Subject: WWII-L Digest - 17 Oct 1994 to 18 Oct 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 19 Oct 1994 00:00:59 -0400

There are 35 messages totalling 2209 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. TACT: Japan if no Pearl (7)
  2. INF: 50 Years Ago - 19-OCT-1944
  3. The Big "What if..." 300 extra U-Boats
  4. INF: USN Chronology 10-18-94
  5. HIST: Origins of Pearl Harbor Raid? (3)
  6. OSS-William Colby (2)
  7. HIST: Taffy 3, USS Butler
  8. INF:Regia Marina, Part 4 (3)
  9. Untold Stories f/ABTF, Pt. 6
 10. Ques: BB 36 (3)
 11. HIST: Taffy 3; USS Gambier Bay
 12. HIST: Taffy-3; USS Kitkun Bay
 13. HYPO: The "Big" what-if? (2)
 14. Rumanian Army & other Balkan forces
 15. THIS LIST, 4TH INF DIV, MARINES
 16. 50TH: HOLDING THE LINE IN GERMANY
 17. NO SUBJECT
 18. Recollections of the Pointe
 19. Invasion of Crete -- Operation Merkur
 20. RESEARCH: USAF Air Wings
 21. [INF] USAAF 19 OCT 44

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 00:12:16 -0400
From:    Carlos R Rivera <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT: Japan if no Pearl

Hello Henry,

> Many thanks for the amplification, and for the implied corrections.
> May I ask what you've been working on to have this "fresh in your
> grey matter?"

-----I am in the middle of writing my dissertation.  I deal with the
development of the hypothetical enemy among the USN and IJN between 1897 and
1922.  So the discussion caught my eye when it dealt with the Japanese and the
Pacific.  A large chunk of my work examines how junior planning officers in the
period came to view their counterparts as the enemy, the inevitability of war
and the nature of such a conflict.  I have spent the last year examining the
Japanese navy's officers, planning process, building plans, and existing war
plans.  I did not mean to sound overly harsh, but with little sleep and an
impending deadline of 43 days, I am running on fumes.  What is your field or
occupation?
Many Regards
Carlos

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 00:56:10 -0400
From:    Carlos R Rivera <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT: Japan if no Pearl

To all on this net, I somehow sent my last message to the net.  Forgive me,
anyway, would someone tell me the procedure for responding to a message
originator, vice the net, when there appears to be distinctive address.  Many
thanks, CRR

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 00:59:23 EDT
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT: Japan if no Pearl

Hello Carlos,

I'm a grad student doing medical geography and 20th century Eurasian
military history. That combination takes some explaining, which I will
be happy to do in about 50 days. Until then, best of luck, and I'm
already drafting a letter to University Microfilms for that dss.

Henry

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 11:43:34 +0100
From:    Ludwig Goller <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT: Japan if no Pearl

On Mon, 17 Oct 1994, Carlos R Rivera wrote:

> RE: Henry Sirotin's response to Bryant,
>
> > In any case, the Japanese intention had been to challenge the US for control
> > of the western Pacific at least since 1907, when an Imperial Rescript to the
> > Japanese armed forces declared the US had replaced Russia as Japan's primary
> enemy.
>
> --------That requires some amplification.  That rescript was actually the
> Teikoku Kokubo Hoshin, or Imperial Defense Policy.  It was sanctioned in April
> 1907, but the Imperial Army selected the Russians as the primary enemy and
> pushed subsequently for a large increase in the size of the army, up to 50
> divisions for wartime purposes.  The Imperial Navy selected the United States
> as its primary enemy and argued for the procurement of the infamous 8-8 fleet
> program, that is eight battleships and eight armored cruisers/battle cruisers.
>
> At no time between April 1907 and March 1922, did the Japanese Empire "declare"
> that the United States had replaced Russia.  The defense policy was revised
> several times, 1918, 1923, and 1935.  The US did become the primary enemy in
> 1923, due primarily to the results of the Washington Conference.  As to the
> Philippines and the Western Pacific, the army's draft of the defense policy,
> August 1906, limited the IJN to a minor role, blockade and occupation of the
> Philippines.  The official policy, April 1907, did not contain that mission.
> But in annual fleet exercises after 1906, the IJN did begin to practice the
> interception of a westward bound American fleet.---Anyway, sorry to drag this
> out, but its fresh in my gray matter.
> Carlos R. Rivera
> Ohio State University
>
Reading this, the following question comes to my mind:
I'm no expert in US naval history, but AFAIK it was the PH raid which
definitely ended the quarrel between the gun-club and the supporters of
the carrier force. Let's think about the following scenario:
The Japanese attack the Philippines, and the US Navy sends in their
Pacific fleet, all battleships and a few carriers for *air support*.
This force encounters a Japanese carrier force supported by landbased
aircraft from the Philipines. Wouldn't this end in an even greater
desaster then Pearl Harbor?

Ludwig

sorry for the sometimes incorrect English

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 04:52:55 -0700
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 19-OCT-1944

On 19-OCT-1944, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - German resistance in the Aachen ares is being worn down. In
the US 7th Army sector, the 36th Division captures Bruyeres. Other units are
preparing to attack St Die.

Italian Front - The 10th Indian Division is attacking over the Savio river.

Philippines - The invasion forces is approaching Leyte island.

Burma - The British 26th Division occupies Mohnyin.

The Homefront
-------------
Maas Wants Pearl Harbor Report - Rep. Melvin J. Maas, R. Minn., says in a St.
Paul speech that a new report on Pearl Harbor drawn up by a Naval Board of
Inquiry is being withheld by the administration . He says it is his intention
to force the publication of the report before the election. He says "the
President and other high officials had word pof the Pearl Harbor attack plans
six hors in aadvance and sent no warning."

Boston Bans Books - Kathleen Winsor's novel "Forever Amber" has been withdrawn
from Boston book stores.

Hurricane - Havana reports that the hurricane that hit Cuba yesterday killed
at least 24 people. The storm did an estimate $20,000,000 damage to the citrus
crop when it then hit Florida.

=============================================================================

Sources: "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi, "The
World Almanac Book Of WW II" by Peter Young, "Facts On File Yearbook 1944,
Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L. Lapica.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.netcom.com in directory /pub/jbd and can
be accessed via the WWW by URL: ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/jbd/ww2.html. If you
have difficulty accessing the Netcom FTP server, please keep trying because it
stays very busy.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis     [email-masked]
Cary, N.C.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 07:54:55 EDT
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT: Japan if no Pearl

On Mon, 17 Oct 1994 14:14:50 EDT Henry Sirotin said:
>In any case,
>the Japanese intention had been to challenge the US for control of the
>western Pacific at least since 1907, when an Imperial Rescript to the
>Japanese armed forces declared the US had replaced Russia as Japan's
>primary enemy.

Context, context--the Japanese were probably sore at Roosevelt's taking
away their victory over Russia in 1905 (-:

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 07:13:31 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: The Big "What if..." 300 extra U-Boats

Hello, Greg!

> What might be more realistic would be a better use of the U-Boats &
> resources at hand-- yes,  a few more Milch boats, better air support,
> maybe even a K-Men raid on Scapa Flow as a pre-emptive strike at war's
> outbreak.  There's an idea........

    Have you heard or read of Guenter Prien's raid on Scapa Flow in
1940? Perhaps more of that sort of thing would have been in order.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 04:58:45 PDT
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 10-18-94

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1944
10/18 Wed. Aircraft from three task groups of the Third Fleet
           (Adm. W. F. Halsey), including 13 carriers, attack
           Japanese installations and shipping in northern Luzon
           and the Manila area, P. I.
           Cruiser task group (Rear Adm. J. B. Oldendorf)
           bombards enemy shore installations on Leyte, P. I.
           Army troops land on Homonhon Island at the entrance
           to Leyte Gulf, P. I.
           United States Naval Advanced Base, Le Havre, France,
           is established.
            United States naval vessel damaged:
             High-speed transport GOLDSBOROUGH (APD-32), by
              coastal defense gun, Leyte Gulf area,
              10 d. 57'N., 125 d. 02'E.
             LST 906, by grounding, off Leghorn, Italy.
            Japanese naval vessels sunk:
             Auxiliary submarine chaser NO. 95, by carrier-based
              aircraft, Luzon area, P. I.,
              18 d. 54'N., 121 d. 51'E.
             Transports NOs. 135 and 136, by carrier-based
              aircraft, Luzon area P. I.,
              17 d. 46'N., 120 d. 25'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 09:09:27 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: HIST: Origins of Pearl Harbor Raid?

The following is presented as an alternative to the position,
repeated on the list recently, that the attack on Pearl Harbor was
inspired by the British success at Taranto.

I apologize for the quality of the writing, which may explain why
the magazine did not identify the author.  The point being that
there was available to the Japanese a far more important example
to follow, long before Taranto.

The First Pearl Harbor Raid

Air Classics Magazine, November 1976

Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Japanese
Combined Fleet (1941-1943), is credited by both Japanese and
western writers as the "bold", "daring", and "brilliant", architect
of the Pearl Harbor attack.

But, ironically, the man who drew up the first blueprints of the
Pearl Harbor raid, and went on to prove his theories, was not a
Japanese.  He was Rear Admiral Harry Ervin Yarnell, an American
pioneer in carrier operations.

An Annapolis and Naval War College graduate, Yarnells beliefs in
the future of air power were as controversial at the time as were
Billy Mitchell's.

In November 1927, he had placed the Saratoga in commission as an
aircraft carrier and had served as her first skipper.  He had
lectured and studied aviation strategy while assigned as a staff
member at the Naval War College.  In 1932, Yarnell revolutionized
naval strategy by implementing a bold plan.  And he proved the
effectiveness of his theories.

In January 1932, in accordance with plans formulated by the U.S.
Naval Planning Board, 200 warships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet
assembled in the waters off California for a fleet exercise.  It
was perhaps the biggest naval concentration ever assembled before
the 1944 Battle of the Phillipine Sea.

The warships were divided into two fleets: the defender and
aggressor forces.  The original concept of the exercise was for
the latter to attack the defending fleet, since the defense complex
of Pearl Harbor had been planned primarily to meet a naval attack.

During the fleet problem, the defense of Pearl Harbor was
entrusted to the defending fleet to protect the defenses to the
harbor and the approaches to the islands.  A flotilla of
submarines was stationed around the harbor.  A full division of
infantry was posted ashore and a massive concentration of heavy
coast artillery guns installed.  The air defense was comprised of
anti-aircraft guns at strategic points, and over 100 fighters and
bombers.

The second fleet, the aggressor force, was under the command of 57
year old Admiral Yarnell.  He flew his flag from the Saratoga,
instead of a battleship.  He also called his group by a name which
one day was to become well known in the Pacific War: a task force.

Yarnell built his task force around the newly built fast fleet
carriers, the Lexington (CV-2) and Saratoga (CV-3).  The two
flat-tops, completed 29 days apart, were near identical sister
ships.  They were built on battle-cruiser hulls, and had retained
their machinery.  The two were the largest carriers in operation in
the world, and remained so, up through the completion of WW-II.

Leaving his battleships, cruisers, and auxiliary vessels behind,
Yarnell sped across the Pacific with the two big carriers.  The
flat-tops slammed through the large waves, their steam turbines
putting out 200,000 horspower each.  The vessels were massive for
those days, with each displacing 33,000 tons, but with their
battle cruiser machinery they were able to attain over 30 knots

Exactly as Yarnell had hoped, 24 hours off of Oahu his carriers
with their escort of four destroyers ran into thick weather which
effectively shielded his force from detection.

In the meanwhile, the defending forces were still expecting a
great invasion fleet.

At dusk on Saturday, February 6, 1932, Yarnell's attacking force
was stealthily approaching from the northeast of Oahu.

When darkness fell, the task force ran without lights and in
complete radio silence.  It steamed ahead full speed through rain
squalls, low clouds, and rising winds.  The destroyers dipped
their rails, and even the big carriers rolled heavily in the icy
waters of a North Pacific winter storm.  It was excellent weather
to escape observation.

Tomorrow would be Sunday, and as Yarnell reckoned, the defenders
would be less alert.  He knew the fleet would be in Pearl Harbor
for the weekend, with most of the crews on two day leave.

The Admiral held off until less than half an hour before dawn,
when he was 60 miles from Pearl Harbor.  He still
had not been detected by the picket destroyers of the defending
fleet.

In pitch darkness, he ordered his carriers to steam into the wind
at high speed.  He began to launch the first of the 152 plane
strike force from his flat-tops.

Yarnell launched his bi-winged F4B fighters first from the 880
foot long platforms, followed by scout/attack planes, BM-1 dive
bombers, and T4M torpedo planes.  Only the blue flames from the
engine exhausts, and the dark silhouettes of the planes were
visible as they sped along the rolling and pitching flight decks.

When Yarnell's planes broke through the cover of clouds, they
found the greatest naval base in the world spread helplessly
beneath them.  The warships were riding placidly at their Hawaiian
moorings around Ford island, in Pearl Harbor.

In an incredibly short time, his little Boeing fighters (similar
to the Army Air Corps P-12) knocked out all the planes on the
ground, and the anti-aircraft guns, in simulated strafing
attacks.  Pilots and ground crews were so effectively pinned down,
that no no defending planes were able to take off.

Next his carrier borne, Martin built torpedo planes and dive
bombers came screaming down, their Pratt & Whitney engines whining
at an ever higher pitch.  They dropped their theoretical bombs and
torpedos on the nearby military installations and sank all the
hypothetical battleships and cruisers in the harbor.

The air was completely dominated by Yarnell's strike forces.  His
planes had gotten through undetected and unmolested.  If his
planes had carried real bombs and torpedos, they could have sunk or
damaged every vessel.

Immediately after Yarnell's "raid", senior naval officers held a
critique in the ruins of Pearl Harbor.  Many of the naval
strategists boldly voiced their observations, that Yarnell's
amazingly successful attack had upset all existing naval
concepts.  Some of the ranking officials now agreed with Yarnell's
revolutionary idea that the Navy should not be organized around
the battleship concept, with air power one of its supports, but
instead the primary weapon of the modern navy was air power.  They
too believe the striking force of a fleet should be built around
its air arm rather than its surface craft.

But no one listened!  The lessons learned from the fleet exercise
were lost upon Washington, and the stage set for a more realistic
and costly attack that would result in the killing, maiming, or
wounding of more than 4,000 Americans.

The lessons learned were unheeded in America's capitol.  But Tokyo,
through its highly efficient espionage organization in Honolulu,
gathered every essential bit of information.  And in Tokyo, an
intense, in depth study of the secret American maneuvers was
immediately conducted.

Japanese naval experts agreed that the primary weapon of a modern
navy was indeed its aircraft carriers.

Admiral Yarnell's advanced maneuver made Tokyo realize that the
Imperial Japanese Navy was offered a workable plan; a brilliant
idea to cripple a greater part of the U.S. Navy. The Imperial Navy
would carry out the American Admiral's idea.

Yamamoto too, must have studied the intelligence reports of
Yarnell's maneuvers, for he and Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the
executor of the Pearl Harbor raid, seemed to have learned their
lessons well.  They followed Yarnell's attack, almost exactly on
the morning of 7 December 1941.

Like Yarnell, they employed one of the basic fundamentals of
warfare: the element of surprise.  And as General Mitchell had
also prophesied, "on...some fine Sunday morning...," the Japanese
attacked.  They knew, as Yarnell had, that the fleet would be in
port for the weekend, and the defenses would be less alert.  Like
Yarnell, the Japanese Fast Carrier Strike Force traveled in
complete radio silence.  It also used the stormy waters of the
North Pacific-that vacant sea where no trade routes exist-to
effectively shield it from detection.

Nagumo too launched his planes before dawn.  He believed as the
American Admiral had, that a surprise attack at dawn would find
the American forces in poor condition of readiness.  His aircraft
followed Yarnell's exact flight path to Pearl Harbor.

In 1932, Yarnell had warned that were an enemy to use six fleet
carriers in a single mass attack, grave harm could be done to any
U.S. installation.  Nine years later, the Imperial Fleet using six
fleet carriers, attacked on a "...fine Sunday morning...."

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 09:15:02 EDT
From:    Mary Hricko <[email-masked]>
Subject: OSS-William Colby

       Hello everyone. I am interested in finding information regarding
   William Colby's involvement with the OSS. I have consulted several
   biographical materials on Colby, but have been unable to find
   detailed information on his decision-making in the OSS. I am also
   interested in information relating to Operation- SPARTAN. Thanks!

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 09:26:31 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: HIST: Taffy 3, USS Butler

From: Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, Vol. III, 1968, Navy
Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History
Division, Washington, D.C.

JOHN C. BUTLER

John Clarence Bulter was born at Liberty, Ariz., 2 February 1921, and
enlisted in the Naval Reserve 19 February 1941. He was appointed
Aviation Cadet 3 April; and, after flight training, he reported to
Bombing Squadron 3 on board carrier YORKTOWN. In the epochal Battle of
Midway 4 June 1942, Butler and his squadron attacked a Japanese carrier
group and despite heavy opposition succeeded in sinking three of the
vital enemy flattops. His plane, however, did not return. For his part
in this gallant attack, which did much to turn the tide of the Pacific
war, Ens. Butler was awarded the Navy Cross posthumously. In part the
citation noted: "His gallant intrepidity and loyal devotion to the
accomplishment of a vastly important objective contributed in large
measure to the success achieved by our forces and were in keeping with
the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

***************************************************************************

USS HOEL DE-339

dp. 1,350;
l. 306';
b. 36'8";
dr. 9'5";
s. 24 k.;
cpl. 186;
a. 2 5", 4 40-mm., 10 20-mm., 3 21" tt., 2 dct., 8 dcp., 1 dcp. (h.h.);
cl. JOHN A. BUTLER)

JOHN A. BUTLER (DE-339) was laid down by Consolidated Steel Corp., Ltd.,
Orange, Tex., 5 October 1943; launched 12 November 1943; sponsored by
Mrs. Walter A. Butler, mother of Ensign Butler; and commissioned 31
March 1944, Lt. Comdr. J. E. Pace, in command.

The new destroyer escort conducted shakedown training off Bermuda before
departing Hampton Roads 5 June 1944 for the Pacific. Sailing via the
Panama Canal, she arrived Pearl Harbor 26 June and engaged in convoy and
training operations during July. JOHN A. BUTLER then departed Pearl
Harbor 9 August screening transports bound for the invasion of the
Palaus. After seeing them safely to Tulagi, the ship operated with
escort carriers out of Manus on preinvasion strikes. Two islands wanted
as advance bases for the long-awaited move into the Philippines, Morotai
and Peleliu, were stormed 15 September; and JOHN A. BUTLER provided
antisubmarine and antiaircraft protection for the supporting carriers.
Returning to Manus 30 September, she replenished in preparation for
the Leyte operation in October.

The escort vessel sailed with Rear Admiral Oftsie's escort carrier group
12 October to provide air cover for the massive movement of transports
into Leyte Gulf. After the initial landings the three carrier groups,
soon to become famous by their radio code names, "Taffy 1," "Taffy 2,"
and "Taffy 3," took station east of the Philippines to lend close air
support.

The Japanese fleet was closing the Philippines in a last attempt to
annihilate the invasion force, with heavy ships designated to break into
Leyte Gulf from north and south, and a diversionary fleet of carriers to
draw Halsey off to the North. In the first two actions of the massive
Battle for Leyte Gulf which ensued, the Battles of Sibuyan Sea and
Suriago Strait, the Japanese were badly mauled. But Admiral Kurita's
Center Force still transited San Bernardino Strait the night of 24-25
October and just after sunrise bore down on the relatively unprotected
"Taffy 3," including JOHN A. BUTLER.

The 2-hour battle off Samar which followed has taken a rightful place
among the most memorable actions in naval history. The slow escort
carriers launched all planes to attack the Japanese cruisers and
battleships, and JOHN A. BUTLER and her sisters laid heavy smoke to
confuse enemy batteries. A rain squall provided cover for a turn to the
south, and just after 0730 the destroyers began their gallant torpedo
attacks against great odds. JOHNSTON, HOEL, HEERMANN, and escort SAMUEL
B. ROBERTS made close-in attacks on cruisers and battleships, forcing
them to zig-zag, while aircraft made continuous attacks. Soon after this
first attack, JOHN A. BUTLER turned from the carriers to launch her
remaining torpedoes, then exchanged gunfire with a heavy cruiser. The
destroyer escort continued to fire and dodge heavy-caliber fire until
dangerously low on ammunition, then returned to the carrier formation to
provide smoke coverage. Admiral C. A. F. Sprague, commander of Taffy 3,
later described the net surprising development: "At 0925 my mind was
occupied with dodging torpedoes when near the bridge I heard one of the
signalmen yell, '... dammit, boys, they're getting away!' I could not
believe my eyes, but it looked as if the whole Japanese fleet was indeed
retiring.... At best, I had expected to be swimming by this time." The
Japanese, damaged and fearing heavier air attack, had indeed reversed
course. Though the escort carriers lost two of their number and three
escorts their valiant fight had stopped the Japanese from attacking the
transports in Leyte Gulf.

After rescuing survivors from ST. LO, JOHN A. BUTLER escorted the
surviving carriers of "Taffy 3" via Manus to Pearl Harbor, then returned
to Manus 17 December. Departing with escort carriers 31 December, she
protected amphibious transports steaming to the invasion of Luzon.
During the voyage through the South China Sea the ships encountered and
drove off determined kamikaze attacks. On the evening of 8 January 1945,
JOHN A. BUTLER and other escorts splashed several kamikazes. She
operated off Lingayen Gulf from 9 to 17 January and screened carriers
during massive strikes in support of ground operations. Departing the
Luzon coast, she arrived Ulithi 23 January to prepare for the net
important amphibious landing-Iwo Jima.

The veteran destroyer escort took part in rehearsals in the Marianas,
and arrived off Iwo 19 February with an escort carrier group. She again
fought off a severe air attack 21 February. She remained on duty off Iwo
Jima until 9 March 1945, when she sailed for Ulithi, having helped to
win another important island air base for the eventual attack on Japan.

Okinawa was to be the site of the last and largest of the Pacific
amphibious assaults. JOHN A. BUTLER sailed 28 March with transports;
and, as the troops stormed ashore 1 April, she resumed her now-familiar
screening duties with carrier groups. As the Japanese launched fruitless
suicide attacks, the ship escorted carriers into Kerama Retto, rescued
downed pilots, and ferried men and material. Transferred to dangerous
outer picket duty north of Ie Shima 20 May, she was attacked by six
kamikazes just before sunset. Skillful gunnery accounted for five of the
attackers, and JOHN A. BUTLER sustained damage only to her mast and
antennas. She sailed 27 May for repairs in the Philippines.

The ship returned to Okinawa with a convoy 4 July and spent the last
month of the long war on convoy duty between that island and the Pacific
advance bases. She returned to San Pedro 23 November and decommissioned
28 June 1948, joining the Pacific Reserve Fleet at San Diego.

With the outbreak of the Korean conflict in June 1950, JOHN A. BUTLER
recommissioned 27 December 1950. Following shakedown, she was assigned
to 11th Naval District for the important job of training naval
reservists on short sea cruises. Thus, she helped maintain highly
trained officers and men to meet the Navy's cold war commitments. In
addition to reserve cruises, she took part in the training program of
Fleet Sonar School, San Diego. She decommissioned 18 December 1957 and
reentered the Reserve Fleet, San Diego, where she remains.

JOHN A. BUTLER received five battle stars for World War II service, and
was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for her part in the Battle
off Samar.

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 10:14:43 -0400
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF:Regia Marina, Part 4

        The collapse of Greece, following the German invasion, and the
occupation of Crete in May 1941, improved the Axis strategic situation
in the region.  British naval losses were high during these operations.
Italian fleet units were not involved in these operations due to a lack
of fuel and a reticence for combat after Matapan.  However, Italian light
forces did take part in the Crete operation which included the exploits
of the destroyer escorts "Lupo" and "Sagitarrio".  [Unfortuantely, no
further info is given on exactly what these exploits were. - Joe]

        The Axis now controlled the Eastern Mediterranean basin and the
passage of their convoys to North Africa was much more secure.  The Regia
Marina continued to escort all convoys to Africa while the British
continued their attempts to interdict this traffic by naval and air
attacks, frequently at night, relying on radar-equipped light cruisers
and destroyers, submarines and aircraft.  At the same time, Axis pressure
on Malta continued.

        In June 1941, the complexion of the war changed with the German
attack on the Soviet Union.  Many of the German aircraft used to attack
Malta were withdrawn for use against the Russians.  This reduced the pressure
on the island, so that more supplies got through.  The consequences were
immediate.  Malta again began offensive operations and Axis convoy losses
grew, to the point that in November 1941, losses were 63%!  This had the
effect of weakening Axis ground forces in North Africa, whose position
was already precarious due to reduced supplies.  The British in Africa
launched an offensive that took them past Benghazi (the start of the
"Benghazi handicaps").  The situation forced the Italian Navy to carry
troop reinforcements to Africa on destroyers and ruses were employed to
get supplies through.  The fuel situation was so severe that gasoline in
jerry cans was transported by cruisers!  This made the ships exceedingly
vulnerable and two were lost on such missions.

        The gravity of the situation was recognized and additional German
air units were assigned to the theater.  The Italian Navy began to use
their heavy units which expended valuable stocks of fuel, which were
already in short supply. This made the Italians even more dependent on
the irregular German deliveries of Rumanian oil.  These Italian measures,
though, especially the use of heavy units to screen convoys, proved
successful and supplies again were built up in Africa.

        In mid-December 1941, the situation in Africa had again deteriorated
for the Axis.  Following a British ground breakthrough, it was considered
urgent that a convoy get through to resupply the Axis forces.  A convoy of
four large cargo ships was organized, with an escort of eight destroyers.
A close screening force of "Duilio", three cruisers and four destroyers
was provided, with distant support based on "Littorio", "Doria", "Cesare",
two heavy cruisers and ten destroyers.  That such a large segment of the
fleet was involved emphasized the seriousness of the situation.

        Once again, the Italians were working with faulty reconnaissance.
They believed that a British force was steaming to intercept their convoy
when, in fact, the British were escorting their own convoy to Malta.  The
opposing forces met on December 17, 1941.  The British were ordered to
avoid combat until the tanker they were escorting was safe, at which time
a night attack was to be made against the Italians, who had been located.
The Italian distant-covering force was sent to intercept the British.
However, at about 5:00PM, Admiral Iachino decided to retire for two reasons.
The first was that the Italian convoy had been discovered and needed his
support.  The second reason was that he was loath to engage in a night
action against a radar-equipmented opponent when he lacked radar.  After
making this decision, lookouts noted the heavy anti-aircraft fire on the
horizon indicating that the British were under aerial attack.  Iachino
once again turned toward the British and as dusk fell, at 5:53PM, opened
fire, at a range of 32,000 meters, taking the British completely by
surprise.  The British immediately laid down smoke and the opposing
destroyers engaged in a gunnery duel.  By 6:04PM, it was dark and action
was broken off.  Throughout the night, to prevent an attack, Iachino
kept his forces between the British and the Italian convoy, which reached
its destination safely.

        Though there were no losses on either side, the results were
favorable to the Italians.  Significantly, the British had lacked carrier
support in this operation, further evidence of how indispensable these
ships were.  Despite their success, the Italian Navy was poorly served
by land-based air reconnaissance, as they had come upon the British more
by chance than by direction.  Though these ships had been located by and
were under Axis air attack, this information had not been passed on to
Iachino.  Had they located and engaged the British earlier, the Italian
ships might well have inflicted serious damage against the smaller British
ships.

        This action was the First Battle of Sirte.

        The next night, the most singular exploits of the war occurred.
An Italian submarine ferried three two-man torpedos to Alexandria.  They
penetrated the harbor and attached their warheads to the battleships,
"Valiant" (a veteran of Matapan) and "Queen Elizabeth" and a tanker.
The tanker sank when its warhead detonated and the two battleships were
put out of action for a considerable amount of time.  All six of the
Italian raiders were captured.

        These losses were added to the loss of "Barham" (another veteran
of Matapan) to a German U-boat in November and the losses of the "Prince
of Wales" and "Repulse" to the Japanese earlier in December.  These losses
stretched British resources very thin and swung the naval balance in the
Mediterranean in the Italians' favor.

        These factors contributed to Axis convoy traffic reaching Africa
with reduced losses and allowed an increased buildup of supplies.  Land
forces under Rommel stopped the British advance and in January 1942 launched
a counteroffensive, retaking Benghazi.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
German Tanker: You?  You're the American Army!
     Odd Ball: No, baby, we're not.
        Kelly: Think of us as a private business venture.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 10:36:35 EDT
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Untold Stories f/ABTF, Pt. 6

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  18-Oct-1994 08:59am EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Untold Stories f/ABTF, Pt. 6

    [This will be the last installment from what was our Nijmegen exhibit
    at city hall.  The next installments will include material from our
    exhibits in Oosterbeek and Groesbeek.  For this installment there are
    two topics: civilian reactions to the battle in the Nijmegen area; and
    the battle in the Betuwe - that very low-lying, no-man's land between
    Nijmegen and Arnhem where the Allies were stopped by the Germans for
    the next six months.]

    CIVILIAN REACTIONS

         "We decided we could not stay after shells landed in our street.
    It was decided we would all go to Sweelinckstraat but we only got as
    far as Postweg when the proprietor of a grocery store, Mr. Smit, called
    out to us, 'Come here, quick!'  Their cellar was to be our home for 20
    months.
         My wife, still completely upset by the shell blast at our home
    earlier in the day, was very anxious about her little black cat, which
    had remained behind.  She begged me to fetch it and set her mind at
    rest.  And what could I do but go off.  I borrowed somebody's bicycle,
    took all my keys with me, rode home, and called the cat, but it would
    not come.  Now and again there was shelling and I had to seek cover,
    but I finally reached Smit's cellar without any mishaps, but also
    without the cat.  'I did what I could,' I told my wife, 'You really
    cannot expect more than that.'
         Tuesday morning Piet van de Ekker came to the cellar with the
    startling news that my street was on fire.  We rushed there and found
    most of the southern end of the street was already ablaze.  We took
    everything we could lay our hands on from the house but we could not
    keep up the pace.
         On Wednesday I went and the sight that met my eyes was a pretty
    sorry one.  Nothing was left of my house, nor anything in it or in
    front of it.  As I carefully made my way through the ruins I heard a
    soft but familiar sound, and there was the cat.  The pads of its feet
    were badly burned.  I picked it up and went back to Smit's.  The animal
    disappeared a few days later."
                   - "Germania" head waiter Theodorus Derksen, Nijmegen

         "In the beginning the British intelligence people were rather
    sceptical about our usefulness, and perhaps trustworthiness, of the
    PGEM [the electrical power company] connections and messages.  But when
    messages from Berghen op Zoom came in - they soon changed their minds.
         On Thursday, the 21st, I reported to the Centrale, the Nijmegen
    power plant at the Waal river, for telephone duty.  I talked with
    people at the PGEM stations at Geertruidenberg, Ede, Lochem, Deventer,
    and Wageninggen.  We had thought up an identification of our own.
    When, for instance, the man at Geertruidenberg rang, we did not answer
    the call, which he repeated a few moments later.  We then whistled the
    opening bars of a certain melody upon which the man at the other side
    of the line knew that he had contacted the right people.
         Alex Hartman called in a lot giving, from the Veluwe [the national
    forest area north of Arnhem], all kinds of information about the
    British paratroopers.  I remember one of Hartman's messages dealing
    with a German target.  'Shell the ferry at Lienden at once.'  A little
    later he called again and said, 'Move your fire 25 meters to the east
    or you'll hit me.  I am in the transformer house.'
         I kept my work absolutely secret and no one, not even my relatives
    and close friends, knew where I was all those weeks."
                                            - Maria Struik Dalm, Nijmegen

         "We rushed off to the Voorstadslaan.  Great havoc in premises 48
    and adjoining houses.  There we find a man (Wijdeveld) with badly
    mutilated legs.  He recongizes me and trusts that I shall help him.  In
    me he sought assistance and help of a man, but there was none to be
    given.  I explained that human aid is no longer of any avail and he
    prayed with me....  '...Thy will be done on Earth....and forgive our
    trespasses....'  The way in which this man accepts his fate deeply
    impresses me.  He deserves Heaven.
         Later, a man comes in to say that in the St. Annastraat near the
    railway bridge some houses have been destroyed.  There are believed to
    be several casualties.  Near the ruins of his house we find Bennie
    Doodkorte.  His mother has already been taken to the hospital with
    shrapnel wounds.  His brother has been recovered mutilated from the
    debris.  His father does not share this suffering.  He died some time
    ago in a German camp."
                             - Head nurse Cornelius Joannes, Nijmegen

         "At about 08:00 there was a knock at the door and some American
    came in carrying a wounded man.  He was a very young man, perhaps 18
    years old, and he seemed in pain.  His calf had been hit by a bullet
    and he had lost quite some blood.  He did not say a word but from his
    eyes I could see that he was very scared.  Of us?  We tried to talk to
    him, but he said nothing.  A little later he accepted some coffee and a
    little bread.  The next morning American medics came and took him to
    one of their hospitals.  Again, he never uttered a word, not even to
    day, 'Thank you.'
         Seven or eight years ago [ca. 1960] he suddenly showed up.  He was
    then stationed in Heidelberg and had driven with his wife to Arnhem
    from where he went, alone, to Nijmegen to try and find us - which he
    did with the help of a local chaplain.  Since then we have maintained a
    regular and friendly contact with Sgt. Paul Nunan."
                             - Housewife Johanna van Osterom, Nijmegen

         "The hospital staff and the evacuees were one big family.  An
    enormous amount of work was accomplished and everybody did what they
    could, even the very old helping out.  There was a team spirit and
    often a pleasant atmosphere about, which we still call to mind quite
    frequently.
         Two German nurses were also working at the hospital.  When the
    British came they wanted to remove them but Dr. Enneking would have
    none of it and said, 'In this house we know no nationality or race.
    These people are doing splendid work and here they stay.'  And stay
    they did.
         In all, some hundred babies were born in the hospital cellars in
    those September days."
                   - Sister M. Dosithee, St. Canisius Hospital, Nijmegen

         "Somewhere near the Town Hall on Nieuwstraat, where everything was
    a mass of ruins, I suddenly saw a small coin lying on the street.  I
    picked it up and it proved to be a Roman coin of the time of Tiberius
    (42 to 37 B.C.).  After the war digging laid bare the remains of a
    Roman cemetery at the site."
                        - Municipal official Joseph Meddens, Nijmegen
    ------------------------
    BATTLE IN THE BETUWE

         "I could see the strategic implications immediately.  The point of
    the operation was simply they had to grab the bridges before they were
    destroyed.  My first operation in Holland was the same thing: I had to
    get the bridges and intact.  It's part of a classical airborne
    operation that when you take a bridge you must land on it or near it.
    If I had been [US Gen.] Brereton, I would not have divided the airborne
    troops.  I would have placed the greater proportion of troops on
    Arnhem: 1 1/2 divisions at Arnhem and the remainder at Nijmegen.
    Urquhart took my experience in Crete too seriously.  Brereton should
    have ordered 1 battalion south of Arnhem: they were dropped too far
    away.  Then, I would never have withdrawn.  I would have fought on with
    all the losses already.
         I would have taken 200 tanks and smashed through between Liege and
    the North coast.  There was no need to go by air.  We had nothing from
    4/17 - there was nothing in the gap.  They could have gotten right
    through.  The war would have been over by December."
                        - Col. Gen. Kurt Student, German 1st Parachute Army

         "I had driven back to Nijmegen and Corps headquarters for lunch
    and, following it, was invited to chat with Browning in his caravan.
    Browning said that his main objective was to keep the road open between
    Nijmegen and Eindhoven.  I remember I asked him about the crossing [of
    the Neder Rijn] and he said he did not know because it was impossible
    to get the boats up to the water.  I was astonished!  It was
    impossible?  The road was open to the west.  Two British troops had
    gotten through and ambulances were carrying my wounded back constantly!
    I told him this, but again he said he did not know.  'Where are the
    boats, please, sir?' I asked.  'Why is it possible for ambulances to
    get through and not boats from the 43rd Division?'  These were not his
    responsibility, I know, but he could not give me an answer.  That
    route, Oosterhout-Valberg, was open as late as the 25th of September
    and everyone knew it."
                   - Gen. Stanislaw Sosabowski, Polish 1st AB Brigade

         "We fought very hard at Elst to hold back the British and I was in
    constant fear that we might be encircled.  It was a relief when the
    order finally came from Bittrich to move out.  We were to draw out
    slowly and move up to Elden because the 166th Panzer Division had
    arrived finally to help block the enemy's way north.  We could safely
    evacuate Elst.  On our way to the new area we were to occupy, we passed
    a railway embankment on which stood a freight train without an engine.
    I was puzzled by the attitude of the Dutch civilians who seemed to
    avoid it.  So I asked someone what was on the train.  I was told that
    it was carrying ammunition.  Then I caught a glimse of a Polish
    paratrooper on the embankment.  Without thinking, I told one of my
    tanks to shoot a couple of times in that direction.  Suddenly there was
    a frightful explosion.  It was felt for miles around.  Men were diving
    for cover all around, thinking they were being fired upon.  The whole
    train had gone up in the air.  At any rate there was no sign of any
    more Poles.  According to a Dutchman, the Poles had occupied this
    embankment.  Now I had given myself more room to breathe, quite by
    accident."
                        - Maj. Hans-Peter Knoust, Kampfgruppe Knoust

         "One evening as I was talking with a soldier from Bavaria, I heard
    a voice saying in Russian, 'Little Father, give it to me, too.'  In a
    corner lay an old man with a deep abdominal wound who was clearly about
    to die.  In some way he had advanced with the Germans and now found
    himself in Lent.  'Where are you from?' I asked.  'From Orel.'  'The
    Krauts didn't take that, did they?'  No, little Father,' the Russian
    replied, smiling.  'Are you a true believer?'  'I sang in the church
    choir all my life,' whereupon the dying man intoned Russian Orthodox
    hymns, and I, who knew them too, joined in.  When I had administered
    the last sacraments to him, the Russian asked me, 'My son is lying
    nearby, he is in a bad way.  Go to him.'  The son was not a believer,
    but he asked for a cigarette.  'Will you put it in my mouth?' he
    requested.  His left arm was entirely gone and the lower half and hand
    of his right arm were smashed.  I looked back and saw by the old man's
    eyes that he believed he had a vision.  Somebody dressed in gold had
    come to speak with him and sing with him in his own language, and then
    there was the golden light of the candles."
                             - Father, Professor Frits van der Meer, Lent

         "When we were south of Elst, approaching the Nijmegen bridge, we
    came to an isolated house.  The whole family, about 15 to 18 children
    and adults were hiding in the cellar.  Our company commander, a 26-28
    year old lieutenant, the same who had commanded us in Arnhem, was a man
    without feelings, very cold, very hard, but weak - not strong.  We all
    disliked him.  He ordered me to shoot this Dutch family, saying, 'These
    pigs will betray us and tomorrow we'll be dead.  Why?  Because they'll
    run over to the British and tell them where we are.  Then the British
    will turn their artillery on us.  Take care of them so that they can't
    talk.'
         So I ordered these people out of the cellar and marched them to
    the edge of the woods.  Then I told them to scram, to wait in the woods
    because Montgomery was coming and the Germans would not be sticking
    around for long.  I did not make a report to my commander and he did
    not ask me whether I had carried out his orders.  I think he may not
    really have meant me to kill them and was hoping that I hadn't.  We had
    all been under a strain for days and people do strange things in such
    circumstances."
                             - Pvt. Horst Weber, German 10th SS Panzer Div.

         "If the British Armoured Guards had sped on through they would
    have run right over us.  We were very low on ammunition.  We had used
    our last grenades in order to give the impression that we had lots of
    ammunition.  We must have been successful because they stopped.  The
    British could have run over Knoust as well, although he would have put
    up one hell of a fight.  The British, however, did have to drive
    _along_ my front line for 8 km in order to go from Lent to Elst.
    Nevertheless, my task was to stop them and it was my luck that they
    hesitated."
                   - Maj. Gen. Heinz Harmel, German 10th SS Panzer Div.

         "One morning the Allies were suddenly in Lent and long columns of
    tanks stood in the streets covered with purple-red and bright yellow
    tarpaulins.  That day three girls were brought into the convent.  They
    had sought shelter somewhere and an American, thinking that they were
    Germans in hiding, had emptied his carbine on the girls, who were all
    three suffering from leg wounds.  The American was extremely upset
    about it and offered to do anything he could to help.  The man was wet
    up to his waist and had presumably crossed the river in one of the
    assult craft."
                                            - Doctor Frans Huygen, Lent

    More in a couple of days.

    Doug

Received:  18-Oct-1994 10:36am

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 10:50:43 -0400
From:    Ron Babuka <[email-masked]>
Subject: Ques: BB 36

Question:  Does anyone know what is the "All or Nothing" principle of
armoring that was introduced on the U.S.S. Nevada?
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 11:20:55 -0400
From:    Carlos R Rivera <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT: Japan if no Pearl

>
> On Mon, 17 Oct 1994 14:14:50 EDT Henry Sirotin said:
> >In any case,
> >the Japanese intention had been to challenge the US for control of the
> >western Pacific at least since 1907, when an Imperial Rescript to the
> >Japanese armed forces declared the US had replaced Russia as Japan's
> >primary enemy.
>
> Context, context--the Japanese were probably sore at Roosevelt's taking
> away their victory over Russia in 1905 (-:
>
> ken koester
> [email-masked]
>

--------Actually, the Japanese were more concerned with the control of China,
and felt more "threatened" by the Open Door Policy.  As to the "victory" issue
of 1905, the Japanese military and government knew that they lacked the
strength to continue the war much longer.  They were, though, victims of their
own propoganda, and had led the population to believe that Japan would receive
a large indemnity and perhaps additional territories
CRivera

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 11:48:31 -0400
From:    Carlos R Rivera <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT: Japan if no Pearl

Ludwig wrote:

> Reading this, the following question comes to my mind:
> I'm no expert in US naval history, but AFAIK it was the PH raid which
> definitely ended the quarrel between the gun-club and the supporters of
> the carrier force. Let's think about the following scenario:
> The Japanese attack the Philippines, and the US Navy sends in their
> Pacific fleet, all battleships and a few carriers for *air support*.
> This force encounters a Japanese carrier force supported by landbased
> aircraft from the Philipines. Wouldn't this end in an even greater
> desaster then Pearl Harbor?

----They probably wouldn't gotten that far, as the Japanese mandate in the
islands east of the Philippines were also "carriers" and bases for submarines.
The decisive battle was moved further and further eastward by Japanese planners
between 1907 and 1936.  But yes one suspects that the disaster would have been
greater.  I can't recall at the moment, but you might check "War Plan
Orange"--sorry for the plug ESM :), for related details.
CRivera

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 12:09:25 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: HIST: Taffy 3; USS Gambier Bay

From: Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, Vol. III, 1968, Navy
Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History
Division, Washington, D.C.

GAMBIER BAY CVE-73

dp. 7,800
l. 512' 3"
b. 65'
t. 108' 1"
dr. 22' 6"
s. 19 k.
a. 1 5", 16 40-mm.
cl. CASABLANCA

GAMBIER BAY, originally classified AVG-73, was reclassified ACV-73 on 20
August 1942 and again reclassified CVE-73 on 15 July 1943; launched
under a Maritime Commission Contract by the Kaiser Shipbuilding Co.,
Vancouver, Wash., 22 November 1943; sponsored by Mrs. H. C. Zitzewitz of
Oswego, Oreg.; and commissioned at Astoria, Oreg., 28 December 1943,
Captain Hugh H. Goodwin in command.

After shakedown out of San Diego, the escort carrier sailed 7 February
1944 with 400 troops embarked for  Pearl Harbor, thence to rendezvous
off the Marshalls where she flew 84 replacement planes to famed carrier
ENTERPRISE (CV-6). She returned to San Diego via Peal Harbor, ferrying
aircraft for repairs and qualified carrier pilots off the coast of
Southern California. She departed 1 May to join Read Admiral H. B.
Sallada's Carrier Support Group 2 (TG 52.11), staging in the Marshalls
for the invasion of the Mariannas.

GAMBIER BAY gave close air support to the initial landings of Marines on
Saipan 15 June 1944, destroying enemy gun emplacements, troops, tanks,
and trucks. ON the 17th her combat air control shot down or turned back
all but a handful of 47 enemy planes headed for her task group and her
gunners shot down 2 of the 3 planes that did break through to attack
her.

The following day, warning of another air attack sounded. As her
fighters prepared to take off, they found intense antiaircraft fire of
the entire task group covering their flight path. Nevertheless, in a
harrowing feat termed by Capt. Goodwin as "...another shining example of
the adaptability and courage of the young men of our country,..." eight
pilots of Composite Squadron 10 did take off to help repulse the aerial
onslaught. GAMBIER BAY remained off Saipan, repulsing aerial raids and
launching planes which strafed enemy troop concentrations, bombed gun
emplacements, and supported marines and soldiers fighting ashore.
Meanwhile, American carriers slashed the carrier air strength of the
combined Japanese Mobile Fleet and turned it back in defeat in the
Battle of the Philippine Sea. GAMBIER BAY continued close ground support
operations at Tinian (19-31 July), then turned her attention to Guam,
where she gave identical aid to invading troops until 11 August.

After a respite for logistics in the Marshalls, GAMBIER BAY spent 15 to
28 September supporting the amphibious attack which drove ashore and
captured Peleliu and Angaur, Southern Palaus. She then steamed by way of
Hollandia, New Guinea, to Manus, Admiralities, where the invasion of the
Philippines was staged. Screened by four destroyer escorts, GAMBIER BAY
and KITKUN BAY (CVE-71) escorted transports and amphibious landing ships
safely to Leyte Gulf before joining Rear Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague's
escort carrier task unit 19 September off Leyte.

The task unit comprised six escort carriers, screened by three
destroyers and four destroyer escorts, and was known by its voice radio
call as "Taffy 3".  Under the command of Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague,
eighteen escort carriers, divided into three "Taffy" units, maintained
air supremacy over Leyte Gulf and eastern Leyte. During the invasion
their planes destroyed enemy airfields, supply convoys, and troop
concentrations; gave troops driving inland vital close air support; and
maintained combat air patrol over ships in Leyte Gulf. While "Taffy 1"
and "Taffy 2" were respectively stationed off northern Mindanao and off
the entrance to Leyte Gulf, "Taffy 3" steamed off Samar.

Meanwhile, the Japanese threw their entire fleet against American naval
power in desperate gamble to destroy the largest concentration of
American shipping in Leyte Gulf. Powerful enemy forces, comprised of
carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, converged on the
Philippines in a three pronged attack to the south, center, and north.
The Japanese Southern Force met disaster before dawn 25 October as it
tried to drive through Suriago Strait to join the center force off Leyte
Gulf. While steaming through the Subiyan Sea enroute to San Bernardino
Strait, the Center Force was hit hard on the 24th by hundreds of planes
from Admiral Halsey's fast attack carriers. After the Battle of Subiyan
Sea, Admiral Halsey no longer considered the Center Force a serious
menace, and he sent the carriers north to intercept decoy carriers of
the Japanese Northern Force off Cape Engano.

These swift moving events left the escort carriers of "Taffy 3" as lone
sentinels off Samar, and unaware of the nighttime movement of the Center
Force. However, shortly after sunrise 25 October, a gap in the morning
mist disclosed the pagoda-like mast of enemy battleships and cruisers on
the northern horizon. The still dangerous enemy force of more than 20
ships had slipped undetected through San Bernardino Strait and down the
fog-shrouded coast of Samar, bound for Leyte Gulf.

Despite the probable outcome of an engagement between two so unequal
surface forces, the presence of enemy ships in Leyte Gulf was
unthinkable; and "Taffy 3" turned to do battle against the enemy.
Immediately an urgent call for help went out from "Taffy 3" as the
escort carriers steamed eastward and launched planes that performed
seemingly impossible feats: scoring hits with torpedoes, bombs, and
strafing until their ammunition ran out, then making dummy runs to break
the enemy formation and delay its advance. Smoke was laid down to cover
their running fight as the gallant destroyers docked in and out of the
mist and smoke to charge battleship, cruiser, and destroyer formations
point-blank until ordered back to cover the escort carriers with more
smoke. The lone 5-inch gun of GAMBIER BAY spat out at an enemy cruise
that shelling her; and destroyer HEERMAN (DD-532) made an unsuccessful
effort under the combined fire of the heavy ships to save GAMBIER BAY.

GAMBIER BAY was soon dead in the water as three cruisers closed to point
blank range. Fires raged through the riddled escort carrier. She
capsized and sank at 0907, 25 October 1944 with the majority of her
nearly 800 survivors rescued by landing and patrol craft dispatched from
Leyte Gulf. Three other ships, gallantly fighting to the end, went down:
HOEL (DD-533); SAMUEL B. ROBERTS (DE-413); and JOHNSTON (DD-557). The
latter used only her 5-inch guns in a dummy torpedo run that thwarted
the torpedo attack of an entire Japanese Destroyer Squadron lead by a
cruiser.

Aircraft from "Taffy 2" joined in the epic battle off Samar. The events
that followed are best described in Admiral Sprague's own words: "At
0925 my mind was occupied with dodging torpedoes when near the bridge I
heard one of the signalmen yell 'They're getting away!' I could hardly
believe my eyes, but it looked as if the whole Japanese fleet was indeed
retiring. However, it took a whole series of reports from circling
planes to convince me. And still I could not get the fact to soak into
my battle-numbed brain. At best, I had expected to be swimming by this
time."

GAMBIER BAY and other ships of "Taffy 3", aided by planes of "Taffy 2"
had stopped the powerful Japanese Center Force and inflicted a great
loss. Two enemy cruisers were sunk and much damage inflicted on the
other ships of this overwhelmingly powerful surface fleet, turned back
in the last analysis by the indomitable spirit of the men of the escort
carriers and their screen of destroyers and destroyer-escorts.

GAMBIER BAY received four battle stars for service in World War II and
shared in the award of the Presidential Unit Citation to "Taffy 3" for
extraordinary heroism in the battle off Samar.

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 12:09:41 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: HIST: Taffy-3; USS Kitkun Bay

From: Dictionary of American Fighting Ships, Vol. III, 1968, Navy
Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval History
Division, Washington, D.C.

KITKUN BAY CVE-71

dp. 7,800;
l. 512' 3";
b. 65';
ew. 101' 1"
dr. 22' 6";
s. 19 k.;
cpl. 860;
a. 1 5", 16 40-mm., 20 20-mm., 28 ac.;
cl. CASABLANCA

KITKUN BAY, originally designated as an AVG, was classified as ACV-71 on
20 August 1942 and reclassified as CVE-71 on 16 July 1943. Laid down 3
May 1943 she was launched 8 November 1943 by Kaiser Shipbuilding Co.,
Inc., Vancouver, Wash., under a Maritime Commission contract ; sponsored
by Mrs. Edward A. Cruise, and commissioned 15 December 1943, Captain J.
P. Whitney in command.

After a shakedown along the Pacific coast, KITKUN BAY departed San Diego
28 January 1944 on a replenishment voyage to the New Hebrides bases.
After loading passengers, planes, and other cargo, she sailed for home
18 February via Pearl Harbor and arrived San Diego 6 March. Upon her
return, the planes of VC-6 were brought aboard for training and
assignment. With Rear Admiral Harold B. Salada, Commander, Carrier
Division 26 embarked, she sailed 1 May for Pearl Harbor and the
completion of her training exercises.

On 31 May her task unit sortied forth to escort the bombardment and
transports units of Task Group 52.17 to Saipan. On 13 June her planes
shot down their first enemy aircraft and the next day began the bombing
and strafing of enemy positions in the Marianas. KITKUN BAY's planes
alternated flying support missions for the Saipan landings and air cover
for ships east of this island. Eight enemy planes were splashed in
attacks on her formation on the 17th and her own guns downed three more
the next day. Early July brought a brief respite at Eniwetok but 14 July
she resumed support sorties at Saipan, Tinian, and from 2 to 4 August at
Guam.

Withdrawn, she steamed to Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides, for upkeep
before sailing to the Solomons for additional practice in support of
amphibious operations. Heading westward on 8 September her task unit
escorted an assault force to Peleliu and Angaur Islands in the Palaus
group and provided cover from the 15th to 21st. Withdrawn to Manus,
Admiralty Islands, she made preparations for the invasion of Leyte,
P.I., and her finest hour.

Departing 12 October she soon joined Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague's task
unit "Taffy 3" composed of 6 CVE's and their screen of escorts. On 20
October KITKUN BAY began launching strikes against Leyte. These
operations conducted from a position east of Samar Island continued
until early in the morning of the 25th when Japanese warships were
sighted on the northwest horizon. Admiral Kurita's powerful Center Force
had passed through the San Bernadino Straits unnoticed, hoping to
destroy the supply ships off Leyte. Not designed to exchange gunfire
with surface warships "Taffy 3" launched what planes were ready and
turned southward behind a smoke screen. In the ensuing 2-hour running
battle, the courageous maneuvers and skillful action of its screen, the
diverting attacks by its planes, the astute orders of its command
officers averted annihilation. In the forefront of the circular
formation KITKUN BAY escaped any direct hits as the shells splashed ever
closer until 0925 when the enemy suddenly broke off the engagement and
retired. The less fortunate GAMBIER BAY and three escort ships went down
fighting valiantly; while suffering some gunfire damage, the Center
Force lost three cruisers as a result of the attacks of the
aircraft of "Taffies 2 and 3."

The final phase of the epic Battle of Leyte Gulf was the retaliatory air
strikes by both sides. Before the "Fore noon" watch had expired, KITKUN
BAY had splashed a suicidal Betty but had also been crashed by a Zeke
which struck the port catwalk killing 1 man and wounding 16. The losses
for the day also included two planes and their crews. The nest day she
sailed for Manus in the Admiralty Islands for replenishment and repairs.

Arrived 1 November, she departed Manus the 7th for Pearl Harbor where
VC-5 was replaced by VC-91. Despite a submarine attack en route, KITKUN
BAY returned safely to Manus 17 December. New Year's Day 1945 dawned
with CVE-71 steaming as part of Task Unit 77.4.3 (Lingayen Transport
Cover Group) bound for the invasion of western Luzon. After passing
through Surigao Straits, the convoy underwent a series of air attacks.
Air cover destroyed seven enemy planes but at 1857 an Oscar got through
and crashed KITKUN BAY's portside amidships at the waterline. Almost
simultaneously a 5-inch shell struck her starboard side. The resultant
fires and flooding were brought under control but 16 were dead and 37
wounded. The following day with a list and only one engine operating she
withdrew and proceeded by stages first to Leyte, Manus, Pearl Harbor and
arrived San Pedro, Calif., 28 February.

Two months later she sailed again for the Western Pacific. After a
training period in the Hawaiian Islands, she departed 15 June for Ulithi
and duty with the 3d Fleet. On 3 July KITKUN BAY sortied forth with
other escorts and ships of the "train" for support of the fast carriers
operating off the coast of Japan. Mid-August she was reassigned to Task
Force 44 gathering at Adak, Alaska, to escort Admiral F. J. Fletcher,
COMNORPAC, who had been designated to receive the formal surrender of
the Japanese in northern Honshu and Hokkaido. Arrived off Honshu 7
September, she remained in the area until the 27th, seeing to the
feeding and transportation of American prisoners of war. Detached to
participate in Operation "Magic Carpet," she first debarked 554 troops
at San Francisco 19 October. Additional voyages to Pearl Harbor and
Okinawa concluded 12 January 1946 at San Pedro, Calif.

KITKUN BAY entered Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, 18 February
and decommissioned 19 April. Sold 18 November 1946 to Zidell Machinery &
Supply Co., Portland, Oreg., she was scrapped early in 1947.

In addition to the Presidential Unit Citation KITKUN BAY earned six
battle stars during World War II.

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 11:08:36 -0500
From:    Greg Kelley <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO: The "Big" what-if?

On Fri, 7 Oct 1994, Henry Sirotin wrote:

>
> Assuming Britain falls, Russia is a deadlock, Japan is contained and
> Germany is at war with the US, my nominee for a likely scenario? Shortly
> after 11pm on the night of July 3, 1948, 90 B-36s take off from bases in
> New England in groups of three. The plane has never been seen outside the
> US and Canada. At the same time, a massive invasion fleet that had been
> detection, attack simultaneously at 410mph from 42000 feet, which stuns
> the few German observers who detect them. By the time the observers react,
> the thirty largest cities in Germany are radioactive ash, and the
> plaintive call of German commanders all across southern Britain,
> "We are being fired upon. What shall we do?" goes into an ethereal
> void.
>
> Sorry about the length of this, but it WAS fun.
>
>
>
> Henry "Wave the Bloody Flag" Sirotin
>
What?!? How did all those B-36s get past the assorted WASSERFALL,
RHEINTOCHTER, and RHEINBOTE antiaircraft missile batteries that would've
ringed the Reich by 1948?  And just when would the Luftwaffe retaliate
with its long-range gruppen of Horten Flying Wings (not the fighter, the
strategic bomber version with the 300ft wingspan).

Undetected over the poles is a nice idea, but I would've guessed the
German weather & early warning stations in Spitzbergen and eastern
Greenland might`ve picked them up on their radar.  Still, I've always had
a fondness for using B-36s in strategic raids against a future Reich.
Would any of them be carrying parasol F-80 fighters for escort purposes?

                                     Glad To Be Of Service!

                                     Greg Kelley, St. Paul Public Library
                                     (who's glad the B-36s didn't target
                                      Bucharest on their first strike...)

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 11:56:03 -0400
From:    "David a. Vandenbroucke" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HIST: Origins of Pearl Harbor Raid?

The description of the simulated attack on PH was very interesting.  While
I'm sure it was useful the Japanese, we should also keep in mind that they
already had the home-grown example of their raid on Port Arthur to serve
as inspiration.

--Dav Vandenbroucke
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 12:39:55 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Rumanian Army & other Balkan forces

Greg: continued thanks-- I'm almost through "Germany And Its Allies" and it
is excellent... I don't know if you're familiar with it but maybe I have one
to suggest for you-- "The Green Shirts and The Others: A History of Fascism
in Hungary and Rumania" by Nicholas Nagy-Talavera, a nice, scholarly but
never boring look at the Iron Guard, Arrow Cross, etc... not quite military
history but first-rate on the political background to these two nations'
involvement in WW2-- the author was a Transylvanian Jew who managed to survive
the war as a teenager in Budapest (however, he doesn't relate many personal
anecdotes unless they help illustrate points of the narrative).  It also fills
in a lot of the social history for the Hungarian peasant that C A Macartney
basically omits in the otherwise outstanding "October 15th: A History Of
Modern Hungary 1929-45" (with the explanation that the common people had
no say and therefore no real interest in politics in Hungary at this time).
Anyway, I digress, but "The Green Shirts etc" divvies up space about 50-50
between Rumania and Hungary and I found both parts immensely interesting...
...well, gotta go...An English copy of Admiral Golovko's "With The Fleet"
just showed up at the main campus library and I'm anxious to dive in
(he commanded Soviet Northern Fleet throughout the war)

Regards

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 13:28:03 -0400
From:    Jim Bowman <[email-masked]>
Subject: THIS LIST, 4TH INF DIV, MARINES

I must bow out of the list for a while, usin America Online is much too bulky
wo I will rejoin when the new software issue comes out in the fall.  But I
would like to comment as an avid reader.
Thanks to John Ausland for information on how to research a soldier who died
in France 1944.  I am progressing in bits and starts but would like anyone
who might have knowledge of a book "History of the Twelfth Infantry Regiment
in WWII" to leave me email
[email-masked].  I would like to show a copy to the soldier's sister there
are still things that even after 50 years have not been tied up.

As to the Marines.  A running theme during the few months I have been reading
here has been the fact that the Marine actions which occurred during the
summer of 44 were not handled very well during the hoopla over D-Day.  Some
of us do not need rememberances in the media.  It was most eloquently stated
during an interview I heard on NPR.  Terry Gross, WHYY, was interviewing a
poet (I cant remember his name) who had just won a McArthur grant.  The man
had been through some tough times.  His wife had left him, and during the
period he had been hit by a car, had his leg shattered and amputated and the
other partially paralysed.  Terry asked him how he got through it.  He
responded, "Being a man of letters, I read a lot."
She asked him what he read to gain strength.  She, and I, expected him to say
The Bible, or one of the Classics, or perhaps a great theologian or
philosopher; instead he responded, "I read about Marines in World War Two."
 I'll never forget his tone of voice when he said it, ive never heard "Thank
you" stated so eloquently.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 13:47:16 -0400
From:    Peter Smith <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Ques: BB 36

On Tue, 18 Oct 1994 10:50:43 -0400, Ron Babuka <[email-masked]> asked:
> Question:  Does anyone know what is the "All or Nothing" principle of
> armoring that was introduced on the U.S.S. Nevada?

The idea was that rather than spreading lighter and heavier armor over the
entire ship, all armor would be concentrated around the ship's vitals and
the remainder would be left unarmored.  In practice, this called for an
armored "citadel" containing the turrets, their magazines, the furnaces
and boilers, and the fighting bridge.  Bow and stern spaces, which con-
tained mostly accomodations, workshops, and stores, were outside, and while
they could be easily pierced and flooded, such hits were unlikely to reduce
short-term fighting ability in the beyond perhaps reducing speed.

I believe the British are usually credited with this plan, but I defer to
those listmembers who have their references handy.
--
Peter Smith -- Data General Corp., Westboro MA, USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 13:56:33 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INF:Regia Marina, Part 4

        Regarding the "exploits of the Lupo and Saggitario, whatever these
were"-- actually a damn good story, and by happy coincidence one that ties in
obliquely with Terry's posts on the fighting for Crete ("Merkur").
        Lupo and Saggitario ("Wolf" and "Archer") were both destroyer escorts.
I don't have the exact specs on hand but in the Regina Marina of this period
that would mean vessels of 600-700 tons, usually mounting three 100-mm guns
plus torpedo tubes and AA armament (if memory serves, the usual AA on these
ships was two 37-mm plus four 13.2-mm mgs on two twin mounts).  I'm mentioning
this to put in perspective the relative fighting power of these Italian DE's
as opposed to the British ships they faced-- not quite as grand a tale as
Heerman, Hoel, etc vs the Yamato & co at Samar, but still quite a mismatch.
        As the German plan for the rapid conquest of Crete began to suffer
serious delays and reverses (see Terry's aforementioned posts for the
blow-by-blow) emergency reinforcement convoys were hastily organized.  The
first of these consisted of 18 small ships, including many locally-commandeered
Greek vessels, carrying about 1,500 men.  The troops were mostly German but
also included a small contingent of Italian marines from the Regimento San
Marco which had originally been assigned as prospective garrison forces for
Suda Bay.  This convoy had Lupo as its sole escort.  En route they were
intercepted by a British force consisting of three light cruisers (Ajax, Orion,
and I think the third one was Achillies) plus four destroyers.  The Lupo,
under Commander Mimbelli, immediately attacked the far superior British force,
engaging first the nearest destroyer and then one of the cruisers with its main
batteries, then closing in to 700 meters to fire torpedoes.  Although none of
these struck the enemy ships Mimbelli then astounded his opponents by steaming
straight through the British formation, passing between the Ajax and the Orion.
By some miracle the little Italian DE survived this fight, despite the fact
that it had been hit by 18 6-inch shells during the engagement, suffering heavy
casualties to the crew.  British ships were reported to have inflicted
"friendly fire" damage on each other as they tried to track the Lupo when it
passed through their formation.  Despite the Lupo's heroics, however, the small
convoy was subsequently destroyed almost to the last ship.
        Sagitario was escorting a larger convoy-- 38 ships carrying 4,000
German mountain troops (originally intended for Heraklion but diverted to
Maleme because that was one area the Germans had secured-- the Lupo convoy had
also been bound for Maleme)-- one day after the Lupo's adventure.  It too was
intercepted, by British Admiral King with a force reported by the Italians as
five cruisers and two destroyers.  Again the lone Italian DE immediately
attacked its far superior opponent to buy time for the convoy to disperse and
flee.  The difference was that the British-- like Kimura's fleet at Samar--
wound up getting confused or discouraged and themselves broke off the
engagement.  The Sagitario's commander, Lt. Giuseppe Cigala, was carried ashore
on the shoulders of the German mountain troops he saved when the Italian DE
returned to port.  (a little different than the average story of Italian
participation in the war, huh?)

Sources: Raymond de Belot "The Struggle For The Mediterranean, 1939-45"
         Marc'Antonio Bragadin, "The Italian Navy In World War Two"
(I don't actually have these here with me but those were the two most
detailed accounts of these actions I've read...De Belot was a French admiral
who commanded a sub flotilla working with the Brits in the North Sea in '40:
Bragadin served most of the war on Supermarina staff but also, coincidentally,
earlier in the war commanded the MAS flotilla which were the first Axis
forces to enter Suda Bay after the British left...)

PS: Joe, if you're not familiar with the Bragadin book and are interested
in the topic, as I assume you are, I'd say its a must-read...best thing I've
been able to get on the subject (although I look forward to getting my hands
on the Sadkovich book of approx. same title-- his "Reevaluating the Major Naval
Combatants of WW2" is great stuff, although he was only the editor).  Bragadin
also has most of the references to the San Marco Regt that I've been able to
find to date.

Regards

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 13:02:46 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: OSS-William Colby

Hello, Mary!

I will post to you some info on Mr.Colby tomorrow. I am away from my
home and all I have on him is there.

More later.

Terry

>        Hello everyone. I am interested in finding information regarding
>    William Colby's involvement with the OSS. I have consulted several
>    biographical materials on Colby, but have been unable to find
>    detailed information on his decision-making in the OSS. I am also
>    interested in information relating to Operation- SPARTAN. Thanks!
>

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 11:19:32 +0200
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: 50TH: HOLDING THE LINE IN GERMANY

  October 18, 1994

  I have not been active here recently because I have been traveling.
  From our arrival in Germany in September until its participation in the
fighting in the Huertgen Forest in November and December, the 4th Infantry
Division was "holding the line" just inside Germany.  With the infantry
battalions rotating in and out of the line, I spent some of the time in a rest
area in Belgium.  This gave me time to write a few letters.  Here are a couple
which I wrote:

          Dear Folks, October 18, 1944, Somewhere in Belgium

          Without going into any details, I will tell you that my section
          and I are occupying a Belgian home for a few days rest. Of
          course, it is not really a rest; it's more an opportunity to get
          our clothes cleaned up and our equipment in condition.

          Dad can tell you about the rain at this time of year in this
          part of the world. The sun rarely shines; it rains every day;
          and when it isn't raining the sky is usually overcast. Dirt
          roads become quagmires. It isn't really cold yet, but it's
          getting that way.

          My usual abode is in a slit trench, covered over with timber
          and dirt. Even with a shelter-half over this, I woke up the
          other morning and thought I was in a quartermaster shower.

          I have a couple of kids in my section. They're really just
          children. It's in some ways a pity they have to see all this
          before they're really old enough to leave their mothers.

          As for letters to Margaret, apparently I've slipped up here.
          But notice, my letters are started "Dear Folks" and are
          intended for all of you. There is neither news enough nor
          time enough to write to individuals. Enclosed in this
          envelope is a letter to Margaret, though.  (Note:
          Margaret is my sister.)

          All my love, John

          Dear Dad, October 19, 1944, Somewhere in Belgium

          Your letter on the weather, German resistance, etc. was a
          source of encouragement for me and several of my fellow
          officers. We are buckling down to a resumption of close,
          difficult fighting.

          Incidentally, yours and the family's letters sound like a
          Safety First Program. You all should know that anyone who
          has seen as much of this as we have soon comes to the
          conclusion that wars are not won by individuals. All of us
          have long since gotten over the sight-seeing attitude toward
          the war, at least all of us who have had machine guns,
          rifles, 88s, rockets, etc. cut loose at us at one time or
          another and sometimes all at once. If this war should get
          me, I sincerely hope I'm not some place I had no business.

          Your son, John

          Excerpted from Chapter 11 of my book LETTERS HOME: A WAR MEMOIR.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 13:26:21 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HIST: Origins of Pearl Harbor Raid?

Hello, Steve!

That is a great post and most interesting. Although Admiral Yarnell
may have been the inspiration of the concept of bombing PH, the
decisive British air raid on the Italian navy anchored at Taranto
provided the Japanese with the latest example or event in which an
anchored fleet could have been attacked that could be studied in
detail, and it was also a combat situation, not a peacetime exercise
or attempt to evade detection as Admiral Yarnell attempted to do.

Just my two cents' worth on this, but the attack at Taranto provided
the Japanese with an excellent opportunity to apply theory to
practice.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 13:39:28 EST
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Ques: BB 36

Ron,
        All or nothing refers to the placement of armor.  American
designers concentrated on protecting the citadel (magazines, propulsion,
command functions, turrets) and placed little or no armor on non-
vital sections of the ships.  Vital sections got _all_ the armor that
was needed (in theory anyway) and non-vital got the _nothing_.  This
allowed American designers to use thicker armor as the total weight of
the armor did not include thin plating that would have been pierced
in any case.  Many foreign dreadnoughts of the time had armor belts
that were at maximum thickness for only a very small area of their
total coverage.
Hope that helps,

Brad Coon
[email-masked]
[email-masked]

IPFW Serials Assistant
(219)481-6882

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 15:19:12 EDT
From:    David Flikkema <[email-masked]>
Subject: NO SUBJECT

-------------------- Mail Item Text Follows ------------------

Microsoft Mail v3.0 IPM.Microsoft Mail.Note
From: Flikkema, David - MROC
To:  Internet
Date: 1994-10-18 15:16
Priority:
Message ID: A8D37176
Conversation ID: A8D37176

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

INDEX wwii-l

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 15:25:20 EDT
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Recollections of the Pointe

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  18-Oct-1994 03:25pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Recollections of the Pointe

    [From Cornelius Ryan's files for _The Longest Day_, here are some of
    the recollections from vets of the 2nd Ranger Battalion.  Pointe du Hoe
    was supposed to to have a battery of navel guns which could blast both
    American beaches.  Jean Marion tried to warn that they were not
    mounted, but to no avail.  The Rangers lost 135 men out of 225 taking
    the cliff.  I'm still trying to find out what German unit was
    positioned there.  Sorry the following turned out so long.  Well, sort
    of.]

         "After reaching the edge of the water and while running across the
    beach, I suddenly found myself on the sand as if knocked down by some
    unknown force.  My first thought was - I have had it.  I immediately
    felt of my body - no bolld, no pain.  I realized that my carbine had
    been knocked out of my hands and was about 10 feet away lying on the
    sand.  Mt first thought was to get across the beach and to reach cover
    at the base of the cliff.  I jumped up, picked up my carbine and raced
    across the beach.  At the base of the cliff, I found that the forearm
    stock of my carbine had been knocked off.  This I could not understand.
    On the night of D-Day, I found two bullets in an ammo pouch which was
    strapped to my right side and also one bullet which had struck in my
    first aid packet.  Apparently I had been hit with a burst of long range
    MG fire which knocked the stock from my carbine, two bullets hitting my
    right hip and sticking in the ammo pouch (2 1/2 blocks of TNT were
    smashed), and one bullet striking my first aid packet.  No other
    damage."
              - Capt. Edgar Arnold, Co. B, 2nd Rangers, DSC 6/7/44

         "I recall that after rolling on the English Channel in those small
    LCA's for a couple hours when my feet hit solid ground, the ground
    started rolling and a couple of times it came up and hit me, or vice
    versa.
         "I also recall once topside of the cliff, I first caught up with
    my CO, he had a prisoner which he turned over to me and told me to take
    him to the beach.  I started off but missed the spot I came up the
    cliff and realized when the bullets started flying I was walking into a
    German machine gun on our flank.  From shell hole to shell hole we
    started back the other way, and I would jump into the shell hole first,
    cover[ing] my prisoner coming in after me.  Only one time he fell in
    dead, killed by his own machine gunners.  Later on, when the CO asked
    about the prisoner, he or the other boys would not believe the story
    and figured I shot him.
                                  - PFC Carl Bombardier, 2nd Rangers

         "I was on flank patrol with Orapello and Sgt. Stivinson when we
    came under morter and artillery fire.  The main group hit the dirt as
    we did diving into a large shell hole.  When we looked over the edge of
    the shell hole our main group was being marched off by the Germans.  We
    immediately began to fire upon the Germans but our M-1's jammed and we
    watched while two of our buddies were taken prisoner.  As we found out
    later, these cliffs which we had taken were honeycombed with tunnels
    and the Germans could pop up anywhere at anytime."
                                       - PFC John Gilhooly, 2nd Rangers

         "After we crossed the beach, we lay flat under the cliff overhangs
    and I heard this voice hollering, 'Captain, mashed potatoes, mashed
    potatoes!'  It was Mike Gargas, the messenger from the second platoon,
    warning me that there was a potato masher grenade between my legs.  I
    managed to creep ahead enough so when it went off, it did not hurt me.
    The name 'mashed potatoes' stuck with Mike the rest of the war.
         I remember Otto Stephens who led the climbing party up the cliff
    by pulling himself up with a bayonet to anchor a rope for the rest of
    us to climb.  Also the aide man, Cpl. Rinker, who made trip after trip
    back out on the beach to bring in and treat wounded under the cliff
    overhangs.  Lt. Moody, who died cleaning out the trenches topside and
    Sgt. Belcher who single handed dispatched all the occupants of several
    dugouts."
                             Capt. Ralph Goranson, Co C, 2nd Rangers

         "As in cliff climbing it is important to travel as light as
    possible, all of us were most anxious to get ashore dry.  Thr British
    navel personnel who manned the LCA's assured us that they would beach
    the craft so that we could step ashore on dry land.  When my LCA
    touched down and the ramp was dropped I dashed out first into what I
    believed was only a few inches of water.
         However we were up against the edge of a deep crater from a large
    aerial bomb and the next thing I knew I was on the bottom in about ten
    or twelve feet of water.  I forgot to inflate my life preserver and
    being loaded down with a radio, grenades and other necessities I had a
    real job getting ashore.  The ground was clay and chalk and was wet and
    slippery.  Every time I thought I was ashore another wave would knock
    me down and roll me around and then pull me back into deep water.  The
    rest of the men, seeing me disappear under water, realized how deep it
    was and walked around the edge of the crater and most were ashore and
    dry before I was.
         I was so angry at everything and everybody that I wasn't even
    aware of the enemy fire until some men next to me were hit."
                   - 2nd Lt. George Kerchner, Co D, 2nd Rangers, DSC 6/6/44

         "[Because] the rope ladders and scaling ropes to be used in
    climbing the cliffs, which were to be carried to the top of the cliffs
    by rockets, fell short by reason of having become water logged on the
    rough trip in from the transport area, numerous means were improvised
    to climb the cliff such as sections of steel ladders, small hand lines,
    free climbing, and the like."
                             - 1st Lt. Theodore Lapres, Co E, 2nd Rangers

         "When we hit the beach and were unloading the ammo, we had to
    carry the stuff about 40 yards across the beach and this was under
    machine gun fire and small arms fire.  We would grab a box of stuff,
    run across the beach, drop it back far enough so the high tide coming
    in would not touch it, and then dash back to the boat and get another
    box.  On a return trip to the boat, myself and John Cobb got to the
    boat at the same time.  I reached into the boat first and picked up a
    box and was just going to turn and make another dash across the beach.
    Cobb said, 'Give me that one and you get another one.'  So I handed him
    the box and he turned and took about 3 or 4 steps and I heard him
    screem.  I looked around real fast and he was on the beach and I could
    see that half of his upper left arm had been shot off by machine gun
    fire.  Had I taken the box and started the run, I would have gotten it
    instead.  Also he was about 5" taller, so maybe my head would have
    stopped the slugs instead of my arm."
                                  Sgt. Regis McCloskey, Co F, 2nd Rangers

         "PFC Bill Roberts of Charleroi, Pa. told us one about T/5 Albert
    J. Uronis.  The two of them came upon an abandoned Jerry machine gun in
    the midst of a hot fire-fight.  We were short of bullets and had
    practically no automatic weapons, but had been taught to use theirs in
    just such a situation.  Bill grabbed the Jerry machine-gun, set it up,
    and began to raise hell with it.  'AJ' (Uronis' nickname) suddenly let
    out a yell 'I'm hit, Roberts, I'm hit,' and fell to the ground.  Bill
    stopped firing and tried to assist 'AJ.'  'Where are you hit,' he
    asked.  'Here,' said Uronis, pointing to his chest.  Bill looked and
    could find no wound, meanwhile 'AJ' continued to groan loudly.
    Finally, Roberts said, 'AJ you're alright.  I can't find any wound.'
    Then he realized the ejected shells had bounced off Uronis' chest with
    great rapidity and some force, but of course he was unhurt.  "AJ' very
    sheepishly arose, picked up his rifle and once again the two of them
    made Jerry pretty uncomfortable.  Poor Uronis, never did quite live
    this down."
                                  - PFC Paul Medeires, Co E, 2nd Rangers

         [from interview notes:]  Petty says that PFC Herman Stein was
    "probably our best soldier."  He himself had little contact with Stein
    on D-Day.  Petty describes him, though, as a case in point for the
    "chanciness" of military citations and awards.  It weems that Stein
    merited a medal many, many times in the course of the war, but never in
    circumstances where an officer was present to write him a citation.
    The irony: Petty finally wrote him a citation, lifted virtually
    verbatim from "The Ballad of Roger Young," recommending him for the
    Medal of Honor.  He didn't get the Medal of Honor - but on this basis
    of action well known to have been performed by someone else, in the
    Pacific theater, Stein got the DSC.
                        - Sgt. William "L-Rod" Petty, Co F, 2nd Rangers

         "We were a photographic assignment unit assigned to the First US
    Army.  Around the 15th of May 1944 we received teletype orders to
    report to the Second Ranger Battalion.  Upon arrival we learned that we
    would have the opportunity to obtain some of the best pictures of the
    coming invasion of fortress Europe.  The Rangers had been training for
    months while we were untrained in cliff-scaling.  But the Army had an
    answer for that; one of the scaling means was fireman's ladders mounted
    on DUWK's.
         All our study of aerial photos, stereos, and models of the cliffs
    was for naught because the four-hour aerial bombing and the 250 16-inch
    navel shells had completely changed the appearance of the cliffs and
    had covered the beach with so much debris that it was impossible to get
    the DUWK's out of the water.  In fact, to get ashore I had to swim,
    getting all of my extra film wet."
                             - 1st Lt. Amos Potts, Signal Service Battalion

    [We recently found four photos of those DUWK's mounted with firemen's
    ladders - to the best of my knowledge no other photos exist.]

         "Unless one was an historian, one wouldn't keep an hourly diary.
    It was like the six photographers who were sent along and told to get
    pictures and not obituaries.  We got 3 obituaries, all lost cameras and
    no pictures.
         [friends killed or wounded]  "Sgt. Richards.  He carried the BAR,
    which I think is the best gun the army ever made.  I was Jack's
    assistant.  He could have easily gotten out of the invasion for he had
    high blood pressure.  Around noon Jack spotted quite a bit of movement
    about 2 to 3/4 of a mile ahead and in so doing asked me to see if I
    could make out who they were.  I gazed innocently for a moment and then
    realized how naked I felt.  I said, 'I'll be darned if they're our guys
    or not and I'll be damned if I'll sit up here any longer to figger it
    out,' and with that slid down.  Jack took the glasses again and said,
    'You know Herm, they look like our guys.'  'Yeah! But get down for a
    few minutes and we'll figger out what to do,' I answered.  But Jack
    insisted on making sure and a moment later Jack slumped over the edge
    of the embankment.  I pulled him back down by the feet.  The blood was
    gushing out of his throat.  I held my hand over the hole in his throat
    trying to stop the flow of blood, but that high blood pressure of his
    was pumping like mad.  A couple of minutes later Jack's eyes opened in
    a glassy, far away look and I knew he was gone.  I carried Jack's blood
    on my heavy undershirt for many weeks.  Jack was the kind of guy who
    would have never done that in training.  He was the model soldier to go
    by the book.
         One of the heroes was Bill Anderson who slid a bang-o-lor torpedo
    into one of the pill boxes.  Bill got killed on [Hill] 4 along with his
    brother Jack, but any tribute that can be paid to Bill, it couldn't be
    to a more deserving guy for just downright bolld and guts.  Bill was a
    braggart and self-centered, but he had the stuff to back it up.  The
    same type of nut as L-Rod Petty, only that L-Rod had the knack of
    leadership where Bill was singular.  These were the colorful ones -
    Bill, Petty, the mad Russian Uronis, Lt. Hill, Red McHugh, and a
    replacement that slips my memory for a moment.  You can count them on
    the fingers of one hand that there are in a Company but take them away
    and you'll never win a war.  And then you've got the sloggers that are
    always in there pitching but never go out of their way looking for
    trouble.  This bunch may be about a third of the company and then
    you've got a batch of dead wood that don't know how to get out of their
    own way.  As far as D-Day went, we had as good a bunch of soldiers that
    you could ever muster into one group and we were far from being
    perfect.  As far as functioning as a coordinated attack group, we
    stunk: but for individual and group fighting, the Germans were no match
    for us.
         For accomplishing the day's mission you have to give credit to
    Petty and his group, Sgt. Kuhn and boys from D and a group from E who
    performed as Sgt. Otto would say - 'A-perfect, Old grandpa's play' -
    and this was going straight up the middle when we played football in
    England.  These were the boys who got to the guns and dropped thermite
    grenades into the barrels.  A supposedly 4 hr. mission that went into 3
    days.
         Another thing that stunk was quite a few of the officers wrote
    each other up citations.  And if you look through the annuls of the
    rest of the combat, you'll find it's the only time they got away with
    it.  A small hard core of us saw to it that only the deserving got tham
    after that.  Any of the officers who had a conscience felt pretty lousy
    about it afterward."
                                  - T/5 Herman Stein, Co F, 2nd Rangers

         [twice wounded] "The first time was a bullet piercing my leg like
    something hot going through my leg.  The second one was an artillery
    shell with great concussion."  [That's all he had to say about the
    whole operation!  And, he called the place _Pointe du Hoe_, so there.]
                                       - Lt. Col. James Rudder, 2nd Rangers

    Had enough?

    Doug

Received:  18-Oct-1994 03:25pm

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 15:05:47 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Invasion of Crete -- Operation Merkur

Hello, Emery and Dave!

Here goes with the last installment on the Crete operation.

As the intelligence officer of the 23rd New Zealand Battalion
commented: "The men who had worked dogs and sheep in the southern
alps of New Zealand had proved a match for the men of the 5th
Mountain Division trained in the alps of Austria.

Thus it came to its sad, inevitable end. A cordon was thrown round
the evacuation beach while Freyberg pleaded with Wavell and the New
Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. Frazer himself, for more ships. But the
Royal Navy, which would lose over 2000 men in the withdrawal, could
not afford to lose any more precious vessels.

Lots were drawn who should go and Freyberg himself had to detail the
officers who would be evacuated and those who would stay. Hargest was
told he could not be taken off and 'obeyed with a light heart.'
Kippenberger's attempt to do the same was 'sharply rebuked.' So he
and the men who were to go with him tramped to the beach, 'the last
part lined with men who had lost their units and were hoping for a
place with us. Some begged and implored, most watched stonily, so
that we felt bitterly ashamed.'

The Battle for Crete was over.

Hope this was of interest.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 16:04:15 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INF:Regia Marina, Part 4

        Addendum to my post on Lupo and Sagitario-- I think the third British
light cruiser in the Lupo action was the Dido, not the Achillies (the pairing
of Ajax and Achillies in my memory no doubt has to do with the Graf Spee
episode-- or maybe just too many dead brain cells).  I also wanted to mention
that not only the British ships engaging Lupo suffered from "friendly fire."
The Sagitario, before reaching home to receive the accolades of the grateful
Gebirgsjagern had to successfully dodge five different attacks by "friendly"
Stukas.

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 20:22:02 GMT
From:    SYSTEM 0PERATOR <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RESEARCH: USAF Air Wings

Wow ! Jack, great info. thanks infinitely. Just was I was looking for.

> Can you be a little more specific in what you are looking for?

I am trying to have the OB of the U.S. Air Forces bombing Germany
for a strategic game named "War in Russia".
At wing level, fortunately (so this should be fairly simple).

I must assign a name, a "main type of aircraft" per period, and a date
of start of operations over Germany to each wing which strategic-bombed
the Reich.
Oh well yes, I must find the 15th A.F. wings too.

With the information you brought, here is what my database would look like :

WING           A.F.   Start of ops.    main aircraft
1st Bomber      8       08/42           B-17
13th B          8       09/43           B-17
45th B          8       09/43           B-17
304th B         15      12/43           B-24
2nd B           8       09/43           B-24
5th B           15      11/43           B-17
20th B          8       09/43           B-24
42th B          12      08/43           ????
55th B          15      03/44           B-24
6th Fighter     8    N/A : training only, no strategic bombing ops
7th F           15      11/43           various
8th F           12      08/43           various
65th F          8       07/43           various
70th F          N/A : Not assigned to strategic bomber escort
62nd F          12      02/43           various
63rd F          12      02/43           various
67th F          8       02/43           various
71st F          N/A : Not assigned to strategic bomber escort

Any other wings I should add ?

Arnaud.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 20:46:03 EDT
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO: The "Big" what-if?

To Greg and Henry, regarding war with Germany
      I find these scenarios very interesting, but what makes you so sure
that we'd be at war with them?  With the fall of Britain, what would we
fight for?  If you remember correctly, even in the darkest moments of
WWII for England, we were kind of luke warm at best.  After Dec. 6, it
was get the Japs back, not liberate Europe.  It was mostly by Churchill's
good relationship with Roosevelt and Roosevelt's understanding of the
European plight that formulated the "Europe First" strategy.
    What if the Germans had developed and atomic bomb?  While they weren't
on their way to one in 1945, they weren't occupying history either.  The
problem with doing these "what-if's" are that the smallest assumption or
change in assumption radically changes the possible outcomes.

That's my .5 cents.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 18 Oct 1994 20:52:00 EDT
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 19 OCT 44

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
THURSDAY, 19 OCTOBER 1944
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  C-47, Douglas Skytrain
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): A B-24 bombs Kurabu Cape on Paramushiru
Island.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA (CBI) THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  BURMA-INDIA (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 10 P-47s blast approaches to 2
bridges in the Mawlu area and 15 support ground forces in the Mohnyin area,
hitting the village of Nyaunggaing and damaging a nearby bridge and pounding
the railroad station at Kadu. In India, a detachment of the 1st Combat Cargo
Squadron, 1st Combat Cargo Group, begins operating from Hathazari, India with
C-47s (squadron is based at Sylhet, India).

  CHINA (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 100+ P-51s and P-40s on armed
reconnaissance over S China hit numerous targets of opportunity from the
Tungting Lake area to Luichow Peninsula; the fighter-bombers concentrate on
rivercraft, troop compounds, and building areas; the 35th Photographic
Reconnaissance Squadron, Fourteenth AF, based at Chanyi, sends a detachment
to operate from Chihkiang with F-5s.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 2 missions are flown.
  Mission 683: 1,022 bombers and 753 fighters attack targets in Germany using
PFF or GH; 6 bombers and 2 fighters are lost:
  1. 381 B-24s are dispatched to hit the diesel engine and armored vehicle
plant at Gustavsburg (50) and the Mainz marshalling yard (280) the secondary
target; 5 B-24s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 148 damaged; 3 airmen
are KIA and 49 MIA. Escort is provided by 195 P-47s and P-51s; 1 P-47 is lost
(pilot MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair.
  2. 217 of 267 B-17s hit the secondary target, Mannheim; 34 others hit a
target of opportunity; 1 B-17 is lost and 97 damaged; 2 airmen are KIA, 1 WIA
and 10 MIA. Escort is provided by 286 P-47s and P-51s; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot
MIA).
  3. 374 B-17s are dispatched to hit an artillery tractor plant at Mannheim
(25); 257 hit the secondary, Mannheim; targets of opportunity are Karlsruhe
(32), Kreuznach (10), Rudesheim (9), Bad Kreuznach (8), Steyer (2) and other
(21); 182 B-17s are damaged; 2 airmen are KIA and 4 WIA. Escort is provided
by 226 P-47s and P-51s; 1 P-51 is damaged beyond repair.
  Mission 684: 5 B-17s and 5 B-24s are dispatched to drop leaflets in France,
the Netherlands and Germany during the night.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): Weather prevents bomber operations;
fighters attack a tank concentration E of Luneville, France, strafe targets
NW of Kaiserslautern, Germany, fly reconnaissance in W Germany, and provide
cover for US Third and Seventh Army forces in E France.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Bad weather restricts
operations to reconnaissance missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): Twelfth AF redesignates HQ XII
Fighter Command as HQ XXII Tactical Air Command following a reorganization
period during which the XXII Tactical Air Command was temporarily referred to
as "X" Tactical Air Command and "X-Ray" Tactical Air Command, to distinguish
it from HQ XII Fighter Command around which it was formed.
  In Italy, B-26s attack the Mantua causeway, a railway fill at Ossenigo, and
bridges at Calcinato and Peschiera del Garda; a Luftwaffe fighter attack NW
of Mantua accounts for 2 B-26s lost and 1 missing; at least 2 of the
attacking fighters are destroyed; B-25s attack bridges in the Milan area at
Lonate Pozzolo, Cameri, and Magenta; fighter-bombers of the XXII Tactical Air
Command hit targets in support of ground forces, concentrating on the Monte
Grande area, and attack rail lines and bridges N of the battle zone. On the
night of 18/19 Oct A-20s hit targets of opportunity during armed
reconnaissance in the Genoa and Bologna areas.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): B-24s on armed reconnaissance from Saipan
Island bomb a bridge, a pier, and the town area on Yap Island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s hit Parepare,
Celebes Island. Fighter-bombers hit Amboina on Ambon Island and Boela
Airfield on Ceram Island and shipping from Zamboanga S in the Sulu-Mindanao
Island area, pound the airfield on Cebu Island, Philippine Islands, hit
nearby shipping, and strafe Miti, Djailolo, and Hate Tabako on Halmahera
Island.  In New Guinea, A-20s and fighter-bombers blast airfields at Urarom,
Sagan, and Babo; the 13th and 63d Troop Carrier Squadrons, 403d Troop Carrier
Group, cease operating from Wakde Island with C-47s and returns to base on
Biak Island.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

19/0054Z OCT

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 17 Oct 1994 to 18 Oct 1994
*************************************************