Subject: WWII-L Digest - 24 Nov 1994 to 25 Nov 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 26 Nov 1994 00:00:41 -0500

There are 27 messages totalling 887 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Thanks!
  2. INF: USN Chronology 11-25-94
  3. Waffen-SS (7)
  4. Airpower over Normandy
  5. GI BENEFITS ? (2)
  6. INF: 50 Years Ago - 26-NOV-1944
  7. 22d in the Hurtgen 25 Nov 44
  8. TRV:Medals
  9. ENOLA GAY AGAIN (2)
 10. Hollywood in World War II
 11. 22d in Hurtgen 25 Nov Cont
 12. Carlson's Raiders
 13. SALERNO
 14. Waffen-SS(Chinese in WWI)
 15. the SS and NATO
 16. CARLSON'S RAIDERS
 17. 22d Inf in the Hurtgen 26 Nov 44
 18. Spitfire vs Mustang (2)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 00:24:04 EST
From:    "MONTGOMERY,KENNETH TODD,MR" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Thanks!

Ireneusz,
          Thanks for your speedy reply.  I'll be sure to keep you in
mind as a resource person--now I just need to FIND all those Polish
sources...
                             Best, Todd

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 04:00:14 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 11-25-94

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1944
11/25 Sat. Aircraft from two carrier groups (Rear Adm. G. F.
           Bogan and Rear Adm. F. C. Sherman) bomb enemy
           shipping and aircraft in central Luzon area, P. I.
           Japanese suicide planes attack United States
           carriers.
            United States naval vessel sunk:
             PT-363, by coastal defense gun, Netherlands East
              Indies area,
              00 d. 55'N., 127 d. 50'E.
            United States naval vessels damaged:
             Carrier ESSEX (CV-9), INTREPID (CV-11), and HANCOCK
              (CV-19), by suicide planes, Luzon area, P. I.,
              15 d. 47'N., 123 d. 14' E.
             Light carrier INDEPENDENCE (CVL-22), by crash of
              friendly aircraft, Luzon area, P. I.,
              15 d. 58'N., 125 d. 14'E.
             Light carrier CABOT (CVL-28), by suicide plane,
              Luzon area, P. I.,
              15 d. 42'N., 123 d. 09'E.
            Japanese naval vessels sunk:
             Heavy cruiser KUMANO, by carrier-based aircraft,
              Luzon area, P. I.,
              15 d. 45'N., 119 d. 48'E.
             Cruiser YASOSHIMA, by carrier-based aircraft, Luzon
              area, P. I.,
              15 d. 40'N., 119 d. 45'E.
             Destroyer SHIMOTSUKI, by submarine CAVALLA (SS-
              244), west of Borneo,
              02 d. 21'N., 107 d. 20'E.
             Transports NOs. 6 and 10, by carrier-based
              aircraft, Marinduque Island, P. I.,
              13 d. 32'N., 121 d. 52'E.
             Coast defense vessel NO. 38, by submarine HARDHEAD
              (SS-365), west of Luzon, P. I.,
              14 d. 22'N., 119 d. 57'E.
             Patrol boat NO. 38, by submarine ATULE (SS-403),
             Luzon Strait,
              20 d. 12'N., 121 d. 51'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 24 Nov 1994 23:53:44 -0500
From:    Christopher Morton <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Waffen-SS

>
>         Not only did the French army of WWI contain Poles, Czechs, and
> Vietnamese, among others, but I read once that 250,000 Chinese coolies
> were brought in to dig trenches for the French Army too.

I recall this as well.  Kind of interesting when you consider what the
Chinese and Japanese (who took no part on the Western front at all) received
out of the war respectively.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 08:01:28 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Airpower over Normandy

 Mike,

Now that you've changed the argument from the original:

 > Contrary to what John Terraine has said, *** air power was not
 > decisive in the Normandy campaign.***  However, it did have a
 > significant impact on the battles and undoubtably made the job of
 > the ground forces considerably easier.

To your current:

 > I stand by my assertion that air power was not *** the decisive
 > factor*** in defeating the Germans in Normandy.

I can't argue with you.

  Airpower was only one of the decisive factors in the success of
the Normandy campaign. Just like ODS, airpower alone can't win the
battle, you must have land forces to push the enemy out of the
contested territory, and sea power to maintain the supply line
that allows the infantry to fight.

    Steve L. New
    [email-masked]
    Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 08:48:05 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GI BENEFITS ?

Thanks Ben,... I had to try the net 1st to try to impress my Nana who is
with us for the holiday. She is impressed, but understandably baffled as
well. Our evening conversation turned to her son's (my uncle) benefits
when she mentioned his wife needs about $2000 of gum surgery. Ben, would
your VA medical cover your wife/gum surgery? Do you know?

'Regards, Alan

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 05:58:25 -0800
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 26-NOV-1944

On 26-NOV-1944, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the US 1st Army sector, the 104th Division captures
Frenz. The 4th Division consolidates its positions in the Hurtgen forest.
In the US 3rd Army sector, units of the XX Corps continue advancing
northeast. The 95th Division penetrates the Maginot Line. In the 7th Army
sector, the 3rd Division crosses the Vosges.

Eastern Front - The 2nd Ukraine Front captures Hatvan, in Hungary. Budapest
is being threatened from the south.

Italian Front - Operations in the Lamone sector are being seriously delayed
by heavy rains.

Philippines (Leyte) - Sudden violent night attacks are launched by the
Japanese on various sectors of the front. The attacks are contained by the
Americans largely by the use of artillery fire. Over 400 dead Japanese are
counted next morning on a ridge west of Burauen.

The Homefront
-------------
Snead Wins - Sam Snead has won his first golf tournament since being
mustered out of the Navy. Snead won the Portland Open with a 72 hole total
of 289.

Pro Football - New York 7, Brooklyn 0; Washington 14, Boston 7; Chicago
Bears 28, Philadelphia 7; Detriot 26, Cleveland 14.

Army & Navy
-----------
New Carrier Commissioned - The 17,000 ton aircraft carrier Bonhomme Richard
has been commissioned at the New York Navy Yard. Captain A.O. Rule takes
command of the ship.

=============================================================================

Sources: "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi, "The
World Almanac Book Of WW II" by Peter Young, "Facts On File Yearbook 1944,
Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L. Lapica and "Time" magazine.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis     [email-masked]
Cary, N.C.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 08:19:45 -0600
From:    Drew Halevy <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Waffen-SS

In Ambrose's D-Day, he says that four Koreans were taken by the Allies on
D-Day. -Drew

Drew Philip Halevy      | I am become death
Grad Student            | The Shatterer of worlds
Department of History   | Waiting that hour
University of Arkansas  | That ripens to their doom
[email-masked]   | Trinity-July 1945

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 09:24:16 EST
From:    "SGM Robert S. Rush" <[email-masked]>
Subject: 22d in the Hurtgen 25 Nov 44

22d Infantry in the Hurtgen Forest 25 November 1944

The 22d's objective on 25 November was Grosshau.  Lanham's plan called for a
combined attack of the 2d and 3d Battalions to take the village from two
directions.  The 3d Battalion would cut through the woods to the ridge north of
Grosshau and assault the town from that direction, while the 2d Battalion
was to make a secondary attack to the edge of the wooods sowthwest of Grosshau.
>From its new location the battalion could place direct fire on both Grosshau
and Kleinhau.  Each battalion was give a company of tanks in support.  The
1st Battalion was ordered to occupy the 3d Battalion's old position west of
Grosshau to cover the regiment's left rear.

Problems began with the supporting attack as soon as the 2d Battalion began
its move.  The trail so recently constructed by the engineers could not
accomodate tanks and an alternate route had to be found.  Someone found
another trail but it entailed winching the tanks across a large crater, eating
up more time.  The battalion attacked without the tanks, with Easy on the left
and Fox on the right.  Resistance was light, but casualties still occurred.
Germans bypassed by the assault companies killed the battalion executive
officer, Captain Eggleston.  The new officers and men made many mistakes
which caused unnecessarily high casualties even against the light resistance.
By 1030 hours, however, the battalion was at the edge of the woodline, about
600 yards to the southwest of Grosshau.

The 3d Battalion also met little initial opposition as it moved through the
woods.  King Company was on the left and Love was on the right.  The
battalion's unexpected attack swept rapidly to the edge of the woods northeast
of Grosshau, capturing some Germans and bypassing others who surrendered
later.  Item Company captured Foresthaus Grosshau.  By 0845 hours the
battalion was in position along the edge of the woods.  All indications
received pointed to Grosshau being lightly defended, and Major Kemp assumed a
coordinated attack on the village using armor and infantry would capture it
quickly.

Unfortunately, getting the armor up through the minefields and mud to the
infantry took four hours, delaying the attack until 1330 hours.  Then
coordination failed when the assault began, and only three tanks and one
tank destroyer left the woods with the infantry.  As the tanks emerged from the
edge of the woods, German anti-tank fire destroyed all three.  The tank
destroyer pulled back into the woods.  Three more tanks 300 yard back in the
woods were then destroyed by anti-tank fire.  The infantry in Love and King
Companies were hit as soon as they left the woods by a massive artillery
barrage and forced back.  For three hours German artillery rained on the
battalikon and artillery bursts cut down almost every tree in the area.  The
concentrations were so heavy and accurate that at on of the 3d Battalion's
positions, eight of eleven scattered foxholes sustained direct hits, and
fragments struck the other three.  The Item Company Commander, Lieutenant
William Lee was wounded.  At about 1500 hours, Kemp called off the attack.
Although Grosshau did not fall, 101 Germans were captured and two of the
22d's battalions were on the edge of the woods.

That night the regiment reported to the division personnel officer (G1)
it had sustained 235 casualties, most from the 3d battalion.  More leaders
fell on the twenty-fifth than any other day in the battle.  Actual casualties,
11 officers, 46 NCOs and 152 other ranks.  In one day the Germans had
reduced the 3d Battalion to the same condition as the 1st and 2d.  The
regiment had nothing left.

At this point few if any squads in the regiment had more than one or two
soldiers in it who had been together for any length of time.  In SLA
Marshall's estimate, this lack of cohesive buddy teams should have
precluded any further advance, continue it did.

Taken from Paschendale with Treebursts

Eight Days Remaining
Rob Rush

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 17:21:34 CET
From:    "COL Donnell, Doug" <[email-masked]>
Subject: TRV:Medals

Several recent postings concerned medals and I thought I'd jump in and
add my two cents (good excuse to start contributing again).

Interestingly enough, the Army of Occupation Medal continued to be awarded
to personnel stationed in Berlin as it was still administered, in some
respects, under the 4 power agreement that divided Germany following
World War II.  So, there are a lot of folks still on active duty with
Army of Occupation Medals.

The National Defence Service Medal was again awarded for service during
the period of the Gulf War in addition to the periods listed in the
posting a few days ago (that should be spelled Defense. . .I've been in
NATO too long).

The POW Medal is a relatively new one, having been approved in the late
80s.  It can be awarded retroactively, so former POWs can apply for it.

I believe Ben Frank's post included several excellent avenues for applying
for medals that SHOULD have been, but were not, awarded.  Another that
might work is a letter to the service secretary or the individual's
congressman.  Good luck.

                               Doug Donnell

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 11:44:54 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ENOLA GAY AGAIN

        While agreeing with the main outline of Terry's post, I also agree
with Lee's response, and would like to make a further point.  The relatively
high casualty rates suffered by the Soviets even in their advance during the
last two years of the war may be attributed to factors other than uninspired
generalship.  One is the quality of manpower they were working with.  Not much
wrong with the Russian in terms of basic soldiering qualities, except perhaps a
lower general standard of education compared with the average German-- and even
that had been greatly improved over the Tsar's armies by virtue of the
attempted universal education programs instituted by the Communists in the
'thirties.  The problem was that training standards throughout this vast army
on the average could never be as thorough as that found in most German units
prior to 1944, or in the British and U.S. forces.  The entire Russian system of
war was to a certain extent built on mass (much as was, effectively speaking,
whatever the idealized planning aspects were, the U.S. war effort, except in
the Soviet case it was almost equally masses of men and masses of machines,
where in the American example it was quantities of weapons rather than people
that did the trick).  The huge early-war manpower losses, and the continuing
heavy drain on the fighting fronts as the Soviet Army learned its craft on the
job (and with the Axis sitting on roughly 60% of European Russia till the
second half of '43 offensive action-- which can be very costly for troops
lacking proper training and/or experience fighting an enemy that had both-- was
an imperative rather than an option) meant that a very rudimentary training was
the rule rather than the exception for many Russian troops throughout the war.
They simply needed the replacements faster than they could train them, a
vicious cycle which continued right up until 1945.  With such troops simpler
but costlier tactics could still prove effective if one is willing to accept
the much higher attrition this implies (and here Terry is right that the Soviet
command did show a very callous attitude toward losses-- compared for instance
with the U.S. where every soldier was a potential voter).  The Soviets in fact
developed a very effective mirror of the German system, using special shock
forces which usually did possess excellent training, often extending to
detailed rehearsals of the specific operation in question (like the western
Allies before amphibious operations), to spearhead the assault and the masses
of lesser-trained infantry to do the blue-collar work.
        One other point which may partially (but not totally) excuse the Soviet
generalship in the matter of high losses is the types of campaigns their troops
had to fight in the victorious final years of the war.  Consider for example
the thrust into southeastern Europe via Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and the
Carpathian passes of Hungary.  Bulgaria and eventually Rumania changed sides
and joined the Russians, but these battles involved eight or nine months of
fighting through mountainous terrain with immense natural advantages for the
defender, mostly through fortified areas (and two world wars have amply proved
how effective German field fortifications could be, at least in cost imposed on
the attacker).  The Rumanian and Bulgarian forces also suffered high casualties
assaulting these defenses (as did the Yugoslav partisans trying to fight as a
regular army in this final phase), although that may not prove much as the
standards of training, equipment, and generalship in these units usually left
much to be desired.  The Allied experience in Italy, where heavily outnumbered
Germans were able to slow the enemy advance to a crawl in combat characterized
by relatively high attrition for the attackers, is a very good analogy (does it
reflect badly on Allied generalship?  A very good question which I'll leave it
to others on the list to answer).  When the Soviets were able to operate in
terrain more favorable for large-scale offensive operations, and furthermore to
make maximum use of their better-trained mobile and armored formations, the
results could be quite impressive (the prime example of course being the
"Bagration" offensive in Byelorussia/eastern Poland, where the overall losses
for the campaign were not so disproportional in favor of the Germans-- a
smaller repetition was the burst into the Hungarian plain in fall '44).  In the
same respect the costly battle for Berlin could be seen as a larger version of
the bitter US struggle for "Bloody Aachen," similar tactical problems resulting
in costly combat for the attackers in both cases.  And for the price tag for
constant head-on attacks in terrain where the defender, even if outnumbered and
outgunned, holds all the aces, the superb series of posts on the Huertgen
Forest currently running on this list provides a graphic illustration.
        One last point is the simple fact that German troops tended to be more
predisposed to fight to the bitter end against Soviet forces.  There were of
course multiple reasons for this.  Aside from the success of the Axis
propaganda efforts in promoting the great anti-Bolshevik crusade, and the
genuine abhorence of the Soviet system felt by large elements of the
populations who became Axis soldiers, there was the practical matter of
protecting ones' home and family from the repulsive behavior of many of the
Soviet troops (especially the second-  and third-echelon units with less
training and discipline), and finally the fact that in the east surrender
often meant death anyway-- either shot out of hand (occasionally subjected to
brutal mutilation) or worked to death in some dismal gulag.  So while troops in
the west, even in 1944, might be expected to surrender if their tactical
situation was hopeless (of course there were many exceptions) the troops facing
the Soviets, especially SS, tended to fight to the death.  American soldiers
and Marines who fought the Japanese knew what that meant-- operations which
make it into the history books as "mop-up" actions, if at all, can often be
fatal to the grunt holding the mop-- and the Germans were generally much better
armed and equipped than the Japanese at every level.  The Germans themselves
had learned earlier in the war-- at places from Brest-Litovsk to Stalingrad--
just how costly it could be to winkle out such die-hards, especially when they
were ensconced in terrain favorable for defense. It might also be worth
mentioning that the last big German offensive of the war was not the Ardennes,
but rather in the Lake Balaton area of Hungary, where the German units involved
were primarily SS panzer units, and the fighting raged heavily as late as March
'45.  (after getting through all the tough terrain  described above, and this
counteroffensive, the Soviets got to fight through more mountains into
Czechoslovakia).
        Finally, having seen the extensive and impressive reading list Terry
was kind enough to post earlier regarding the eastern front, I might suggest
that the preponderance of German sources (or of authors who drew heavily on
German sources) even when filtered through such an obviously preceptive mind
might exert a subtle effect on the evaluation of the tactical equilibrium
between the German and Soviet forces.  From flacks like Paul Carell (who
whatever his faults in preaching the pro-German gospel at least did interview
hundreds of actual German veterans and has in part told the war as they saw it)
up to respected commanders like Manstein almost every post-war German writer
presents the picture that tactically speaking the Germans were far superior,
repeatedly winning the firefights, even with inferior numbers (and sometimes
inferior equipment), and inflicting disproportionate casualties almost without
fail.  Although there is some truth in this as a general picture (IMHO), such
an all-encompassing evaluation ignores the many occasions throughout the
1941-45 period when Soviet forces of equal or even lesser strength (and often
suffering under further disadvantages such as local German air control) held
their own or even triumphed against German units.  BTW, if you read the
histories, especially of the actual fighting men, from the Soviet side one gets
an almost diametrically opposite picture at times.  Of course, these accounts
were mostly subject to the censorship of the Soviet press, and many aspects
might be regarded as suspect for that reason, but the German writers
(especially the two examples I cited above) had their own ideological ax to
grind as well, and I'm wondering why we sometimes don't regard what they had to
say (much intended for the ears of their new NATO audience) with an equal
degree of skepticism.  But even if these readings don't create a sort of bias
toward the German side I think its possible to miss a certain appreciation for
the immense problems faced by the Soviet troops and commanders. Having said all
that, I must admit that I fall prey to the same syndrome of buying into a
concept of absolute German tactical superiority which, exceptions aside, may
not completely conform to the actuality of life on the eastern front.
        Gee, can anyone on the list tell I'm working a skeleton shift today
with no patrons in my library and not much to do??  We'll call that my $2000
worth...
        At any rate, my purpose is not to disagree with Terry's assessment of
the Soviet command, but rather to elaborate that, as with virtually all things
historical and military, there are many complexities to the situation.

Regards

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 11:53:21 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Waffen-SS

        A book really germaine to this entire discussion, which I've just
obtained a copy of (on Greg Kelley's recommendation) and am now devouring, is
J. Lee Ready's "Forgotten Axis."  Much of what has been talked about on this
subject line is discussed in great detail, from the actual organization and
combat history of the foreign SS detachments to the background social contexts
alluded to by Terry in a recent post on the topic regarding the French.

Regards

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 11:58:11 -0500
From:    Ellen Shepard <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Hollywood in World War II

Do you have a list of the women in Hollywood who were involved in WWII?  I am
very interested for research that I am doing?

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 12:42:16 -0500
From:    Pulp-Fiction <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Waffen-SS

It doesnt take much sense to figure out that :
(a) The CO's were ALWAYS GERMANS, in these so-called "non-german" SS
units, and
(b) The fought in countries other than where they were recurited, except
Valasov's forces

On Wed, 23 Nov 1994, Oliver Bonham-Carter wrote:

> > Not only was there an Indian SS unit, there was an ENGLISH SS unit, although
> > it was even smaller than the Indian one, and was comprised for the most part
> > of common criminals.
> >
> > There were also French, Dutch, Belgian, Italian, Bosnian, Danish, and other
> > foreign SS units.
>
> I don't understand, why would there be SS groups formed out of non-German
> peoples? How would the French SS react while fight French forces and the
> same with the others. Would they even know they were fighting their own
> or were the French SS (and the others) solders trators?
> Thank you for your time.
>
> [email-masked]
>  "...So the bartender says "Hey, that's not a DUCK!"
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 12:30:50 EST
From:    "SGM Robert S. Rush" <[email-masked]>
Subject: 22d in Hurtgen 25 Nov Cont

Sorry, I left off part of the 25th of November post

22d in the Hurtgen 25 November Continued

When word came down from 4th Division Headquarters to prepare to continue the
assault the following day, Lanham told Lieutenant Colonel Delaney he would wait
for a direct order from General Barton.  Henley wrote the "Men are tired and
sleepy and their nerves are about shot.  Too much of anything is too much."
Lanham, after hearing much the same thing from the 1st Battalion commander,
agreed and said,

"The general knows it too, but nothing can be done about it.  The general has
tried in higher echelons but it's just we or the Krauts . . . There is no
relief in sight except in defeating the Krauts."

In his nightly report to the division, Lanham downgraded the efficiency of the
regiment from "very good" to "good" because of regiment's continued loss of
leaders.  That night the regiment received 295 replacements to reload the
ranks.

Because of the poor condition of the 22d, General Barton notified Lanham at
2130 hours on 25 November no attack on Grosshau would occur on the
twenty-sixth.  He also told Lanham to begin considering a night attack to take
the village.  Barton committed nine battalions of artillery, ranging from 105mm
to 240mm (108 pieces of artillery total) plus mortars to shell the Germans in
Grosshau.  He wanted Lanham's regiment to improve positions and wait for the
12th Infantry Regiment and 5th Armor Division (V Corps) to come on line in the
south before trying again.

>From Paschendale with treebursts

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 13:02:56 -0500
From:    Pulp-Fiction <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Waffen-SS

TO understand the SS one has to understand the aritect behind it.It was
gruppenfurhur Heydrich, and his boss Himmler.If any one you guys/girls
have read Himmlers speechs, such have been translated into english.You
will reaslise that he always intended the SS to be a pan_germanic
organisation, much in organisation to NATO.Unlike NATO, this pan-germanic
would onbly be interested in German Interets, even if they were contrary
to some countirs in Europe.
Hitler himself say on numerous occasations, that the Indians were
descended from the Aryans, and gave explicit orders that Indians captured
were not to be abused or punished.
The fact that he allowed the Greeks, esp Officers to keep there Side-arms
is a reflection that the typical conception of blue-eyes and white skin
was not necessary the imagine which he had. Alfred Rosenbury the
"thinker" of the NASDP had similar ideas. Although Himmler and Rosenbury
never really got on, Himmler was not to proud to take his ideas, and
claim that there were his.
Himmler also wanted the idealogy of the SS to be non-christain, in fact
it was anti-christain, and in 1944 he made comments to the fact that if
the religion was Islamic, it would have been a better thing, and that his
country (i.e Greater Germany) would not be in a predictement that it was
facing then. Hilter although 100% loyal to his friends, amde numerous
remarks to his secretary and Bormann, at the Wolfs layer, that an
alliance with the Arabs would have been much more benifical than an
alliance with the Italians, who he considered a liability, even though he
respected the duce.
The Bosnians, were involved inn garrisson duty, and briefly were invovled
in patrols in russia, near the border, however that particulat SS unit
was dissolved, when it become clear that the participants were too ruddy.
I hope i have not confused, but claified the matter.

I AM LOOKING FOR INFORMATION IN ENGLISH ON FIELDMARSHALL MODEL. CAN
ANYONE HELP.THERE IS A BOOK ON THE "FIREFIGHTER" IN GERMAN.

On Fri, 25 Nov 1994, Drew Halevy wrote:

> In Ambrose's D-Day, he says that four Koreans were taken by the Allies on
> D-Day. -Drew
>
> Drew Philip Halevy      | I am become death
> Grad Student            | The Shatterer of worlds
> Department of History   | Waiting that hour
> University of Arkansas  | That ripens to their doom
> [email-masked]   | Trinity-July 1945
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 14:36:47 -0500
From:    Lee Windsor u <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ENOLA GAY AGAIN

On Thu, 24 Nov 1994, Ben Frank wrote:

> Sorry, Lee. I don't know how that connotation of Semper Fidelis entered the
> "system" except to say that most of the people in WWII were a lot more cynical
> than were earlier Marines, perhaps. It might be somewhat like the "Kilroy Was
> Here" syndrome. Cheers, and Happy Turkey Day. Ben Frank
>
Thank you Mr. Frank

I guess that's just one of those peculiarities that cannot be explained.

Have a good Thanksgiving.
Lee

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 10:56:21 -1000
From:    Jim Adams <[email-masked]>
Subject: Carlson's Raiders

A couple of months ago this was a topic.  The November issue of Marine
Corps Gazette has an article titled "Braiding the Cord:  The Role of
Evans F. Carlson's 2d Marine Raider Battalion in Amphibious Warfare," by
Phyllis A. Zimmerman  (Ben Frank mentioned her before as she is writing
an biography on Carlson).

The lead to the article says "The formation of raider battalions in 1942
touched off a controversy in the Marine Corps that continued until they
were disbanded in 1944.  The results of this experiment of creating an
elite within an elite has had a far-reaching impact on the development of
the Corps.  Carlson's Raiders played a significant role in this process,
influencing the future organization and equipment of regular Marine units."

For Ben Frank:

do you have an address, either email or postal mail for Dr Zimmerman?

****************************************************************************
Jim Adams                       [email-masked]
Cultural Resource Manager
USS Arizona Memorial, NPS       (808) 422-2771  extension 130
1 Arizona Memorial Place
Honolulu, Hawaii 96818
****************************************************************************

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Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 18:20:37 -0500
From:    Lee Windsor u <[email-masked]>
Subject: SALERNO

Hello all!

I hope everyone had their fill of bird.

Field-Marshal Montgomery has often been criticized for not doing enough
to ease the pressure on the 5 Army beachhead at Salerno in the first few
days of the landing.

The standard interpretation is that naval gunfire and close air support
were decisive in breaking up German counter-attacks on the beachhead, and
that by the time troops from 8 Army arrived, the situation was well in hand.

I agree with this interpretation for the most part, but I would argue
that the awareness in the German command, of the steady, if slow,
approach of Canadian and British troops from Taranto and Calabria was
perhaps more influential to the battle than is otherwise given credit.
The advance of 1 Canadian Div up the "foot" and into the "ankle"
presented a threat to the German lines of communications behind the
beach, forcing Vietinghoff to rethink his plan for pushing General
Clark's troops back in the sea.

Well guys, whatdaya think?

Lee

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 18:32:11 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Waffen-SS

Re the Waffen-SS as the first "European Army:" How about Le Grande Armee
of 1812?

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 18:40:23 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Waffen-SS(Chinese in WWI)

The Chinese brought to Europe as laborers in WWI acted as stevedores in
the British sector, and as factory workers in the French sector. They
came under formal non-combatant labor contracts, and would not have
been used as trench-diggers under fire. For more details, please contact
me privately, unless Joe B. approves, because this is off-list.

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 23:59:35 GMT+1
From:    SYSTEM OPERATOR <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Waffen-SS

Christopher Morton <[email-masked]> writes:

> As for the Charlemagne division, there was always considerable pro-Nazi
> sentiment in France.  Remember, the French were sending the Germans Jews they
> didn't even ask for.

I hope nobody will fall for this.
French pro-nazi sentiment was never "considerable" in any sense of the word.
I am not a very nationalist Frenchman and occasionally extremely critical
of my country, but I can not let such statements slip by.

What French sent Jews to the Germans were that antisemitic minority which
ruled the State at the time. Calling them "The French" is a gross error, and
can be compared  with calling the KKK "The Americans". I am myself of a
partly Jewish family and know no French Jews who view the French people
as "considerably" pro-Nazi or antisemitic.

The Laval government was never elected, bear this in mind.
It is perfectly correct that Petain was popular up to 1942. Most people
thought he was "playing" with the occupier and softening the rigours of
occupation. When his pro-German attitude became clear the regime became
unpopular.
To let you judge how confused matters were, a Jew relative of mine whose
brother died in Barkhausen concentration camp in 1942 applauded Petain in
Lyon in mid-1944. This shows how confused the French were.

Remember that the French were predominantly anti-German at the time. Deat,
Doriot and other French Nazis were sponsored by the Germans and never enjoyed
great popular support.

Arnaud.

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 26 Nov 1994 00:43:58 GMT+1
From:    SYSTEM OPERATOR <[email-masked]>
Subject: the SS and NATO

Yes, I too have seen this argument that "the SS was the ancestor of NATO".
In pro-nazi litterature (a book about the SS Wallonie Brigade and Degrelle).
This is a recurrent theme in post-war pro-Nazi literature, the SS is
described as "the First European multi-national army protecting civilized
Europe from the Soviets".
Funnily, this same author also described the raping of women by SS soldiers
as "the shield of wombs Europe is erecting against Bolshevism" !!
Amazing propaganda.

Arnaud.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 21:02:05 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: CARLSON'S RAIDERS

Jim, you can get her at the Department of History, Ball State University,
Muncie, Indiana. Regards, Ben

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 21:02:09 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GI BENEFITS ?

I am not familiar with the benefits the VA has for veterans since I have not
yet reached an age when I need VA assistance, almost there, though. I honestly
doubt that a wife can obtain medical benefits on the basis of her husband being
a veteran. That is not the definitive answer, so I suggest that you check with
the people I recommended who are much more familiar than I with veterans'
benefits. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 22:00:16 EST
From:    "SGM Robert S. Rush" <[email-masked]>
Subject: 22d Inf in the Hurtgen 26 Nov 44

The 22d Infantry in the Hurtgen Forest 26 November 1944

The regiment's disposition on 26 November looked like a horseshoe with the open
end facing Grosshau, 3d Battalion in the north, 1st at the base and 2d in the
south.  A 500 yard gap, enough room for one company, separated the 2d and 3d
Battalions and Lanham wanted the 1st Battalion to conduct a limited attack and
straighten the center.  So on the morning of the twenty-sixth, Company Charlie,
consisting of mostly replacements, one veteran officer and less than a half
dozen NCOs, attacked along both sides of Road X towards a point just short of
the western edge of Grosshau.

     This attack had problems from the outset.  German artillery fire landing
on the company's line of departure delayed the jump off time.  The attack
started with one squad leading each of the two assault platoons until the
company began to cross an opening in the woods about 150 yards wide.  All
semblance of the attack formation was lost when artillery started dropping in
the clearing.   Private Forest Casteel, one of the new replacements commented,

"The artillery was worse that I ever want to see; one hit two feet in front of
my hole and broke my rifle butt-plate and ripped my cartridge belt.  I saw
others who weren't so lucky.  It was the first taste of battle for a huge
number of us, and I guess that one day of that is worth an entire shift of
basic training."

The training the replacements received in the United States had been no
preparation for hell they encountered in the H|rtgen Forest.

     Continuing to move forward, the soldiers overran a German position of
about fifty soldiers and killed about twenty more.  The company was both
disorganized and smaller when it got to its objective.  In position for only an
hour, the members of Charlie Company began receiving artillery fire, direct
fire from enemy machine gunners who had infiltrated the company's rear, and
shells from a Mark IV tank holed up in a building on the edge of Grosshau not
more than seventy-five yards away.  When it looked like they were in danger of
being overrun by German infantry the men beat a hasty retreat to their original
line of departure.  The company commander, Lieutenant Frederick Sweeny, was the
last man out and carried the two remaining wounded men.  By the day's end,
Charlie Company had an effective strength of approximately twenty officers and
men.

     The regiment reported to the division personnel officer (G1) 135 soldiers
killed, wounded, or missing, but no replacements were available for assignment
to the 22d.  All of the division's infantry replacements went to either the 8th
or 12th Infantry.  If there were problems with American organization, as Van
Creveld maintains (discussed later in detail in Chapter Four), on the
twenty-sixth of November, the 22d should have become ineffective.

>From Paschendale with Treebursts
Rob Rush

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 22:30:35 -0500
From:    David Rising <[email-masked]>
Subject: Spitfire vs Mustang

A quick question. Why could the American Mustang penetrate so far into
German airspace, while the British Spitfire seemed to be confined to a
purely defensive role?  My question is based on observations of both
aircraft, which appear to be roughly the same size.
Gordon Stock on David Rising's e-mail

Also, I remember a few months ago a story that somebody posted about
American planes invading Swiss airspace during ww-ii and there was a
comical (if not anecdotal) story about it. If whoever originally posted
it wouldn't mind posting again, I'd be appreciative.
David Rising

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 25 Nov 1994 23:12:37 -0500
From:    chris garcia <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Spitfire vs Mustang

I'm not sure what the limitations on the spitfire were.  The Mustang and
Spitfire both shared the same engine- a Rolls Royce "Merlin".  In fact
the mustang was a flop in it's first development with an american
engine.  Then some bright soul said "what if" and stuck a british engine
in the mustang and it came alive.  It was extremely fuel efficient and
had a main tank, an auxiary (sp) tank and a drop tank.  Between them they
could fly from england to germany and back.  Goering said when he
"saw Mustangs over Berlin (he) knew the jig was up."

On Fri, 25 Nov 1994, David Rising wrote:

> A quick question. Why could the American Mustang penetrate so far into
> German airspace, while the British Spitfire seemed to be confined to a
> purely defensive role?  My question is based on observations of both
> aircraft, which appear to be roughly the same size.
> Gordon Stock on David Rising's e-mail
>
> Also, I remember a few months ago a story that somebody posted about
> American planes invading Swiss airspace during ww-ii and there was a
> comical (if not anecdotal) story about it. If whoever originally posted
> it wouldn't mind posting again, I'd be appreciative.
> David Rising
>

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End of WWII-L Digest - 24 Nov 1994 to 25 Nov 1994
*************************************************