Subject: WWII-L Digest - 19 Oct 1994 to 20 Oct 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 21 Oct 1994 00:01:45 -0400

There are 36 messages totalling 1875 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. TRIV: Helmet straps (5)
  2. Helmet SAFETY straps
  3. OSS-BILL COLBY
  4. HIST: Taffy-3 (4)
  5. INF: USN Chronology 10-20-94
  6. Churchill's bad decisions (from Economic Causes of the
  7. WWII Bomb
  8. WEAP:V2 (5)
  9. INF: 50 Years Ago - 21-OCT-1944
 10. Untold Stories f/ABTF, Pt. 7
 11. Aircraft wreck
 12. Aircraft wreck.
 13. MEDIA: Philippine Invasion
 14. Ft Slocum
 15. RIP Martha Raye (3)
 16. Teaching WWII in Germany today.
 17. WEAP: CVE 18, USS ALTAMAHA
 18. Midway & Luck
 19. HYPO:  The "Big" what-if?
 20. WEAP: B-26
 21. TRIV : Helmet straps
 22. QUES: troopships
 23. [INF] USAAF 21 OCT 44

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 19 Oct 1994 19:05:41 -0400
From:    Christopher Morton <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TRIV: Helmet straps

>
>         While not the best source for primary information, a while back
> I watched a particular episode of "Combat!" that piqued my curosity so
> I'm bringing my questions to the veterans on the list.  In the episode,
> Sarge's squad received four new replacements.  The "regulars" were
> helping the replacements get acclimated and they were told not to strap
> their helmets on (as if it wasn't a good idea).  They left it at that
> with no explanation.  Since the U.S. Army was a consultant for the show,
> I suspect that this was truly done.  So my questions are: were helmets
> not strapped on and, if not, why not?  I figure veterans who had to wear
> the things could share their thoughts on the matter.  Thanks.

For one thing, someone walking up behind you can grab the front rim and do
great injury to your cervical vertebra.  This was at one time taught as a
technique of hand to hand combat.

I never had much trouble hanging onto my helmet other than at airborne school.
A properly adjusted headband will retain it just fine.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 00:57:11 -0500
From:    Oliver Bonham-Carter <[email-masked]>
Subject: Helmet SAFETY straps

With all this "head blown off" discussion, wouldn't it make more sense to
equip helmets with an elastic or lose rubber strap (the kind that is
stong enough for regular use but could stretch or break under severe
measures)? That way, the helmet would be close to the head and protecting
it, but not as dangerous if suddenly yanked or grabbed by the opponent
(or blown off, I guess...).

[email-masked]
 "This is it... so read it!"

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 03:08:36 -0300
From:    Boris Raymond <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TRIV: Helmet straps

I was in combat in the US infantry in the Ardennes +.  As I
remember, I did not bother with the strap.  I don't remember why.
                Boris Raymond

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 08:57:14 +0200
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: OSS-BILL COLBY

  October 20, 1994
  In case someone has not mentioned it, William Casey wrote an autobiography.
Sorry, I do not recall the title.  He also had an interview about D-Day in the
French magazine L'EXPRESS about his adventures.
  Regards, John Ausland/Oslo Norway

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 03:32:34 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: HIST: Taffy-3

    This is the last of the Taffy-3 files.  As we approach the 50th
    anniversary of the battle, I still can't help but wonder about the role
    that pure, dumb luck sometimes plays in such monumental moments.

    There is no way that the ships and aircraft of Taffy-3, even with the
    help of the aircraft of Taffy-2, configured as they were to support the
    landings, could possibly have defeated the Yamato and her company.  Yet
    the facts are inescapable.  A few incredibly brave men, fighting their
    DDs and DEs as if they were BBs, chased off a force that could actually
    have sped right through them to the landing beaches without suffering
    major losses.

    Perhaps my personal fascination with this engagement comes from my
    father's recollections of the battle.  As a member of a beachmaster
    team on Leyte, he recalls hearing the gunfire, seeing the flashes on
    the horizon, and watching the unfortunate aircrews from Taffy-2 &
    Taffy-3, landing on the incomplete airstrip to re-arm and return to the
    fight, if they were lucky, or plowing in to the unimproved surface, to
    be bulldozed out of the way, if they weren't.

    Oh, yes, he also recalls the multiple "returns" of General McArthur,
    camera crews at the ready, with a bulldozer available to maintain the
    approach ramp for the landing craft so that the General strode to the
    beach in theatrically deep water, but not over his head.

    Wasn't it General Eisenhower who said that he'd spent years studying
    acting under McArthur?

     Steve L. New
    [email-masked]
    Just an  armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

From: Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, Vol. III, 1968, Navy
Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History
Division, Washington, D.C.

JOHNSTON

John Vincent Johnston of Cincinnati, Ohio, entered the Navy in September
1861 as First Master in gunboat ST. LOUIS. He assisted in the Union
gunboat attacks that captured strategic Fort Henry on the Tennessee
River 6 February 1862. The night of 1 April 1862 he was the Navy
commander of a combined Army-Navy boat expedition from ST. LOUIS which
landed and spiked the guns of Fort No. 1 above the Confederate
stronghold, Island No. 10. He was promoted to Acting Volunteer
Lieutenant for gallantry in this expedition. After joining in the
bombardments of Vicksburg, he took command of FORREST ROSE to patrol the
Mississippi and its tributaries. On 15 February 1864 his gunboat
repelled the attack of confederate raiders, saving the town of
Waterproof, La. and its federal garrison. Lt. Johnston resigned from the
naval service 23 June 1864 and died 23 April 1912 at St. Louis, Mo.

USS JOHNSTON DD-557

dp. 2,700 n.;
l. 376'6";
b. 39?8";
dr. 17'9";
s. 35 k.;
cpl. 273;
a. 5.5", 10 40-mm., 7 20-mm., 10 21" tt; 6 dcp., 2 dct.;
cl FLETCHER

The first JOHNSTON (DD-557) was laid down 6 May 1942 by the Seattle
Tacoma Shipbuilding Co., Seattle, Wash.; launched 25 March 1943;
sponsored by Mrs. Marie S. Klinger, great-niece of Lt. John Johnston;
and commissioned 27 October 1943, Comdr. Ernest E. Evans in command.

The day JOHNSTON commissioned, Comdr. Evans made a speech to the crew:
"This is going to be a fighting ship. I intend to go in harm's way, and
anyone who doesn't want to go along had better get off right now."
During the Marshall Islands campaign 3 months later, JOHNSTON bombarded
the beaches at Kwajalein 1 February 1944, and made a 5-day bombardment
of Eniwetok 17 to 22 February. She gave direct support to invasion
troops there, destroying several pillboxes and taking revetments along
the beach under fire. En route to patrol duty in the Solomons 28 March
1944, she bombarded Kapingamarangi Atoll in the Carolines. An
observation tower. several blockhouses, pillboxes and dugouts along the
beach were shelled. Two days later she came into the mouth of the
Maririca River, southeast of Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, Solomon
Islands. After laying a heavy barrage into that area, she took up
antisubmarine patrol off Bougainville. During this duty 15 May 1944, she
depth charged and sank Japanese submarine I-16.

After 3 months of patrol in the Solomons, JOHNSTON sailed to the
Marshalls to prepare for the invasion and capture of Guam in the
Marianas. On 21 July 1914 she teamed up with that Pearl Harbor "ghost",
PENNSYLVANIA (BB-38), to bombard Guam. The destroyer had sent in more
than 4,000 rounds of shells by 29 July. Her accurate gunfire shattered
the enemy 4-inch battery installations, numerous pillboxes and
buildings. JOHNSTON next helped protect escort aircraft carriers
providing air support for the invasion and capture of the Palau Islands.

Now the time had come for General MacArthur's long awaited return to the
Philippines. Following replenishment at Seeadler Harbor, Manus,
Admiralty Islands, she sailed 12 October 1944 to help protect the escort
carriers maintaining air supremacy over eastern Leyte and the Gulf,
sweeping the enemy off local airfields, giving troops direct support on
the landing beaches from 20 October, and even destroying vehicle
transport and supply convoys on the roads of Leyte itself. JOHNSTON was
operating with "Taffy 3" (Escort Carrier Task Unit 77.4.3) comprising
Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague's flagship FANSHAW BAY (CVE-70), five
other escort carriers, three destroyers including herself, and four
destroyer-escorts. "Taffy 3" was one of the three units of Rear
Admiral Thomas L. Sprague's Escort  Carrier Task Group 77.4 known by
their voice calls as "Taffy 1," "Taffy  2," and "Taffy 3."

The morning of 23 October 144 American submarines detected and attacked
units of the Japanese fleet coming in from the South China Sea toward
the precarious Leyte Beachhead. The battleship-cruiser-destroyer
Southern Force was decimated as it attempted to enter Leyte Gulf via
Surigao Strait the night of 24-25 October 1944. The more powerful
battleship-cruiser-destroyer Center Force had been pounded by Admiral
Halsey's attack carrier planes and presumably turned back from San
Bernardino Straits. Admiral Halsey then raced north with his attack
carriers and heavy battleships to engage a Japanese carrier-battleship
task force off Cape Engano. This left Johnston and her small escort
carrier task unit lonely sentinels in north Leyte Gulf, east of Samar
and off San Bernadino Strait.

As enemy ships fled the Battle of Surigao Strait at daybreak of 26
October 144, the powerful Japanese Center Force slipped through San
Bernadino Strait and into Leyte Gulf. It steamed along the coast of
Samar directly for JOHNSTON's little task unit and the American invasion
beachhead at Leyte, hoping to destroy amphibious shipping and American
troops on shore.

One of the pilots flying patrol after dawn alert of 26 October 194
reported the approach of Japanese Center Force. Steaming straight for
"Taffy 3" were 4 battleships, 7 cruisers, and at least 12 destroyers.
JOHNSTON's gunnery officer later reported "We felt like little David
without a slingshot." In less than a minute JOHNSTON was zigzagging
between the six little escort carriers and the Japanese fleet and
putting out a smoke screen over a 2,500-yard front to conceal the
carriers from the enemy gunners: "Even as we began laying smoke, the
Japanese started lobbing shells at us and the JOHNSTON had to zigzag
between the splashes.... We were the first destroyer to make smoke, the
first to start firing, the first to launch a torpedo attack ...."

For the first 20 minutes, JOHNSTON was helpless as the enemy cruisers
and battleships had her in range. But the destroyer's 5-inch guns could
not yet reach them. She charged onward to close the enemy-first a line
of seven destroyers; next, one light and three heavy cruisers, then the
four battleships. To the east appeared three other cruisers and several
destroyer.

As soon as range closed, JOHNSTON opened her 5-inch battery on the
nearest cruiser, scoring damaging hits. About this time an 8-inch shell
landed right off her bow, its red dye splashing the face of JOHNSTON's
gunnery officer, Lt. Robert C. Hagen. He mopped the dye from his eyes
while remarking: "Looks like somebody's mad at us!" In 5 furious minutes
JOHNSTON pumped 200 rounds at the enemy, then Comdr. Evans ordered,
"Fire torpedoes !" The destroyer got off 10 torpedoes then whipped
around to retire behind a heavy smoke screen. When she came out of the
smoke a minute later, Japanese cruiser KUMANO could be seen burning
furiously from torpedo hits. KUMANO later sank. But JOHNSTON took three
14-inch shell hits from a battleship followed closely by three 6-inch
shells from a light cruiser: "It was like a puppy being smacked by a
truck. The hits resulted in the loss of all power to the steering
engine, all power to the three 5-inch guns in the after part of the
ship, and rendered our gyro compass useless." Through "sheer providence"
a rainstorm came up; and JOHNSTON "ducked into it" for a few minutes of
rapid repairs and salvage work.

At 7:50 a.m., Admiral Sprague ordered destroyers to make a torpedo
attack. But JOHNSTON had already expended torpedoes. With one engine,
she couldn't keep up with the others: "But that wasn't Comdr. Evans' way
of fighting: 'We'll go in with the destroyers and provide fire support,'
he boomed." JOHNSTON went in, dodging salvos and blasting back. As she
charged out of blinding smoke, pointed straight at the bridge of gallant
HEERMANN (DD-532), "All engines back full!" bellowed Comdr. Evans. That
meant one engine for JOHNSTON who could hardly do more than slow down.
But HEERMANN?s two engines backed her barely out of the collision
course-Johnston missed her by less than 10 feet. Now there was so much
smoke that Evans ordered no firing unless the gunnery officer could see
the ship. "At 8 :20, there suddenly appeared out of the smoke a 30,000-
ton KONGO-class battleship, only 7,000 yards off our port beam. I took
one look at the unmistakable pagoda mast, muttered, 'I sure as hell can
see that!" and opened fire. In 40 seconds we got off 30 rounds, at least
15 of which hit the pagoda superstructure.... The BB belched a few 14-
inchers at us, but, thank God, registered only clean misses."

JOHNSTON soon observed GAMBIER BAY (CVE-73) under fire from a cruiser:
"Comdr. Evans then gave me the most courageous order I've ever heard:
'Commence firing that cruiser, draw her fire on us and away from GAMBIER
BAY'." JOHNSTON scored four hits in a deliberate slug match with a heavy
cruiser, then broke off the futile battle as the Japanese destroyer
squadron was seen closing rapidly on the American escort carriers.
JOHNSTON outfought the entire Japanese destroyer squadron, concentrating
on the lead ship until the enemy quit cold, then concentrated on the
second destroyer until the remaining enemy units broke off to get out of
effective gun range before launching torpedoes, all of which went wild.

JOHNSTON took a hit which knocked out one forward gun, damaged another,
and her bridge was rendered untenable by fires and explosions resulting
from a hit in her 40-mm ready ammunition locker. Evans shifted his
command to JOHNSTON's fantail, yelling orders through an open hatch to
men turning her rudder by hand. At one of her batteries a Texan kept
calling "More shells! More shells!" Still the destroyer battled
desperately to keep the Japanese destroyers and cruisers from reaching
the five surviving American carriers: "We were now in a position where
all the gallantry and guts in the world couldn?t save us, but we figured
that help for the carrier must be on the way, and every minute's delay
might count.... By 9:30 we were going dead in the water; even the
Japanese couldn't miss us. They made a sort of running semi-circle
around our ship, shooting at us like a bunch of Indians attacking a
prairie schooner. Our lone engine and fire room was knocked out; we lost
all power, and even the indomitable skipper knew we were finished. At
9:45 he gave the saddest order a captain can give: 'Abandon Ship.' ...
At 10:10 Johnston rolled over and began to sink. A Japanese destroyer
came up to 1,000 yards and pumped a final shot into her to make sure she
went down. A survivor saw the Japanese captain salute her as she went
down. That was the end of JOHNSTON."

>From JOHNSTON's complement of 327, only 141 were saved. Of 186 lost,
about 50 were killed by enemy action, 45 died on rafts from battle
injuries;  and 92, including Comdr. Evans, were alive in the water after
JOHNSTON sank, but were never heard from again.

HOEL (DD-533) and SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DE-113) also sacrificed themselves
to save the escort carriers and to protect the landings at Leyte. Two of
four Japanese heavy cruisers were sunk by combined surface and air
attacks; and Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague was soon amazed by the
sight of the retirement of Kurita's entire fleet. By this time planes of
"Taffy 2" and Taffy 1" and every available unit of the Fleet were headed
to assisting the fighting "Taffy 3." But JOHNSTON and her little escort
carrier task unit had stopped Admiral Kurita's powerful Center Force in
the Battle off Samar, inflicting a greater loss than they suffered.

JOHNSTON's supreme courage and daring in the Battle off Samar won her
the Presidential Unit Citation as a unit of "Taffy 3" (Task Unit
77.4.3). Comdr. Ernest E. Evans was posthumously awarded the
Congressional Medal Honor: "The skipper was a fighting man from the
soles of his broad feet to the ends of his straight black hair. He was
an Oklahoman and proud of the Indian blood he had in him. We called him-
though not to his face-the Chief. The JOHNSTON was a fighting ship, but
he was the heart and soul of her."

In addition to the Presidential Unit Citation, JOHNSTON received six
battle stars for service in World War II.

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

The following is an attached File item from cc:Mail.  It contains
eight bit information which had to be encoded to insure successful trans-
mission through various mail systems.  To decode the file use the UUDECODE
program.
--------------------------------- Cut Here ---------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 04:00:56 PDT
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 10-20-94

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1944
10/20 Fri. Army forces land on Leyte, P. I., supported by naval
           gunfire and carrier-based aircraft. The overall
           commander is Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the naval
           commander is Vice Adm. T. C. Kinkaid, and the ground
           troops are commanded by Lt. Gen. W. Krueger.
           Naval Operating Base, Guam, Marianas Islands, is
           established.
            United States naval vessels damaged, Leyte area, P.
             I.:
             Light cruiser HONOLULU (CL-48), by aircraft
              torpedo,
              11 d. 01'N., 125 d. 07'E.
             Destroyer BENNION (DD-662), by coastal defense gun,
              10 d. 50'N., 125 d. 25'E.
             LST 452, by coastal defense gun,
              11 d. 10'N., 125 d. 01'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 12 Oct 1994 14:58:58 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Churchill's bad decisions (from Economic Causes of the

On Wed, 12 Oct 1994, Robert T. Moore wrote:

> > Terry, you referred to 617 being pulled out of the line to bomb the damns,
> > saying that the mission wasn't necessary to the war effort.  Well, was
> > nighttime area bombing all that much more necessary or effective?

>     Attacking those panacea targets was certainly a glamourous and
> intriguing idea, and they were attention-getters, but that was about
> all.

I don't think that the strategic thinking behind these attacks was
invalid. The idea was to attack the few targets that were highly critical
to the German war effort, instead of indiscriminate bombing of cities.
Later in WWII, it worked quite well, especially when the oil industry was
targetted. The problem with the dam-raids was that they weren't followed
up (What is understandable, if you consider the losses at this occasion).
It certainly was a better idea than area-bombing. The problem was really
one of intelligence and decision-making; identifying the important targets
can be more difficult than bombing them --- it still is --- and the
damage done was often overestimated.

> > that 617 did later in the war, as an "elite" squadron (dropping extremely
> > large bombs with pinpoint accuracy) seem to make this effort worthwhile in
> > the long run.  Just 2 cents, anyway.
>
>     Maybe against military targets, but not civilian, if the purpose
> here was to cause significant disruptions in war production. Just my
> opinion anyway.

Depends what you consider 'significant disruptions' of course. The bombing
did hamper German war production, and it would surely have risen even
more without bombing. Sometimes critical targets were hit. The disruption
of communication also affected the production, even if the factories were
intact. And the quality of parts produced in damp underground factories
or by slave labour was often suspect.

Of course 617 was used mostly against military targets: U-boat shelters,
the Tirpitz, the V-3 installation, jamming of German radars... But it did
precision attacks against factories and transportation systems as well. It
also played an important role in developing high-precision night
bombardment techniques, thus increasing the accuracy of the bomber group
it belonged to.

> as England have one thing in common. Rather than demoralize the
> population and cause significant dislocations and disruptions in war-
> related production, it tended to have the opposite effect. The

Improving morale, yes. But increasing the war production? That had
probably more to do with the efforts of Speer than with the bombing.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 06:58:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: WWII Bomb

The Associated Press reported that a 1.8-ton (3,600-pound or 1,344
kg) bomb dropped by an RAF aircraft during WWII was found and
defused Wednesday, 19 Oct, in Ludwigshafen, Germany.  The bomb was
found using metal detectors and aerial photographs taken by RAF
aircraft (in WWII??).  About 10,000 people had to evacuate the area
for three hours while the work was in progress.  Ludwigshafen is a
southern Rhine River city with a population of about 170,000
people.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 12:10:26 BST
From:    Stephen Baldwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP:V2

someone here at work asked me a couple of questions I (not surprisingly)
couldn't answer.....

1. V2s could obliterate what size of area? (i.e. if one was dropped in a
residential area, how many square feet/metres of ground would be affected
by the blast?)

2. Had the V2 been available say, a year earlier, would it have made a
significant difference to the outcome of the war?

thanks in advance

Steve Baldwin
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 04:32:39 -0700
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 21-OCT-1944

On 21-OCT-1944, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - The German garrison of Aachen surrenders. Much of the city has
been reduced to a pile of rubble. Units of the VI Corps (7th Army) enter
Brouleveurs. Other units continue to advance towards St Die.

Eastern Front - The leading units of the 2nd Ukraine Front reach the
Danube at Baja in southern Hungary. In Yugoslavia, the German Army Groups
E and F abandon one position after another, continually under attack by
the Bulgarian 1st Army on the eastern front and elsewhere by Yugoslav and
Albanian partisans.  In Finland, the Karelia Front advances from Petsamo
towards the Norwegian border.

Italian Front - The Canadian I Corps and British V Corps continue to cross
over the Savio river despite the river being very high from recent rains. The
South African 6th Armoured Division completes the capture of Monte Alcino. The
British 4th Division completes the capture of Cesena.

Angaur - Japanese resistance on Angaur comes to an end. The Japanese have lost
1,300 dead and 45 prisoners. The Americans have lost 265 dead and 1,335
wounded. US heavy bombers are already operating from Angaur. The biggest
islands of the Palau archipelago are not occupied by the Americans. Their
garrisons, with no supplies, no longer present any danger to US forces.

Philippines - After holding out against Japanese night attacks, the US forces
take Dulag Airfield and the village of Tacloban. They are still unable to link
the two main bridgeheads over the river Labiranan. The ships of the 7th Fleet
and one groupp from TF 38 provide gunfire and air support.

The Homefront
-------------
College Football - Georgia Tech 17, Navy 15; Illinois 39, Pittsburg 5; Kansas
20, Nebraska 0; Kentucky 26, VMI 2; Notre Dame 28, Wisconsin 13; Penn State 6,
Colgate 0.

=============================================================================

Sources: "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi, "The
World Almanac Book Of WW II" by Peter Young, "Facts On File Yearbook 1944,
Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L. Lapica.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.netcom.com in directory /pub/jbd and can
be accessed via the WWW by URL: ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/jbd/ww2.html. If you
have difficulty accessing the Netcom FTP server, please keep trying because it
stays very busy.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis     [email-masked]
Cary, N.C.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 07:01:30 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TRIV: Helmet straps

Hello, Joe!

>         While not the best source for primary information, a while back
> I watched a particular episode of "Combat!" that piqued my curosity so
> I'm bringing my questions to the veterans on the list.  In the episode,
> Sarge's squad received four new replacements.  The "regulars" were
> helping the replacements get acclimated and they were told not to strap
> their helmets on (as if it wasn't a good idea).  They left it at that
> with no explanation.  Since the U.S. Army was a consultant for the show,
> I suspect that this was truly done.  So my questions are: were helmets
> not strapped on and, if not, why not?  I figure veterans who had to wear
> the things could share their thoughts on the matter.  Thanks.

    You may have already received an answer to this, but the reason
is that a helmet that has been strapped on may bring about the
wearer's death or severe wounding in case of blast concussion from a
near miss from an artillery shell.

    Hope this helps.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 07:03:24 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TRIV: Helmet straps

Hello, Cooper!

That may have been true in VN but I don't think that type of strap
existed in WWII.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 07:18:40 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP:V2

Hello, Steve!

I will try to answer one of your questions. An opinion, anyway.

> 2. Had the V2 been available say, a year earlier, would it have made a
> significant difference to the outcome of the war?

    I really doubt it. It may have delayed the outcome, but the
outcome would have been the same. The Allies would have retaliated
with air strikes at production facilities on a round-the-clock basis
if it wasn't practical to bomb suspected sites. Delays would have
been the outcome from having these missles a year earlier, but the
outcome would still have been the same.

    My two cents' worth on this anyway. Emmanuel can probably give
you a precise answer to the first question.

    Thanks, Steve.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 08:22:32 EDT
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Untold Stories f/ABTF, Pt. 7

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  18-Oct-1994 04:44pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Untold Stories f/ABTF, Pt. 7

    [Remembering that not everyone has massive amounts of disk space for
    long messages, I am castigating myself (before fearless leader does) to
    shorten the length of these missives.  This next series of stories are
    from the exhibit we did - and still remains - at the Airborne Museum
    "Hartenstein" in Oosterbeek, the headquarters of the British 1st
    Airborne Div. during the Arnhem battle.  We only had room for less than
    one-third the panels we used in Nijmegen, so these are fewer and
    shorter stories.]

    TRAGEDY IN WAR

         "When a Dutch civilian was challenged at night and was asked
    simply 'Dutch?' he replied, 'NO,' and was promptly shot down.  He
    probably thought the question was 'Deutsch' and being a good
    Nederlander was indignant - it didn't save him."
                                       - L/Cpl. JS Smith, Royal Signals

         "After escaping Arnhem I was with the leading brigade of the 43rd
    Wessex Division somewhere south of Elst.  That night they were
    discussing German strength in Elst.  I seem to recall they had a few
    SP's there and some tanks and perhaps two or three hundred troops.
    This fact seemed to discourage them and I believe the decision was not
    to attack.  I'm afraid I blew my stack.  Here our men were being
    systematically annihilated across the river and they were worried about
    two or three hundred Germans and a lack of artillery support.  I told
    them, 'I am prepared to lead the attack if you'll let me.'  Christ,
    they nearly died.  All of them looked like I'd gone mad.  Someone
    shoved a scotch in my hand.  They all crowded around to pat me on the
    shoulder and the next thing I knew I was being hustled out of the
    room."
                                  - Capt. Eric MacKay, 1st British AB Div.

         "Major Page gave a few words of comfort to a couple of young
    para's who obviously were in their first action, were very much afraid,
    and just lay on their bellies firing in mid-air at nothing.  He told
    them to look where they were firing and demonstrated how to look over
    the top of the hollow.  I can still see him and hear his words to the
    boys, 'take a look here, take a look there,' bobbing his head up at
    different points.  This seemed to give the boys courage but the Major
    popped up a third time only to be shot in the right temple as fast as a
    dog with a rat."
                                  - Sgt. William Hurst, 1st British AB Div.

         "We went into the Gestapo building, up the stairs to the first
    floor and rummaged around.  In racks on the walls were dozens of
    shotguns all belonging to Dutch civilians.  We took a quick look
    through the files.  They were full of photographs of atrocities: men
    and women, usually shot and then their bodies mutilated.  I remember
    Patterson saying we ought to take some and show them to the
    authorities."
                        - Signalman Stanley Copley, 1st British AB Div.

         "On Friday afternoon, the 22nd of September, I remember an English
    officer by the name of Meikle in the cellar.  He sat with us and
    talked.  At the same time my husband was out helping the soldiers.  He
    asked if I was not afraid for my husband?  I said I was afraid, but
    that I could not ask him to stay here when the English had come from
    far away to liberate us and die for us.  My husband, I told him,
    considered it his duty to do all he could.  Meikle then did a strange
    thing.  He took both of my hands, looked at me for a few seconds and
    then left.  I never saw him again, but I know he was killed because his
    name is inscribed in the pulpit of the church."
                                  - Housewife Bertha Breman, Oosterbeek

         "When I was in the German FAP I saw two nurses and two dutchmen
    shot in the back of the head.  They had Red Cross armbands but my
    captors said they were partisans."
                             - Signalman TDL Bowden, 1st British AB Div.

    Humor(?) is next.

    Doug

Received:  20-Oct-1994 08:22am

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 09:45:57 -0300
From:    Boris Raymond <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HIST: Taffy-3

I am sorry to post this to the discussion group, but there's
no way I can contact the LISTSERV to change my sub to a
digest.  All messages get bounced back.  Please help.
Boris Raymond

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 08:40:36 EDT
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP:V2

On Thu, 20 Oct 1994 12:10:26 BST Stephen Baldwin said:
>someone here at work asked me a couple of questions I (not surprisingly)
>couldn't answer.....
>
>1. V2s could obliterate what size of area? (i.e. if one was dropped in a
>residential area, how many square feet/metres of ground would be affected
>by the blast?)
>
     This is a very difficult question to answer because it depends on many
factors, including but not limited to: target material composition, design,
point of explosion, surrounding objects (from vehicls to large buildings),
etc.  Bomb Damage Assessment has always been difficult to perform - from
any point of view.  As in the case of Desert Storm, it was very difficult
to tell exactly how much damage was done.  I believe the warhead on a
V-2 was in the area of a thousand pounds, making it the equivalent of a
Tomahawk.  But it would be more like a Scud, because of its speed and
trajectory.  There are probably some good Scud attack pictures in recent
periodicals and books (last  four or so years).  That's what I think, at
least.

>2. Had the V2 been available say, a year earlier, would it have made a
>significant difference to the outcome of the war?
>
>thanks in advance
>
>Steve Baldwin
>[email-masked]

    No, not very likely given the overwhelming material strength of the
US.  They could, however, have made landings on Normandy difficult, as
well as destroying important ports (Mulberries, Antwerp).  But Hitler was
more interested in retaliation than winning it would seem.

William LIppert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 08:15:49 CST
From:    "SCHERRER, TIM" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TRIV: Helmet straps

My experience in German and American helmets is if you don;t wear your
strap and you are doing any kind of running or crawling you'll have to
go back and pick up your helmet because they will fall right off your
head.  I think the Germans were more conscious about wearing chinstraps
than the GI's.  I would dare say most who didn't wear their chinstraps
were those in artillery and behind the lines since their movement really
won;t effect the helmet staying on their heads.  My experience in them
is always wear the chinstrap unless you want it be picking it up or lose
it--then again I payed for mine too so that makes a difference in
perspective.  TAS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 07:44:27 -0800
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HIST: Taffy-3

     Steve L. New wrote:
>    This is the last of the Taffy-3 files.  As we approach the 50th
>    anniversary of the battle, I still can't help but wonder about the role
>    that pure, dumb luck sometimes plays in such monumental moments.

I've enjoyed your posts.  We could start a whole new thread on "dumb luck."
 My favorite dumb luck win is Midway.  Yes, Nimitz and Spruance made good
decisions, but the elements of dumb luck in finding the Japanese carriers
in the first place, and then rearming and refueling their planes gives you
pause.

>    Oh, yes, he also recalls the multiple "returns" of General McArthur,
>    camera crews at the ready, with a bulldozer available to maintain the
>    approach ramp for the landing craft so that the General strode to the
>    beach in theatrically deep water, but not over his head.
>
>    Wasn't it General Eisenhower who said that he'd spent years studying
>    acting under McArthur?

Yes, and I think Mac called Ike the best clerk he had ever had.

John Riegsecker                                 (206) 756-3566
Dept of Math and Computer Science               [email-masked]
University of Puget Sound

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 07:44:33 -0800
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Aircraft wreck

[deleted]
I saw this on the local news.

>     That it is an airplane is certain -- the type of airplane has
>not quite been determined, although best guess is that it is the
>wreckage of a PBY-1 or PBY-2 Navy anti-submarine aircraft, according
>to McChord AFB officials.  The number of crew members who might have
>been aboard the aircraft at the time of the crash is, as yet,
>undetermined.

I believe they now think it was a Lockheed Ventura, although I am not
certain about that.  The last I heard was that a snowstorm had stopped
recovery work.

Many of you may know that there is a WWII bomber in a glacier on Mt
Rainier.  That plane and its crew have never been recovered and the area is
off-limits to hikers out of respect for the dead.

John Riegsecker                                 (206) 756-3566
Dept of Math and Computer Science               [email-masked]
University of Puget Sound

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 11:25:24 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Aircraft wreck.

     > That it is an airplane is certain -- the type of airplane has
     > not quite been determined, although best guess is that it is the
     > wreckage of a PBY-1 or PBY-2 Navy anti-submarine aircraft

     > Wreckage included ... parts of the wheel gear

     Since both the PBY-1 and PBY-2 were pure flying boats, it's
     interesting that wheel gear has been found.

     Perhaps this is actually a PBY-5a?

     Steve New
     [email-masked]
     Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 11:39:41 -0400
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA: Philippine Invasion

>From the Dod Newswire 18 October 1994

:WWII ISLAND LANDING REMEMBERED

   TACLOBAN, Philippines  -- With a U.S. invasion fleet on the
horizon, Valeriano Abello slipped past Japanese soldiers down to the
beach and signaled a U.S. warship to warn it of nearby artillery.
   "Who are you?" the ship signaled back. "Boy Scouts of America,"
Abello replied.
   Now 81, Abello hopes some of the Americans he met will return for
celebrations Thursday commemorating the Oct. 20, 1944, landing on
Leyte Island that began the liberation of the Philippines from the
Japanese.
   The first U.S. Marines arrived on the southern Dinagat Island
Monday. Two squads of Marines based in Okinawa and a brass band flew
from the helicopter carrier USS Belleau Wood to the town of Loreto.
   Top officials and diplomats from a dozen nations are coming to
honor the sacrifice of Americans, Filipinos and others during the
fighting 50 years ago on Leyte, 350 miles southeast of Manila.
   Six U.S. Navy ships carrying 4,164 sailors and Marines will
re-enact the landing. Defense Secretary William Perry is to head the
American delegation. Australia, which had troops in the invasion,
will send its defense minister.
   Abello's act of bravery, sending his warning with makeshift
semaphores made from borrowed handkerchiefs, showed the unique role
of Filipinos during the war.
   An Asian land, the Philippines was also American territory, a
self-governing U.S. commonwealth. Abello learned semaphore -- or
flag signals -- as a youth when he was a member of the Boy Scouts of
America.
   The presence of U.S. forces made the Philippines an early target
of Japan, which invaded shortly after Pearl Harbor. Japanese troops
defeated a U.S.-Filipino force in May 1942 in the battles of Bataan
and Corregidor.
   Japan tried to exploit the not always smooth relations between
the United States and its colony, where U.S. troops crushed a
Filipino independence movement early in the century after seizing
the islands from Spain in 1898.
   Japanese leaders told Filipinos they had come to drive out
Westerners and establish an "Asia for Asians." Members of the
Filipino elite, such as former President Corazon Aquino's
father-in-law, Benigno Aquino Sr., rallied to Japan's standard.
   But many more Filipinos joined guerrilla forces at great personal
risk and remained loyal to Washington. They were convinced that
despite early defeats, the Americans would someday return.
   On Oct. 17, 1944, Abello first saw U.S. warships on the horizon
and realized an invasion was imminent. Two days later, after moving
his family to safety inland, he decided to try to help.
   "I decided to signal the Americans so I could give them
information," he said. "But my problem was I didn't have a flag."
   He borrowed his brother's handkerchiefs, tied them to wooden
poles, crept down to the beach and began signaling: "Do not land,
enemy on the beach."
   "The ship signaled back, 'Who are you?"' he recalled. "I thought
to myself, 'Who am I?' I was not with any guerrilla group. So I
signaled back, 'Boy Scouts of America.' I thought, once a Scout,
always a Scout."
   After about two hours, the American ship messaged that Abello
could come aboard if he could find a boat. Abello and two friends
set out in a rowboat but came under Japanese fire. The boat
capsized, but the three were rescued by a second U.S. warship.
   The crew fed them eggs, turkey, beef and bread, a lavish feast
after years of deprivation during the occupation. Abello was then
taken to the "war room" where he pointed out Japanese artillery
batteries on a map.
   That night, he stood on deck and watched as ships shelled the
Japanese positions he had pointed out.
   "At 6 p.m. all hell broke loose," he said. "All the ships shelled
that place. After 10 minutes, which seemed like an eternity, all the
booming stopped, all at once."
   Once the Americans came ashore, Abello served four days as a
guide for American soldiers.
   He never received any pension or other recognition from the
Philippine government because he had not joined a guerrilla unit.
   The only official acknowledgement of his service was a
certificate given by the Americans for killing a Japanese sniper
hiding in a coconut tree.
   "When I was with the Boy Scouts, nobody thought of wars," he
said. "I only know that a Scout should help people at all times.
Maybe it saved the lives, most especially of civilians, who were not
involved in the war."

=====

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        [email-masked]
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 12:14:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Ft Slocum

During WWII, Ft Slocum, New York was located on Davids Island in Long
Island Sound approximately 1.3 miles (2.1 km) off New Rochelle, New York.
The island is approximately 77 acres (31.2 hectacres).  The fort was
abandoned years ago and all the buildings are in serious disrepair.  There is
news today that Donald Trump ("the Donald" to people in this area) has
proposed building a 45-story condominium tower and three 22-story condominium
buildings plus a Heliport, retail outlets, treatment plant and marina on the
island.  He also proposes running ferries to New Rochelle and Greenwich,
Connecticut and a hovercraft to the Wall Street area of Manhattan.

Wonder what a GI who served on Ft Slocum would think of the place now?

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 12:25:27 -0400
From:    Peter Smith <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HIST: Taffy-3

On Thu, 20 Oct 1994 07:44:27 -0800, John Riegsecker <[email-masked]> said
regarding Steve's "Taffy" posts:

> I've enjoyed your posts.  We could start a whole new thread on "dumb luck."
>  My favorite dumb luck win is Midway.  Yes, Nimitz and Spruance made good
> decisions, but the elements of dumb luck in finding the Japanese carriers
> in the first place, and then rearming and refueling their planes gives you
> pause.

I'm not sure the timing of Spruance's strike was "dumb luck" at all;
"damned smart luck", really.  Both Morison and Prange credit one of
Spruance's staff by name for calculating the likely return time of the
Japanese planes and urging that a counter-strike be launched even though
at extreme range to catch them during turn-around.  Moreover, if I
recall correctly, Prange implies that trying to catch enemy carriers
during this most vulnerable time was something that had been studied
before the war and was accepted tactical doctrine.  Can anybody elaborate
on this?

Good luck usually favors those who anticipate potential opportunities and
are positioned to take advantage of them when they pan out.  If there was
an unanticipated bit of good luck that day, it was the silver lining to
the obliteration of the torpedo squadrons:  having the Japanese CAP down
at sea-level when the dive bombers arrived overhead.
--
Peter Smith -- Data General Corp., Westboro MA, USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 12:31:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: RIP Martha Raye

Martha Raye, the big-mouthed, big-heared entertainer who
entertained GIs in WWII, Korea and Vietnam died yesterday in Los
Angeles.  She was 78.

Margie Yvonne Reed was born into showbiz family in the charity ward
of a hospital in Butte, Montana.  She picked the name  Martha Raye
from a telephone book.  She appeared in her first film in 1936 with
Bing Crosby.

During WWII, she began entertaining the troops (there is a picture
of her in N Africa in 1943) and the 1944 film FOUR JILLS IN A JEEP
was based on a USO tour of bases in England and Africa made in the
company of Kay Francis, Carole Landis and Mitzi Mayfair.  She
received many citations for her efforts to entertain the troops
including a special Academy Award in 1969.  In Nov 93, President
Clinton awarded her the Presidential Medal of Freedom, citing her
"great courage, kindness and patriotism."  Yesterday, Bob hope
said, "She was more popular with the GI's than a weekend pass.  They
loved her in Vietnam. She was a Florence Nightingale, Dear Abby and the
only singer who could be heard over the artillery fire."

Miss Raye was a staunch defender of the American GI. In a 1971
interview, she said, "It seems to me a lot of this anti-war stuff is
aimed at the wrong target _ at our boys over there."  At the time,
she had made 10 trips to Vietnam to entertain the troops.

Requiescat in pace.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 13:24:22 EDT
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Teaching WWII in Germany today.

Hi Ludwig, Erik, and William,...

I wanted to thank the German respondants for their offerings. As I am
familar with the feelings Vietnam generated here, it must be at least
equally difficult for the survivors, whom I respect, having fought, worked
in a factory, or farmed...

... and speaking of the fighters, William, it might be revealing to know
exaclty what % of the male German population were casualties. I expect the
number to be significant, telling of a reason why the only ones who talk
today were related to farmers or factory workers; they survived.

-Al

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

N.Korea has exposed the next international money maker.
Yes, if you too work to develop nuclear arms, you too
can qualify for billions of U.S. dollars in U.S. aid,
and hold the world at ransom.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 14:32:19 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP: CVE 18, USS ALTAMAHA

From: Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, Vol. A, 1991, Navy
Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History
Division, Washington, D.C.

ALTAMAHA (CVE-18)

dp. 7,886;
l. 492';
b. 69' 6";
ew. 112';
dr. 25' 6";
s. 16 k.;
cpl. 970;
a. 2 5", 20 40-mm.;
cl. BOGUE;
T. C3-S-A1

ALTAMAHA (CVE-18) was laid down under a Maritime Commission contract (MC
hull 235) on 19 December 1941 at Tacoma, Wash., by the Seattle-Tacoma
Shipbuilding Corp.; launched on 25 May 1942; sponsored by Mrs. Thomas S.
Combs, the wife of Comdr. Combs who was the commanding officer of
seaplane tender CASCO (AVP-12), and commissioned on 15 September 1942
Capt. J. R. Tate in command.

Followin brief sea trials, ALTAMAHA got underway for San Diego, Calif.,
on 27 October in company with KENDRICK (DD-612). While they were en
route, KENDRICK spotted a submarine and claimed that members of her crew
had seen three torpedoes which had been fired at the escort carrier.
However, no one on ALTAMAHA observed any of the torpedoes. The voyaGe
continued uneventfully, and the ships reached San Diego on the 31st. The
carrier then took on aircraft and passeners and sailed in convoy on 3
November for the southwest Pacific.

Upon reaching Espiritu Santo on 24 November, she delivered part of her
cargo and continued on to New Caledonia. She reached Noumea on 28
November and commenced a period of flight operations and training
exercises. The vessel returned to Espiritu Santo on 30 December, but
continued on to the Fiji Islands and touched at Nandi on 13 January 1943
before beginning another period of opertional training.

In early February, ALTAMAHA paused off Funafuti, Ellice Islands; loaded
cargo and personnel on to barges and sent them ashore. The carrier then
proceeded to Hawaii and arrived at Pearl Harbor on 10 February. There,
the planes and personnel of Air Group 11 came on board, and the ship set
a course for the Fiji Islands on the l9th. She reached Nandi on 28
February, discharged her cargo, and reversed her course back toward the
Hawaiian Islands.

After a short stay in port at Pearl Harbor, the escort carrier got
underway on 9 March with replacement aircraft for the flattops of the
Pacific Fleet. She paused at Palmyra Island on 15 March, continued on to
Johnston Island debarked marine aviation personnel on the 17th; and
touched at Midway three days later before reversing course and returning
to Hawaii. She remained at Pearl Harbor for one day, 23 March, and then
continued on to the west coast.

ALTAMAHA reached San Diego on 1 April and commenced three and one-half
months of flight operations off the California coast alternated with
upkeep in San Diego. On 13 July, she arrived at Alameda, Calif., to take
on planes from the naval air station there. The escort carrier got
underway for Australia three days later and made Brisbane on 3 August.
Following a 10-day visit to Fremantle, she got underway on the 16th for
India and arrived at Karachi on 28 August and delivered 29 Army Air
Force airplanes.

On 2 September, the escort carrier reversed her course and steamed back
to Australia. She reached Melbourne on the 18th and, at the end of three
days there in a leave and upkeep status got underway for the west coast
of the United States. On 8 October, the vessel entered the Mare Island
Navy Yard, Vallejo Calif., for overhaul.

The escort carrier got underway for sea trials on 8 November paused
briefly at Alameda to take on replacement aircraft, and sailed on the
13th for Brisbane. ALTAMAHA reached her destination on 30 November and
began discharging her cargo. The ship left there on 4 December to return
home. Upon her arrival at San Diego on the 21st, she began a period of
local operations carrier qualifications, and repairs.

The ship got underway for Pearl Harbor on 22 March 1944 arrived there on
the 28th, and began taking on Composite Squadron 6 for transportation to
an operating area 300 miles east of the Marshall Islands. The carrier
had been selected to be the nucleus of Task Group (TG) 11.1-which was
established for a hunter/killer operation to destroy Japanese submarines
operating against the Pearl Harbor-Marshall Islands supply lines-and
left Hawaii in company with four destroyer escorts on 30 March. The
warships reached their assigned area on 3 April and began their first
patrol. The group reported contacting two submarines but did not receive
credit for damaging or destroying either. The task group put into Majuro
Atoll on 8 April to allow the destroyer escorts to refuel.

The ships sailed on the 11th to carry out a second antisubmarine
mission. ALTAMAHA was the target of a torpedo attack on the 15th but
successfully evaded all four shots. The remainder of the patrol passed
uneventfully before TG 11.1 was relieved on 18 April and shaped a course
for Pearl Harbor. Following a short upkeep period in Hawaiian waters,
the carrier returned to Majuro in early May and operated in an
antisubmarine screen off the Marshall Islands for several days before
returning to Pearl Harbor on 11 May.

After a two-day layover in Hawaii, ALTAMAHA pushed on toward the west
coast. Reaching Alameda on the 18th, she entered the shipyard of the
United Engineering Co. for repairs and alterations. She resumed
operations on the last day in May and headed for Hawaii, laden with
aircraft and spare parts.

Having delivered her cargo at Pearl Harbor, ALTAMAHA returned to
Alameda. From there, she proceeded to San Diego which she reached on 19
June and spent two days loading men and equipment before departing
California on the 21st, bound for the New Hebrides. She reached Espiritu
Santo on 7 July-discharged cargo-and, on the 12th, headed for Morobe,
New Guinea, where she arrived on 16 July. Having made additional calls
at Langemak, New Guinea, and Seeadler Harbor, Manus Island, ALTAMAHA
arrived back at Espiritu Santo on the 25th. She made one more cruise
from this island, during which she visited Seeadler Harbor and
Guadalcanal. The carrier departed the New Hebrides on 10 August bound
for Hawaii.

ALTAMAHA paused at Pearl Harbor for two days and then sailed on to San
Diego. She spent four days there before getting underway and setting
course for Pearl Harbor. She departed Hawaiian waters on 8 September,
made port calls at Emirau Island and Seeadler Harbor, and returned to
San Diego, where she arrived on 6 October. The vessel next spent three
weeks in local operations before getting underway on the 26th for
another voyage west.

The escort carrier paused at Pearl Harbor for three days, then sailed
for Eniwetok with replacement aircraft and pilots. On 15 November, she
reached Ulithi and then carried out flight operations off Ulithi through
14 December, when she got underway for the 3d Fleet replenishment area.
On the 16th, the ship joined TG 30.8-which was composed of oilers and
replacement carriers-in the Philippine Sea and, the next day, began
transferring pilots to BUCHANAN (DD-484). However, heavy seas compelled
her to break off that task. By early morning on the 18th, the
disturbance had grown into a raging typhoon. By 0900, the escort carrier
was laboring heavily and rolling as much as 25 to 30 degrees to either
side. An hour later, visibility dropped to zero, and the vessel
abandoned all effort to keep station. Almost one-half of the aircraft on
board ALTAMAHA broke loose and plunged overboard. The ship also
experienced problems with flooding in the forward elevator pit. By 1600,
the weather was improving and the ship rode better. Soon she made a
rendezvous with other members of TG 30.8.

While the carrier sustained considerable material damage, she suffered
no personnel casualties and was able to resume her resupply operations
on 19 December. ALTAMAHA continued her operations with the replenishment
group through early February 1945. During this time, she serviced 3d
Fleet units in Philippine waters and made port calls at Guam Manus, and
Ulithi. On 15 February, the ship touched at Pearl Harbor.

ALTAMAHA continued on to the west coast, arriving at Alameda on 26
February. The ship began an availability at the Hunters Point Navy Yard
on 3 March during which she was dry-docked for routine work below the
waterline and repairs to a propeller damaged in the typhoon. The carrier
emerged from the yard on 14 March and began loading planes, ammunition,
and supplies for transportation to Pearl Harbor.

During the remaining months of World War II, ALTAMAHA provided general
transportation service from Alameda, San Diego, and Pearl Harbor to
various points in the Pacific. Among her stops were Guam, Saipan,
Eniwetok, Kossol Roads, and Samar. Following the Japanese capitulation
in mid-August ALTAMAHA returned to the west coast for repairs and an
overhaul at the Hunters Point Navy Yard. She began sea trials in mid-
October and got underway for Pearl Harbor on the 22d. The vessel was
then assigned to the "Magic-Carpet" fleet and transported armed forces
personnel and equipment throughout the Pacific back to the United
States.

On 15 January 1946, ALTAMAHA headed to Tacoma, Wash. Deactivation
preparations were begun there, and the carrier was placed out of
commission, in reserve, on 27 September 1946. The ship was redesignated
CVHE-18 on 12 June 1955. Her name was struck from the Navy list on 1
March 1959, and the vessel was sold on 25 April 1961 to Eisenberg & Co.,
New York City, N. Y., and, later that year, was scrapped in Japan.

ALTAMAHA won one battle star for her World War II service.

     ***  Yes, Jorge, got it right on the first guess, I am a modeler.  I
     admit, I had let it drop for about 10 years, but got back into it last
     spring.  I'm currently trying to convert an Airfix 1/48 Hawker Fury
     into a Yugoslavian Fury, Series-II.  (It's tough enough converting it
     into a Fury)  ***

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 11:57:53 -0800
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Midway & Luck

>On Thu, 20 Oct 1994 07:44:27 -0800, John Riegsecker <[email-masked]> said
>regarding Steve's "Taffy" posts:
>
>> I've enjoyed your posts.  We could start a whole new thread on "dumb luck."
>>  My favorite dumb luck win is Midway.  Yes, Nimitz and Spruance made good
>> decisions, but the elements of dumb luck in finding the Japanese carriers
>> in the first place, and then rearming and refueling their planes gives you
>> pause.
>
>I'm not sure the timing of Spruance's strike was "dumb luck" at all;
>"damned smart luck", really.  Both Morison and Prange credit one of
>Spruance's staff by name for calculating the likely return time of the
>Japanese planes and urging that a counter-strike be launched even though
>at extreme range to catch them during turn-around.  Moreover, if I
>recall correctly, Prange implies that trying to catch enemy carriers
>during this most vulnerable time was something that had been studied
>before the war and was accepted tactical doctrine.  Can anybody elaborate
>on this?
>
I can.  The man's name was Miles Browning.  I thing he was Spruance's Chief
of Staff.  He was later captain of a carrier and was sacked by Jocko
Clarke.  He spent some time in a mental institution I believe, and may have
committed suicide, at any rate it is easy to find some more info on him.
He is always described as brilliant but unstable.  In the biography of
Spruance, Spruance denies that the timing of the strike was meant to catch
the planes refueling and rearming.  Also, there was a delay in the Japanese
changing from torpedoes to bombs.  This delay would never have happened if
there had not been a need for a second attack on Midway.

>Good luck usually favors those who anticipate potential opportunities and
>are positioned to take advantage of them when they pan out.  If there was
>an unanticipated bit of good luck that day, it was the silver lining to
>the obliteration of the torpedo squadrons:  having the Japanese CAP down
>at sea-level when the dive bombers arrived overhead.

Finding the carriers in the first place invloved a lot of luck.  This is
from memory, which I should never trust.  I believe Hornet's planes never
found the carriers.  One flight of the dive bombers continued on after they
should have turned back.  Then, acting on a hunch, headed in a direction
contrary to where the carriers were expected.  Then they spotted a Japanese
destroyer that had stopped to depth charge Nautilis which attacked the
carriers.  Deciding that the destroyer was heading for the main fleet they
headed on its bearing and found the main fleet.

In my first post I agreed that some very good decisions were made.  I just
think that we were extremely lucky.

John Riegsecker                                 (206) 756-3566
Dept of Math and Computer Science               [email-masked]
University of Puget Sound

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 17:01:55 -0400
From:    "John E. Kollar" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO:  The "Big" what-if?

Yeah, they had many troubles with their magnetic-influence warhead, but
the contact fused torps worked much better, while an entire class
of American torpedoes wouldn't work no matter what trigger you used.

Part of my what-if is that if the >Germans had concentrated on improving
their shipyards to build all of the subs, then what would have been
the results, not how likely it would have been.

John E. Kollar

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 17:03:03 -0400
From:    "John E. Kollar" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: B-26

It was the A-26, was renamed because it was now a bomber, not an
attack plane.

John E. Kollar

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 17:12:10 EST
From:    "CARL WERNKE (TCWERNC@VCCSCENT)" <[email-masked]>
Subject: TRIV : Helmet straps

 To: Multiple recipients of list WWII-L([email-masked])

 Joe Barone wrote at Wed, 19 Oct 1994 14:11:10 -0400
 > While not the best source for primary information...

 My tour in the United States Navy was from June 1942 through August 1976,
 when I retired off the USS Forrestal (CV-59). During this period, I was
 assigned on board many ships; many years of sea duty compared with three
 tours of shore duty, of which the US Naval Academy was the most rewarding and
 challenging.

 All US Navy combatant ships had, or has, a S.O.P which states that during
 General Quarters (GQ), *ALL* personnel will wear the helmet with the strap
 secured snug just under the chin. When secured from GQ, the helmet(s) were
 stored in a helmet rack or locker.

 Save Our Heads---S.O.H. :-)
 Save Our Ship----S.O.S. :-))

 Continue the excellent work, Joe !

 Carl Wernke
 [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 17:15:26 -0400
From:    "John E. Kollar" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: QUES: troopships

The reason that the QE II and several other large liners were used as
troopships and not escorted was that their speed of advance, 17 knots
and up, prohibited U-boats from being able to target them effectively,
basically they could outrun all the U-boats, and didn't need escorts

who would just slow them down and add to the likelyhood of their
being detected.  They suffered no losses during the entire war, they
were operated in this service almost from the word 'go'

John E. kollar

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 17:42:36 -0400
From:    "John E. Kollar" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP:V2

They would do less damage than a scud becuase the warhead was buried
underground before it was detonated, killing alot of durt, but

destroying any buildings in a short radius, I will check my
books at home and should hopefully get back to you tomorrow.

John E. Kollar

p.s. my thesis about WWI proved to cumbersome so it has shelved for

the present time, my new idea is one on the history of ASW in the
us armed forces, I'm now looking at info to, and we have a good

couple of sources in the library here, don't worry I'll post when I run
out of sources.  Sorry for the extra spaces but the keyboard I am using
is seriously whacked.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 17:13:39 -0400
From:    Douglass Green <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RIP Martha Raye

I remember Martha Ray visiting our unit in VN. We appreciated her big time.
Sorry to see her go.

--
Doug Green
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 19:27:55 PDT
From:    "Russell A. Verbofsky" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RIP Martha Raye

Don't forget about that the Green Berets made her an honorally Green Beret.

-------------------------------------
Name: Russell A. Verbofsky
E-mail: pp000679
Date: 09/03/94
Time: 11:10:42

Do on to others before they do on to you.
-------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 21 Oct 1994 01:51:01 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP:V2

On Thu, 20 Oct 1994, Stephen Baldwin wrote:

> 1. V2s could obliterate what size of area? (i.e. if one was dropped in a
> residential area, how many square feet/metres of ground would be affected
> by the blast?)

The warhead of the V-2 was in the nose. It was 910kg of Amatol explosive,
behind 7.5mm thick steel plate, with a detonator in the extreme nose.
Amatol was selected because it could survive the 600C heat of atmospheric
re-entry. The damage done is described as 'similar to that of the V-1',
which doesn't help that much, does it? Probably someone on the list can
estimate the blast of such a load of explosives. But my understanding is
that the effects of such an explosion would depend *strongly* on local
conditions.

> 2. Had the V2 been available say, a year earlier, would it have made a
> significant difference to the outcome of the war?

The answers on a "what-if" question are usually very random. You never
will know what the people would have decided in 1943.

There is some doubt that the V-2 was an useful weapon at all. Yes, the V-2
was impossible to stop, had a deadly effect on anything it hit, and it's
launchers were fully mobile. It was also expensive, required a large
number of man-hours to produce, and used liquid gases as fuel. Its warhead
was not more effective as that of the V-1 --- which could be built with a
fraction of the effort --- but it had a slightly larger range. Accuracy
was very poor for both missiles.

On the other hand, if the V-offensive had started in 1943, there would
have been very little that could be done about it. In June 1944, the
Allied armies were already beginning to roll up the launching sites ---
that would have been impossible in 1943. Also, in June 1944 the newest
fighters were just able to catch the V-1, and soon the proximity fuse
greatly improved the effectiveness of the AAA. In 1943 the only answer
would have been to attack either the launch sites or the factories. I
guesstimate that this would have produced only minimal results, because
the former were mobile and the latter underground. A continued attack
would have had serious effects on the morale, could have forced the
evacuation of London, or might even have disrupted the preparations for
'Overlord'.

>From there, it is all an open question. The allied main offensive might
have been Churchill's route through Northern Italy... The US might have
turned to the Pacific first, waiting for the A-bomb to deal with
Hitler... Or the US could have been the target for the A-4/V-2's big
brother, the two-stage, intercontinental A-10.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 20 Oct 1994 20:50:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 21 OCT 44

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
FRIDAY, 21 OCTOBER 1944
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  C-47, Douglas Skytrain
  L-5, Stinson Sentinel
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-39, Bell Airacobra
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN: The 1st Composite Squadron, AAF Composite Force 8012,
begins a movement from Ascension Island to the US.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA (CBI) THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 15 P-47s damage at least 3 bridges
throughout the railroad corridor in N Burma; 15 other P-47s support ground
forces in the Mohnyin area, hitting gun positions and defensive works at
Ywathit; 12 others attack positions and occupied areas around Bhamo and Muse,
6 knock out the Paungni River bridge, and 4 attack the town of Mawhun; about
270 sorties are flown by Tenth AF transports in the CBI. The detachments of
the 5th and 6th Fighter Squadrons (Commando), 1st Air Commando Group,
operating from Cox's Bazar, India with P-47s, return to base at Asansol,
India.

  CHINA (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 3 B-25s and 130+ P-40s and P-51s
attack shipping, gun positions, troop areas, bridges, town areas, road
traffic, and other targets of opportunity around Yuma, Takhing, Dosing,
Konghow, Shawan, Kuanyang, Kweiping, Tungpingchi, Tingka, Muse, Wan Lai-Kam,
Shekpo, Menghsu, and Amoy; the 530th Fighter Squadron, 311th Fighter Group,
moves from Dinjan, India to Kwanghan with P-51s.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): Bad weather grounds the bombers.
Fighters fly armed reconnaissance and attack railroads in W Germany and
support elements of the US Third and Seventh Armies in E France and W
Germany. In the Netherlands, the 125th Liaison Squadron, Ninth Air Force
(attached to Ninth Army), moves from Arlon, Belgium to Maastricht with L-5s.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): In Hungary, 104 B-24s with
fighter escort attack marshalling yards at Gyor and Szombathely; almost 100
P-38s and P-51s strafe Szombathely and Seregelyes Airfields and rail lines
between Sajoszentpeter to Ipolyszog.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): B-26s, in the day's only medium
bomber mission in Italy, attack Nervesa della Battaglia railroad bridge and
causeway; fighters and fighter-bombers operate in close support of US Fifth
Army forces S of Bologna and fighter-bombers also hit communications in N
Italy as far N as Verona and as far W as Turin; during the night of 20/21 Oct
A-20s bomb targets of opportunity during intruder missions N of battle area.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 28 B-24s from Saipan Island bomb Iwo Jima
Island. 2 B-24s, in the first US air strike from Guam Island, Mariana
Islands, hit Yap Island. The 26th, 98th and 431st Bombardment Squadrons
(Heavy), 11th Bombardment Group (Heavy), arrive on Guam Island from Kwajalein
Atoll with B-24s.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s bomb Cagayan
in the Philippine Islands and Parepare on Celebes Island. B-25s and fighter-
bombers hit Misami Island, New Guinea and blast a truck convoy near Kibawe on
Mindanao Island.  Other fighter-bombers hit Kaoe Bay supply areas on
Halmahera Island; fighter-bombers hit Boela Airfield on Ceram Island and the
Amboina town area on Ambon Island. In New Guinea, Mongosah and Sagan
Airfields are also bombed; the ground echelon of the 17th Reconnaissance
Squadron (Bombardment), 71st Tactical Reconnaissance Group, begins a movement
from Biak Island to Leyte Island (air echelon operations from Biak Island
with B-25s until Dec 44); the 64th Troop Carrier Squadron, 403d Troop Carrier
Group, based on Biak Island ceases operating from Wakde Island with C-47s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

21/0052Z OCT

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 19 Oct 1994 to 20 Oct 1994
*************************************************