Subject: WWII-L Digest - 9 Feb 1995 to 10 Feb 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 11 Feb 1995 00:02:53 -0500

There are 56 messages totalling 2581 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Enola Gay Exhibit (3)
  2. Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's (13)
  3. HELP: Locating USAF personnel
  4. INF: 50 Years Ago - 11-FEB-1945
  5. 3rd Army Chron. M59-->M24 conv. (2)
  6. INF: 3rd Army Chronology - 09Feb45
  7. burning itch of napalm
  8. GEN: JOHN TOLAND GULLIBLE?
  9. MALABAR reunion
 10. Enola Gay
 11. <No subject given>
 12. GEN Re: ? native Americans during WWII (2)
 13. TAC: Operation Anvil (3)
 14. Japan posts (2)
 15. The Invasion of Japan (2)
 16. Westerly 3 of 5: Howard, part I
 17. Westerly 3 of 5: Howard part II
 18. WWII Diary
 19. Sorry list, no direct path.....
 20. Morality: glory of war (was Shooting Downed Pilots)
 21. 50TH: HELPING THE
 22. One last Japan post (honest)
 23. OBIT-Local ace with a strange story
 24. ADMIN: Another weekend warning
 25. "British" aces of WWII
 26. Part two of final Japan post
 27. RCAF Units In The RAF "Tiger Force"
 28. ?where is NIEDOWICZE, POLAND
 29. DoD Newswire
 30. [INF] USAAF 11 FEB 45
 31. [INF] USAAF 12 FEB 45
 32. [INF] USAAF 13 FEB 45
 33. USMC Chronology
 34. GEN RE: ? NATIVE AMERI
 35. Obersalzburg
 36. Seasickness

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 00:44:35 -0500
From:    John Cropp <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Enola Gay Exhibit

 On Thu, 9 Feb 1995, James Ray Watkins wrote:

> for example, that the discussion over the bomb should include careful
> distinctions between, say, the military command, and the ordinary soilder,
> or between the system of the millitary and the population at large. This
> arguable that at times the U.S. millitary was 'out of control' in a
parallel
> way during the so-called Spnaish American War, or Vietnamn. I would be
> wonderful thing, for example, that the U.S. millitary thinks of itself as
> outside politics, at least to the extent that it has only rarely and only in
> isolated cases thought of taking over the government. If that idea could be
> understood, we might just be that much closer to preventing the next war.
> Ray Watkins
> A.I., Department of Rhetoric and Composition
> English, University of Texas at Austin

Mr. Watkins,
Forgive the observations of a non academic, but your message disturbs me.
While Americans and Japanese are groups of individuals, nations go to war
as single entity.  Without any fear of being accused of racism, I can
point out that the Japanese are much more homogeneous then we.  A
deliberately distorted version of Bushido was promoted in the 20th century
as a means to promote aggresive action in soldiers.  It also promoted
contempt for "others" who did not follow this code.  The training for
aggresion was all too successful.  Do I hold that government responsible
for aggresive war?  I do.  Do I hold an individual responsible for an
action of atrocity?  I most certainly do!  Men are not amoral puppets.
Cultures can sicken.

The BOMB and the decision to drop it were not the results of moral
relatvity, but rather a cleareyed decision based on the information
available at the time.  No one can ever know if the invasion of the
mainland would have occured,  but we surely were planning such an action.
The question of casualty number is, to me, rather a non-issue.  What
commander in chief would KILL more of his own troops to avoid inflicting
horror on the enemy nation.  Knowledge of the effects of nuclear weapons
was much less then today, but from what I know of Truman, he still would
have dropped the bomb if his information was more like ours.

I know quite a few WWII vets that hold an unshakeable belief that their
own rearends were pulled out of the fire by Truman's bomb.  Such widely
held belief needs to addressed by those who seek to interpret the meaning
as something other then the bomb as the ender of WWII.

On a different note, I have a small bone to pick with you.  As a Vietnam
vet, I never was "out of control".  I never saw anyone out of control.
One of the many problems with that conflict was entirely too much control
from people who knew nothing about warfare.  With few exceptions, the
American military was not out of control.

I am currently studying the Japanese Bomb effort.  Its hard as I do not
speak the language.  But I have found that the Japanese did plan to use
their bomb in a military way(no peaceful uses for them).  They planned to
deliver the weapon in a I boat to a California harbor, and detonating the
rascal underwater!  I bet San Francisco might have experienced a tiny
touch of (dare I say it) nuclear horror.  The point is that we suffer no
unique moral guilt for doing what we did.  We did not build death camps,
and we did not rape Nanking.  We did not start the war by bombing their
ships at harbor.

I enjoyed your thoughts-they made me think.  I think you try to be fair in a
very commendable way.  There does seem to be a bit of guilt over some of our
history(sins of the fathers and all that), but interesting none the less.
I guess it boils down to a difference of philosophies.  If someone tries to
mug me, I feel I have the moral high ground.  I will use anything to defend
myself.  The mugger's death would still find me on the moral high ground, and
I own the mugger nothing.

                         All my best,
                         John

John L. Cropp                      *   "Quomodo manibus mortalis
[email-masked]      *    talia magna opera
11041 Fancher Rd.                  *    coquinaria?"
Westerville, OH 43082              *

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 10:42:21 +0100
From:    Henrik Olsen <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

The bombing of the Gestapo headquater ('Shellhuset') in Copenhagen did
happen, and most of the prisoners did escape.

A girls school were hit, and many were killed.

Gestapo were preparing an attack on the danish resistance movement, and
that was the reson why the HQ were bombed.

The bombing was filmed by one or more of the Mosquito's.

I have some reference, but it is danish. If there's an interest, I'll
translate some of it and send it to the list.

Henrik

[email-masked]

'today, is the history of tomorrow'

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Feb 1995 18:11:14 CET
From:    "COL Donnell, Doug" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HELP: Locating USAF personnel

Back on 23 Jan Jim Brady asked how to locate USAF personnel.  It took me a
while, but here's the info:

To locate a USAF retiree:

Submit a request along with a stamped envelope (with your address in the
"from" corner to:

     AFMPC/RMIQL
     550 C Street West
     Suite 50
     Randolph AFB, TX  78150-4752

Give them any information you can about the person you are trying to locate
(the SSAN is best, but last base of assignement, rank, age, etc help also).
If they can identify and locate the person, they will then address your
letter and mail it to the retiree.  It is then up to the retiree to contact
you at the "from" address you put on the envelope.  Only submit one address
(individual) per request.

To locate a USAF person on ACTIVE DUTY:

Submit a self addressed stamped envelope along with your request.  Give
them as much information as you can (again, SSAN is best. . .or like the
retirees, anything that would help identify a specific individual).  They
will find the individual (if possible) and mail the address to you.  The
request you send must be in writing.  No e-mail requests are accepted.
(BTW, address is the same as above).

Phone numbers (it would surprise me if they gave out names over the phone)
are (210) 652-6377 for active duty and (210) 652-3431 for retirees.

Hope that helps.

                          Doug Donnell

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 07:31:43 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 11-FEB-1945

On 11-FEB-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the British XXX Corps
overcomes German resistance and flooded terrain to advance in the area of
Cleve and Materborn and the important road junctions of Hekkens and Gennep.
The U.S. 1st Army begins a period of regrouping. In the 3rd Army sector,
the VIII Corps continues its offensive in the Prum sector, with the 90th
Division taking Prum itself. The XII Corps advances between the
fortifications of the Siegfried Line in the Wallendorf bridgehead. The 10th
Armoured Division completes regrouping in the vicinity of Metz.

Italian Front - The U.S. 82nd Division breaks off limited attacks, both in
the coastal sector and in Serchio Valley.

Eastern Front -  The 1st Ukraine Front breaches the German line on the Oder
northwest of Breslau and captures Luben, Haynau, Leignitz, Neumarkt and
Kanth. The advance southeast of Breslau threatens Silesia. Dresden is also
threatened, 75 miles further west. The Russians take Deutsch-Krone in the
northeast sector. In Budapest, forty-five more blocks of buildings fall
into the hands of the Russians.

Philippines - South of Manila, the 11th Division captures Pasay, a suburb
of Manila and part of Nichols Airfield. The 37th Division and 1st Cavalry
Division continues to clear Manila. In the I Corps sector, the 26th
Infantry Division advances from San Isidro toward Puncan. The XI Corps
makes little progress in the Zigzag Pass area.

Pacific - The Joint Expeditionary Force begins the final rehearsals for the
Iwo Jima operation, off the west coast of Tinian in the Marianas.

Yalta - The Yalta Conference is concluded, with Stalin, Churchill and
Roosevelt reaching an agreement on the future strategy of the war and on
the political order of the post-war world. The USSR confirms its adhesion
to the United Nations and agrees to take part in the war against Japan once
the war in Europe is over (expected in July). In exchange, the Soviets are
to be given important concessions in the Far East (Dairen, Port Arthur,
part of Sakhalin and the Kurils). Churchill has opposed what he considers
to be dangerous and unjustified concessions on the part of Roosevelt,
especially with regard to the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe, but he
has had to yield to the wishes of his more powerful ally.

The Homefront
-------------
College Paper Suspended - Publication of "The Flat Hat", student newspaper
of the College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va., has been suspended
pending faculty action on an editorial by 22 year-old Marilyn Kaemmerle,
the editor, which suggested the time will come when Negroes will attend the
college, "join the same clubs, be our roommates, be in the same classrooms
and marry us."

Weapons Board - Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Navy Secretary James V.
Forrestal and Dr. Frank Jewett, president of the National Academy of
Sciences, announce in Washington the establishment of a new board of
civilian and military scientists, to be known as the Research Board for
National Security, which will develop weapons for use in any future
conflicts.

Best Selling Books - "The Green Years" by A.J. Cronin, "Cannery Row" by
John Steinbeck, "Immortal Wife" by Irving Stone and "Brave Men" by Ernie
Pyle.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 07:53:48 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 3rd Army Chron. M59-->M24 conv.

Steve said:

>I think you have missed the point on "conversion".  The article is
>discussing the conversion of a unit from using one vehicle (the M5
>Stuart light tank) to the use of a replacement vehicle (the M24 Chaffee
>light tank).  It wasn't meant to indicate that the M5s were physically
>converted to M24s.
>
>I have no idea what an M59 might be, but as it is historical fact that
>the M24 was introduced in the European theater in 1945 to replace the
>obsolete M5, I suspect that the M59 published is a typo.
>
  I sure did miss the point. Thanks for clearing this up for me. -Al

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 07:57:19 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 3rd Army Chronology - 09Feb45

February 9, 1945
D-Day + 248

-3rd Army G-2 identified that Panzer divisions "out of contact" might
 be utilized to counterattack threatened portions of the front. Tank
 Destroyer units were proving to be very effective against pillboxes
 and machine-gun nests.

-III Corps, 6th Armored Div gained a mile joining their two bridgeheads.

-VIII Corps, 90th Inf Div gained the high ground overlooking the Alf River,
 4th Inf Div drove eastward toward Prum, 87th Inf Div captures Neundorf.

-XII Corps, 5th Inf Div expanded its bridgehead on the Sauer River. In
 the fighting for their 800yd deep by 3500 yds wide bridgehead, they
 captured several hundreds of Germans prisoners.

-XX Corps cleared the Banholz woods south of Sinz.

-XIX TAC flew 192 sorties dropping 91 tons of bombs on 15 military
 installations, 8 marshalling yards, cutting 14 rail lines, and 161
 railroad cars.

-P-47s dropped 800 K rations and 800 D rations to advanced elements of
 the 80th Inf Div across the Our River.

***Source: _Patton's Third Army, A Chronology_ by Charles Province

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 07:31:30 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

Hello, Nechama!

Sorry to differ, but it did happen. As I said earlier, a good pilot
can manipulate the flight characteristics of a bomb to achieve
desired results. Consider the "skip-bombing" technique used in the
Pacific.

> So my vote is that it is highly unlikely that this happened.

    All the best.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 07:32:48 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

Hello, Robert!

> I was about to post a question on the same topic. In John Tolands book "The
> Last 100 Day" there is a short chapter (14 - The Shell House) concerning this
> incident. It seems the raid succeeded in the destruction of Gestapo records
> concerning the Danish resistance. However one of the fighters crashed short
> of the target spilling its bombs onto a girls schools. The next wave of bombers
> dropped their loads into the smoke thinking this was the target. Almost all of
> the prisoners in the target building escaped(only 6 of 32 died), but at the
> girls school the death toll was 83 children, 20 nuns and 3 fireman.
> My question is: does anyone know of other references concerning this incident?

    Yes, I have a most interesting article that deals with this. If
you or anyone else is interested, I will post it to the list.

    All the best.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 07:28:11 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

Hello, Henrik!

> I have some reference, but it is danish. If there's an interest, I'll
> translate some of it and send it to the list.

    I would be be very interested in whatever you have on this
incident.

    Thanks for the offer.

    All the best.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 09:21:42 -0500
From:    Burt Knight <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

I believe it was Shell House and yes, they did manage to free a number of
prisoners by blowing out the lower stories of the building.  A number of school
children were killed, though, when a bomb accidentally went into an elementary
school nearby. The plane dropping that bomb may have been damaged.

source: 'Wing Leader', JE Johnson.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 09:25:11 EST
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

I would be very interested, too, to find out more about this little
incident.  This is something of a minor detail, but was this HQ really
a Gestapo HQ?  Or was it a joint Gestapo-SD venture, or, more specifically,
a SIPO-SD building.  I am not familiar with occupation policy in Denmark,
but in France the Sipo and SD did not act independently of one another and,
in fact, were formed under a new organization called the Sondercommando.
Therefore to refer to any specific headquarters in France as a Gestapo HQ
might be incorrect as the Gestapo had no direct jurisidiction (and thus
Mueller no executive power).  First, the Wermacht and German embassy had
full authority and then it would fall directly to the RSHA.  The Gestapo,
SD Ausland, and perhaps some units of the Orpo were represented, but
none of the organizations had control.  This, however, was a frustrated
bureacracy as leaders and deputies could give orders not as part of their
relative organizations but as ranking officers in the SS.
   Therefore, I have two questions: first, was the set-up in Denmark and the
rest of Northern Europe similar to that of France?  Second, how do I approach
this bureacratic tangle between the party, the SS, and the State?  It's all
kind of confusing.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 08:55:20 CST
From:    Michael P LaForge <[email-masked]>
Subject: burning itch of napalm

Oops. Sorry. Broke my own worst pet peeve by using some acronymyies
without mentioning what they mean. IM stands for Isobutyl Methacrylate.
NP stands for Napalm.  It should probably be noted that "Napalm" is kind of
a catchall name for a variety of Thickened or gelled fuels - not all of which
actually use Napalm as the thickener.  Napalm is kind of the "kleenex" or
"Q-Tip" of the ammunition family

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 07:51:51 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: GEN: JOHN TOLAND GULLIBLE?

  FOR JIM CURRY
  In an earlier message, you commented that John Toland is rather
gullible and believes almost anything told him.  Could you expand on
this and give your reasons for saying this.
  I am asking because I am not familiar with his writings but now have
got hold of a copy of THE RISING SUN.
  Regards, John Ausland/Oslo Norway

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 10:54:04 -0500
From:    Jeanne Schramm <[email-masked]>
Subject: MALABAR reunion

   A 50th anniversary reunion of those who served on the U.S.S. MALABAR
   is being planned for this summer in West Virginia.  If anyone who
   subscribes to this list knows the name and phone number of a veteran
   of this ship, please contact me.  I am posting this announcement for
   someone else and I don't subscribe to this list.  Therefore, please
   contact me at my e-mail address, by mail or by phone and I will pass
   the information along.
       In addition, if anyone has been involved in planning a reunion
   and has any good suggestions for locating people, that would be
   appreciated.  The individual planning the reunion has met with little
   success in extracting information out of veteran and navy officials
   in Washington.
        Thanks in advance for any advice you can offer.

   Jeanne Schramm
     Librarian
   W.L.S.C.
   W. Liberty, WV  26074
   304-336-7159                         [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 11:07:50 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Enola Gay

Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]> writes:
> I think the blood requirement estimates- 395,000 casualties by D+120-
> are tangible. There was as much pressure to keep this figure low as to
> overestimate it. In 1945, whole blood required glass bottles and
> extensive refrigeration, two qualities that play hell with combat
> logistics. The special handling, useful product-to-space ratios, and
> extra fuel required for refrigeration would have led medical planners
> to come in with as low an estimate as possible and still be on the safe
> side.

        The Summer, 1993 issue of Military History Quarterly had an
interesting article concerning US medical practices during the various
wars.  In World War II, the US heavily relied on plasma rather than
whole blood precisely for the reasons enumerated above.  Field surgeons
vehemently complained that they needed whole blood but for most of the
war, this policy did not change.  Field surgeons in the ETO frequently
borrowed blood from the British. Further, stores of plasma didn't always
keep up with the demand so that field surgeons went so far as to use
bovine serum albumin as a substitute.  It wasn't until the invasion of
Okinawa that the US had a decent supply of whole blood and that was soon
exhausted precipitating the use of plasma again.  With all that said,
it seems to me that examining the amount of whole blood that would be
required for the invasion of Japan indicates a *minimum* requirement
since the US would have switched over to plasma when the whole blood
ran out.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
This, gentlemen, is my counterpart, General Vogel.  When I look at his
face, I see a loser.  I'm sitting in his headquarters; I'm drinking his
wine; hell, I even have one of his broads hanging around here somewhere.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 08:37:39 -0800
From:    Mazen Fadel <[email-masked]>
Subject: <No subject given>

unsubscribe Mazen Fadel
Mazen Fadel
Systematic Designs International, Inc.
[email-masked]

"Better the pride that unites
 all the citizens of the world
 than the pride that divides
 when a colourful rag is unfurled"
                                Neil Peart

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 12:07:22 -0500
From:    "Sidney W. Kitchel" <[email-masked]>
Subject: GEN Re: ? native Americans during WWII

Robert T. Moore writes to the list:
>    As stated in my post, "to my knowledge" ...Native-Americans
>served with the US Marines. My mistake, to be certain. However, those
>having served with the US Army are a well-kept secret. You hear about
>the Navajo Code Talkers but virtually nothing about them serving with
>the Army in WWII.

Hi, Terry,
        Now, I am confused. I thought you were talking about Indians
serving in all roles of combat and support. From your message, you
seem to be only referring to using Indian languages to encode voice
messages.
        Well, in that restricted subject area, once again my response
is look to the Thunderbirds. That division's use of Tsa-la-gi
(Cherokee) is fairly well documented. It was even included in at least
one American movie about WWII. Unlike the Marine Corps unit, the
Oklahomans just spoke their messages in Cherokee instead of using an
actual code. The effect on the Germans was about the same as on the
Japanese....chance of decode down around the ole NIL.

>    Perhaps this needs more research. Thanks, again.

        I could agree more....I certainly would like to know more
about this subject.

                                                        --Sid
--
Sidney W. Kitchel           [email-masked], [email-masked]
Data Parallel Systems, Inc.  ============||  DPSI  ||===============
4617 E. Morningside Drive                             (812) 334-8100
Bloomington, Indiana,  47408  USA               FAX:  (812) 334-8121

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 12:46:37 -0500
From:    Lee Windsor u <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Operation Anvil

Hi Scott,

>
> I think I read that somewhere close to half the supply going to the Allied
> forces in NW Europe by the fall of '44 went thru Marseille.
>
> I can't see operations in Italy leading to much other than getting the
> Germans out of Italy.>

> Also, the French were in no mood to fiddle around in Italy while the
> US and Commonwealth troops were busy fighting in France.

You've brought up some excellent points here, and I agree with you for the
most part, but just to show the other side of the argument, I'm going to
suggest that if we had at least kept the American formations in Italy
then an exploitation of the Gothic Line breakthrough may have been
possible.  It is not likely that such a breakthrough would yield much
profit, except that it would continue to tie down German divisions and
possibly draw more in at a time when German manpower was already
stretched to the limit.  It would have come with comparativly little
effort from the Allies as the troops were already in position.

Also the sealift devoted to landing in southern France could have been
possibly better employed in the channel.

One last quick point, the Americans encountered no resistence in south
France, which was known as the "Champagne Campaign".  The Breakout from
Normandy and the drive on the Rhine was already well underway.  In
essence, they weren't really needed.  A landing of the three French
divisions could have accomplished the same task with much less sealift,
gasoline, and aircover.  Of course hindsight is a key player here, but
once the breakout was underway, it must have become apparent at the time
that those four U.S. divisions could *possibly* have been more cost
effective in Italy.

I think this failure to recognize that fact or even to consider it, is
reflective of the tension between the British and the Americans over the
whole Mediterranean effort.  The Americans had been constantly pressuring
the Brits to focus on France.  It would not be so easy to change the
minds of the U.S. planners who believed(quite soundly)  that their forces
would be better utilized in France where the real war was, rather than on
some British Imperial adventure.

I'm just playing devil's advocate, I still haven't decided where I stand
of this issue.  Great stuff, keep it coming!

Lee

Lee A. Windsor                             [email-masked].
8th Canadian Hussars                                  35 High St.
Wilfrid Laurier U.                                  Waterloo, ONT
Waterloo, Ontario                                         N2L 3X7
                         "Semper Fidelis"

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 12:25:13 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japan posts

        Please excuse a couple of partial messages posted by me on this
subject.  I was experiencing further e-mail difficulties (but I guess it
wouldn't be a good idea to elaborate on them :-)-- see, you've even got me
using that silly icon).  Will try to fill in the blanks with one final Japan
post if anyone is interested.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 12:41:03 -0500
From:    James Ray Watkins <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Enola Gay Exhibit

> On Thu, 9 Feb 1995, James Ray Watkins wrote:
>
>> for example, that the discussion over the bomb should include careful
>> distinctions between, say, the military command, and the ordinary soilder,
>> or between the system of the millitary and the population at large. This
>> arguable that at times the U.S. millitary was 'out of control' in a
>parallel
>> way during the so-called Spnaish American War, or Vietnamn. I would be
>> wonderful thing, for example, that the U.S. millitary thinks of itself as
>> outside politics, at least to the extent that it has only rarely and only in
>> isolated cases thought of taking over the government. If that idea could be
>> understood, we might just be that much closer to preventing the next war.
>> Ray Watkins
>> A.I., Department of Rhetoric and Composition
>> English, University of Texas at Austin
>
>Mr. Watkins,
>Forgive the observations of a non academic, but your message disturbs me.
>While Americans and Japanese are groups of individuals, nations go to war
>as single entity.

Not to put too fine a point on it: I don't think nations ever do anything
'singularly' (witness this group discussion). There are always debates,
dissidents, even various levels of agreement. Individuals disagree, but also
institutions: it seems to me that there was a real clash between, say, the
Presidents' office and congress in the Vietnam War. What actually took
place- the war itself- was a by product of all of these multiple
interactions. Sometimes individuals can have an incredible impact- depending
on a lot of things- but often we simply particiapate in various institutions
that have outcomes very far from what we personally may or may not have
intended.

 Without any fear of being accused of racism, I can
>point out that the Japanese are much more homogeneous then we.

Again: the idea of 'homogeneous' is very difficult to understand; it seems
more an effect of distance. Unless they- the 'Japanese'- are an anomoly, the
closer you get the more they begin to break down into various groups,
regions, classes, at the far end of this spectrum they are all individuals,
after all.
A
>deliberately distorted version of Bushido was promoted in the 20th century
>as a means to promote aggresive action in soldiers.  It also promoted
>contempt for "others" who did not follow this code.  The training for
>aggresion was all too successful.

That, to me, is closer to the mark; but how did soilderly training effect
the popualtion at large? There is always a kind of parallel discipline
imposed on the population in general, but it would seem to me to be very
difficult to 'train for specific acts of agression' on a very large scale.
After all the actual members of an army are a small part of the population.
Its a classic millitary problem, leading people like Mao to suggest that, in
effect, the entire population be conscripted into a 'people's malitia'.
Racism, of course, might provide a ready ground for this kind of thing
during wartime. It which case you are thrown back on culture: how and where
and when did Japanese society promote racism, given that the millitary
training for expansionist agression needed something like that (or
zenophobia) in order to take root? It also seems to me that Nuremburg
established a kind of cut-off point for legal responsibility (not the same
as ethical or moral, I know). But its an important point that blame is often
difficult to assign in cases of large scale violence: at the least, it would
have been impractical to inprison everyone who was, say, a member of the
Nazi party.

 Do I hold that government responsible
>for aggresive war?  I do.  Do I hold an individual responsible for an
>action of atrocity?  I most certainly do!  Men are not amoral puppets.
>Cultures can sicken.

Of course, as I said as well. But I was hoping that the kind of language
which simplified whole peoples into things like 'the Japanese' could be
avoided. I for one am an American, but also a damm coon-ass. So I would
think the 'Japanese' are similar. And yes, 'cultures can sicken' but that
tells us nothing (how you cure a 'culture'?); if you, on the other hand,
know how a particular institution or set of institutions went wrong, that
might be helpful. My father fought in WWII, and I would have gone in a
minute, but we are no longer fighting it. I worry that other things-
economic anxieties- creep into present discussions of Japanese war behavior.
>
>The BOMB and the decision to drop it were not the results of moral
>relatvity, but rather a cleareyed decision based on the information
>available at the time.  No one can ever know if the invasion of the
>mainland would have occured,  but we surely were planning such an action.
>The question of casualty number is, to me, rather a non-issue.  What
>commander in chief would KILL more of his own troops to avoid inflicting
>horror on the enemy nation.  Knowledge of the effects of nuclear weapons
>was much less then today, but from what I know of Truman, he still would
>have dropped the bomb if his information was more like ours.
>
>I know quite a few WWII vets that hold an unshakeable belief that their
>own rearends were pulled out of the fire by Truman's bomb.  Such widely
>held belief needs to addressed by those who seek to interpret the meaning
>as something other then the bomb as the ender of WWII.
>
My father was one of those Vets that knew his ass was pulled out of the fire
by the bomb. I am not at all ready to say we should not have- or should not
have- dropped the bomb. I tend to agree that the mere fact is a done deal.
What I am interested in isn't relativism either: I do have standards-
however ill formulated- for how I think an army should behave. What I am
interested in, is a way of understanding the decision that does more than
take sides. If I was there at the time, as I said, I would have gone in a
minute; I am not there, and I don't question anyone who went. I do question
a way of understanding what happened in terms that seem to me to be
dangerous, at the least: again, grouping all the Japanese or Americans or
Germans into one 'enemy' box. The war, at least WWII, is over. I don't think
that remembering is enough, I think we need to pay attention to how we remember.

>On a different note, I have a small bone to pick with you.  As a Vietnam
>vet, I never was "out of control".  I never saw anyone out of control.
>One of the many problems with that conflict was entirely too much control
>from people who knew nothing about warfare.  With few exceptions, the
>American military was not out of control.
>

I did not mean to offend you with the phrase 'out of control'; sorry. All I
wanted to point out was that no millitary is immune to the kinds of
atrocitites commited by the Japenese, and that millitaries in many countries
have, at one time or the other, over stepped their bounds. I do think that
there were too many times in both Vietnam and in the so-called Spanish
American war when the U.S. millitary did go too far, if not perhaps on such
a scale as the Japanese millitray (and government and...). On the other
hand, to pick the most obvious example, I think the U.S. millitary (and
government and...) did go as far in how it dealt with the Native American
population. I also think that we are fortunate to have a millitray in the
U.S. which recognizes this problem, and in some ways instructs its soilders
to avoid it.The millitary itself deserves some credit for dealing with these
kinds of thing, but 'dissident; helped, and the effort is by no means over.
The Geneva conventions are a larger scale way of doing the same thing. In
fact, that might be the best way to judge the Japanese army, or any army, by
its compliance to the conventions. At least then the standards are explicit.

>I am currently studying the Japanese Bomb effort.  Its hard as I do not
>speak the language.  But I have found that the Japanese did plan to use
>their bomb in a military way(no peaceful uses for them).  They planned to
>deliver the weapon in a I boat to a California harbor, and detonating the
>rascal underwater!  I bet San Francisco might have experienced a tiny
>touch of (dare I say it) nuclear horror.  The point is that we suffer no
>unique moral guilt for doing what we did.  We did not build death camps,
>and we did not rape Nanking.  We did not start the war by bombing their
>ships at harbor.
>
>I enjoyed your thoughts-they made me think.  I think you try to be fair in a
>very commendable way.  There does seem to be a bit of guilt over some of our
>history(sins of the fathers and all that), but interesting none the less.

I think 'guilt' here is very interesting; it often seems a kind of misuse of
physcological terms. I am not at all sure I understand what it could mean in
this context. If by guilt you mean that I think the U.S. has done things
wrong in the past that it needs to recoginize and, perhaps atone for, then
yes. But I think that could be said of any country, any person. That seems
to me the nature of the world as I have experienced it. What fascinates me
is this attempt to proove the U.S. was 'more' or 'less' right; an odd debate
that seems impossible to settle. WWII war reparations, would seem a moot
point here, the U.S. did plenty in that regard. But getting over its old
animosities, or trying to think about the world in a way which would
preclude violence? Dealing with its sometimes violent past? I just have to
read this list to know that, in that sense, the war isn't over. That might
be as close to guilt as I could find: I do wish discussions of war were more
self-conscious in this way, and I do wish that my particular country would
work more dilligantly to move in this direction. But that may just be that I
want my own to be better, and my own turns out to be just about the same as
people everywhere. We all muddle thorugh, after all.

>I guess it boils down to a difference of philosophies.  If someone tries to
>mug me, I feel I have the moral high ground.  I will use anything to defend
>myself.  The mugger's death would still find me on the moral high ground, and
>I own the mugger nothing.

All I can add is thank god mugging is relatively uncommon; also, I'm no
pacifist, but isn't the high grouund the christian notion of 'turning the
other cheek.'?
Thanks for the response.

Ray Watkins
A.I., Department of Rhetoric and Composition
English, University of Texas at Austin

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 11:27:01 -0800
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: The Invasion of Japan

I have just checked a book out of our library, _The Invasion of Japan
Alternative to the Bomb_, John Ray Skates.  There is one chapter on
projected  casualties.  I'm going to read it independently of any reviews,
but I'm curious to know if anybody knows anything about the book or
Professor Skates, who I note is a retired Colonel in the Army Reserves.

John Riegsecker                                 (206) 756-3566
Dept of Mathematics and Computer Science        [email-masked]
University of Puget Sound

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 14:23:48 -0500
From:    Cheryl Abdullah <[email-masked]>
Subject: Westerly 3 of 5: Howard, part I

Hello, here is a third summary of a taped interview
for your scrutiny.  I am sending it in two parts.
There won't be messy text this time, but I cannot
guarantee the two parts will arrive simultaneously or
in sequence.

Note: Roy's story is condensed from 55 pages of
transcript.  It got a little confusing for me in the
middle because discussed general American experiences
mixed in with his own with frequent jumps in time.
There are Italian city names I could not find in my
reference book or maps at home.  Again, I THANK YOU in
advance for your corrections and queries.  Cheers,

Cheryl               [email-masked]

-----------------------------------------------------

Narrator:  ROY T. HOWARD
DOB:  July 23, 1918
POB:  Westerly, RI
Entered active duty:  June 26, 1941
Separation or discharge date:  Nov. 1945

1

HIGHLIGHTS/ANECDOTES OF THE MILITARY EXPERIENCE:
Howard was graduated in 1936 from Westerly High School
with Mary Touro, whom he later married.  Studied
accounting at Boston University from 1937-1941 with
two years of ROTC training.  Drafted in Dec. 1940, he
was deferred so he could finish school.  He enlisted
on June 26, 1941 and was sent to Ft. Devens, MA, along
with 12-14 other Westerly inductees, including Joe
Trepozacchi and a Morrone boy.  After one week, Howard
was sent to Camp Croft in Spartansburg, SC.  "That was
the policy of the service, to send men to different
areas...you concentrated on your training and not
about what was happening at home."  In 13 weeks of
training at Camp Croft he learned about equipment
care, living in the field, and getting along with
others.  Two men were killed and two men wounded when
a rifle discharged during training.  Some professional
card gamblers cleaned out the camp but were later
picked up by the FBI.  Because of his ROTC training,
Howard attended Cadre school at Camp Croft from
9/30/41 to 12/30/41 with a 15-day leave scheduled
afterwards.  His leave was canceled after Pearl
Harbor, but an "exceptional" officer helped him and
others get home for Christmas anyway.

2

        After Christmas , Howard was promoted to
corporal and sent to Ft. McClellan in Anniston, AL,
for nine months.  In Sept. 1942 he went to Ft.
Benning, GA, for Officers' Training School where he
had "exceptionally good training."  On 1 Jan. 1943 he
was assigned to the just-activated 80th Infantry
Division in Tullahoma, TN, where he umpired field
maneuvers.  An exciting occurrence was the visit of
President Roosevelt and General Chiang Kai-shek.
Howard was later assigned to Ranger school as a safety
officer on a water-cooled machine gun.  During
training, men had to crawl under a 20-inch high line
of fire wearing their rifles and packs.  They had
three weeks to get used to fire and explosives, study
some martial arts, practice crawling underneath barbed
wire using the buddy system, and learn other skills.
The only incident was when a man kicked his leg in the
air and got shot in an ankle.  "We believe [Ranger
school training] saved a lot of lives in actual combat
because the men had an idea of what was going on."

3

        After a short leave, Howard went overseas as a
replacement while the rest of the 80th Division went
to Salina, KS, for more training.  He left Norfolk on
a liberty ship for Oran, a 23-day trip in a large
convoy.  Howard believes that Rommel had surrendered
by the time he landed, as most of the Germans had
retreated to Sicily.  "The only thing that we were
subjected to was bombing [twice]...while we were in
camps."  Howard was never assigned to a unit while in
Africa.  He attended two months of training in the
desert for 18 hours each day at a "tough" mine and

4

demolition school run by the British.  "The
British....did an excellent job....Many men panic when
they find themselves in mine fields.  The thing you
have to do is freeze right in your tracks....The
Germans were very clever,...if you stepped on [a foot
mine] it would go up about 15 feet in the air and
explode.  If you were right underneath the mine,...you
could lay down and be safe because when the mine
exploded you got a cone effect and anybody right
underneath it was safe.  But then they got the idea of
putting a tight screw in the bottom of the mine
so,...it only came up about three feet from the
ground."

5

        Howard left Oran for Naples in Nov. 1943 via a
Scottish liner, getting three meals a day with
silverware and napkins.  He was then assigned to the
34th Infantry Division under the command of General
Ryder, "a fine man."  This was a National Guard unit
from MN with extensive experience in Africa.  They
traveled upwards through Concerta [q: Caserta?
Carroceto?], St. Georgia [San Giorgio?], and Peidmonte
[?]to Cassino.  The 34th was a foot soldier's division
supported by the 155 and 240 howitzers of the Corps
Artillery, whose movements were slowed by the
mountains.  "[We] would call for fire.  They would be
5 miles or so behind the lines, and they had observers
with us on the front lines so they could direct the
fire....We had bazookas and anti-terrorist guns, but
that was just like a bb gun.  The German tanks had six
inches of armor plate in the front of them.  It took a
direct hit from an artillery shell to stop the tanks.

6

        "The Germans were well fortified [in an abbey]
in Cassino....They could probably see 8 to 10 miles in
the valley, and we were coming up that valley.  We
prayed every day.  It was so dangerous.  We had a very
sad experience at Cassino.  We...went through a little
tiny town called Cairo approaching the abbey....in one
half hour the 36th Division [on the left flank] lost
2,000 men [killed or wounded] while crossing the
Rapido river....It should never have been
attempted....We were probably 500 yards from Cassino
and the Germans drove us back.  We were that close to
capturing [Monte Cassino]....They had made the
decision not to bomb the abbey because it was a
religious institution.  We got our revenge.  The

7

British decided to bomb the abbey and we looked up and
you could see about 1,000 B-17's flying over and they
leveled Cassino to the ground, but we weren't able to
destroy the underground tunnels....Shortly after that,
in Jan. 1944, we moved from Naples to Anzio [after the
first invasion]....The idea of the Anzio operation was
to cut the highway that supplied Cassino.  But we
weren't able to, so the Germans had a route to replace
their men and supplies and that went on for another 4
months.  Had we kept moving in Anzio, I believe that
we could have cut that campaign much shorter.  But
they didn't do it and our commanding general [doesn't
remember name] was relieved because of this."

Cheryl                                    [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 14:27:25 -0500
From:    Cheryl Abdullah <[email-masked]>
Subject: Westerly 3 of 5: Howard part II

Roy Howard WWII personal history summary, cont.
---------------------------------------------------
8

        Howard discussed the bombing of Concerta.  "The
Air Force flew planes over Concerta, notifying the
people that the town was going to be bombed, [but no
one thought it would happen]....3 or 4 days later the
town was bombed.  Not only did we drive the Germans
out but 30,000 civilians lost their lives.  It was
their own fault because they didn't listen."
        "At Cassino, I survived a mortar barrage.  The
mortars were all around us but I didn't get seriously
hurt.  At Anzio I got caught in a German artillery
barrage....I laid on the ground.  We learned in Africa
that if you were below the surface you had an 80%
chance for survival.  But if you were above the
surface, you had no place to go.  You had to keep
moving in order to protect yourself....Fortunately,
when I went over I was a replacement assigned to
troops with experience and they knew what they were
doing....God took care of all of us."

9

        By spring of 1944, the Germans were in retreat.
"We were very happy to get into Rome.  We had a chance
to spend the night in a hotel and get a decent meal
and get a shower and get cleaned up....We had a
cemetery in Anzio, and I understand that at one time
we had 70,000 men buried there....Now of course the
government doesn't admit this, and this is what  I was
told.  I later confirmed that fact by reading...Follow
Me and Die...about the 27th National Guard Division

10

[out of PA?].  "If the generals were on the front
lines, you didn't have any trouble.  But when they
were in the rear echelon making decisions at
headquarters, we lost a lot of men because they made
the wrong decisions.  We had, thank God, General
Bradley in North Africa....He knew what he was talking
about and he wasn't afraid to act on his own....We
were moving from high ground to high ground and that
was the only way that we could protect our advances.
Whereas if you could go through a corridor or a
valley, your men would be slaughtered.  It was slow
moving but that is the way we had to go in Africa and
that was the way it was in Italy.  Every time the
Germans hit us with crack troops we took a beating."

11

        Before entering Rome, Howard learned that his
youngest brother, a radio operator on a B-17, died in
a fog-related take-off crash in England.  After Rome,
his unit went as far north as the Leaning Tower of
Pisa, then began going up the Appian Way very quickly.
"I saw Bologna destroyed, but I never got into Bologna
again....I was very friendly with the men in my
outfit...they knew my younger brother had been killed
and they came to me one day and said 'Lieutenant, you
are going home.'  I said, 'You're kidding me...No,
that can't be'....As far as I knew, there was no
reason."  Because of the Sullivan Act [see endnote],
Howard was pulled from combat and sent home.  His
other brother, a paratrooper in the invasion of
Belgium, had been captured and sent to a German prison
camp--something Howard did not learn until he was back
in the States.

12

        Howard got to the Boston Harbor on a liner.
Learning he had yellow jaundice and could die from it,
he went to the Ft. Devens hospital after a weekend
visit to Westerly.  He remained at Ft. Devens for
three months.  "They knew very little about jaundice
at that time....I had lost about 30 pounds."  He ate
seven meals a day, with steak twice a day, for two
months.  To this day he cannot give blood transfusions
because of the jaundice.  After leaving Ft. Devens,
Howard went to Atlantic City for a week's rest before
his new assignment as a trainer at Camp Meade in
Baltimore, MD.  He stayed there until Oct. 1945 and
moved to Camp Pickett, VA, when Camp Meade became a
separation center.  "They hurried the men so fast from
the service that they had to set up [new] camps....I
stayed there about a month and I got disgusted, and I
had more than enough points to get out."  Howard
received no decorations during his enlistment.  He
worked for the Moore Company after the war, staying
with them for 40 years.  When computers came along, he
left his accounting position to work in the parts
department for 15-16 years.  Today, upon thinking
back, he hopes that he helped the men he trained.

Audio tape interview:       3 December 1993
Interviewer:                  Julia B. Kerr
Written History Editor:     Cheryl Abdullah

ENDNOTE: Five brothers named Sullivan, all serving on
the same ship, were killed in Hawaii.  After that the
U.S. government passed the Sullivan Act, refusing to
assign two brothers to the same "theater of operation"
[Howard's words.  Query re. extent of proximity--ship?
unit?]  for duty.

Cheryl                                    [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 14:27:09 -0600
From:    "William L. Huber - SAA" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WWII Diary

>
> I found one line particularly interesting:
>
>         "5/1/45  Tue.    Saw 15 PW's shot, hooray."
>
> Anyone want to speculate as the to context for this?  (It does seem to
> fit in with the general theme of the devaluation of human life that we
> often see during wartime, and which has been touched on in a variety
> of recent posts).
>
> Terry Lindell

I'll give it a shot, as it were...  John Ausland could probably give
you a far better first hand account of the feelings that might drive
men to feel this way since he was there.  From what I have read and
men I have spoken with who were in that situation it boils down to the
frustration felt by American troops (possibly others but I have
discussed it with US vets) when they make contact with a couple of
Germans who wait till their lead tank rolls by, blast it with a
panzerfaust and then throw up their hands in surrender.  Feelings ran
differently if they surrendered before having fired on US troops or
surrendered after an engagement but to fire first and then surrender
before return fire could be directed at them was the last straw in
many situations.

If you put yourself in that position, say your a squad leader in an
infantry squad and 3/4 of the squad is replacements.  Your slogging
through a town and a sniper shoots one of your last original squad
members in the final days of the war and then throws out his rifle and
yells "kamerad" before your buddy hits the ground.  Whatcha gonna do??
Everybody knows what the Geneva Convention says about treatment of
POWs but in a situation like I described above, Geneva is a long way
away.  Mix those feelings with experiences of liberating a
concentration camp and it gave the average GI a pretty dim view of his
German adversary.

Is it right?   Thank God its not up to me to decide.

Cheers, Bill Huber / [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 14:35:25 -0600
From:    "William L. Huber - SAA" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Sorry list, no direct path.....

   ----- Unsent message follows -----

> Sorry to post this to the group, still getting bounce mail delayed by three days
> to you Bill.  You got another e-mail address that receives?  Let me know.

Hi Chip,

[email-masked] is the only address I have.  It should
work though.  The characters after sadis are zero and one rather than
"o" and "l".  That sometimes trips folks up.  Other than that I don't
know.  What error are you getting? -Unknown user - Unknown
hostname.....

> I am somewhat of a collector, ain't got much but books.

Books are the right place to start!  It sure beats the high cost of
education that results from being stung by repros.  Nobody is immune
but there are many problems that can be avoided by keeping up with the
literature in the hobby.

I collect 3rd Reich uniforms and insignia mostly although recently
(the last 4 years) I have been aggressively pursuing additions to my
reference library of original sources like Ranglisten and
Dienstalterslisten of the various organizations.  My favorite part of
the hobby is researching named items.  Luckily, I have been able to
acquire quite a few and they have been lots of fun to research.

What is your particular interest?

Well, I gotta run but I appreciate your note as it is always a
pleasure to meet fellow collectors.

Cheers, Bill

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 14:47:49 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

Hello, William!

Will post the whole story on this beginning on Monday.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 14:49:47 -0600
From:    "William L. Huber - SAA" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Morality: glory of war (was Shooting Downed Pilots)

>          It's essentially about boys who get obsessive collecting enemy
> artifacts during the war, ignoring air raid proprieties, competing with
> each other for the neatest find.
>
> Cheryl                                    [email-masked]
>

Cheryl brings up an interesting point and reminded me of a
conversation I had with a co-worker once.   He had been a young boy
during the Battle of Britain and he and his friends used to race to
wreck sights to collect souvenirs.  He had a good little grouping
till one day he came across a glove which still had the hand inside.
It was a fellow Brit and after that he lost his interest in
souvenirs.

This is the same fellow who I mentioned months ago in a post about his
father who had been a merchant seaman.  His "official" notice of his
father's death was when a bundle of his and his mother's letters to
him came back stamped "undeliverable, ship sunk".  Therein lies the
glory of war....

Bill Huber / [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 14:49:43 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

Hello, again, William!

>    Therefore, I have two questions: first, was the set-up in Denmark and the
> rest of Northern Europe similar to that of France?  Second, how do I approach
> this bureacratic tangle between the party, the SS, and the State?  It's all
> kind of confusing.

    I am just wondering how you mean this? Particularly with
reference to the second question. Do you mean this in reference to
security in general or day-to-day functions?

    Just curious.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 14:55:43 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GEN Re: ? native Americans during WWII

Hello, Sid!

    Thanks for the note and I reread my post and I can see where the
confusion arose.

    I only meant that Native-Americans in general serving with the
U.S. Army is well-kept secret. It is well-known that the Navajos
served with the US Marines. Your reference to the Cherokees doesn't
appear to be that well-known, and does need further research and
publicity.

    You would think Army or other branches of service would have
published something relating to the role of minority groups having
rendered honorable and invaluable service to this country during
WWII. Particularly in the late post-war era.

    Sorry about the muddle.

>         I could agree more....I certainly would like to know more
> about this subject.

    Maybe some day or someone may get the bug to look into this area
more closely.

    All the best, and thanks again.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 15:03:28 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 50TH: HELPING THE

Hello, Ken!

Thanks for the response.

> Yes and no:  didn't the Berlin blockade begin only *after* the Soviets
> developed their own bomb?

    No. The Berlin Blockade didn't begin until 1948. The Russians had
    exploded their first atom bomb in 1949.

  Ditto the crackdown in Czechoslovakia--in short,
> Soviet treatment of Europe divides into two phases, with Stalin restraining
> his most overt actions until after he had a bomb of his own.  We have some
> Soviet specialists on the list, yes?  Some input here?

    Berlin was a situation in which Stalin wanted to test Western
resolve.

    Hope this helps.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 16:24:49 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: One last Japan post (honest)

        I was trying, before my system went haywire again, to point out in
relation to the pre-war incidents of "gekokujo" that the struggle came to be
less between the two major Japanese political parties (the young militants
wanting to end party rule completely in favor of government by the military) as
between two competing trains of thought among the philosophical disciples of
Tanaka.  The so-called "Control" faction (a name bestowed by Japanese
newspapers) wished to expand to China and possibly beyond.  This was the group
which eventually gained power through its leading spokesman General Hideki
Tojo.  The other faction, the "Imperial Way," believed after the Manchurian
takeover that possession of Manchuria and a small surrounding buffer zone would
be sufficient to guarantee Japanese prosperity and security, and hence would
have acted as a brake on the Army's expansionist tendencies (one of its famous
members, and also one of the most talented Japanese generals, was General
Yamashita, the later conqueror of Malaya and Singapore, and in 1944-45 defender
of the Phillipines-- his career was however sidetracked somewhat in the late
'30's as a result of backing the wrong horse).  Prime Minister Tsuyoshi Inukai,
assassinated in May '32, and Finance Minister Takahashi, who died in the 2/26
Incident of 1936, were both members of the expansionist Seiyukai party, but
that did not save them from the young extremists.

        I wanted to comment briefly on the Japanese preparations to repell the
invasion.  We have seen that at the "Big Six" meeting of August 9th both War
Minister Anami and Army Chief-of-Staff Umezu were still confident, at the very
least, of causing heavy casualties to any invading force, and that Navy
Chief-of-Staff Admiral Toyoda still believed defeat could be averted.  However,
the Japanese high command had been guilty of overconfidence many times before
since 1942, so their opinion need not be accepted as gospel.  The Japanese
would have deployed forty divisions and a total of two million men to defend
the homeland against invasion.  They still had considerable forces overseas on
the Asian mainland-- in August 1945 there were 28 divisions (including one
armored division) in China proper (not counting an additional division in the
"Mongolia Garrison Army"), another 24 divisions in Manchuria, and seven in
Korea.  Contrary to US fears, however, the Japanese were not planning to
withdraw these for the defense of the home islands.  For that purpose they were
engaged in creating a whole new force virtually from scratch, in three great
mobilizations (March, May, and June 1945).  The Japanese created a new type of
division, the coastal division, for the defense of the homeland.  These would
be light in numbers and equipment except for heavy artillery, much of which
would be permanently emplaced.  Some of the divisions of this last great
mobilization effort would however have been mobile units intended for
counterattack.  The March mobilization created 18 coastal divisions, which were
given very little training, but instead almost immediately put to work
constructing fortifications in their assigned areas.  The May mobilization was
almost entirely of the better-equipped counterattack forces, consisting of
eight mobile divisions plus six tank brigades and five tank regiments.
According to Saburo Hayashi in "Kogun,"  some of the best formations were
reserved for a counterattack on the fertile Kanto plain, which occupies much of
the eastern part of the main island of Honshu, beginning north of Tokyo.  Here
the 36th Army contained two of the four armored divisions the Japanese created
during the war, and also the 83rd and 91st Divisions, both of which were made
up of instructors from the various military schools.  The quality of these
units was clearly a cut above most of the rest in the defense of Japan.  The
Konoye Division stationed in and around Tokyo was also a higher-class unit,
with some combat experience earlier in the war during the conquest of Malaya
and Singapore, and the prestige of being the Palace Guard.
        I wanted to digress for a second to explain the organization of the
Japanese divisions.  Until the creation of the coastal defense units mentioned
above there were three types, the A (reinforced), B (regular), and C (special)
divisions.  The B division had 11-13,000 men, composed of three infantry
regiments, an artillery regiment, and in some but not all divisions a horse
cavalry regiment (actually the size of a battalion numerically, 950 men max).
The A divisions almost always included the cavalry regiment, and usually had a
second artillery regiment, and sometimes a company or more of tanks, bringing
the total strength to 14-16,000 men.  "A" divisions sometimes had double the
number of 75-mm regimental guns as well (eight per regiment instead of four).
The C Division was created later as a second-line unit for garrison and
counter-guerilla activities, with less than 10,000 men, organized into two
brigades of four rifle battalions each (a regiment normally had three) with
minimal supporting services.  By 1945 many of the divisions left in China and
Manchuria were of this type.
        The 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions were activated in July 1942,
and deployed to Manchuria to form the Mechanized Army under General Shin
Yoshida (note that even at this date it was thought necessary to create a
counterpoise to the threat of Russian armor).  The 3rd Armored Division was
created in the first half of 1943 and sent to China, where it eventually joined
12th Army, and took part in a number of tactically successful offensive
operations, right up until mid-1945.  The 4th Armored Division began forming in
July 1944, and remained in Japan, eventually as part of 36th Army.  Also in
1944, prior to the American landings at Leyte, the 2nd Armored Division was
tranferred to the Phillipines, where it was later worn away in small-scale
combats on the main island of Luzon, a portion surviving in Yamashita's
mountain redoubt until the Japanese surrender.  In January 1945 the 1st Armored
Division was returned to Japan to join 36th Army.
        A Japanese armored division consisted of up to three tank regiments and
a motorized rifle brigade of 3,800 men in trucks.  The tank regiments had a
nominal strength of up to 90 tanks each, although the independent tank
regiments encountered during the war rarely had more than 20-30 operational
vehicles.  The total strength of the armored division was 10,500 men, with
1,850 motor vehicles, and artillery support consisting of eight 105-mm and four
150-mm howitzers, 18 47-mm antitank guns, and four 75-mm plus 16 automatic
20-mm antiaircraft guns.  (most of this organizational info from A. Mollo's
"Armed Forces Of World War 2").

        Time forces me to break this last post into two parts.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

                "I am the ally of the Reich against Russia.  I am neutral
                between Great Britain and Germany.  I am for the Americans
                against Japan.  Did you understand?"

                        Marshal Ion Antonescu, explaining Romanian foreign
                          policy to the local press corps, circa 1942

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 15:36:33 -0800
From:    John Holtz <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Operation Anvil

>
> You've brought up some excellent points here, and I agree with you for the
> most part, but just to show the other side of the argument, I'm going to
> suggest that if we had at least kept the American formations in Italy
> then an exploitation of the Gothic Line breakthrough may have been
> possible.  It is not likely that such a breakthrough would yield much
> profit, except that it would continue to tie down German divisions and
> possibly draw more in at a time when German manpower was already
> stretched to the limit.  It would have come with comparativly little
> effort from the Allies as the troops were already in position.
>
> Also the sealift devoted to landing in southern France could have been
> possibly better employed in the channel.
>
> One last quick point, the Americans encountered no resistence in south
> France, which was known as the "Champagne Campaign".  The Breakout from
> Normandy and the drive on the Rhine was already well underway.  In
> essence, they weren't really needed.  A landing of the three French
> divisions could have accomplished the same task with much less sealift,
> gasoline, and aircover.  Of course hindsight is a key player here, but
> once the breakout was underway, it must have become apparent at the time
> that those four U.S. divisions could *possibly* have been more cost
> effective in Italy.
>
> I think this failure to recognize that fact or even to consider it, is
> reflective of the tension between the British and the Americans over the
> whole Mediterranean effort.  The Americans had been constantly pressuring
> the Brits to focus on France.  It would not be so easy to change the
> minds of the U.S. planners who believed(quite soundly)  that their forces
> would be better utilized in France where the real war was, rather than on
> some British Imperial adventure.
>
> I'm just playing devil's advocate, I still haven't decided where I stand
> of this issue.  Great stuff, keep it coming!
>

Lee (et.al.):

The American, U.K., and Canadian forces were also quite thinly stretched
when they finally reached the German border.  How much more thinly
stretched would they have been without U.S. divisions in the Vosges
mountains?

The French divisions alone - plus hastily incorporated FFI units - were
sufficient to cover the maritime Alps but not provide for the defence of
the upper Rhine.  And, as you noted, Americans were adamant about
focusing all attention on Germany where it was possible to get to grips
with the main German forces in the West in terrain best exploited by the
Allies' superior mobility and firepower (tracked, winged, and wheeled).

Ta.

jwh

--
John W. Holtz, Asst. Professor       INTERNET: [email-masked]
Sangamon State University Library       PHONE: (217) 786-6633
Springfield, IL  62794-9243               FAX: (217) 786-6208

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 16:40:18 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: OBIT-Local ace with a strange story

The following is excerpted without permission from a local newspaper,
the Fort Wayne News Sentinel.
"Louis E. Curdes, 75, of Fort Wayne died Wednesday at his home.  The
Fort Wayne Native became an Air Force flying ace during World War II
when he bagged 5 German aircraft in May of 1943 and was awarded the
Oak Leaf Cluster in June of that year.  He later downed an Italian
fighter during his 200 hours of flying 44 combat mission that year.
        During August 1943, he went to the aid of another pilot
under attack by 5 German aircraft and shot down 2 before being shot
down himself.  He was taken prisoner but later escaped.
        He later flew P-51 Mustangs in the Pacific.  During that
stint, he was the only flier to be decorated for shooting down a
U.S. aircraft.  The damaged plane was headed for a Japanese held
airfield the pilot thought was still held by the Americans.  Failing
to wave off the crew, he damaged the engines, forcing the  crew to
bail out at sea where they were rescued the next day.  For this, he
received his second Distinguished Flying Cross of the war.
        He was instrumental in starting the local Air National Guard
wing and retired as Lt. Colonel in 1963 after 22 years service.

Typos and abrigdements are all mine.
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 17:00:21 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: ADMIN: Another weekend warning

        While comparisons of other time periods may serve to highlight
certain points, it seems that the comparisons may be getting a life of
their own.  Please refrain from using this list to discuss the Vietnam
War, the Spanish-American War, and the treatment of Native Americans.
Thanks.
--
Joe Barone, WWII-L listowner
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 17:52:13 -0500
From:    Dan Ford <[email-masked]>
Subject: "British" aces of WWII

A while ago I posted an item about Christopher Shores's latest and
magnificent *Aces High*. For those of you with the ability to "browse"
the world-wide-web, I have put a review of this fine book in my homepage.
Address below.

                 - Dan
                   email: [email-masked]
                   website: http://pubpages.unh.edu/~df

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 18:00:01 -0500
From:    "Mr. Scott Hannon" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Operation Anvil

Lee Windsor writes:

>Also the sealift devoted to landing in southern France could have been
>possibly better employed in the channel.

I don't really know enough about the details of the situation to say for
sure, but I thought the main supply problem was the insufficient port
capacity. If so, then more shipping might not have been all that useful
if it just meant more ships sitting around waiting to unload.

>One last quick point, the Americans encountered no resistence in south
>France, which was known as the "Champagne Campaign".  The Breakout from
>Normandy and the drive on the Rhine was already well underway.  In
>essence, they weren't really needed.  A landing of the three French
>divisions could have accomplished the same task with much less sealift,

Well, "no resistance" is of course not literally true, but right, some
parts of the operation faced only light resistance. The Normany
breakup coupled with the Anvil landings made staying and fighting in
southern France untenable (except for the ports garrisons, etc). Thus
the fighting withdrawl up the Rhone valley to the Vosges.

But the French Corps had a tough fight taking the ports. (BTW, they refer
to these operations as the Battle of Provence). I'm not sure things
would have worked out had the US Corps not been there to do the inland
exploitation and engage the other German forces in the area. I suppose
it comes down to what those other German forces would have done:
withdraw up the Rhone anyway, or engage the French invasion force.

There's also the political consideration; I think there would have been
a reluctance to allow DeGaulle's Free French troops to lead the invasion.
With the local commanders being DeGaulle's men, it'd be hard to try and
suppress DeGaulle's efforts to set up a provisional gov't. (The US was
unable to do that as it was, but...).  There may have been a military
reluatance as well...French performance in Italy had been somewhat mixed.
And certainly a French lead invasion would still have required major US
logistical and engineering assets accompany them.

It's debateable how costly the campaign was to the Germans. In the recent
US Army in WW2 green-back volume _Riviera to Rhine_, I think the authors
suggested that Germans losses were higher than the Germans admitted (based
on a Allied counting of PoW's, dead, etc). Somewhere around 200 (?)
thousand troops. That qualifies as a major defeat IMO.

Scott.
Scott Hannon, Fri Feb 10 1995 ([email-masked])

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 18:33:31 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

In mid-March 1945, the Danish Government in exile became concerned that
the Nazis, in a final burst of outrage, were planning on arresting and
executing as many members of the Resistance in Denmark as they could
locate. In response, the Royal Air Force laid on a precision raid to
take out Gestapo HQ, Shellhaus, in downtown Copenhagen. The two
critical problems were the central city location of the target,
which was bound to be crowded during a daylight strike (the need
for precision ruled out a night raid) and the fact that Danish
prisoners were located on the upper floors of the five or six story
building.

Eighteen Mosquitos (predominantly light bomber mods, some fighters)
were assembled on 20 March and the raid conducted on the 21st. These
were elite crews and aircraft, drawn from squadrons that had precision
experience: four planes from 21 Sqn., 6 from 464 Sqn., and 7 from 487
Sqn. The eighteenth was a photo plane from Film Production Unit. They
attacked in three (?) waves from one hundred feet at noon in poor
weather. Several bombs struck the building between the first and
second floor, a substantial number of Gestapo personnel were
killed, and the records necessary for any round-up of the resistance
were destroyed in the ensuing fire. Most of the prisoners survived.

Although the raid achieved complete initial surprise, three Mosquitos           were lost to flak, and according to my source, one of these crashed
into the school. It says nothing about the school being mistakenly
bombed. A fourth Mosquito went down when it hit a flagpole during
the attack, and at least one was an operational write-off although
it made it home. Two of the escorting Mustangs (64 Sqn.) were also
lost to flak.

I have some data on pilots and aircraft reg nos. on the Mossies, if anyone
wants them.

Source: C. Martin Sharp and Michael Bowyer, MOSQUITO, London, Faber and
Faber, rev.ed., 1971, pp.256-57. I think this book is the most comprehensive
op history of the Mosquito published.

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 18:36:22 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Part two of final Japan post

        I was giving a short explanation of the types of divisions found in the
Japanese Army.  The tank regiments, both within the armored divisions and the
independent ones supporting regular infantry armies in the field, were usually
a roughly equal mix of light and medium types.  The light types were the
7.4-ton Type 95 "Ha-Go," and, after 1942, a small number of the 7.2-ton Type 98
"Ke-Ni" (only 200 of which were built).  Both were three-man vehicles mounting
a 37-mm main gun.  The medium tanks in use in December 1941 were the 15-ton
Type 97 "Chi-Ha" and, primarily in China but also in the initial conquest of
Malaya, Singapore, and Burma, the older 13-ton Type 89 "Otsu."  Both were
four-man vehicles mounting a short 57-mm gun.  From 1942 these began to be
replaced by the 17-ton Type 1 "Chi-He" (essentially an improved "Chi-Ha"),
which began production in 1941, or, more commonly, by the 15.8-ton
"Shinhoto ("modified") Chi-Ha," both these tanks fitted with the tank-mounted
version of the 47-mm antitank gun.  In 1944 the Japanese built a small number
of the 18.5-ton Type 3 "Chi-Nu," with a 75-mm gun the first Japanese tank
capable of taking on a Sherman on anything like equal terms.   The handfull of
these that were built were apparently retained for the tank units defending the
homeland.  The 30-ton Type 4 "Chi-To" existed only in the form of six
prototypes.  It carried a more powerful 75-mm gun derived from the standard
antiaircraft gun (the gun in the "Chi-Nu" was a modified version of the
Japanese copy of the French Schneider, which the Japanese built in small
quantities as an antitank gun late in the war-- the 75-mm AA gun of the "Chi-To"
had a longer barrel and much higher velocity).  I should add that the Japanese
only produced about 6,500 tanks of all kinds during the war, and that number
includes a fairly large quantity of little two-man tanks and tankettes for
direct support of the infantry.  The best of the latter was the 4.7-ton Type 97
"Te-Ke," mounting a 37-mm gun, which first began reaching the troops in
quantity in 1942 and was subsequently encountered in virtually every theatre in
which the Japanese Army fought.  The average A or B division was to have up to
17 of these small vehicles attached to the HQ of the "infantry group," a
separate command level within the division composed of the three infantry
regiments.  The Type 97 "Te-Ke" proved to be a fairly versatile little machine,
employed for roles as diverse as armored ammunition carrier and mobile armored
observation post.  But I digress... (most of this info from Peter Chamberlain
and Chris Ellis' "Tanks of the World 1915-45")
        The Japanese Army had started the war with 51 full divisions (not
counting a number of brigades, and a few special combat groups built around two
or three rifle battalions).  Eventually they created 140 divisions, counting
those raised for the defense of the homeland.  As in the German Army, as the
war progressed the quality of training, equipment, and leadership of the newer
divisions decreased, and division numbers over 100, regardless of type, tended
to be a lot less combat-worthy than the original 51.  Also, while in December
1941 the Japanese divisions were all type B with a few of the even stronger
type A, many of the newer formations created later were of the type C  variety
primarily destined for service in China.  The coastal divisions raised for
defense of the homeland were also, like the type C units, inferior in manpower,
equipment, and usually in training.  In 1941 many of the best divisions in the
Japanese Army were still stationed in China or Manchuria (in 12/41 there were
22 divisions in China, 13 in Manchuria, and five in the home islands and Korea,
leaving only 11 divisions-- and nine independent tank regiments-- for the
entire southern offensive against the Americans, British,
Australians, and Dutch).  However, as early as 1942 these strong and experienced
divisions had begun to be pulled out and redeployed against the Americans and
British (primarily the former), so that by mid-1945 virtually all of them had
either been destroyed or were sitting surrounded, starving, and useless as
garrisons of by-passed strongholds like Truk or Rabaul.  By August there were
hardly any of the low-numbered, high-quality divisions remaining for defense of
the homelands ( there was still the Konoye Division, the 9th Division on
Formosa/Taiwan, and three or four low-numbered, experienced units in China).
The newly-raised formations could hardly expect to compare with their
predecessors in fighting power, excepting the few units like the 83rd and 91st
Divisions mentioned earlier, and the tank outfits, and this would have
certainly been another factor prejudicing the Japanese defensive efforts.
For the 400,000+ men added to the colors in the 1945 home defense mobilizations
(none of this data includes any civilian militia organizations), there were to
be, for instance, only 12,000 motor vehicles, and many of these would have to
be drawn from the roughly 24,000 civilian cars and trucks still operating in
the home islands.  Equipping the new armies would also require one-seventh of
all the horses still in Japan (Skates, "Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the
Bomb").  The effectiveness of these forces, given shortages of every kind and
the expected deficiencies in training, may rightly be questioned, but the
Japanese forces were numerically impressive, and according to US surveys the
terrain would favor the defense in many areas.  And of course the suicidal
spirit expected from the Japanese when defending their own homeland was another
major factor to consider.
        For the aerial defense of the homeland, a kamikaze effort of immense
proportions was contemplated.  In August 1945 the Japanese Army and Navy
already had on hand some 4,900 workable aircraft earmarked for suicide attacks,
and projected to have another 500-1,000 available by October.  In addition, the
Army and Navy combined also disposed of about 3,100 conventional attack and
reconnaisance planes (Skates: see also "Fading Victory," the English
translation of the diaries of Admiral Matome Ugaki.  Ugaki was Chief-of-Staff
to Yamamoto from Pearl Harbor until the Admiral's aerial assassination, which
Ugaki was one of the few to survive-- he was in the second transport plane,
which crashed in the water while Yamamoto's aircraft went down in the jungle,
and escaped with a broken arm and assorted other injuries.  Ugaki commanded 1st
Battleship Division-- YAMATO and MUSASHI-- from the YAMATO at Leyte Gulf, but
in 1945 he headed the naval 5th Air Fleet in southern Japan, and as such played
a prominent role in both the air fighting over Okinawa, including the kamikaze
attacks, and the planning for more of the same in defense of the homeland.
After the Japanese surrender he took off on an attempted final kamikaze
mission, accompanied by the bulk of a squadron that volunteered to go with him,
never locating the US fleet and apparently crashing at sea.  He radioed back a
final poem which read, "Having a dream, I went up into the air."  But I digress
again).  The Japanese labored under tremendous difficulties and
shortages-- among other things the 1945 harvest was poor, although this in
itself, even added to the privations caused by blockade, was still not enough
to convince most of the Army leadership they should surrender (see Toland,
"Rising Sun"), and there had also in the past two years (as if they didn't have
enough problems) been two major earthquakes in Japan, which destroyed among
other important installations several important aircraft/aircraft engine
production plants. But(IMHO) the suicide factor alone would have made for severe
casualties among the invaders and their supporting naval units.  I should also
mention that in spite of the difficulties, shortages, and widespread paralyzing
of internal communications through air attack, the Japanese mobilization for
homeland defense described earlier in this post was carried out pretty much as
scheduled (Skates).  Could they have won, or forced a peace that was less than
unconditional surrender? I doubt it.  Could they have made the invasion a
bloodbath for the US troops?  I think that was a strong probability, especially
when you consider also the total mobilization of the civilian population.
Besides the kamikazes and the conventional ground forces we probably would have
seen plenty of crazies with lunge mines (an antitank charge on the end of a
stick-- you ran up and pressed it against the tank) or rigged up with
explosives as "human bombs" or even banzai charges with bamboo spears.  And,
although I doubt that this was a big deal to Truman, Japanese casualties would
almost certainly have been through the roof.
        One last comment.  In addition to skimming through Skates, a book I
used for the discussion of the land defense of the homeland was Hayashi's
"Kogun."  Col. Hayashi served in several general staff positions at Imperial
Army HQ during the war, and in August 1945 he was the military secretary to War
Minister Anami.  Although I didn't mention him earlier, he too played a role in
the events surrounding the surrender and the abortive coup.  It was Hayashi who
was sent by Anami to Umezu with the proposal to ask Field Marshal Hata, former
commander of the China theatre and highest-ranking active officer in the
Japanese Army, to intercede with the Emporer on behalf of the officer corps to
keep on fighting.  It was also Hayashi who, in a moment of bluntness
uncharacteristic of a high-ranking Japanese officer, told Anami after the War
Minister met with the plotters that from what was said "I couldn't tell if you
supported them or not."  His book is rather brief and dry, but a good outline
of the war as seen from the upper echelons of the Japanese Army.
        I guess that about wraps it up.  This is a pretty rambling set of
posts, mainly because it wasn't intended to be a coherent exposition of a topic
but just grew as I delved into it.  I've been trying to be better about citing
my sources.  I also agree-- at least in part-- with a criticism leveled by Ray
Watkins, that we shouldn't consider the Japanese as one united mass.  I hope
that at points, at least, I have given consideration to Japanese politicians
and military figures who opposed the militarists, and at least briefly
explained some of the pressures toward conformity exerted by the Japanese
educational system and the brutal military discipline.  I must however also
agree that Japanese society was much more homogenous and by its very nature
conformist (remember the old Japanese adage, "the nail that stands up will be
hammered down") than most western cultures, even Nazi Germany, in the period
discussed.  Plus it becomes pretty cumbersome to always type, "the portion of
the Japanese population that either actively supported the expansionist
military and/or those who simply went along" instead of "the Japanese." (my
allusions to the Japanese Communists and socialists also indicates some dissent
was present).  I will however admit that I have in these posts given more
prominence to the negative aspects of the Japanese participation, but then I
was trying to make a point (i.e., given what we knew at the time, the decision
to drop the bomb probably made sense.)
        Forgive the length of all this.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

                "Don't worry, we've all been in the same position."

                Notorious drinker, lady's man, and NKVD chief Lavrenti Beria to
                        the non-drinking Marshal Tito, as the Yugoslav leader
                        was heaving his guts out from the back porch of
                        Stalin's country dacha following a state dinner and
                        the customary multiple shots of vodka that accompanied
                        same.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 19:08:56 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: The Invasion of Japan

Dear John,

I've read most of Skates, and found it to be interesting but hardly
definitive. He seems to have used two or three National Archive record          groups, but never got down into the detail of the planning. He also
does not go into depth on the Japanese preparations, and his viewpoint,
understandably, does not deal at length with the naval aspects of the
op. For me, Skates most interesting revelations centered on the special
weapons alternatives that were being considered. Edward Miller                  (WAR PLAN ORANGE) edited the book, and made the point last year that
Skates actually walked most of the landing sites, so his observations
on terrain should also be specially noted.

The next round in the "casualty wars" will be Robert Newman's
forthcoming TRUMAN AND THE HIROSHIMA CULT. Those interested in a
foretaste can check either the op-ed page of the Nov 30 Washington
Post, or keep an eye out here, as I think next week I will finally
have time to type in Newman's piece. The battle has already been
joined in a Feb 5 op-ed piece by Gar Alperovitz.

Regards,

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 16:31:53 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: RCAF Units In The RAF "Tiger Force"

For a superb history of 6 Group Bomber Command, read:

        REAP THE WHIRLWIND, by Spencer Dunmore.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 19:37:00 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ?where is NIEDOWICZE, POLAND

Dear Margaret,

Niedowicze isn't listed in the 1962 Columbia Gazetteer of the World,
which you may have checked. If not, it's the most comprehensive source
in English. There is a Niedomice, just north of Tarnow in southeastern
Poland, but this is nowhere near Warsaw. There is also a Niedzweidz in
the north, about 75 miles south of Gdansk, and a Niedzica, which I think
is the old East Prussian Neidenberg, that was 90% destroyed during WWII.

Will try to check further. Do you have some context you can share?
If this is Holocaust related, it might well be a corruption of Niedomice.

Regards,

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 16:44:10 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: DoD Newswire

Jim...
        "DoD Newswire..."
Tell me more.
:-)

Regards -- Sidney.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 17:00:36 -0800
From:    Steve New <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Japan posts

You wrote:

>
>        Please excuse a couple of partial messages posted by me on this
>subject.  I was experiencing further e-mail difficulties (but I guess
it
>wouldn't be a good idea to elaborate on them :-)-- see, you've even got
me
>using that silly icon).  Will try to fill in the blanks with one final
Japan
>post if anyone is interested.
>
>        Regards
>
>        Mike Yaklich
>
>
Mike,

Please finish the post, I'm very impressed with what you have to say.  I
got so frustrated when the last post ended in mid-sentence.

--

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 20:04:00 EST
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

On Fri, 10 Feb 1995 14:49:43 GMT-6 Robert T. Moore said:
>Hello, again, William!
>
>
>>    Therefore, I have two questions: first, was the set-up in Denmark and the
>> rest of Northern Europe similar to that of France?  Second, how do I approach
>> this bureacratic tangle between the party, the SS, and the State?  It's all
>> kind of confusing.
>
>    I am just wondering how you mean this? Particularly with
>reference to the second question. Do you mean this in reference to
>security in general or day-to-day functions?
>
>    Just curious.
>
>    Terry

Terry,
   As you may recall, I'm attempting to write about the SD-Gestapo.  Thus,
my question is in reference to the operations of those two organizations.
Since they were security organizations it was also their day-to-day
function.

Thanks,
William Lippert

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 18:29:07 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 3rd Army Chron. M59-->M24 conv.

>Hi Joe,... do you know if there were any friendly fire casualties with the
>converted design (I mean to initiated the "rounds") or was preemtive thinking
>employed (a rarity) ?   -Al
>
>>> February 5, 1945
>>> -Tanks used by cavalry recon squadrons were being converted from M59 to
>>>  M24. These conversions not only created a faster, more maneuverable tank,
>>>  but also exchanged a new 75mm gun in place of the old 37mm.
>>
Actually M-5 series
>>        Squadron's "M24 in Action" indicates that the M24 had to
>>"make the rounds" to all the ETO troops so that they could familiarize
>>themselves with its appearance.  Until then, German and Allied armor
>>could be easily differentiated by looking at the roadwheel layout and
>>suspension system of the vehicle.  The M24 had roadwheels characteristic
>>of a Pzkw III so it was thought that troops might shoot at an M24.

PzKpfw - II has the large road wheels , not the IIIs.
>>Joe Barone
>>[email-masked]
>>These tanks are faster than any other tanks in the European theater
>>of operations, forwards or backwards.  See, man, we like to feel that
>>we can get out of trouble quicker than we got into it.
>
>Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
>ACC - Lippitt - URI
>Kingston, RI  02881
>
>American Legion, Post 102
>I am the NRA.

I hope this clarifies if anyone was confused

Jim O'Neil  From the interrigation of a German General at the end of WW II:

               "The reason the American Army does so well in War, is that War
                is Chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis"

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 20:36:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 11 FEB 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
SUNDAY, 11 FEBRUARY 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  B-29, Boeing Superfortress
  UC-78, Cessna Bobcat
  L-5, Stinson Sentinel
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): Of 7 B-24s off on an air cover mission for a
naval task force, only 3 reach the target.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 17 B-25s hit railroad yards
at Sinyang and Lohochai and a locomotive foundry at Hsuchang; 23 P-47s pound
Hankow Airfield; 8 fighters hit Anyang Airfield and Pinghan railroad targets
of opportunity; B-24s claim 2 cargo vessels sunk in the S China Sea.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): Mission 36: 56 of 59 B-29s bomb storage dumps
around Rangoon, Burma; they claim 0-0-3 Japanese aircraft; no B-29s are lost;
the mission is flown in conjunction with B-24s of the Eastern Air Command's
Strategic AF which also hit the target.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 11 B-25s bomb troops and
supplies at Loilem; 22 P-47s support ground forces in the Mongmit area,
hitting buildings at Nabu and Japanese positions S of Myitson; 100+ fighter-
bombers pound troop concentrations, supplies, ammunition dumps, gun
positions, and targets of opportunity at several locations including
Pangsang, Taung-gaing, Panghsapye, Nampok, Byaungbyan, Manai, Kutkai,
Mongmit, Namun, and Pangmakhe-leng. Transports complete 503 sorties to
forward bases and over frontline areas (dropping supplies).

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 827: In Germany, 124 of
127 B-24s attack the Dulmen oil depot using Micro H; 1 B-24 hits the Lochern
road junction using H2X; no losses. Escorting are 50 of 51 P-51s without
loss. Other fighter missions are:
  1. 48 of 51 P-51s hit the Celle/Uelzen railroad without loss.
  2. 183 of 192 P-51s make a sweep over NW Germany; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot
MIA).
  3. 7 of 11 P-51s escort photo reconnaissance aircraft over Germany without
loss.
  4. 8 P-51s fly a scouting mission without loss.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 97 B-26s and A-20s bomb
the Bingen and Modrath marshalling yards; fighters fly armed reconnaissance
and patrols, attack special targets and targets of opportunity, and attack in
cooperation with the US XII Corps across the Sauer River NW of Echternach,
Luxembourg. The flight of the 112th Liaison Squadron, Ninth AF (attached to
HQ Command, SHAFE), operating from Namur, Belgium with UC-78s and L-5s,
returns to base at Buc, France.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Bad weather limits operations
to B-24 supply mission to Yugoslavia during the night of 10/11 Feb and to
P-38 reconnaissance missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, A-20s on night intruder
missions attack enemy movement and lights at various points in N Italy, hit
bridges in the Po Valley, and attack frontline positions in the N Apennines;
weather grounds the medium bombers but fighters and fighter-bombers blast
railroad bridges and lines in the NE and C Po Valley and stores and supply
dumps in the C and W Po River areas.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 21 B-24s from Saipan Island, operating in 2
separate forces, bomb airfields and defenses on Iwo Jima Island; 3 others, on
armed reconnaissance, bomb Marcus Island. 25 B-24s based on Angaur Island
bomb Corregidor Island in Manila Bay on Luzon Island. During the night of
11/12 Feb, 10 B-24s from Saipan fly individual harassment strikes against Iwo
Jima.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): Mission 30: 9 B-29s from the Mariana Islands
carry out a reconnaissance mission for the US Navy; 1 returns early; the area
covers 135-OOE to 148-OOE to 30-OON.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Luzon Island,
B-24s attack Corregidor Island almost continuously throughout the day;
fighter-bombers support ground forces blasting numerous targets from
Cauringan to Taytay and at Wawa, Montalban, Antipolo, and Marikina. P-47s
blast a train NE of Heito, Formosa. B-24s fly a light strike against Bago on
Negros Island. The 388th and 389th Bombardment Squadrons (Light), 312th
Bombardment Group (Light), move from San Jose, Mindoro Island to Mangaldan,
Luzon with A-20s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

11/0134Z FEB

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 20:43:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 12 FEB 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
MONDAY, 12 FEBRUARY 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): B-25s cancel a cover mission for a naval force
because of weather.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 6 P-51s destroy 6
locomotives between Suchow and Pengpu and strafe the Nanking and Suchow
airfields; other fighters claim at least 10 more locomotives destroyed in
areas S of the Yellow River; P-40s bomb troops in the Hsiangcheng area and
hit trains on the Pinghan railroad; HQ 81st Fighter Group and the 92d Fighter
Squadron move from Kwanghan to Fungwansham with P-47s.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): 23 P-47s support ground forces
hitting NE of Nabu and bombing mortar positions S of Myitson; 4 others
support forces at Loiya; 3 P-47s severely damage a bridge at Pa-mao; 60+
P-47s and P-38s pound supply areas, troops, tanks, and trucks at various
locations including Hu-kawt, Kongtap, Namtu, Namta-gun, Mongmit, Loingu, and
Tonsing. 520 transport sorties are flown to forward areas throughout the day.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  AIRBORNE OPERATIONS (IX Troop Carrier Command): HQ 434th Troop Carrier
Group and the 71st, 72d, 73d and 74th Troop Carrier Squadrons move from
Aldermaston, England to Mourmelon-le-Grand, France with C-47s.

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 828: During the night, 6
of 7 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany without loss. In
England, HQ 92d Combat Bombardment Wing (Heavy) moves from St Edmunds to
Elveden Hall after all it's bombardment groups are reassigned.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): All combat operations cancelled
because of bad weather. In France, HQ 409th Bombardment Group (Light) and the
640th, 641st, 642d and 643d Bombardment Squadrons move from Bretigny to
Couvron Airfield, Laon with A-26s.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Continued bad weather restricts
operations to reconnaissance and reconnaissance escort by P-38s and P-51s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, A-20s, during the night
of 11/12 Feb, bomb communications targets in the Po Valley and NE Italy,
including the Brenner Pass area; bad weather during the day restricts medium
bomber operations to bombing the bridge at Ala and a a sugar refinery at
Legnago; only 1 fighter gp, the 57th, can operate, hitting bridges, rail
lines, and guns in the Po Valley.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 9 Guam Island-based B-24s pound Chichi Jima
Island naval installations while 19 bomb airfields and defenses on Iwo Jima
Island; during the night of 12/13 Feb, 8 B-24s from Guam fly single bomber
harassment strikes against both Iwo and Chichi Jima.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): 2 missions are flown.
    Mission 31: 21 B-29s from the Mariana Islands bomb heavy AA sites on Iwo
Jima Island in preparation for the amphibious invasion of the island on 19
Feb; no losses.
    Mission 32: 10 B-29s fly a reconnaissance mission for the US Navy
covering from 135-OOE to 148-OOE and to 30-OON; 1 B-29 is lost.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Luzon Island,
B-24s continue to pound Corregidor Island in Manila Bay; A-20s sweeping S
Bataan Peninsula, sink about 30 barges loaded with troops, ammunition, and
supplies; throughout the day B-25s and fighters directly support ground
forces on the Bataan Peninsula and from Lingayen Gulf area to Nichols Field.
The 67th Fighter Squadron, 347th Fighter Group, based on Middelburg Island,
New Guinea with P-38s, begins operating from Morotai Island. The 498th,
499th, 500th and 501st Bombardment Squadron (Medium), 345th Bombardment Group
(Medium), move from Tacloban, Leyte Island to San Marcelino, Luzon with
B-25s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

11/0141Z FEB

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 17:08:52 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Enola Gay Exhibit

In today's newspaper, Colonel Tibbest is quoted as saying recently
that he "never lost a night's sleep over dropping the A-bomb".

The real voice of the Second Wolrd War.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 20:51:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 13 FEB 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
TUESDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  F-3, Douglas Havoc
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER

  CARIBBEAN (Sixth Air Force): The 74th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), VI
Bomber Command, moves from the Galapagos Islands to Aguadulce, Panama with
B-24s.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, fighters sweep the railroad
from Sinyang to Hsuchang, bomb the approach to a Hsuchang bridge, and strafe
Sinyang and Ichang Airfields; B-25s bomb a foundry at Hsuchang

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, troop concentrations,
supply areas, and targets of opportunity are pounded by 70 fighter-bombers at
several locations including Kongpaw, Namtu, Kyao-hpak, Laihka, Kon-wet, Mong
Pa, Hkom-nio, and Naung-lang; 19 fighter-bombers support ground forces in the
Mongmit-Myitson area; 16 fighter-bombers knock out the approach to the main
bridge and damage the bypass bridge at Hay-ti. 477 air supply sorties are
flown by transports throughout the day. In India, the 1st and 2d Fighter
Squadrons (Commando) move from Kalaikunda to Cox's Bazar with P-51s.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  AIRBORNE OPERATIONS (IX Troop Carrier Command): HQ 435th Troop Carrier
Group moves from Welford Park, England to Bretigny, France.

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 829: 9 B-24s drop leaflet
in the Netherlands and Germany during the night without loss.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 320+ B-26s, A-26s, and
A-20s, attack rail bridges at Sinzig, Neuwied-Irlich, and Euskirchen,
military transport depots at Schwelm and Iserlohn, defended points at
Wittlich, and targets of opportunity; fighters escort the A-20s, A-26 and
B-26s, bomb the Neuss and Zieverich bridges and other targets, fly armed
reconnaissance, and support Third Army elements from Prum to Saarlautern
along the Our and Sauer Rivers, and Saar River bridgehead areas. In France,
HQ 97th Combat Bombardment Wing (Light) moves from Voisenon to Marchais; the
39th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron, Ninth AF, based at Amand with
F-5s, sends a flight to operate from Gosselies, Belgium (another flight is
operating from Jarny); and the 405th Fighter Squadron, 371st Fighter Group,
moves from Tantonville to Metz with P-47s. The 155th Photographic
Reconnaissance Squadron, 10th Photographic Group (Reconnaissance), moves from
St Dizier, France to Le Culot, Belgium with A-20s and F-3s.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): In the Vienna area of Austria,
640+ B-17s and B-24s with fighter support hit the S ordnance depot, S and SE
goods yards and depot, C repair shops, and Matzleinsdorf marshalling yard,
and the marshalling yards at Graz, Austria; Sarvar, Hungary; and in
Yugoslavia, 2 at Zagreb and 2 at Maribor, the Pula harbor, the Maribor
locomotive depot and rolling stock repair shops, and several targets of
opportunity. P-38s and P-51s carry out reconnaissance and reconnaissance
escort missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy during the night of 12/13
Feb, A-20s attack enemy movement in the C and NC Po Valley; medium bombers
hit bridges at Calcinato, Dogna, and Chiusaforte and the bridge approach at
Lavis; fighter-bombers fly nearly 350 sorties against enemy communications in
N Italy including marshalling yards at Verona, Parma, and Vicenza.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 25 B-24s from Saipan Island fly two strikes
against Iwo Jima Island, while 10 others hit Haha Jima Island; during the
night of 13/14 Feb, 5 B-24s, flying individual harassment strikes, bomb Iwo
Jima at intervals over an 8-hour period.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Luzon Island,
B-24s continue to pound Corregidor Island in Manila Bay as a large segment of
B-24s attack the main coastal guns and score direct hits on several
batteries; B-24s bomb Mariveles on Bataan Peninsula while A-20s and P-47s bomb
and strafe targets of opportunity throughout the S part of Bataan Peninsula;
B-25s and fighters attack small shipping during sweeps of E and N coasts.
B-25s, with fighter support, hit Kagi Airfield on Formosa. HQ 345th
Bombardment Group (Medium), moves from Tacloban, Leyte Island to San
Marcelino, Luzon. The 339th Fighter Squadron, 347th Fighter Group, based on
Middelburg Island, New Guinea with P-38s, begins operating from Morotai
Island.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

11/0150Z FEB

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 21:16:30 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: USMC Chronology

10 February 1945
Task Force 58 from Ulithi--including Marine Fighter Squadrons 123, 216, 217,
212, and 451 on board large carriers attacked Tokyo (16, 17, and 25 February),
furnished air support for the Iwo Jima landing forces (beginning 19 February)
and participated in a series of strikes on Okinawa (1-2 March).
Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 17:01:36 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

Nechama...
        In WW2, the airforce used smart *pilots*, nong before there
were "smart bombs".  :-)

        Contrary to what you may believe, a variety of bombing techniques
were worked out then - including skip-bombing, bouncing bombs, and low-lebel forrward bombing.
        RAF Mosquito bombers were particularly good at the latter -- being able to launch a brace of bombs at low level and high sped, so that the bombs
shot forward like artilley shells. They could do it with great accuracy.

And, the low-level attack on Gestapo HQ in Copenhagen most certainly did
happen. As did several other similar raids, including that against
Amiens
prison.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 21:55:26 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: GEN RE: ? NATIVE AMERI

Let me correct you, Sidney re/Navajo code talkers in the Marine Corps. While
the first 30 recruited went through boot camp together, and the existence of a
Navajo code talker program a highly classified matter, after their initial
training, they were portioned out to the divisions in the Pacific and assigned
to the division signal companies, which would then send teams down to
regimental and battalion level. In other words, they were not kept in special
units. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 16:41:41 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

That raid on gestapo HQ in Copenhagen took place in March 1945.
The building was Shell Petroleum House, used by the Gestapo as a prison.
Thirty-two Danish Resistance fighters were being tortured in the basement,
and another six Danish prisoners were being held on the top floor.
The combined bomber forces of British and American aircraft aimed at the
middle three floors. Incidentally, they did not use "skip-bombing". They
used the technique of releasing their bombs at high speed and low
altitude, so the bombs shot forward like artillery shells. The raid was
successful in that it killed over 100 Germans and several Dutch Nazis, and
killed only six prisoners.
Nine Allied aircraft were destroyed in the raid. One hit a power line and
crashed into a school nearby. Other aircraft following thought the flames were an aiming point, and dropped their bombs there. Sad to say, 86 children were
killed as a result.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 22:18:35 EST
From:    Charles Mattocks <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Obersalzburg

Colonel Donnell,

I'm very interested in the other information you have on the Obersalzburg HQ,
Bavaria.

Thanks.
Chip
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 19:22:38 -0800
From:    Julian E Gomez <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

Nechama Cox <[email-masked]> wrote:

>>allies launched a raid which consisted of flying along the city street,
>>and skipping a bomb into the ground floor. The building collapsed, but
>>few of the prisoners were harmed.
>>My question is this: did this really happen, and if so, can anyone
>>provide details (i.e. what prisoners, what year, how do you "skip" a bomb
>>etc.) Thanks in advance,
>
>I seriously doubted that this happened.  The Allies were not
>technologically able to bomb until late in the war, and even then it was a
>matter of lots of planes dropping lots of bombs on a 7 square mile area.
>The bombing raids were far from precise.

This is a strange statement. The Allies, Britain in particular, were
bombing in 1940. Hardly "late" in the war. The Americans started bombing in
1942, again not "late" in the war. And with the Norden bombsight, they were
doing much, much better than just dumping them in a 7 square mile area.

A few days ago on Compuserve a member who was a P-40 pilot in the South
Pacific was relating stories of flying escort for B-25's that were skip
bombing Japanese ships. In 1942. Once again, not "late" in the war at all.

>This type of bombing sounds like something that could only be done with the
>so called "Smart Bombs" that were used in the Persian Gulf.  But from my
>understanding, that technology was not available until the Persian Gulf.
>
>So my vote is that it is highly unlikely that this happened.

You haven't been paying attention.

"I was a precocious child and obviously destined to be a scientist."

        Dr. Julian "a tribble took it" Gomez
        Apple Computer, Inc.  408/862-1289 or 996-1010
        [email-masked]  [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 10 Feb 1995 22:29:01 EST
From:    Charles Mattocks <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Seasickness

On the resent posting concerning seasickness, I recall one cruise where very few
of the troops were sick, but you could tell the ones who were or were close to
being sick having the patch behind there ear.

I must admit though, I've had it to...I made the mistake of eating a MRE, beore
catching a ride on a LCAC back to the ship.  That was the longest ride and the
only relief was a garbage bag, just for such occasions.;-)!

Semper Fi!
Chip

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 9 Feb 1995 to 10 Feb 1995
************************************************