Subject: WWII-L Digest - 6 Oct 1994 to 7 Oct 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 8 Oct 1994 00:02:18 -0400

There are 70 messages totalling 2886 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. ITALY IN WW2, MY $ (2)
  2. Switzerland in WWII (4)
  3. TACT:Could they have won ? (7)
  4. TACT:Balkan strategy (3)
  5. Motivation Behind the SA Purge
  6. HYPO:  The "Big" what-if? (3)
  7. Carlson's & Edson's Raiders
  8. Gustav Geraet (3)
  9. TACT:Fuller Part II:Balkan strategy (2)
 10. HYPO: The Big What-if?
 11. Churchill's bad decisions (from Economic Causes of the War) (4)
 12. INF: 50 Years Ago - 08-OCT-1944
 13. POL: Economic Causes of the war (2)
 14. Raid in Poland (2)
 15. WEAP: Ar234C with E381
 16. WEAP:  P38 in ETO
 17. Christie Tanks & the Soviet Union
 18. Motivations behind the SA Purge
 19. INF: Regia Marina, Part 1
 20. HYPO: The "Big" what-if? (4)
 21. German Economics pre-WW2
 22. [TRIV] Re: odd WWII air encounters
 23. Italy in WW2--book titles (3)
 24. Untold Stories f/ABTF, Pt. 3
 25. HIST -- SA purge
 26. POL: War Economies(Re: HYPO: The Big What-if?) (2)
 27. HOME:US:Illinois at War
 28. Invasion of Crete -- Operation Merkur (4)
 29. Churchill's bad decisions (from Economic Causes of the
 30. Untold Stories, Pt. 3 Update (2)
 31. MEDIA: Bombs in Berlin
 32. Conducator's Guard--book titles, etc.
 33. Carlson's Raiders
 34. Arnhem
 35. [INF] USAAF 8 OCT 44
 36. Egypt
 37. BIO:  Wingate
 38. SS in combat

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 01:04:12 EDT
From:    Cassady Craft <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ITALY IN WW2, MY $

What about Wingate and his group?  What a character!  Someone with a love
for the "mavericks" fill us in on this character.  I don't have the sources
anywhere near.

Cassady Craft
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 01:06:22 EDT
From:    Cassady Craft <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Switzerland in WWII

I just read in Doolittle's auto that some (2) "P-38s landed in Portugal.
One took off under a ruse and the other ins interned." (p. 320).
Anyone have any stories about escapes such as this one?

Cassady Craft
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 01:13:50 EDT
From:    Cassady Craft <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT:Could they have won ?

Yes Jim and Robert, DDAy was the hump.  Not only could a tremendous defeat

but such a defeat would have allowed the Russians to finish the war off
before the West could have conducted another invasion--unless they gampbled
with an ad hoc thing.  Anyone know of any contingency plans for either evacuati
onof the beaches or having anohter go at the whole operation if if it failed?
Sorry for the lack a of correction capability, using a new software package.

Cassady Craft
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 01:18:27 EDT
From:    Cassady Craft <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT:Balkan strategy

Bob, isn't it fairly well accepted that the failure in Italy began with
Sicily?  Kind of like Monty flunking the Dutch service exam by planning
market garden, the way to skin Italy is through Sardinia and Corsica, thus
giving yourself some strategic surprise about where you are going next.
Once you go into Sicily, you almost must go to the boot.

An excellent source on the Sicilian campaign is _The Battle of Sicily_
by Mitcham and von Stauffenberg.  It has the OB for Sicily that others were
seeking.

Cassady Craft
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 6 Oct 1994 22:46:33 PDT
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Motivation Behind the SA Purge

Roehm's homosexuality and appointment of senior aides of similar persuasion
was also part of the rationale for killing him. Probably no more than an
excuse, though, as the name of the game -- then as ever -- was simply a
struggle for power.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 6 Oct 1994 22:47:39 PDT
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO:  The "Big" what-if?

"Safe behind the ditch..."
!!
        ??

--

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 6 Oct 1994 23:59:26 PDT
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Switzerland in WWII

An interesting other aspect of this topic is the internment of aircrew
from both sides in neutral Ireland during the Second World War.
        After he spring of 1943, the Irish government begal allowing
interned British and American fliers to quietly leave the camps and
slip back across the border into Ulster. Luftwaffe crews interned in
Ireland stayed that way until after war's end.
        Regards -- Sidney Allinson.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 6 Oct 1994 21:37:10 -1000
From:    Jim Adams <[email-masked]>
Subject: Carlson's & Edson's Raiders

A delight to see this topic as this was the subject of my BA thesis.

Mrs. Roosevelt, the President's wife, after visiting the Pacific
"sugested prolonged quartine before returning such men to civilian
society."  She said this knowing that her son, James, was one of the
raider leaders.

Much of the Marine Corps command did not favor a seperate raider unit, as
they felt this was already the job of the Marine Corps.  President
Roosevelt, was enthralled with the British Commandos and like his friend
Churchill, liked the unorthodox.

President Roosevelt was also influenced by his son, James, a Captain in
the Marine Corps Reserve.  Captain Roosevelt was influenced by Evans Carlson.

During the 30's, Carlson left the actiive Marine Corps and went to China
to observe the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army (under Mao Tse-Tung).
He was greatly influenced by their organization and tactics.  They were
successful in hampering the Japanese army.  He later returned to active
Marine duty and applied the lessons of guerrilla warfare, etc. that he
learned from the Chinese army to his raider organization.  Capt (later
Major) James Roosevelt was his executive officer for the 2nd Raider Bn.

At the same time Carlson formed the 2nd Raider Bn, Lt Col Merrit Edson
formed the 1st Raider Bn.  his executive officer was Maj Samuel Griffith,
who later translated *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare*.  All four of
these officers were believers in unorthodox methods.

Carlson and Edson were both given great lattitude to organize and train
their battalions as they saw fit.

I found WEB Griffin's The Corps descriptions of the raiders to be accurate.

Raider tactics and organization had influence on later Marine Corps, such
as the 13 man rifle squad, divided into 3 fire teams was a product of
Carlson.

"Gung Ho" was a Chinese phrase that Carlson brought back.  It roughly
means "to work together," but actually escribes to a larger or deeper
philisophical meaning of all being equal.

During the filming of the movie "Gung Ho," a story of the Raiders  and
Makin Island raid, Carlson was assigned as an advisor.  He was upset when
he noticed that not all actors were being treated equal, that the "stars"
were given better treatment, etc.  He said this would not be the case
with the raiders that they were portraying and insisted that if they were
going to make a movie about his raiders, then they must act the same
way.  He threatened to cancel the movie and his involvement unless all
the actors received equal treatment.

Some other sources are *Special Marine Corps Units of World War II* by C.
L. Updegraph (1972, Historical Division HQMC).  *Once a Legend. "Red
Mike " Edson  of the Marine Raiders* by J.T. Hoffman (1994 Presidio).

****************************************************************************
Jim Adams                       [email-masked]
USS Arizona Memorial, NPS        (808) 423-7300
1 Arizona Memorial Place
Honolulu, Hawaii 96818
****************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 09:08:43 BST
From:    Stephen Baldwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Gustav Geraet

>
>Hello, Tim and others!
>
>I have the info on the Paris Gun, and there is considerable info on
>this weapon. Since it relates to WWI, I can only state that what I
>send would have to be compared with what I have already posted on the
>Gustav.
>
>Terry

I hereby nominate Prof. Terry Moore  to lifelong membership of WWI-L
(alternatively, you could just subcribe, "do your stuff", and
unsubscribe.. :-))

I'm positive this will help

Steve Baldwin
[email-masked]

PS - what ever happened to the excellent input from USMA, LtCs
Crane/Cannon etc...are they still on the net??

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 10:03:29 +0200
From:    "A.Bouis" <[email-masked]>
Subject: TACT:Fuller Part II:Balkan strategy

Second part of Fuller's ideas on the war, this time on the Balkan
strategy.
While I would personally agree with the author's strategic vision (how
not to agree with hindsight ?), like Bob I doubt its practicability (rough terrain). But his arguments are worth quoting...

(Volume III, pages 547-548)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 (Fuller explains how Stalin manoeuvers Churchill and Roosevelt into
 landing as far away from his objective, Central Europe, as possible and
how Harry Hopkins explains to the President that Russia will be a powerful
nation after the war)

This estimate is reflected in a telegram sent by Mr. Churchill to
Field-Marshall Smuts a few days after the conference ended.
"I think", he said, "that Russia will be the greatest land Power in the
world after this war, which will have rid her of the two military Powers,
Japan and Germany."
These predictions meant that once Germany was crushed, the totalitarian
rule of Stalin over Europe would replace that of Hitler; as far as the
western allies were concerned, the war would lose its political aim, and
in consequence it would be absurd to continue it.
It would appear that this vitally important inference was not discussed
for a moment. Had it been discussed it would have become apparent that in
order to attain their political aim, it was essential for the western
allies not only to destroy Hitlerism, but simultaneously to prevent its
replacement by Stalinism. And if psychological attack is omitted, this
could only be accomplished if they adapted their military operations to
this political end.
In the time at their disposal there was only one course they could have
taken, and that was to accept the front, then about to be established by
General Eisenhower and General Alexander in Italy, as the Second Front,
and to have put "Overlord" into cold storage. Had they done so, then,
when Alexander had been reinforced by the resources earmarked for
"Overlord" - more particularly landing craft - by a series of amphibious
operations up the leg of Italy he rapidly could have compelled
Field-Marshall Kesselring to withdraw beyond the Po, and by a landing in
the Trieste area he could have forced him either to abandon Italy or risk
the loss of his communications. Such an eventuality, which was by no
means impracticable, would win for the western allies the Road to
Vienna, Budapest, and Prague.
In any case the Chiefs of the Combined Staff should have seen that,
instead of striking at the apex of the German salient
Leningrad-Brest-Athens, strategy dictated that, were the means available,
its reduction should be sought by striking at its waist - Lubeck-Trieste.
Because it was more difficult to strike at the former target than the
latter, a second front in the Trieste area was the only practical
operation in the time available to eliminate the rival totalitarian
systems.

(Fuller then explains at length the development of the Teheran conference
and how firmly Stalin then vetoes Churchill's idea of a Balkan or Turkish
venture)

(...and before, page 533 :)
On october 16, Constantin Fotitch, the Yugoslav Minister in Washington,
broached to President Roosevelt the question of an invasion of Europe by
way of the Balkans, and he pointed out that this strategy, "already
suggested by Churchill, would prevent the installation of Soviet puppet
regimes in the Balkans and in Central Europe." The President replied that
the problem would be decided "purely upon its military aspects." Fotitch
observed, "...that it was a costly absurdity to fight a war for purely
military reasons, with no moral or political objectives."

-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Arnaud

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 12:15:03 +0200
From:    "A.Bouis" <[email-masked]>
Subject: HYPO: The Big What-if?

I would tend to agree with William Lippert on much of what he says, particularly on the fact that for each Axis good decision/invention, there would certainly have been an Allied response, just as there were for Rommel's genius, wolfpacks, and Kamikazes.

What I imply here is that WWII was a completely unbalanced production war and none of the early German/Japanese incredible successes enabled them to counterbalance this decisive factor. Neither did any Allied critical mistake, and look at how many there were :
Abandon of Czechoslovakia, the unbelievable collapse of the French Army, the countless British disasters in North Africa, the shattering of Russia's army (the largest in the World, in three months), Pearl Harbor, the incredible loss of shipping in the Atlantic, the mighty disasters in the Far East, the erroneous Italian campaign, failure to trap the Germans in Sicily, Arnhem, non-productive Strategic bombing for years on end, etc.. etc...

All this failed to win Hitler the war. So could one more have changed the conclusion, which was that the world could not live with Hitler ?
One may suspect that had Hitler forced a peace on England in 1940 she would have raised other coalitions, like in the days of Napoleon -which would not have been difficult given the terror Hitler would have laid on Europe -, and in the end have stamped out an overstretched Reich, just as was toppled Napoleon's mighty Empire.

Now I now that I seem to be discounting strategy in favour of  production. I may be very stupid to imply this, so let's say that I only agree with William that in all probability Rommel's conquest of Africa would have been countered by counter-invasion or isolation, as would have the procurement of Doenitz' 300 U-boats.

Arnaud.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 07:21:37 EDT
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT:Could they have won ?

Cassady Craft <[email-masked]> said:

>Yes Jim and Robert, DDAy was the hump.  Not only could a tremendous defeat
>but such a defeat would have allowed the Russians to finish the war off
>before the West could have conducted another invasion--unless they gampbled
>with an ad hoc thing. Anyone know of any contingency plans for either evacuati
>onof the beaches or having anohter go at the whole operation if if it failed?

I seem to recall Ike saying something to the effect that there were no plans
for evacuation; this was an operation they were commited to.

-Al

Every program in development at URI expands until it can read mail. ;-)

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 07:40:41 EDT
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Churchill's bad decisions (from Economic Causes of the War)

On Thu, 6 Oct 1994 10:54:41 -0500 Tim J. Watts said:
>Bob Stewart pointed out that Churchill wanted to invade the Balkans, a
>bad decision.  Joe Barone replied that Anzio was Churchill's idea too.

In all fairness, Anzio was botched by the commanders in the field.  Certainly
it was logical to use Allied air & naval power to end-run Axis lines in
Italy.

>How many bad decisions can you folks come up with that Winnie made?
>One that comes to my mind is send most of the military resources from
>North Africa in early 1941 to Greece; instead of probably taking all of
>North Africa before the Africa Corps could intervene, he made the
>political decision to prop up Greece, who was obviously going to be
>overrun by the Germans.

This is a tough one.  Militarily, the move was a mistake, but the war
was fought on other than military grounds, and in context, Churchill
had to support Greece in some fashion or suffer an even greater moral
and political defeat.  Germany's diversion to Greece wasted 2-6 weeks
from the Russian campaign, so it wasn't a total loss (although Churchill
probably didn't know that would be the ultimate effect of defending
Greece).

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 04:53:45 -0700
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 08-OCT-1944

On 08-OCT-1944, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - An advance by the Canadian II Corps from Hoogerheide to
Korteven is halted by a counter-attack by the German 15th Army. The Canadians
are driven back to their starting point and just barely are able to withstand
the German counter-attack. The US XIX Corps captures Herzogenrat. The 90th
Division is fighting the Germans house to house in Maizieres-les-Metz. The US
XII Corps are advancing along the banks of the river Seille, capturing
Moivron, Arraye-et-Han, Lixieres and Fossieux. A strong German counter-attack
holds up the American advance in the Mariadorf sector.

Eastern Front - Finnish troops retake Kemi at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia.

Greece - Corinth is evacuated by the Germans; which is subsequently occupied
by British troops from Araxos. Troops from the British 9th Commandos reach
Nauplia.

The Homefront
-------------
Wendell Willkie Dies - Windell L. Willkie, 52, Republican presidential
candidate in 1940 has died in New York city from a heart attack.

Congressional Medal Of Honor - Pfc. John W. Dutko from Homer City, Pa., has
been awarded posthumously the Congressional Medal of Honor for his
singlehanded killing of 11 Germans on May 23rd in Italy.

Best Selling Books - "Strange Fruit" by Lillian Smith, "The Robe" By Lloyd C.
Douglas and "The Razor's Edge" by W. Somerset Maugham.

World Series - The Cardinals take the lead in the series by defeating the
Browns 2-0.

Pro Football - Cleveland 19, Chicago Bears 7: Detroit 19, Brooklyn 14; New
York 22, Boston 10; Washington 31, Philadelphia 31.

=============================================================================

Sources: "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi, "The
World Almanac Book Of WW II" by Peter Young, "Facts On File Yearbook 1944,
Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L. Lapica.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.netcom.com in directory /pub/jbd and can
be accessed via the WWW by URL: ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/jbd/ww2.html. If you
have difficulty accessing the Netcom FTP server, please keep trying because it
stays very busy.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis     [email-masked]
Cary, N.C.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 07:06:41 -0500
From:    Bill Smith <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: POL: Economic Causes of the war

1937 was a pivital year for the FDR administration.  It was torn over the
need for international action, all the way to the top.  Advisors have
speculated that FDR's Quarantine speech was not intended as some effort
to divert attention as much as it was one to begin to draw some attention
in the general public to matters overseas.  Some also indicate it was a
reflection of a growing shift within FDR's mind toward foreign affairs,
the start of his own personal shift toward greater interest in
intervention, a move away from isolationism.

Remember there were deep divisions between branches of government (State
vs. Treasury) and even within (Hull vs. his asst. secretaries) over
foreign intervention.

On Wed, 5 Oct 1994, Tim J. Watts wrote:

> Arnaud-
> An interesting post about economics and causes of the war.  One challenge
> to the theory.  He mentions the Sept. 1937 depression in the U.S. and
> the need to divert public attention from this situation "especially as
> the presidential elections were impending".  Presidential elections
> were next held in 1940 - 3 years after the event and hardly impending.
> This makes me doubt his effort to tie the "Quarantine speech" purely
> to the economic conditions.
>
> I am interested in the idea of economics and its role in history.  I
> don't know enough to discount its effects, so I look forward to what
> others have to say.
> Tim J. Watts
> Valparaiso University
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 07:08:51 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Switzerland in WWII

Hello, Cassady!

Just a comment to your interesting post.

> I just read in Doolittle's auto that some (2) "P-38s landed in Portugal.
> One took off under a ruse and the other ins interned." (p. 320).
> Anyone have any stories about escapes such as this one?

    I might add that the pilot of that P-38 that landed in Portugal
under a ruse was Captain Jack Ilfrey, who claims to be the first ace
in a P-38. He lives in New Braunfels, TX and was a member of the 20th
Fighter Group.

    Regarding similar escape stories, what about Franz von Werra's
escape from a Canadian POW camp, making his way through the US,
neutral at the time, into Mexico, where he made contact with the
German embassy, boarded ship there, and finally arrived in Germany
safe and sound. He was restored to flying status but was later shot
down and killed on the Eastern Front.

    There are others.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 07:13:16 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ITALY IN WW2, MY $

Hello, Cassady!

> What about Wingate and his group?  What a character!  Someone with a love
> for the "mavericks" fill us in on this character.  I don't have the sources
> anywhere near.

    You are absolutely right about Orde Wingate. I have some info on
him that I can post, and a few things come to mind. He loved to eat
raw garlic cloves. His feeling was that they were nature's perfect
food and eating these would ward off any illness and prolong life.
The fact is that noone could stand to stay around him for any length
of time and he was left pretty much alone.

    He was unorthodox, to say the least, but probably the most
colorful and creative character to emerge from WWII. I think he was
killed in action in Burma in 1944.

If you are interested, I can post to you some more info on Mr.
Wingate.

Terry

 >
> Cassady Craft
> Department of Political Science
> University of Georgia
> e-mail [email-masked]
> or
> [email-masked]
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 07:14:58 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO:  The "Big" what-if?

Hello, Cassady!

I would like to respond to this but it will take some time. By Monday
or later on today.

Terry
> Ed, see my other posting, or yes to what you said.  I'm really getting at
> the "if Germany takes Moscow, the war is over" vs. "Germany could have never
> defeated Russia, because they were imregnable behind the Urals, and the Brits
> were safe behind the ditch, and the US the arsenal of democracy (communism)"
> argument.  I'm also looking for "key decision" that could have been decisive
> in preventing Germany from winning the war.  Mr Yarborough's answer was very
> cogent, I think.  I would like more details about what the Fuhrer did wrong
> in the summer of 41, etc.  Lots of knowledge on the list that I would learn
> from, and I'm trying to provide a mechanism.  What-if scenarios can be
> excellent teaching tools, just as the "revisionist" works are.
> Thanks in advance to all who partake.
>
> Cassady Craft
> Department of Political Science
> University of Georgia
> e-mail [email-masked]
> or
> [email-masked]
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 07:18:43 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Raid in Poland

Hello, Christopher!

The Army Colonel who set up the Brandenburgers was Colonel von
Hippel.

I hadn't read or heard that they were going to storm the Reichstag
and arrest Hitler if the Munich crisis had resulted in war. My
understanding was that the officers of the General Staff would have
done this, as they had direct access to Hitler at the time. Witzleben
and Halder were the prime movers in this plot.

        Terry
 > >
> > I'll have to double check my sources when I get home tonight, but the
> > first troops which would later be called "Brandenburgers" were assembled
> > in the fall of 1938, under the command of an Army colonel whose name
> > escapes me just now.  They were to assigned the responsibility of
> > storming the Reichstag and arresting Hitler if the Munich Crisis hadn't
> > resolved peacefully.  I'll check my copy of Harold Deutsch's HITLER AND
> > HIS GENERALS: THE UNSEEN CRISIS, 1938 for details.
>
> I'd be interested in hearing more about this.
>
> >
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 07:27:54 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Ar234C with E381

Hello, Joe!

Here is some info on the Ar 234C.

Power plant: 4 BMW 003 (900 kg, 1980 pounds thrust) turbojets
Crew: 1
Maximum Speed: 874 km/h (534 mph) at 6100 meters (20,000 feet)
Initial Climb Rate: 1090 m (3,570 feet) second
Service ceiling: 11,500 meters (37,700 feet)
Endurance: 85 minutes with 60% thrust
Takeoff distance: 1420 meters (4650 feet)
                  612 meters (2000 feet) with RATO

If you would like more, I can post it.

Thanks, Joe.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 08:36:50 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP:  P38 in ETO

TO:
John Meierhoffer
[email-masked]

First, the P-38 in the ETO

John,

As I stated in my initial message re: the F-82,  there are more
important aspects to air combat than maneuverability.  Tactics,
aircrew quality, firepower, A/C maintenance etc. all have a
bearing on how well an A/C performs its mission.  It appears that
this is what has affected the perception of the P-38 in the ETO.

I'll start with a quotation from Gen. James Doolittle, from the
March '76 issue of Airpower, where he attributes the P-38s poor
showing in the ETO during '42-'43 to "external factors":

"The P47 and P51 types would probably have fared as poorly under
the rules of that period-but neither type was developed or mass
produced until later.  Pilots with only rudimentary training were
pitted against Luftwaffe pilots long on experience, and the newly
developed Allison, heavily boosted by turbosupercharging, was most
unhappy with the quality of British fuels."

Kenneth Sumney, in the Dec '76 issue of Wings states "In 1942-1943
every U.S. type introduced into the ETO suffered through a
traumatic familiarization and shakedown process.  Because of the
time lost due to mechanical and supply problems, P-38Fs never had
the opportunity to develop and coordinate effective tactics before
entering combat."

At the same time as these inexperienced P-38 pilots were being
thrown into the battle as long range bomber escorts, they were
using the "British" method of extending their operational range...

      Cruise at 1600 RPM, in auto-lean, with a high manifold
pressure.  This reduced fuel consumption to 70 gal/hr.  But, poor
quality British fuel, combined with bitterly cold temperatures at
low altitudes, caused a great many engine and turbocharger
failures through detonation and backfire.

(NOTE:  This is the same technique that Charles Lindberg introduced
to the P-38 units in the Pacific later in the war.  Using American
AvGas, and under milder climates, it was a great success.)

Warren M. Bodie, the author of the Airpower article that quoted Gen.
Doolittle concluded: "Early versions of the P-38-F, G and H models,
held their own in the ETO despite inefficient pilot training and
the application of unsuitable tactics in combat.  Later versions
of the fighter-J-25 and L models..." (which incorporated power
boosted flight controls) "...could outfly the best German
fighters, at altitude or on the deck."

In addition, the application of the "Butterfly" dive flaps on
later P-38s corrected the compressibility problem that caused
pilots to lose flight control in high speed dives.  With the
restrictions on dive speed lifted there wasn't a plane in the
European sky that could dive with the P-38.

However, by this time, P-47s and P-51s were becoming available in
the ETO, and General Kelley was scheming and screaming to get
every P-38 he could into the Pacific.  So the best of the P-38s
didn't have much of a chance to duke it out with the best of the
Luftwaffe.

Even so, the P-38s record in the ETO was 2500 kills against 1750
losses.  Even though the 1.4 to 1 ratio isn't good compared to
those of the Mustang and Thunderbolt, it's still a positive record
against the Luftwaffe.

> pg 110.  Price summarizes the results of trails between a FW 190 A
> and a P-38F:  FW190 was faster that the P-38 up to 23,000 feet.
> FW190 had better climb below 20,000 feet.  FW 190 dives better and
> can out turn the P-38 at higher speeds.  Fw 190 accelerates faster
> in all cases.

  See above RE: dive flaps and power controls

> 'The turbo-superchargers were controlled by an oil regulator and
> at altitude the oil had a tendency to congeal, which caused
> serious problems'.

  See above RE: British fuel

> A further problem with the P-38 was that its
> airframe was not strong and it had a relatively low maximum diving
> speed.

       1.  The P-38 could out dive any fighter in the theater,
unfortunately, at high dive speeds, early P-38s lost aileron
control due to the effects of compressibility (find many Luftwaffe
prop-engined fighters that reached the speeds where
compressibility problems arise?) so that high speed dives were
prohibited.  Later versions incorporated flaps that corrected this
effect, thus lifting the restrictions on dive speed.  This
restriction was never the result of a weak airframe.

      2.  The classic example of the strength of the P-38 airframe
is the fate of A/C 41-2092.  During a strafing run in North
Africa, the A/C collided with a telephone pole.  Resulting damage
included a torn open port side gun bay door, loss of the port side
propeller, and the left outboard wing being pushed back
approximately 20 degrees.  All this at high speed and very low
altitude.  Yet the aircraft completed an RTB and landed normally
without even blowing a tire.

     Now, the F-82.

     Unfortunately, as the F-82 has never been much of an interest of mine, I
haven't a lot of references on it.  Definately none that list the type of
performance specifications you want.

     A couple of them state that the F-82 was surprisingly maneuverable, and
able to hold its own against a single engined fighter opponent, but that doesn't
answer the mail.

     If I come across something better, I'll let you know.

        Steve L. New                     .............................
        Weapon System Manager            .............................
        Battalion Countermine Set        ............ /\ .............
        U.S. Army TACOM AMSTA-IM-FR1D    ............/  \.............
        DSN: 786-5403  FAX: 786-7788     ............    .............
        EMAIL  [email-masked]   ............    .............

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 08:35:17 EDT
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT:Balkan strategy

On Fri, 7 Oct 1994 01:18:27 EDT Cassady Craft said:
>Bob, isn't it fairly well accepted that the failure in Italy began with
>Sicily?  Kind of like Monty flunking the Dutch service exam by planning
>market garden, the way to skin Italy is through Sardinia and Corsica, thus
>giving yourself some strategic surprise about where you are going next.
>Once you go into Sicily, you almost must go to the boot.

That I don't understand at all.  How could you go for Sardinia/Corsica
w/o Sicily for your air support?

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 09:57:36 -0400
From:    QUACK <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT:Could they have won ?

I believe that Germany could have won the war if they didn't invade Russia.
The offensive line that Germany had in operation was too large to keep
supplied with men and materiel. The Italians were of no help in the overall
scheme of things so they couldn't be included in the offensive picture. The
same thing hold true for the Japanese.
To large a battle front to maintain many miles from home.
Of course if Hitler had been assasinated in 1937 or 1938....

Ron Musco

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 09:13:22 -0500
From:    Greg Kelley <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Christie Tanks & the Soviet Union

FYI.....

the two Christie M-1931 (or T-3) tanks that the Soviet Union obtained
were purchased in late 1930, with approval for evaluation & development
of the Christie series granted by the Revolutionary War Council on 13th
February 1931.

RUSSIAN TANKS, 1900-1970  by John Milsom (1970)
('cause all my Zaloga titles are at home)

                                          Glad To Be Of Service!

                                          Greg Kelley
                                          St. Paul Public Library
                                          [email-masked]

On Thu, 6 Oct 1994, Robert T. Moore wrote:

> Hello, Cassady!
>
> Thanks for the note.
>
> > Terry and others, maybe the professor was referring to the Soviet adaptation
> > of the Christie chasis for their tanks.  Perhaps with the Germans training
> > in Lipetsk, they acquired some of these.  Just a guess, hopefully enough
> > to get someone who knows more to weigh in.
>
>     The Christie chassis was sold or the rights to it were sold to
> the Russians in the 1920's, 1923, I think, because the U.S.
> Government didn't think that the development of such a vehicle would
> be necessary after the end of the war to end all wars, among other
> things.
>
>     The Russians however, did develop and use this chassis for their
> T-34 design, which as we all know, was one of the best tanks to be
> used in WWII.
>
>     Anyway, the US did not build tanks for the Germans, and if they
> were built they were constructed in secret or in Russia.
>
>     Thanks, again, Cassady!
>
>     Terry
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 10:48:53 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT:Could they have won ?

     > I believe that Germany could have won the war if they didn't invade
     > Russia. The offensive line that Germany had in operation was too
     > large to keep supplied with men and materiel. The Italians were of
     > no help in the overall scheme of things so they couldn't be included
     > in the offensive picture. The same thing hold true for the Japanese.
     > To large a battle front to maintain many miles from home.
     > Of course if Hitler had been assasinated in 1937 or 1938....

     > Ron Musco

     I don't believe that Germany could have avoided war with Russia in the
     long run.

     From the German side, communism the great bogeyman (after the Jews)
     that the NAZI party used as the great external threat to keep the
     minds of the people off of what was happening at home.  Once the Final
     Solution was final, the Germans would have no choice but to move
     against Russia.

     From the Russian side, Stalin had to be aware that war with Germany
     was coming.  He did everything he could to stall it while attempting
     to strengthen his defenses.  The Nazis had made it very clear how they
     felt about communism.

     The NAZI/Communist clash aside, the USSR was an expansionist state,
     insisting on huge buffers between its borders and anyone strong enough
     to cause it harm (like all of eastern Europe).  No way could it have
     accepted German domination of the rest of the continent up to its
     borders.

        Steve L. New                     .............................
        Weapon System Manager            .............................
        Battalion Countermine Set        ............ /\ .............
        U.S. Army TACOM AMSTA-IM-FR1D    ............/  \.............
        DSN: 786-5403  FAX: 786-7788     ............    .............
        EMAIL  [email-masked]   ............    .............

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 11:02:46 -0400
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Churchill's bad decisions (from Economic Causes of the War)

Ken Koester <[email-masked]> writes:
> In all fairness, Anzio was botched by the commanders in the field.  Certainly
> it was logical to use Allied air & naval power to end-run Axis lines in
> Italy.

        Operation Shingle (Anzio) should have died on the drawing board
and many of the commanders expected it to.  Because of logistics contraints
(landing craft needed for Overlord, etc.), the plan called for a mere
two divisions to hit the beach.  This was simply insufficient manpower
to exploit any surprise end-run.  The operation could not have been
expanded without cutting into the Overlord operation which the US would
not allow.  It was only because Chirchill would not back down despite
the overwhelming evidence that the operation would not achieve any useful
goals that the operation continued.  Marshall considered Italy a sideshow
and didn't want any more resources invested there.  "Fatal Decision:
Anzio and the Battle for Rome" by Carlo D'este is my primary source.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
We will *not* have the element of surprise!  Those Tigers will
hear our Detroit engines long before we enter the town.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 11:04:00 EST
From:    "Eliot K. Friedman" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Motivations behind the SA Purge

I said:

>> Roehm and the top SA men had ambitions to become commissioned officers
>> in the Wehrmacht, a matter of considerable social significance in prewar
>> Germany.  The incumbent officers were anxious to keep "common street
>> brawlers" out of their "gentleman's club".  "Night of the Long Knives"
>> was a way for the Party to reassure the Wehrmacht that it would keep its
>> monopoly of national defense.
>
>David Rising replied:
>
>Wasn't Roehm a lieutenant (captain?) during the 1st WW? I think that it's
>pretty clear that Night of the Long Knives was more of a consolidation of
>Himmler/Goering/Hitler/s power. Strasser/Roehm/et al weren't following the
>direction they wanted to go, so they were killed.

    More importantly, was Roehm an officer PRIOR TO WWI?  I won't argue
    Roehm's WWI service record, but he was far from "Regular Army".

    I doubt that in WWII, the US West Point grads had much in common with
    the "90 day wonders", commissioned out of necessity, not choice.  I'm
    sure that a similar situation existed in the WWI German Army, but to a
    much greater degree, since German society was far more class conscious.
    Roehm's WWI experience, like Hitler's, if anything must have widened
    the gulf between himself and the generals.

    I maintain that, personal party rivalries aside, Roehm's presence in
    any high post prevented the Party from gaining indispensible allies
    outside the Party, namely Army commanders and the big industrialists.
    Gaining absolute control of the Party wouldn't be worth much if a
    hostile Army decided to throw the Party out of power the next day.
    This was always a possibility, at least through the 30's, had any of
    Hitler's foreign adventures not turned out so well.

    El

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 11:15:44 -0400
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: Regia Marina, Part 1

[All the messages I received concerning my Regia Marina posts were positive.
So here is the first installment.  - Joe]

        The Italian navy came into existence shortly after the unification
of the country in 1861 with the amalgamation of the small navies of the
various states.  This young navy inherited ancient traditions but integration
was long and difficult.  The defeat at Lissa, in 1866, at the hands of the
Austrians was a serious blow to the Italians.  However, the Italo-Turkish
war of 1911 convinced the navy that it finally achieved real operational
experience.  This view was reinforced in World War I.  Despite these
successes, though, Italian naval operations had been limited to the use
of light forces and submarines in a closed sea, the Adriatic.  This did
not provide the navy with experience in high-seas operations against a
strong, well equipped adversary.  In 1940, the Regia Marina, though
equipped with modern ships, suffered grave deficiencies in technology,
organization, logistics, doctrine, and most importantly, real high-seas
experience.

        When Italy declared war on the Allies on June 10, 1940, the Italian
Navy had only two battleships combat ready, the "Conte di Cavour" and "Giulio
Cesare".  These ships comprised the 5th Division of the 1st Naval Squadron.
Both were World War I vintage ships which had been decommissioned in the
late 1920s only to be modernized and reactivated in the mid-1930s.  Despite
this modernization, though, both ships still were deficient in armor and
armament.  The more modern ships, "Littorio" and "Vittorio Veneto", making up
the 9th Division, had only been handed over by the shipyards and were still
undergoing training that would take another three months before they were
operational.  "Caio Duilio" and "Andrea Doria" were still in the yards, being
fitted out and undergoing trials and training.  "Duilio" would be ready at
the end of the summer, "Doria" by the end of the fall.  The other "Littorio"
class ships, "Roma" and "Impero", were still under construction.

        That the battleship force was so unprepared for war is convincing
evidence that the Italian declaration of war was prompted by political, not
military, considerations.  Another affect of the sudden declaration was that
large numbers of Italian merchant ships were unable to return home, being
captured or interned, significantly reducing available shipping.  Mussolini
believed that France would soon fall to the advancing Germans and the
capitulation of Great Britain would follow shortly thereafter.  Despite
France's collapse, however, Britain stood firm and rejected a negotiated
peace.  As a result, Italy became embroiled in a long and difficult conflict
with her armed forces, industry, and economic base totally unprepared.

        Allied strategy depended on the French Fleet playing a large role
in holding the Mediterranean.  France's withdrawal from the war meant that
there was now near parity between Italian and British naval forces in the
area.  The Italian Navy included two battleships (with four more nearly
ready), seven heavy and twelve light cruisers, about one hundred and twenty
destroyers and torpedo boats and over one hundred submarines.  These forces
were numerically superior to the British Mediterranean Fleet, based in
Alexandria, and Force H, a hastily constructed replacement for the French
Fleet, based in Gibraltar.  Together, these two British forces would have
been an imposing force but they rarely operated together because of
operational demands placed on each.

        The Italians were handicapped by the lack of aircraft carriers.
This was to have a significant and negative effect in numerous engagements
and on the course of the war.  British tactics were based on the use of
carrier-based aircraft in reconnaissance and strike roles.  All Italian
aircraft were controlled by the Regia Aeronautica which had resisted all
attempts to create a naval air arm and the building of carriers.  It was
Mussolini's opinion that the Italian peninsula served as a large carrier.
He failed to perceive the need for specially trained naval aviators or the
requirement for carrier aircraft to protect the fleet.  The need was finally
acknowledged in 1941 but the first Italian carrier, "Aquila", though ready
at the time of the armistice, never entered service.

        A brief period of relative quiet followed the first weeks after
Italy's entrance into the war, as the two navies assessed the situation.
However, the need for Italy to supply its forces in Libya and for Britain
to reinforce its forces in Egypt and Malta led to an early delineation
of naval strategy in the Mediterranean -- the interdiction of enemy
convoys and protection of friendly ones.  This became the objective of
numerous operations.

        The first major fleet action in the Mediterranean occurred on
July 9, 1940, in the waters of Point Stilo, off Calabria.  An Italian
squadron comprising the battleships "Cesare", "Cavour", 14 cruisers,
and numerous destroyers, came into contact with the British Mediterranean
Fleet.  This included the battleships "Warspite", "Malaya", and "Royal
Sovereign", aircraft carrier "Eagle", five light cruisers, and 14
destroyers.  The two squadrons were at sea escorting convoys; the Italians
were escorting one to Benghazi, and the British were escorting two -- one
to Malta, and one evacuating civilians from the island.

        Neither side fought the action with great zeal.  Contact between
the two forces occurred in a position favorable for the Italians, near
the Italian coast and in range of land-based bombers.

        Initially, there was a brief and inconsequential exchange of fire
between the cruiser forces.  At 3:53 PM, "Cesare" and "Cavour", each armed
with 10 12.6 inch guns, opened fire at a range of 26,400 meters against
"Warspite", which was in the van of the British battleships.  "Warspite"
returned fired, as did the other battleships.  At 3:59 PM, "Cesare" was
hit by a 15-inch shell from "Warspite" at extreme range which went through
the after smoke stack, exploding on the armored deck and causing a fire.
Four of her eight boiler rooms were filled with smoke, forcing them to
shut down, which reduced her speed to 18 knots.  Admiral Campioni, the
Italian commander, decided to break contact.  He ordered a destroyer
attack and continued firing with his aft guns, to cover his withdrawal.
Within half an hour, "Cesare" had worked back up to nearly 24 knots and
sailed to Messina for repairs while the rest of the fleet made for Taranto.

        The Battle of Point Stilo (known by the British as the Action off
Calabria) had no tactical winners or losers and neither side incurred
significant losses.  However, it demonstrated the inferiority of the
rebuilt Italian battleships compared to the heavier, better armed British
ships.  More importantly, it revealed the lack of Italian naval-air force
cooperation.  Though close to Italy, requested aircraft arrived late, failed
to cause any damage to the British and even mistakenly attacked the Italian
ships.  This contrasted markedly with the British use of carrier aircraft
from "Eagle" which were present throughout the engagement, harrying the
Italians.  These were used effectively though they did not achieve results
on this occasion.  A psychological ascendancy was gained by the British due
to this action, which they never relinquished, even in their desperate days
of 1942.

        This encounter might have had a different outcome, however.  The
9th Division, made up of "Veneto" and "Littorio", were in the final stages
of training and were nearly operational.  Admiral Bergamini, commander of
the 9th, requested permission to sail and add his ships' 15-inch guns to
the battle, but his request was denied.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
To a New Yorker like you, a hero is some kind of weird
sandwich, not some nut who takes on three Tigers!

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 10:34:18 -0500
From:    Greg Kelley <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO: The "Big" what-if?

Out of curiosity, how many "what-ifs" are allowed in this discussion?
I mean, if you're in a sense changing Hitler's personality to allow for
some really BIG policy changes, then how about his opponents?  For
example, if Reynaud had cashiered Gamelin (not just replaced, but really
shook up the lethargic French General Staff) and pursued the fighting
withdrawal to North Africa concept.  Paris would not have been declared
an open city, the Foreign Legion's Tours & Lyon bases could've formed the
nucleus of yet more rear guards, the French Fleet stays in Allied hands,
and so forth and so on.  Sure, Panzer columns would've ended up on the
Riviera, but not as quickly as a lot of people suppose.  France had
millions of troops under arms (yes, Gamelin said he had no available
MOBILE reserves, but sooner or later the Germans would've encountered the
assorted regional regiments in central France, and I find it hard to
believe they would've ALL given up, especially with a determined leader)

France had nearly half a million troops and HUNDREDS of aircraft in North
Africa in the summer of 1940.  If Hitler was reluctant to cross the "big
ditch" of the English Channel, how quick would he have crossed the Med?
Oh, yes, via Spain.  Anyone else read GERMANY'S MILITARY STRATEGY IN SPAIN?
How quick would've Franco entered the war--any quicker than he did in
history?  Remember, now, France is still with the Allies, and Morocco
filled with troops. (but just think-- our 80cm Gustav might really be
used for shelling Gibralter, as it had been designed to do...)

Hey, this could be fun.. I haven't got to the point where the Italian 5th
Army in Tripolitania gets to beat itself silly against the Mareth Line in
Tunisia before all the spahis in the world ride out of the southern
Sahara to take Tripoli  (see Aglion's FIGHTING FRANCE about the thousands
of bedouin cavalry being assembled from dissident Libyans & Fezzans down
towards Fort Lamy & Ghadames).

To be continued.....

                                          Glad To Be Of Service!

                                          Greg Kelley
                                          St. Paul Public Library
                                          [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 11:10:03 -0700
From:    John Holtz <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: German Economics pre-WW2

>
> >Tim, Bob, very interesting answers. All arguments seem to be very valid, except
> >that I'd like to comment, Bob,
> >that Hitler's loans from German banks do not result in foreign debt and
> therefor
> >e do not constitute a point of contradiction with the author's discourse.
>
> Arnaud,
>
>         The point I was trying to make was that Fuller's loan-capitalism vs
> barter system dichotomy seems to be of his own invention. Germany under
> Hitler was as capitalist as the US under Roosevelt. The institution of a
> barter system in trade had more to do with Germany's problem with the
> outflow of wealth than any philosohic opposition to capitalism. Other
> countries took steps to improve their trade balances. Roosevelt tried
> purchasing gold to deflate the dollar and make exports more attractive and
> imports less so.

The most succinct, yet detailed, discussion I have read on this topic
viz. Nazi Germany is in:

_Germany and the Second World War_(1990) edited by the
Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt.  Oxford Press.  This discussion is
in volume 1.

jwh

--
John W. Holtz, Asst. Professor       INTERNET: [email-masked]
Sangamon State University Library       PHONE: (217) 786-6633
Springfield, IL  62794-9243               FAX: (217) 786-6208

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 12:11:28 -0500
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: [TRIV] Re: odd WWII air encounters

        The Germans also delivered at least one complete Me 109 (by sub,
I think),    I can't recall offhand if it was E,F, or G version, to the
Japanese.  This aircraft and a captured P-40 were tested against the
prototype Ki-61 "Hien" in 1942.

Regards

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 12:20:32 EDT
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT:Could they have won ?

On Fri, 7 Oct 1994 09:57:36 -0400 QUACK said:
>I believe that Germany could have won the war if they didn't invade Russia.
>The offensive line that Germany had in operation was too large to keep
>supplied with men and materiel. The Italians were of no help in the overall
>scheme of things so they couldn't be included in the offensive picture. The
>same thing hold true for the Japanese.
>To large a battle front to maintain many miles from home.
>Of course if Hitler had been assasinated in 1937 or 1938....
>
>Ron Musco

   First, you are then assuming that Stalin would not have pre-empted an
attack on Germany say, by 1943.  I don't think I would have called the
cooperation between the USSR and Germany anything but an interest motivated
matter - completely lacking in sincerity.  Still, I would admit that the
outcome would have been effected in a rather large way.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 12:40:47 EDT
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Churchill's bad decisions (from Economic Causes of the War)

On Fri, 7 Oct 1994 11:02:46 -0400 Barone said:
>Because of logistics contraints
>(landing craft needed for Overlord, etc.), the plan called for a mere
>two divisions to hit the beach.  This was simply insufficient manpower
>to exploit any surprise end-run.  The operation could not have been
>expanded without cutting into the Overlord operation which the US would
>not allow.

That's a rationale--from the times--I'd like to see investigated.  It
doesn't seem reasonable that it would take 6 months to reposition men &
materiel from Italy to England.  Yet it was always given as an excuse for
limiting operations in the Med.  The logical conclusion, given how the
campaign turned out, would be not to invade Italy in the first place, since
w/o operations of this type the Allies were doomed from the start to slog
their way up the Appenines.

For that matter, why were landing craft in such short supply?  I mean,
it's not like building a bloody aircraft carrier, is it?  If you can
turn out a liberty ship in 9 days, you sure should have been able to
*flood* the waters with landing craft.  Or is this meant to include
landing ships as well?  Still, one wonders if perhaps the production
campaign went astray here.

ken koester
[email-masked]
>hear our Detroit engines long before we enter the town.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 13:11:23 -0500
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Italy in WW2--book titles

        Conducator's Guard?? Terror Tanks??  Come on, now, Greg...
quit teasing me here.  I've seen replies to several other list participants
detailing your bibliographic sources.  How about letting me share the fun and
opening up about where you're reading all this stuff about Rumania???  Like,
you could start with a reference to where you came up with anything about the
Conducator's Guard, Royal Guards, etc??  Are these, and the obviously detailed
description you've read about the fighting at Odessa, all in "Forgotten Axis?"
(my copy hasn't arrived yet).  If not, I'd really appreciate it if you could
take the time to let me in on some of your (English-language please--I'll
struggle through Italian but my Rumanian is merda) sources since you seem to
know a lot more about this than anyone else I've run into so far (and I'd like
to join that elite company of WW2 Eastern Europe cogniscenti).  If for some
reason you don't want to help me out here I'll stop bugging you (two messages
to the list is my limit) but I'd appreciate any info you can offer.

Regards

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 13:16:35 -0500
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Italy in WW2--book titles

        I'm away from my sources here, but I recall reading somewhere a
breakdown which referred to 20 L3's on Rodos, 8 on Leros, and the rest of the
"Commando Truppo Egeo"'s L3 battalion on Crete.  I thought the source (not
exactly unimpeachable-- he makes a lot of mistakes on the actual campaign by
identifying entire divisions based on the appearance of sub-units of battalion
size) was Papagos' "The Battle Of Greece 1940-41," but that wouldn't account
for the presence of the Italians on Crete (at least not yet).  I'll try to
track down my source on this one (I use Riccio a lot, too)-- hopefully you
can also give me some help (see previous message re:Rumania)

Regards

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 12:21:45 -0700
From:    John Holtz <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT:Could they have won ?

>      I don't believe that Germany could have avoided war with Russia in the
>      long run.
>
>      From the German side, communism the great bogeyman (after the Jews)
>      that the NAZI party used as the great external threat to keep the
>      minds of the people off of what was happening at home.  Once the Final
>      Solution was final, the Germans would have no choice but to move
>      against Russia.
>
>      From the Russian side, Stalin had to be aware that war with Germany
>      was coming.  He did everything he could to stall it while attempting
>      to strengthen his defenses.  The Nazis had made it very clear how they
>      felt about communism.
>
>      The NAZI/Communist clash aside, the USSR was an expansionist state,
>      insisting on huge buffers between its borders and anyone strong enough
>      to cause it harm (like all of eastern Europe).  No way could it have
>      accepted German domination of the rest of the continent up to its
>      borders.
>
>
>
>         Steve L. New                     .............................

All throughout Hitler's own writings, and all through almost every
decent analysis of Hitler's foreign policy (the latest I've read is in
"Germany and the Second World War, Vol. 1" (1990) Oxford Univ. Press) is
the need to acquire land to the east and that the true foe of National
Socialism is Communism.  These are two of the fundamental pillars of
Hitler's "Weltanschauung."  Neither could be satisfied within Germany's
existing borders nor without an active campaign, eventually, against the
Soviet Union.  And to clear the way for the conclusive eastern campaign,
security in the west must be assured.  The linkage is plain in Hitler's
writing, domestic politics, and foreign policy.

jwh

--
John W. Holtz, Asst. Professor       INTERNET: [email-masked]
Sangamon State University Library       PHONE: (217) 786-6633
Springfield, IL  62794-9243               FAX: (217) 786-6208

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 13:34:59 EDT
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Untold Stories f/ABTF, Pt. 3

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  07-Oct-1994 01:34pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Untold Stories f/ABTF, Pt. 3

    [These stories require a bit of a preface.  Sorry this is so long,
    folks, but you'll see why as you read on.  These stories are a
    combination of three exhibit panels: "Crossing the Waal," "Taking the
    Bridge," and "Saving the Bridge: The Controversy Continues."
    Basically, there was a great fight for the Nijmegen bridges (the last
    two before Arnhem's 'bridge too far').  The MARKET 82nd AB Div. was to
    have taken the railroad and road bridges before the GARDEN British
    armoured division arrived.  Due to the facts that the 82nd's missions
    were more than one division should have had and there were delays
    getting into Nijmegen, alowing the Germans to beef up their defenses,
    by the 20th of September the bridges were still in German hands and the
    British armour had arrived.  Attempts at direct assult were driven back
    mainly because of the geography: tanks vs. AT amongst buildings is a
    slow process.  (Nijmegen is on the south side of the Waal River.)  At
    any rate, one or both of the bridges _had_ to be taken and quickly if
    the operation was to reach its final goal and the British 1st AB Div
    was to be saved.  It was at this point the 82nd's Gen. Gavin came up
    with the idea of an assult crossing to grab the bridges from the
    _north_ bank.  This assult _should_ have gone down as one of the
    greatest feats in American military history but never has.  Imagine: 17
    canvas-sided assult boats in the first wave (a lot few in later waves),
    done in broad daylight before coordinated resistance from small arms up
    to 20mm or larger calibers, down an embankment and across a 200 yard
    wide river and across a wide open flood plain of 400 yards and down the
    flanks of the dike road full of Germans past a fort to the railroad
    bridge about 1/4 mile away and finally perhaps another 1/4 mile to the
    road bridge.  The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment did it (with a
    small number of supporting people) _and_ reached the bridges before the
    Brits came over from the other side.]

    CROSSING THE WAAL: CAPTURING THE FAR SHORE

         "General Browning [British], who was commanding the operation
    said, 'We have got to cross that river and get to the other end of the
    bridge to keep the enemy from blowing it up.  Where can we get troops
    that can get across and still fight that horde?  I don't have any!'
         "Colonel Tucker [commander of the 504th PIR] said, 'By God, my men
    can do it!'  I knew that was us."
                                       - S/Sgt. Nicolli, 82nd AB Div.

         "At first, when we were briefed for the assult crossing, we took
    it as a joke.  We couldn't believe anyone could be serious about it.
    We were simply told that we were going to get the Nijmegen Bridge.  I
    wasn't sure how they were going to get it, but I can remember that it
    was flattering, and at the same time a little fantastic, that we
    engineers were going to lead this flotilla across.  We usually followed
    people around, not lead them.  Suddenly it came across that this was
    _not_ a joke - that we _were_ going to paddle those flimsy canvas boats
    across, and at that moment, I would have liked to have been _any_place_
    in_the_world except there.
         All I can remember thinking was, 'I'm not dead yet - let's get
    going!'  I got in and shouted, 'Everybody paddle like Hell!'  We all
    tried to crouch down, but I took one look at the sides of the boat and
    didn't think that crouching was going to do much good.  I remember
    feeling that my helmet at that point seemed like a beanie.
         We beached on a gentle slope and started inland.  About 150 yards
    up from the beach we came across two German pillboxes.  We hit them
    from the side.  We threw in three of four grenades and then went on."
                        - 2nd Lt. John Holabird, US 307th AB Engineers

         "I looked up and saw that the engineer on the tiller had been
    knocked off the back of the boat.  I heaved myself up and grabbed a
    paddle and used it as a steering oar until we were practically across
    the water.  We were being heavily fired upon and we were paddling fast.
         There was a great deal of overhead fire coming from the [British]
    tanks on our side of the river.  The smoke that had been laid down was
    practically gone - big, hugh, gaping holes in it.  The British tanks
    which were standing almost track to track on the dike, were doing a
    great job.
         A few yards from shore, I dropped off the back and gave the boat a
    big shove which drove us onto the shore.  There were only three of us
    moving.  The boat was half-filled with water.  Most of it was blood."
                                  - Capt. Carl Kappel, US 82nd AB Div.

         "We climbed over the wounded and dead in the bottom of the boats
    and up to our knees in water waded to shore.  For about 30 seconds I
    lay behind the little embankment just beyond the small beach getting my
    breath and then we got up and moved out across the open field into the
    fire.  In many ways this was the most remarkable scene of the whole
    operation.  All along the shore line our troops were now deployed as
    skirmishers.  They ran into murderous fire from the embankment 800
    yards away, but they continued to move forward in a single line
    hundreds of yards wide.  They cursed and yelled at each other, the
    non-coms and officers giving orders and the men firing from the hip
    their BAR's, machine guns, and rifles.  Many times I have seen troops
    who are driven to a feaver pitch - troops who for a brief interval of
    combat are rendered crazy by rage and the lust for killing - men who
    forget temporarily the meaning of fear.  It is then that the great
    military feats of history occur.
         However, I had never witnessed this human metamorphosis so acutely
    as on this day.  The men were beside themselves.  They continued to
    plow across the field inspite of all the Krouts could do.  Generally
    the German resistance lessened until, as we approached the big
    embankment, it had almost completely deteriorated from that particular
    spot.  For the present we were relatively safe.  The river had been
    crossed and the beachhead established.  The first phase was over.
         For a moment everyone lay on the rear slope of the bank drawing
    deep breaths.  A few of us stuck our heads up over the bank to see what
    was next.  A man had his head blown off!  On the other side was another
    field with an orchard at the end.  There was little organization at
    this point.  Officers found themselves with heterogenous groups from
    all platoons and companies.  So they mustered whatever men were near
    them, it made little difference who was who, and prepared to go over
    the top toward the next objective.  The sector between us and the
    bridge was comprised of many isolated strong points widely separated.
         So off the men pushed.  This time in small bunches, each in a
    slightly different direction, each with a separate mission.  But in the
    back of everyone's mind was the one thought - to keep going towards the
    bridge _which_must_be_taken_at_all_costs!"
                                       - Capt. Henry Keep, US 82 AB Div.

         "The entire crossing was resisted by German small arms and
    artillary fire along the northern edges of the river and also from
    behind the dike which runs roughly parallel to the north shore.
         In less time than it takes to tell about it, all hell broke loose!
    From under the shore abutment of the railroad bridge came enfilade
    Krout machine gun, 88 and small arms fire.  The boats got hit.  Some
    sank, but others drove on to the far side.  During the first wave
    crossing, 15 boats were sunk or damaged, so that only 11 remained for
    the first return pick-up.
         At this time, General Browning said, 'What magnificent troops to
    move forward like that.  Any nation should be proud of 'em!'"
                                  - Col. Reuben Tucker, 82nd AB Div.

         "Of all the incidents of World War II, I believe the most
    memorable to be the river crossing at Nijmegen.  It was also the most
    gallant and heroic.  It was audatious to the point of foolishness, but
    it did work.  One of the sergeants with me entered the fort at the end
    of the railroad bridge by simply opening the door, moving up the steps
    in the dark, and moving from gun position to machine gun position,
    shooting all the Germans at each position before being wounded
    himself."
                                  - Capt. Carl Kappel, 82nd AB Div.

         "This crossing in small open boats of so big a river with a strong
    current (as a boy I had often swum and canoed in it) followed by a
    crossing of rather large outer marches, under direct enemy gunfire and
    rifle-fire, aimed by a hard, experienced opponent, surpassed human
    powers."
                             - Student Jacobus Brouwer, Nijmegen

    TAKING THE BRIDGES

         "Capt. Karl Euling's battalion occupied the central traffic circle
    in Nijmegen and closed the way to Arnhem.  He could see the German
    troops being puched back over the bridge and the Sherman tanks forging
    forward.  Combat vehicles followed and Euling knew he was trapped in
    Nijmegen.
         He and his men were all in the command post.  A tank drew up by
    the command post and stopped almost in front of the door.  Its first
    shot swept through the house but it was then destroyed by a bazooka.
    The enemy began shooting intensively at the command post.  Leading from
    the house, however, was an air-raid shelter, a sort of trench.  A tank
    stood at the exit of this shelter firing shells into the garden.
    Euling's ammunition was running out.
         By 22:30 the house was blazing and thinking that the last Germans
    had died in the flames the enemy stopped watching the house.  In single
    file, Euling in the lead, the men left the house in a casual manner, as
    if they were Americans going to take up their assigned positions.  They
    crossed the street, jumped into a trench running parallel to the street
    and followed it until they reached the river bank.  They leaped out of
    the trench and ran to cover.  So far so good.
         Now they had to decide in which direction to turn.  Euling knew
    that the railroad bridge to the left was surely in American hands.  He
    decided to take the more dangerous sourse and to go under the big
    bridge where the Allies' reinforcements were moving forward.  He gave
    his men the order to march ahead like an enemy column, making free use
    of the word 'stop' to prove their authenticity as Americans.  Feeling
    their way in the dark they set out.  Euling and his 60 men made it to
    the other side right under the enemy's nose."
                             - Maj. Gen. Heinz Harmel, 10th SS Panzer Div.

         "Our men were exceedingly brave, felt that they had been placed in
    very desperate circumstances and they responded by very aggressively
    attacking every position from which the enemy fire came.  The taking of
    a large number of prisoners would have imposed a burden on us and would
    have impeded our actions.  Under the circumstances, the men in 'H'
    Company, who largely accumulated around the north end of the railroad
    bridge refused to take prisoners, and even though a good many of the
    Germans attempted to surrender as they retreated across the bridge, our
    men shot them dowm.  Some Germans, seeing what was happening, jumped
    from the bridge into the river and were drowned."
                             - 1st Lt. Virgil Carmichael, 82nd AB Div.

         "As always, the Americans acted cruelly, throwing the wounded from
    the bridge into the Waal and shooting the captured riflemen."
                             - Col. Gen. Kurt Student, 1st Parachute Army

         "As soon as the firing ceased at the bridge I went there because
    somebody told me there were seriously wounded lying there.  It was
    there that I saw precisely what war really signifies.  Mutilated
    bodies.  Severely wounded and dying soldiers.  The road was littered
    with hand grenades.  Stolen bicycles had been shot to pieces.  An
    American officer told the Germans, 'Help your comrads.'  I was given
    right of way everywhere.  Then a war correspondent came along who took
    a picture [later published in newspapers and titled "Priest on the
    Bridge"].  When I arrived at the Valkhof pillbox, American bodies were
    just being carried out.  I asked if there was anything at all I could
    do, the bearers only answered, 'dead.'"
                                  - Curate Wilhelmus Peterse, Nijmegen

    [The Valkhof is part of a Roman ruin just to the south-west of the
    bridge and used as a German strong-point.]

         "We were withdrawn across the bridge and I still remember a German
    soldier on the Nijmegen side of the bridge who was dead and his arm was
    up in the air and seemed to be pointing across the bridge."
                                       - Cpl. Fred Baldino, 82nd AB Div.

    [A photo of that very German is in the Ryan Collection.]

         "The next day my troop [the first tanks to cross the bridge] was
    brought back across the bridge.  There, we were greeted by General
    Adair and General Horrocks.  I do not remember much of the conversation
    except that Adair remarked he could hardly believe his ears when he
    heard we had crossed the bridge.  I believe Adair was particularly
    pleased because the Grenadier Guards had sent the first tank across.
    Adair was an old Grenadier."
                   - Sgt. Peter Robinson, British Guards Armoured Div.

    SAVING THE WAAL BRIDGE; THE CONTROVERSY CONTINUES

    [A story quickly grew after the battle that a local boy scout and
    sometimes resistance member, Jan van Hoof, had saved the Nijmegen road
    bridge by getting to the detonation wires and cutting them.  He was
    shot by the Germans in a separate incident and so was not around to
    support or deny the story.  Some people say he claimed something like,
    'they can't blow the bridge,' which may or may not mean he himself had
    anything to do with it.  At any rate, a monument was erected in
    Nijmegen in his memory eventhough there were people who felt the story
    was nonsense since he would have had to cross the bridge to even get to
    the wires and the Germans had already closed the bridge to civilians
    and were guarding it.  Americans and British have also claimed they
    were the ones to cut the wires and Germans claim they did try to blow
    the bridge but failed.  Stories from the Ryan Collection do not solve
    the mystery, which may never be answered.]

         "Jan van Hoof, whom I had known for years, arrived from occupied
    Nijmegen and brought with him lots of information and material,
    including maps.  I saw him bending over these papers, together with a
    number of high-ranking officers.
         Subsequently, Capt. Bestebreurtje [an OSS liaison officer]
    summoned people to the Sionshof [a hotel between Nijmegen and Groesbeek
    turned into an 82nd headquarters], locked the door and told us 'the
    Guards Armoured Division will march on the city in four columns.  Two
    will proceed to the railroad bridge and the other two to the highway
    bridge.  A Dutch guide will accompany them.'  When three men had
    applied to guide the columns, I also offered to go, though I did not
    know the town very well and thought it was more up to Jan van Hoof.
    However, Jan did not feel like it.  He had done enough, he said.  He
    did offer to outline the route exactly to me, among others with the aid
    of a map.
         During the period of waiting to move out, I repeated with van Hoof
    over and over again the route to be taken until I knew it to
    perfection.  As each route on the map ended at the Waal bridge, it
    seemed significant that van Hoof made no mention to the effect that
    there was no chance whatever of the Waal bridge being blown up.  The
    next evening it was announced that the bridge had been captured.  A
    bottle of champagne was dug up from somewhere inside the tank I was in.
    I later heard a rumor to the effect that General Gavin eventually
    became very annoyed about the heroic story of van Hoof and the bridge.
    He is said to have exclaimed on one occasion, 'I wish I had my 500 men
    back, then they could have their Jan van Hoof!'"
                                       - Student Robbert Smulders, Nijmegen

         "As the last tank went through the roadblock, I was just on the
    second span of the bridge from the north end.  I told my driver to stop
    and I got out.  The first thing I saw were six or eight wires coming up
    over the railing and laying on the footpath.  I used a pair of wire
    cutters to cut them.
         I walked down the bridge toward the road block and saw about a
    dozen Teller mines pilecd neatly in a slit trench.  I removed the
    igniters and threw them in the river.  I then walked to a point just
    north of the second pier from the north bank of the river.  There I
    discovered a set of charges all grouped neatly on both sides in the
    gutters near the footpaths.  They had not been put in position and were
    quite harmless.
         A German offered to show me the charges [under the bridge].  He
    said the north abutment had no charges but I didn't trust him and took
    a look around for myself.  The German had been right.  There were some
    in the second from the north end.  There were windows in the sides of
    the compartments and through them you could see the girders.  In them
    we found the charges.  They were directly under the place where I found
    them on the road just to the north of the pier.
         I was struck by the painstaking thoroughness of the job.  There
    was an elaborate system of staging to reach the girders to place the
    charges.  The charges themselves were packed in green-painted tin
    boxes, painted to match the color of the bridge.  They were obviously
    pre-fabricated, manufactured precisely to fit the girder they were
    attacked to by means of brackets.  Each box vore a serial number
    corresponding to a serial number painted on the girder.  I assumed
    there must have been 500 pounds of TNT on the bridge.  The charges were
    to be fired electronically (probably from a pillbox or a slit trench on
    the north side) and the aluminum-sleeved detonators were screwed in and
    connected to one of the wires I had cut previously from the deck.  I do
    not know how the circuit fired, whether in series or in parallel.  I
    removed the detonators and threw them in the river.  The line of cut
    was at an angle to the horizontal.  In other words, it was planned in
    such a way that, when the bridge blew, there was no chance of it
    getting hung up: it would drop straight into the river.
         I do not believe anyone got to the bridge and prevented the
    Germans from blowing it the day before.  When I arrived, there was no
    evidence of any sort to convince me that anyone had removed any of the
    charges.  I couldn't tell you to this day why that bridge wasn't blown.
    It certainly could have been.  The only possibility would have been the
    charges I found laying in the gutter, near the footpaths.  It is
    conceivable - but most unlikely - that someone got on the bridge and
    moved these charges to one side preventing the Germans from blowing up
    the concrete roadway.  Common sense would dictate that anyone on that
    bridge, under the noses of the Krouts, would have to work hurriedly.
    It seems unlikely that, under those circumstances, the sharges would
    have been left piled neatly beside the roadway.  Moreover, if they had
    been pushed aside, the Germans would have certainly spotted it.  Those
    charges weren't meant to be concealed.  They simply streached across
    the road, one wired to the other, and connected in to the main
    circuit."
                                  - Lt. "Tony" Jones, Guards Armoured Div.

         "Dear Mr. Ryan,   Following your television appearance in which
    you expressed doubts about the saving the Waal Bridge by Jan van Hoof,
    I the undersigned, his mother, would like to acquaint you with the
    following details.
         At that time there was much talk as to whether or not Jan did save
    the bridge.  During the investigation many mistakes were made
    especially by a certain A. Timmers, who is a mere dilettante.  As we
    know from the Nijmegen archives this man perpetrated untruths by
    confusing names and altering facts.  The version of the A. Timmers is
    valueless.
         We, Jan's parents, in our bewilderment approached the Minister of
    War at the time, who promised us a thorough investigation.  The
    minister appointed a committee whose president was General Baron van
    Voorst tot Voorst.  Many high military officials took part in the
    investigation in which hundreds of persons made statements under oath.
    The investigation was very thorough but because Jan van Hoof, the main
    witness, died in the battle for his country it was not possible to
    bring everything to light.  They informed us that the result of the
    investigation had been sent to Nijmegen.  With this letter I enclose a
    copy of the report as well as the document of the Military
    _Willemsorde_ given us by Queen Wilhelmina.
         All documents are in the War Documentation- Bureau and belong to
    Dr. L de Jong, Herengracht 474, Amsterdam.  We abandoned the archives
    of Nijmegen because we discovered many errors there.  We know many
    facts and rumours which our son told us.
         I'm 82 years old and have not got much time anymore.  I would not
    be able to cope again with the sorrow we suffered through false
    information.
         May my age be an excuse if my hand has been trembling to try once
    more to put straight the false stories about my son who cannot defend
    himself anymore.
         I hope to have served you with this letter and also hope that this
    case will receive the serious treatment it deserves.
         Mrs. E.M. van Hoof - August 1969."

    more next week,
    Doug

Received:  07-Oct-1994 01:34pm

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 12:44:23 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HIST -- SA purge

Hello, William!

Thanks for the info on Canaris' and Heydrich's relationship. I had
read some of what you said earlier, and you are correct, of course.

>     I addressed the matter of Heydrich's involvement in another message, I
> think, but there is one other matter I'd like to address.  Heydrich did
> not bear any particular bad will for the Abwehr.  His relationship with it
> was strained, but he and the Abwehr chief, Admiral Canaris, were best of
> friends.  There was a time, back in 1938 I think, when someone had wanted
> to investigate Canaris and his staff.  Heydrich made an immediate stop
> to all investigations.
>    Their friendship began during Heydrich's navy years.  In fact, Heydrich
> was an officer on one of Canaris' boats.  And Canaris taught him all the
> ropes of intelligence gathering.  Later, Heydrich and Canaris' wife had
> many a string ensemble.  It might be hard to believe, but Heydrich had
> a genuine affection for Canaris and so there was never any thought of
> doing harm to him.

    I do know that Heydrich was well aware of Canaris' tendency and
others as well, such as Hans Oster, to give some assistance to the
Allies that could be considered treasonable. In Oster's case, there
was no doubt.

Regarding Heydrich, I have often thought that he tolerated Canaris,
although he may have liked him personally, but professionally, that
he was playing with him, as an animal that knows he has its victim
but will play with it before it is killed or devoured. This is my own
opinion, of course. But, as you state above, I have read similar
accounts of their relationship. There is also no doubt that Heydrich
viewed the Abwehr as competition and wanted all intelligence
activities under his control.

Thanks, William.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 13:21:09 -0400
From:    Bob Stewart <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT:Fuller Part II:Balkan strategy

>Second part of Fuller's ideas on the war, this time on the Balkan
>strategy.

Arnaud,

        One consequence of Fuller's scenario of an allied advance through
central Europe might likely have been a German withdrawl from the east to
protect their lines of communications. This in turn might have brought
together American/British forces and their Soviet counterparts at a somewhat
earlier point in the war. It certainly would have increased the chances of a
conflict between the two sides if it appeared they were fighting over the
same turf. But as someone else has already pointed out, Eastern Europe had
already been "given" to Stalin at Yalta. Thus, even if Americans occupied
part of Eastern Europe, it would have to be given up, as it was in
Czechoslavokia, or we might find ourselves fighting a rather well armed
Soviet foe.

     Bob Stewart    [email-masked]   (202) 232-3433
     1835 Lamont St., NW
     Washington, DC

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 13:22:24 -0400
From:    Bob Stewart <[email-masked]>
Subject: POL: War Economies(Re: HYPO: The Big What-if?)

>What I imply here is that WWII was a completely unbalanced production war
and no
>ne of the early German/Japanese incredible successes enabled them to
counterbala
>nce this decisive factor.
>
>Arnaud.
>

Arnaud,

        Interestingly, in the Galbraith book I mentioned,
_A_Journey_through_Economic_Time_ (1994), he also talks about the relative
levels of production in the allied and axis countries. I realize I sound
like a shill for his publisher, but this is a very readable, concise book
that covers the interwar and war years quite well. Anyways, Galbraith was a
director of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey which after the war attempted
to assess the effects of the strategic bombing of Germany and Japan. In
order to measure its economic effects, it was necessary to first examine and
quantify these economies. He comes to two interesting conclusions.

        First, the fact that Germany was near full employment at the start
of the war turned into a big disadvantage. When Britain and the US went to
war production they still had vast numbers of idle plants and workers on
which to draw. In addition he points out that the Germans didn't exhibit the
urgency in production that their British and US counterparts did. He states
that Britain alone out-produced Germany in weapons both in 1941 and in 1942.
German production peaked in mid-1944! Which leads to the second point: the
strategic bombing had only a marginal effect on the German economy.
Galbraith points out that the bombing helped to bring about the urgency in
production that the Germans lacked. As an example he uses the raids on
aircraft plants in Febuary 1944. After these raids production of aircraft
actually increased 48%! He also makes the argument that the air campaign,
like the Blitz, helped to motivate the people to the cause rather than to
demoralize them.

     Bob Stewart    [email-masked]   (202) 232-3433
     1835 Lamont St., NW
     Washington, DC

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 12:53:12 -0500
From:    Michael D Wallick <[email-masked]>
Subject: HOME:US:Illinois at War

On June 23, 1942, President Roosevelt signed the Servicemen's
Dependents Allowance Act which provided financial support to families
when fathers were away to war.  The act provided a wife with one child
$40.00 a month and another $10.00 for each additional child.  A portion
of the serviceman's pay was deducted monthly for this purpose and to it
was added a larger contribution made by the federal government.  In
October 1943, the allowance was doubled by Congress.

>From November 11, 1940, to June 30, 1945, the Illinois Selective Service
inducted 604,033 men into the military.  Another 353,821 enlisted
voluntarily.

Source:
Bailey, Robert E. and Elaine Shemoney Evans.  ILLINOIS AT WAR, 1941-1945:
A SELECTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM THE ILLINOIS STATE ARCHIVES.  Springfield,
Ill.: Illinois State Archives, 1994.

Michael Wallick

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 12:57:45 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Invasion of Crete -- Operation Merkur

Hello, Emery!

Did you receive the info on Crete that I posted? Please advise. Sorry
to bother the list with this.

Terry
> Does anyone know of some good source material for a day-to-day account
> of the German assault on Crete?  This seems like an incredibly bold
> undertaking and a fascinating study.
>
> Emery
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 12:55:48 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Invasion of Crete -- Operation Merkur

Hello, Cassady!

Sorry to have taken so long to get back to you.

> Terry, by all means recount whatever Herr Beine has told you that would be of
> interest here.  I think we all enjoy first hand accounts (even if they be
> second hand).

    I will gladly post to you the names of all German vets with whom
I have corresponded who were involved in the invasion of Crete.

    Mr. Beine's comments to me regarding Crete were limited to the
unit he served with, and the people whom he knew. Most of his
conversations with me on this topic dealt with his involvement in
the Battle of Cassino.

    Please let me know if you would like to see some more names.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 13:50:05 EDT
From:    Cassady Craft <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO: The "Big" what-if?

What strategic difference would it have made if the Japanese returned Hitler's
gift of stupid war declarations by attacking Soviet Union?  They certainly
had every intention of fighting the Ruskies.  What about Wilmott's proposal
that the Japanese _should_ have stormed the Indian Ocean all the way to
Magadascar instead of splitting their carrier strength at Coral Sea and
Midway? Would this have finished off the British Empire (threatened oil fields,
lose India, etc.)?

 How autonomous would the Thrid Reich have been if Hitler doesn't turn
the Panzers north and south after Smolensk?  Take Moscow, push on to what
Holsti calls the "Moscow-Gorki Strategic Space" and the Volga in the six
weeks that was wasted (much less even more without the Balkans fiasco).
Could the Soviets have come out of the Urals, with little transportation
web, their political center gone, 90 percent of their ethnically trustworthy
population under the Reich, and also about 90 % of the industrial base gone?
If you say, the Reich would have been _real_ autonomousthen would the US have
had the capability to subdue it?  Would it have lasted for 50 years?
I would ask why the US couldn't have traded with the Nazis, but that has been
covered in the recent and excellent discussion on this list on Fuller and
Galbraith, but if there are other interpretations, let's hear them.

Is there any evidense to suggest that Soviet troop deployment at the onset
of Barbarrosa was not geared to the defensive, but to an offensive into
Rumania?  I think it is also Holsti who speculates on this.  Just want some
comments....

Citations:  H.P. Wilmott.  _Empires in the Balance._ and _Barrier Against the
Javelein_.  Both Naval Institute Press.  Incidentally, in the foreward of one
of these, it is mentioned as a trilogy.  Anyone know how progress on the
third is going?

Holsti (don't know first name), was with the Naval Post-Graduate school in
Monterrey, CA.  _Hitler's Panzers East_.  University of Oklahoma Press.

Cassady Craft
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 13:09:15 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Gustav Geraet

Hello, Steve!

Can you tell me how to subscribe to WWI-L? If anyone else on this
list wants this info, maybe Joe might make an exception as it is
related to artillery developement that was used in both wars.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 13:19:46 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Churchill's bad decisions (from Economic Causes of the

Hello, Ken!

Will try to answer your question.

> For that matter, why were landing craft in such short supply?

    At the time, landing craft were not a high priority as was other
forms of shipping before 1943. There was also a demand, and a more
urgent one from the Navy, for its operations in the Pacific where
such ops were so dependent on them.

Also, given the military and domestic front situations in before
1942, when the fortunes of war looked bleak to the Allies, demand was
for other weapons of war that were needed immediately and not much
thought was given to materiel having an offensive capability. Also,
the factories here in the US didn't really gear up to full production
of wartime materials until 1942.

 I mean,
> it's not like building a bloody aircraft carrier, is it?  If you can
> turn out a liberty ship in 9 days, you sure should have been able to
> *flood* the waters with landing craft.

    This, of course, came later. It really wasn't possible to do this
much before 1942-43.

    Thanks for allowing my comments.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 14:15:43 EDT
From:    Cassady Craft <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO:  The "Big" what-if?

Kendall and William L.,  it seems to me that it is not the number of mistakes
that you make, nor even their magnitude to some extent, but whether or not
you have the capability (industrial, ideological, demographic, and technolo-
gical) to recover from your mistakes.  The "pool" of strategic resources for
the allies was much greater, but Germany was still nothing to sneeze at.
Look at what it took to subdue them.

When I say technological above, I am referring to know-how, not necessarily
hardware.  If this doesn't include military professionalism, then add that.
I would certainly include leadership (political) under the ideological
category.

Thanks for your excellent discussion.

Cassady Craft
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 14:55:14 EDT
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Untold Stories, Pt. 3 Update

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  07-Oct-1994 02:55pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Untold Stories, Pt. 3 Update

    Just as I sent out the Pt. 3   l o n g  post a student came in with a
    class asignment to write a four page paper and had selected the Ryan
    Collection and his source.  As always happens with students he was
    thinking of doing the paper on officer plans, actions, and reactions
    with operation MARKET-GARDEN.  With a bit of guidance and strong
    suggestions I got him to narrow it to the 82nd's assult crossing of the
    Waal River and taking the Nijmegen bridges.  Even then it will be too
    much for a four page paper, but at least he got an important lesson in
    taking chewable bites.
         With officers alone there are over 25 files full of
    questionnaires, letters, interviews, and photos.  Then there are G-2
    reports, after action reports, and critical analysis pieces of the
    crossing.  Fortunately for the student, I had already made copies of
    pertinent maps and period photos, and I could show him photos I took of
    the ground just three weeks ago.  At the moment his eyes are real big,
    his brain blown, and he's unknowingly headed for a wonderful and
    rewarding research experience with primary materials.
         Ah, sometimes there are rewards even for dust-on-their-shoulders,
    smelling-like-mold archivists!  (Couldn't help throwing that in.  This
    is the end of my first full week back in a month.  Well, you'd be
    depressed too if you spent three weeks overseas receiving praise and
    honors only to return to the same old abuse.  But who am I to complain:
    I don't want to make money - I just want to read documents!)
         Back to biz: the Ryan Collection is open to researchers and is
    still full of good stuff.  While there are a few restrictions (like you
    can't entirely base something you want to publish on the Collection)
    there are none to keep you away if you are interested in things
    relating to OVERLORD, MARKET-GARDEN, AND ELIPSE.  There are also things
    on the early American space program including interviews and
    correspondence with Wernher Von Braun.

    Doug

Received:  07-Oct-1994 02:55pm

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 15:11:40 -0400
From:    Emery Ford <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Invasion of Crete -- Operation Merkur

Hello everyone,

On Fri, 07 Oct 94, Terry Moore wrote:

>Did you receive the info on Crete that I posted? Please advise.

Thanks again, Terry.  You've added tremendously to my already formidable
reading list.  :)

I have a specific query in mind with regards to British strategy in the
defense of Crete.  At which point did the British decide to evacuate the
island?  It seems to me that it must have been a very difficult
decision to make for the Brits.

Emery

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 14:53:11 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Untold Stories, Pt. 3 Update

Hello, Doug!

A very interesting insight into that Ryan Collection.

>          With officers alone there are over 25 files full of
>     questionnaires, letters, interviews, and photos.  Then there are G-2
>     reports, after action reports, and critical analysis pieces of the
>     crossing.  Fortunately for the student, I had already made copies of
>     pertinent maps and period photos, and I could show him photos I took of
>     the ground just three weeks ago.  At the moment his eyes are real big,
>     his brain blown, and he's unknowingly headed for a wonderful and
>     rewarding research experience with primary materials.

    Can you provide a quick list, without going to too much trouble,
of those officers whose files are included in that collection. Just
the names. You don't have to list the rank. I would appreciate that
greatly. If it is too much trouble in one go, would it be possible to
post it in increments?

    Thanks, Doug, and welcome home, such as it is!!

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 14:38:18 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: POL: War Economies(Re: HYPO: The Big What-if?)

Hello, Bob!

. After these raids production of aircraft
> actually increased 48%! He also makes the argument that the air campaign,
> like the Blitz, helped to motivate the people to the cause rather than to
> demoralize them.

    I think the Strategic Bombing Survey conducted and compiled after
the war proved this. This was certainly the case in England during
the Blitz, that rather than demoralize the populace, it actually
caused the reverse.

 Also, Albert Speer's decentralization of the war economy in Germany
after 1942, certainly helped to increase production. Of course, he
was greatly aided by the efforts of Milch and Sauer in this effort.

    Thanks for allowing me to speak to this.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 15:22:46 EST
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Gustav Geraet

You can join WWI-L by sending the message SUB WWI-L to the
address  [email-masked]
I hope some of you join that list too.  I have learned a lot I
didn't know about WW 2 but lord knows how much I need to learn
about WW 1.
*****************************************************
Brad Coon                     Windows: the operating
[email-masked]          system for people who
[email-masked]    think even a Macintosh
                              is too fast.

Remember, only YOU can prevent political correctness!
******************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 15:15:14 -0500
From:    Greg Kelley <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO: The "Big" what-if?

Along these lines, might I suggest a book by David Downing?
THE MOSCOW OPTION (1980) is an historical "what-if" novel that has Hitler
in a coma due to a plane crash during the critical decision time of
August 1941; these decisions (regarding the drive on Moscow) are made by
the General Staff, so by the time Hitler recovers Moscow is in German
hands--BEFORE the snows.  It's a fun read, and the author's explanatory
notes emphasise that he does NOT change basic Hitler-cum-Nazi thought, so
there's no enlightened "liberation", genocide continues, untermenschen, etc.
I hate to give away the plot, but the later chapters depicting Panzer
columns in northern Iran are the proverbial hoot.  Worth reading.

                                          Glad To Be Of Service!

                                          Greg Kelley
                                          St. Paul Public Library
                                          [email-masked]

On Thu, 6 Oct 1994, Cassady Craft wrote:

> Ed, see my other posting, or yes to what you said.  I'm really getting at
> the "if Germany takes Moscow, the war is over" vs. "Germany could have never
> defeated Russia, because they were imregnable behind the Urals, and the Brits
> were safe behind the ditch, and the US the arsenal of democracy (communism)"
> argument.  I'm also looking for "key decision" that could have been decisive
> in preventing Germany from winning the war.  Mr Yarborough's answer was very
> cogent, I think.  I would like more details about what the Fuhrer did wrong
> in the summer of 41, etc.  Lots of knowledge on the list that I would learn
> from, and I'm trying to provide a mechanism.  What-if scenarios can be
> excellent teaching tools, just as the "revisionist" works are.
> Thanks in advance to all who partake.
>
> Cassady Craft
> Department of Political Science
> University of Georgia
> e-mail [email-masked]
> or
> [email-masked]
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 17:01:32 -0400
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA: Bombs in Berlin

>From the DoD Newswire 7 October 1994

:BERLIN FEARS WORLD WAR TWO BOMBS IN REICHSTAG

     BERLIN, Oct 6  - Berlin, worried that unexploded World
War Two bombs may still be buried inside the Reichstag, will begin a
detailed investigation of Germany's parliament building, a city
official said on Thursday.
     Three weeks after a World War Two bomb detonated and killed three
workers at an east Berlin construction site, a Berlin munitions
disposal service official said the agency will drill into the
Reichstag's foundation to search for explosives.
     "This is a precautionary measure," said Annette Bleidiesel,
director of the agency responsible for locating and defusing the
thousands of bombs found in Berlin since the end of the war.
     "One fears that munitions or munitions fragments could possibly
be buried there," Bleidiesel told Reuters.
     She said it is possible that explosives landed inside the
Reichstag through a gaping hole in the cuppola during the battle for
Berlin in April and May 1945.
     The Reichstag was damaged during the war but rebuilt between 1957
and 1961. Bleidiesel said there was, however, no comprehensive search
for explosives made at the time.
     Craters left in the foundation were in all probability simply
filled with dirt and concrete, she said. Bleidiesel said the search
will focus on the foundation beneath the destroyed cuppola in the
centre of the building.
     "If the craters were filled in after the bomb did what they were
supposed to do -- explode -- there is no problem," she said. "But if
there were still explosives in the crater and it was simply filled in,
that would be a problem."
     Germany's parliament, which voted in 1991 to move the seat of
government from Bonn to Berlin, occasionally meets in the Reichstag
and is due to move back to the building by 2000.
     Preliminary results of the investigation should be known within
about four to five weeks, Michael Roberts, a spokesman from the firm
working on the search, told the daily Berliner Morgenpost.
     Towards the end of the war, Allied bombers flew raids over
Germany almost daily, raining tonnes of bombs on Berlin and other
cities. One in 10 failed to detonate.
     Although thousands of the unexploded bombs have been found and
destroyed, authorities have said that there are about 3,000 unexploded
bombs and another 12,000 explosive devices from the war still buried
throughout Berlin.
     U.S. and British aircraft pummelled Berlin from the air from
mid-1943 until May 1945. The Reichstag and centre of Berlin also came
under heavy attack from Soviet artillery in the final weeks of the
war.
     Three people died and 17 were injured on September 15 when an
unexploded U.S. bomb was set off in the afternoon rush hour by
construction work on the site in Frankfurter Allee, one of east
Berlin's busiest boulevards.
     The explosion trapped workers under building machinery, sent huge
chunks of concrete tumbling through the air and devastated
neighbouring houses and cars.

====

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        [email-masked]
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 14:40:06 -0700
From:    Jim Curry <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Switzerland in WWII

Hello, Terry!
If I recall rightly, the only book about Von Werra in English (Kendal Burt's
_The One Who Got Away_) says that he was killed in an accident--the engine
of his Me-109 cut out during a routine patrol over the North  Sea.  Do
you hve other information.
Jim Curry

On Fri, 7 Oct 1994, Robert T. Moore wrote:

> Hello, Cassady!
>
> Just a comment to your interesting post.
>
> > I just read in Doolittle's auto that some (2) "P-38s landed in Portugal.
> > One took off under a ruse and the other ins interned." (p. 320).
> > Anyone have any stories about escapes such as this one?
>
>     I might add that the pilot of that P-38 that landed in Portugal
> under a ruse was Captain Jack Ilfrey, who claims to be the first ace
> in a P-38. He lives in New Braunfels, TX and was a member of the 20th
> Fighter Group.
>
>     Regarding similar escape stories, what about Franz von Werra's
> escape from a Canadian POW camp, making his way through the US,
> neutral at the time, into Mexico, where he made contact with the
> German embassy, boarded ship there, and finally arrived in Germany
> safe and sound. He was restored to flying status but was later shot
> down and killed on the Eastern Front.
>
>
>     There are others.
>
>     Terry
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 17:05:38 -0500
From:    Greg Kelley <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Conducator's Guard--book titles, etc.

Mike--

Sorry, I'm not trying to frustrate you with bits of info.  What I'm
relating on such things as Terror Tanks, the Rumanian Army, and so forth
is, shall we say, off the top of my head.  I'm only too happy to share
what sources I've encountered over many (many, many..) years of reading,
but my time is not, as they say, my own.  I monitor several lists in the
course of my job, and while WW2-L may be high in my interest, it is
regrettably low in my professional priorities.  If you can be patient,
I'll relate titles (with full bibliographic citations--it's the librarian
in me) as I can retrieve them from my personal collection.

To at least help you get started, there is some basic data (including
uniforms & organisation) for both the Royal Guard Division & the
Conducator's Guard in a slim but handy volume--

THE ROMANIAN ARMY OF WORLD WAR 2  by Mark Axworthy & Horia Serbanescu
Osprey Men-At-Arms Series # 246, published 1991.

Many of the sources I'll gradually be citing are more political-military
history, but hey, where ever you can find it, right?

Now, if you know someone who's got a PC loaded with one of the language
interpreter programs, then we can get Gostozny's books translated from
the German.  They are nice.  (you know, NICE.)

It'll be next week before I can enter some more.  Hopefully by then I'll
have retrieved the issue of AFV NEWS that dealt with the Terror Tanks,
and also the title of the Russian book about the siege of Odessa.

As the Rumanians said on the Don, "opreste ce vum ori pragu"

                                          Glad To Be Of Service!

                                          (Domnule) Greg Kelley
                                          St. Paul Public Library
                                          [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 19:17:42 EDT
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Carlson's Raiders

Re Evans Carlson's "democratic" tendencies: he was an (unofficial?)
observer with the Chinese Communist forces in the mid-1930s, and came           home greatly impressed with their cooperative spirit. I understand the
legend is that he introduced "Gung Ho" to the Corps. It is supposedly
an Anglicized corruption of "gung he," which in Mandarin does indeed
mean "work together." Is that right Ben?

Please don't confuse an appreciation- probably justified- of Chinese
Communist work ethic and morality in the context of the 1930s with
questions of broader political loyalties.

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 17:33:12 PDT
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Italy in WW2--book titles

Mike... (or someone...)
        Recently there was some discussion of Romanian troops fighting
in Russia.
        As often happens, I just came across a book on the topic...
                ROMANIAN VOLUNTEERS OF THE WAFFEN SS,
                        by Richard Landwehr.
'Says it's the story of "6000 Romanians who fought on in the SS after their
country was over-run by the Red Army in 1944."
        Not my cup of tea, but probably be of interest to the SS fan club.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 20:37:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Arnhem

My wife and I were in New York City today on business and we stopped and
saw the restored film MY FAIR LADY with Rex Harrison and Audrey Hepburn.
On the way home, I remembered reading somewhere that Hepburn had been
visiting the Netherlands when the Germans invaded and was trapped there for
the rest of the war.  When I got home, I checked THE FILM ENCYCLOPEIDA by
Ephraim Katz and found the following:

"HEPBURN, AUDREY.  Acress.  Born Audrey Hepburn-Ruston, May 4, 1929 near
Brussels, Belgium.  Died 1993.  The daughter of an English banker and a
Dutch baroness, she was sent to a girls' school near London after her
parents' divorce.  She was vacationing with her mother in Arnhem, the
Netherlands, when WWII broke out.  She spend the war years in the
Nazi-occupied town, attending a local public school and receiving ballet
training at the Arnhem Conservatory."

She would have been 15 when MARKET-GARDEN was initiated.  Does anyone have
any additional information about her and Arnhem?

I believe the original article I had read about her indicated that her
involvement with UNICEF in the 1970s and 80s was a result of her experiences
growing up in the Netherlands during WWII.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 20:43:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 8 OCT 44

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
SUNDAY, 8 OCTOBER 1944
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  C-47, Douglas Skytrain
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): Photo missions to Paramushiru, Matsuwa,
Onnekotan and Shasukotan Islands turn back due to weather.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA (CBI) THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 20+ P-47s hit targets of
opportunity in the Mawhun and Manyut areas, knock out a bridge at Seywa, and
bomb railroad tracks in N Burma; 5 B-25s damage a bridge and score hits on
the other bridge approaches at Namhkai and knock out 2 bridges at Wuntho and
Kawlin. In India, HQ 443d Troop Carrier Group moves from Dinjan to Ledo.

  CHINA (Fourteenth Air Force): 12 P-40s and P-51s hit locomotives, trucks,
and river traffic at Yuncheng and NE of Pengtse.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): A revision and elaboration (from
28 Sep-8 Oct) of the Ninth AF interdiction program against railroads
connected with the Rhine River results in the issuance of a new interdiction
program; it includes rail lines further to the E and requires attacks by all
4 Tactical Air Commands of the Ninth AF, plus aid from the British Second
Tactical AF.  300+ B-26s and A-20s, with fighter escort, hit strongpoints and
bridges over wide areas of E France and W Germany; fighters support ground
forces of the US VII, XV, XIX, and XX Corps in E France and W Germany, and
attack airfields, railroads, and numerous military targets in forward areas.
In France, HQ 394th Bombardment Group (Medium) and the 584th and 585th
Bombardment Squadrons (Medium) move from Bricy to Cambrai/Niergnies with
B-26s.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Bad weather limits operations
to reconnaissance and sea-search missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, bad weather forces
medium bombers to cancel missions; XII Fighter Command fighters are airborne
to support ground forces over the battle area and abort all missions; HQ 60th
Troop Carrier Group and the 28th Troop Carrier Squadron move from Brindisi to
Pomigliano with C-47s. In France, the detachment of the 23d Photographic
Reconnaissance Squadron, 5th Photographic Reconnaissance Group [attached to
3d Photographic Group (Reconnaissance)] operating from Dijon with F-5s
returns to base at Valence.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 3 Saipan Island-based B-24s hit Pagan and
Marcus Islands. 24 P-47s hit buildings, beach defenses, and gun positions on
Pagan Island. During the day and night of 8/9 Oct B-24s from the Marshall
Islands bomb Wake Island. In Hawaii, the 531st Fighter Squadron, 21st Fighter
Group, moves from Kuoloa to Mokuleia Field with P-38s and P-51s.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Ceram Island,
P-47s bomb Amahai and Boela. In the Moluccas Islands, P-38s hit Dodinga Bay
barge hideouts, supplies and targets of opportunity along Wasile and Kaoe
Bays on Halmahera Island. In New Guinea, B-25s, A-20s, and fighter-bombers
hit Sorong, Doom Island, runways and targets of opportunity at Efman and
Samate, and gun positions, bivouacs, and supplies at Simora Point; a
detachment of the 17th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron, 4th Photographic
Group (Reconnaissance), begins operating from Noemfoor Island with F-5s
(squadron HQ begins a movement from Guadalcanal Island, Solomon Islands to
Morotai Island; another detachment is operating from Bougainville Island,
Solomon Islands).

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

08/0046Z OCT

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 17:51:51 PDT
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Invasion of Crete -- Operation Merkur

Emery...
        The British/Australian/New Zealand forces withdrew from Crete
over a period of five days -- starting on the night of May 28, 1941.
        Though German parachute and glider troops eventually succeeded
in driving the British off the island, German losses were so severe that
their airborne forces were in effect destroyed. The costliness of this
disaster on Crete finished German enthusiasm for airborne operations.
        The Germans on Crete lost 1,990 men killed in action.
        British and Commonwealth forces lost 1,742 men killed in action.

Regards -- Sidney Allinson.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 18:03:45 PDT
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Egypt

One of the best overall accounts is:
                THE DESERT GENERALS,
                        by Corelli Barnet.

Say "Hi" to Olaf for me.

Regards -- Sidney Allinson.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 21:06:08 EDT
From:    Cassady Craft <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: POL: Economic Causes of the war

Sorry guys and ladies, but I don't have my history books here to confirm which
it is, but wasn't 1937 the year that the Supreme Court blew the Second New
Deal out of the water?  Didn't he also get thwarted in some other actions
about this time in domestic affairs?  When were the last of the Neutrality
Act passed, 1936?

Just trying to pin down this Quarantine Speech a little more.  Anyone have
any contact with Roger Biles at Oklahoma State?  He has written a good piece
on the New Deal.  I know, he made me buy it for his class!

Cassady Craft
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 21:12:07 EDT
From:    Cassady Craft <[email-masked]>
Subject: BIO:  Wingate

Terry, thanks for the responses.  If you haven't posted the stuff on Wingate
recently, others might also like to read of it, so post it on the list.  If
you have done this recently, please send it to me via privite email--if it
is not too much trouble.

Cassady Craft
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 21:28:24 EDT
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO: The "Big" what-if?

Two points re James Yarborough's thesis-
1. Barbarossa caught the Red Army in mid-expansion and poorly deployed.
By 1942 the Soviets would have had upwards of 4000 T-34 and KV, and             possibly as many as 6000, in vastly better trained, equipped, and               integrated units. So far as I know the Germans had no plans to improve on
their armor, except perhaps to upgun the Pz MkIII to 50mm hi-velocity guns,     still woefully inefficient against the T-34/KV. The long 75mm and the 88mm
guns were the product of Barbarossa experience. And there is no certain
reason to believe German Intelligence, which was generally inept against        Russia, would have gotten wind of the new Soviet armor. By June 1941            the Russians already had at least 1861 of them, and they were still
a surprise (there was one German report that a new tank was being built-
no details.) Even if they did suspect Soviet developments, German arrogance
re Russia and the general belief that the army that beat France in four
weeks was sufficient would have precluded major changes. Germany did not
go to a full war footing until 1944, so even if they had details of the         T-34/KV, it is highly doubtful new designs could have been produced in any
kind of numbers within a year. What allowed the initial success of Barbarossa   was the state of the Red Army and Stalin's monomanical instance, in the face    of all evidence, that Hitler would not attack, which prevented his officers
from taking the measures that, to a man, they knew were necessary. Neither      of these conditions would necessarily have existed in 1942, and the scenario    could have been a marginally improved Wehrmacht of Barbarossa attacking the     Red Army of 1944. We saw something like that at Kursk in July 1943.             Please don't reduce the Red Army to purges and political commissars.

2. The US was capable of sweeping aside the well equipped and much better       entrenched Japanese to bring a multimillion man invasion force to the gates
of Tokyo. Would the shorter distances and weaker naval opposition in the
Atlantic have been that much more of a challenge? Europe could have been
invaded from North America, if the US and the Canadians put there mind
to it. Remember, the B-36 was designed to attack Berlin from Labrador,
Nova Scotia, and New England/Long Island, and one of the Rainbow plans
specifically covered the "so-be-it, alone" option.

Finally, for my last $.02, the only question I can see about whether
Germany "wins," on any terms, is what the American people were willing
to accept. If Willie, Joe, and Joe's girl friend Rosie decided that the         Nazis were a threat (and I think,in a very few years, that would have           been the case), they were finished. Three rules of international engagement     that would-be aggressors might find useful:
  1) Don't bet against the English-speaking parliamentary union.
  2) Don't take on the United States Army; you may get lucky and beat it,
     but if the American people get sufficiently annoyed, you will find              yourself facing the Army of United States (with apologies to the                other services- I think you will understand my point.)
  3) Americans do not like political settlements to wars. If they reach a
     reasonably unified decision to fight them, they prefer to win them.

Assuming Britain falls, Russia is a deadlock, Japan is contained and
Germany is at war with the US, my nominee for a likely scenario? Shortly
after 11pm on the night of July 3, 1948, 90 B-36s take off from bases in
New England in groups of three. The plane has never been seen outside the
US and Canada. At the same time, a massive invasion fleet that had been
rehearsing off Cuba "for the upcoming invasion of Japan," and was moving
towards the Cape of Good Hope "because the Panama Canal could not handle
that volume of traffic," quietly appears off Britain. Shortly after 6am,
the 30 B-36 groups, having flown over the pole and striking from nearly         due north in a high-low-high flight plan that minimizes German radar            detection, attack simultaneously at 410mph from 42000 feet, which stuns         the few German observers who detect them. By the time the observers react,      the thirty largest cities in Germany are radioactive ash, and the               plaintive call of German commanders all across southern Britain,
"We are being fired upon. What shall we do?" goes into an ethereal
void.

Sorry about the length of this, but it WAS fun.

Henry "Wave the Bloody Flag" Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 21:56:00 EDT
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT:Could they have won ?

Churchill believed the war was won the minute the first Japanese planes
appeared over Pearl Harbor.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN HE KNEW ABOUT IT.

HS

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 21:18:45 EDT
From:    Cassady Craft <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT:Balkan strategy

Ken, on my map (which isn't all that good, but you have to expect it to be
close), it doesn't look like Sardinia is that much further from Tunisia than
Sicily.  Malta may well be the answer, but I'[ve got to think that the range
was there, by this time in the war.  1943 you do have the lightning, which
was a mild improvement in range, but maybe not enough.  Anyone want to help?

Hey, it is further from Sicily and all but the top of Italy to Sardinia and
Corsica on my map than it is from Tunisia.  How did they take those places,
anyway?  Maybe that will settle the question.

My sources say that Sicily was determined on as the follow up to Torch
based on the recommendation of General Sir Alan Brooke.  Both Mountbattan and
Cunningham wanted Sardinia.  They were overruled at Casablanca.  On the other
side of the lines, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, CIC South, in april
sent an appraisal to OKW, stating that the enemy "would gain more
from an operation against Sardinia and Corsica if the Allied objective were
the speedy capture of Rome."  Corsica would also facilitate operations against
southern France, according to Kesselring.  Commando Supremo also picked
Sardinia as the best target.  Reasons:  1) stepping stone to southern France;
2) Allied air forces in Sardinia and Corsica could bomb all of Italy and
southern germany; 3) Sardinia was the gateway to the Po River valley, Italy's
most important ag. and ind. area; 4)Italian Navy would be bottled up in
Tyrrhenian Sea.  Sicily would not, Commando Supremo felt, put the allies within
escorted bomber range of Po RV or southern Germany; nor would it serve as
a launch point for an invasion of central or northern Italy.  FM W. von
Richthofen, STudent, Badoglio, Doenitz and OKL and Supermarina, all picked
Sardinia.

Guzzoni picked Calabria in the toe of the boot, as did Maj.Gen Rodt of the
15 PG Div in Sicily (worried about his rear?).  Hitler picked the Balkans.

Interesting reference here to Operation Mincemeat, deception plan that used
a dead body, made to look like a drowning accident of a royal marine courier,
                          with "plans" for the invasion of Greece and the
Dodecanese handcuffed to him.  Found by the Spaniards and turned over to
Abwer.  Hitler fell for it.

Richthofen moved fighters from Sicily to Sardinia before the invasion, but
otherwise, there was only 1 partially formeed German Div. with little or no
hope for reinforcement of ground troops due to it being between 100 and 200
miles (my source is fuzzy) from the mainland.  There were no plans to hold
Corsica if Sardinia fell.

MParl. Aneurin Bevan said later, "Indeed, I am bound to say, if the House will
forgive the metaphor, that the Allied High Command have approached the Italian
mainland like an old man approaching a young bride, fascinated, sluggish, and
apprehensive."

My source here is Mitcham and von Stauffenberg, _The Battle of Sicily_.

Cassady Craft
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 22:16:00 EDT
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Churchill's bad decisions (from Economic Causes of the War)

On Fri, 7 Oct 1994 12:40:47 EDT Ken Koester said:
>On Fri, 7 Oct 1994 11:02:46 -0400 Barone said:
>>Because of logistics contraints
>>(landing craft needed for Overlord, etc.), the plan called for a mere
>>two divisions to hit the beach.  This was simply insufficient manpower
>>to exploit any surprise end-run.  The operation could not have been
>>expanded without cutting into the Overlord operation which the US would
>>not allow.
>
>That's a rationale--from the times--I'd like to see investigated.  It
>doesn't seem reasonable that it would take 6 months to reposition men &
>materiel from Italy to England.  Yet it was always given as an excuse for
>limiting operations in the Med.  The logical conclusion, given how the
>campaign turned out, would be not to invade Italy in the first place, since
>w/o operations of this type the Allies were doomed from the start to slog
>their way up the Appenines.
>
>For that matter, why were landing craft in such short supply?  I mean,
>it's not like building a bloody aircraft carrier, is it?  If you can
>turn out a liberty ship in 9 days, you sure should have been able to
>*flood* the waters with landing craft.  Or is this meant to include
>landing ships as well?  Still, one wonders if perhaps the production
>campaign went astray here.
>
>ken koester
>[email-masked]
>>hear our Detroit engines long before we enter the town.

   I am going to take a random shot at answering this question, based upon
my readings from a book entitled, "The Pacific War" by John Costello.  In
it he relates how there were never enough landing craft (I'm exaggerating
a bit).  To begin with, the US was very Pacific oriented (the Navy was,
at least) and so requisition was very biased towards the Pacific.
Additionally, Marshall and Roosevelt weren't too excited over the whole
Italy scheme anyway, and thus they didn't have their hearts in it.  They
might have seen pulling landing craft from England as yet another way
for Churchill to delay Overlord.
   Finally, as for production, I am also at a loss as to why there weren't
enough landing craft.  All I can guess is that you can never make everything,
no matter how much you try.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 21:43:09 -0500
From:    "William L. Huber - SAA" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: SS in combat

> what-- no credit to Alfred Naujocks for creative thought?
>
>                                           Greg Kelley

It was an interview of Schellenburg that I was reading.  I guess he
figured Al was just one of the boys in the band..... :-)

Cheers, Bill Huber / [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 7 Oct 1994 22:26:26 -0400
From:    Christopher Morton <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Raid in Poland

>
> Hello, Christopher!
>
> The Army Colonel who set up the Brandenburgers was Colonel von
> Hippel.
>
> I hadn't read or heard that they were going to storm the Reichstag
> and arrest Hitler if the Munich crisis had resulted in war. My
> understanding was that the officers of the General Staff would have
> done this, as they had direct access to Hitler at the time. Witzleben
> and Halder were the prime movers in this plot.

Thanks.  I'd never heard the part about the Brandenburgers either.

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 6 Oct 1994 to 7 Oct 1994
***********************************************