Subject: WWII-L Digest - 6 Nov 1994 to 7 Nov 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 1994 00:01:58 -0500

There are 30 messages totalling 1430 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. HYPO: "The big what-if"
  2. INF: USN Chronology 11-07-94
  3. NOST: BAND PERFORMANCE
  4. WEAP:  P38 in CBI & Other (2)
  5. <No subject given>
  6. more on bersaglieri
  7. Eastern Front Books (3)
  8. IS THE NET UP??
  9. Untold Stories f/TLB, Pt. 2
 10. WEAP: P38 CBI & Other
 11. INFO: File List
 12. WEAP: BB-64??
 13. INF: 50 Years Ago - 08-NOV-1944
 14. MEDIA: Unexploded Bomb
 15. COLLECTING STUFF: PATCHES + PINS
 16. MEDIA: Arctic Convoys
 17. WEAP M5A1 Stuart tank
 18. WEAP: P38  CBI & Other
 19. Italian marines in WW2
 20. Unsub
 21. Dams and Defence (2)
 22. Italian marines in WW2 (part 2)
 23. [INF] USAAF 8 NOV 44
 24. P-47/P-51
 25. Lockheed Model 18
 26. WEAP:Query: Zero name

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 02:00:32 EST
From:    Cassady Craft <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HYPO: "The big what-if"

In full agreement with Emmanuel's remarks about the inability of Germany to
make up for experimental shortcomings with theoretical brilliance during the
war, I would like to make a small comment.  The creation of the atomic bomb
was not a really breathtaking theoretical accomplishment.  While Leo Szilard
probably had the original breakthrough, others were able to carry out the line
of thought almost immediately.  The Manhattan Project was a brilliant, and
expensive Engineering project--with a lot of physics thrown in for good
measure.  The point is that the physicists were already there, brainpower
was assembled, not created--while the technology to deploy the weapon was
created, assembled, and then disassembled in an atomic explosion.

Cassady Craft
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 04:00:10 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 11-07-94

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1944
11/07 Tue.  United States naval vessel damaged:
             PT-301, by accidental explosion, western New Guinea
              area,
              01 d. 15'S., 136 d. 23'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 07:51:52 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: NOST: BAND PERFORMANCE

  FOR JOHN DAVIS
  That was a moving message about the band contest.  I have forwarded it to the
WWII forum on Compuserve.
  Regards, John Ausland/Oslo Norway

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 07:34:17 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP:  P38 in CBI & Other

     Arnaud wrote:

     > Steve,
     > I was not speaking specifically of the USAAF, but of all Air Forces
     > as a whole. I'd have a bent for this explanation. And I have not
     > read that the USAF had a positive kill ratio in Europe, but on the
     > contrary that the losses were fairly even up to 1944. In 1945 the
     > kill ratio suddenly became 3.6/1 IN FAVOUR OF THE GERMANS, due to
     > several factors.

     Arnaud,

     You are quite correct, I did not express myself well.  I was not
     thinking of the AAF as a whole, but only in fighter v/s fighter
     action.  When you throw in the losses of strategic bombers to German
     AAA and fighters, as well as the losses of close support/ground
     interdiction aircraft to AAA (neither mission being performed much by
     the Germans in late 1944 through 1945) then the ratio changes.

     Checking the records of the heavy and medium bomber squadrons of the
     8th AF, and the ground interdiction squadrons of the 12th and 15th AF
     (among others) to determine the number of aircraft lost v/s the claims
     for enemy a/c killed would probably identify the discrepancy, but to
     what purpose?  These aircraft weren't designed or deployed to destroy
     enemy a/c so it won't be any news that they weren't very successful in
     the role.

     I recall reading years ago about a P-51 pilot who flew over Italy, his
     function was to destroy armor, trains, bridges etc. as a ground
     attacker.  In one bad week he had three Mustangs shot out from under
     him in three days (small arms fire penetrating the glycol tank or
     lines).  He would head out into the Med, bail out, and have the British
     pick him up in a Walrus (same crew all three times).  This pilot never
     got a kill to attempt to even up the losses of those a/c, but the
     rolling stock, ammunition, fuel, food etc. that he destroyed before it
     could reach the German troops made it's own contribution to the war
     effort.

     I personally don't see that the numbers, by themselves, indicate that
     something is being hidden/ignored.  You have got to look at the total
     picture, including the units assigned mission.

     Steve

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 06:56:20 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: <No subject given>

Hello, Mary!

Will see what I can find. That name is familiar. Off hand, would this
person have been in touch with or known of "Madeleine"?

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 07:18:01 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: more on bersaglieri

Hello, Mike!

Here goes with the bio on Generalmajor Fritz Fullriede.

Born: 4 Jan 1895 in Bremen

1914-1918: Volunteered for WWI service.
December, 1939: 1a in the 191st Infantry Division
1 Feb 1940: Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion of Inf. Regt. 642.
July, 1941: Wounded in Russia
1943: Sent to Tunesia. CO of Battle Group
March-August 1944: CO of Panzer Grenadier Regt. 200
                   CO of Pz. Gr. Rgt. 67
                   CO of Parachute-Pz.Gr.Rgt. 1 of the Parachute-
                      Panzer Division "Hermann Goering".
Fought in the defensive battles around Warsaw
14 Feb-23 Mar 1945: Battle Commandant of Kolberg in Pommerania
>From 3 April 1945-27 Apr 1945: CO of 3rd Naval Inf. Division
>From 28 Apr-8 May 1945: CO of Battle Group "Fullriede" in Northern
Germany.

1945-1949: In Dutch Captivity.
Died on 13 Nov 1969 in Borstel/Schleswig-Holstein

Knight's Cross: 11 April 1943 as Lt.-Col. and CO of Battle Group
"Fullriede in Panzer Army High Command

Oakleaf: Number 803 on 23 March 1944 as Colonel and Battle Commandant
of Kolberg

After his death, his family moved to South Africa, where they live to
this day.

Hope this has been of interest.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 07:10:36 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Eastern Front Books

Hello, Drew!

Here goes with some more titles dealing with "Barbarossa".

                       Paperbacks

I Cannot Forgive by Rudolf Vrba and Alan Bestic
The General Was a Spy by Heinz Hoehne
Hitler: A Study in Tyranny by Alan Bullock
Men of Colditz by P. R. Reid
Adolf Hitler by Colin Cross
The Fall of Fortress Europe by Fred Majdalany
Das Reich by Max Hastings
The Battle for Moscow by Albert Seaton
The Warsaw Uprising by George Bruce
Gehlen: Spy of the Century by E. H. Cookridge
Hitler's Secret Conversations by Henry Picker
The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany by T. L. Jarman
Barbarossa by Alan Clark
Knights of the Black Cross by Bryan Perrett
Kommando by James Lucas
Ashes of Honor by Christian de la Maziere
Blitzkrieg to Defeat by H. R. Trevor-Roper
Stalingrad by Geoffrey Jukes
The Siege of Leningrad by Alan Wykes
Kursk by Geoffrey Jukes
Barbarossa by John Keegan
Warsaw Rising by Guenther Deschner
Rundstedt by John Keegan
Zhukov by Otto Preston
Stalin by Ross Tremain
Panzer Division by Kenneth Macksey
The Guns: 1939-1945 by Ian V. Hogg
Waffen-SS by John Keegan
Russian Armor by Douglas Orgill
The Conspiracy Against Hitler by Harold Deutsch

The Warsaw Ghetto No Longer Exists by Juergen Stroop
Die Infanterie Regimenter 12 and 467: 1921-1945
Tank by Kenneth Macksey
Panzerzuege im Einsatz auf deutscher Seite 1939-1945 by Wolfgang
                                                        Sawodny
Otto Weidinger by Mark Yerger
Otto Kumm by Mark Yerger
The Onslaught: The German Drive to Stalingrad by Max Hastings
Von Kleist: From Hussar to Panzer General by Clyde Davis
SS Armor by Robert C. Stern
Panzer Battles by Major-General F. W. von Mellenthin
Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 by Paul Carrell
Scorched Earth: The Russo-German War 1943-1944 by Paul Carrell

I found one more book I had overlooked which deals with

                        Normandy

Last Round Against Rommel: Battle of the Normandy Beachhead by
Alexander McKee

                     Novels

Mila 18 by Leon Uris
Stalingrad by Theodor Plivier
Moscow by Theodor Plievier
Berlin by Theodor Plievier
Days and Nights by Konstantin Simonov
Crack of Doom by Willy Heinrich

Hope this has been of interest. More tomorrow.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 08:23:15 -0500
From:    Mike Oaks <[email-masked]>
Subject: IS THE NET UP??

HELP, HELP, TEST, TEST,
   Is the net up?? I haven't received anything for over 5 days. Is it me
or does the net have a problem???
 ___________________________________________________________________
|                                                                   |
|    Michael A. Oaks                 Music: A way to mark times     |
|    Kennesaw State College                 stepping stones through |
|    [email-masked]             your calendar of life.  |
|    Tel: (404) 423-6049  Fax (404) 423-6541   ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  MAO |
|___________________________________________________________________|

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 09:31:04 EST
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Untold Stories f/TLB, Pt. 2

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  07-Nov-1994 09:30am EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Untold Stories f/TLB, Pt. 2

    [Ryan's second battle book, _The Last Battle_, was mostly about the
    battle for and capture of Berlin.  This brought about his research trip
    to the Soviet Union (with John Erickson) as one of the first westerners
    to visit the Moscow Archives and interview Soviet vets.  To keep his
    western audience interested, I suspect, he was also obligated to give
    some coverage to such events as the Soviet-American link up at the
    Elbe.  Evenso, I think TLB is the weakest book of the three (at least
    by the standards of marketing/sales) mainly because it concentrated on
    German vs. Soviet rather than western allies vs. Germans a la TLD and
    ABTF.  Perhaps here is the place to note that these stories are not in
    Ryan's books and that if you want the complete tales of the topics,
    turn to the books.]

    THE ODD

         On the 5th of April, a Britisher was brought into Gen. Steiner's
    headquarters wearing a German uniform.  Says Steiner, "This man said he
    wanted to fight against Communism.  I said to him, either you are a POW
    trying to escape (as he had been told to do) or you have some personal
    reason like a German girl-friend, or you really want to fight
    Communism.  And so I doubt very much if your Prime Minister would agree
    with that.  Come and have dinner with me because we must talk this one
    over."
         During the dinner Steiner said, "Why don't you spill the truth?
    You're an intelligence man - yes?"  The Britisher said, "My name is
    Douglas Webster St. Auben, Burnville Clay, and I'm a member of the
    British aristocracy.  We are not involved in any kind of British
    intelligence service."  Steiner said he had to go to the front the next
    day and would visit 50 others from the British Legation so the
    Britisher could go along.  On the way back Steiner said, "Here is my
    decision.  I don't want the British Legation types or you.  You can be
    my personal guest.  You'll of course always be with a German officer
    and once the British army reaches our lines you can take a car and
    leave."  On the 2nd of May he did leave.  Steiner remembers remembers
    that one year later he was taken to identify a photo of Clay and told
    to forget the entire incident.
                        - interview with Gen. Felix Steiner, German Army

         Considered half-Jewish, the Sternfeld family was shunned
    throughout the war.  Until mid-April they were not able to share the
    secure bomb shelter with the other house residents.  He'd take two
    blankets and hold them over his wife and daughter to protect them from
    flying splinters and rubble.  By April 20th the house residents "alomst
    dragged me into the regular shelter."  Now that the end of the war was
    obvious, people started being friendly.
                                  - interview with Leo Sternfeld, Berlin

         "I belong to the nation.  I have duties, not rights.  I realized
    after Hitler was dead that the wrong men were around him.  I am afraid
    that the Jews and people who are insincere, motivated chiefly by
    revenge and hate, and not sincere idealists of the resistance movement
    will use the present situation to get back at the Germans and while
    those guilty for war crimes should suffer, the common man should not be
    disgraced and branded as a war criminal.
         I did not believe the stories circulated in Allied and neutral
    countries, about concentration camps because I found Himmler, when I
    was sick, a kind and considerate person.  Yes, it was only when he
    betrayed Hitler that I realized what Himmler really was."
    - US Army interview with Hanna Reitsch, test pilot and Hitler favorite

    THE LINK-UP

         At 11:30 in the morning of April 25th, 1st Lt. Kotzebue and his
    men saw their first Russian.  At the little town of Leckwitz they saw a
    Russian horseman riding leisurely into a farmhouse courtyard.  There
    was no offer to shake hands, there was no friendly waving.  Asked where
    his unit was, the Russian replied curtly, "at the Elbe."
         When he crossed the river, Kotzebue wanted to create as good an
    impression as possible.  The Russians and Americans saluted each other
    and shook hands.  At first the Russians appeared to be quite suspicious
    but they thawed after Kotzebue told them who he was and what his unit
    was and said he had come in hopes of arranging a meeting between the
    Russian and American commanders.
         He decided to radio back to his headquarters.  Ironically, the
    message was made out to, "Commanding Officer Try Hard."  Kotzebue was
    told later that his headquarters didn't understand what the message
    meant.  They had forgotten he had been told to find the Russians and
    felt he had exceeded orders.  General Rinehart, Commander of the 69th
    Division, was all for pressing charges, but was talked out of it by
    General Robert V. Mareist, who impressed upon Rinehart that he'd look
    damn silly if he courtmartialed the man who first met the Russians.
    Instead, Kotzebue was awarded the Silver Star.
         In the meantime, another patrol under Lt. Richardson had contacted
    Russians and instead of staying with them, brought the Russians back
    with him, thereby getting all the publicity.
              - interview with 1st Lt. Albert "Buck" Kotzebue, US 69th Div.

    Wee paws for station identification.

    Doug

Received:  07-Nov-1994 09:30am

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 15:21:39 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: P38 CBI & Other

On Sun, 6 Nov 1994, SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR wrote:

> >         3.  The AAF overall did have a positive win/loss ratio against all
> >      adversaries in WWII.  It's possible that the good luck was spread out
> >      fairly evenly.

> Therefore there should be US squadrons with very bad as well as excellent
> ratios. It seems to me that you are perfectly right in saying that politics
> changed bad ratios into favourable ones.
> What I am amazed at is finding those distorted ratios reproduced without
> comments in serious books and unit histories. This does look like a lack of

Despite the efforts of intelligence officers, the number of kills claimed
by fighter units always exceeds the number of actual kills by a
considerable margin --- large enough to give everyone a positive kill
ratio. (The kills claimed by bomber units are even more removed from
reality.) Perhaps the best known example are the grossly overestimated
kill numbers during the Battle of Britain, which totally misled the German
staffs. Even in later times, when fighters were equipped with gun cameras,
I would assume that any claimed number of kills is at least 50%
exaggerated.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 10:46:51 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: INFO: File List

     > Now, back on carriers.... Could you send me the list of files about
     > carriers (CV's, CVL's, CVE's) that you have on hand?

     > Cheers,

     > Jorge Merino

     Here is the list of what I have, but it's just a subset of what's
     available out of byrd.mu.wvnet.edu.

     CVs  1, 2, 8, 11, 12, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 31, 36, 66

     CVEs  6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 18, 20, 21, 23, 35, 36, 51, 57, 60, 68, 69, 71,
     73, 75, 95, 98, 99

     Steve

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 11:47:39 CCS
From:    Jorge Merino <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP: BB-64??

First of all, thanks Larry for your info about the gifs at byrd. Now,
I have a question for the naval experts:

> bb64.gif      137699 Nov  6  USS MINNESOTA, BB-64, 11 NOV 44, at Pearl
>                              Harbor, alongside USS OKLAHOMA, BB-37 (the
>                              "Okie" is being prepared for return to
>                              CONUS.)

I was aware that BB-64 is USS Wisconsin. Is this the same ship (with other
name)?

Jorge Merino

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 08:13:47 -0800
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 08-NOV-1944

On 08-NOV-1944, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - The last German defenders on Walcheren Island surrender,
bringing the number of prisoners taken by the Allies during operations in the
Scheldt estuary to 8,000. The US 3rd Army begins its offensive against the
Saar.

Italian Front - The Polish 3rd Division enters Dovadola, while the Polish 5th
Division pushes on towards Castrocaro.

Philippines (Leyte) - Fierce fighting continues in the X Corps sector, despite
a raging typhoon.

Burma - The 5th Indian Division completes the recapture of the area south of
Tiddim.

The Homefront
-------------
Nine Die In Train Wreck - Nine people have been killed and more than 75
injured when a section of the Southern Pacific's Chicago-to-San Francisco
Challenger train plunged off the track on a curve 50 miles northeast of
Sacromento.

=============================================================================

Sources: "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi, "The
World Almanac Book Of WW II" by Peter Young, "Facts On File Yearbook 1944,
Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L. Lapica.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.netcom.com in directory /pub/jbd and can
be accessed via the WWW by URL: ftp://ftp.netcom.com/pub/jbd/ww2.html. If you
have difficulty accessing the Netcom FTP server, please keep trying because it
stays very busy.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis     [email-masked]
Cary, N.C.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 11:56:40 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA: Unexploded Bomb

>From the DoD Newswire 6 November 1994

:WW II BOMB FOUND IN GERMANY

   LUDWIGSHAFEN, Germany  -- About 15,000 people were evacuated
from their homes for an hour Saturday while bomb experts defused a
1.8-ton unexploded British bomb from World War II.
   "The bomb was defused without any problems," said fire department
spokesman Michael Lindner.
   Buses and police vehicles had taken residents to schools and gyms
where refreshments were available during the short wait. Some opted
to leave the city and visit friends elsewhere, police said.
   Police in the Bavarian city of Regensburg also reported defusing
of an old 500-pound American-made bomb on Saturday.
   Police said the bomb uncovered at a new construction site was
defused by bomb experts and hauled away for later destruction at a
remote site. About 200 people were evacuated for about 90 minutes as
a precaution.
   On Oct. 19, 10,000 residents of the same area of Ludwigshafen,
Chancellor Helmut Kohl's hometown in southern Germany, were
evacuated for three hours while police defused an old bomb.
   Authorities in the industrial city of 170,000 people are using
British aerial impact maps from the war to systematically remove the
last bombs. As many as 20 others remain to be defused, said
Ludwigshafen police chief Voelker Strub.
   The bomb, a type known as an air mine, was in an empty field
between two western suburbs of the city. Air mines were used to
create a huge shock wave that would knock out windows and roofs so
that the normal 500-pound bombs that followed its use would cause
more damage.
   Saturday's was one of the largest evacuations by a bomb squad,
but dozens of such actions occur each year in Germany because the
thousands of tons of unexploded ordnance buried in the earth, much
of it still lethal.
   A Sept. 15 explosion of a World War II bomb at a Berlin
construction site killed three people and injured 17.

=====

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        [email-masked]
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 11:01:33 -0600
From:    Drew Wright <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: COLLECTING STUFF: PATCHES + PINS

William,

My name is Drew Wright and I have been collecting Third Reich militaria
for several years now.  My only word of advice to you is to be extremely
careful when you buy anything supposedly made during this time.
Reproductions have, in my opinion, ruined the market for original
Third Reich militaria (to the extent that I am selling everything I have)
and this is especially true in the SS area (some reproduction cloth
insignia is nearly impossible to tell from original).  If you would be
content with reproduction items, by all means buy them.  Original SS-SD
cloth insignia can easily run you a few hundred bucks for one patch.
I'll try to send you some addresses of possible sources for original and
repro items.

Best, Drew Wright

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 12:24:09 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA: Arctic Convoys

>From the DoD Newswire 7 November 1994

:ARCTIC CONVOY VETERANS STILL WARY OF MURDEROUS SEAS

     OFF THE KOLA PENINSULA, Russia, Nov 7  - Anyone
unfortunate enough to fall into these murderously cold seas in winter
usually took less than 10 minutes to die.
     "We remember these icy waters very well," growled Bob Allan,
staring at three small wreaths bobbing on the surface of the
steel-grey Barents Sea.
     Allan was one of a handful of British and Russian veterans who
had ventured out on a cruise boat to commemorate the 2,773 sailors who
died during the often-forgotten Arctic convoys of 1942 to 1945.
     The convoys, harried constantly by German submarines and
figher-bombers, battled from Iceland across to the ports of Murmansk
and Arkhangelsk with vital cargoes of food, weapons and fuel shipped
under the Allies' Lend-Lease aid programme to the former Soviet Union.
     The best-known convoy was the disastrous PQ-17, which lost 24 of
its 36 ships in July 1942 after it was ordered to disperse because
German warships were thought to be approaching.
     A total of 210 bombers, 430 tanks, 3,350 vehicles and almost
100,000 tonnes of ammunition went to the bottom.
     "The worst thing was that we did not have the ability to
manoeuvre. We were a sitting target. One hit and that was it,
especially if you were carrying aviation spirit," recalled Allan, who
served on one of the PQ-17 merchant ships.
     "The attacks were incessant -- both torpedo planes and dive
bombers. A lot of ships were picked off by submarines. We heard their
distress signals but we had enough problems of our own without them,"
he said.
     "Most of us thought we would die. Every year we've had since the
war ended has been a bonus. We never thought we'd see our 21st
birthdays."
     The convoys were escorted by destroyers, which had the weaponry
needed to drive off bombers and submarines.
     Conditions were foul aboard the cramped escort ships, which ran
the risk of capsizing in winter as tonnes of ice quickly built up on
the superstructure.
     "It was far from romantic. You could only hack the ice off with
picks," said Richard Squires, then a petty officer aboard a destroyer
responsible for fending off Nazi submarines with depth charges.
     "We used to work four hours off, four hours on the whole time,
running along the deck between waves," he recalled.
     "All you wanted to do was get somewhere warm and sleep. We were
never comfortably dry. And you could forget about water to wash with."
     A man who fell into the sea during the winter died mercifully
quickly. Those who made it to the lifeboats all too easily fell victim
to hypothermia and frostbite.
     "The people in the lifeboats had terrible injuries. One chap who
had been resting his hand on the side of the boat left all his fingers
behind when he was lifted out," said Squires.
     "Another had to have his legs guillotined off without
anaesthetic." Some ships had special "corpse officers" to deal with
the mangled bodies.
     "It was all pretty sordid," said naval commander Tom Horton, then
an able seaman on board one of the escorts.
     "Suddenly one of the merchant ships would disappear. If it was
carrying petrol or ammunition, it was a spectacular sight, sickening."
     Those who sailed during the summer soon discovered the Arctic sun
never set, giving German bombers the freedom to attack 24 hours a day.
The winter convoys hardly saw the sun, but the weather was so bad it
could break a ship's back.
     In all, the Arctic convoys delivered four million tonnes of food,
weapons, fuel and ammunition, for the loss of 18 escorts and 87
merchantmen.
     But as the Cold War quickly took hold, Moscow began to minimise
the role of the convoys, claiming they had supplied an insignificant
amount of food and arms.
     It took the advent of perestroika some 40 years later to let the
truth out. Only now do Russians realise the aid was vital in the
darkest hours of 1942 when defeat was still on the cards.
     "In the early days we survived pretty much on what we received
from the convoys," acknowledged Murmansk regional governor Yevgeny
Komarov.
     Murmansk had to wait until former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev
came to power in 1985 before it was finally awarded the title of Hero
City, a decoration which other cities had received more than 40 years
earlier.
     "Before, we thought Lend Lease was just oranges, tinned ham and
chocolate. Only now do we realise arms were sent as well," said Nina
Korolyova of the Northern Fleet Museum in Murmansk.
     But the museum itself is still very Soviet in character,
stressing the role played by the fleet in defending the convoys and
highlighting the disaster of PQ-17.
     In the last three years the local history museum has done a
little better, adding a small cabinet containing books about the
convoys but giving no specific information.
     An old inscription elsewhere in the museum informs visitors that
the aid shipped under Lend-Lease amounted to $10 billion. Just below
is the figure the former Soviet Union says it paid to win the war --
$485 billion.
     The British veterans hardly seem to mind about Moscow's snub.
Indeed, some seem happier burying their wartime memories.
     "There's a danger people could accuse ex-servicemen of trying to
glorify the war. But we do not see any glory in war," said Allan.
     "There was a lot of monotony, a lot of boredom, a lot of wasted
time and lives. It's a pretty futile occupation -- there are no
winners."

=====

--

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        [email-masked]
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 11:54:23 CST
From:    "SCHERRER, TIM" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP M5A1 Stuart tank

Mark--I can place you in touch with a man who owns a real one in
Chicago--I think he can answer your questions--or go look at his and
then tell you the answers.  TAS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 12:36:51 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: P38  CBI & Other

    Hello, Steve!

Great post and I would like to comment on the one below.

>         4.  There was a war on, and you certainly don't want the folks back
>      home to think your losing, do you?  I don't have the name at the tip
>      of my tongue, but didn't an AAF B-17 pilot get a posthumous CMH for
>      sinking a Japanese "Battleship" off the Phillipines in 1941 when in
>      fact he had attacked an American submarine which simply dove to escape
>      the bombs?  Every army has got to have some heros, even if they make
>      them up themselves.

    You are thinking of Colin Kelly and you are right on about that.
I just wanted to add that the same "face" was put on the Ploesti raid
of 1943 in which 5 MoH's were awarded, the most awarded for a single
action in WWII. The raid itself was a disaster but the fact that made
it "acceptable" if you will lies in the fact that so many were
awarded for this mission. I second your final comments wholeheartedly.

    Thanks for allowing me to make a comment.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 14:02:30 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Italian marines in WW2

        OK, here goes with the final installment of an unintended trilogy on
the elite Italian footsoldiers of WW2.  I have to start off with a caveat: I
have not been able to find nearly as much information about the Italian marines
as I have on other elite branches of the Italian armed forces.  For Ben Frank,
this means unfortunately that I don't have any information on the unit you
named.  In fact, I'm kind of hoping someone else out there can fill me in on
anything I might have missed.  I even put the question out to the list when I
first signed on, and did get a very helpful synopsis of organization etc for
the proposed Malta operation from Joe Barone (which he got from an issue of
Command magazine and which I'm shamelessly reproducing as part of this post)
and the address of a possible contact on the subject in Italy which
procrastination and other projects have so far prevented me from following up.
I think the dearth of easily-accessible English-language info on this topic
(I'd be happy to plow through Italian-- I did for the alpini post) may be due
in the first place to the tiny size of the unit in question-- the Italian
marine "corps" was in fact only one regiment-- and partly because from what I
gather they did not participate in much actual combat prior to the middle of
1942.  If Greg or someone else out there has additions, corrections, etc, I
would hope this post can provide a forum for me to learn more as well.

        Marine infantry played a prominent role in the war efforts of several
major powers.  The U.S. Marine Corps set the standard for naval infantry in the
Second World War, by 1945 constituting a semi-autonomous army of six full
divisions (each at least 16-18,000 men at full strength).  The acheivements of
the U.S. Marines spoke for themselves, and were a strong argument in favor of
the Corps' post-war status as a quasi-independent fourth branch of the American
military.  The Soviet and Japanese forces also employed large numbers of naval
infantry, although both nations lacked both the degree of autonomy and the
organizational heirarchy of the U.S. Marines (in both cases they were organized
for tactical purposes only, in units of brigade size or less, which lacked a
central command and were placed under the local, non-marine Army or Navy
commanders).  Still, in the two major areas of employment alone-- the Murmansk
region in the Arctic north and the Black Sea peninsula of the Crimea in the
south-- some 33,000 Soviet marines saw action, and these Russian
sailor/footsoldiers were used in many other places from the appraoches to
Leningrad to Novorossiyisk.  During the war the Soviets carried out 114
amphibious operations, in which over 300,000 men were landed, and although many
of these troops were regular Army the Soviet marines participated in a large
percentage of these undertakings.  The Japanese marine unit was small, a
"special naval landing force" of 700-1500 men, but the Imperial Japanese Navy
employed a great number of these detachments.  They fought in Shanghai and
other parts of China; in Indonesia; at Wake Island; at Rabaul; on Guadalcanal,
New Georgia, and Tarawa; in defense of the Marianas and the Phillipines; and
on Iwo Jima and Okinawa.  There was even an airborne "special naval landing
force," which carried out two parachute drops in Indonesia in early '42.
        Compared to efforts on this scale, the Italian marine force was so
small as to be barely worthy of mention.  The Italians didn't have a marine
"corps," they had a marine regiment-- the San Marco Regiment.  And it wasn't
even a particularly strong regiment, numerically speaking.  At no time during
the period 1940-43 did the San Marco Regiment ever have much more than 2,500
fighting men, nor was it able during that time to field more than two
conventional battalions for land fighting.
        However, though it may have been small, the Italian marine force was
rich in tradition.  The San Marco Regiment traced its origins back to the
shipboard infantry of Venice, back to the glory days when that independent
city-state had been a regional power (especially economically).  San Marco
(St. Mark) was the patron saint of both Venice and the Italian marines, and the
"Lion of St. Mark," the emblem of Venice for centuries, was also the
distinctive insignia of the San Marco Regiment.  They wore it on their sleeve--
literally-- a rectangular crimson patch bearing the highly-stylized gold lion
just above the cuff, a mark of distinction equal to the bersaglieri cockerel
plume or the black eagle feather worn on Alpini hats and helmets.
        The small size and uniqueness of the San Marco Regt did have one
advantage, in that the Italian marines could afford to be highly selective in
terms of personnel.  Their ranks were filled with motivated, highly disciplined
professionals, specially trained and in peak physical condition.  In 1940 the
San Marco Regt consisted of two battalions, each organized for independent
operations.  The Italian marine battalions were fairly strong numerically,
about 1,000 men each, made up of three rifle companies, an mortar company (with
six 81-mm mortars), and an antitank company (with four 47-mm guns).  That was
as much heavy weapons support as was normally found in a full regiment in the
Italian Army (and as late as the second half of 1942 many units actually
engaged in combat still had no antitank weapons whatsoever organically at the
regimental level), so the marines were at least a little better supported in
this respect than their Army colleagues.  The marine battalions also had a
rather high proportion of men trained in demolitions and explosives work,
enough to form ad hoc commando squads of demolition experts if the occasion
required.
        The average Italian marine carried the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle (from
the few pictures I've seen it seems the M38 short rifle was the Regina Marina's
preferred version).  Early in the war even sergeants carried bolt-action
rifles, but later the 9-mm Beretta M38 and M38/42 submachineguns became very
popular among the marines (whose elite status no doubt facilitated access to
these weapons), and not only officers and nco's but even regular privates were
sometimes armed with them.  I've also seen a picture of a marine sergeant-major
carrying a dagger at his waist (in addition to bayonet), but don't know if this
was commonplace, or if it was ceremonial or intended to actually be used in
combat.
        The marine officers' uniform was identical to the standard Army
uniform, except for the footwear, the hob-nailed short Army boots being
replaced by an ankle-length, lace-up black leather Navy type, and the insignia.
As in the U.S. Marines, the Italian ranks corresponded to the Army rather than
Navy system (this was also true for shore-based naval engineering personnel).
Enlisted marines wore a hybrid, which was (except for the shoes, as described
above) identical to the Army from the waste down (i.e., baggy grey-green
pantaloons and canvas wrap-around "puttee" leggings), but with a v-necked Navy
type "square rig" jersey with a flap in back, only in grey-green.  Under the
jersey the men wore a long-sleeved grey turtleneck shirt (or in winter
sweater).  All ranks wore the Navy steel helmet, virtually identical to the
Army model except for a gold anchor painted on the front (marines tended to
paint over the anchor before going into combat-- not too tough to understand
why they'd be reluctant to go running around a battlefield with such a nice
target painted in the middle of their foreheads).  In North Africa, where the
Italian marines did most of their fighting, they were issued a tropical uniform
identical to the above, but made of a lighter-weight, light brown khaki drill.
Ironically, the grey-green canvas webbing equipment, consisting of two ammo
pouches, belt, suspenders, and bayonet scabbard, was made under license in
Britain before the war.
        Serious Italian preparation for amphibious operations in the war did
not begin until the Greek campaign.  The Italian Navy was not officially
informed of the decision to invade Greece until October 16, 1940, ten days
before the initially scheduled start date.  The Regina Marina had not been
invited to the meeting at the Palazzo Venezia the day before, where the final
decision was apparently taken (the Air Force had no official representative
either, although Count Ciano, attending in his capacity as Foreign Minister,
was also an officer in the Regia Aeronautica; four serving general officers of
the Army were present-- Marshal Badoglio, the armed forces chief-of-staff;
Soddu, the Undersecretary for War; Roatta, acting chief-of-staff of the Army;
and Visconti-Prasca, Italian commander in Albania).  Only on Oct. 22nd was the
Navy informed that the operation was to include an amphibious landing on the
island of Corfu.  The Navy immediately formed a "Special Naval Force" (later
the 12th Naval Division), under Admiral Vittorio Tur, the Regina Marina's
ranking expert on amphibious warfare.  The two largest warships assigned to
Tur's unit (each about 3,100 tons) were the BARI and the TARANTO, old
German-built light cruisers acquired by Italy after WW1.  Though too outmoded
for conventional fleet operations, they were considered useful for artillery
support (BARI mounted eight 150-mm guns, TARANTO seven) and for service as
floating headquarters (BARI subsequently became Tur's flagship).  The naval
unit also included two fleet-size destroyers, three smaller destroyer escorts,
four of the little wooden MAS-type torpedo boats, and three SESIA-class landing
ships, the latter specially outfitted for the support of amphibious operations.
Four convoys were hastily organized to carry the Bari infantry division to
Corfu.
        Severe weather forced the postponement of the entire Greek operation
for two days (to Oct 28), and the Corfu landings for two more.  Finally the
group set sail on the night of Oct 31, but while at sea the convoy was
re-routed to Valona, as the Bari Division was urgently needed on the main front
in Albania, and the landings were cancelled as abruptly as they had been
ordered.  I mention this because the San Marco Regiment was soon afterward
attached to Admiral Tur's force.  One effect of this transfer was to intensify
the training of the Italian marines for true amphibious warfare.  Actually, the
main role of the San Marco Regt had previously been to serve as a reliable
ground force to secure important forward naval bases against potential enemy
raids, although the marines were also trained for landing operations.  Under
Tur, however, a group of 500 "nuotatori" or "swimmers" was raised and trained.
These were specialists, trained for ocean swimming, demolitions, and beach
assault.  They were supposed to swim in to their target beaches in small
groups, with weapons and explosives carried in waterproof pouches, to take out
enemy strong points in commando fashion in advance of the main landings.
        A detachment of the San Marco Regiment had been earmarked for the
occupation of the Allied naval base at Suda Bay during the Axis invasion of
Crete in May 1941.  However, this group was diverted to Maleme in an attempt to
reinforce the Germans there, with the outcome of the fight still in the
balance.  The Italian marines joined the convoy of 18 small vessels escorted by
the destroyer escort LUPO.  On the night of May 31, when virtually in sight of
their destination, they were intercepted by three British cruisers and four
destroyers.  Although the LUPO fought bravely, and managed to escape after
steaming straight through the British formation, the convoy was completely
wiped out, and most of the marines and their equipment were lost.

Time considerations are going to force me to break this into two parts.
That about covers the background, organization, and equipment.  I'll post
something about the actual battle history 1942-45 later today.

Regards

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 8 Nov 1994 08:36:04 +1000
From:    Benjamin Daniel Natali <[email-masked]>
Subject: Unsub

I am going away for a while and I am having trouble unsubscribing can
someone tell me the Email address of the administrator of the group so they
can take me off the list.

Thanks
Ben
at
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 8 Nov 1994 09:30:03 +1100
From:    John Foster <[email-masked]>
Subject: Dams and Defence

  On the list the subjects of Hiroshima, Dresden etc and decisions that cost
large amounts of life either friendly or enemy pop up at regular intervals so I
was interested to read of one that I hadn't heard discussed. In an article in
an old New Scientist on dams and their potential as a weapon when busted
mention is made of their use through history and the one that attracted my
attention was in the Sino- Japanese war.Chinese generals under Chiang Kai-shek
breached adyke of the yellow river to halt advancing Japanese forces. This
innundated an area the size of Denmark and moved the estuary by 500km. The cost
in chinese life was estimated between 250k to 1 million and most probably the
single most deadly act of the war only exceeded perhaps by the holocaust though
this was self inflicted slaughter.
  The article goes on to mention how many dams are not being built which would
aid the countries and communities involved because of the defence
possibilities. This seems somewhat a paradox or two mutually exclusive
principles that causes my civilian mind some turmoil. You cant have progress
because the defenders of that progress say it may be a liability.I pictured
Hitler fuming at his underlyings after the dam busters raid as they tended
their excuses " We tried to tell
you that building all those dams to supply the Ruhr would cost us the
war"

Regards
John Foster

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 18:19:33 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Italian marines in WW2 (part 2)

        The San Marco Regiment spent the first half of 1942 rehearsing for its
role in "Operation Hercules," the proposed Axis landings on Malta.  A leading
part was to be played by the "swimmer" units, with ten 30-man teams slated to
lead the way, coming in silently ahead of the first wave to neutralize
strongpoints on the main landing beaches.  The entire marine regiment was to
participate in the operation.  Marshal Cavallero, the chief-of-staff of the
Italian armed forces (he replaced Badoglio in December 1940), was one of the
originators of the plan to take Malta by a combined airborne and amphibious
landing.  It would be a primarily Italian operation, with (apart from the
marines) the Folgore parachute division and the two infantry divisions of the
Italian 7th Corps (who had been specially trained for this task) providing the
bulk of the ground troops.  Admiral Tur, who was in command of the naval
aspects of the operation, was confidant that it could be carried out
successfully, although many Italian officers (including, for example, General
Carboni, commander of the first-wave Friuli Division) believed it would be a
costly failure, and were in some cases (for example, Carboni's) very vocal in
their opposition.  Cavallero's strategic conception stressed that it was
imperative to take out Malta before attempting any further large-scale
offensive operations in North Africa (he was even against Rommel's riposte that
recaptured Benghazi in Jan '42).  The elimination of Malta would (in
Cavallero's opinion) allow the Axis to stockpile sufficient fuel and other
supplies to undertake a serious invasion of Egypt.  Rommel, however, after his
success at Gazala and the subsequent recapture of Tobruk (June '42), pressed
for an immediate exploitation of his victory, arguing that he had to strike
quickly while the British were still weak and in disarray.   By taking his case
to the highest German and Italian political circles (i.e., going directly or by
emissary to Hitler and Mussolini) Rommel was able to get backing for his own
plan at the expense of "Hercules," which could not succeed without German
support, especially in terms of air units.  Cavallero hurt his own case by
proposing a postponement until the Folgore Division completed its training
(under German instructors).  Since there were not enough resources available to
carry out both plans simultaneously, the Malta invasion was first postponed,
and then, as Rommel swept into Egypt, cancelled completely.  Thus another
large-scale Italian amphibious landing, in which the Italian marines might have
had a chance to demonstrate their specialty, was scrapped.
        With "Hercules" shelved, one battalion of the San Marco Regt was sent
into Tobruk as garrison troops.  However, they did not entirely confine
themselves to a passive role.  On August 29th a party of 14 demolitions experts
from the San Marco battalion at Tobruk were landed by an MAS boat behind the
British lines.  Their mission, in support of Rommel's last Egyptian offensive
(which culminated in the battle of Alam Halfa), was to blow up both the rail
line and the aqueduct running from Alexandria.  Although the Italian marines
completed this mission successfully their efforts proved of little help to
Rommel's attack, which made scant headway before being called off.
        On the night of September 14th the British launched a complex,
large-scale commando raid on Tobruk.  One group of about 500 men came ashore
near the shore batteries, which they unsuccessfully attacked.  The San Marco
marines, reacting quickly, were directed against this group (something you
missed if you saw the movie "Tobruk"-- in the film version it was German
troops) and managed to contain the British force, virtually all of whom were
either killed fighting or captured.  The Allied mission wound up a costly
failure.
        The Allied "Torch" landings in French North Africa brought the San
Marco Regt back into the center of things.  One result of the landings was the
Axis decision to occupy Corsica.  Admiral Tur's force was once again mobilized
for the task.  With the BARI, six destroyer escorts, 16 large transports, and
123 smaller craft acting either as escorts or makeshift transports (carrying a
total of 12,000 men from the Italian 7th Corps), Tur set sail for the main
Corsican port of Bastia on November 11th.  He arrived in the late afternoon,
and after personal negotiations between Tur and the local French commander, was
allowed to land his force without resistance.  This was done overnight, and
Tur's ships returned to Italy November 13th.  Meanwhile, a detachment of the
San Marco marines were carried to Ajaccio by the destroyer PIGAFETTA, where
they landed and occupied the port without incident.
        Shortly afterward, both battalions of the San Marco Regt were
dispatched to Tunisia, where they were among the first Italian reinforcements
to the theatre.  Initially their role was to secure the main ports of Tunis and
Bizerte, but at least one battalion eventually saw considerable combat on the
front lines.  On December 2nd a party of Italian marines landed on the island
of Galite, just off the coast roughly midway between Bizerte and Bone, in order
to establish a base for special assault units of the Italian Navy.  Again, this
small operation was carried off without difficulty (although the subsequent
naval operations from Galite bore little fruit).  The San Marco Regiment's
Grado Battalion fought valiantly in Tunisia, attached for a time to the Afrika
Korps, fighting in the Enfidaville line, and then in late April '43 transferred
to the northwest corner of the front, where it joined the battalion-sized
remnants of the 5th and 10th Bersaglieri Regts.  In this sector, where about
one-fourth of the troops were Italian, the Americans made only very slow and
grudging progress in their final offensive, until the Axis forces began to run
out of ammunition after the first week of May.
        The San Marco Regiment was resurrected by the pro-Allied Italian forces
after the armistice of September 1943.  It spent the winter of '43-'44
undergoing intensive training in Allied operational and combat methods, being
brought into the front lines near Venafro, on the hotly-contested Cassino
sector of the front, on April 9th, 1944, as part of the British 13th Corps.
In June '44 the San Marco Regt was transferred to the rugged Abruzzi mountains,
participating in the battles to clear the Chieti area.  In July the Italian
marines were reinforced by a newly-raised third battalion, and put under
command of the reconstructed Nembo parachute division (its predecessor of the
same name, German-trained, had been one of the few Italian units to voluntarily
join the Germans at the time of the Italian surrender).  Still part of the
British 8th Army, it now operated on the Adriatic coast in the Macerata area,
and assisted in offensive operations in that sector resulting in the liberation
of Urbino.  Finally, in early September 1944, after five months of continuous
front-line service (and anyone who has read about the Italian campaign will
know of the grueling nature of the fighting that characterized this theatre--
an unpublicized, unrewarding, unrelenting exercize of crossing the next river,
and winkling the deeply dug-in Germans out of the next hill, paying a price for
every small advance, only to start the process all over again) the San Marco
Regiment was withdrawn for rest and replenishment.
        They re-entered the lines in February 1945, now part of the
second-generation Folgore Division, operating in Romagna.  The San Marco
Regiment remained in the front lines till fighting in Italy ended in early May.
The highlight of this portion of their service was the capture of Tassignano, a
centuries-old fortress located at the top of a steep 1,000-foot peak, which the
Germans had heavily fortified and turned into a key strongpoint in their line.
The San Marco marines suffered 15% casualties in taking this position.
        I should also mention that the pro-German RSI forces apparently raised
their own marine units.  They too wore the "Lion of St Mark" badge, but on the
lapel of their double-breasted, collar-less Army tunics (in 1943 many marines
on both sides of the lines switched to a version of the Army paratroopers
uniform, complete with long pants and jump boots).  I have no further
information about the RSI marines, except that they existed.  My guess is that
they were mostly employed on security and anti-partisan tasks, like the
majority of RSI forces.
        The above comprises a summary of virtually every reference I have been
able to locate thus far regarding the San Marco Regiment.  I'd be greatly
indebted if anyone else on the list would be able to add (or elaborate on)
anything, so please chime in with any info, no matter how small.  I hope this
proves helpful to anyone interested.   Now I'll shut up about the Italians for
a while and go back to reading about my Hungarians.

Regards

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 19:55:25 GMT+1
From:    SYSTEM OPERATOR <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP:  P38 in CBI & Other

>      Checking the records of the heavy and medium bomber squadrons of the
>      8th AF, and the ground interdiction squadrons of the 12th and 15th AF
>      (among others) to determine the number of aircraft lost v/s the claims
>      for enemy a/c killed would probably identify the discrepancy, but to
>      what purpose?  These aircraft weren't designed or deployed to destroy
>      enemy a/c so it won't be any news that they weren't very successful in
>      the role.
>      [...]
>      I personally don't see that the numbers, by themselves, indicate that
>      something is being hidden/ignored.  You have got to look at the total
>      picture, including the units assigned mission.

Steve,

thanks for your answer. Did the allies had an edge in Fighter
combat ? One report of the North American Committee for Aeronautics says :
"While for the July-August-September 1944 period the ratio of reciprocal losses
was 1 for 1 -most allied losses being fighters, and a small proportion of
bombers- the losses ratio from 22 February to 26 March '45 was of 1 to 7.5
, this time with a large proportion of four-engined aircraft. Those figures speak
for themselves."
(Sorry, I was wrong for the 3.6, it was 7.5).
Looking at the big picture is what I would like to be able to do.
What were the total American/British fighter losses on the Western Front ?

Arnaud.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 20:10:45 GMT+1
From:    SYSTEM OPERATOR <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Eastern Front Books

> Hitler Moves East, 1941-1943 by Paul Carrell

What do you think of Paul Carrell's books ? Are they german-biased or really
fair ? Given their price, I have always hesitated to buy them.

Arnaud.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 21:06:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 8 NOV 44

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
WEDNESDAY, 8 NOVEMBER 1944
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-29, Boeing Superfortress
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): An 8-aircraft shipping sweep is cancelled due
to weather.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In S China and N French Indochina 2
B-25s hit railroad tracks at Lohochai, China and 2 others hit tracks at Duc
Tho, French Indochina. 4 P-51s blast road machinery near Muse, Burma. 15
B-25s, 13 P-40s and P-51s pound storage buildings, villages, and other
targets of opportunity throughout the Mangshih, China area.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 80+ P-47s support ground
forces in the Mawlu area, bomb personnel, supplies, and communications
facilities at Tunhong, Chaungdauk, and Kutkai, gun positions at Hsipaw, the
Man Hpa town area, Kawlin Airfield and targets of opportunity along the
Kawlin-Pinwe railroad; 8 B-25s knock out the Bawgyo railroad bridge. 270+
transports fly sorties to forward areas. In India, a detachment of the 5th
Fighter Squadron (Commando), 1st Air Commando Group, begins operating from
Fenny with P-47s; the detachment of the 6th Fighter Squadron (Commando), 1st
Air Commando Group, operating from Cox's Bazar return to base at Asanol.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): The transfer of training functions
from VIII Air Force Composite Command to combat groups is completed; the VIII
AF Composite Command ceases to function as personnel are attached to the Air
Disarmament Command (Provisional) by the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe
(USSTAF). The airfield at Denain/Prouvy, France is assigned to HQ Eighth AF;
this is the first step in establishing an VIII Air Force Services Command
Service Center on the European continent so that Eighth AF can service and
administer its own aircraft and personnel in the area.
  2 missions are flown.
  Mission 705: 690 bombers and 890 fighters are dispatched to make a PFF
attack on Merseburg oil plants and Rheine marshalling yard; bad weather causes
the recall of 350+ bombers; 3 bombers and 11 fighters are lost:
  1. 267 B-17s are dispatched to hit the Leuna oil plant at Merseburg (193);
2 others hit a target of opportunity; 9 of 12 B-17s fly as a screening force;
3 B-17s are lost and 85 damaged; 1 airman is WIA and 27 MIA. Escorting are
752 P-47s and P-51s; they claim 2-0-1 aircraft in the air and 0-0-1 on the
ground; 2 P-47s and 9 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA) and 2 P-51s are damaged
beyond repair.
  2. 145 B-24s are dispatched to hit the Rheine marshalling yard (77);
targets of opportunity are Enschede (8), Nordhorn Canal (8) and other (1); 15
B-24s are damaged. Escorting are 36 of 37 P-47s without loss.
  3. 266 B-17s dispatched to hit the Leuna oil plant at Merseburg are
recalled due to weather.
  11 of 14 P-51s fly a scouting missions without loss.
  Mission 706: 5 B-17s and 12 B-24s (2 abort) drop leaflets in France, the
Netherlands and Germany during the night without loss.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): Weather cancels operations against
military depots and troop concentrations in Germany, and fortified positions
in France; a mission against rail bridges in Germany is recalled due to
weather; fighters fly escort, attack railroads, bridges, factories, supply
dumps, and command posts; the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands support the US
28th Infantry Division in the Schmidt, Germany area (V Corps begins
withdrawing the Kall River bridgehead) and Third Army elements start an
assault on enemy fortifications in the Metz, France area.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): In Yugoslavia, 34 B-24s bomb
troop concentrations at Mitrovica, Prijepolje, and Sjenica.  Heavy cloud over
the targets forces 70+ others to abort.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, medium bombers strike
the rail line in the Brenner Pass and other lines running into Italy from the
NE and bomb bridges in the C and W Po Valley, damaging several and destroying
the bridge at Mantua; fighters and fighter-bombers hit communications in the
Bologna area, but concentrate most of their operations against bridges and
rail lines in the Parma area in an effort to disrupt battle area supply lines.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): B-24s from Saipan Island hit shipping at Chichi
Jima and Haha Jima Islands. A single B-24 on a snooper mission bombs Iwo Jima
Island during the night of 8/9 Nov. P-47s attempt a fighter sweep over Pagan
Island but must abort because of bad weather.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): 17 XXI Bomber Command B-29s are airborne
against the airfield on Iwo Jima Island; 6 manage to bomb through a hole in
the cloud cover; others fail to bomb the target; enemy aircraft drop
phosphorus bombs on the formations, damaging 1 B-29; 1 B-29 ditches, the
first aircraft lost by the XXI Bomber Command on a combat mission.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s again hit
Alicante Airfield on Negros Island. On Celebes Island, B-25s bomb Langoan
Airfield while P-38s on sweeps over the Kendari area hit parked aircraft,
shipping, the nickel mine, and other targets of opportunity. On Halmahera
Island, B-25s attack Kaoe and Hate Tabako Airfield while others hit targets
of opportunity on Ceram Island. The 12th Fighter Squadron, 18th Fighter
Group, based at Sansapor, New Guinea, begins operating from Morotai Island
with P-38s. The 424th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 307th Bombardment Group
(Heavy), that has been operating from Noemfoor Island with B-24s, returns to
base on Wakde Island.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
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08/0206Z NOV

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 21:30:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: P-47/P-51

On Wed, 2 Nov 1994, Steve L. New wrote:
 >                 P47 Thunderbolt         15683
 >                 P51 Mustang             15686

Steve, please list a source for these numbers.  According to THE ARMY AIR
FORCES IN WORLD WAR II, Volume Six, MEN AND PLANES, by Wesley Frank Craven
and James Lea Cate, acceptances by model were:

Republic P-47 Thunderbolt...15,579
N. American P-51 Mustang....14,490

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 22:04:53 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Eastern Front Books

Dear Arnaud,

Paul Carrell is the nom de plume of a former ranking official in Goebbels
Ministry of Propaganda, whose name escapes me at the moment. His books
are a good example of the interpretation of the war the Germans were
trying to establish in the 1950s and 1960s. They are considered biased
by most scholars in the field, but they are also good on some detail.
If you are building a specialized Eastern Front collection, they may be
worth the money ($35 or so? I got mine years ago, and don't know the
current price), but be careful in reading them. If you want accuracy,
although in a drier read, get Earl Ziemke's volumes or Albert Seaton's
work instead.

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 22:06:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Lockheed Model 18

Recently, Steve L. New wrote about seeing photographs of Lockheed Model 18s
(USAAF C-56, C-57, C-59, C-60 and C-66) in Japanese markings during WWII.
Sorry Steve, my research indicates that the Japanese never had Model 18s
unless they captured a few.  Here is what I found.

In 1938, 20 Lockheed Model 14s, and the license production rights, were
acquired by Tachikawa Hikoki KK (Tachikawa Aeroplane Co Ltd).  (The Model
14 was later converted to the famous Lockheed Hudson or A-29 or PBO in
USAAF and USN service respectively.)  I have sources that state that these
Model 14s were Model 14-WG3Bs or 14-G3Bs; regardless, the msn of these
aircraft were 1426-1428, 1433-1438, 1445, 1446, 1452 and 1455-1462.
Tachikawa Hikoki KK was acting as an agent for Nihon Koku KK (Japan Air
Transport Co Ltd); the airline also acquired another 10 Model 14-WG3Bs.
All of these aircraft were delivered between Jun and Sep 38 and were used
on routes between Japan and China.  After the war began, these aircraft
were given the Allied Code Name TOBY.  These aircraft wre equipped with
two Wright Cyclone GR-1820-G3Bs rated at 900 hp for take-off and 840 hp at
8,000 feet (2,438 m).

In 1939, Tachikawa exercised it's license rights and submitted a proposal
to the Japanese Army Air Force to build a modified Model 14 powered by
two 900 hp Mitsubishi Ha-26-I (Army Type 99 radial Model 1) 14-cylinder
radial engines.  A total of 119 of these aircraft, designated Army Type LO
Transport, were built by Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo KK (55 machines built 1940-
41) and Tachikawa (64 aircraft built 1940-42) and were given the Allied
Code Name THELMA.

In Sep 39, while Kawasaki was gearing up to build the modified Model 14
described above, the JAAF Air Headquarters told Kawasaki to design an
improved version of the aircraft.  Designated Ki-56, the emphasis was on
improved take-off characteristics and a larger cargo capacity.  Without
assistance from Lockheed, the Kawasaki engineers lenghtened the fuselage by
4 feet 11 inches (1.5 m) vs 5 feet 6 inches (1.58 m) on the Model 18; they
also redesigned the Fowler flaps to increase efficiency, the tailplanes
were retained in the original location of the Model 14 atop the rear
fuselage, the Ki-56 had a large cargo door, with a small passenger door,
on the port side of the fuselage, the weight of the wing structure was
reduced, and it was powered by two 950 hp Nakajima Ha-25 (Army Type 99)
radial engines.  The first two production aircraft were completed in Nov
40, and after further testing, production was ordered and 119 additional
Army Type 1 Freight Transports were delivered between Aug 41 and Sep 43.
This aircraft received the Allied Code Name THALIA.

Rather than the Lockheed Model 18, Steve is probably talking about the very
similar Kawasaki Ki-56 Army Type 1 Freight Transport.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 22:57:18 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Dams and Defence

Dear John,

Would you have a citation on that New Scientist article, or at least a
rough date? I have heard it said that one reason Sadat sought peace
with Israel was the realization that if the Israeli Air Force could
breach the Aswan Dam, the resulting flood from Lake Nasser would scour
the lower Nile valley, possibly killing 90%+ of the Egyptian population.
Is there anything in the article to support this?

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 7 Nov 1994 23:04:11 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP:Query: Zero name

Dear Emmanuel,

Thanks for the correction and the additional comments. I was working off the
top of my head, and wasn't sure how many companies built for the Navy.

Henry Sirotin

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End of WWII-L Digest - 6 Nov 1994 to 7 Nov 1994
***********************************************