Subject: WWII-L Digest - 16 Nov 1994 to 17 Nov 1994

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 18 Nov 1994 00:01:50 -0500

There are 35 messages totalling 1536 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. HIST-THE STUDY OF
  2. Naval Hist. Morrison
  3. WHAT-IF YAMAMOTO (5)
  4. INF: USN Chronology 11-17-94
  5. INF: 50 Years Ago - 18-NOV-1944
  6. Dieppe Raid in 1942 (2)
  7. Battle of the Huertgen Forest
  8. Revenge on japan
  9. 50TH: BATTLE OF THE HUERTGEN FOREST (6)
 10. 22d Inf in Hurtgen 17 Nov 44
 11. PTO vs ETO
 12. german pow in the united states (2)
 13. 22d Inf in the Hurtgen 18 Nov
 14. 22d Inf in Hurtgen 19 Nov
 15. Untold Stories f/TLB, Pt. 5
 16. HIST: PTO vs. ETO (3)
 17. ACES:
 18. ARC: Byrd is back on the line, for now.
 19. WHAT-IF:Yamamoto
 20. German units in the Hurtgen
 21. [INF] USAAF 18 NOV 44
 22. 22d Infantry Hurtgen 20 Nov 44

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 02:23:41 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HIST-THE STUDY OF

John, I never heard that story about "Terrible" Turner's death. I really don't
know how he died. I know that King liked Holland Smith, and it was during one
of his periodic meetings with Nimitz in San Francisco, and this was after the
Attu landings, which Smith attended with his staff as observers, that they
agreed a senior Marine would be needed in the Pacific and that Smith was their
man. This decision, by the way, was made after Smith had met with both of them
at the same time in this same hotel, I think it was the St. Francis or the
Francis Drake--whichever. Smith wrote in "Coral and Brass" that he and Turner
had some monumental arguments, but when all was settled and they were working
in trace, that spelled "Hell" for the Japanese in big red letters. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 16 Nov 1994 22:39:12 -0500
From:    Scott C Stathis <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Naval Hist. Morrison

Niraj, I have to agree with Pete Smith the 15vol. set by Morrison will be
flawed but it will at least be some what accurate about U.S. Naval
operations (if not their results on the Japanese.) However you should
definitely follow Pete's advice and get "The Two-Ocean War" by Morrison.

It's just a hell of alot more cost effective since it is only $19.95.

If you absolutely need to use the 15 Vol. set try finding it in the library
at Lowell. If they don't have it try inter-library loan from here at Umass-
Amherst, since I know we have it. (I've used it many time for history
papers.)

If you need more info. about Interlibrary loans please write.

Scott Stathis
[email-masked]
Umass-Amherst

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 16 Nov 1994 22:46:41 -0500
From:    Scott C Stathis <[email-masked]>
Subject: WHAT-IF YAMAMOTO

Hi, everybody

    This is my first attempt at posting something of interest to me to the
list. And there for if it seems rather passe please forgive me.

   But noticing the What-If opinion I couldn't resist. So heres a WHAT-IF
for you.

  What if Admiral Yamamoto had lived through the entire war? Would the
outcome have been different in anyway?

Scott Stathis
[email-masked]
Umass-Amherst

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 04:00:15 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 11-17-94

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1944
11/17 Fri.  United States naval vessel damaged:
             Attack transport ALPINE (APA-92), by suicide plane,
              Leyte area, P. I.,
              11 d. 07'N., 125 d. 02'E.
            Japanese naval vessels sunk:
             Escort carrier JINYO, by submarine SPADEFISH (SS-
              411), Yellow Sea,
              33 d. 02'N., 123 d. 33'E.
             Submarine I-26, by aircraft (VC-82) from escort
              carrier ANZIO (CVE-57) and destroyer escort
              LAWRENCE C. TAYLOR (DE-415), Philippine Sea,
              12 d. 44'N., 130 d. 42'E.
             Torpedo boat HIYODORI, by submarine GUNNEL (SS-
              253), South China Sea,
              16 d. 56'N., 110 d. 30'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: Larry Jewell <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 04:37:03 -0800
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 18-NOV-1944

On 18-NOV-1944, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - The XXX Corps, British 2nd Army, begins an offensive for
the capture of the Geilenkirchen salient (Operation Clipper).  Operation
Queen continues with the US 2nd Armoured Division reaching Apweiler and
the 29th Division reaching Setterich. In the US 1st Army sector, the 4th
Division advances in the forest of Hurtgen. The 8th Infantry Regiment
reaches the outer edge of Duren. In the US 3rd Army sector, the 10th
Armoured Division captures Launstroff and Schwerdorff and reaches the
river Nied near Bouzonville. The 95th Division enters Metz from the
northeast and the 5th Division from the south. Two divisions of the XII
Corps, the 35th and 26th, resume their advance on the Sarr. In the
southern sector of the front, the 79th Division attacks Fremonville. In
the VI Corps sector, the 100th Division is attacking Raon-l'Etape. The 5th
Armoured Division and the 2nd Moroccan Division (French 1st Army) are
approaching Belfort from the north. The French 1st Division advances about
6 miles beyond Belfort between the Rhine Canal and the small Swiss border
town of Delle.

Eastern Front - Activity picks up with the Leningrad Front as they attack
the German forces defending the southern point of Saaremaa Island, in the
Gulf of Riga. This position is very important to the Germans, which has to
consider evacuating the Army Group North, trapped in Norther Latvia, east
of Riga.

Philippines (Leyte) - Bitter fighting is taking place in the X Corps
sector.

The Homefront
-------------
Mutineers Sentenced - The 12th Naval District Headquarters in San Franciso
has announced that 50 Navy enlisted men, all Negroes, have received
sentences ranging from eight to fifteen years and dishonorable discharges
upon being found guilty of mutiny for refusing to load ammunition after the
Port Chicago explosion.

SPAR Recuiring Ends - Recruiting for the Spars (the women's component of
the Coast Guard) will end as of Nov. 23rd, Washington announces.

College Football - Alabama 19, Mississippi 0; Army 62, Penn 7; Duke 34,
South Carolina 7; Georgia 49, Auburn 13, Georgia Tech 14, LSU 6; Kentucky
40, West Virginia 9; Michigan 14, Wisconsin 0; Navy 32, Purdue 0; N.C.
State 39, Richmond 0; Notre Dame 21, Northwestern 0; Tulane 36, Clemson
20; Yale 13, North Carolina 6.

Army & Navy
-----------
Navy Ace - Fighter Ace Dick Bong's top score of 33 Japanese planes was
almost broken in 95 minutes of furious fighting during the second battle
of the Philippines, when Navy Commander David McCampbell, flying a
Hellcat, shot down nine Japanese fighters (plus two probables).
McCampbell's air-combat total after this attack: 30. This makes him the
second-ranking U.S. Ace.  McCampbell, born in Bessemer, Alabama, is 34
years old. A Naval Academy graduate he has served as signal officer on the
carrier Wasp and was aboard her when she was torpedoed off Guadalcanal in
1942.

=============================================================================

Sources: "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi, "The
World Almanac Book Of WW II" by Peter Young, "Facts On File Yearbook 1944,
Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L. Lapica and "Time" magazine.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis     [email-masked]
Cary, N.C.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 06:50:09 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Dieppe Raid in 1942

Hello, Emery!

To answer your question.

> Didn't Zeitzler gain Hitler's attention and favor as a result of being
> the local commander at Dieppe?

    No. Zeitzler gained Hitler's attention as a logistics expert. He
succeeded Franz Halder as Chief of the German General Staff in 1942
during the Stalingrad operation.

    Hope this helps.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 07:51:42 EDT
From:    "Steve L. New" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Battle of the Huertgen Forest

     TO: Bob Rush

     Please, if it's not too much trouble, continue with the series.

     Thank You
     Steve New

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 06:54:30 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Revenge on japan

Hello, Mike!

> Paul M. Fussell suggested in Wartime that the reason
> Americans agreed to the ETO-first approach is that it
> would leave them leisure to really finish off the Japanese,
> the real task at hand.

    I don't agree with Mr. Fussell's interpretation above. It was
very clear from the beginning of the war that Hitler  was much the
more dangerous of the two enemies. An interesting thought, but not
substantiated by the facts.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 06:56:59 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF YAMAMOTO

Hello, Scott!

To answer your question.

>   What if Admiral Yamamoto had lived through the entire war? Would the
> outcome have been different in anyway?

    No. Yammamoto himself recognized the industrial potential of this
country even before his country attacked PH. The outcome would have
been no different, but the way the Japanese may have fought it may
have been different.

    Hope this helps.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 15:29:16 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: 50TH: BATTLE OF THE HUERTGEN FOREST

  November 17, 1994
  FOR JOE BARONE
  I am absolutely fascinated by your message about the German Huertgen Forest
game.  I have read a great deal about this battle, as well as having
participated in it.  This is the first I have heard of a game.
  What is your source for this information?
  Regards, John Ausland/Oslo Norway

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 15:42:41 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: 50TH: BATTLE OF THE HUERTGEN FOREST

  FOR SGM Robert S. Rush
  November 17, 1994
  I have read your account of the beginning of the battle for the 22nd and would
like to encourage you to continue.  While the 22nd was only one of the three
regiments of the 4th involved, its experiences will illustrate what happened.
  You quoted Hemingway, who was there with Buck Lanham.  I suppose you know that
Carlos Baker's biography of Hemingway has an interesting account of this, as
well Hemingway's other experiences with the 22nd.
  There is also an excellent account of the battle by a German historian, which
has a great many pictures, which convey more graphically than words what is was
like to fight in that tree ladened landscape.
  I revisited it in 1992 and find there is no sign that anything unusual ever
happened there.  The mines have all been cleared, at the cost of many German
lives including the mayor of the town of Huertgen, and the fortifications have
been smoothed over.
  I am curious as to how you happened to go so deeply into this battle.  Could
you tell us more about yourself and what your sources are?
  Regards, John Ausland/Oslo Norway

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 10:20:06 EST
From:    "SGM Robert S. Rush" <[email-masked]>
Subject: 22d Inf in Hurtgen 17 Nov 44

17 November 1944

Colonel Lanham believed the 2d Battalion's resupply problems hampered its
ability to continue the attack the 17th.  Instead, the Regimental Operations
Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Earl Edwards, ordered the 1st Battalio to pass
around the left flank of the 2d Battalion and attack along the firebreak
that led northeast over Hill 206.  The 2d Battalio was to follow the 1st
Battalion.

The Germans reacted violently to the 1st Battalion's advance the morning of
November.  Heavy barrages of German artillery adn mortar fire crashed down as
soon as the battalion began to move forward.  The fire caused heavy casualties
in Baker Company, leading the attack, and killed the 1st Battalion Commander,
Major Hubert Drake.  Disorganization halted the advance for a few hours until
the battalion reorganized and evacuated the casualties to the rear.  The 1st
Battalion Operations Officer, Captain Clifford Henley, remembered:
     Everything was in a muddle.  B Company had about 50 casualties at teh
     top of a slope and it was difficult to hand carry them in litters to
     the forward aid station 1000 yards away.  Communications were also
     knocked out.  We did everything possible to reorganize and push off
     with the attack as planned.
In the midst of this disorder, Lanham ordered the battalion executive officer,
Major George Goforth, to assume command.  The only instructions Goforth
remembered receiving were that he was not to get in the same foxhole with
Captain Henley because of the heavy officer losses.

Just before the advance resumed, four light tanks arrived and started forward
with Baker Company.  They were good for morale but little else.  Two drove
over mines and were knocked out and fallen trees prevented the other two
from advancing far.  German artillery fire constantly pounded the 1st
Battalion.  The woods close to the firebreaks were thick with anti-tank and
anti-personnel mines and there was a continued pattering of sniper fire, but
soldiers in the battalion concerned themselves more with the artillery fire
than with the mines and small arms fire

Obviously concerned about the heavy casualties, Lanham stopped the 1st
Battalion attack at 1240 and limited the 2d Battalion's attack to the west
side of Road X (Weisser Weh, a north south road the 22d had to cross)
The 1st Battalion reached its objective on Hill 208 at 1310 hours and began
digging in.  The distance between the Germans and American was so close that
Major Goforth's attempts to pull one company back from the front lines and
into reserve failed.  After talking with General Barton, the 4th Infantry
Division Commander, Lanham ordered the 2d Battalion to continue its attack,
and although the attack kicked off at 1500, the White Battalion (code name
for 2d) could not cross the road.

In the regiment's rear are, the Germans kept up a heavy artillery fire on all
trails and firebreaks, causing breakdowns in wire and radio communications
between the regimental headquarters and the forward battalions.  The German
fire repeatedly cut the telephone wires and destroyed the radios.

The 3d Battalion, in reserve covering the rear against German infiltration,
had no direct contact with the enemy, but nevertheless suffered heavy
casualties from artillery.  The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur
Teague, the last remaining infantry battalion commander in the division who
had landed as a battalion commander on the Normandy beaches, and a large part
of his staff became casualties within three minutes of the 1st Battalion
Commander's death.  The artillery did not let up and later that morning, Major
James Kemp, the new 3d Battalion Commander radioed his position was 'hot
as hell.'

Casualties for the day were heavy, especially among the leadership.  Not only
had the regiment lost two of its three battalion commanders, but company
commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders fell in alarming numbers.
Reported to regiment as killed, wounded and missing were two officers and 104
enlisted men.  Actual losses were ten officers and 129 enlisted.  The regiment
received 148 replacements that night from the 92d Replacement battalion, most
of whom had been wounded in the regiment's earlier campaigns and were returning
from hospital.  They stayed at the regimental service company overnight and
went forward to the battalions the next day.

The 22d captured forty-two Germans on 17 November.  Many of these captives said
they were under orders to fight to the last man.  They also reported the
American artillery had not caused many casualties, but its amount and duration
demoralized them by keeping them in their bunkers and preventing them from
getting food or evacuating their wounded.

>From Paschendale with Treebursts

If anyone would like information on the German formations the 22d Faced in the
Hurtgen, I can also post.  The data comes primarily from prisoner of war
reports and intellegence analysis.  Plus a few German diaries.  Gives a
much different perspective than what we've read after the war.  (I find it
similiar to the myth of the South histories published in the 1870-1900)

Rob Rush

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 07:59:51 -0800
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: PTO vs ETO

At  6:22 PM 11/16/94 -0600, JEFF ROBERTS wrote:
[...]
>Finally, regarding Dower's _War Without Mercy_ -- Yes, our propaganda was
>racist, and so was theirs.  But this is hardly surprising.  Has there ever been
>a war in which we fought against people we *liked*?  Does any country ever
>describe their enemies as "just like us, only a little different?"  I don't
>think so.  Indeed, it may well be *required* to belittle one's enemies, for it
>must be easier to kill "monkeymen" than humans.  Americans used various choice
>words for describing the Germans as something less than human beings -- the
>fact that the Japanese were of a different race merely made the slandering
>easier in the context of the times.  Overall I find Dower's work interesting,
>but guilty of "generational chauvanism" (i.e. judging individuals of the past
>by the standards of the present) and ultimately unconvincing in its argument
>that racism was what made the Pacific war so hellish.

Thanks  for you comments on Dower's book.  I think I am fairly sensitive to
what you call "generational  chauvanism" and I didn't have the same
reaction.  I try to read all books (even all posts on this list) with a
healthy dose of skepticism, so I would never claim that Mr. Dower has said
the last word on the subject.  However you read it though, I think it
raises some interesting points.

John Riegsecker                                 (206) 756-3566
Dept of Mathematics and Computer Science        [email-masked]
University of Puget Sound

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 11:33:15 EST
From:    "SGM Robert S. Rush" <[email-masked]>
Subject: 50TH: BATTLE OF THE HUERTGEN FOREST

  FOR SGM Robert S. Rush
>  I am curious as to how you happened to go so deeply into this battle.  Could
>you tell us more about yourself and what your sources are?
  Regards, John Ausland/Oslo Norway

I am a past sergeant major of the first battalion 22d.  As such I was deeply
involved with the history and lineage of the regiment.  At the regimental
reunions I would listen to the WWII veterans talk of their experiences.
Without fail, even though the regiment was in combat from D-Day on, the
talk centered around the Hurtgen forest.

When I entered my graduate program, I decided to use the 22d's experience
in the Hurtgen as the centerpiece for my thesis, which focused on the units
ability to continue to fight while suffering such horrendous casualties.

I was very fortunate the 4th Division had saved all of its records and had
them microfilmed, to include notes between staff sections and everything else.
Not just the daily reports, but the hand written journals, prisoner of war
reports, maps, interviews by Historical teams, after action reports, casualty
reports by name.  I couldn't ask for more.  All of this information (to include
that of the 8th) is on microfilm at Carlisle Barracks Military History
Institute and available through interlibrary loan.  Hard copies of most of the
information is also available at the National Archives in Suitland.  German
reports of the Battle are at the National Archives, Washington.

The narrative you are reading comes exclusively from the primary sources
listed.  I have found that time tends to color remembrances, while at the
same time enhancing perceptions.

Hope this helps
Rob Rush

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 11:41:37 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 50TH: BATTLE OF THE HUERTGEN FOREST

John,

        My source for the German wargaming of Huertgen Forest is the
Summer issue of Military History Quarterly.  The article, written by
Thomas B. Allen, starts on page 62 and is entitled, "Little Wars."
(Most of the article details the use of wargaming during the Persian
Gulf War.  It used the Huertgen Forest wargame as an early example.)
It doesn't list his sources but the little blurb at the end of
the article states, "Thomas B. Allen is the author of _War Games_
(McGraw-Hill, 1987).  He is writing, with Norman Polmar, _Codeword
Downfall. November 1 1945: The Invasion of Japan_."
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
What's he want a yacht for?  There's no money in yachts!

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 12:07:54 -0500
From:    Keith Johnson <[email-masked]>
Subject: german pow in the united states

     hi! i am currently researching german pow interned in the united
states during ww2. is anyone out there a former pow or know a former pow?
     thanks. keith

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 12:04:13 EST
From:    "SGM Robert S. Rush" <[email-masked]>
Subject: 22d Inf in the Hurtgen 18 Nov

22d Infantry in the Hurtgen    18 November 1944

Colonel Lanham planned on the eighteenth to renew the attack to the east.
Hoping to mislead the enemy into expecting the attack to continue to the
northeast, he had Baker Company plus artillery engage the Germans on Hill 210,
while Able and Charlie Companies maneuvered to the east.  They crossed both the
Weisser Weh Road (Road W) and Stream and reached the high ground 500 yards
beyond.  The soldiers waded across the knee-deep water, almost all of them
getting soaked.  In an after action interview conducted with Able Company in
December 1944, Private First Class John L. Page, squad leader and later platoon
leader 2d platoon, commented,

I never dried out, and neither did most of the rest of us for the next two
weeks.  The heavy mud caused most of the boys to throw away their galoshes and
the constant rain and sleet made us that much colder and wetter.  Not so bad
when you keep moving during the day, but not so nice when you sleep with your
sopped shoes on in a foxhole which leaks.

The miserable weather certainly affected morale adversely and probably also
reduced combat effectiveness.

     Lanham's feint was successful.  The 1st Battalion suffered few casualties
advancing to the high ground.  Once there, the companies dug in.  Just before
dark, a 120mm mortar round struck the Charlie Company command post, wounding
Captain Edward W. Martin and most of his headquarters platoon soldiers.  To
protect the northern flank and main supply route of the regiment, the 3d
Battalion moved up and occupied the positions vacated earlier by the 1st
Battalion.  Although still not in direct enemy contact, the 3d Battalion
continued to lose soldiers to enemy shelling.  Lieutenant William Cook,  Love
Company Commander, was wounded as his company occupied positions south of
Rabenheck.

      Farther south, the 2d Battalion had much more trouble.  The Germans, from
their positions on the hill east of Road W, watched the advance and, as the
assault companies neared the road, placed artillery fire on the entire
battalion.  The units following the assault companies suffered heavy
casualties.  The initial losses included Lieutenant Colonel Walker and most of
the battalion staff. Then, in quick succession, Major Joseph Samuels, thet
forward to assume command.

     The 2d Battalion companies had problems crossing Road W.  Easy Company
encountered an extensive anti-personnel mine field west of the road.  While
maneuvering around the mine field, the company strayed off course and lost
contact with both George Company and the battalion headquarters. Fox Company,
the battalion reserve, covered the regiment's southern flank.  Heavily hit, the
company lost all but one of its officers and many of its soldiers.  The German
fire shifted to George Company, the right flank assault company, which also
sustained heavy casualties.  Failing to cross in the south, Lieutenant Twomey
moved his company north and crossed the road behind Easy. The soldiers then
climbed to the crest of the overlooking hills on the east side and dug in.

     When the regiment halted its attack for the day, the 1st Battalion was
north of Road X and the 2d Battalion was dug in on Hills 124 and 126 located
south of thent to the north and the 12th Infantry Regiment to the south, were
each about a mile and a half from the 22d, with only a cavalry troop screening
the forest to the north.   Three days of fighting had seen less than a square
mile of the German defenses overrun and the main supply road for the 22d, (Road
W) remained in enemy hands.

     The night of 18 November the regiment reported 13 officer and 150 enlisted
casualties to division headquarters.  Actual battle casualties were 9 officer
and 137 enlisted men.  The 22d suffered 331 actual battle casualties in the
first three days.  If one includes non-battle casualties, the total was over
400. The casualties among officers were particularly high.  In three days, the
22d had lost to enemy fire all three battalion commanders, a battalion
executive officer, almost the entire 2d Battalion staff, large parts of the
other two battalion staffs, and many of the company officers. Many of the
soldiers felt better being with the assault elements than following.  PFC Elton
K. Fisher, a rifleman in Able Company, commented, "I'd rather lead with an
assault platoon any day than wait and have to wade througurgency in getting the
trails open, the attached engineers removed many mines while under artillery
fire.  As long as the roads were blocked, the path to get supplies in and
casualties out followed a line of white engineer tape extending 3000 yards,
with nearly the entire route through the woods.  During each trip, members of
the supply parties climbed two steep slopes and forded two icy streams, one of
them chest deep, carrying loads of over 100 pounds each. The soldiers in the
battalion support platoons could not keep up with the heavy demand, forcing
commanders to take soldiers from the firing line in the rifle companies and
replacements to form carrying parties to resupply the forward units.

     The first days of combat had been an infantryman's fight.  The densely
wooded terrain, mud, and slopes restricted the tanks and tank destroyers to the
roads, and as long as the roads remained mined, the armor could not move
forward to assist the infantry.

     On 18 November, the remainder of Charlie Company 4th Engineers joined the
one platoon already attached to the 22d; but even with the additional
engineers, the mine clearing proceeded slowly.  In many places, the engineers
found one mine placed on top of another and fitted them with anti-lifting
devices.  These mirtillery fire scattered the working parties.

>From Paschendale with Treebursts

I will send 18-20 November today.  Will be out of town on those days. Will
pick up 21 November on Monday.

Rob Rush

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 12:55:55 -0500
From:    "John E. Kollar" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF YAMAMOTO

Probably not, Yamamoto knew he could not win, the naval battles might
have been more drawn out, and he might have harboured strength more,
and maybe (very,very,very,very,tiny,small(you get the idea...) he might
have convinced the army to surrender earlier than it did, but by
Midway the fate of Japan was sealed, alot lay ahead, but the blow to the
Japanese air arm and carrier force was mortal.

John E. Kollar

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 13:35:10 EST
From:    Cassady Craft <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 50TH: BATTLE OF THE HUERTGEN FOREST

John Ausland, I believe that Weigley discusses the game at some length in
_Eisenhower's Lieutenants_.

Cassady Craft
Department of Political Science
University of Georgia
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 12:40:36 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 50TH: BATTLE OF THE HUERTGEN FOREST

Hello, David!

Thanks. I will be looking to view it. Sounds good!

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 13:38:21 EST
From:    "SGM Robert S. Rush" <[email-masked]>
Subject: 22d Inf in Hurtgen 19 Nov

22d Infantry in the Hurtgen Forest, 19 November 1944

Lanham worried about the 22d's forward units becoming isolated.  To counter
this risk, he directed each battalion establish a 360 degree defensive
perimeter and attempted to move a two day supply of food and ammunition up to
each battalion position.  Higher headquarters also became concerned.  At 0700
hours on 19 November, General Barton authorized Lanham to stop the regiment's
attack for the day.  Knowing time and lives were being lost in the woods,
Lanham tried to continue with the advance, but the companies scheduled to lead
were too disorganized.  By 1200, none of his units had moved for one reason or
another and realizing they wouldn't, again talked with General Barton.  Barton
ordered the attack halted, and the regiment reorganized and resupplied.  To
ease the supply situation he directed the 22d clear Road W to its northern
boundary with the 8th Regiment, and the 12th Infantry to clear the area between
it and the 22d.

      Although there was no regimental attack on 19 November, fighting
continued.  Even the regimental command post was not immune from attack.
Lieutenant Robert Mitchell, the Regimental Headquarters Commandant, was killed
when bypassed Germans attacked the regimental command post.  Getting the call
for help, King Company attacked the enemy position near the command post, but
couldn't destroy it.  Item Company attempted to alleviate the supply situation
when it cleared Road W to the regiment's northern boundary.  The 2d Battalion
got a new battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Kenan, who had been
the regimental operations officer in Normandy until he was wounded, and Major
Blazzard again became the regimental intelligence officer.  Infantrymen dug
foxholes deeper and hand-carried supplies up to the front lines.  The engineers
continued clearing mines and repairing the roads and trails.

The forest made it hard to control the maneuvering units, and leaders could
not account for all of their soldiers.  Although the regiment did not attack on
the nineteenth, the regiment continued to suffer heavy casualties from German
artillery fire.  Losses reported for the day totaled 109.  Actual casualties
were 14 officers and 72 enlisted.  Many of the casualties reported were
soldiers killed or
wounded in the previous days' fighting and not yet reported

>From Paschendale with Treebursts

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 16:21:14 EST
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Untold Stories f/TLB, Pt. 5

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  17-Nov-1994 04:21pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Untold Stories f/TLB, Pt. 5

    [Because of exhibit space limitations, we only selected only two tragic
    stories for our display last June.  Just so you know how sick I am, I
    find the second story a little funny and a great deal pathetic.]

         "I still see a group of girls in the grey-blue uniform of the
    airforce auxiliaries laughing and holding onto each other - a long row
    of them attempting to run across the 'green' together.  Their hair
    flying in the wind and their laughter ringing out.  And then the
    Russians mowed them down and holding onto each other they fell, they
    stumbled forward and were dead."
                                       - Wilhelm Nolte, Berlin Fire Dept.

         "The radio was putting out the story that if the Germans lost the
    Jews would have their revenge.  I feel that it was then my father
    decided to kill my family for he felt that all was lost.  He wrote a
    letter to me addressed to the Reich Chancellery telling me of his
    plans.  He gave the family a sleeping potion in their fruit juice, and
    it was his plan that after they were asleep he would prepare hydrogen
    cyanide gas and that they would die while sleeping.
         The next morning all awoke.  Father was horrified to see all of
    them alive, and worse, they were very ill from the effects of the
    cyanide.  On the night of 3 May 1945, he gave my sister Heidi's three
    children an injection of morphine which he believed to be a lethal
    dose.  He decided that he must meet each member of the family
    separately and shoot them to death.
         He met the servant Anna in the garden and shot her through the
    base of the skull.  He found Mother next in the cellar and was able to
    approach her from the rear and put a bullet through her head under the
    noise of the bombardment.  He approached Heidi in the hall and shot her
    through the head.  He then entered the children's room and shot them.
    Then he went to his desk where he prepared a lethal dose of morphine
    which he intended to administer to himself and then shoot himself,
    immediately after the injection.
         As it happened, he fell asleep immediately before he could shoot
    himself.  Thenext morning he awoke filled with horror, as he realized
    his failure.  The body of Anna, the servant, had been found in the
    evening and later my mother's body was discovered in the cellar.  My
    father found himself in a state of clouded consciousness from the
    injection of morphine and had periods of blindness.  His only thought
    was then to kill himself, but the police who had been called prevented
    this.  It was made clear to him that he was to be held responsible as a
    murderer for the death of his family.
         On two occasions, when his vision returned, he tried to jump from
    a window, but he was restrained.  On another occasion he tried to slash
    his wrists, but again was unsuccessful.  When all but one of the
    attendants had gone, he succeeded in opening a bedside table and
    inserting a small revolver in his mouth and shot himself.  He slumped
    over his bed, dead."
                                  - US Army interview with Hanna Reitsch
    [her father, BTW, was a doctor]

    Next is the final installment from _The Last Battle_.

    Doug

Received:  17-Nov-1994 04:21pm

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 15:24:57 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: german pow in the united states

Hello, Keith!

I know and have corresponded with many who were prisoners of the
Americans, French, German and English.

How can I help you?

Terry
>      hi! i am currently researching german pow interned in the united
> states during ww2. is anyone out there a former pow or know a former pow?
>      thanks. keith
>

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 20:34:00 UTC
From:    "Edward S. Miller" <[email-masked]>
Subject: WHAT-IF YAMAMOTO

Scott Stathis asks

  > What if Admiral Yamamoto had lived through the entire war? Would the
  > outcome have been different in anyway?

  Yes.  America would have won sooner.
  High points of his career:
  (1) Pearl Harbor: tactical errors (hit battleships, not the base); bad
luck (US carriers absent); unintended penalty--USN became overwhelmingly air-
minded; above all, political lunacy, a sneak attack that enraged America for
a fight to unconditional surrender instead of negotiated settlement Japan
intended. This attack was conjured up by the leader who supposedly knew
America best.
  (2) Midway: scattered his fleet all over the ocean, no communications
security, slipshod air and submarine scouting, defeat by a lesser force.
  (3) Guadalcanal: unwise attrition battle far, far from home bases; equal
losses of ships and planes but Japan could not replace her losses.
  (4) Killed in air ambush, became mystical hero.
  Someday I'll finish my article, "Yamamoto was a Turkey."
  Did Y's successors do worse?  Hard to say.  After mid-1943 Japan's navy
was decidedly inferior in quantity and quality so it's doubtful that later
defeats would have turned out differently. Possibly--just possibly--Yamamoto
might have seen the error of his ways and used his prestige to form a peace
faction.  There was, however, no evidence of such an inclination before his
death.
  Rommel and Yamamoto are the most admired enemy commanders of WWII.  Rommel
deserves some respect for his early successes and as a plotter against
Hitler.  Can't say the same for Yamamoto, except maybe for his pioneering
faith in air power.

Terry: If Yamamoto really understood U.S. industrial power, why did he
insist on a strategy that assured total mobilization of that power for
Japan's utter destruction?  Surely he knew that America could replace any
losses at Pearl Harbor.

  Edward Miller     Stamford, Conn.  [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 17:26:42 EST
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HIST: PTO vs. ETO

On Thu, 17 Nov 1994 00:20:00 UTC Edward S. Miller said:
>William Lippert states:
>
>  The record does not support your contention.
>  The Germany-first policy was first proposed at a high level in November
>1940 by Admiral Harold E. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations.  Stark's
>"Plan Dog" memo to the president ("Dog" for choice "D" among four options),
>endorsed by General Marshall, argued that unless Germany were beaten the war
>would be lost but that defeat of Japan could be delayed if necessary.  Stark
>was no Anglophile; in fact, navy plans had always envisioned fighting Japan
>(Plan Orange).
>  Meetings with British staff officers to convert Plan Dog into Plan Rainbow
>Five commenced at the "ABC" conferences in Washington, January-March 1941.
>Oddly, the British argued for sending the US Pacific Fleet to Singapore
>where it would likely have been mauled worse than at Pearl Harbor, a concept
>rather inconsistent with Germany-first and which the US wisely rejected.
>They completed Rainbow Five in May 1941.  FDR and Churchill did not meet for
>their first wartime conference, at Argentia, Newfoundland until August 1941.
>  Churchill unquestionably favored Germany-first.  However, there is no
>evidence that the US adopted it because of his "machinations."  American
>strategists correctly saw it to be in the best interest of the U.S.
>  Please cite the reasons why you think most Americans desired a Pacific-
>first strategy.  Were there public opinion polls?
>  Edward S. Miller   Author, "War Plan Orange"   [email-masked]

   Good question!  I'll look into it over the weekend.  I'd gotten this
opinion from somewhere or other.  I'll try and figure out where.  However,
Churchill did push for a Europe first quite actively once America entered
the war.  This can be seen by his arguments in the meetings between at the
head-of-state level and at military liason levels.  I'll try and get proof
on that, too.

William Lippert

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 17:29:30 EST
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HIST: PTO vs. ETO

      Some people are criticizing my stand that much of America advocated
a Pacific first strategy.  I will not say that this is definitely the case.
However, if it was the case that Americans as a public viewed the Pacific as
more important (however wrongly) why is the case that we waited so long to
support the British?  Why wouldn't we have entered the war earlier?  How was
it that the isolationists were so strong in Congress if the American public
did not view the war in Europe as something "European"?
      The Germans, it must be remembered, never did anything particularly bad
to the Americans, except be themselves.  And even though they continued to
sink our shipping, America remained "neutral".  However, when the Japanese
bombed Pearl Harbor, America took it very personally and, as an emotional
reaction, wanted revenge and a Pacific first strategy.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 00:34:53 GMT+1
From:    SYSTEM OPERATOR <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HIST: PTO vs. ETO

William Lippert <[email-masked]> writes:

>    But today we remember the ETO more because Hitler and the Nazis symbolize
> evil in the modern world.  The Japanese weren't friendly or nice, but they
> did not have the aura of evil that the Nazis had with their marches, flags,
> etc.  Hitler was the devil's partner, while Tojo was just a little too
> aggressive.  These opinions are not necessarily mine, but those held (if
> I may generalize) by the American public.  That is why and how America
> sees WWII today.
>    Anyone disagree?

I would tend to share this point of view.
Hitler is unique as a terrorizer - entrancing the masses like the Devil in
Nuremberg ceremonies, secretly engineering a plan of destruction of (part) of the
human species, among a caste of black-uniformed minions, directing merciless
Death Squads of executioners and torturers - the SD and the Gestapo. The
Mikado and his generals spread no such terror to the European public.

I would like to give some arguments as to why the ETO was arguably the
most important theater - strategically, politically and militarily.

Strategically, and the prime reason, because the territories at stake were
infinitely richer than those of the Far East, and contained the bulk of the
World's industry.

Politically, because Germany was an ideologic power, while Japan could best
be described as a thief trying to steal territories and oil. The war with
Nazism was a war between variant ideologies, the Democratic and the National
Socialist creed, and its aim of war was not only to rob tracks of land from
the subdued countries, but also to change their political structures,
ideologically, economically, and socially. In 1939, there existed extensive
reactionary inner fronts in all the Democracies, and in many other countries
Fascist and National Socialist movements had taken power. Germany could
attack countries from within, even America, while Japan could not. This is
what Churchill meant when he compared the war against Nazism to a war of
Religion. What mattered was not whether Germany was more powerful than
Japan, but which of their aims was the more dangerous to the democratic
way of life.

Militarily, because Germany's perceived might was much higher then Japan's.
In 1939, Germany bedazzled the World with her science, her engineering skills
(I refer to the conversation on Lindbergh), had already made the World
tremble with her Generalship. Dominating Europe, she could have become a
superpower, using the labour of a huge population and in control of
most of the World's industry, and have made America tremble. Japan could
never hope to conquer Europe or America.
This does not mean, naturally, the combattants in the PTO were any less
essential.

Arnaud.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 18:30:58 -0500
From:    Scott C Stathis <[email-masked]>
Subject: ACES:

Does someone out there know the leading Aces for each country. I know
some but am missing others. Also does anyone know of a good book on WWII
Ace?.  Lastly could you please included the plane they flow the most and
their # of kills.

           Country     Name    Kills   Plane

           Germany    Hartmann   364    Me-109G-6

           U.S.A      Bong        40    P-38J

           U.S.S.R     ?           ?      ?

           Britain     ?           ?      ?

           Japan       ?           ?      ?

Thanks
Scott Stathis
[email-masked]
Umass-Amherst

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 18:41:43 EST
From:    "H. Emery Ford" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Dieppe Raid in 1942

Hi Terry!

OK.  Perhaps I overstated my case, but I came across the following
passage in THE RUSSO-GERMAN WAR 1941-45 by A. Seaton (page 304):

"A great freind of Schmundt, Hitler's military aide, and personally
known to the Fuhrer, Zeitzler, as Chief of Staff to Army Group D, gained
some credit  for the repulse of the British-Canadian raid on Dieppe in
August 1942."

Outside of this I know little of Zeitzler's role in Dieppe.

Thanks for keeping me honest!

Emery

>> Didn't Zeitzler gain Hitler's attention and favor as a result of being
>> the local commander at Dieppe?
>
>No. Zeitzler gained Hitler's attention as a logistics expert. He
>succeeded Franz Halder as Chief of the German General Staff in 1942
>during the Stalingrad operation.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 18:46:36 EST
From:    "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Subject: ARC: Byrd is back on the line, for now.

The Historical Documents at byrd.mu.wvnet.edu is back on the line, but
there is going to be some modernization done in the next few weeks, so
be patient and I'll keep you up to date.  We hope to have a home page
for the archives soon, which should please the WWW-users.  We might
also have room for more pictures, something we've been tight on for
a while.

More details when I get them.

Here's the path and route to the goodies (Check out pictures.new!)

How to access byrd.mu.wvnet.edu via WWW or gopher.

Web clients may access this site at:
   http://history.cc.ukans.edu/history/WWW_history_main.html

Below is the path I use to access byrd via the gopher at Purdue U.

Academic Resources on the Internet (by Subject)/
Academic Resources on the Internet (by Subject)
Humanities / Social Sciences Reading Room/
History Network <TEL>
Login: history
Resources: Historical Data Bases
BYRD: Historical Archives (ftp byrd.mu.mvnet.edu) (US)

FTP vistors should go to /pub/history

Larry J

[email-masked]; Co-Mod.: BYRD.MU.WVNET.EDU (Historical docs)
"Sunday's horoscope is note worthy because of its strange, sudden and wholly
unpredictable and inexplicable occurrences, affecting all phases of life."
Your Horoscope" L.A. Evening Herald Express, Sat, 12/06/41

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 16:28:10 -0800
From:    Jim Curry <[email-masked]>
Subject: WHAT-IF:Yamamoto

Hello, Scott!
The only difference I can see if Yamamoto had survived to the end of the
war is that he would have been tried for war crimes afterward.  As the
architect of the Pearl Harbor attack he would have stood little chance
of escaping a guilty verdict and almost certain execution.  In a way
he was lucky to die in combat as a Japanese warrior, not on a gallows
as a convicted criminal.
Jim Curry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 19:33:49 EST
From:    "SGM Robert S. Rush" <[email-masked]>
Subject: German units in the Hurtgen

The first part of this post tells of the terrain and the second part of
the German units facing the 22d in the Hurtgen.

The Terrain  and Weather in the Hurtgen Forest

     The Hurtgen Forest lies along the middle eastern portion of the forest
barrier located south of Aachen in front of the Roer River.  The towns of
Eschweiler to the northwest, Duren to the northeast, Rvtgen to the southwest,
and the Schwammenaul Dam to the southeast formed the four corners of the
battlefield.  Figure 2 provides details of the Hurtgen Forest area in which the
22d fought.  Entering the forest from the west, the 22d Infantry first
encountered the Roter Weh road and stream.  Immediately after crossing the
stream, the soldiers climbed a 180 foot high hill that runs north south with a
promontory known as Rabenheck.  Firebreaks traversed the hill laterally, which
during November were water-logged and had been filled with mines by the
Germans.  East of Rabenheck, the Weisser Weh road traveled north to south
through a gorge.  Known in the American plan as Road W, it was the only road
suitable for resupplying the regiment.  The Weisser Weh stream also traversed
this gorge.  In 1944, the stream was about nine feet wide and waist deep.

     Two roads joined Road W near Rabenheck.  Both also traveled down steep
gorges cut into the rock by streams.  The most important of the two in the 22d
Infantry's sector was the one in the north, called Road X, which led to the
village of Grosshau.

     Road Z, in the southern part of the sector led to the village of Kleinhau.
 Between these two roads stood a 310 foot high ridge, which was cut by many
streams.  Road Y, an offshoot of Road X, zigzagged up the ridge and also led
into Kleinhau.

     The entire region was thickly wooded with hardwood and fir trees, with
very few cleared areas.  The forest was divided into forestry sections, with
concrete markers telling the section numbers at each trail intersection.  The
firs, in nursery rows ten to fifteen feet apart; limited visibility to a few
yards.  Those areas not planted by foresters were thick with dense hardwood
undergrowth.  The combination of terrain and vegetas cleared for farming.  East
of the hamlets, the forest closed on the roads leading into the Roer plain and
the elevation dropped 630 feet in the 2000 yards separating Grosshau and Gey.
The one road between the two villages twisted and turned with an almost sheer
sixty foot drop on one side.

     The Hurtgen's topography robbed the infantryman of two of his closest
companions, armor and artillery.  The few roads and steepness of the hillsides
restricted the use of armor until the infantry could clear a path to open
terrain and the denseness of the forest limited the use of artillery because
the observers could not observe the targets at long distances.

     The trees tremendously increased the effectiveness of the defender's
artillery while negating the effectiveness of the attacker's.  Treebursts,
caused by artillery rounds hitting tree trunks and branches, showered
everything below with fragments.  The shrapnel from the rounds was effective
against attacking soldiers in the open, but had little effect on defending
soldiers dug in with overhead cover.

     Almost nothing is worse for an infantryman's morale than to be wet and
cold and to hathes stayed wet, and the dampness bred hypothermia and
trenchfoot.

     The weather affected not only the individual soldier but also the
organization. Even when it was not raining, water dripped continually from the
trees.   The soil in the area has a high clay content, which when wet turns
into an oily, slippery mud that sticks to everything it touches.  Trails
quickly became axle-deep in mud under vehicle traffic, and soldiers climbing
the slopes many times found themselves sliding back down the hill, only The
German Forces in the Hurtgen

     Facing the 22d Regiment in the Hurtgen Forest was a conglomeration of many
units.  The 275th Volksgrenadier (VG) Division had been in the forest since the
middle of October and had successfully opposed the 9th and 28th Divisions in
their earlier bid to clear the woods.  By 16 November, the 275th had absorbed
thirty-seven different units.  Two battalions of the 275th's 985th Regiment,
each with approximately 300 soldiers, opposed the 22d's initial attack.

     The mainstay of the German defense was its artillery.  When the battle
opened, General Hans Schmidt, the 275th Division Commander, controlled 25
pieces of motorized artillery (9 105mm, 6 150mm, and 10 122mm howitzers) plus
had within his sector another 106 field pieces ranging in size from 88mm to
210mm, for at total of 131 tubes of artillery, not counting mortars, versus 96
pieces of artillery, counting corps artillery, that could support the 4th US
Division.   Schmidt's division also had twenty-one assault guns, twenty-two
75mm anti-tank guns and one 88mm anti-tank gun.  And for the first time in
months, the Germans had a good supply of ammunition.  This was just the
beginning strength.  As units cycled into the battle, more artillery and mrman
regiments entered the line between the 22d and its objective, Grosshau.  North
and south of Grosshau were the I and III Battalions of the 1055 Regiment of the
89th Division and the II Battalion of the 1058 Regiment, 344th Volksgrenadier
Division, was positioned in the center.  While these regiments were from
different divisions, the 275th commander, General Schmidt, remained in overall
command of the sector.  When the American attack resumed on 20 November, fresh
German units faced them.

     It appears throughout the battle that newly arrived German units acted as
counter attack forces until they too became exhausted.  On 21 November, the
344th VG Division replaced the 275th VG Division.  The original 344th had been
destroyed in the German retreat across France and rebuilt in October from
remnants of the 344th and the had little time to train together.  The surviving
infantry soldiers of the 275th transferred to the 344th.

     The 344th had no experience in woods fighting and was unfamiliar with the
terrain.  It is no wonder that only six days later, the 353d VG relieved the
remnants of the 344th.  This was the 353d's second stint in the Hurtgen, since
it had been relieved by the 275th VG in early October so that it might
reconstitute.  Again the remaining infantry of the relieved division was
absorbed by the incoming division.  Quite possibly some of the German soldiers
transferred to the 353d VG had been in that division before it was pulled out
for reconstitution, remaining in the woods with the each successive
headquarters.

     The 22d met in turn, units of  four German divisions during its eighteen
day ordeal in the forest.  When Grosshau fell on 29 November, the 22d Infantry
reported that there were German units in the town from almost every division in
the LXXIV Corps.  As noted in Figure 8, the 250 captured prisoners represented
four different divisions, eight different regiments, and forty-seven different
company-sized elements.  The regimental intelligence officer reported that he
could not find a complete squad.

     The morale and overall quality of the German forces facing the Americans
in the Hurtgen was low.  The units were a hodgepodge from everywhere.
Intermingled as they were, therut.  In their hopeless resignation some became
fatalists, others sought consolation in religion.  After collapse of the
confidence in its leadership, the troops, in point of fact, continued fighting
only for their personal security.

     German division commanders in the Hurtgen sector ordered their soldiers
not to retreat or surrender.  The option to retreat closed; many preferred to
surrender than face their superior's wrath for retreating.

     Although many expressed a desire to surrender, fear for their families
held many lower ranking German soldiers in place.  During this period of the
war, it was standard practice for German officers to require their soldiers to
sign loyalty oaths.  German soldiers also faced the threat of their families
imprisonment in concentration camps if they deserted.  Some divisions posted
names of those who had deserted or been captured and used them as warnings to
other soldiers in the division not to surrender.

Excerpts from one of the exhortations captured from soldiers of the 275th VG
reads as follows,

Think about it

1. Don't surrender to the enemy, unless your are severely wounded and your
can't shoot anymore.

6. Every act of treason will be known at home and not forgotten there.  For
traitors there will be no homecoming.

7. The families are responsible for cowards and deserters.  Their names will be
placed on the 'blacklist'.

Others were more vehement,

     Traitors from our ranks have deserted to the enemy.  Their names are: . .
. .

These bastards have given away military secrets. . . Deceitful Jewish mud
slingers taunt you with their pamphlets and try to entice you into becoming
bastards also. . . As for the contemptible traitors . . .rest assured, the
division will see to it that they never see home and loved ones again.  Their
families will have to atone for their treason.

     Notwithstanding the threat of reprisals, many of the German soldiers saw
surrender as the preferred solution for their plight.  The motivation of a
typical German soldier is shown in a diary of a soldier captured outside
Grosshau,

22 November 44--While standing my post I am thinking about my brother who died
3 years ago. I am wet through and through and wish the only possible thing,
either get slightly wounded or become a PW. The latter would be the much more
appreciated solution.

23 November 44--While the shells explode in front of my foxhole I am writing
this . . . The Corporal is missing since last night and we think he is a PW.
We all envy him. . . .

In the eighteen days of combat, the 22d Infantry captured 764 Germans, many of
who either walked into the American lines and gave up or waited until the
Americans were on top of their positions to surrender.

     The lack of first class troops in the Hurtgen Forest did not hamper a
strong German defense.  They overcame their personnel deficiencies by mining
the few roads, trails, and firebreaks in the Hurtgen, and plotting massive
artillery concentrations on the road and trail junctions.  With the terrain
further constricted, even poorly organized squads could hold out against much
larger units, while inflicting heavy casualties on any attacker.

Excerpted from Paschendale with Treebursts

I also have the complete German Order of Battle down to the Company level
to include the names of most of the company commanders.  (Extracted from
the interrogation prisoner of war reports.)

Rob Rush

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 20:03:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 18 NOV 44

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
SATURDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 1944
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  C-47, Douglas Skytrain
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): On Paramushiru Island, 4 B-24s strike
Suribachi shore batteries, including one on Takikawa Cape. A shipping sweep
by 6 B-25s is cancelled due to weather.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 10 B-25s blast stores at
Hengshan and hit populated areas from Ishan to Liuchow; 130+ P-51s, P-40s,
and P-38s pound targets of opportunity scattered over vast areas of S China;
troops, shipping, supplies, trucks, and railroad targets are hit particularly
hard N of Lingling, from Liuchow to Ishan, from Hengshan to Hengyang, from
Kweilin to Liuchou, from Siangtan to Paoching, and at Chuanhsien,
Hwaiyuanchen, Chingmen, Chuchiang, and Shihkiachwang.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma,  27 fighter-bombers
support ground forces S of Pinwe and in the Bhamo area; 16 attack troops and
supply area at Panglong and Nga-pwegyi while 7 hit the ferry area at Meza; 20
hit targets of opportunity along the Kanbalu-Wuntho railroad and at Maymyo
and Wetwin; 9 B-25s pound Man Pwe rail yards, destroying warehouses and other
buildings and causing much general damage. Transports continue large-scale
operations to forward areas. In India, the detachment of the 317th Troop
Carrier Squadron (Commando), 2d Air Commando Group, operating from Tulihal
with C-47s returns to base at Sylhet.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 2 missions are flown.
  Mission 716: 402 fighters (47 P-47s and 355 P-51s) are dispatched to strafe
oil storage depots in the Hanau and Ulm areas, airfields at Leipheim and
Lechfeld, and miscellaneous ground targets in Germany; 374 actually attack;
about 70 Luftwaffe fighters are encountered and the AAF claims 26-2-6 in the
air and 69-0-41 on the ground; 2 P-47s and 5 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA) and
2 P-51s are damaged beyond repair.
  Mission 717: 4 B-24s and 6 B-17s drop leaflets in Belgium, the Netherlands
and France during the night.
  HQ 92d Combat Bombardment Wing (Heavy) moves from Sudbury to Bury St
Edmunds, England.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): 340+ bombers of the 9th Bombardment
Division strike barracks areas, rail bridges, rail facilities, strongpoints,
and defended positions at 13 locations in Germany; fighters escort the
bombers, fly sweeps and armed reconnaissance over W Germany, and support
ground forces E of Aachen, Germany and in the Sarreguemines, France area. In
France, the 355th Fighter Squadron, 354th Fighter Group, based at Orconte
with P-47s, begins operating from St Dizier.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): 680+ B-17s and B-24s bomb the
Floridsdorf oil refinery at Vienna, Austria and the Korneuburg, Austria oil
refinery; airfields at Aviano, Villafranca di Verona, Udine, and Vicenza,
Italy; and troop concentrations at Visegrad, Yugoslavia; 126 P-38s escort the
Austrian missions while 12 others bomb the troop concentrations at Visegrad,
Yugoslavia; 186 P-51s provide cover for raids on the Italian airfields and
sweep target areas; 50+ other fighters fly reconnaissance and reconnaissance
escort. The 37th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron, 5th Photographic
Reconnaissance Group, arrives at Naples, Italy from the US with F-5s (first
mission is 3 Feb 45).

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): Medium bombers bomb bridges at
Pizzighettone, Romano di Lombardia, Castelnuovo di Garfagnana, Migazzone,
Casarsa della Delizia, and Casale Monferrato, Italy; and at Zidani Most,
Yugoslavia and also pound the Brod-Ljubljana, Yugoslavia railway, the
principal German escape route in the Balkans; fighter-bombers continue
successful attacks on rail lines, dumps, guns, and pipelines in the N
Apennines and the Po Valley, XXII Tactical Air Command claiming 100+ train
cars, 8 locomotives, and nearly 75 vehicles destroyed.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): B-24s from Saipan Island and Guam Island hit
shipping at Chichi Jima and Haha Jima Islands. P-38s and B-24s from Saipan
Island escort photo planes over Iwo Jima Island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: In the Mindanao-NE
Celebes Islands areas B-24s, B-25s and A-20s again hit airfields and
targets of opportunity. Fighter-bombers, A-20s, and B-25s over several
locations in the Philippine Islands pound shipping, supply and personnel
areas, harbors, barges, airstrips, and communications targets. In Borneo,
B-24s, with P-38s and P-47s supporting, launch a major strike against oil
installations at Tarakan; other B-24s and B-25s hit shipping off Tarakan and
in Brunei Bay. On Celebes Island in the Makassar and Kendari area B-24s bomb
Polewali shipyards; B-24s pound airfields in the Ceram Island-Ambon Island
area while P-38s strafe shipping. B-25s continue to support ground forces on
Mapia Island off the NW coast of New Guinea. In the Philippine Islands, HQ
58th Fighter Group and the 310th and 311th Fighter Squadrons move from
Noemfoor Island to San Roque, Leyte Island with P-47s. In New Guinea, the
66th Troop Carrier Squadron, 433d Troop Carrier Group, moves from Nadzab to
Biak Island with C-47s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

18/0104Z NOV

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 20:03:04 -0500
From:    Michael Andrew Turton <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF YAMAMOTO

The problems with Yamamoto are to me embedded in a larger problem
of the general terrible grand strategy and gutlessness of Japanese
flag officers.  Nagumo's refusal to bomb Pearl's repair and
oil storage facilities, his indecision at Midway, Tanaka's failure
to follow up on the sinking of five cruisers at Guadal by failing
to destroy the troop transports, Kurita's errors off Samar.....
Too often Japan's leader's seemed merely to be "counting coup" while
we were actually fighting a war.

And look at the failure to exploit their strategic superiority during
the first six months of WWII in the Pacific.  The dispersal of
carriers in waht were essentially giant raids devoid of long-term
fruit......imagine if the Pearl Harbor Strike Force had contained
an invasion force to take the island......for a warrior people
it seems Japan's planners were afflicted with a lack of audacity.

Mike Turton
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 17 Nov 1994 20:05:26 EST
From:    "SGM Robert S. Rush" <[email-masked]>
Subject: 22d Infantry Hurtgen 20 Nov 44

The 22d Infantry in the Hurtgen Forest 20 November 1944

     On the morning of the twentieth, the 1st and 2d Battalions renewed the
attack eastward.   The 1st quickly advanced 600 yards to a point just west of
the junction of Roads X and Y.  The soldiers now used a different assault
technique from the one they had used attacking across France.  The soldiers
moved in an open formation about five yards apart, reducing the likelihood that
one shell would get more than a one soldier, and rather than stalking snipers
or crawling up on machine-guns, the men listened for the whistle of incoming
rounds.  As one soldier put it, it was, ". . . a grim game of musical chairs,
with everyone tensely watching for a possible location to dive while they had
one ear cocked to the sound of the shells."

     The 2d Battalion again took the majority of the regiment's casualties.
The battalion's assault ran head on into a German tank-supported attack
beginning at the same time.  George Company, located on the exposed southern
flank, was caught in the open as it began its advance and was pinned down in a
crossfire of German machine guns and snipers in addition to heavy artillery
shelling.  Every officer and half the enlisted soldiers were killed or wounded.
 Lieutenant Twomey, who had ably led the company in the first days, was killed.
 The remnants fell back to the line of departure, too disorganized to continue
the attack.

     Easy Company, with secure flanks, advanced the 200 yards to its objective.
 Captain Newcomb discovered George Company officerless and sent one of his
officers to take command.  Before the end of the day this officer also lay
dead, but not before he had collected about twenty-five of the survivors of
George Company and reorganized them on their original position.  Artillery hit
the 2d Battalion command post again and wounded all of the staff officers.
Only the Lieutenant Colonel Kenan and a half dozen communications men remained
unwounded.

      The 2d Battalion was now down to the strength of a company.  Fewer than
150 soldiers remained in the front lines along with only six, while King
Company continued to engage the bypassed strong point near the regimental
command post. Patrols from Love Company combed the rear areas and searched for
an enemy artillery observation post thought hidden behind American lines near
the bridge.  The German artillery fire was too accurate to be unobserved.
Toward the end of the day, Lanham sent the remainder of Love to protect the 2d
Battalion's southern flank.

     The 22d Infantry reported 8 officers and 195 enlisted as casualties for 20
November.  Actual casualties were 5 officers and 126 enlisted; a high price to
pay for an extremely small gain.  That night two hundred and six enlisted and
one officer replacement joined the regiment.  The regiment was virtually
without reserves, unsupported on either flank and dangerously exposed to
counterattack.  It was becoming standard practice for the Germans to launch
counterattacks against both flanks as soon as the 22d's battalions stopped
their advance.

     The regiment's supply situation by the end of the twentieth remained only
partly solved.  The engineers opened the firebreak captured by the 1st
Battalion to jeep traffic, but shortly thereafter it became almost unusable due
to axle deep mud, and mines buried on the shoulders of the break prevented
vehicles from bypassing.  The regiment's wounded and supplies continued to be
hand-carried from the Weisser Weh Creek, now anywhere feam where it was
assembled in waist and neck deep icy water.  Mines continued to close the main
supply route (Road X), and their removal went slowly.

     With the access routes to the front blocked, American tanks and anti-tank
guns were unable to support the regiment's infantry, who faced enemy tanks not
operating under the same restrictions.  The Germans armor was being used either
singly or in small packets as support weapons for the infantry, and the
numerous counterattacks usually were built around one or two tanks or assault
guns.

Taken from Paschendale with Treebursts
Rob
Rush

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 16 Nov 1994 to 17 Nov 1994
*************************************************