Subject: WWII-L Digest - 23 Jan 1995 to 24 Jan 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 1995 00:04:58 -0500

There are 66 messages totalling 2028 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. ENOLA GAY.  WHERE (2)
  2. WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor (21)
  3. COLLABORATION TRIA
  4. Farewell BBs (5)
  5. WEAP: Japanese Aerial Torpedoes of WWII (3)
  6. [INF] USAAF 24 JAN 45
  7. INF: 50 Years Ago - 25-JAN-1945
  8. INF: USN Chronology 01-24-95 (2)
  9. WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor-II (3)
 10. Request for help
 11. INF: 3rd Army Chronology - 24Jan45
 12. BOOKS:  Reviews Wanted
 13. <No subject given>
 14. 22d Hurtgen Epilogue
 15. INF: MEDIA: Excerpt from _A Soldier's Story
 16. 50TH: EVALUATION OF BULGE
 17. ADMIN: Listserver does its Star Trek M5 impersonation
 18. SUB: Effectiveness
 19. INFO-OSS/SOE Ops in Scandinavia
 20. WEAP: Battleships (2)
 21. Auschwitz (2)
 22. WANT: VFW/AL HQ
 23. Bomb Pentration Data Needed
 24. deaths of german pow
 25. BOOKS:  REVIEWS WANTED
 26. Inf: 3rd Army Chronology- 25Jan45
 27. Inside The Third Reich-Speer (2)
 28. Replacement Policy (was 22nd Hurtgen Epi.)
 29. German POW deaths
 30. [INF] USAAF 25 JAN 45
 31. Auschwitz liberation
 32. POWs
 33. Book:Himmler

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 00:30:27 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ENOLA GAY.  WHERE

There is an airfield right off 40 near Wilmington, Jack, which was for
commercial and private aircraft, and also the Delaware Air National Guard was
housed there. Could it have some of their big planes you saw? The last time I
passed by, and this was before 95 all the way to NJ Turnpike, I think there
were some C-130s there. But I could be wrong. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 23 Jan 1995 22:46:08 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

In message <[email-masked]> World War II Discussion List
writes:
> Just thinking about the long-term effects of the raid on Pearl Harbor on
> Dec. 7, 1941.  Question and what if:  Knowing what you know now, if you
> could advise Yammamoto whether to make the raid or not, what would you
> advise.  Make it that war with the US will begin on that day; or if you
> want, make it that you don't declare on the US.  Let's see what happens.

I love what-if's... Especially when you just look at a broad stroke picture.
:-)

It seems fairly obvious that a Japanese-American conflict was bound to happen
at some point -- The U.S. trying to deny the Japanese raw resources and the
U.S. on the brink of being plunged into the conflict with only the spark of
some catalyst, the likelihood that the U.S. would be able to stay out of WWII
was probably fairly poor.

Knowing the U.S. was "invadeable," the attack on Pearl Harbor was potentially
one of the most devastating and important acts of WWII no matter what happened.
It was a serious risk -- a lot of ships of the line could have been lost.

On the other hand, if the attack had been wholly successful -- more battleships
destroyed and the Pacific carrier fleet neutralized, there would be little
opposition facing the Japanese in the Pacific.  The occupation of Midway and
the Aleutians -- the doorway to the North American west coast -- would have
been relatively easy.  Part of the long term plan included the capture or
destruction of the Panama Canal -- it takes a LONG time to send ships around
the horn.

Of course, had intelligence been better and the oil storage units hit, etc.,
things could have been even worse for the Americans.  A massive and relatively
unthreatened manufacturing juggernaut would have had difficulty launching
ships and would, as the Japanese were convinced in April of 1942, have been
forced to hold back massive supplies, men and materials for the defense of
the home lands.

If the Japanese had resigned themselves to the fact that war with the United
States was only a matter of time, then an attack on Pearl Harbor -- especially
with the bulk of the fleet anchored in one small area -- was a very calculated
risk, but an opportunity that begged to be taken advantage of.

I think if the Japanese command had known _more_ information, the temptation
to take advantage of the opportunity would actually have been greater.  It
could have been extremely successful.

(If I think of my old days as a weekend wargamer, I would've gone for it in
a shot...  Of course, I also get to play again next weekend even when I lose
:-)

--
Robert J. Granvin
Southern Minnesota Wing Confederate Air Force

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 00:30:46 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: COLLABORATION TRIA

The list may be interested to know that the Naval Institute Press will soon
publish "Scapegoats," by Captain Edward L. Beach, USN, Ret., which sets forth
all the hearings and argues, successfully in my view, that Kimmel and Short
were scapegoats indeed, and that Marshall, Stark, and MacArthur, and Richmond
Kelly "Terrible" Turner were directly responsible for the debacle at Pearl
Harbor and in the Philippines. It is a book well worth reading. Without being
revisionist or taking the view of the Roosevelt haters, the book fairly
demonstrates that there was enough blame to be passed around and there are
still many questions which haven't been answered, and very likely will never
be. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 04:58:00 UTC
From:    "Edward S. Miller" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Farewell BBs

Cassady Craft asked
  > Say Ed, was the USS Oklahoma counted twice in that list?! :)

I think not because it was not returned to service.  However, several
"sunk" ships on the list were raised and restored to service, sometimes by
the enemy.  Two battleships were salvaged twice; one (the Cavour of Italy)
no less than three times!

My footnote to the 19 BBs sunk by aircraft in WWII got lost.  It should have
read:
    * Italy 4, Germany 3, Greece 1, Japan 6 (3 at sea, 3 at Kure)
       US 5 (all at Pearl Harbor; 3 salvaged)

Ed Miller  [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 08:16:49 +0000
From:    Nechama Cox <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

>Just thinking about the long-term effects of the raid on Pearl Harbor on
>Dec. 7, 1941.  Question and what if:  Knowing what you know now, if you
>could advise Yammamoto whether to make the raid or not, what would you
>advise.

My first piece of advice would be to make sure that the declaration was
going to go out.  It just hit the news here in London a few months ago that
they planned to declare the attack, but everyone in the Japanese embassy
was out partying that night, and when they finally got back they were
unable to get out the declaration before the bombing began.

I am not sure what would have happened if the declaration had gone out.
After all, all thru school I was told that it was so dastardly to attack
without warning that the US had to enter the war.  Maybe had the
declaration gone out on time the US would have stuck to their issolationist
principles.

Comments?

Nechama

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 04:07:21 +0500
From:    Scott Finn <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

I think that Japan made the right decision by not declaring an attack.
The whole point was to have the element of surprise, which the Japanese
had.  The Admiral partially accomplished the mission of destroying the
American fleet.  The question could be raised as to why the US was not
better prepared for an attack knowing the growing tensions between the two
countries.

I think it would have been impossible for the US to remain
Isolationists.  Days after the attack Hitler and Germany declared war on
the US.  If Japan had any chance of crippling the US Navy, a surprise
attack would have been the only way to have gotten it done.

All's fair in love and war!!!

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 00:18:19 -1000
From:    John DeVirgilio <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Japanese Aerial Torpedoes of WWII

On Mon, 23 Jan 1995, QUACK wrote:

> How does one fire a torpedo?
> Are wires attached  just before its slid in the tube?
> How is the motor started?
> Seems simple to some people but I'd like a little info.
> Thanks, Ron
>

Hello Ron,

INJ torpedoes had a small "T" shaped lever built into the dorsal portion of
the aft engine section.   Ship and submarine torpedoes would start after
being air-blasted forward approx. 70mm.   In the aerial version of
the IJN torpedo the engine starting lever was pulled by cable.

Aloha,

John F. De Virgilio

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 07:05:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 24 JAN 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
WEDNESDAY, 24 JANUARY 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-29, Boeing Superfortress
  C-46, Curtiss Commando
  C-47, Douglas Skytrain
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): In the Kurile Islands, 4 B-25s on a lowlevel
attack on Torishima Island abort due to mechanical trouble; 4 more B-25s bomb
buildings on Torishima; AA fire damages 2 B-25s. In the Aleutian Islands, 6
fighters take off after radar reports an unidentified target SE of Attu
Island; they spot a balloon which they shoot down with tracers.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 12 P-51s on armed
reconnaissance attack railroad targets N of Siangsiang, between Loyang and
Kaifeng, and near Tungchen; 21 locomotives are claimed destroyed.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 12 B-25s bomb Hsumhsai
Airfield; 17 P-47s support ground forces at Padin near Namhkam, and along the
Irrawaddy River in the Bahe area; 6 P-47s knock out the Inailong bypass
bridge; troop concentrations and supply areas are attacked at Nawng-ang,
Pangsan, Mansak, Konsan, Yaunggwin, Mangkung, Nawngngun, Mong Long, Mogok,
Namhsan, and in the Mongmit area. Transports again fly 500+ sorties to
forward areas.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 67 of 70 P-51s based in Belgium
are dispatched in 4 flights to fly sweeps over Wahn Airfield-Dorweiler area
and Karlsruhe-Koblenz area in Germany, claiming 3 fighters downed; 1 P-51 is
lost.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): 25 9th Bombardment Division bombers
hit communications centers at Schleiden, Stadtkyll, and Pronsfeld, Germany;
fighters fly armed reconnaissance, sweeps, airfield cover, and bomb 1 bridge;
the XIX Tactical Air Command supports US III, VIII, XII, and XX Corps
elements along the battlefront at several points from SW of Saint-Vith,
Belgium to the Saarlautern, Germany area. The 39th Photographic
Reconnaissance Squadron, Ninth AF, arrives at Valenciennes, France from the
US with F-5s.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Unfavorable weather limits
operations to 1 complete weather reconnaissance mission.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, cloud conditions and
ground fog at bases nearly halt operations; 1 medium bomber flies weather
reconnaissance over the Venice area and P-47s fly weather reconnaissance over
the Bologna-Parma area; 2 of the P-47s destroy a truck and damage a train
near Parma.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 33 B-24s, from Guam and Saipan Islands, pound
Iwo Jima Island during 4 raids; 6 others act as airborne spotters for a naval
bombardment of Iwo; during 5 hours on the night of 24/25 Jan, 10 B-24s
maintain harassment strikes against the island's airfields. The 78th Fighter
Squadron, 15th Fighter Group, departs Bellows Field, Hawaii for Iwo Jima with
P-51s.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): Mission 23: 20 of 28 B-29s dispatched hit 2
airfields on Iwo Jima Island without loss.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Luzon Island,
B-24s pound Corregidor Island, Cavite, the Canacao peninsula seaplane base,
and Grande Island at the mouth of Subic Bay. FEAF fighters and bombers on
sweeps, armed reconnaissance, and light raids attack a variety of targets
all over Luzon including small shipping, airfields, defensive positions,
storage and town areas, roads, and vehicles. During the night of 24/25 Jan,
B-24s on a snooper mission again hit Takao Airfield on Formosa. The 65th
Troop Carrier Squadron, 433d Troop Carrier Group, based on Biak Island begins
operating from Hill Field, Mindoro Island with C-46s and C-47s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

24/1203Z JAN

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 07:20:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ENOLA GAY.  WHERE

 >There is an airfield right off 40 near Wilmington, Jack, which was for
 >commercial and private aircraft, and also the Delaware Air National Guard was
 >housed there. Could it have some of their big planes you saw? The last time I
 >passed by, and this was before 95 all the way to NJ Turnpike, I think there
 >were some C-130s there. But I could be wrong. Ben Frank

Ben,

That was New Castle County Airport, now Greater Wilmington Airport.
Back when I was in the USAF, there was a USAF fighter-interceptor
squadron based there to defend Philiadelphia/Wilmington/Baltimore/
Washington; the Delaware ANG is still there with C-130s.

These aircraft were on a "farm" located on the north side of the
road but I do not remember whether it was in Delaware or Maryland.
The only thing I do remember was that the building where these
aircraft were located sat at least 100 yards (if not more) off US
40 because I was just able to see the vertical tail surfaces on the
B-17.

Another opportunity lost due to my stupidity!!

Jack McKillop

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 07:20:03 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 25-JAN-1945

On 25-JAN-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the British 2nd Army sector, Operation Blackcock
continues. The 7th Armoured Division captures Linne and Putbroek and
continues northeast toward the river line. The 52nd Division takes
Kirchhoven without opposition. The 43rd Division reaches the Wurm between
Heinsberg and Randrath. The 1st and 3rd Armies continue to make progress
north and south of the remainder of the German salient in the Ardennes.
Units of the 7th Armoured Division take Wallerode and Medel. The 1st
Division takes Ambleve and Mirfeld easily. In the 3rd Army sector, the bulk
of the III Corps is now across the Clerf River, attacking east. Elements of
the 90th Division capture Hupperdange, Grindhausen, Heinersheid and
Lausdorn. The 26th Division occupies Clerf, Reuler and Urspelt. The 5th
Division takes Merscheid. The 90th Division takes Wilwerwiltz and
establishes a bridgehead over the Clerf and continue on taking Pintsch,
east of the river. Elements of the 8th Armoured Division take Berg. In the
7th Army sector, the Germans penetrate the positions of the 103rd Division
reaching Schillersdorf and Nieffern.

Eastern Front - The German position in East Prussia grows increasingly
desperate, with the 2nd and 3rd White Russian Fronts compressing the German
pocket. The 1st Ukraine Front takes Ostrow, southwest of Kalisz in Poland
and Oels, in German Silesia.

Philippines - In the XIV Corps area, units of the 40th Division are working
on Japanese positions in the hills west of Bamban. Units of the 37th
Division take the Mabalacat East Airfield.

Burma - The 81st East African Division occupy Myohaung in the Arakan
sector.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                Cary, North Carolina              [email-masked]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 07:25:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

Scott Finn writes:
 >I think that Japan made the right decision by not declaring an attack.
 >The whole point was to have the element of surprise, which the Japanese
 >had.  The Admiral partially accomplished the mission of destroying the
 >American fleet.  The question could be raised as to why the US was not
 >better prepared for an attack knowing the growing tensions between the two
 >countries.

Agreed, the Japanese won a tactical victory at Pearl Harbor.  But
their surprise attack got the American people angry and for the
first time since World War I, we were unified and isolationism was
OUT!

Jack McKillop

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 04:00:23 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 01-24-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
01/24 Wed. Battleship, cruiser, and destroyer task group (Rear Adm.
           O. C. Badger) bombards enemy positions on Iwo Jima,
           Volcano Islands.
           Naval land-based aircraft from the Philippine Islands bomb
           Japanese shipping at Keelung, Formosa.
            United States naval vessel sunk:
             Salvage vessel EXTRACTOR (ARS-15), accidentally by
              United States submarine, Philippine Sea,
              15 d. 44'N., 133 d. 29'E.
            United States naval vessel damaged:
             Landing ship dock SHADWELL (LSD-15), by aircraft
              torpedo, Philippine Islands area,
              09 d. 01'N., 123 d. 45'E.
            Japanese naval vessel sunk:
             Destroyer SHIGURE, by submarine BLACKFIN (SS-322), Gulf
              of Siam,
              06 d. 00'N., 103 d. 48'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 06:53:30 -0600
From:    Terrance Lewis <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

On Tue, 24 Jan 1995, Nechama Cox wrote:

> >Just thinking about the long-term effects of the raid on Pearl Harbor on
> >Dec. 7, 1941.  Question and what if:  Knowing what you know now, if you
> >could advise Yammamoto whether to make the raid or not, what would you
> >advise.
>
> I am not sure what would have happened if the declaration had gone out.
> After all, all thru school I was told that it was so dastardly to attack
> without warning that the US had to enter the war.  Maybe had the
> declaration gone out on time the US would have stuck to their issolationist
> principles.
>
> Comments?

Kind of hard to remain isolationist once a country has declared war against
you,  no matter if the declaration had been coupled with a previous attack
or not.

"T"
[email-masked]
Terrance L. Lewis, PhD  History Dept.
Southern University at New Orleans

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 07:53:51 -0500
From:    Thoams Wildenberg <[email-masked]>
Subject: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor-II

I'd re-phraze the question:

What if Nagumo had conducted a follow up attack to destroy the oil farm,
harbor facilities, etc.

What then??

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 08:01:10 -0500
From:    Thoams Wildenberg <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Japanese Aerial Torpedoes of WWII

On Tue, 24 Jan 1995, John DeVirgilio wrote:

> On Mon, 23 Jan 1995, QUACK wrote:
>
> > How does one fire a torpedo?
> > Are wires attached  just before its slid in the tube?
> > How is the motor started?
> > Seems simple to some people but I'd like a little info.
> > Thanks, Ron
> >
>
>
> Hello Ron,
>
> INJ torpedoes had a small "T" shaped lever built into the dorsal portion of
> the aft engine section.   Ship and submarine torpedoes would start after
> being air-blasted forward approx. 70mm.   In the aerial version of
> the IJN torpedo the engine starting lever was pulled by cable.
>

Hello John, Tom here.

Re:starting cable--was this attached to tail of aircraft?  Did IJN copy
British practice?  What was US practice.  Interesting stuff for a change.

> Aloha,
> John F. De Virgilio

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 08:17:17 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Request for help

Robert Barrage at the e-mail address below is seeking information on the
relations between Ireland and Nazi Germany:

                [email-masked]

-- Warren Thompson

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 07:32:36 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 3rd Army Chronology - 24Jan45

January 24, 1945
D-Day +232

-Extreemely rugged terrain combined with severe winter conditions was
 considered by G-2 to be more of an obstacle than 40,500 troops and
 an estimated 130 tanks/assault guns, to 3rd Army's advance.

-XX Corps, 94th Inf Div entered Berg, where they met the dragonteeth and
 the landmines of the Siegried Line. The mines were cleared by advance
 elements of the division.

-XIX TAC flew 213 sorties, claiming 137 vehicles and 29 gun installations.

-26th Inf Div took positions along the Clerf River. 90th Inf Div captures
 Hupperdange. 6th Armored takes Holler, Breidfeld, Drinklange, and
 Wilwerdange.

-General Patton attends a conference in the office of Lt. General Bradley.
 Lt. General Hodges and other subordinates are there. The subject: the
 coordination of 1st & 3rd Army's attacks against the Siegried Line.

 "By the end of January we had eliminated the Bulge and were up against
the Siegfried Line. First Army was concentrated on a narrow front between
Huertgen Forest and St. Vith while Ninth Army had sideslipped to include
Hodges' front to the Roer. Patton had drawn the main force of his Third
Army up against the enemy's fortifications where they followed the
Luxembourg border to the Moselle. A third corps extended Patton's front
32 miles south of the Moselle to the vicinity of Saarlautern where it
joined Dever's group. Of the 47 U.S. Divisions then committed on the
Western front, 21 had been packed into the narrow sector between the
Huertgen and the Moselle." -Gen. Omar Bradley

*********Sources: _Patton's Third Army, A Chronology_ by Charles Province
                  _A Soldier's Story_ by Gen. Omar Bradley

         Typos: Regrettably mine.

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 08:22:14 EST
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: BOOKS:  Reviews Wanted

On Mon, 23 Jan 1995 20:24:50 EST Cassady Craft said:
>Anyone had a chance to read Doubler, Michael D. _Closing with the Enemy:
>How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945_?  Seems relevant to some of
>our discussions.

No, but the WPost reviewer liked it a lot, and I've put it on my AtHIS
list (After the House Is Sold (-: )

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 08:23:55 EST
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

On Mon, 23 Jan 1995 20:29:31 EST Cassady Craft said:
>Just thinking about the long-term effects of the raid on Pearl Harbor on
>Dec. 7, 1941.  Question and what if:  Knowing what you know now, if you
>could advise Yammamoto whether to make the raid or not, what would you
>advise.  Make it that war with the US will begin on that day; or if you
>want, make it that you don't declare on the US.  Let's see what happens.

I'd advise him to make that raid on Tokyo--it would work out better for
Japan in the long run (-:

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 08:24:20 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: <No subject given>

Below is a corrected name and e-mail address:
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++=
Robert Burrage at the e-mail address below is seeking information on the
relations between Ireland and Nazi Germany:

                [email-masked]

-- Warren Thompson

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 08:30:07 EST
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

On Tue, 24 Jan 1995 08:16:49 +0000 Nechama Cox said:
>I am not sure what would have happened if the declaration had gone out.
>After all, all thru school I was told that it was so dastardly to attack
>without warning that the US had to enter the war.  Maybe had the
>declaration gone out on time the US would have stuck to their issolationist
>principles.

A declaration delivered an hour before the attack would have done little
to assuage the rage the country felt.  Perhaps a day would have made some
difference.  But bluntly, *any* attack by the Japanese would have enraged
most people, declaration or no.  There was a good deal of racial hostility
in both countries vis a vis the other before & during the war.

ken koester

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 07:43:27 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 22d Hurtgen Epilogue

Hello, Rob!

Thanks for that most informative response.

> You just described the American Replacement System of World War II, and
> the Confederate Replacement System as well :)  Now the problem is to determine
> how long you take units out of the line to acclimatize the new soldiers.

    Yeah, that would be a problem. I guess that would be determined
by the seriousness of the military situation depending on where the
unit was.

  And
> at what level do you reconstitute?  That's the dilemma.  Almost makes me want
> to go back to the square division of with four brigades. Two in Combat, one
> in reserve and one reconstituting hard hit companies and battalions.

    That wouldn't be a bad idea. It might make for a more cumbersome
employment, but replenishment would be expedited.

  Both
> the US and Germans tried reconstituting while in reserve.  More often as not
> the reserve mission took priority and reconstitution stopped when things got
> hot, re the 4th and 28th Infantry Divisions at the Bulge, and some of the
> German Divisions around Hurtgen and Aachen, and on the Russian Front.

    Yeah, those are well known situations.

> Any body else have any thoughts on this.

    Thanks, again, Rob! Hope all is well with you, and please stay in
touch.

    All the best.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 08:56:28 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Farewell BBs

Weren't the Strassbourgs lost to British gunfire?  And it seems to me that
the Bismarck and at least one of the Kongo's ought to go into that column
as well.  They may have been scuttled or torpedoed but it was only after
having been wrecked by gunfire.  Oops, just remembered the Scharnhorst too.
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 09:02:27 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Farewell BBs

Oops,
When I first read the post dealing with how BBs were lost I thought
it was saying that no WW 2 BBs were lost to naval gunfire.
I guess I will drink more coffee before I reply to anything else today :)
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 09:48:11 -0500
From:    QUACK <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Japanese Aerial Torpedoes of WWII

Thanks John-any more info out there?

As an aside THE DISCOVERY CHANNEL last night at 9 Eastern had a special on
the Kodoku (spelling?) Trail across the Owen Stanley Range with interviews
of Japanese and Australian survivors.
I tuned in late so didn't tape it-drat.

Ron

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 10:00:12 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Farewell BBs

Edward S. Miller <[email-masked]> writes:
> My footnote to the 19 BBs sunk by aircraft in WWII got lost.  It should have
> read:
>     * Italy 4, Germany 3, Greece 1, Japan 6 (3 at sea, 3 at Kure)
>        US 5 (all at Pearl Harbor; 3 salvaged)

        Three of the four Italian BBs were also salvaged (Roma was sunk at
sea).
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
Hey!  Did you lose my aerial photographs?

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 09:58:43 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: MEDIA: Excerpt from _A Soldier's Story

Gen. Omar Bradley wrote:

 "Not until late January when a delivery of U.S. newspapers reached us
in Luxembourg did we learn how hysterical the press coverage from SHAEF
had been during the Ardennes offensive. Since September, Hansen had been
pleading with me for the establishment of a press camp at EAGLE TAC, but
but I had always put off his proposal. There was little need, I protested,
for a situation briefing midway between the eyewitness reporting of
correspondents accredited to the Armies and the Theater roundup at SHAEF.

 On the other hand in the British sector, Montgomery had consolidated
his press at 21st Group rather than disperse it as we had to the armies.
As a result, the efforts of the British and Canadian Armies were melded
into a comprehensive frame in the briefing at 21st group. By contrast,
U.S. press coverage had suffered from the failure of newsmen accredited to
the Armies to grasp the inter-relationship of their respective Army campaigns.
In this they received little help from the Armies, for each of the staffs
there was intensely chauvinistic and jealous of the others. SHAEF briefings
in Paris, I am told, were sketchy and as a result our consolidated Army
Group effort during the November and December offensives more often than
not emerged in the newspapers as two unrelated campaigns.

 To prevent a recurrence of the distorted coverage that had exaggerated
our peril during the Ardennes, I reversed my view on an Army Group press
camp and notified SHAEF of our intent to open one at TAC in Namur.
Eisenhower arrived several days later, mildy suspicious of our intentions.
He raised the question late that evening after a desultory game of bridge.
I reasoned that Captain Harry C. Butcher, USNR, had probably planted the
fear in the mind of his chief, for I am sure Ike would never otherwise
have questioned our intentions. As Eisenhower's PRO, Butcher apparently
feared that we might utilize the press in a scrap with Monty, or worse
yet undercut SHAEF coverage by the press. I assured Ike that we were
anxious only to help the newsmen better report the war with a summary
briefing each day at TAC. He was satisfied with my explanation and
instantly approved the request.

 "As a matter of fact," Ike explained, "I wasn't the least bit scared
about the Ardennes offensive until I read the U.S. papers."

***Source: _A Soldier's Story_ by Gen. Omar Bradley

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 10:45:39 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: 50TH: EVALUATION OF BULGE

  This is my final excerpt from the chapter on the Bulge in my book
LETTERS HOME: A WAR MEMOIR.  It includes my evaluation of that battle,
fifty years later.

          SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE

          On January 28, the German offensive was declared officially
          over. It did not actually end, however, until January 31. On
          that day, Private Eddie Slovik was executed. He was the first
          American soldier executed for desertion since 1865 and the
          only one during World War II. During the bulge, there had
          been a great many desertions and self-inflicted wounds in
          the 28th Division. Eisenhower decided that an object lesson
          was needed. The only unit informed of Slovik's execution at
          the time was the 28th. Had I not read about it in David
          Eisenhower's book about his grandfather, I would not know
          about this event even now.

          Another casualty of the Ardennes was Maj. Gen. Raymond
          O. Barton, commander of the 4th Division. His ulcer finally
          got the better of him, and he returned to the US for medical
          treatment and retirement. Brig. Gen. Harold W. Blakeley,
          until then commander of the 4th Division Artillery, replaced
          him and got another star. Barton was well respected in the
          Division. What a terrible combination, responsibility for the
          lives of thousands of men and an ulcer.

          THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE A HALF CENTURY LATER

          With a perspective of nearly half a century and experience
          after the war with military matters, my views regarding the
          Ardennes offensive can be reduced to a few simple
          statements: First, I can understand Bradley's decision to
          leave the Ardennes lightly defended, so he could concentrate
          his forces in more favorable terrain. I can also, if barely,
          forgive US intelligence for failing to detect what was going
          on. What I find inexcusable is the failure of commanders to
          insure that the divisions in the Ardennes had as strong a
          defense posture as possible. If they had, they probably
          would have been overrun anyway. It would have taken the
          Germans, however, longer to do it. This would have given
          more time to deploy forces to counter the penetration. It
          could also have reduced casualties, which were extremely
          heavy. (There were about eighty thousand, with about ten
          thousand dead.)

          As always with such things, there was plenty of blame to go
          around. No one above division level lost his command.
          Nevertheless, Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, commander of
          the VIII Corps, should have insured that the artillery was in
          a defensive posture. Furthermore, he should have verified
          that bridges were prepared for demolition.

          Eisenhower was right in handing over US forces north of the
          bulge to Montgomery temporarily. It is just a pity that this
          testy general had to gloat publicly. Had it not been for
          Churchill's praise of US forces in the House of Commons,
          Montgomery's untimely press conference could have seriously
          disrupted the alliance. (Montgomery made no reference in
          his memoirs to the disputes over strategy and command.)

          There is no way of knowing how the war would have gone
          had Hitler not ordered this offensive. The reality, however,
          was that the German Army was not able thereafter to put
          up a serious defense, and the generals knew the war was
          lost. As Danny S. Parker notes in his Battle of the Bulge,
          even Hitler lost interest in the western front and
          concentrated on the eastern.
          END EXCERPT

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 11:16:45 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: ADMIN: Listserver does its Star Trek M5 impersonation

        This is just a quick note to let everyone know that the
listserver which normally auto-deletes listmembers in a random
fashion has targetted all America-On-Line and Delphi listmembers
and has removed them from the list.  I have complained to the
listserver site to get an explanation and will keep you informed.
If there are any members from these Internet providers still on
the list, be warned that a lull in activity may indicate that
you have been removed.
--
Joe Barone, WWII-L listowner
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 10:52:18 -0500
From:    "Peter I. Hidas" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: SUB: Effectiveness

CONCERNING the Soviet economy during the Second World War one should
consult George Ranki's economic history of the war.
<Peter I. Hidas, <Montreal

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 16:43:00 +0000
From:    "H.G. Henry" <[email-masked]>
Subject: INFO-OSS/SOE Ops in Scandinavia

A colleague of mine is just beginning his PhD thesis on "OSS/SOE
(Special Operations Executive) Intelligence Operations in Scandinavia in
WWII".

These include SIGINT and HUMINT ops and thus is interested in not only
secondary and primary documents and books but also in contacting any
surviving people who were involved.

Any comments, queries would be appreciated.

Hugh G Henry III
St John's College
University of Cambridge
CB2 1TP
United Kingdom

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 09:00:00 -0800
From:    Jim Benn <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

I've always wondered WHAT IF Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor, but the
USSR instead.  Wouldn't that have made a big difference in the German
attack on Russia?  Also, Germany would not have declared war on the US.
Was it not in Japan's strategic interest to double-team Russia with Germany?

Jim Benn.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 10:55:15 CCS
From:    Jorge Merino <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Battleships

> Another interesting note:  There were originally six Iowa-class
> battleships laid down: the four that served, as well as the Illinois
> and Kentucky.  Illinois and Kentucky wer laid down but never finished.
> One of them (I believe Kentucky) was launched, and had parts of
> her armour belt and barbettes added; the other never got off the
> blocks.  I don't recall I ever heard what happened to them.

The six Iowa-class battleships were:

BB-61 Iowa
BB-62 New Jersey
BB-63 Missouri
BB-64 Wisconsin
BB-65 Illinois
BB-66 Kentucky

As you know, the first four ships were commissioned during WWII and saw
combat there. The remaining two weren't finished. This is what happened
to them:

USS Illinois (BB-65)
--------------------
19 July 1940      : Authorized
15 January 1945   : Laid down at Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pennsylvania
12 August 1945    : Cancelled (22% complete), and subsequently scrapped

USS Kentucky (BB-66)
--------------------
19 July 1940      : Authorized
6 December 1944   : Laid down at Norfolk Navy Yard, Virginia
1946              : Authorized for conversion to a Missile Launching
                    Ship, reclassified BBG-1
17 February 1947  : Cancelled (72.1% complete), floated from her building
                    dock and moored at Norfolk
9 June 1958       : Name struck from the Naval Vessel Register
31 October 1958   : Sold for scrap

Their engines were used to power other ships.

Jorge Merino

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 12:10:18 -0500
From:    chris garcia <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

On Mon, 23 Jan 1995, Cassady Craft wrote:

> Just thinking about the long-term effects of the raid on Pearl Harbor on
> Dec. 7, 1941.  Question and what if:  Knowing what you know now, if you
> could advise Yammamoto whether to make the raid or not, what would you
> advise.  Make it that war with the US will begin on that day; or if you
> want, make it that you don't declare on the US.  Let's see what happens.

It may be I'm not understanding your question properly, but here's my
comment anyway;
   Yamamoto never wantedto make the raid on Pearl Harbor.  If you had
advised him not to make it, he would have growled "Shigata ga nai!"  ("It
can't be helped..").  He thought it was a great mistake to attack Pearl
Harbor and declare war with the United States.  he felt Japan would never
have a chance if America really got serious, and by attacking Pearl
Harbor the Japanese would be provoking a war they couldn't finish.
Yamamoto had been educated in California, spoke english well and liked
americans.  He knew american nature.  He advised the military leaders
that if war was declared he would run wild for the first several months,
winning every battle BUT, if the war continued longer than two years,
Japan would be crushed.  He was right on all counts.  He was ordered to
make the attack, and putting away his doubts, carried it out.  The rest
is history.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 12:17:52 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Auschwitz

        Perhaps the "Green Book" didn't mention the liberation of Auschwitz
because it was the Soviets who liberated that camp?  Just a guess...

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 10:24:32 -0600
From:    Greg Kelley <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WANT: VFW/AL HQ

Regarding lists of VFW and American Legion posts:

We've had this question at our library before, and the answer I got by
contacting the state HQ's of these organizations is that yes, such lists
exist, but No (a very emphatic NO) they are NOT available for public use,
since they don't wish to be on mailing lists.

However........

Since that time our library has subscribed to one of those marvels of
modern technology, the American Business Directory on CD-ROM.  This
wondrous device DOES allow us to create lists of the 97 VFW and 235 AL
posts throughout the state.  If you haven't access to this at the U of M,
feel free to email me back & I'll try copying.  Least I can do in return
for the thrill of watching my dad get choked up at the sound of P-51s
buzzing the St Paul field a couple years ago.....

                                          Glad To Be Of Service!

                                          Greg Kelley
                                          St. Paul Public Library
                                          [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 10:52:46 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Bomb Pentration Data Needed

>Need information on the penetrating power of 500 vs 1000 lb aerial bombs
>with respect to their ability to piercd deck amour.  I have read Okum's
>early articles in Warship Int'l, but they're not much help to me.
>
>Does anyone have access to this data or know an ordnance expert that can
>help me?
>
Tom Wildenberg,

Contact Dave Ferris [ [email-masked] ], as he has my tech bulliten with
the official US numbers; it's a 1946 document and provides all the
information you want for dive bombing, level bombing from various heights
and the effects of GP bombs... He is the author of SHIPBASE III, a computer
battle resolution system for IBM compatible computers, which is why he
wanted to borrow it. Hope this helps,

If you give me an S-Mail address, I can give you a xerox of a chart or two
from OPNAV-16-A6, dtd Mar '44 which also has some of the data

Jim O'Neil      They don't pay me enough to fight fair!

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 11:33:24 -0600
From:    Jon Stevens <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: deaths of german pow

On Mon, 23 Jan 1995, Keith Johnson wrote:
>      I have never come across a definitive work on the German POW
> experience in the Soviet Union; however, for a history paper in college,
> I researched this subject as best as I could. About 1 1/2 million died
> during their internment and another 2 million are unaccounted for.
>
>      Keith
>
If you can read German there is a multivolume work on just about all
aspects of German POWs in the USSR.  The title escapes me at the moment
but a chapter in Ambrose's book that rebuts _Other Lossess_ has the
details of this work.  Anyone seen or read the multivolume work? (title?)

Jon Stevens -- [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 19:01:59 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

On Tue, 24 Jan 1995, Scott Finn wrote:

> I think that Japan made the right decision by not declaring an attack.

It was not a decision, it was an error. Japan actually intended to declare
war a few hours before the attack --- not enough to make a prepared
defence possible, but enough to be justifiable under international law.
But the personnel at the Japanese embassy badly delayed the message.
Cordell Hull had his translation of the declaration of war, decoded by
'Magic', several hours before the Nomura and Kurusu received theirs, and
appeared in his office with it. He then pretended to be very surprised
and angered... Not too difficult, under the circumstances.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 18:16:53 +0000
From:    Nechama Cox <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

At  4:07 AM 1/24/95, Scott Finn wrote:
>I think that Japan made the right decision by not declaring an attack.

I don't it was a consious decision. It was just the way that things worked
out. They had planned to declare, but it did not get out in time.

Nechama
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 14:39:46 -0500
From:    chris garcia <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

> >Dec. 7, 1941.  Question and what if:  Knowing what you know now, if you
> >could advise Yammamoto whether to make the raid or not, what would you
> >advise.  Make it that war with the US will begin on that day; or if you
> >want, make it that you don't declare on the US.  Let's see what happens.
>
> I'd advise him to make that raid on Tokyo--it would work out better for
> Japan in the long run (-:
>
Even that odd notion is up for grabs.  Modern Japan is largely a product
of the the thinking of one man- General Douglas MacArthur.  After the war
MacArthur ruled every aspect of Japan's economy, politics and culture
(see "American Caesar", by William Manchester) and he threw away the
military power structure, the feudalistic style land owners, gave the
voteto women, land rights to common- even poor- people, created a
representative democracy including a free press, and a market economy.
The rise in health care maintence added literally ten years to the life
of every japanese, more than making up for japan's casualties of the
war.  Without the war there would be no American Caesar.  Without him,
the face of modern Japan would be very different from what we now know.
No walkman's or sushi bars here either.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 17:48:30 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: BOOKS:  REVIEWS WANTED

Cassady, Doubler's book was reviewed in last Sunday's "Book Review" of the
Washington Post. If you want, I can send you a copy. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 15:10:43 EST
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

On Tue, 24 Jan 1995 09:00:00 -0800 Jim Benn said:
>I've always wondered WHAT IF Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor, but the
>USSR instead.  Wouldn't that have made a big difference in the German
>attack on Russia?  Also, Germany would not have declared war on the US.
>Was it not in Japan's strategic interest to double-team Russia with Germany?

Not really.  How far would they have gotten with just one measly RR to
support the advance, no roads to speak of, and a brutal climate to make
war in?  They'd have wound up clinging to the Pacific litoral & have been
not a whit closer to the oil so desparately needed.  The Soviets would
have kept their nerve, most likely, thrown in some cannon fodder to
rein in the advance, and kept right on attacking Hitler.

>From the Japanese POV, the golden goose was to the south and east;
everything else was just a means to that end.  Besides, the Japanese had
already tangled briefly with the Sovs a year prior, to the discomfiture
of both sides.  Neither was especially eager for a repeat, least of all
the Japanese.

ken koester

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 15:32:46 -0500
From:    Lee Windsor u <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

Hello Jim,

> I've always wondered WHAT IF Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor, but the
> USSR instead.  Wouldn't that have made a big difference in the German
> attack on Russia?  Also, Germany would not have declared war on the US.
> Was it not in Japan's strategic interest to double-team Russia with Germany?
>
> Jim Benn.
>
Putting aside all the political consequences, I think the Japanese knew
that they didn't have the ability to fight the Russian successfully for
lack of things like good tanks and trucks.  However, if they had even
just kept their attention on their northern sphere of influence, it may
have had an effect in Europe considering that many of the reserves that
formed the core of the 1941-42 Soviet Winter offensive had been shifted
from the east only after it became apparent that Japan's attention was
turning southwards as evidenced by the attacks on Pearl, Hong Kong,
Malaya, etc.

Having said this, I still don't think it was possible for the Japanese to
be successful in a land war with Russia in 1941, and they knew it.
Even if they could, they would have to fight their way across alot of
wasteland in order to get anything useful out of it.

Just a thought

Semper Fi

Lee W.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 14:02:12 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor-II

Hello, Thomas!

> What if Nagumo had conducted a follow up attack to destroy the oil farm,
> harbor facilities, etc.

    Thank God he didn't. If by chance this target had been discovered
and destroyed, it would have presented a serious problem for later
supply of warships, such as the carriers that weren't there at the
time. These and others would have been forced to return to the US for
refuelling, if within sailing distance, return to PH to wait for
fuel, or so conduct their operations as to hopefully be refuelled at
sea. In any case, the prospect would have had serious consequences
for our Pacific fleet.

    Not to mention the difficulty of gaining access to affected areas
at PH once the planes had left. Cleanup would have been seriously
hampered.

    My thoughts.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 16:07:01 -0500
From:    "John E. Kollar" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

Boy, that is an interesting question.  But the amount of troops that
the Japanese could spare, between the China campaign, etc. was very
small, and with no armor (or poor armour) I think that the Russies could
have rolled over them, Hitler might have gotten a little further in the
west, but not far enough to knock out the Soviets, as they (Nazis) were
already sstretched too far.

John E. Kollar

ps. Japan's economic strategy lay to the south, Oil.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 15:49:45 +0000
From:    "Metod M. Milac" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Auschwitz

A 55 minute video cassette, produced by the National Center for
Jewish Film at Brandeis University, entitled "Liberation of
Auschwitz," covers the period from 27 Jan., 3 pm (official Soviet
Army time of entering Auschwitz complex) until 28 Feb. 1945 and
many subsequent developments and facts. This video is based entirely
on the records of the Soviet Army.
Metod M. Milac

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 13:00:29 -0800
From:    Ed Kettler <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Battleships

You wrote:

>
>> Another interesting note:  There were originally six Iowa-class
>> battleships laid down: the four that served, as well as the Illinois
>> and Kentucky.  Illinois and Kentucky wer laid down but never
finished.
>> One of them (I believe Kentucky) was launched, and had parts of
>> her armour belt and barbettes added; the other never got off the
>> blocks.  I don't recall I ever heard what happened to them.
>
>The six Iowa-class battleships were:
>
>BB-61 Iowa
>BB-62 New Jersey
>BB-63 Missouri
>BB-64 Wisconsin
>BB-65 Illinois
>BB-66 Kentucky
>
>As you know, the first four ships were commissioned during WWII and saw
>combat there. The remaining two weren't finished. This is what happened
>to them:
>
>USS Illinois (BB-65)
>--------------------
>19 July 1940      : Authorized
>15 January 1945   : Laid down at Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pennsylvania
>12 August 1945    : Cancelled (22% complete), and subsequently scrapped
>
>USS Kentucky (BB-66)
>--------------------
>19 July 1940      : Authorized
>6 December 1944   : Laid down at Norfolk Navy Yard, Virginia
>1946              : Authorized for conversion to a Missile Launching
>                    Ship, reclassified BBG-1
>17 February 1947  : Cancelled (72.1% complete), floated from her
building
>                    dock and moored at Norfolk
>9 June 1958       : Name struck from the Naval Vessel Register
>31 October 1958   : Sold for scrap
>
>Their engines were used to power other ships.
>
>Jorge Merino
>
>
Kentucky's bow was used to replace one of her sisters (Missouri I think)
damaged in a collision.  The engines power the AOE Sacramento-class
ships.

Ed Kettler

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 15:46:26 -0600
From:    Terrance Lewis <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

On Tue, 24 Jan 1995, Jim Benn wrote:

> I've always wondered WHAT IF Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor, but the
> USSR instead.  Wouldn't that have made a big difference in the German
> attack on Russia?  Also, Germany would not have declared war on the US.
> Was it not in Japan's strategic interest to double-team Russia with Germany?
>
> Jim Benn.
>

Yes and Maybe Yes to your two questions.  But for Japan to have gone that
route (attacking north at the USSR instead of south against the British
and it allies and the United States -- remember it was not just Pearl Harbor
that was attacked, the attacks on the other areas are only dated December
8th because of the international date line)would have taken a lot of changes
in Japanese political history since at least 1867, if not 1593; that is the
divisions within the ruling Japanese elite play as much (or more) of a role
in that decision as strategic interest.

The strategic value of the USSR when Japan need materials more easily
found to its south is debatable, but a good argument can be made for either
(and I'm sure will be).  The only thing that might not be debateable is
that the Germans would have had an easier time in the winter of 1941-42
had the Soviets not been able to use troops (many have argued some of the
Soviets best troops) pulled out of Siberia & around Mongolia to attack
German positions.

I really think to go much beyond that takes us from history to war
gaming.

"T"
[email-masked]
Terrance L. Lewis, PhD  History Program
Southern University at New Orleans

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 15:48:26 -0600
From:    Terrance Lewis <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

On Tue, 24 Jan 1995, Emmanuel Gustin wrote:

> On Tue, 24 Jan 1995, Scott Finn wrote:
>
> > I think that Japan made the right decision by not declaring an attack.
>
> It was not a decision, it was an error. Japan actually intended to declare
> war a few hours before the attack --- not enough to make a prepared
> defence possible, but enough to be justifiable under international law.

Emmanuel Gustin

I thought it was a declaration that further negotiations were to be
broken off, as opposed to a formal declaration of war.

"T"
[email-masked]
Terrance L. Lewis, PhD  History Program
Southern University at New Orleans

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 15:27:07 -0800
From:    Julian E Gomez <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Farewell BBs

>The seagoing dinosaurs did not enjoy a distinguished career fighting enemy
>battleships as they were designed to do:
>
>    BATTLESHIPS OF THE WORLD, 1866-1955
>
> LOST IN ACTION OR OTHER WAYS:
> ...
> Rammed                                         1
>                                            -----

What could possibly ram a BB and sink it, rather than being reduced to
scrap itself?

"I was a precocious child and obviously destined to be a scientist."

        Dr. Julian "a tribble took it" Gomez
        Apple Computer, Inc.  408/862-1289 or 996-1010
        [email-masked]  [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 17:49:56 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: Inf: 3rd Army Chronology- 25Jan45

January 25, 1945
D-Day +233

-XX Corps, 26th Inf Div advances, 90th Inf Div takes Fischbach, Clervaux,
 Kochery, and Reuler. 6tyh Armored takes Weiswampach.

-17th Airborne reaches outscirts of Espeler in the VIII Corps area.

-Many other units patrolled with intent, looking for the aggresive edge.
 The 317th Regiment of the 80th Inf Div crossed the Clerf, clearing
 Lellingen and Pinstsch. Woof.

-XIX TAC flew 198 sorties claiming 2 German aircraft, and 240 vehicles.

**********

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 15:32:48 -0800
From:    Sonnenschein Nath and Rosenthal <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Inside The Third Reich-Speer

On Mon, 23 Jan 1995, Douglass Green wrote:

> I am finishing my first read of Speer's book Inside the Third Reich. I saw
> a peice to TV last night called 'Hitler's Henchmen' where they referred to
> the book as self serving. I see some of that, but I also see Speer taking
> responsibility for his actions/inactions during the war.
>
> I would be most interested in other's views on this book. Thanks.
>
> --
> Douglass Green
> [email-masked]
>
        I found the book to be very interesting from the architectural
aspect. I have a BS in architecture and have admired Speer's
neo-classical style in many of his proposals to Hitler. Speer was a
man
of many talents, too bad they were wasted on such a warped cause. On a
side note, Speer is also discussed in _Architects of Fortune_ about Mies
van der Rohe and the Bauhaus in the 20's and 30's.

Doug Shireman

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 15:52:29 -0800
From:    Steve New <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

You wrote:

>
>>Just thinking about the long-term effects of the raid on Pearl Harbor
on
>>Dec. 7, 1941.  Question and what if:  Knowing what you know now, if
you
>>could advise Yammamoto whether to make the raid or not, what would you
>>advise.
>
>My first piece of advice would be to make sure that the declaration was
>going to go out.  It just hit the news here in London a few months ago
that
>they planned to declare the attack, but everyone in the Japanese
embassy
>was out partying that night, and when they finally got back they were
>unable to get out the declaration before the bombing began.
>
>I am not sure what would have happened if the declaration had gone out.
>After all, all thru school I was told that it was so dastardly to
attack
>without warning that the US had to enter the war.  Maybe had the
>declaration gone out on time the US would have stuck to their
issolationist
>principles.
>Comments?
>Nechama
>[email-masked]
I can't see how the U.S. could have remained neutral after having been
attacked, and having war declared by the Japanese (and then their Axis
partners) regardless of whether the declaration had been delivered
before or after the attack.

At the rate that relations were failing between us and the Japanese, had
they failed to attack us in 1941, we may have ended up starting the war
(probably as an attempt to help Chaing in China, in response to
something similar to the Panay) ourselves at the end of 1942.

Science and technology (long range aircraft, rockets, weapons of mass
destruction, radio & television), sociodynamics (serious attempts by
more than one state for world or regional domination), economics (the
loss or gain of international trading partners) and other factors were
leading the U.S. out of its isolationism, slowly but surely.

In effect, it was about time for the U.S. to grow into its world power
status.  If Pearl Harbor hadn't triggered it, something else would have.

--

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 16:05:24 -0800
From:    Steve New <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor-II

You wrote:

>
>I'd re-phraze the question:
>
>What if Nagumo had conducted a follow up attack to destroy the oil
farm,
>harbor facilities, etc.
>What then??

I suspect that the majority of the Pacific Fleet would have been
recalled to California waters until the facilities in Pearl could be
repaired or replaced.

Eventually, the rebuilt Pacific fleet would have been sent out to push
the Japanese back, but with the new production ships fighting in the
initial stages.  Picture Coral Sea with 5 or 6 fleet carriers, supported
by 4 or 5 jeep carriers, New Jersey and Missouri.

Of course, the Japanese would have been stronger too, and our Navy would
be in the attack rather than defense position (a more difficult role to
succeed in) so I suspect that the war would have extended into 1947
(barring the development __and delivery__ of a-bombs).

--

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 18:35:59 -0600
From:    Chuck Johnson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Replacement Policy (was 22nd Hurtgen Epi.)

> > And at what level do you reconstitute?  That's the dilemma.
> > Almost makes me want to go back to the square division of
> > with four brigades. Two in Combat, one in reserve and one
> > reconstituting hard hit companies and battalions.
>
>     That wouldn't be a bad idea. It might make for a more
> cumbersome employment, but replenishment would be expedited.

  Forgive me for continuing a thread that is somewhat off-topic --
  although we are comparing WWII practice with modern practice so
  it's not completely off-the-wall -- but isn't the current U.S.
  practice that battalions are switched from regiment to regiment
  on virtually an ad hoc basis -- in other words, the most important
  administrative and combat maneuver unit is the battalion and
  regiments are set up as practically the same as the WWII German
  Kampgruppen?

  If this is true then it really doesn't matter that much (although
  it still does a little) how many regiments or brigades you are
  organized into -- you retire the hard-hit battallions to the rear
  and reorganize the remaining combat worthy battallions into smaller
  but still ready-for-combat regiments.

  Yours,
   Chuck Johnson -- [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 19:43:26 -0500
From:    Keith Johnson <[email-masked]>
Subject: German POW deaths

     FYI
     The counterpart to the book "Other Losses" by Bacque is:

     "Eisenhower and the German POWs: facts against falsehood" edited by
Gunter Bischof and Stephen Ambrose c1992.

      Keith

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 21:01:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 25 JAN 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
THURSDAY, 25 JANUARY 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  F-7, Consolidated Liberator
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-39, Bell Airacobra
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  CARIBBEAN (Sixth Air Force): The 30th Fighter Squadron, XXVI Fighter
Command, moves from Aguadulce, Panama to Howard Field, Canal Zone with P-39s
and P-40s.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 21 P-51s hit rail targets
and airfields in the Peking area, claiming 4 locomotives and 40 aircraft
destroyed; 16 P-40s and P-51s attack railroad targets around Kaifeng,
Shihkiachwang, Pengpu, and Chingmen; 42 locomotives are claimed destroyed.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 24 P-47s support ground
forces in the Namhkam area, near Molo, and near Myitson; 12 B-25s pound the
Heho airfield; 80+ fighter-bombers attack troops, supplies, and targets of
opportunity at Hsenwi, Loi-weng, Ho hpong, Loi Nan, Ting-yet, Mong Tat,
Ho-mong, Mong Long, Pangkwai, and in the Kutkai area. Transports fly 581
sorties to forward areas.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 111 of 121 P-51s based in Belgium
fly a sweep over wide areas of SW Germany, claiming 2 Luftwaffe fighters NE
of Mannheim and E of Kirrlach; 1 P-51 is lost.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): 170 A-20s and B-26s hit
communications centers and railroad bridges, overpasses, and lines in W
Germany with the aim of harassing and obstructing troop movement; fighters of
the 3 Tactical Air Commands fly armed reconnaissance, alerts and night
patrols, escort bombers, and attack numerous ground targets; the XIX Tactical
Air Command supports the US 5th Infantry Division in the Echternach,
Luxembourg area.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Weather curtails operations;
P-38s, with P-51 escort, fly photo and weather reconnaissance missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy during the night of 24/25
Jan, A-20s make several intruder attacks on roads, motor transport, bridges,
and trains; bad weather during the day greatly curtails flying; the only
medium bomber mission dispatched achieves poor results on the Cremona
ammunition dump; fighter-bombers and fighters of the XXII Tactical Air
Command hit communications and dump areas, mainly in the Milan area, with
good general success.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 14 Saipan Island-based B-24s bomb Iwo Jima
Island in the afternoon; during the night of 25/26 Jan, 10 more, flying
individual harassment strikes at intervals, pound the island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s, operating in
force, again pound Corregidor Island in Manila Bay, Luzon Island; B-24s,
B-25s, A-20s, and fighter-bombers on sweeps, armed reconnaissance, and small-
scale strikes hit vehicles, enemy positions, airfields, ammunition and supply
dumps, barges, communications, and targets of opportunity in general, over
wide areas of Luzon and Palawan Islands, and in the C Philippine Islands.
During the night of 25/26 Jan, B-24s fly a harassing raid on Takao, Formosa.
The 20th Combat Mapping Squadron, 6th Photographic Reconnaissance Group,
based at Dulag, Leyte Island, begins operating from Tacloban, Leyte with
F-7s; the 387th Bombardment Squadron (Light), 312th Bombardment Group (Light)
moves from Tanauan, Leyte to San Jose, Mindoro Island with A-20s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

25/0200Z JAN

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 17:15:02 -0800
From:    Steve New <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

You wrote:

>
>I've always wondered WHAT IF Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor, but
the
>USSR instead.  Wouldn't that have made a big difference in the German
>attack on Russia?  Also, Germany would not have declared war on the US.
>Was it not in Japan's strategic interest to double-team Russia with
Germany?
>Jim Benn.
It could have been a great help to Germany, but the Japanese weren't all
that interested in helping Germany, they had their own agenda to pursue.

The following is extracted from chapter 5 of John Costello's The Pacific
War,
1941-1945:

The Fuhrer's long planned crusade to rid the world of bolshevism,
while it achieved spectacular military triumphs during its first
weeks, was to prove a diplomatic disaster....The attack on Russia
very nearly ruptured the Tripartite Pact on which Japan was
depending on Germany's aid in maintaining good relations with
Stalin so as to preclude any threat from Siberia while the Army
and Navy concentrated on their southward thrust.  Prime Minister
Konoye felt betrayed because the Germans clearly trusted their
Axis partners too little to warn them of Barbarossa...

The Japanese cabinet members were divided by the foreign minister's
strident advocacy of following Hitler's ditates to launch into an
attack on Vladivostok and march north against Russia....the
headstrong Matsuoka had rushed to the Imperial Palace to try to
win the Emperor's backing for a Siberian adventure.  But he had so
lost face with his colleagues that he was now regarded as
"Hitler's office boy."...

On July 2, the Emperor presided over an Imperial Conference that
took the momentous decision to carry forward a policy of southern
expansion, "no matter what obstacles my be encountered."...the
cabinet rejected Matsuoka's advice for an immediate attack on
Russia, in favor of executing Japan's advance "southward in order
to establish firmly a basis for her self existance and self
protection."  A move against Siberia was only to be made if "the
German-Soviet war should develop to our advantage."

--

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 20:17:50 EST
From:    "Thomas L. Townsend" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INF: USN Chronology 01-24-95

>             United States naval vessel sunk:
>              Salvage vessel EXTRACTOR (ARS-15), accidentally by
>               United States submarine, Philippine Sea,
>               15 d. 44'N., 133 d. 29'E.

Does anyone have any further information on this? Lives lost? Courts of
Inquiry?

Thanks

-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Townsend                    6th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Co. A.
[email-masked]
         In the future I plan to be present in the past.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 21:46:35 EST
From:    Charles Mattocks <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Auschwitz liberation

Auschwitz was indeed liberated by the Russians.  I read something somewhere,
here or in a book, that Stalin and his cabnit knew of Auschwitz, but did
not inform his field commanders of its existence.  Mainly because they were also
anit-semetic, and that they did not consider it a military objective.  This
Russian Colonel also said that his Corps commander did not know of its existance
, but found out about it from the population in the area.  Stalin knew about it
from Roosevelt and Churchill.  I'll check when I get back home, I believe this
was an article from World War II magazine.

Hope this helps!
Chip Mattocks
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 21:43:50 EST
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Inside The Third Reich-Speer

On Mon, 23 Jan 1995 21:17:11 -0500 Douglass Green said:
>I am finishing my first read of Speer's book Inside the Third Reich. I saw
>a peice to TV last night called 'Hitler's Henchmen' where they referred to
>the book as self serving. I see some of that, but I also see Speer taking
>responsibility for his actions/inactions during the war.
>
>I would be most interested in other's views on this book. Thanks.
>
>--
>Douglass Green
>[email-masked]

     I just read the book a few weeks ago.  I found it generally interesting
and very readable.  Clearly, the book is a very successful attempt to put
Speer in the best possible light without making up too many stories.
A book, "Albert Speer, the End of a Myth" criticizes many of the things
that Speer says which removes him from absolute guilt.  In the book and
the trials, Speer is willing to admit a fair amount of guilt and, of course
the "collective guilt", but he does not admit to the his full knowledge
of the concentration and extermination camps nor his full collaboration
for the use of slave slabor.  He doesn't deny it, as did others, but he
only tells half the truth.  This is what I've read and heard, at least.
    What I most enjoyed about the book is how Speer communicated what it
was like to be one of the inner circle people with Hitler as well as having
considerable power (unlike secretaries, doctors, etc.).  It also put Hitler
in a different light than others authors have done.  Neither good nor bad,
but a different point of view.  It was a book worth reading.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 21:53:10 EST
From:    Charles Mattocks <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: POWs

This is getting off the subject that started this dicussion, but didn't the
Russians "liberate" some POW camps that held US, British and other western
allies personnel?  I read or heard alot of them never came back after being
liberated by the Russians?  Is this true?

I've also read accounts of the Soviets brutality to the civilian population ie
women?  Has anyone else heard this?  I understand that this was mostly conducted
by units from the far east portion of the Soviet Union.  I also read some where
that the Soviets executed any Soviet Soldier that surrendered, escaped and the
returned to Soviet lines?  Any comments?

Chip Mattocks
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 24 Jan 1995 21:50:37 EST
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Book:Himmler

Hello all!
   This semester I am taking a class called Nazi Germany.  The professor
is Dr. Breitman.  He wrote, "Architect of Genocide" - about Himmler and
the Final Solution.  Anyone ever read it?  Comments?

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 25 Jan 1995 02:30:40 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

On Tue, 24 Jan 1995, Terrance Lewis wrote:

> > It was not a decision, it was an error. Japan actually intended to declare
> > war a few hours before the attack --- not enough to make a prepared
> > defence possible, but enough to be justifiable under international law.
>
> I thought it was a declaration that further negotiations were to be
> broken off, as opposed to a formal declaration of war.

No, that message came some weeks earlier. I don't know the exact words,
but it said (obviously intended for the embassador only) "for all
practical purposes, the negotations have ended. But don't let them
notice... Tell them you are waiting for instructions..."

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 25 Jan 1995 02:36:44 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WHAT-IF: Pearl Harbor

On Tue, 24 Jan 1995, chris garcia wrote:

>    Yamamoto never wantedto make the raid on Pearl Harbor.  If you had
> advised him not to make it, he would have growled "Shigata ga nai!"  ("It
> can't be helped..").  He thought it was a great mistake to attack Pearl
> Harbor and declare war with the United States.

Not entirely correct. Yamamoto opposed against a war with the US. But he
insisted that if a war would be begun, it would start with an attack on
Pearl Harbour. He threatened to resign if he wasn't allowed to attack
Pearl Harbour --- a move many admirals thought to be too risky. There
were those who proposed simply waiting for the US to react, and then fight
a battle in the Japanese home seas. That was the traditional Japanese
strategy, and a far less provocative one. But also one that would tie up
most of the Japanese naval forces in a purely defensive position.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 23 Jan 1995 to 24 Jan 1995
*************************************************