Subject: WWII-L Digest - 22 Oct 1994 to 23 Oct 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 1994 00:01:34 -0400

There are 16 messages totalling 699 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. INF: USN Chronology 10-22-94
  2. WEAP: CVE-100 USS Bougainville
  3. GEN: RE BORIS RAYMOND
  4. INF: 50 Years Ago - 24-OCT-1944
  5. HIST: von Braun and the SS
  6. QUES: troopships (2)
  7. QUES: Troopships (3)
  8. Martha Raye
  9. HYPO: The "Big" what-if?
 10. USS BOGUE (CVHE-9, ex-CVE-9
 11. [INF] USAAF 24 OCT 44
 12. Churchill's bad decisions (from Economic Causes of the
 13. INF: USN Chronology 10-23-94

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 22 Oct 1994 04:00:12 PDT
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 10-22-94

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1944
10/22 Sun.  Japanese naval vessel sunk:
             Auxiliary submarine chaser NO. 5, by carrier-based
              aircraft, Leyte area, P. I.,
              12 d. 55'N., 121 d. 35'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 03:16:35 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP: CVE-100 USS Bougainville

From: Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, Vol. I, 1964, Navy
Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History
Division, Washington, D.C.

BOUGAINVILLE (CVE-100)

dp. 7800;
l. 512' 3";
b. 108' 1";
dr. 22' 4";
s. 19.3 k.;
cpl. 860;
a. 1 5";
cl. CASABLANCA

BOUGAINVILLE (CVE-100) was launched 16 May 1944 by Kaiser Co., Inc.,
Vancouver, Wash., under a Maritime Commission contract; sponsored by
Mrs. Sally A. Montfort, wife of Captain Montfort; acquired 18 June 1944;
and commissioned the same day, Captain C. A. Bond in command.

On 25 July 1944 BOUGAINVILLE departed San Diego and steamed to Pearl
Harbor where on 1 August she reported to Commander, Carrier Transport
Squadron, Pacific Fleet.  During the remainder of 1944 she transported
aircraft to the Marshall, Admiralty and Marianas Islands.  Returning to
San Diego 22 December, she underwent a brief period of availability
until 7 January 1945.

On 8 February 1945 BOUGAINVILLE reported to Commander, Service Squadron
6, at Eniwetok and for the next six months provided underway
replenishment throughout the Western Pacific to the various Task Groups
of TF's 58 and 38.  She rendezvoused with these groups at sea and
delivered planes, replacement pilots, and aircraft crews to the large
fleet carriers.  During February and March 1945 she carried out
replenishment operations with TG 50.8 during the Iwo Jima operation.
Until June she provided vital logistic support to the units of the 5th
and 3rd Fleets engaged in raids in support of the Okinawa operation.

In August, after a brief period of availability at San Diego,
BOUGAINVILLE returned to Pearl Harbor.  During the remainder of the
month she transported aircraft between Pearl Harbor and the Marshall and
Marianas Islands.

In September she steamed to Okinawa where she remained until getting
underway 6 October 1945 to deliver planes and occupation personnel to
several Chinese ports.  Returning to Okinawa on the 19th, she departed
the following day for San Diego.  At San Diego she underwent a brief
yard period until 28 November and then made her final voyage to Pearl
Harbor and Eniwetok.  She returned to San Diego 12 January 1946 and
reported to the 19th Fleet for inactivation.  She sailed from San Diego
19 January enroute to Port Angeles, Wash., and then to Tacoma.
BOUGAINVILLE was placed out of commission in reserve there 3 November
1946.  She was reclassified CVU-100 on 16 June 1955.

BOUGAINVILLE received two battle stars for her World War II service.

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 10:18:17 +0200
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: GEN: RE BORIS RAYMOND

  FOR BORIS RAYMOND
  Even though you were with the regiment that escaped, I still feel sure you
have a story to tell.  Couldn't you share with us what you experienced and saw?
  I will reply to the other parts of your message in a private message.
  Regards, John Ausland/Oslo Norway

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 06:48:25 -0700
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 24-OCT-1944

On 24-OCT-1944, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - The Canadian 2nd Division begins to advance along the
Beveland Isthmus. The offensive of the British XII Corps penetrates to 's
Hertogenbosch.  In the US 7th Army sector, the 3rd Division steps up its
attack along the road to St Die.

Eastern Front - In Rumania, Russian forces complete the occupation of the
whole of Transylvania.

Italian Front - The South African 6th Armoured Division captures the Passo
del Termine. The British 6th Armoured Division reaches Monte Orsaro. In the
British 8th Army sector, the 10th Indian Division advances towards the river
Ronco.

Greece - British troops enter Lamia.

Philippines - A small force from the 1st Cavalry Division crosses the San
Juanico Strait from Tacloban to land on Samar. Other units from the division
advance along the south side of the Strait to Guintiguian.

Battle of Leyte Gulf - Japanese aircraft based on Luzon attack Task Group
38.3, fatally damaging the carrier Princeton. Kurita's Center Force, now in
the Sibuyan Sea, is attacked throughout the day by aircraft from the three
US carrier groups. The battleship Musashi sinks in the early afternoon.
Kurita turns away because of the weight of the attacks. During the evening
Kurita again reverses course. The Japanese Southern Force is also sighted
but receives negligible damage from the resulting ir attacks. Ozawa's
carriers locate TG 38.3 and send the majority of their aircraft to attack.
They do not find their targets and are forced to land on Luzon. Ozawa has
only 25 planes left after this occurs. Late in the day Halsey orders his
carriers and battleships to assemble in preparation to move to attack Ozawa
believing that Kurita has withdrawn.

The Homefront
-------------
Blue Network Asks Name Change - The Blue network has filed an application with
the FCC to change its name to the American Broadcasting Co.

=============================================================================

Sources: "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi, "The
World Almanac Book Of WW II" by Peter Young, "Facts On File Yearbook 1944,
Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L. Lapica.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.netcom.com in directory /pub/jbd and can
be accessed via the WWW by URL: ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/jbd/ww2.html. If you
have difficulty accessing the Netcom FTP server, please keep trying because it
stays very busy.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis     [email-masked]
Cary, N.C.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 13:21:45 -0400
From:    Warren Thompson <[email-masked]>
Subject: HIST: von Braun and the SS

To Terry et al.: My source for vB's SS memeber ship is,

        Linda Hunt. SECRET AGENDA: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT,
                NAZI SCIENTISTS, AND PROJECT PAPERCLIP, 1945 to 1990
                [St Martin's, 1991].

Short quotation follows:

Just two weeks before the moon landing, von Braun confessed in a latter to an
Army general that he had been a member of the SS. The letter to retired Major
General Julius Klein discussed columnist Drew Pearson, who had revealed von
Braun's SS membership decades earlier. It was written on von Braun's official
stationery as director of Marshall [Space Flight Center] and was marked
"Personal and Sensitive."

        "It's true that I was a member of Hitler's elite SS. The columnist was
correct," von Braun wrote to Klein. Then he admonished: "I would appreciate it
if you would keep the information to yourself as any publicity would harm my
work with NASA" [p.226].

See also the following paragraph for info on vB's involvement with
Dora/Mittelwerk.

-- Warren Thompson

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 12:39:50 -0500
From:    "Danny G. Cox" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: QUES: troopships

+==================================+
|   DAN COX                        |
|   REPUBLIC, MO                   |
|   [email-masked]   |
+==================================+

On Sat, 22 Oct 1994, SYSTEM 0PERATOR wrote:

> "John E. Kollar" <[email-masked]> writes:
>
> > The reason that the QE II and several other large liners were used as
> > troopships and not escorted was that their speed of advance, 17 knots
> > and up, prohibited U-boats from being able to target them effectively,
> > basically they could outrun all the U-boats, and didn't need escorts
>
> Obviously the British did not fear the "frontal" attack, where a submarine
> waits for his prey ahead of its course, as opposed to chasing it. My "Silent
> Service" computer game must be unrealistic :-)

I also had wondered about this. Maybe they were counting on the odds of a
U-boat being front of them as unlikely, and they were surely running some kind
of zig-zag course. The range of the sonar at the time would have put the subs
in a position mostly of having to catch up to the ships, then circle
around in front to get on station for an attack.  For a WW-II boat to do that
they would about have to surface and run at flank speed.  You just
couldn't do it submerged.  At that speed batteries wouldn't last but
about 1/2 Hr., and as I understand it using a snorkel (on the old WW-II
diesel powered boats) running real fast, the air inside the sub became
*very* bad, making a several hour chase not practical.

> > who would just slow them down and add to the likelyhood of their
> > being detected.
>
> Didn't most destroyers run at 30 knots or more ?

Yes

> One thing I would suggest maybe is that were escorts added, they would have
> to run fast, and would not have been able to use their sonar effectively,
> due to their own noise.
> Does this sound reasonable ?

I don't know about WW-II gear I never used any.  I was however a sonerman
from 55-59 and the equipment we had then worked good at 18 knots.
Whenever we would have speed trials (go all out at flank speed and see
what you could do) by the time you were at 30 knots sonar had deteriorated
badly.

Any submariners out there with the answer?

PS: Your computer game is probable set up for a nuclear boat which doesn't
require air to run the powerplant.

Dan

> Arnaud.

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 10:50:50 -0700
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: QUES: Troopships

>Sender:       World War II Discussion List <[email-masked]>
>From:         "Danny G. Cox" <[email-masked]>
>Subject:      Re: QUES: troopships
>To:           Multiple recipients of list WWII-L <[email-masked]>

>> > who would just slow them down and add to the likelyhood of their
>> > being detected.
>>
>> Didn't most destroyers run at 30 knots or more ?
>
>Yes

For how long?  All the way across the Atlantic?

John Riegsecker
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of Puget Sound

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 15:08:16 EDT
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: QUES: troopships

Sonar was one problem for escorts running at 30 knots; two others were
fuel consumption at these speeds- many vessels probably couldn't have
completed an Atlantic crossing at this rate- and general wear on the
vessel in North Atlantic conditions.

The odds on being in position for a frontal attack on a single vessel
sailing at 22 knots+ under blackout conditions would, I think, be very
slim, especially if the ship were off expected routes and the attackers
did not have radar. Then too, during the period in which the Queens made        most of their runs, the allies knew the location of most U-boats through
Ultra.

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 14:35:34 -0500
From:    "Danny G. Cox" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: QUES: Troopships

+==================================+
|   DAN COX                        |
|   REPUBLIC, MO                   |
|   [email-masked]   |
+==================================+

On Sun, 23 Oct 1994, John Riegsecker wrote:

> >> Didn't most destroyers run at 30 knots or more ?
> >
> >Yes

John,

  I think both the question and my reply were misleading.  30 knots is
close to a destroyers top speed.  They can hit that ok for a time,but all
the way across the Alantic, I doubt it.  Somthing would break down even if
you refueled at sea.  They can easily cruise above 18 knots tho, which was the
speed posted for the troop ships, at least the one I was stationed aboard
could.

  Sorry for the confusion.  In looking at it like you did it does seem
kind of dumb. :-)

Dan

> For how long?  All the way across the Atlantic>
> John Riegsecker
> Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
> University of Puget Sound
>
> [email-masked]
>

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 14:52:50 -0500
From:    Cheryl Kaye Bryant <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Martha Raye

On Sat, 22 Oct 1994, mc killop wrote:

> Someone reported that Martha Raye was made an honorary Green Beret in the
> past.  I was watching the new tonights and they had a story about Martha
> Raye being buried at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina with six Green Berets as
> pall bearers.  I think she would have like that.
>

Jack
She not only would have liked it, but the honorary Lt. Colonel of the
Green Beret requesested it.  I am glad they chose to honor the request.

C.K. Bryant
*******************************************************************
"The Riskier the road, the greater the profit."    / C.K. Bryant
        The 62nd Rule of Acquisition               / W.I.U. English
*******************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 18:47:43 EDT
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO: The "Big" what-if?

To Greg and William,

Sorry about the delay in this response, but I've been busy elsewhere.

First, Gregg. If I remember correctly, all the AA missile developments
were wartime responses to the situation that existed because Britain
did *not* fall. Even if R&D were kept up, Germany would have had
tremendous energy and expense tied up in subjugating and integrating
her conquests. In addition, I don't believe Russia would ever have
surrendered- a cold war, with Russians quietly financed and equipped
by Washington, was a more likely outcome. The cost of this war,
directed against an opponent with no strategic air arm, and the overall
economic cost of the peace, combined with the "isolation" of America and
the general belief of all armed forces that what has just worked is
sufficient would have directed German focus to Russia and given air defense     improvement a relatively low priority. In addition, the Americans and           British evacuues would have been well ahead of the Germans in electronics.      Chaff was unknown to the Germans until 1943, when it was a major surprise       at Hamburg. It might still have been unknown in 1948. Two of each group         of B-36s carried one bomb and one bay of chaff dispensers each; the third       carried electronic jammers. No need for P-80s- the Americans couldn't fly       that night. Every station in Germany could have told you that Spitzbergen       radar showed a massive front suddenly developing. There was a heavy storm       moving in.

William raises the question of why would we fight Germany. By the mid-1940s
I think a combination of circumstances would have shown Germany's long-term
hostile intentions toward the US. Naziism was an expansive ideology,
and the Germans were already making inroads in Latin America (if Americans
in 1940 were largely isolationist, they also believed in the Monroe
Doctrine- consider the defense program Congress passed in the two
months after France fell, a year and a half *before* Pearl Harbor).
Given another half dozen years of infiltration, both here and abroad,
and with the kind of atrocity stories that would have been coming out
of Europe (what percentage of the American public traced its roots back to
Britain plus the dominated Europe of 1942?) I think by 1948 most Americans      would have considered Hitler unfinished business. As for a German A-bomb,
that kind of R&D would also have been back-burnered, if it existed at all.
Nazi and Wehrmacht leadership simply did not think in the long term- their
strategic intelligence was lousy and their assumptions of superiority led       them to believe that they could always win short, pre-planned campaigns.
American decadence would allow them to choose the time, place, and terms
of that engagement as well.

I partly agree with you about the fallacy of the "what-if," although I think
the real problem is mistaken initial assumptions. My whole note was intended    less as an argument than as a response to the on-going list debate on the       possibility of German victory in Russia and then world-wide. It was an
attempt (maybe overdramatized) to call people back to first principles:
there was no way Germany wins WWII given American potential. I could have
made a similar case for Russia, but that would have been more complex,
and taken a lot more bandwidth. As I'm pushing proper limits on that now,
I'll close by saying that despite this, I think "what-if"s are good
thought experiments, and useful for training anyone who might have to do
policy planning. And for anyone who has followed me through this far,
I'll pose a few small questions: was the Wehrmacht luckier than it was good?
Were its victories more the result of its opponent's weaknesses than its
own strengths? Did it ever beat a truely first rate opponent?

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 18:59:49 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: QUES: Troopships

Part of the answer about whether destroyers could steam fast enough and long
enough to potentially escort big liners used as troopships might be moot in
view of the fact that full-size fleet destroyers were very seldom used as
escorts for North Atlantic convoys.  The true destroyers of over 1,200 tons
spent most of the war operating directly with other elements of the combat
fleets -- e.g., cooperating with battleships, cruisers, carrier units, etc.
Most of the Atlantic escorts, RN, USN, or Canadian, were (at least from what
I've read) tended to be smaller craft, such as the American DE's, British
"Hunt" class destroyers (essentially the RN's equivalent of the DE), the
ubiquitous "Flower"-class frigates, and sloops, all of which were significantly
slower than US or British fleet destroyers (the latter virtually all made
30 knots-- or in most cases better-- while most of the smaller escort craft
mentioned were in the 20-22 knot range, with less capacity to keep up in
heavy seas.  One of the problems with the "Flower"-class corvettes was that
a surfaced Type VII or IX U-boat could out-run them).  When you throw into the
equation the low ratio of escorts to transport ships in the average North
Atlantic convoys, particularly early in the war, its easy to see why the Allies
were reluctant to shackle such fast ships to slower, not particularly well-
protected convoys.  I suppose that special one-ship convoys escorted by fleet
destroyers could have been organized around the Queen Mary's and other liners
serving as troopships, but this would have been a very expensive proposition
in terms of commitment of ships away from their prime mission (and also in
wear and tear on the destroyers so committed) for extended periods of time
(especially counting the increased demands for maintenance, repair, and refit).
All in all, the best argument for handling the situation exactly in the manner
it was handled was the lack of losses by such huge but fast targets sailing
independently-- success is a pretty good argument.  When you consider the
relative speeds of the liners in question compared to that of even a surfaced
U-boat, plus such factors as the difficulty of interception of single fast shipssailing off the normal routes (as previously posted), the Allied "Enigma"
intercepts, etc-- odds were that even if a U-boat by calculation or chance
managed to intercept one of these liners it would still have a damn hard time
gaining position for an effective attack.

Thanks for allowing me to ramble a bit.

Regards

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 19:57:19 EDT
From:    SKIP WILDER <[email-masked]>
Subject: USS BOGUE (CVHE-9, ex-CVE-9

BOGUE was scrapped in Japan, November, 1960, according to Silverstone, _U.
S. Warships of World War II_.

------------------------------------------------------------
|    Skip Wilder               |                           |
|    [email-masked]       |"The road to hell is paved |
|    FAX (703)528-2103         | with good intentions."    |
|    McLean, Virginia, U.S.A.  |                           |
------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 21:21:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 24 OCT 44

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
TUESDAY, 24 OCTOBER 1944
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  UC-78, Cessna Bobcat
  L-4, Piper Cub/Grasshopper
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): On Paramushiru Island in the Kurile Islands, 3
B-24s bomb Kashiwabara and Kurabu Cape; 4 B-25s weather-abort a photo mission
to the island; 2 others on a shipping sweep off Kurabu hit a freighter, which
is observed listing and smoking, and strafe 2 subchasers.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA (CBI) THEATER OF OPERATIONS: The CBI Theater is split into
2 theaters, China and India-Burma.

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): About 80 P-40s, P-51s, and P-38s on
armed reconnaissance over SE China, SW China, and E Burma hit runways,
storage facilities, town areas, troops, horses, gun positions, and other
targets of opportunity around Amoy, Lohochai, Tanchuk, Sinthe, Menghsu,
Pingnam, Mangshih and Chefang, and Lashio, Burma. HQ Fourteenth AF is
reassigned from US Army Forces, CBI Theater to US Forces, China Theater.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma from 24 Oct through 27 Oct,
fighter-bombers and B-25s steadily support Allied troops on the N Burma
front, pounding road and rail communications, troop concentrations and supply
dumps, and sweeping airfields; the strikes include close support of British
troops advancing on the right flank of the front known as the "Rail
Corridor," and of Chinese forces pushing down the left flank along the
Myitkyina-Bhamo road.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): By this date, all Pathfinder
aircraft of the 482d Bombardment Group (Pathfinder), engaged in H2X and other
radar training at RAF Alconbury, have been dispersed to bombardment groups
within the bombardment division, which set up their own H2X training.
  In Germany, 415 P-47s and P-51s are dispatched to attack aircraft and
ground targets in the Hannover-Kassel area; 73 bomb flak positions at Elburg,
a factory near Nienburg, and miscellaneous ground targets; bad weather causes
other fighter-bombers to jettison bombs in the English Channel and Zuider
Zee; the fighter-bombers strafe transportation and other ground targets with
good results.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In France, bad weather cancels all
operations except fighter patrols by the IX and XXIX Tactical Air Commands
over W Germany; the fighters attack rail targets. In Belgium, the 153d
Liaison Squadron, IX Tactical Air Command (attached to First Army), moves
from Verviers to Spa with L-5s; the 410th and 411th Fighter Squadrons, 373d
Fighter Group, moves from Reims, France to Le Culot with P-47s.

  US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE (USSTAF): The 173d Liaison Squadron,
USSTAF, is activated at Orly Airport, Paris with L-4s and UC-78s.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Weather cancels all offensive
operations.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, weather grounds the
medium bombers; 300+ XXII Tactical Air Command fighters and fighter-bombers
attack targets in support of the US Fifth Army S of Bologna and hit
communications and shipping in the Turin-Genoa and E Po Valley areas,
destroying 14 locomotives and 100+ railroad cars; during the night of 23/24
Oct A-20s attack targets of opportunity in the Po Valley.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): Guam Island-based B-24s bomb Yap Island while
Saipan Island-based P-47s hit Pagan Island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s bomb Buayoan
Airfield on Mindanao Island while B-25s on armed reconnaissance hit small
shipping and troops. B-24s, B-25s, and fighter-bombers hit the Sandakan,
Borneo area. P-38s bomb Amboina, Ambon Island reservoir areas. In New
Guinea, A-20s and fighter-bombers again pound Babo, Moemi, Sagan, Manokwari,
Otawiri, and other Vogelkop Peninsula area targets. The following units
move from New Guinea to Leyte Island: HQ 85th Fighter Wing from Hollandia;
HQ 49th Fighter Group and the 7th and 9th Fighter Squadrons from Biak Island
to Tacloban with P-38s. The 72d Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 5th
Bombardment Group (Heavy), moves from Noemfoor Island, New Guinea to
Morotai Island with B-24s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

24/0124Z OCT

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 24 Oct 1994 02:34:10 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Churchill's bad decisions (from Economic Causes of the

On Fri, 21 Oct 1994, William Lippert wrote:

>    The Germans, on the other hand,viewed the war as a regretable incident
> and not at all something to be pleased about.  When the soldiers marched
> off to Poland and Hitler staged a huge parade right before the invasion,
> the streets of Berlin were noticeably empty.  When the bombing of Berlin
> started during the Battle of Britain, the British were only able to throw
> small numbers (less than 50) of bombers at Berlin.  But the air raids
> were large enough to require the population to go to the air raid shelter
> between 7PM and 2AM local time - generally disrupting their sleep.  This
> didn't help productivity to be sure - nor did it make them particularly
> happy.

You are basically correct about the Germans being initially indifferent
about the war (that changed after the initial victories), but remember
that Berlin was a-typical.  The citizens of Berlin were never very
supportive of Hitler and his war.  Before the Nazi's took power, Berlin
was more or less the center of West-European communism. It was a 'red'
city and Goebbel's efforts to change that didn't help much. It was also a
center of 'modern' culture, with intellectuals that did not do much good
in Hitler's eyes.  The Berliners were probably too world-wise to be fooled
by Hitler; they were also known for their irony --- or more correct:
sarcastic humor. The real base of Nazi political power was south Germany,
then a more rural, poorer part of the country.

Before WWII, it was widely believed that bombardments would easily break
civilian morale. I think that the experience from WWII shows that, as long
as people feel that they can do something --- maybe not shoot back
directly, or extinguish fires, or just survive it --- the threat will
actually unite them against the common enemy. Of course the reactions of
bombed people will vary; of course they won't get too much sleep, they
will mourn for their death, they will lose their homes, and so on. But
social and political differences are pushed mostly (not always entirely)
aside. Their hate was concentrated on the attackers (with some help of the
propaganda). Things can work out quite strange; you would expect that the
inhabitants of bombed cities would hate Goering as being partly
responsible for their fate, but it seems that he was popular, and
well-received if he visited them.  In general, the people would stoically
endure it; to the amazement of front soldiers on leave, and certainly very
much to the surprise of some Nazi leaders.  Goebbels at one time (I think
after visiting the burned-down remains of Hamburg) claimed that when the
bombing went on like this, the people would rise up against their
government. But they didn't.

BTW, the V-1 and V-2 attacks were an exception, probably because the
British people were tired of the war, and because of the a-personal nature
of the weapon. They had a very adverse effect on the morale.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 23 Oct 1994 04:00:12 PDT
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 10-23-94

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1944
10/23 Mon. Battle for Leyte Gulf (13-16 October) opens as United
           States submarines off Palawan Island sight and attack
           the Center Force of three Japanese naval groups
           moving on Leyte in a major effort to drive United
           States forces from the Philippines. Two enemy
           cruisers are sunk.
           Submarine NAUTILUS (SS-168) lands men and supplies on
           east coast of Luzon, P. I. (Operation continues on 24
           and 25 October)
            Japanese naval vessels sunk, off Palawan, P. I.:
             Heavy cruiser MAYA, by submarine DACE (SS-247),
              09 d. 11'N., 117 d. 07'E.
             Heavy cruiser ATAGO, by submarine DARTER (SS-227),
              09 d. 28'N., 117 d. 17'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 22 Oct 1994 to 23 Oct 1994
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