Subject: WWII-L Digest - 23 Jul 1994 to 24 Jul 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 25 Jul 1994 00:00:42 -0400

There are 10 messages totalling 650 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. INF: USN Chronology 07-24-94
  2. GEN: RONALD J. DREZ D-DAY BOOK
  3. 50TH: OPERATION COBRA (2)
  4. 50 Years Ago - 25-JUL-1944
  5. ATTENTION: Disbelievers and Unread Ingrates! :-) (2)
  6. WWII Naval Stats Needed
  7. [INF] USAAF 25 JUL 44
  8. ARC: CNO Reports to Sec. Knox

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 24 Jul 1994 01:19:24 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 07-24-94

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1944
07/24 Mon. Naval attack force (Rear Adm. H. W. Hill) lands Marines
           (Maj. Gen. H. Schmidt) on Tinian, Marianas Islands.  Landing
           is supported by naval gunfire, carrier aircraft, and land-
based
           aircraft from Saipan.
            United States naval vessels damaged:
             Battleship COLORADO (BB-45), by coastal defense gun,
              Marianas Islands area,
              15 d. 02'N., 145 d. 50'E.
             LST 481, by coastal defense gun, Marianas Islands area,
              13 d. 24'N., 144 d. 39'E.

Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 24 Jul 1994 16:09:26 +0200
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: GEN: RONALD J. DREZ D-DAY BOOK

  July 24, 1994
  There is a book by Donald J. Drez, with the title VOICES OF D-DAY, which is a
companion for Stephen Ambrose's D-DAY.  If anyone has the Drez book, I would
appreciate his or her sending me an EMAIL message.
  Regards, John Ausland/Oslo Norway

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 24 Jul 1994 16:53:58 +0200
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: 50TH: OPERATION COBRA

  There are certain days during the war which remain clearer in my mind than
others.  One of these was July 25, 1944 and OPERATION COBRA.  As anyone
acquainted with this operation knows, many of the bombs on July 24 and 25
dropped on US forces.  What puzzled me for many years was why this happened.  It
was only when I was doing research for LETTERS HOME that I learned.
  Rather than sending excerpts from the chapter on Cobra, which is rather long,
I will share with you the article I wrote for the IVY LEAVES, the quarterly
newsletter of the 4th Infantry Division Association.

BEGIN TEXT
   No one who was in the 4th Division on August 24 and
25, 1944 will ever forget those days, for they set the stage for
our breakout from the bridgehead on Normandy. Once going, we did
not stop until we reached Germany. What is less well known is why
all those bombs fell short and killed so many in the assault units.
  The US Army history has this to say about the planning for Cobra,
the name of the bombing operation which made the breakout possible.
`General Bradley presented the Cobra idea at a conference with his
staff and his corps commanders on 12 July. He characterized the
battle of the hedgerows as "tough and costly...a slugger's
match...too slow a process," and spoke of his hope for a swift
advance made possible by "three or four thousand tons of bombs"
from the air. He stated that aggressive action and a readiness to
take stiff losses if necessary were the keys to the success of
Cobra. "If they [the Germans] get set [again]," he warned, "we go
right back to the hedge fighting and you can't make any speed." He
insisted, "This thing [Cobra] must be bold."' (Martin Blumenson,
Breakout and Pursuit, pages 213-214.)
  Cobra was a brilliant plan. There was, however, one important
detail which General Bradley left open. When conferring with the
Air Chief Marshall Leigh-Mallory and other air commanders, he
expressed a preference for the aircraft to attack parallel to the
road. Thus, any bombs which fell short would not drop on American
forces. He failed, however, to pin the air commanders down on this,
and those commanding the heavy and medium bombers decided to bomb
perpendicular to the road.
  According to US Air Force documents, the air planners had
understood that General Bradley expected heavy casualties and was
prepared to accept them no matter how the bombing took place. This
proved a costly misunderstanding.
  On July 24, there was great confusion both at higher headquarters
and on the ground. The official US Army history says this:
"Air Chief Marshall Leigh-Mallory had set the Cobra H-Hour at 1300,
24 July and on the morning of 24 July he went to Normandy to
observe the operation. He found the sky overcast, the clouds thick.
Deciding the visibility was inadequate for the attack, he ordered
a postponement. Unfortunately, he was too late. The message
announcing the decision reached England only a few minutes before
the actual bombing was to commence in France. Although the planes
were ordered to return without making their bombing runs, it was
impossible to get them all back." (Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit,
p. 228.)
  Before word reached General Collins that the ground attack had been
postponed, he ordered the divisions to move forward. Some units
were, however, unable to do this, because bombs which fell short
killed 25 men and wounded 131. Even when he got word the ground
attacked had been postponed, Collins decided the corps had to move
back to the road, in order to prevent the Germans from moving
forward.
  When General Bradley discovered on July 24 that his proposal for
the direction of the bombing had not been followed, he was furious.
He was, however, confronted with a terrible dilemma. To change the
plans at that point would have meant delaying several days. Higher
headquarters were pressing for action, and there was the danger
that the Germans would rush additional forces into the breakthrough
area. General Bradley decided, therefore, to go ahead the next day.
While not perfect, the weather on July 25 was better. Some 2700
bombers and fighter bombers dropped over 4000 tons of bombs.
  Although the fighters flew parallel to the road, the bombers again
flew a perpendicular path.
  This time bombs which fell short killed 111 men and wounded 490.
These included Lt. Gen. Leslie J. McNair, who was visiting the
front line troops to see the bombing.
  After the bombing, General Eisenhower was angry about the large
number of American casualties.  In his memoirs, A Soldier's Story,
General Bradley declared the perpendicular approach "a serious
breach of good faith in planning."
  The explanation is less dramatic than that. Bradley wanted the
bombing to be over in an hour. The box for the bombing was about
three miles wide and one mile deep. It was impossible to fly
several thousand bombers through a one mile slot in an hour.
Hence, bombing parallel to the road was not possible.
  What is hard to understand is why the commanders were not able to
clarify all this at their planning meeting. This was partly due to
the fact that the concept of using bombers in a tactical role was
new. In addition, the understanding by army commanders of air power
was less than perfect. Whatever the explanation, a number of
soldiers paid with their lives for what is now euphemistically
called "friendly fire."  END TEXT
  Regards, John Ausland/Oslo Norway

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 24 Jul 1994 06:36:16 -0700
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: 50 Years Ago - 25-JUL-1944

On 25-JUL-1944, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - The US 1st Army launches Operation Cobra, with the goal of
     advancing towards Coutances, southwest of St Lo. The attack is made up of
     the VII Corps in the center, the VIII Corps on their right and the XIII
     Corps on the left. The attack is preceeded by bombing attacks by 1,500
     heavy bombers from the 8th Air Force. Some of the bombers drop their
     bombs short and kill some American troops. Despite this the VII and VIII
     Corps make good progress. The British attacks around Caen have drawn away
     a number of troops and tanks from the area. South of Caen, the Canadian
     troops are attacking towards Falaise against heavy resistance.

Eastern Front - The 2nd Baltic Front cuts the road between Dvinsk and Riga, in
     Latvia. Lvov is surrounded by the 1st Ukraine Front. Four Russian
     armoured columns converge on Brest-Litovsk.

Italian Front - The British XIII Corps continues to advance towards Florence.

Marianas - On Guam, strong Japanese counter-attacks prevent the Marines from
     joining up their two beachheads. The fighting is fiercest around the
     northern beachhead where some 3,500 Japanes troops are killed. On Tinian,
     the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions follow closely after the Japanese who
     are retiring towards the center part of the island. The Marines occupy
     two of Tinian's four airfields.

Caroline Islands - Two carrier groups from TF 58 attack Palau, while a third
     sends its planes against Yap, Ulithi, Ngulu, Tais and Sorol. Vice Admiral
     Marc A. Mitscher is in command of TF 58.

New Guinea - The 112th Cavalry are able to break out of the Japanese
     encirclement after a vigourous counter-attack by troops of the 127th
     Infantry.

Dutch East Indies - The Japanese naval base at Sabang, an island off the north
     coast of Sumatra, is bombarded by the ships from the British Far Eastern
     Fleet. Carrier based aircraft from the fleet bomb airfields in the area.
     The fleet is commanded by Admiral Somerville and includes the carriers
     Victorious and Illustrious as well as four battleships.

German Homefront
----------------
Berlin - Goebbels is appointed Reich Plenipotentiary for Total War and new
     decrees are issued cancelling vacations for women involved in war work.

The Homefront
-------------
End Of War Not Apparent - Sec. of War Henry L. Stimson, who has just returned
     from inspecting French and Italian battlefields, tells a press conference
     that the end of the was is not apparent. He disagrees with Churchill who
     has said that "the war may end earlier than we have a right to say."
     Stimson says that the Axis armies are shaken but are by no means beaten
     yet.

=============================================================================

Sources: "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi, "The
World Almanac Book Of WW II" by Peter Young, "United States Naval Chronology,
World War II" by Naval Historical Division - United States Navy, "Facts On
File Yearbook 1944, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L. Lapica.

----------
John Davis  ([email-masked]/[email-masked])
Cary, N.C.
----------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 24 Jul 1994 23:32:50 +0200
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ATTENTION: Disbelievers and Unread Ingrates! :-)

On Sat, 23 Jul 1994, Louis R. Coatney wrote:

>      It was the afternoon of August 5, 1945.  To a group of six
> hundred Army officers assigned to the Hiroshima garrison, Professor
> Yoshitaka Mimura of Hiroshima Bunri University, a theoretical
> physicist, was explaining the scientific possibilities of new
> weapons which might reverse the tides of war.  Japan had little Navy
> or Air Force left.  Within months, a massive invasion of the home
> islands seemed likely.  "Could you tell us, sir," a young lieutenant
> colonel asked, ['Ever notice how it's always the "young lieutenant
> colonels" who ask the good, unorthodox questions?  LRC] "what an
> atomic bomb is?  Is there any possibility that the bomb will be
> developed by the end of this war?"

In the book 'The Making of the Atomic Bomb' by Richard Rhodes (by know
certainly one of the most quoted sources on the Internet!) the story of
the Japanese atomic bomb program is told more in detail.

The Japanese were actually concentrating their efforts on a process
(thermal gaseous diffusion) to separate U235 from U238, that does not
work. After finding that, the scientists involved stubbornly continued the
work anyway --- perhaps in the hope of saving the young scientists from
the draft and a predictable quick death.

In any case, even if the process had worked, Japan would not have had the
industrial base to produce a bomb. It took the US several years in an
all-out effort, with the ruthless gen. groves pushing it forward and
throwing lots of money at it. It would have taken the Japanese more than
a decade.

So I am inclined to think that prof. Mimura was either unaware of the
practical problems (that can happen to theoretical physicists) or, more
likely, was just trying to boost the morale.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 24 Jul 1994 17:37:00 EDT
From:    Robert Gannon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WWII Naval Stats Needed

I'm trying to find some figures for destruction on the seas during
World War II.  I'm particularly interested in sinkings attributed to
torpedoes.

I have a couple--for instance, Japanese shipping sunk by submarines is
set at 5.3 million tons, or 1,314 ships, about 55 percent of all
Japanese ship losses.  But I would like much more, and somehow I'm not
finding it.

Can anyone out there help, either with specific statistics or with
sources?  (I can't believe that I haven't such figures in my reference
books; maybe I'm not looking at the right index item.)
======================================================================
Robert Gannon              |  Internet:  [email-masked]
35 Burrowes Building       |  Phone:     814 355-4800 or
Penn State                 |             814 355-0943
University Park, PA 16802  |  Fax:       814 863-7285

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 24 Jul 1994 17:44:22 EDT
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 50TH: OPERATION COBRA

John wrote,...
>  What is hard to understand is why the commanders were not able to
>clarify all this at their planning meeting. This was partly due to
>the fact that the concept of using bombers in a tactical role was
>new. In addition, the understanding by army commanders of air power
>was less than perfect. Whatever the explanation, a number of
>soldiers paid with their lives for what is now euphemistically
>called "friendly fire."

Air's role in the matter was tactical and a great test of the feasibilty
of saturation bombing.

Bradley wanted to avoid the problem with the craters that Monty ran into
advancing toward Caen. He called for 100 lb fragmentation bombs for
greater density and fewer craters. This translated into 60,000 bombs.
Hence the great number of aircraft. Each of 1500 Liberators and "Forts"
were to carry 40-100 pounders.

The affect was of a lack of communications firstly, and of troop
movements. The original plan included withdrawing Collin's troops
1500 yards begind the Periers road. "Leigh-Mallory could not confirm
the agreement (on the parallel drop), for he had been called out of the
(planning) conference at Stanmore before it ended." Air Marshall
Leigh-Mallory was with Strategic Air.

source: A Soldier's Story

-Alan Wild

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alan Wild, LAN MGR.  Father of 1.556           Voice:          (401) 792-2611
ACC - Lippitt - URI  American Legion Post 102. FAX:            (401) 792-5479
Kingston, RI  02881                            Bitnet:           AWild@URIACC
                                               Internet: [email-masked]

"When war is declared, Truth is the first casualty." -Arthur Ponsonby
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 24 Jul 1994 18:38:14 -0400
From:    Dan Ford <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ATTENTION: Disbelievers and Unread Ingrates! :-)

> >      It was the afternoon of August 5, 1945.  To a group of six

Okay, so they had four days to get out of town?

> > hundred Army officers assigned to the Hiroshima garrison, Professor
> > Yoshitaka Mimura of Hiroshima Bunri University, a theoretical
> > physicist, was explaining the scientific possibilities of new
> > weapons which might reverse the tides of war.  Japan had little Navy
> > or Air Force left.  Within months, a massive invasion of the home

Well, that;s not entirely true. Japan went to war with 2,700 planes in the
inventory, army and navy. At the end of June 1945 she had nearly 11,000
aircraft in service, of which 8,000 had been converted for suicide
missions, with 2,500 more scheduled for conversion. Robert Mikesh in
*Broken Wings of the Samurai* figures that Japan could have sent just
about the whole 11,000 against the American invasion fleet.

 > > islands seemed likely.  "Could you tell us, sir," a young lieutenant
> > colonel asked, ['Ever notice how it's always the "young lieutenant > >
colonels" who ask the good, unorthodox questions?  LRC] "what an > >
atomic bomb is?  Is there any possibility that the bomb will be > >

Yes, it was generally lieutenant colonels in the Imperial Army! They
seemed to hold that rank permanently, and yet somehow to run the entire
war. I'm thinking of Tsuji Masanobu particularly. He planned the invasion
of Malaya, seemed to be responsible for the Bataan Death March, screwed
up the Japanese campaign on Guadalcanal, more or less took charge of the
defense of Burma in 1945, and escaped from British custody that fall in
Rangoon. He was a light colonel the whole four-plus years.

            - Dan      <[email-masked]>

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 24 Jul 1994 19:39:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 25 JUL 44

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
TUESDAY, 25 JULY 1944
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  C-47, Douglas Skytrain
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  P-61, Northrop Black Widow

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA (CBI) THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 24 P-40s and P-51s hit targets
around Myitkyina, Kamaing, and Mogaung.

  CHINA (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 24 B-24s bomb Yoyang, blasting the
storage area and railroad yards; 51 P-40s and P-51s attack road and river
traffic, troop compounds and cavalry units at Chaling, Siangsiang, Changsha,
Siangyin, and Sinshih and NW of Hengyang; 27 P-40s escorting the B-24s over
Yoyang claim 6 Japanese interceptors shot down; and 11 fighter-bombers
support Chinese ground forces in the Salween area.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 494: 1,581 bombers and 500
fighters are dispatched to support a US First Army assault (Operation COBRA)
with saturation bombing in the VII Corps area in the Marigny-Saint-Gilles
region, just W of Saint-Lo; 5 bombers and 2 fighters are lost; 843 of 917
B-17s and 647 of 664 B-24s hit the Periers/St Lo area and 13 B-17s hit
targets of opportunity; 1 B-17 and 4 B-24s are lost, 2 B-24s are damaged
beyond repair and 41 B-17s and 132 B-24s are damaged; 9 airmen are WIA and 46
MIA. Escort is provided by 483 P-38s, P-47s and P-51s and also provide escort
for Ninth Air Force B-26s; they claim 12-1-3 Luftwaffe aircraft in the air
and 2-0-0 on the ground; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots are MIA) and 5 damaged. Due
to a personnel error, bombs from 35 bombers fall within US lines; 102 US
troops, including Lieutenant General Lesley J McNair, are killed and 380
wounded.
  Mission 295: Late in the afternoon 106 B-24s are dispatched to bomb the
Brussels/Melsbroek Airfield, Belgium but they are recalled because of heavy
cloud formations. Escort for this mission is provided by 26 P-38s and 110
P-51s.
  1 P-38 and 78 P-47s fly a fighter-bomber mission against the Fournival/Bois
de Mont fuel dump; they claim 0-0-1 aircraft; 1 P-38 and 4 P-47s are
damaged.
  17 B-24s fly CARPETBAGGER missions during the night.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In France during the morning 11 B-26
and A-20 groups attack tactical targets in the vicinity of Saint-Lo in
support of the US First Army; in the afternoon 4 groups bomb bridges on the
Seine and Loire Rivers; 42 B-26s, repeating errors of the previous day, short-
bomb behind US lines and casualties again are concentrated in the 30th
Infantry Division; fighters strafe and bomb military targets in the Saint-Lo
area in support of Operation COBRA, fly area patrol and sweeps S of the
battle area, and carry out armed reconnaissance against installations in the
Laval-Ghent-Amiens areas; and the 422d Night Fighter Squadron, 71st Fighter
Wing, moves from Scorton, England to Maupertus with P-61s (a detachment is at
Ford, England).

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): In Austria, 420 B-17s and B-24s
bomb the Hermann Goring tank works in Linz while other bombers hit the
Villach marshalling yard and targets of opportunity in Austria and
Yugoslavia; fighters provide escort and carry out sweeps; 175-200 enemy
fighters oppose the attacks; 21 AAF aircraft are lost; the bombers and
fighters claim 60+ fighters shot down. Operating from USSR Operation FRANTIC
bases, 34 P-51s and 33 P-38s attack the airfield at Mielec, Poland and return
to the USSR.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, A-20s hit a storage dump
and rail lines while medium bombers pound bridges in NW Italy at Borgo San
Dalmazzo, Fossano, Albenga, Casale Monferrato, Cervo, Legnano, Rovigo, and
Chivasso; fighter-bombers continue to attack communications in the Po River
Valley, hitting numerous targets and completely destroying a railroad bridge
at Crema.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA, Seventh Air Force): P-47s continue to hit Tinian
and Pagan Islands. B-24s, based at Kwajalein Atoll, bomb Truk Atoll. The
819th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 30th Bombardment Group (Heavy), arrives
on Saipan Island from Wheeler Field, Territory of Hawaii with B-24s.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s bomb the
airfield and other targets in Woleai Atoll. In New Guinea, bad weather again
cancels strikes in the Vogelkop Peninsula, but C-47s complete 48 missions to
Biak Island despite the weather; communications and troop concentration along
the coast in the general area of Wewak are attacked throughout the day; and
the detachment of the 419th Night Fighter Squadron, 18th Fighter Group,
operating from Nadzab with P-61s, returns to base on Guadalcanal Island,
Solomon Islands.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 24 Jul 1994 21:26:43 EST
From:    Larry & Kim Jewell <[email-masked]>
Subject: ARC: CNO Reports to Sec. Knox

The document described below is being uploaded to byrd.mu.wvnet.edu
in directory /pub/history/military/wwii/CNO.reports.  The First Report
is available now and the other two reports and the three appendices
will be uploaded within the next two-three weeks.

Larry J

BTW, my P&M about digitizing the Green Books must have reached receptive
ears, I've heard from a company that has 35 of them on disk. They're
sending me a sample and I'll report when I've had a good look at them.

U.S. NAVY AT WAR
1941-1945

OFFICIAL REPORTS TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

by

FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING, U.S. NAVY
Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations

Washington,
United States Navy Department
1946

Transcribed and uploaded by Larry W. Jewell, [email-masked]

Table of Contents

FIRST REPORT
                                                                Page
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ..........................................   2

INTRODUCTION ...................................................   3

I   THE PEACETIME NAVY .........................................   4
    Prior to the War in Europe .................................   4
    As Affected by the War in Europe ...........................   7

II  THE WARTIME NAVY ...........................................  12
    Fighting Strength ..........................................  12
    Personnel ..................................................  20
    The Marine Corps ...........................................  26
    The Coast Guard ............................................  27
    The Seabees ................................................  29
    The WAVES ..................................................  29

III COMBAT OPERATIONS ..........................................  31
    General ....................................................  31
    Strategy ...................................................  37
    The Pacific Theater ........................................  39
        The Defensive ..........................................  39
        The Defensive-Offensive ................................  47
        The Offensive-Defensive ................................  49
        The Offensive ..........................................  70
        Supporting Operation ...................................  74
    The Atlantic Theater .......................................  77
    The Mediterranean Theater ..................................  82
        Landings in North Africa ...............................  82
        Landings in Sicily .....................................  86
        Landings in Italy ......................................  88

IV  TEAMWORK ...................................................  89
    The Navy Team ..............................................  89
    The Army and Navy Team .....................................  89
    The Allied Team ............................................  90

V   CONCLUSION .................................................  92

SECOND REPORT

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL ..........................................  96

I   INTRODUCTION ...............................................  97

II  COMMAND AND FLEET ORGANIZATION ............................. 100
    United States Fleet ........................................ 100
    Organization of United States Naval Force in the Pacific ... 100
    Organization of United States Naval Force in the Atlantic-
        Mediterranean .......................................... 101

III COMBAT OPERATIONS: PACIFIC ................................. 103
    Hollandia and Fast Carrier Task Force Covering Operations .. 104
    Marianas Operations ........................................ 106
    Progress along New Guinea Coast ............................ 112
    Western Caroline Operations ................................ 114
    Reoccupation of Philippine Islands ......................... 117
    Assault on Inner Defenses of Japan ......................... 129
    Continuing Operations ...................................... 132

IV  COMBAT OPERATIONS: ATLANTIC-MEDITERRANEAN .................. 134
    United States Atlantic Fleet ............................... 134
    United States Naval Forces in Europe-
        The Normandy Invasion .................................. 135
    Eighth Fleet-Italy ......................................... 143
    Eighth Fleet-Invasion of Southern France ................... 143

V   FIGHTING STRENGTH .......................................... 146
    Ship, Planes and Ordnance .................................. 146
    Personnel .................................................. 152
    Supply ..................................................... 155
    Health ..................................................... 157
    The Marine Corps ........................................... 159
    The Coast Guard ............................................ 159

VI  CONCLUSION ................................................. 161

THIRD REPORT

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL .......................................... 166

I   INTRODUCTION ............................................... 167

II  COMBAT OPERATIONS: PACIFIC ................................. 173
    The Capture of Iwo Jima .................................... 173
    Assault on Okinawa and its Capture ......................... 175
    Fast Carrier Force Operation in Support of
        Okinawa Invasion ....................................... 180
    Joint Operations in the Philippines and Borneo ............. 183
    Fast Carrier Force Pre-Invasion Operations
        against Japan .......................................... 188
    Contributory Operations .................................... 190
    The Surrender and Occupation of Japan ...................... 192

III LOGISTICS AND BASES-PACIFIC ................................ 196

IV  SUBMARINE OPERATIONS ....................................... 201
    Attacks on Merchant Shipping ............................... 201
    Attack on Naval Vessels .................................... 202
    Special Missions ........................................... 203

V   ATLANTIC OPERATIONS ........................................ 205
    Antisubmarine Operations ................................... 205
    Tenth Fleet ................................................ 206
    U. S. Naval Forces in Europe ............................... 207
    U. S. Atlantic Fleet ....................................... 211

VI  SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL .............................. 213
    Shipbuilding Program ....................................... 213
    Aircraft ................................................... 214
    Personnel .................................................. 216
    Health ..................................................... 219
    The Marine Corps ........................................... 221
    The Coast Guard ............................................ 222

VII NAVAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DURING WORLD WAR II ......... 225

VIII CONCLUSION ................................................ 231

APPENDIX A Status of major combatant ships of Japanese Navy
           at the conclusion of hostilities .................... 233

APPENDIX B Major combatant ships added to United States Fleet,
           7 December 1941-1 October 1945 ...................... 252

APPENDIX C Losses of United States naval vessels from all causes,
           7 December 1941-1 October 1945 ...................... 287

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End of WWII-L Digest - 23 Jul 1994 to 24 Jul 1994
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