Subject: WWII-L Digest - 29 Oct 1994 to 30 Oct 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 1994 00:00:15 -0500

There are 18 messages totalling 832 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. PEARL HARBOR
  2. WEAP: Sonar (2)
  3. INF: USN Chronology 10-30-94
  4. INF: 50 Years Ago - 31-OCT-1944
  5. INF: 50 Years Ago Archives
  6. HIST: Oral History
  7. WEAP:  CVE-71  USS Kitkun Bay
  8. Rumanian Paratroops
  9. Moscow study trip(s) update
 10. Old 59
 11. Hisler successor
 12. GEN: PEARL HARBOR
 13. HYPO: The "Big" what- (3)
 14. ME163
 15. [INF] USAAF 31 OCT 44

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 00:06:24 -0400
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: PEARL HARBOR

Bravo Zulu, Jim. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 00:03:40 -0500
From:    "Danny G. Cox" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Sonar

Tim, as no one else has replied to your questions, I'll try.  Wish there
had been a WW-II Sonarman on the list who could give us some answers from
1st hand experience.  Guess there just isn't that many around anymore,
unfortunately.

See message below.

+==============================+=============================================+
| DAN COX                      | "I have made this letter longer than usual, |
| REPUBLIC, MO                 | only because I have not had the time to     |
| [email-masked] | make it shorter."--Blaise Pascal            |
+==============================+=============================================+

On Mon, 24 Oct 1994, Tim J. Watts wrote:

> Recent messages about whether escorts were necessary for large luxury
> liners brought up some questions in my mind; hopefully someone on the
> list will have some answers.
>
> I think I remember reading somewhere that WW II sonar sets were not
> much good if the ship was traveling more than about 8-10 knots.  The
> water traveling past the sonar dome would cause too much interference
> above that speed.  Does anyone know if that was true or can you confirm
> it?

In the early stages of our entry in the war the sonar transducer
(antenna) was mounted on the bottom of the hull, and immersed in the sea
water.  As the ship moved along the water would flow against, and around
the transducer.  This produced a water noise in the sonar equipment which
the sonar operator would have to try to hear over.  Of course the faster
the speed of the ship the louder the water noise.  This would reach a
point where the equipment would no longer be useful.  Now I don't know
at what speed this occurred, but I feel it might have been under 8 Knots.

After a time a housing was devised which would cover the transducer, sort
of like a small tank turret.  This is the sonar dome you refer to
above.  This preventer the water from flowing directly against the
transducer, and would flow around the dome easer than it did the transducer,
ergo less water noise.  Modifications to these domes were being
made pretty much an a continuing bases throughout the war till a tear drop
shape was settled on.

Once again I don't know for sure, but I think the 8-10 Knots you cited
might be too slow for the equipment being used at the end of the war.

Take this for what you think it's worth. I don't have any references to
cite.  I taking this from memory.  I did use some WW-II gear once for 2
weeks in Sonar School, but it was in an attack trainer, not at sea.

Will try to answer your other questions later.

Dan

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 00:20:58 -0500
From:    "Danny G. Cox" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Sonar

Don't know where you read it but you're absolutely correct.  This was one
of, if not the primary factor prompting the Germans to develop the
snorkel.

Dan

+==============================+=============================================+
| DAN COX                      | "I have made this letter longer than usual, |
| REPUBLIC, MO                 | only because I have not had the time to     |
| [email-masked] | make it shorter."--Blaise Pascal            |
+==============================+=============================================+

On Fri, 28 Oct 1994, Robert Hohlt wrote:

> Tim J. Watts Mon, 24 Oct 1994 wrote:
>
> >
> >     --- Stuff Deleated ---
> >
> Where have I read that the U-Boats really started to get hammered
> when the allies started using a new and much improved surface radar?
>
> This 'improved' surface radar enabled hunter-killer groups to locate
> surfaced submarines at a much greater distance than before.
>
> Or was this in the Pacific?
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Robert Hohlt, Jr.
>

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 04:00:17 PDT
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 10-30-94

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1944
10/30 Mon.  United States naval vessels damaged, Leyte area, P.
            I.:
             Carrier  FRANKLIN (CV-13), by suicide plane,
              10 d. 20'N., 126 d. 40'E.
             Light carrier BELLEAU WOOD (CVL-24), by suicide
              plant
              10 d. 20'N., 126 d. 40'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 04:08:40 -0800
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 31-OCT-1944

On 31-OCT-1944, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - Amphibious assault units of the Canadian II Corps prepare to
land on the island of Walcheren. Units of the British XII Corps overcome
German resistance in the Raamsdonk sector.

Denmark - The Gestapo Headquarters in Aarhus is destroyed by the RAF in a
precision bombing attack designed to aid the resistance forces by wiping out
many of the Gestapo records.

Eastern Front - The 2nd Ukraine Front steps ups its offensive and enters
Kecskemet in Hungary.

Italian Front - The 10th Indian Division is advancing swiftly towards the
river Rabbi. The 4th Division establishes two bridgeheads over the Ronco.

Greece - The Germans evacuate Thessaloniki.

Philippines - Units of the XXIV Corps are advancing from Abuyog across the
center of the island towards Baybay. In the X Corps sector, the Americans mop
up the area of Jaro, near Tacloban.

Burma - In the northern sector, the British 36th Division occupies Mawlu.

The Homefront
-------------
October Films - "Laura" featuring Gene Tierney, Clifton Webb, Dana Andrews
and Judith Anderson; an out of the ordinary murder mystery. "Our Hearts
Were Young And Gay" featuring Diana Lynn, Gail Russell, Charles Ruggles
and Dorothy Gish;  two innocent girls abroad in the early 20's - the
scenes at Notre Dame are hilarious. "To Have And Have Not" starring
Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall, based upon the novel by Ernest
Hemingway; do you know how to whistle Steve?  [The was a very good month
for new films.]

=============================================================================

Sources: "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi, "The
World Almanac Book Of WW II" by Peter Young, "Facts On File Yearbook 1944,
Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L. Lapica.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.netcom.com in directory /pub/jbd and can
be accessed via the WWW by URL: ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/jbd/ww2.html. If you
have difficulty accessing the Netcom FTP server, please keep trying because it
stays very busy.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis     [email-masked]
Cary, N.C.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 06:11:24 -0800
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago Archives

The October 1944 "50 Years Ago" articles are now available for downloading
from my "50 Years Ago" archives. In addition to past "50 Years Ago"
articles, these archives also include a number of additional WW II related
articles and files that I've found to be especially interesting. I am
constanly adding new files to my archives so you may want to check back on
a regular basis.

The best way to access the "50 Years Ago" archives is through the World
Wide Web. The WWW URL is "ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/jbd/ww2.html".  You may
also download the files by anonymous FTP. I have included instructions for
doing this below. If you have difficulty accessing Netcom's FTP server
via the WWW or by FTP please keep trying, Netcom has a limit on the
number of simultaneous accesses and the Netcom server stays very busy.

Instructions for downloading files by FTP -

The 50 YA articles are stored by month. To retrieve the articles by FTP,
open host "ftp.netcom.com", enter "anonymous" when prompted for login ID,
enter your Internet mail address when prompted for password. To change to
the directory where the articles are stored enter "cd /pub/jbd". Enter
command "ls" to get a listing of all the files available. The file name
identifies the month for 50 YA articles (example - sep1944.txt, contains the
September 1944 articles).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis     [email-masked]
Cary, N.C.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 10:38:10 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: HIST: Oral History

    To Ben Frank,

    Ben,

    Could you provide the address of the Marine Corps Historical Center?
    I've been talking to my father about his providing an oral history
    covering his experiences in the Pacific, and would really like to study
    the guide that you mentioned.

    Thank You,

    Steve New
    [email-masked]
    The purpose of science is to develop better mouse traps.
    The purpose of nature is to develop better mice.

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 09:54:11 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP:  CVE-71  USS Kitkun Bay

From: Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, Vol. III, 1968, Navy
Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History
Division, Washington, D.C.

KITKUN BAY (CVE-71)

dp. 7,800;
l. 512' 3";
b. 65';
ew. 101' 1"
dr. 22' 6";
s. 19 k.;
cpl. 860;
a. 1 5", 16 40-mm., 20 20-mm., 28 ac.;
cl. Casablanca

KITKUN BAY, originally designated as an AVG, was classified as ACV-71 on
20 August 1942 and reclassified as CVE-71 on 16 July 1943. Laid down 3
May 1943 she was launched 8 November 1943 by Kaiser Shipbuilding Co.,
Inc., Vancouver, Wash., under a Maritime Commission contract ; sponsored
by Mrs. Edward A. Cruise, and commissioned 15 December 1943, Captain J.
P. Whitney in command.

After a shakedown along the Pacific coast, KITKUN BAY departed San Diego
28 January 1944 on a replenishment voyage to the New Hebrides bases.
After loading passengers, planes, and other cargo, she sailed for home
18 February via Pearl Harbor and arrived San Diego 6 March. Upon her
return, the planes of VC-6 were brought aboard for training and
assignment. With Rear Admiral Harold B. Salada, Commander, Carrier
Division 26 embarked, she sailed 1 May for Pearl Harbor and the
completion of her training exercises.

On 31 May her task unit sortied forth to escort the bombardment and
transports units of Task Group 52.17 to Saipan. On 13 June her planes
shot down their first enemy aircraft and the next day began the bombing
and strafing of enemy positions in the Marianas. KITKUN BAY's planes
alternated flying support missions for the Saipan landings and air cover
for ships east of this island. Eight enemy planes were splashed in
attacks on her formation on the 17th and her own guns downed three more
the

Page 660

nest day. Early July brought a brief respite at Eniwetok but 14 July she
resumed support sorties at Saipan, Tinian, and from 2 to 4 August at
Guam.

Withdrawn, she steamed to Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides, for upkeep
before sailing to the Solomons for additional practice in support of
amphibious operations. Heading westward on 8 September her task unit
escorted an assault force to Peleliu and Angaur Islands in the Palaus
group and provided cover from the 15th to 21st. Withdrawn to Manus,
Admiralty Islands, she made preparations for the invasion of Leyte,
P.I., and her finest hour.

Departing 12 October she soon joined Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague's task
unit "Taffy 3" composed of 6 CVE's and their screen of escorts. On 20
October KITKUN BAY began launching strikes against Leyte. These
operations conducted from a position east of Samar Island continued
until early in the morning of the 25th when Japanese warships were
sighted on the northwest horizon. Admiral Kurita's powerful Center Force
had passed through the San Bernadino Straits unnoticed, hoping to
destroy the supply ships off Leyte. Not designed to exchange gunfire
with surface warships "Taffy 3" launched what planes were ready and
turned southward behind a smoke screen. In the ensuing 2-hour running
battle, the courageous maneuvers and skillful action of its screen, the
diverting attacks by its planes, the astute orders of its command
officers averted annihilation. In the forefront of the circular
formation KITKUN BAY escaped any direct hits as the shells splashed ever
closer until 0925 when the enemy suddenly broke off the engagement and
retired. The less fortunate GAMBIER BAY and three escort ships went down
fighting valiantly; while suffering some gunfire damage, the Center
Farce lost three cruisers as a result of the attacks of the aircraft of
"Taffies 2 and 3."

The final phase of the epic Battle of Leyte Gulf was the retaliatory air
strikes by both sides. Before the "Fore noon" watch had expired, KITKUN
BAY had splashed a suicidal Betty but had also been crashed by a Zeke
which struck the port catwalk killing 1 man and wounding 16. The losses
for the day also included two planes and their crews. The nest day she
sailed for Manus in the Admiralty Islands for replenishment and repairs.

Arrived 1 November, she departed Manus the 7th for Pearl Harbor where
VC-5 was replaced by VC-91. Despite a submarine attack en route, KITKUN
BAY returned safely to Manus 17 December. New Year's Day 1945 dawned
with CVE-71 steaming as part of Task Unit 77.4.3 (Lingayen Transport
Cover Group) bound for the invasion of western Luzon. After passing
through Surigao Straits, the convoy underwent a series of air attacks.
Air cover destroyed seven enemy planes but at 1857 an Oscar got through
and crashed KITKUN BAY's portside amidships at the waterline. Almost
simultaneously a 5-inch shell struck her starboard side. The resultant
fires and flooding were brought under control but 16 were dead and 37
wounded. The following day with a list and only one engine operating she
withdrew and proceeded by stages first to Leyte, Manus, Pearl Harbor and
arrived San Pedro, Calif., 28 February.

Two months later she sailed again for the Western Pacific. After a
training period in the Hawaiian Islands, she departed 15 June for Ulithi
and duty with the 3d Fleet. On 3 July KITKUN BAY sortied forth with
other escorts and ships of the "train" for support of the fast carriers
operating off the coast of Japan. Mid-August she was reassigned to Task
Force 44 gathering at Adak, Alaska, to escort Admiral F. J. Fletcher,
COMNORPAC, who had been designated to receive the formal surrender of
the Japanese in northern Honshu and Hokkaido. Arrived off Honshu 7
September, she remained in the area until the 27th, seeing to the
feeding and transportation of American prisoners of war. Detached to
participate in Operation "Magic Carpet," she first debarked 554 troops
at San Francisco 19 October. Additional voyages to Pearl Harbor and
Okinawa concluded 12 January 1946 at San Pedro, Calif.

KITKUN BAY entered Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, 18 February
and decommissioned 19 April. Sold 18 November 1946 to Zidell Machinery &
Supply Co., Portland, Oreg., she was scrapped early in 1947.

In addition to the Presidential Unit Citation KITKUN BAY earned six
battle stars during World War II.

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 09:24:09 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Rumanian Paratroops

    Greg,

    My sources are at home.

    Did it really take both the Rumanian paratroops to secure Bucharest?

    Steve New
    [email-masked]

    The purpose of science is to build better mousetraps.
    The purpose of nature is to build better mice.

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 05:23:13 -0800
From:    Eric Fenster <[email-masked]>
Subject: Moscow study trip(s) update

>From efenster  Sun Oct 30 05:21:48 1994
>From efenster  Sun Oct 30 05:21:49 1994
Received: (from efenster@localhost) by igc2.igc.apc.org (8.6.9/Revision: 1.4 ) i
d FAA12183 for efenster; Sun, 30 Oct 1994 05:21:48 -0800
Date: Sun, 30 Oct 1994 05:21:48 -0800
From: Eric Fenster <efenster>
Message-Id: <[email-masked]>
To: efenster
Subject: Moscow study trip(s) update
Status: R

This update concerns the Moscow study trip 27 May-27 June 1995 and
other potential ones.*

1) For participants who are students and desire credit, Eastern
Michigan University will offer 4 credits.  The additional cost for
tuition and fees would be $200.  The amount is exceptionally low
because in 1995 EMU will not be sending a co-instructor and will
thus not have those salary & travel costs.

2) NATO will provide a briefing during the stopover in Brussels. In
response to my request for a focus on the new NATO relations with
East Europe, the representative of Lithuania has agreed to meet
with the group.

3) A reminder that the $50 reduction is valid for registrations
received by 10 November. The intent is to pass along savings which
result from early signup.

4) A shorter version of the study trip (29 Apr-23 May),
incorporating the 50th anniversary commemoration of the victory in
WW2, and/or a Russian language course (27 May-04 Jul) can only be
organized if there is early expressed demand. This is the time to
speak up!

5) There will be no space-sciences oriented trips.  The price
proposed by the host, the Moscow Aviation Institute, was exorbitant
and they refused to negotiate.  I, in turn, refuse to bring people
to Russia to be fleeced.

6) If you need the detailed announcement by Email or on paper, please let me
know. The text has been modified to reflect the credit possibility from EMU.

7) Participants who would be coming from Europe need to contact me
quickly so that I can block seats at a low price before they
disappear

Thank you,
Eric

*The study trip will examine the political, economic and social conditions in
Russia and is in its 15th year. If this is the first you have heard of it and
wish details, let me know by Email ([email-masked]), NOT by reply to
this list. Observations (38K) on the situation in Russia during the last trip
in June are still available for the asking.

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 13:02:10 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Old 59

    A number of combat aircraft survived their combat usefulness while
    still flyable.

    In the Eighth AF, a number of fighters such as P-51s and P-47s were
    coded as WW (war weary) painted in bright colors, (some even modified
    into two seaters) and used as squadron hacks.

    A number of WW B-24s were painted in outlandish schemes (parti-colored
    stripes and polka dots)  and used as formation ships, for squadrons to
    form up on at take-off.

    There were also several occasions, particularly with the high
    performance fighters, where pilots would overstress an airframe in the
    course of combat where, even without receiving battle damage, the AC
    could no longer be scheduled for combat.

    Steve New
    [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 13:08:58 -0500
From:    Warren Thompson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Hisler successor

To Greg, Jarrod et al.: I have a feeling, had he lived, that Reinhard Tristan
Eugen Heydrich might have put himself in the lists to succeed Adolf.

-- Warren Thompson

thompson@acad,lvc.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 20:36:56 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: GEN: PEARL HARBOR

  FOR JIM ADAMS
  October 30, 1994
  I read your October 28 message on the list with considerable interest.  Could
you tell us more about your father's experiences?  What was in that message
traffic in the National Archives?
  Also, tell us more about your work at the Memorial.  My wife and I visited it
several years ago and found it a very moving experience.
  I recently had a message from a Japanese EMAIL pen pal, who visited it with
his family.  After watching the film, his wife was in tears.  He added that this
is something Japanese children do not often see.  She expressed regret that
there were no Japanese subtitles, so those Japanese who do not understand
English could know what was being said.
   Regards, John Ausland/Oslo Norway

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 29 Oct 1994 23:26:22 GMT+1
From:    SYSTEM 0PERATOR <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO: The "Big" what-

A few personal comments on the subject :

> ... he (Hitler) probably saved
> the Ostheer with his "stand-or-die" orders after the battle of
> Moscow, again in opposition to his generals. It was not Hitler's
> fault that no one made provision for cold weather gear or lubricants
> before Barbarossa, and I do not accept that this was not done out
> of fear of being accused of treason by planning for failure in

This would be interesting to research...does anyone have insight as to
this ? Was it Hitler's or OKW's decision not to issue winter clothing ?

..and until their
> introduction of jets, their aircraft were effectively a generation
> behind allied aircraft

Probably not very true, Mr Messerschmitt would reply !

> We are just beginning to understand what happened on the eastern front.
> One thing seems clear, however. While the Russians did use obliterating
> artillery, they were able to achieve local "steamroller" concentrations
> by outsmarting the Germans. I have not checked the latest figures,
> but there may have been a rough parity in German and Russian troop
> strengths as late as 1944. What the Russians did do was use the
> 600,000 American trucks they received intelligently, together with
> extremely effective deception operations, to shift forces back and
> force, always maintaining the initiative. There were no "Mongol Hordes."
> And if the Wehrmacht had planned its war effort intelligently,
> by 1944 they might have had 600,000 trucks too. And interior lines.

I would agree with the above. The German propaganda, with which we all
too agreed to be fed with during the Cold war, is being demystified.
Read John Erickson's, C. Duffy's and David Glantz' books if still convinced
that the Russians were dumb hordes. The Vistula-to-Oder operations are a
demonstration of late-war Russian mastery of mechanized warfare.

> You are right about the Franco-Italian front. Sorry.

Some information in my book on the shelf :
the French 6th Army, guarding the Alps, had 81,000 men in 3 Infantry
Divisions (later reinforced by a fourth). Opposed to it were Italian 1st and
4th Army, totalling 185,000 and 127,000 men, for a total of 312,000 men.
The Italians forces succeded in crossing the border in two places, and
then were blocked. Fighting was very violent at some places.
On June 25, the losses totals were as follows :
French : 36 killed, 79 wounded, 165 prisoners
Italians :504 killed, 3266 wounded, 277 prisoners.
The difference can be explained by the fact that the French defended
fortified positions.  The troops, mostly local and alpine, knew the terrain
well.

Arnaud.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 31 Oct 1994 02:22:47 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ME163

On Fri, 28 Oct 1994, Ron Babuka wrote:

> >>     I can't help but think that this was a lot of trouble and took up more
> >> time, effort, and resources had to spare.  Did the performance of the Me163
> >> at all justify this effort and risk?

No. It would not even have paid off if the Me 163 had had a safer engine;
the rocket-powered fighter was never a good idea.  Its endurance was too
small, combined with a too weak armament, to achieve something.

> The Luftwaffe thought that the Me-163 would be "worth the effort" in
> maximizing the efficiency of their remaining defensive forces.  The belief
> was that instead of commiting a large number of your conventional forces at
> possible diversionary raids or commiting them before you knew what the
> possible target was (due to the time that it took for aircraft to climb to
> an attack height), you could place a number of Me-163's at known strategic
> sites and only launch them when you sure of what the target was.  At least
> the logic seemed sound.
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This concept of a 'point defence interceptor' was pursued with the Me 163
and Ba 349 Natter.  It could be added that after the war, the RAF found
the concept interesting enough to invest in it. Boulton-Paul developed a
small aerodynamic prototype of a vertically-launched interceptor. And
Saunder-Roe developed a rocket-powered fighter along the lines of the Me
163, but this time with a small jet engine added for cruise and landing
(it wasn't powerful enough for take-off) in the SR.53. But nothing came of
this.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 20:29:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 31 OCT 44

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
TUESDAY, 31 OCTOBER 1944
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  F-6, North American Mustang
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  P-61, Northrop Black Widow

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): 4 B-25s score direct hits on a cannery at
Tomari Cape on Paramushiru Island and leave nearby buildings burning; 1 of 2
B-25s hit by AA heads for and safely lands in the USSR.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  AAF, INDIA-BURMA SECTOR: The 427th Night Fighter Squadron arrives at
Pandaveswar, India from Italy with P-61s (first mission is 23 Nov).

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 6 P-51s hit shipping
targets of opportunity at Swatow and Amoy; about 70 fighters support Chinese
ground forces by pounding positions in the Lungling area; 4 B-25s and 12
P-40s bomb a railroad bridge at Pengpu.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Buram, 60+ P-47s attack occupied
areas and supply areas at Namun, Bhamo, and Nakang, and railroad bridges,
locomotive shelters, and rolling stock along the Kyaikthin-Naba line; 2 B-25s
attack targets of opportunity from Katha to Bhamo along the Irrawaddy River.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 695: 3 B-17s and 5 B-24s
drop leaflets in the Netherlands, France and Germany during the night.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): Weather forbids bomber operations
and limits fighters; the XII and XIX Tactical Air Commands fly patrols,
sweeps, and armed reconnaissance over E France and W Germany; the XII
Tactical Air Command also supports US Seventh Army elements in the Metz,
France area. In Belgium, the 161st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, 363d
Tactical Reconnaissance Group, moves from Sandwieler, Luxembourg to Le Culot
with F-6 and P-51s.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): P-38s fly photo and weather
reconnaissance; 174 B-24s, dispatched against a target in Yugoslavia, are
forced to return because of weather. The 885th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy),
Fifteenth Air Force (attached to Mediterranean Allied Air Forces), arrives at
Brindisi, Italy from Algeria with B-17s and B-24s (the squadron transports
supplies to partisans and drops leaflets in the MTO).

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, B-26s hit a bridge and
causeway at Nervesa della Battaglia and bridges at Montebello and Piazzola
sul Brenta; fighter-bombers attack guns and positions in the battle area S of
Bologna in the Apennines, and communications and shipping targets in the Po
Valley and on the Po River.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): During the night of 31 Oct/l Nov a B-24 on a
snooper mission from Saipan Island bombs Iwo Jima Island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: P-47s and A-20s
bomb Kairatoe Airfield and Saharoe village on Celebes Island. B-25s and P-40s
hit Loloda and Soasioe in the Moluccas Islands. In New Guinea, P-38s and
A-20s, concentrating on airfields, attack Samate Efman, Sagan, and Doom
Island.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
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31/0129Z OCT

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Date:    Mon, 31 Oct 1994 03:49:49 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO: The "Big" what-

On Fri, 28 Oct 1994, Henry Sirotin wrote:

> Question: was the "dreadful" state of British armor as measured
> against prewar standards in all armies, or against the new standard
> as created by the Wehrmacht.

Poor compared with German, French or Soviet armour. (Most other nations
simply didn't have armour pre-war.) The error was one of doctrine: British
tanks were either too light or too slow, because all official theories
about tank warfare were wrong.

> RWulf. Prior to June 1941 I seriously doubt a case can be made that
> Germany was outnumbered in any real sense.

I think that the combined French, British, Belgian and Dutch forces in
May 1940 slightly outnumbered the German attackers. But they didn't
cooperate, and were distributed erronously.

> I would think that by now the myth of "it was Hitler's fault" is
> a dead horse. True, he micromanaged where he shouldn't have,
> but he had a far better sense of what could be done in 1939-1940
> than many of his staff-trained Generals, and he probably saved
> the Ostheer with his "stand-or-die" orders after the battle of
> Moscow, again in opposition to his generals.

Hitler often had good ideas -- even von Manstein admitted that --- but he
also often was detached from reality, and his aides did little to cure
that. Already during the Norwegian campagn, Keitel and Jodl were critised
(by a mere colonel) for communicating unexecutable orders.  You can't
blame Hitler alone for the final defeat of the Whermacht, but he was
certainly a major contributor. After all, he was the primary responsible
for the disasters at Stalingrad, Tunis and Falaise.

> It was not Hitler's
> fault that no one made provision for cold weather gear or lubricants
> before Barbarossa,

Absurd. Of course it was. He did the planning for the attack personally,
rejecting two plans drawn up by staff officers (Marcks and Paulus). It
was his responsability. Hitler clearly wanted an one-year campaign;
winter clothing was made for an occupational force only.

> follow victory. The list of logistics failures in the Wehrmacht
> is immense: their artillery was barely an improvement on WWI models,
> their tanks were generally inferior to their opponents up to 1943,
> and then barely held their own against the Russians, and, until the
> introduction of jets, their aircraft were effectively a generation
> behind those of the western allies.

I know little about artillery, but it is certainly true that they did rely
primarily on horses for movement. That their tanks were generally slightly
inferior to French or Soviet counterparts is also correct. But that their
aircraft were a generation behind I would seriously doubt.  There was a
problem in 1943-1944, because older types had to stay in production too
long; but until the end of the war the best German aircraft could fight
the best allied aircraft on a basis of equality. The most serious
deficiency in the Luftwaffe was probably the lack of good air transport.
Ike called the C-47 one of the more important weapons the war was won
with; the German Ju 52 certainly was one, probably two generations behind
on the C-47, and there were always too few.

> The Wehrmacht wasn't limp, and, overall, it wasn't second-rate. But it
> wasn't the mythic fighting force swamped by enemy numbers and production
> and the daffy orders of the "carpetchewer" that the German generals
> portrayed in their post-war accounts.

A 'carpetchewer' or 'Tepichfresser' (sp?) is someone who wears down the
carpet by pacing up and down the room. No need for imagining more vivid
scenes!

> In fact, one of the things that
> was second rate was a lot of their generalstaffship.

Much better than the French or Italian, obviously, and probably also
better than the British. The incompetent commanders the USSR had in 1941
were soon replaced by better people, and thereafter the Soviets did well
in overall planning, but also made errors.  The staff that Ike created for
his European operations also suffered some setbacks. I would think that
the German general staff, while not outperforming the opposition, still
was one of the best.  But the real strength of the German Army was not
planning, but they grabbed opportunities quicker and better than the
opposition. I think that the medium ranks were the real strong point of
the German army, until the end, when too many officers had been killed.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 30 Oct 1994 22:31:22 -0500
From:    David Rising <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO: The "Big" what-

On Mon, 31 Oct 1994, Emmanuel Gustin wrote:
-lots deleted-

> You can't
> blame Hitler alone for the final defeat of the Wehrmacht, but he was
> certainly a major contributor. After all, he was the primary responsible
> for the disasters at Stalingrad, Tunis and Falaise.

Let's not forget Dunkirk!

-lots more deleted-

David Rising

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End of WWII-L Digest - 29 Oct 1994 to 30 Oct 1994
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