Subject: WWII-L Digest - 5 Jul 1994 to 6 Jul 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 7 Jul 1994 00:00:57 -0400

There are 21 messages totalling 1050 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Coatney adrift in academic seas.  :-)
  2. INF: USN Chronology 07-06-94
  3. MANSTEIN'S "PROFESSIONALISM"
  4. Gen. Short
  5. [INF] USAAF 6 JUL 44
  6. Guam/Nippon reconciliation
  7. Re[2]: Coatney adrift in academic seas. :-)
  8. Invasion of Japan
  9. 50TH: ATTACK ON STRONG POINT
 10. A-bomb/Smithsonian (7)
 11. info is requested
 12. Re[2]: A-bomb/Smithsonian
 13. Wendy and the A-Bomb
 14. Aleutians, et al
 15. E. Front Armour

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 5 Jul 1994 22:25:41 PST
From:    "Jones, Scott T." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Coatney adrift in academic seas.  :-)

     So, Lou,

     Did you get the job?

______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: Coatney adrift in academic seas.  :-)
Author:  World War II Discussion List <[email-masked]> at
INTERNET-MAIL
Date:    6/30/94 6:51 PM

Forwarded message:
>From [email-masked] Thu Jun 30 20:17 CDT 1994
Date: Thu, 30 Jun 94 20:13:06 CST
From: "Lou Coatney" <[email-masked]>
Message-Id: <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Subject: Coatney adrift in academic seas.
Content-Type: text
Content-Length: 3375

                               RESUME
Louis R. COATNEY                                   626 Western Ave.
[email-masked]                        Macomb IL 61455
                                                   309/836-1447

OBJECTIVE:  To teach history and historical thinking.

EDUCATION:
  MA in History, May94, WIU:  3.8 (out of possible 4.0) GPA
      Fields:  Modern Europe and U.S. (Military/Diplomatic)
    Thesis topic:  Significance to the West of the Katyn Massacre
    Initiated (for general scholarship) into Phi Kappa Phi, Apr92,
        and (for historical scholarship) Phi Alpha Theta, Dec91
  MS in Library Science, Aug73, Univ. of Illinois/Champaign/Urbana
  BA in Philosophy, May72, Augustana College (Rock Island, Illinois)
    (Also: Knox Coll., Sep65-Mar66, and U.S. Mil. Acad., Jul64-Jan65)
  Rock Island Senior High School, Class of 1964

PUBLICATION:
  "A New Library Patron:  The Systemwide User."  ILLINOIS LIBRARIES
      75 (May93:  Library Cooperation):  240-42.
  A PLACE FOR GAMES AND SIMULATIONS IN ACADEMIC LIBRARIES:  ARE THEY
      DIGESTIBLE?  ERIC Document ED 330 339.  1990.
  "Best Laid Plans . . . ASPIN and the Quest for Total Depository
      Collection of Alaska State Publications."  ILLINOIS LIBRARIES
      71 (Nov89:  Accessing Government Documents):  457-62.
  GERMAN EAGLE VS. RUSSIAN BEAR:  A WORLD WAR II RUSSIAN FRONT BOARD-
      GAME KIT.  ED 287 786.  1987.  (2d ed. to be republished 1994)
  Various library education handouts, etc.

EXPERIENCE:
  Teaching:
    Library research skills instruction classes, Jan89-Jun94
    "Campaigns of World War II," Juneau-Douglas (Alaska) Comm. Coll.
        1976(?)
  Librarianship:
    Western Illinois University Library, Jan89-Jun94
      Reference librarian, Jan89-Jun94
      Part-time:  Quad Cities Library Services Coordinator, Sum92-
          Oct92;  WIU Map Librarian, Sum91-Sum92;  Government
          Publications, Jan89-Sum91
    Alaska State Library, Juneau, Sep73-Jan89
  U.S. Army, volunteer/draftee, Jan67-Jan69:  West Texas and Germany

ACTIVITIES, SERVICE, ORGANIZATIONS:
  WIU (Student-Faculty) Council on Student Welfare (CSW), 1991-1994
  WIU Chess Club Faculty Advisor, 1990-1994
  World War II Studies Association (formerly, American Committee on
      the History of the Second World War), 1986-1994
  North Central Association High School Accreditation Team (evalu-
      ating Rock Island Senior High School library), Nov92
  Various Internet forums: MILHST-L, WWII-L, CONSIM-L, H-DIPLO, IACRL
  Contributor, MAGAZINES FOR LIBRARIES (1994)
  Various library committees, organizations

LANGUAGES:  Some German, a little French, less Russian

INTERESTS:
  Military and naval history and gaming, classical music, chess,
      Alaska, general reading, sailing, jogging.

REFERENCES:
  Prof. Nicholas Pano, Associate Dean of Arts and Sciences and
      (Soviet and Eastern Europe) History professor, WIU,
      309/298-1828
  Dr. Sterling Kernek, (Diplomatic) History professor, WIU,
      309/298-1350
  Dr. Daniel Wise, Chair, Geography Department, WIU, 309/298-1648

                          * * * * * * *

I might add that I enjoy people and helping them learn.  Also, I have
  a personal, living memory of the important events of post-1950
  history, while maintaining/nurturing a somewhat independent and
  original mind about them.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 01:17:36 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 07-06-94

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1944
07/06 Thu. Carrier-based aircraft commence daily bombings of Japanese
           coastal and antiaircraft guns, supply dumps, and airfields
           installations on Guam and Rota, Marianas Islands.
            Japanese naval vessel sunk:
             Destroy HOKAZE, by submarine PADDLE (SS-263), Celebes
              Sea,
              03 d. 24'N., 125 d.  28'E.

Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 11:45:28 GMT,BST
From:    John Gillies <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: MANSTEIN'S "PROFESSIONALISM"

Terry writes:
>
>     No. Manstein was a professional soldier of the highest
> credentials. Had he been shown to have given such an order and
> carried it out, I feel certain that the Russians would have had him
> up on war crimes, and would have found himself sitting in the dock,
> which didn't happen.
>
>     I, personally, have the greatest admiration for his abilities,
> for he showed himself to be the consummate professional. Had he been
> given control of operations on the Eastern Front from the beginning,
> I feel certain that the outcome would have been different. I think
> that needs to be considered regardless.
>
At Manstein's trial, the prosecution introduced in evidence an Order
of the Day, issued by Manstein on November 20, 1941, in which he
reminded each soldier of the 11th Army that he was "not merely a
fighter according to the rules of the art of war, but also the
bearer of a pitiless ideology......therefore the soldier should
understand the necessity for a severe but just revenge on subhuman
Jewry."
Sounds a little more than "professionalism" to me.
Manstein was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment (subsequently
reduced to twelve).
John

John Gillies
Department of Psychology
Adam Smith Building
University of Glasgow
Glasgow  G12 8RT                      Tel: (0)41 339 8855 ext.5351
Scotland
                         [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 06:59:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Gen. Short

Last week, I sent out e-mail stating that Admiral Kimmel, Commander of the
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, had traveled from San Francisco to Honolulu
to assume command of the fleet and had neglected to read a briefing book
that had been furnished. Someone challenged me on this and I must report
that my message was false; it was not Admiral Kimmel but Lieutenant General
Walter C. Short, Commanding General of the Army's Hawaiian Department. My
source is PEARL HARBOR FINAL JUDGEMENT by Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee
published by Crown Publishers, Inc in 1992 (ISBN 0-517-58644-4). I do not
remember a discussion of this book on the list so as an introduction, this
is from the dust cover:

"In 1944, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, knowing that high-ranking
members of the military had testified falsely before the various bodies
investigating Pearl Harbor, selected a lowly major and young lawyer named
Henry C. Clausen and gave him extraordinary authority to go anywhere and
question anyone under oath, from enlisted personnel right up to Chief of
Staff George C. Marshall. To this day, no member of the public knows the
full story of Clausen's investigation. Over seven months during 1944 and
1945, Clausen traveled more than 55,000 miles (88,512 km) to interview and
obtain sworn affidavits from nearly one hundred Army, Navy, civilian, and
British personnel. Many of these people never testified before any other
inquiry, including Congress. Clausen wore a self-destructing case
containing ultrasecret decoded Japanese messages that forced witnesses to
tell the truth and opened files that revealed a massive, inconceivable
failure to exploit the priceless intelligence obtained by the United States
in the months prior to Pearl Harbor.

"Clausen presented an 800-page report to Secretary of War Stimson - but
because his report was Top Secret, he did not write a conclusion. That
conclusion, and in fact Clausen's entire Top Secret report, would have torn
apart the government of the United States and revealed the breathtaking
secret capability of the Allies to crack Japanese and German codes. Henry
Clausen is the last major living witness, the one person who can reveal,
fifty years afterward, the real truth about Pearl Harbor.

"His 'final judgement' puts an end to all the conspiracy theories
mistakenly based on perjured testimony and self-serving misinformation that
continue to pollute the historical record.

"Henry C. Clausen lives and practices law in San Francisco.

"Bruce Lee, who lives in New York City, has been editor-researcher for
Cornelius Ryan, the editor of Gordon Prange and Admiral Layton, and is
regarded as a major figure in military history."

So sayeth the dust cover entries.

Clausen states that he took an affidavit from Major General Charles D.
Herron who had commanded the Hawaiian Department from October 1937 until
relieved by General Short on 7 February 1941.  One of the problems in the
transfer of command was that Herron was scheduled to depart on the same
ship that brought Short and his wife to Hawaii and that gave Herron less
than 2.5 days to brief Short.  To make it easier for Short, Herron had his
staff prepare a briefing book that was sent to San Francisco thereby
allowing Short time to become familiar with the command.  "Upon my meeting
Short when he arrived," said Herron, "I asked him whether he had read the
papers and material.  He replied that ....he had not given them much time
while en route."  Short stated that he read a novel, OLIVER WISWELL, during
the trip.

According to Herron, he did what he could in the limited time available
including giving Short a briefing on the staff officers.  According to
Herron, "I told him of my estimate as to the efficiency of the staff
officers and, with respect to G-2, that Colonel George W. Bicknell, a
Reserve Officer, was an experienced and qualified, efficient man for that
position, and that it had been my intention to make him my G-2.  I further
told him of the G-2 work being done, of the liaison with the Navy, the FBI,
and related sources of information, of the defense plans [for Pearl
Harbor], of my experience with the ALL-OUT alert of 1940...."  Bicknell had
been involved in intelligence as far back as World War I.

One of the reasons given for the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was that
the military was afraid of scaring the civil population by holding an
ALL-OUT alert.  Yet on 17 June 1940, the War Department had ordered a trial
alert as an exercise based on war games that had shown that the best way
for an unknown enemy to devastate the fleet in Pearl Harbor would be a
surprise aerial attack.  The actual order for the alert from Washington had
read:

"Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible
trans-Pacific raid, to the greatest extent possible without creating public
hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents.
Suggest maneuver basis.  Maintain alert until further orders.  Instructions
for secret communications direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you
shortly.  Acknowledge."

Herron had conducted the maneuvers successfully and the civilian population
had been unconcerned.

Herron reiterated to Clausen his statement that he had briefed Short about
"the relations and cooperation which had existed with the Navy, of the
civilian population, of the Japanese situation, of the assumption that
alien agents conducted for the Japanese government."  Herron also took
Short on a tour around Oahu, showed Short the Army installations and "gave
him my ideas of possible attack and defense of that island."

Then Herron stated, "Following my talks with General Short at the time, he
did not ever ask my opinion, or for information, or correspond with me on
the subject of command or related problems."

Another incident involving Short was the rewriting the Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP) involving alerts.  In the SOP dated 14 Jul 1941, Number 1
alert was the highest alert and Number 3 the lowest.  This is the SOP that
was on file in Washington.  On 5 November 1941, Short and/or his staff
rewrote the SOP reversing the numbers, i.e., Number 1 alert was the lowest
and Number 3 the highest; this revised SOP was never sent to Washington.
Clausen asked Herron if this was a normal procedure; Herron responded,
"The Commander may and should take whatever action he believes dictated by
necessity, but must so report to the War Department at the earliest possible
moment."  When the War Department sent a war warning to Hawaii on 27
November 1941, Short had ordered his Alert Number 1. Washington thought that
this was the maximum effort but under Short's new SOP this was a minimum
alert.

According to Clausen, Herron further stated, off the record, that he did
not feel that Short was up to the job.  Herron stated that Short, a
specialist in training troops, was in the last post of his career and did
not want the Hawaiian command; he thought it beneath him.  Short was
supported in this by his wife who believed that after spending all those
years as an Army wife, she deserved better than to be taken away from her
friends and relatives and isolated in a distant post in Hawaii.  Both
General and Mrs. Short had been hoping for a post in Washington or at the
Presidio in San Francisco.

Herron went on to say that after he reported to his new post in Washington,
he received reports that Short was very nonchalant about his duties in
Hawaii.  Supposedly, Short's wife would call him frequently and complain
vehemently about life in general and he would leave to go home and calm her
down regardless of what he was working on.

Another thing that bothered Herron was that Short promoted Colonel Kendall
J. Fielder to be his G-2.  Herron's G-2 was Colonel Bicknell who had
established excellent relations with the Navy, FBI, FCC monitoring
station, the British, etc. whereas Fielder was inexperienced with
intelligence matters.  Clausen states that there two reasons for this move.
Bicknell was a Reserve Officer recently recalled to active duty, a
rough-tough man who was more like a cop.  Fielder was a West Point graduate,
smooth, polished, urbane, a 10-handicap golfer and a good dancer.  Whenever
Short was busy, someone had to accompany Mrs. Short to social events; that
someone was Colonel Fielder.  Such was Army life in 1941.

In Jul 1941, Colonel H.S. Burwell, Air Corps, had completed a special
investigation of the Hawaiian Department and reported many deficiencies in
the command; one of the major issues was the mind-set of both the Hawaiian
Department and Hawaiian Air Force.  Among other things, the report stated:

  1. The Air Force staffs were unable to understand the immediate need for
steps to prevent sabotage, but a "considerable portion of the Command"
failed to comprehend the realities of modern warfare.  As Burwell put it:
"[They] do not see the mental picture of the interplay of relations now
existing between intercontinental theatres of war and our local sphere of
action."

  2. The Hawaiian command was not alert to the possibility that the
American Forces in Hawaii might have to react quickly in the event of a
surprise enemy attack.  This was especially true in the event of "an abrupt
conflict with Japan."

  3. The causes for these failures were those of the ingrained habits of
peacetime.  There was a carefree sense of "no worry" that was created by
the isolation of a tropical island with a large force of troops stationed
on it.  This meant that operations and supply functions received priority
attention from Short's staff, and there was "relative inattention accorded
in peacetime to intelligence functions."

  4. The troops had lost their "aggressive initiative."  The posture of the
command was one of a purely defensive attitude.  Nor was there any evidence
by which Burwell could ascertain that the command itself had any "critical
concern for the future."

  5. In other words, Burwell's inspection report said that Short's command
was lazy and ill prepared for the outbreak of a war that everyone believed
was coming.  Worse, nothing was being done to change the situation.  The
Army's Hawaiian command was a perpetual happy hour.

I would appreciate any other comments from people who are familiar with
this subject and/or this book.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 07:07:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 6 JUL 44

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
THURSDAY, 6 JULY 1944
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  L-5, Stinson Sentinel
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA (CBI) THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 12 P-40s attack a bridge near
Myitkyina while 40+ others support ground forces in the area; several other
P-40s attack Maingna, barracks at Sahmaw, a train at Taungni, and troops at
Sakangyi; 6 B-25s bomb Maingna and 2 hit Mohnyin; and HQ 311th Fighter
Group moves from Dinjan, India to Tingkawk Sakan.

  CHINA (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, B-25s, P-40s, and P-51s continue to
pound river shipping, bridges, troop concentrations, road traffic, and
general targets of opportunity throughout a wide area around Tungting Lake
and along the Yangtze River; hit particularly hard are the town area and
supply depot at Sinshih; B-25s near the Burma border cause considerable
damage at Tengehung and drop supplies to Chinese ground forces on the Salween
front, and during the night of 6/7 Jul bomb Tien Ho Airfield at Canton.

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Twentieth Air Force): Brigadier General LaVern G
Saunders becomes Commanding General XX Bomber Command with HQ at Kharagpur,
India.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 455: In the morning,
missions are flown to France and Germany:
  1. 800 bombers and 224 fighters are dispatched to bomb 18 V-weapon sites in
the Pas de Calais area; 556 of 641 B-17s and 133 of 159 B-24s bomb; 1 B-17 is
damaged beyond repair; 161 B-17s and 59 B-24s are damaged; 2 airmen are KIA
and 3 WIA. Escort is provided by 141 P-38s and 83 P-51s; they claim 4-0-0
Luftwaffe aircraft; 1 P-38 is lost (pilot is MIA).
  2. 229 of 262 B-24s bomb the dock area at Kiel, Germany and 1 hits a target
of opportunity; 3 B-24s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 105 damaged; 8
airmen are WIA and 22 MIA. Escort is provided by 168 of 189 P-51s; 1 P-51 is
lost (pilot is MIA).
  Mission 456: In the late afternoon 73 of 104 B-17s and 148 of 176 B-24s
strike 6 V-weapon sites and supply installations, 3 railroad bridges, a
highway bridge, and an airfield in N France. Escort is provided by 443 P-38s,
P-47s and P-51s; 1 P-47 is lost; afterwards a squadron of P-47s dive-bombs 3
airfields in the Conches area.
  212 P-38s and P-47s, fly fighter-bomber missions against rail and road
traffic in the Paris area; they claim 11-1-2 Luftwaffe aircraft; 2 P-47s are
lost (pilots are MIA).
  Mission 457: 7 of 7 B-17s drop leaflets in Belgium and France during the
night.
  20 B-24s fly CARPETBAGGER missions; 1 B-24 is lost. A C-47 makes the
first landing at a secret airstrip in the Ain, France area.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In France during the morning around
500 B-26s and A-20s bomb bridges and rail lines at 8 locations; in the
afternoon 5 targets are attacked, including bridges, fuel dumps, railroad
tracks, and a V-weapon location; 15+ fighter groups escort bombers, fly armed
reconnaissance of rail lines, roads, and marshalling yards, damaging or
destroying tracks, trains, a tunnel, a building, and a supply dump; fighters
also cover the beach and bomb and strafe troop concentrations and gun
positions; HQ 404th Fighter Group and 506th, 507th and 508th Fighter
Squadrons move from Winkton, England to Chapelle with P-47s; the 14th Liaison
Squadron, XIX Tactical Air Command, moves from Ibsley, England to Nehou with
L-5s; and the 388th Fighter Squadron, 365th Fighter Group, moves from
Beaulieu, England to Azeville with P-47s. In England, HQ 367th Fighter Group
and 393d and 394th Fighter Squadrons move from Stony Cross to Ibsley with
P-38s.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): In Italy, 530+ B-17s and B-24s
attack the Verona marshalling yard, Bergamo steel works, Avisio viaduct,
Tagliamento-Casarsa della Delizia railroad bridge, Aviano oil and gasoline
storage, Porto Marghera oil storage, and Trieste oil refinery; P-51s and
P-38s provide escort; and the 99th Fighter Squadron, 332d Fighter Group,
moves from Orbetello to Ramitelli with P-51s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, A-20s hit an ammunition
ship at La Spezia during the night of 5/6 Jul and continue attacks on fuel
supplies during the day; medium bombers again hit communication,
concentrating on bridges N of the battleline, and attack enemy warehouses and
HQ; fighter-bombers hit rail lines (with especially good results between
Viareggio and Massa Lombarda) and damage several bridges just N of the battle
area as the US Fifth Army continues clearing Rosignano and takes Castellina
Marittima and Mount Vaso.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA, Seventh Air Force): P-47s bomb and strafe forces on
Saipan, Rota, and Tinian Islands. B-24s, staging through Eniwetok Atoll,
pound Truk Atoll during the night of 5/6 Jul and follow with another raid
during the day. B-25s, based at Makin Island, hit Nauru Island. The 333d
Fighter Squadron, 318th Fighter Group, moves from Bellow Field, Territory
of Hawaii to Saipan Island with P-47s.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: In New Guinea,
B-25s, A-20s, and fighter-bombers continue to pound the Wewak area,
concentrating on troops S of Matapau; B-25s and fighter-bombers sweep the N
coast of the Vogelkop Peninsula and offshore islands, hitting targets of
opportunity; other fighter-bombers hit the Manokwari area and buildings at
Ransiki, Moari, and Oransbari; airfields, gun positions, communication
targets, and supply dumps in the area around Babo are hit by B-24s, A-26s,
A-20s, and P-38s. B-24s bomb the town and warehouse area of Yap Island and a
few hit the airfield at Woleai Atoll.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 08:11:34 EDT
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: Guam/Nippon reconciliation

   On July 21, U.S. veterans will congregate near Asan Beach on Guam to
commemorate the 50th anniversary of the retaking of the Pacific island
after 32 months of Japanese occupation. Japanese participation is expected
to be a key feature of the "Liberation Day" proceedings. "Ours is a ceremony
of reconciliation", says Mark Forbes, deputy chief of staff to Guam's
governor Joseph Ada. "We're not trying to relive the past."

   Guam's economy is supported mostly by Japanese visitors, so of course
the govenment is encouraging sound relations. There are however groups
which are demanding reparations from Japan for forced labor, confiscated
property, and deaths during the occupation.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALAN WILD, LAN MGR.  FATHER OF 1.556           VOICE:          (401) 792-2611
ACC - Lippitt - URI  American Legion Post 102. FAX:            (401) 792-5479
Kingston, RI  02881                            Bitnet:           AWild@URIACC
                                               Internet: [email-masked]

  Television, in its present form, makes it difficult for Americans to
understand different cultures. It's a medium that conveys emotion better
than reason. Abstractions as powerful as religions and ideologies, deficits,
languages, and collective memories and loyalties just don't make it.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                      - Graham Fraser -Toronto Globe & Mail

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 07:48:11 CDT
From:    Tim not Timothy Scherrer <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re[2]: Coatney adrift in academic seas. :-)

Lou--call me today--there may be a position here at NMSU in Special
Collections that may interest you.  TAS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 09:15:14 EDT
From:    "Patrick D. Marsden" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Invasion of Japan

For anyone looking for a good new reference on
the proposed invasion of the Japanese home islands,
"The Invasion of Japan, Alternative to the Bomb,"
by John Ray Skates, University of South Carolina
Press, 1994, isbn: 0-87249-972-3.  It contains a good
amount of detail on both the allied and Japanese
capabilities and intentions.

Patrick,

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 14:57:22 +0200
From:    John Ausland <[email-masked]>
Subject: 50TH: ATTACK ON STRONG POINT

  Oslo, July 6.  This is part of John Davis' posting of 50 years ago today for
July 5:

>On 05-JUL-1944, the following occurred -
>
>World War II - The Battlefronts
>-------------------------------
>Western Front - Heavy fighting is occuring along the entire Normandy front.
>     The La Haye-du-Puits railway station is captured by the US VIII Corps.
>     The VII Corps continues to slowly advance towards Periers, along the road
>     leading from St Lo to Lessay on the west coast of the Cotentin peninusla.

Here is an example of the "heavy fighting", excerpted from LETTERS HOME:

          THE 8TH REGIMENT'S ATTACK ON A GERMAN STRONG POINT AT NIGHT

          As a result of the loss of B Battery to a mine during the
          landing, Tommy made some changes in the 29th after the
          capture of Cherbourg. Capt. Lorton S. (Doc) Livingston,
          who had been in the fire control center, was given the
          difficult task of forming a new B Battery. I went to the
          First Battalion of the 8th Infantry Regiment as liaison
          officer, which I joined shortly before it was to make a
          night attack. General Barton wanted to eliminate a
          bothersome German strong point which lay in the
          division's sector. (Note thenear the center of the map
          on the facing page.) The official US Army history
          describes the results as follows:

          "The main obstacle to success was the stream, which was
          difficult to cross. Deciding that it could best be crossed
          during darkness, General Barton had instructed the
          commander of the 8th Infantry to make a surprise move
          during the night of 6 July. By sending two battalions over
          the stream at night, the units would be in position to
          clear the area at daylight, 7 July, thus eradicating a
          potential nuisance to the division that might hold up the
          advance should the division break through to Periers.

          "Though the regimental commander complied with
          instructions, one of his battalions could not cross the
          stream even at night because of enemy fire. The other
          battalion, after having picked its way through the marsh
          during the night and made the crossing, found itself in
          an untenable position at daybreak and was forced to
          withdraw after taking more than a hundred casualties."
          (Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, page 231.)

          According to an account I wrote shortly after this battle,
          the atmosphere on the eve of this operation was one of
          improvisation and confusion. Stumbling through trees in
          the dark, we took up a position on the edge of the
          marsh. After an artillery preparation (which I felt was a
          mistake because it would alert the Germans), Companies
          A and B moved into the swamp. They were soon pinned
          down by German machine gun fire, accompanied by
          mortars. Major John H. (Jack) Meyer, the battalion
          commander, ordered Company C to move into the marsh.
          After a bit the commander of this company, Lt. Joseph
          Gude, showed up at the command post and reported that
          his company had scattered.

          By this time, Col. Rodwell had appeared, to see what was
          going on. He said to Gude, "Son, you have to lead your
          men. You have to lead them." Gude replied, "That was
          the trouble, sir. I was leading them. If I had been behind
          them, they wouldn't have been able to run off."

          Col. Rodwell did not comment further, but it was clear he
          was unhappy. It was embarrassing for him to fail on his
          first attack. This was no small matter, since at that time
          officers from generals on down were being relieved
          because they were not getting results.

          During and after the attack, Major Meyer was unhappy
          with me. The forward observers could not see anything in
          the dark and hence would have been unable to direct the
          artillery where to fire. I was unwilling to see these officers
          and their radio operators risk being killed for no purpose
          and told them not to join the companies until daylight.

          Major Meyer complained to Lt. Col. Thomason about this.
          I am not sure what transpired between them, but, after
          hearing my explanation, Tommy left me as liaison officer
          to the battalion.

          The Germans in the strong point subsequently withdrew
          without a fight when the division's advance threatened to
          cut them off. After they left, I visited the site and saw
          that it had been a terrible mistake to ask infantry to
          attack it head on. The Germans were well dug in and
          able to direct deadly fire across the marsh from covered
          dugouts, using cords attached to their exposed machine
          guns.

          There was also evidence that the Germans had left in a
          hurry. The body of a German was lying on the ground,
          beside an improvised stretcher. His head was lying
          several feet away. Nearby, the bodies of American soldiers
          were piled up like cord wood four feet high, with a little
          earth scattered over those on top.

          Lt. Thomas H. Crawford from Company B, in a post
          combat interview which I got from the National Archives,
          told about crossing the marsh the day after the attack.
          He described it as "a pathetic scene." Equipment was
          scattered all over the place. He added that he saw about
          thirty dead in the First Battalion sector. He also talked to
          a wounded man from the 83rd Division, which had failed
          in an earlier attack on the peninsula, who had spent
          three days in the swamp. He survived by eating the
          rations he found on his dead comrades.

          Until I revisited this site in 1992 and wrote this account,
          it was difficult for me to recall that night without tears
          coming to my eyes. I wish I could say that this attack
          was the last needless operation in which the 4th Division
          would be involved, but worse was yet to come after we
          reached Germany.

          END EXCERPT

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 12:37:00 EST
From:    Don Bowden <[email-masked]>
Subject: A-bomb/Smithsonian

        I have never lost any sleep over the morality of dropping the A Bomb
on Japan. Nothing put my thoughts so succinctly as a dinner conversation
many years ago in graduate school. One of a circle of friends was a Japanese
student working on his Ph.D. here in the US. For some reason the conversation
turned to Hiroshima etc. and Hiro's comment was quite simple:"Is there any
doubt that if Japan had the Bomb, they would have used it?" Simple and to the
point. Among other things at the time the bomb was dropped my father was in
transit from Europe to the states for a 30-day leave and subsequent posting
to the invasion of Japan. The book "Tennozoan" (sp?) gives an absolutely
horrific description of the fighting on Okinawa and the thought was that it
would only be worse on the mainland of Japan. I think there is substantial
reason to believe that dropping the bomb saved not only many American, but
almost certainly many, possibly millions, of Japanese lives.
Don Bowden
Winston-Salem, NC

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 13:28:16 -0400
From:    Wendy Slader <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: A-bomb/Smithsonian

On Wed, 6 Jul 1994, Don Bowden wrote:

>         I have never lost any sleep over the morality of dropping the A Bomb
> on Japan. Nothing put my thoughts so succinctly as a dinner conversation
> many years ago in graduate school. One of a circle of friends was a Japanese
> student working on his Ph.D. here in the US. For some reason the conversation
> turned to Hiroshima etc. and Hiro's comment was quite simple:"Is there any
> doubt that if Japan had the Bomb, they would have used it?" Simple and to the
> point. Among other things at the time the bomb was dropped my father was in
> transit from Europe to the states for a 30-day leave and subsequent posting
> to the invasion of Japan. The book "Tennozoan" (sp?) gives an absolutely
> horrific description of the fighting on Okinawa and the thought was that it
> would only be worse on the mainland of Japan. I think there is substantial
> reason to believe that dropping the bomb saved not only many American, but
> almost certainly many, possibly millions, of Japanese lives.
> Don Bowden
> Winston-Salem, NC
>

Hi.  Just had to interject here after reading above message.  I was not
around during the time the bomb, or bomb(s) as it were, was dropped on
Hiroshima/Nagasaki.  In fact, I was barely around during Vietnam.
However, my Dad and his five brothers were all WW II veterans.  I heard
many stories over the years and have always had an interest in this war
(obviously--that's why I chose this discussion group).  Anyway, I have
also just completed a very enlightening course in WWII history.

I cannot say how I would have felt had I lived through the time of the
bombing of Pearl Harbor, WWII in general and the ultimate dropping of the
A-bomb.  I find that most who did live during that time were not opposed
to the dropping of the bomb and did indeed feel that it was necessary to
ensure a swift end to the war, thus saving hundreds of thousands of
additional American lives.  I can deal with the dropping of the first bomb.
Although I do feel that Harry Truman was something of a zealot in many of
the decisions he made (especially with the subsequent Korean conflict and
Mac Arthur ordeal) perhaps it was "necessary."  But what of the second
bomb on Nagasaki?  Was a second annihilation necessary?  Wouldn't,
perhaps, some additional conventional bombing have finished them off
after Hiroshima--or was the dropping of the second, even more powerful,
plutonium-based bomb more a "guinea pig test" that just happened to have
an underlying "justification" at the time?  Believe me, I'm not your
proverbial militant left-wing bleeding-heart liberal--just trying to make
sense of it.  Any thoughts?    Thanks.     Wendy Slader

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 13:30:49 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: A-bomb/Smithsonian

Wendy,
        I am drawing from memory here so I am open to corrections.
The two bombs that were dropped were all that we had at the time but
by dropping a second so soon after the first, the impression was gained
that this would continue, city by city, until Japan either surrendered
or was destroyed.  I wasn't alive then either but I have never second
guessed the decision to use the bomb in that time and situation.
        Under other circumstances, for example, if Japan had broadcast
a willingness to surrender immediately after Hiroshima, and then, we
had dropped the Nagasaki bomb, I would say that would not have been
justified.  But all of this is fanciful of course.  I agree with those
believe that using both of those bombs saved far more lives than they
cost.
************************************************
Roger (Brad) Coon            "Better to have one
[email-masked]          freedom too many,
[email-masked]    than to have one
                              too few."

Politically incorrect and proud of it.
Niquimictitoc inana Bambi.
************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 14:32:03 -0400
From:    Shane Alan Lieffers <[email-masked]>
Subject: info is requested

Hi!  I am in the process of subscribing to several war-related lists, as I am a
major war-buff.  However, I have had no luck in locating a list that deals
exclusively with the American Civil War.  I found one - H-CIVWAR - but they
only allow scholars and professional historians to join.  If anyone can help me
out, I would greatly appreciate it.

Thanks in advance,

Shane Alan Lieffers

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 14:39:54 -0400
From:    Tom Shirhall <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: A-bomb/Smithsonian

Wendy Slater said:

>I can deal with the dropping of the first bomb.
>Although I do feel that Harry Truman was something of a zealot in many of
>the decisions he made (especially with the subsequent Korean conflict and
>Mac Arthur ordeal) perhaps it was "necessary."  But what of the second
>bomb on Nagasaki?  Was a second annihilation necessary?  Wouldn't,
>perhaps, some additional conventional bombing have finished them off
>after Hiroshima--or was the dropping of the second, even more powerful,
>plutonium-based bomb more a "guinea pig test" that just happened to have
>an underlying "justification" at the time?  Believe me, I'm not your
>proverbial militant left-wing bleeding-heart liberal--just trying to make
>sense of it.  Any thoughts?    Thanks.     Wendy Slader

I'm 60, and I remember WWII pretty well. My recollection of information
available later indicated that only two bombs existed, and it would be
several months before any more could be made. They were both prototypes, not
production models. When the first one didn't get the desired results; i.e.,
an immediate surrender, it was decided to drop the second bomb to make it
appear that we had a ready supply. It has been said that the command
structure of the Japanese had been so disrupted that they couldn't respond
rapidly. If so, it was a genuine tragedy. The Emperor spoke, the first time
most Japanese had ever heard his voice, and caused the surrender.

Somewhere there is a science fiction book based on an invasion of the
Japanese homeland.

In any war, there is always enough guilt to go around, but it only takes one
person to start a fight, and you're always better off if you can defend
yourself.

I guess that I don't understand what problem you have with Korea. Truman
didn't start the fight. The North Koreans attacked without warning, and the
U.S. and Korean troops were driven back into the Pusan Perimeter, and barely
held on until troops could be sent from the States. McArthur specifically
disobeyed a direct order from his commander-in-chief and was cashiered, but
allowed to make his famous speach to the Congress. He was not a beloved
leader of WWII to his men. We didn't invade North Korea because Red China
had intervened and a major attack would have meant war with China.

Tom Shirhall
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 13:59:41 CDT
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: A-bomb/Smithsonian

> additional American lives.  I can deal with the dropping of the first bomb.
> Although I do feel that Harry Truman was something of a zealot in many of
> the decisions he made (especially with the subsequent Korean conflict and
> Mac Arthur ordeal) perhaps it was "necessary."  But what of the second
> bomb on Nagasaki?  Was a second annihilation necessary?  Wouldn't,
> perhaps, some additional conventional bombing have finished them off
> after Hiroshima--or was the dropping of the second, even more powerful,
> plutonium-based bomb more a "guinea pig test" that just happened to have
> an underlying "justification" at the time?  Believe me, I'm not your
> proverbial militant left-wing bleeding-heart liberal--just trying to make
> sense of it.  Any thoughts?    Thanks.     Wendy Slader

The second bomb puts a "finality" on the entire experience.  After the first
bomb, the military leadership still was unwilling to budge.  It took the
Emperor himself, breaking all tradition and shocking the cabinet by taking
the matter into his own hands and ordering the surrender.  This didn't happen
until after the second bomb.

One bomb can always be considered a "fluke."  No one knew how many bombs
the U.S. possessed.  If it dropped one devastating bomb and then continued
with conventional bombing, it might be perceived that the allies possessed
very few of this super-weapon.  By suddenly deciding to go exclusively with
the weapon, after giving adequate warnings regarding its use, the impression
is given that the rain of massive and basically wanton destruction is at the
whim of the enemy.

Ironically, it's all psychological.  The U.S. only possessed two such
weapons, but through its actions proved that the first use was not an
experiment (even though it was) and proved to the Japanese that this weapon
truly works.  Follow this with the impression that the U.S. may, in fact,
have an unlimited supply of bombs and you are faced with a truly black or
white decision.

IMHO, the second bomb was very probably "necessary."

--
Robert J. Granvin                                    Southern Minnesota Wing
[email-masked]                                       Confederate Air Force

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 15:19:14 CDT
From:    Tim not Timothy Scherrer <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re[2]: A-bomb/Smithsonian

This is slightly off topic--but wasn;t Truman more the Dove than
MacArthur.  Hindsight is always 20/20, or so we think.  What people miss
when they second guess the dropping of the atomic bombs is the war
weariness and sacrifice that has taken place.  I am sure Truman had
casualty reports flowing across his desk and wanted to stop them.
Probably most of us in his position AT THE TIME would have made the same
decision, and not had a second thought about it.  BTW, did Truman truly
order the dropping of the bomb, or did it happen on his watch and he
takes credit for it--did he truly pick the target and approve the drop,
approve the drop somewhere on Japan, or did he just approve of the
system, and the use was inevitable?

TAS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 16:20:02 -0400
From:    Dan Ford <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: A-bomb/Smithsonian

On Wed, 6 Jul 1994, Wendy Slader wrote:

> I can deal with the dropping of the first bomb. . . . .  But what of the
second > bomb on Nagasaki?  Was a second annihilation necessary?
Wouldn't, > perhaps, some additional conventional bombing have finished
them off > after Hiroshima--or was the dropping of the second, even more
powerful, > plutonium-based bomb more a "guinea pig test" that just
happened to have > an underlying "justification" at the time?  Believe me,
I'm not your > proverbial militant left-wing bleeding-heart liberal--just
trying to make > sense of it.  Any thoughts?  Thanks.  Wendy Slader >

I doubt that additional bombing was necessary (though we did that too,
with a thousand-plane raid the night before Japan surrendered). Remember
that only 72 hours elapsed. The Japanese literally did not know what had
happened at Hiroshima. They called the police station: no answer. They
called the military barracks: no answer. They finally dispatched an
investigation team which of course could not get into the city because the
tracks were vaporized. I believe, though I am not sure, that the
investigators had not yet made their report when the bomb was dropped on
Nagasaki.

I too used to believe that the Nagasaki bomb was by way of experiment,
until somebody on another newsgroup pointed out that of the 3 bombs
manufactured, that exploded at Alamagordo was plutonium, while that at
Hiroshima was uranium--hence that was the test bomb. We didn't even have
the justification that we wanted to know whether the plutonium bomb
worked, because we already knew that. In my opinion, the Nagasaki bomb was
the most criminal decision ever made by an American president, even while
I not only accept the Hiroshima bomb but regarded it as fully justified in
the context of the time, and probably a life-saver not only for American
troops but Japanese civilians as well, as compared to the carnage of an
amphibious assault.

            - Dan      <[email-masked]>

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 15:46:56 -0500
From:    Bill Smith <[email-masked]>
Subject: Wendy and the A-Bomb

Wendy:

Having made a post earlier on the reasoning of why two bombs and no
warning/test drop, I will only submit two books which I feel are
instructive.  The first is Herbert Feis' work on the close of the war,
and for the life of me right now I can't remember the title.  The other
is Awesome Power by Richard Haynes.

As several individuals have posted earlier today, you will find almost
compete solidarity of thought among the war generation about the
righteousness of the decision.  It is with time and further knowledge
that others question the call.

Sure, we can easily draw into question the morality of the weapon now,
but to do so ignores what the Germans call the zeitgeist, or the spirit
of the time.  The revisionist often feels free to ignore zeitgeist, and
does so at Cleo's peril.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 16:51:07 -0400
From:    "J.M.Ruel" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: A-bomb/Smithsonian

One thing we must remember the bombs did stop the war. Even with the major
cities of Japan devastated by firestorm bombing the Japanese people were ready
physically and mentally to defend their land from house to house. This would
have resulted in enormous losse on both sides. So the bombs were , in a
strange way a humanitarian tool of war. It stopped it NOW!

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 20:33:01 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Aleutians, et al

There was an excellent -- more or less -- Japanese feature
  film about the evacuation of Sitka.

An anti-military library colleague at the Alaska State Library
  refused to get it when we could have.  :-(

The ship models were beautiful -- a la TORA, etc. -- but the
  toy airplanes obviously shooting their spring-launched toy
  *rockets* into the bathtub were ... unimpressive.  :-)

Good, *impassive* acting, of course.  I think Toshiro Mifune
  had the lead role.

Akira, have you seen the film?

Lou Coatney (still?)

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 6 Jul 1994 20:39:02 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Re: E. Front Armour

See TANK VS. TANK by Kenneth Macksey.

Lou Coatney (still)

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 5 Jul 1994 to 6 Jul 1994
***********************************************