to-head firepower, the Germans (usually) had the
advantage in Europe in 1944, but an intelligent Allied commander
used his mobility to maneuver and negate that.

     The Matilda beat out the PzIIID and PzIVD-E, easily.  The
Germans negated the Matildas with (the forward/aggressive use of)
their 50mm and 88mm (long) anti-tank guns.  They had some mobile
(captured) Russian 76mm guns, too.

     For all of its sponson-awkwardness the old 75mm gun on the
Grant caused the Germans serious problems in the June 1942
battles.

     All we hear is Allied gripes.  The Germans could grip just
as much, and with good reason.

Lou Coatney

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 12:22:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: LCI(L)-758

There is an interesting article on Page B2 of the Metro Section of the May
23, 1994 issue of the New York Times.

LCI(L)-758 was built in Portland, Oregon 50 years ago and participated in
five Pacific invasions.  In 1950, Circle Line, the company that operates
ships on trips around Manhattan Island, bought her and after refitting,
named her Circle Line X.  On Saturday afternoon (May 21), a number of 60-
and 70-year veterans who had served on the ship in WWII again boarded her
for the trip around Manhattan.  For those of you with access to this story,
it is an interesting read.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 12:21:06 EDT
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Anglo-American ArmoUr deficient?

On Mon, 23 May 1994 10:22:50 -0500 Louis R. Coatney said:
>     While there were cases like the 3 Jagdpanthers annihilating
>and entire battalion of British tanks in Normandy, the Germans
>envied our mechanical reliability and mobility.

It's true that the Panther had extended teething pains, but was generally
reliable after that.  Shermans may or may not have been more reliable;
they were probably easier to repair.  "Mobility" in this context could only
mean cross-country trackability, which in turn translates into ground
pressure per sq.in. & horsepower.  I don't have the figures with me, but
doubt the Sherman had any great advantage there.

>     In head-to-head firepower, the Germans (usually) had the
>advantage in Europe in 1944, but an intelligent Allied commander
>used his mobility to maneuver and negate that.

Which implies that the Allied commander realized that he didn't have the
best tanks.

>     The Matilda beat out the PzIIID and PzIVD-E, easily.  The
>Germans negated the Matildas with (the forward/aggressive use of)
>their 50mm and 88mm (long) anti-tank guns.  They had some mobile
>(captured) Russian 76mm guns, too.

Well, except the Matilda was too slow for them to need to take them on.
German combined arms tactics pre-dated these tanks & were a general feature
of desert warfare for them.

>     For all of its sponson-awkwardness the old 75mm gun on the
>Grant caused the Germans serious problems in the June 1942
>battles.

Because the British didn't develop the battle the way Rommel expected them
to, and because the Germans were surprised to find these tanks on the
battlefield.

>     All we hear is Allied gripes.  The Germans could grip just
>as much, and with good reason.

It's true that both sides thought they were behind in the desert & envied
the other side's tanks.  However, bear in mind that the Germans usually
didn't have their own top of the line equipment, and that when it got to
them, it was generally in short supply.  Rommel mentions at one point
having a tank superior to anything the Allies could field--but only having
4 of them in theatre, etc.

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 12:46:23 -0400
From:    Kevin Kamphaus <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: D-DAY: Which is it?

I am reading Bradleys book "A Generals Life" and he refers to it as Point du Hoe also.

Kevin Kamphaus
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 13:00:10 EDT
From:    Joe Cafaro <[email-masked]>
Subject: <No subject given>

If I may I would like to add to the discussion concerning some of the
positive developments or policies during the Mussolini period.
IMHO maybe one of the most popular accomplishments of this
time period was the conclusion of the Lateran Treaty of 1929.
As many of you are no doubt aware the Catholic Church had placed
restrictions on its dealings with the Italian Govt as a result
of the Italian seizure of Rome in 1870.  Thus for many Italians
it was truly a dilemma in that one could not fully be patriotic
and proud of Italian unification with its capital at Rome, while

at sametime remain in good standing with one's religious faith.
The conclusion of this Treaty repaired the relations between the
Catholic Church and the Italian Govt.  It is this Treaty that
established the concept of the Vatican City.  The overall implications
and results of the Treaty are quite momentous.  I would certainly
be thrilled to hear other comments.  Thanks!

                                        Joe Cafaro
                                        Associate Professor
                                        History Dept.
                                        LaGrange College

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 13:09:55 -0500
From:    Michael D Wallick <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA: CBS Reports

On Thursday, May 26, 1994, at 8 p.m. C.D.T. (9 p.m. E.D.T.), CBS will
present "D-Day", a commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Allied
invasion.  Dan Rather and Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf host the program,
which includes comments by the sons of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Bernard
Montgomery, and Erwin Rommel; Andy Rooney; and Anthony Hopkins.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 15:13:59 -0400
From:    Dan Ford <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [SCI/POL/GEN/???] First word on the Zero.

On Mon, 23 May 1994, Robert Hohlt wrote:
> During the early war years with Japan in China, our ambassadors
> and spys, sent back reports on the capabilities of Japanese
> aircraft and pilot skill right???

Oh, very definitely. In China, Major McHugh sent regular reports back
through channels to the Navy. Claire Chennault, though he had no such
official capacity, wrote some very clear-sighted reports on Japanese
aircraft and tactics, and also on Soviet counter-tactics, which he sent to
the Army Adjutant General. (The Russians, BTW, solved the problem of
Japanese maneuverability by turning to the tactic that Chennault is
generally credited with devising: grab the high perch, dive and shoot, and
climb back to altitude before trying again.) Royal Leonard, who was Chiang
Kai-shek's pilot, at least on one occasion went to the American consul and
gave a report on the Soviet assembly plant and airfield that had been set
up on the China side of the Gobi desert, over which Russian planes and
pilots were transported to China.

Cheers - Dan     <[email-masked]>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 15:16:32 -0400
From:    "Steven Pudlo, Dept. Computer Svcs." <[email-masked]>
Subject: AIRSHIPS

Does anybody have any information about the big airships that were in use
prior to the actual start of hostilities?

For example: Hindenberg, Graf Zapplin, Akron, etc.

Anectdotes, tech stuff, etc welcome!

                                                                Steve

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Steven E. Pudlo  - [email-masked] |"Life may be a drag BUT
STC Programmer/Analyst - (203) 885-2343  |  it sure beats the only
Three Rivers Community-Technical College |           known alternative"
574 New London Turnpike                  |                     (S.E.P.)
Norwich, CT. U.S.A. 06360                |No one gets out of it alive..
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 20:27:41 BST
From:    Stephen Baldwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Anglo-American ArmoUr deficient?

>
>       It's true that the Panther had extended teething pains, but was generally
>       reliable after that.  Shermans may or may not have been more reliable;
>       they were probably easier to repair.  "Mobility" in this context could only
>       mean cross-country trackability, which in turn translates into ground
>       pressure per sq.in. & horsepower.  I don't have the figures with me, but
>       doubt the Sherman had any great advantage there.
didn't the Shermans have a bit of trouble in the winter mud of the
Ardennes 'cos of their narrow tracks? I recall reading sthg
like that in Charles MacDonald's (execellent) book on the Battle of
the Bulge..

smb

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 17:06:07 -0400
From:    "Mr. Scott Hannon" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Anglo-American ArmoUr deficient?

Ken Koester writes:

>...the Panther had extended teething pains, but was generally
>reliable after that.  Shermans may or may not have been more reliable;
>they were probably easier to repair.  "Mobility" in this context could only
>mean cross-country trackability ...

Primarily, but not only. The Germans had a bad habit of designing tanks
too large for easy/efficient transport. One of the design constraints on
the Sherman was its physical size (in particularly its width).

BTW, in Korea both the Pershing and Sherman tanks were used, and it was
the Sherman ("Easy 8" model) that was generally prefered...much better
mobility.

>>     In head-to-head firepower, the Germans (usually) had the
>>advantage in Europe in 1944, but an intelligent Allied commander
>>used his mobility to maneuver and negate that.
>
>Which implies that the Allied commander realized that he didn't have the
>best tanks.

Not necessarily. IMO it indicates the Allies developed appropriate tactics
for defeating enemy armor with the weapons available. No sense engaging in
macho head-to-head frontal assaults if other tactics work better.

Also, according to US doctrine, US tanks were not supposed to be used in
the AT role...there were TD units (equipped with M-10 and M-36) for that.

In 1944 the Germans made the decision to build Panthers as their MBT.
While a fine tank, it was expensive to make...IMO too much so for a MBT
and thus as a rather inefficient use of German resources.

Scott.
Scott Hannon, Mon May 23 1994 ([email-masked])

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 17:48:17 -0400
From:    "Harold J. Cohen." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: AIRSHIPS

                        Peter Brooks' "Zepplin:Rigid Airships 1893-1940"
will tell you more than you possibly ever wanted to know about these
craft.
                                 Harold Cohen
                                 Ithaca College

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 16:04:51 +0200
From:    YARBROUGH James L <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP: Artillery

Forgive me for needing to ask, BUT...

Can anyone tell me the technical and definitive differences between
howitzers, mortars, recoilless rifles, and any other unnamed field
pieces???

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 17:13:31 PDT
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GEN: Channel Islands

No attempts to re-take the Channel islands were made throughout WW2, so
as to prevent needless loss of life among the approx. 20,000 British
residents.
        The British began the avacuation ofthe Channel Islands on June 19,
1940, so close to France that they must inevitably by occupied by Germany. Over 22,000 British citizens were evacuated within five days, and were re-settled
in England.
        There was no battle for the Islands and the Germans maintained a
garrison of about 20,000 there throughout the war.  Most Channel Islanders
followed a line of merely passive resitance under the Occupation, as local
geography made any other policy pointless. Only two or three Commando raids
were sent against the islands, mostly for the purpose of taking off German
soldiers for Inteligence purposes. The Germans maintained a concentration camp
on Guersey, CI, where most of  inmates were prisoners sent from the Continent,
although sveral dozen CI's were incarcerated there.  Several score Channel
Islanders were eventually sent to Belsen and Ravensbruck, for such "heinous"
crimes as succoring Russian prisoners on the islands.
        The Vritish side-stepped the CI during the invasion, again to avoid
needless civilian casualties. The German garrison surrendered to a 12-man squad
of Royal Engineers on May 9, 1945.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 May 1994 20:46:54 CDT
From:    Mike Seningen <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Artillery

I'll make a short attempt

Recoiless Rifles -- weapon that fired a shell that had a back-bleading system or
rear fire vents to discharge the gasses upon firing -- thusly reducing the recoil.
I belive some models actaully "fired" a large slug the opposite direction to reduce
recoil.

Mortars -- typically a tubed weapin that lobs a shell in a indirect and parabolic manner.
The shells are thrown upwards and drop back to earth, they typically have shorter ranges.

Artillery (howitzer?) -- Typically an indirect fire weapon (Long Range)(though they can be
direct firing as well).  I'm not sure of the distinction between Artillery and
Howitzer, Maybe Artillery is rifled, howitzer smooth bore?

Infantry Gun, typically an Artillery/Howitzer piece used in a direct fire mode to
support infantry.  Often they had gun shields to protect the crew from small arms fire.

Anti-Tank Gun, similar to an Inf Gun, but used as an Anti-Tank, Anti-Personal weapon.
Often rifled to achieve accuracy and high velocities. These also had Gun Shields to
protect its crew.

AA-Gun.  Basically an artillery piece used in an Anti-Aircraft role.  Typically
set-up for higher angles of barrel elevation.  Some AA-Guns were used quite
effectively as AT Guns and Anti-Personal weapons. (Ex. German 88s)

Thats a quick synopsis.

cheers,

mike

I'm sure the experts will fill in the wholes as necessary.

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 22 May 1994 to 23 May 1994
*************************************************