Subject: WWII-L Digest - 5 Feb 1995 to 6 Feb 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 1995 00:02:28 -0500

There are 60 messages totalling 2452 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. GEN: "Most Significant" events...
  2. Unsung hero sacrifices virginity to liberate Dachau
  3. Enola Gay Exhibit (4)
  4. INF: 50 Years Ago 03-FEB-1945 (2)
  5. ?from high school student JRM
  6. INF: 50 Years Ago - 07-FEB-1945
  7. 3rd Army Chronology - 04Feb45
  8. 3rd Army Chronology - 05Feb45
  9. 3rd Army Chronology - 06Feb45
 10. Marine Corps Chronolog (2)
 11. INFO: Gestapo and SD (2)
 12. WEAP: Bismark (4)
 13. WANT: Map information
 14. 3rd Army Chronology - 07Feb45
 15. WWII Music
 16. WEAP:  Book Review (2)
 17. MEDIA:Nazi Papers Auction (2)
 18. Senator Robert Dole (6)
 19. Peruvian Ecuadoran War (2)
 20. Xerox Copy
 21. Re[2]: Senator Robert Dole
 22. admin (sorry) (2)
 23. 25mm AT gun
 24. USA Air Corps in North Africa
 25. more on Japanese coup, etc
 26. administrative problems
 27. torpedo boats
 28. Shooting Downed Pilot (was: Law of Armed Conflict) (2)
 29. Polish Jews
 30. Lend-Lease Act
 31. WHAT-IF: Roosevelt and the Bomb
 32. Fortune Magazine
 33. brief history of "gekokujo" (relates to August 1945 coup attempt)
 34. INF: 50 Years Ago - 05-FEB-1945
 35. Enola Gay cartoon
 36. WORLD WAR 2 MUSIC
 37. ADMIN: Trying to avoid flame (was RE: admin (sorry)
 38. DOC: Re: Operation OLYMPIC - Estimate of casualties
 39. DOC: Re: Operation OLYMPIC - Estimate of casualties (pt 2 of 2)
 40. Japanese Nukes
 41. MARINE CORPS CHRONOLOG

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 00:50:28 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: GEN: "Most Significant" events...

Ya know, out on the airshow circuit, we often get simple questions that drive
you nuts.  Such as: "What were the most significant events of the war?"

There are several that are immediately apparent to most people: The Battle
of Britain, Pearl Harbor, Midway, the atomic bombs.

But there are a lot of things that happened inbetween that paint a broad --
yet structured -- picture of how you get there from here.

With the amount of research some people have done, I'm curious if anyone
has tackled this (not so :-) simple question.  What really were, from the
point of view of any participant in WWII, the major events of the war.

(In another way of thinking about it, what would a timeline look like if it
were just to address the major stories and touch on the pieces inbetween?)

(Yes... We're beginning to think about give-aways for airshows and such that
are right along those lines.  Space requirements force limited details, but
it's also got to make sense of seeing how you get from A to B to C...)

Curious about what the local historians think about...

--
Robert J. Granvin
Southern Minnesota Wing Confederate Air Force

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 18:23:33 +1100
From:    John Foster <[email-masked]>
Subject: Unsung hero sacrifices virginity to liberate Dachau

  The Australian press carried a story last week of a fellow in Queensland who
walked out of the gates of Dachau dressed as an SS officer.
  It seems the fellow in question was being given the eye by a captain of the
womens SS unit in the camp. His CO suggested  he "make a play for her" in order
to get info as they were afraid the camp was about to be liquidated as the
front came closer.
  He carried out his orders despite being scared ( touching an SS even
accidentally could get you executed) and end up swapping his body 3 times a
week in the oficers room for information. Finally the women told him that her
unit was being replaced by another and the CO was afraid this might be a death
squad arriving and told him to see if the SS women would get our hero out in
return for a good word in the allies ears im her behalf.
   Being convinced that the war was already lost she agreed to help him and
supplied him with a uniform and they strolled through the gate arm in arm. He
had to be careful not to stare at the bodies stacked like cordwood near the
gate like a good SS soldier. He affected his escape and on encountering
American troops told them of the camp and led them there to bring about its
liberation. When pressed about the heroism of his action he merely shrugged it
off. " It was nothing I just bonked my way to freedom" was his reply. No VC no
movie portrayal by Steve Mcqueen but an unassuming who gave his all
Regards
John Foster

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:07:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Enola Gay Exhibit

 >It's interesting, the various comments and opinions on this matter.
 >I've been "lurking" in the background, enjoying the postings from the
 >group, but I feel I now have something to contribute on this subject.
 >
 >My sister-in-law has been residing and working in Tokyo for about 2
 >years now and was in the "states" for the holidays.  She works in an
 >office almost exclusively Japanese and the A-bomb stamp and Enola Gay
 >exhibit have been quite the hot topics.  To make a long story short, at
 >least her japanese associates are of the opinion that they started it,
 >and we ended it the best way we knew how.  She has not heard any
 >animosity directed towards her or the U.S. regarding this.  Some of her
 >japanese friends even find all the controversy a bit odd.

SNIP  SNIP  SNIP

I was reading something in the NEW YORK TIMES this weekend (don't
remember whether it was a letter to the editor or an article) and
the author said that one Japanese student was heard to say that
they bombed Pearl Harbor in retaliation for us dropping the two
A-bombs.  (Yeah, I know!)

Has your sister-in-law heard anything like this or is this (1)
fiction and/or (2) an isolated incident?

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:15:29 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INF: 50 Years Ago 03-FEB-1945

Mike Long <[email-masked]> asked,...

>Western Front - In the U.S. Ist Army sector, elements of the 78th Division
>swim the flooded Roer River  ?????????  SWIM ??????
>
>In Feb??? Whoa that must've been quite a wakeup. And I have a tough time
>dipping the ice out of the dog's dish BRRRRRRRR.
>
>Were they issued any special equipment for this assault?

Truely this was new melt from the foothills. They must've been issued
wetsuits or better yet drysuits. Can anyone add more?  JD ?

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:23:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ?from high school student JRM

 >On Tue, 31 Jan 1995, Margaret J. McCormick wrote:
 >I'm an amateur at these things, especially compared to many of the
 >historians here, so I hope you get a lot of replys from them as well.  I
 >will tell you what I know from reading.
 >
 >>   If the first bomb was so destructive and awful, why did Japan not
 >> surrender and avoid being bombed again?
 >>
 >There is a lot of controversy about this, and the real reasons will never
 >be quite clear.  One account I read, after Hiroshima the american
 >government sent a message to Japan demanding surrender or else more bombs
 >would follow.  The Japanese government replied with a message that had to
 >be trnaslated from Japanese to english.  The key word was an ambiguous
 >word that could either be taken in context to mean "We will" or "We are
 >thinking about it."  Asian languages often have ambguities that are hard
 >for westerners to interpret.  For instance, in Korean the word "I" is
 >rarely used.  If you say you're going to the store, you don't say "I'M
 >going to the store."  Just "Store- now, going."   A Korean will know
 >intuitively who is going to the store, but a westerner might not.  So the
 >american government took the japanese message to mean they were
 >undecided, and maybe therefore needed another push.

The Big 3 conference was held at Potsdam, Germany on 17 Jul-2 Aug 45.  On
26 Jul, the Big 3 issued the Potsdam Proclamation which demaded the
Japanese surrender unconditionally on pain of "complete destruction."  On
30 Jul, the Japanese rejected the proclamation.

RE: The dropping of the second bomb, the following is something I posted
several months ago.

On my last birthday, my wife gave me a copy of TRUMAN by David McCullough
(Simon & Schuster, 1992, ISBN 0-671-45654-7).  I have not had a chance to
read it yet (another one on the pile of TO BE READ!!!) but due to the
current debate about the Nagaski bomb, I decided to use the book as a
reference to see what McCullough had to say about this event.

On page 457, McCullough states that no high-level meeting had been held
about the Nagaski bomb and no order, other than the military directive for
the first bomb, had ever been issued.  This directive had been issued on 25
Jul 45 by General of the Army George C. Marshall's deputy, General Thomas
T. Handy, to General Carl A. Spaatz, Commanding General, U.S. Army
Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific (USASTAF).  Paragraph 2 of the
directive stated, "Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets
as soon as made ready by the project staff....."  The plutonium bomb,
nicknamed "Fat Man," was delivered two days ahead of schedule.

NOTE: According to THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II, Volume 5, Wesley
Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, the University of Chicago Press, 1953,
some thought had been given to dropping the second bomb on 11 August 45.
When bad weather was forcast for the Japanese main islands on 11 August,
the strike day for the atom bomb was advanced to 9 August.  This decision
was made by military personnel in the Marianas Islands, not by Truman.
(page 718)

 >>   Also, how was radar used during WWII?
 >Radar was a British invention, and was critical in the early years of
 >the war to england's defense against Germany.  The German Luftwaffe (Air
 >Force) underestimated the potential of radar and lost many planes to
 >British fighters who were able to intercept them efficiently.  Early
 >radar was crude and short ranged.  The Germans were pioneering radar
 >systems of their own but were behind the British.  Radar was used
 >exclusively for air defense at first, and then later became useful for
 >accurate guiding of anti-aircraft guns and rockets.  By the end of the
 >war the Germans had perfected radar guided anti-aircraft cannons that
 >played hell on allied bombers, especially at night.
 >    It is interesting that radar was in place on Hawaii the day that
 >Pearl Harbor was bombed by the Japanese.  In fact the radar systems saw
 >the huge groups of airplanes coming towards the island and frantic radar
 >operators called the air force bases and warned them, even when the
 >Japanese planes were still miles away from the island.  However, the
 >operators were only on the mountain top sunday morning because they were
 >new guys just practicing with the new invention, and no one took them
 >seriously.  The officers figured they had picked up a big flock of
 >birds, or a group of large AMERICAN bombers on the screen and were
 >overreacting.  Also american military officers were suspicious of radar,
 >because it was a british invention and not an american one.

RE: Radar in Hawaii on 7 Dec 41, the following is one of my annual Pearl
Harbor posts.

This post describes the radar facilities on Oahu, specifically the Opana
Radar Station, during the early hours of 7 Dec 41.  All times specified are
local Hawaiian time.

The U.S. Army was responsible for defending all military installations in
Hawaii against aerial attack.  The Signal Corps had planned an aircraft
warning service consisting of an Information Center at Fort Shafter and nine
radar stations, three fixed and six mobile.  By 7 Dec 41, the six mobile
stations were in operation but the towers for the three fixed station were on
the dock at Oakland, California.

To save money, manpower, and wear and tear, the six mobile radar stations
only operated during the following hours:

  Sunday: 0400-0700
  Monday thru Friday: 0700-1100 and 1200-1600
  Saturday: 0700-1100

The Information Center at Fort Shafter consisted of a plotting board where
plotters marked the position of aircraft up on radar or by coast watchers.
The plotters had no way of distinguishing friend from foe.  Two officers were
also on duty, a controller and a pursuit officer.  The pursuit officer was
"to assist the Controller in ordering planes to intercept enemy planes or
supposed enemy planes, after the planes got in the air."

The best of the mobile radar stations was the Opana Mobile Radar Station
which was located 230 feet (70 meters) above sea level near Kahuku Point on
the northern tip of Oahu.  The site consisted of a few tents and two
equipment trailers.  The radar set itself had a range of approximately 130
miles (209 km).

At 0400 hours on Sunday, 7 Dec 41, Privates Joseph L Lockard and George E
Elliott went on duty.  Lockard was the more experienced of the two and began
instructing Elliott in the use of the equipment.  At 0700 hours, Lockard began
shutting the radar unit down but because the truck taking them to breakfast
was late, Elliott convinced Lockard to leave the radar system on for
additional training.  At 0702 hours, they picked up more than 50 aircraft
bearing 005 degrees at 132 miles (212 km).  After checking the radar to
ensure that it was functioning correctly, Private Elliott called the
Information Center to report.  The conversation lasted seven or eight
minutes during which time the target moved 20-25 miles (32-40 km) closer to
Oahu.

Since the Information Center was located on an Army post, the plotters and
Controller did not have to wait for a vehicle to take them to breakfast.
Therefore, the center was closed promptly at 0700 hours and by the time
Elliott called, there were only two people left, the switchboard operator
and the Pursuit Officer.  Strangely, the tour of duty for the Pursuit Officer
lasted until 0800 hours.  The Pursuit Officer that morning was Lieutenant
Kermit A Tyler, a fighter pilot in the 78th Pursuit Squadron (Interceptor)
at Wheeler Field.  Tyler's first experience with the Information Center was
on 3 Dec, four days earlier.  It never occurred to him that this incoming
flight could be enemy aircraft.  He almost immediately remembered that a
flight of 12 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress' were enroute from California and
due to arrive about an hour later.  When plotted at the Opana Radar Site,
the B-17s would bear 010 degrees, 5 degrees east of the bearing of the
Japanese aircraft.  Tyler told Elliott that his target was the B-17 flight
at approximately 0720 hours when the target was at 74 miles (119 km), bearing
003 degrees.  Lockard and Elliott continued to track the target until 0739
hours when ground clutter interfered.  At that time, the target was at 20
miles (32 km) bearing 041 degrees.

Lockard and Elliott made one big mistake.  They neglected to tell Lieutenant
Tyler that the sighing consisted of more than 50 aircraft.  If they had,
perhaps Tyler would not have confused the blips with a flight of 12 B-17s.
Then again, this is one of the great "What If" discussions of the war.

The Opana Radar Station continued operating during the morning and tracked
the Japanese aircraft when they headed north back to their carriers.  The
Information Center at Fort Shafter recorded these reports at 1027 and 1029
hours.  However, the high command had convinced themselves that the Japanese
carriers lay in a southerly direction and the radar reports were ignored.
This is another "What If" discussion.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:28:36 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 07-FEB-1945

On 07-FEB-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the U.S. 1st Army sector, the 78th Division continues
the offensive against the Schwammenauel dam, taking Kommerscheidt and
entering Schmidt and Harscheid. In the 3rd Army sector, the offensive
against the Siegfried Line is meeting strong German resistance, but the
offensive continues along the entire front. The 17th Airborne Division and
6th Armoured Division cross the Our and enter Germany. Elements of the XII
Corps cross the Our and Sauer between Vianden and Echternach. The XX Corps
takes Sinz and attacks the German pocket between Campholz and Tettingen.
The 26th Division launches a series of thrusts in the area of the
Saarlautern-Roden bridgehead. In the French 1st Army sector, the XXI Corps
continues its offensive along the Rhine north and south of Balgau. The 1st
Armoured Division crosses the Ill at Ensisheim.

Eastern Front - In Budapest, the Russians capture the southern railway
station. The 1st Ukraine Front puts more troops across the Oder near
Furstenberg and south of Frankfurt. The 1st Belorussian Front attacks
Arnswalde and Deutsch-Krone. Additional Russian forces are put into action
against Poznan. In Yugoslavia, the Germans are preparing to withdraw from
Mostar and Visegrad. The German Army is suffering from an increasing
shortage of officers as a result of their high casualty figures. All
leaves are suspended.

Philippines - Operations against Manila are ordered to be speeded up by
MacArthur. The 1st Cavalry Division begins mopping up the eastern part of
Manila up the Pasig, which is crossed by the 37th Division using inflatable
boats. In the I Corps area, the battle of Munoz ends. The Japanese
defenders are virtually wiped out when they attempt to escape. The Japanese
in Lupao are still holding out strongly though. In the 8th Army sector, the
11th Airborne Division, with air and artillery support, begin to drive on
Nichols Field.

China - In southeast China, the Japanese occupy Kanchow, a base of the U.S.
14th Air Force.

The Homefront
-------------
U.S. Sub Reported Lost - The Navy reports that the submarine Tang is
overdue and presumed lost.

Lend-Lease Extension Backed - Foreign Economic Administrator Leo Crowley
has told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the Lend-Lease system
"must be continued until the final day of unconditional surrender of
Germany and Japan."

Soldier Gets Life Sentence - The death sentence imposed on Pvt. Henry Weber
at Camp Roberts, Calif., by a general court martial board for refusing to
drill has been revoked in favor of a dishonorable discharge and life
imprisonment with hard labor. Weber, a member of the Socialist-Labor Party,
is a conscientious objector on non-religious grounds.

Most Popular Songs - Variety reports the current most popular songs as
"Don't Fence Me In", "Accentuate the Positive", "Rum and Coca-Cola, "I
Dream Of You" and "There Goes That Song Again".

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:28:56 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: 3rd Army Chronology - 04Feb45

February 4, 1945
D-Day +243

-A reshuffling of German Panzer divisions remaining in the west, with a
 strong trend of movement to the northern sectors on the front, and with
 no contact with 3rd Army indicated that the Germans were aware something
 was on in the north.

-VIII Corps continued its attack on the line of Neuendorf-Prum-Prosfeld.

-XII Corps used search lights to illuminate battle areas. The 2 that
 scanned across the Moselle River near Canach did not provoke German
 artillery.

-XIX TAC was grounded except for weather recon.

***

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:43:37 -0500
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INF: 50 Years Ago 03-FEB-1945

On Mon, 6 Feb 1995, Alan Wild wrote:

> Mike Long <[email-masked]> asked,...
>
> >Western Front - In the U.S. Ist Army sector, elements of the 78th Division
> >swim the flooded Roer River  ?????????  SWIM ??????
> >
> >In Feb??? Whoa that must've been quite a wakeup. And I have a tough time
> >dipping the ice out of the dog's dish BRRRRRRRR.
> >
> >Were they issued any special equipment for this assault?
>
> Truely this was new melt from the foothills. They must've been issued
> wetsuits or better yet drysuits. Can anyone add more?  JD ?
>

That is all it said in my source. This item came from the Army green book
chronology volume.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:41:42 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: 3rd Army Chronology - 05Feb45

February 5, 1945
D-Day +244

-17th Airborne patrolled the Our River.

-VIII Corps, 90th Inf Div, 359th Regiment clears Habscheid. 4th Inf Div
 captures Brandscheid and Schlausenbach. 87th Inf Div launched attack on
 Siegfried Line at 0400 hours.

-XIX TAC was grounded.

-Tanks used by cavalry recon squadrons were being converted from M59 to
 M24. These conversions not only created a faster, more maneuverable tank,
 but also exchanged a new 75mm gun in place of the old 37mm.

-Authorization was given to reestablish local mail and telephone in
 Luxembourg City, Esch, and other cities in Southern Luxembourg.

***Source: _Patton's Third Army, A Chronology_ by Charles Province

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:49:18 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: 3rd Army Chronology - 06Feb45

February 6, 1945
D-Day +245

-III Corps, 17th Airborne in conjunction with 6th Armored Div crossed
 the Our River in a limited attack.

-VIII Corps, 11th Armored reached a point about 8 miles southwest of Prum.
 4th Inf Div captures Sellerich, Herscheid, Hontheim, and Wascheid.
 4th Armored captured Bettel. 87th Inf Div advances about a mile keeping
 in line, coordinating with First Army.

-At 0100 hours, XII Corps, 5th Inf Div crosses the Sauer River and gains
 1000 yards on the bank. At 0300 the 80th Inf Div crosses and attacks.
 Prior to the attacks, III and XII Corps artillery prep the area with
 29,000 rounds in 280 firing missions aimed at German artillery positions,
 137 German command posts, and 102 German occupied towns.

-XIX TAC flew 214 sorties damaging or destroying 272 vehicles, 13 armored
 vehicles or tanks, 245 railroad cars, and 30 buildings.

-German snipers did not fire upon liter carriers with bib-type Red Cross
 aprons produced by local civilian labor.

***

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 08:42:52 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Marine Corps Chronolog

I am definitely interested.  Post away.
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:46:16 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INFO: Gestapo and SD

Hello, William!

Will try to help.

>     I do, however, have certain questions which I hope that some might be
> able to answer.  First, how closely did the Gestapo work with the Orpo?
> I ask this because, while both were under Himmler, the Gestapo was part
> of the Sipo and Heydrich while the Orpo was under Kurt Daluege.  Therefore,
> there was a seperation at the upper elechon of the police and, I imagine,
> it was fairly intense given the personality of Heydrich.  Did this persist
> to the lower levels of cooperation?  Additionally, did the Gestapo carry
> out all of its arrests on its own or did they use various SS or civil
> service persons?

You might consult Gerald Reitlinger's "SS-Alibi of a Nation" which
discusses this aspect of cooperation between the Orpo and the Gestapo.

Hope this helps.

>     Second question: What were the differences in the operations of the Gestapo
> and the SD abroad?  They two are often mentioned in the same sentence when
> speaking of fomenting the Nazi movements in Austria or Czechoslovakia.  In
> fact, the party itself added to the mosaic of foreign operatives.  Were these
> organizations given seperate tasks or were they all doing the same thing?

    You might consult Heinz Hoehne's "Order of the Death's Head" for
info on this. Also, Hoehne's "Canaris".

>     Third, on internal Reich affairs, the Gestapo had responsibility to
> look to the security of the Reich as Political police.  The SD had the
> responsibility to look to the security of the Reich as the Party Intelligence
> Service.  But, by 1934, the Reich became little more than an extension of
> the Party (in the view of Hitler) and therefore the SD monitored non-party
> environments such as universities, churches, etc.  Besides the fact that
> the Gestapo had the responsibility of arresting, imprisoning, etc., what
> were the practical differences between the two.  In theory, the Gestapo
> was a state organization, while the SD was a party organization.  But, as I
> mentioned, the party and state were almost one.
>
> Third question: In operations in occupied territories and in particular the
> securing of power and eventually the Final Solution, both the SD and Gestapo
> were involved.  Was there any differences in their roles?

    I don't think so, but at the same time, the Germans were
fastidious about delineations between security agencies. It seems to
me that the SD was concerned with the internal administration of the
camps and the Gestapo with identifying and arresting people for
deportation to the camps.

My thoughts. Wish I could supply you with more info.
>
> Thank you for any help you might be able to give.  If anyone would like,
> I can upload copies of the paper if I ever get it finished.

    It would be an interesting read. Would appreciate it.

    All the best.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:53:25 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Bismark

Hello, John!

There were reports of German subs in the area and the captain didn't
want to subject his men or vessel to an enemy attack. He received on
censure for doing this. It was a wartime situation, and, given the
feeling toward the Germans at the time, although regrettable, he
called off the rescue attempt.

Hope this helps.

Terry
> I was watching the National Georgraphic special on the Bismark last night and
> was really troubled when it started talking about the Bismark survivors and
> how the Dorchester (sp?) was attempting to rescue the survivors and then
> decided to call off the rescue leaving most of them to die. The show did not
> go into very much detail on this incident. Could anyone shed any further
> light on this? Why did the captain order the rescue called off? Did he ever
> receive any type of censure for doing this?
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> John Davis                           | [email-masked]
> Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:54:19 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WANT: Map information

Hello, Kevin!

Try the "West Point Atlas of American Wars"

All the best.

Terry
>
>   Can anyone recommend a good source for detail maps showing troop deployment in
> the ETO.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Kevin Kamphaus
> [email-masked]
>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 08:12:21 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: 3rd Army Chronology - 07Feb45

February 7, 1945
D-Day +246

-SHAEF, Twelfth Army Group orders 3rd Army to continue its limited attacks
 and maintain positions.

-17th Airborne and 6th Armored enlarged the bridgehead across the Our River.

-VIII Corps, 4th Inf Div captured Obermerlen, 87th Inf Div continues its
 attack in coordination with First Army.

-XII Corps, 80th Inf Div captures Wallendorf.

-Poor weather again grounds XIX TAC.

 "On February 7 the First Canadian Army jumped off at Nijmegen in the Allied
attack that within 35 days was to destroy the German army west of the Rhine.
As Simpson's army waited in readiness on the Roer, Hodges ordered Gerow to
go after the dam sites and gain control of that river. By February 10,
V Corps had captured the Roer dams and driven the enemy into the dark forests
that stretched beyond them.

 But before quiting those dams, the enemy dynamited their floodgates. As
the torent of waters sluiced down the Roer valley, the river washed 3 feet
above its muddy banks. An unseasonable winter thaw melted the thick snows
of the Eifel and soon a score of rushing streams fed the river flood.
Division commanders of the First and Ninth Armies, drawn up on the river
bank, looked across the muddy torent and prayed that Group would delay the
offensive rather than dare it at flood stage. Not wanting to risk a
catastrophe on the river crossing, both Armies settled down to wait for the
flood to subside.

 By now our intent was apparent and I was fearful the enemy might reinforce
this front with troops from the Eifel where Patton had been instructed to hold
defensively on his line. There, George had been probing the Siegfried Line
with small feeler attacks, not in preparation for a major offensive but
primarily because he found it impossible to sit still. For Third Army viewed
defensive warfare as something to be shunned at all costs. Now with
Eisenhower's consent, I ordered Patton to mount an offensive in the Eifel.
It was to be strong enough to keep the enemy from shifting to the Roer but
not so strong as to arouse the objections of Monty. Replacements for this
limited offensive could be spared initially while the First and Ninth
Armies fidgeted on the Roer.

 Patton was to pierce the enemies Siegfried fortifications north of the
Moselle and advance quietly to the Kyll, a mountain stream that paralleled
the Luxembourg border, 12 miles beyond the German frontier. There he was
to seize a bridgehead in anticipation of a full-scale advance to the Rhine.
But this later phase was not to begin until Monty was safely anchored on
the Rhine opposite the Ruhr.

 Rather than directly disobeying SHAEF's written orders consigning him to
the defensive, Patton termed his 3rd Army operations in the Eifel an
"aggresive defense". His staff innocently believed that they were
hoodwinking Ike's staff at Versailles. Moreover it was rumored that I had
joined Patton in this conspiratorial offensive. My insubordination however
was purely make-believe, for without the knowledge of Patton's staff and mine,
Eisenhower had agreed to it." -Gen. Omar Bradley

***Sources: _Patton's Third Army, A Chronology_ by Charles Province
            _A Solidier's Story_ by Gen. Omar Bradley
   Typos: mine...

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 09:12:31 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Bismark

FWIW, the highest ranking surviving officer of the Bismarck was one of those
rescued by the Dorchester.  In his book he indicates that under the circumstances, the British captain made the right decision.  I don't have the reference
with me, but if I still have the book I will try to find it if someone
else doesn't beat me to it.
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 09:53:34 EST
From:    Richard King <[email-masked]>
Subject: Marine Corps Chronolog

Ben:
I'll second the posting of a daily (or whenever) Marine Corps
Chronology. Sounds like a good, interesting project.

Richard King ([email-masked])

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 09:57:04 EST
From:    Richard King <[email-masked]>
Subject: WWII Music

Sidney:
Concerning the story about the Airborne veteran whistling PLEASE COME
BACK TO THE RED RIVER VALLEY: you've proved once again that great
stories don't have to be lengthy! Thanks for a good posting on
a cold Monday morning.

Richard King ([email-masked])

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 07:32:50 -0800
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Enola Gay Exhibit

At 7:50 AM 2/2/95, Steven Pudlo, Dept. Computer Svcs. wrote:
[...]
>Margaret:
>
>The reason that Japan did not surrender after Hiroshima was not that they
>were getting over ths shock of what happened. The Japanese high council
>knew within hours just what had happened over hiroshima. They immediately
>began 'spin control' attempts to keep the truth from their own subjects.
>
>They wanted a 'glorious fight ffor the homeland', no matter how many of their
>own people died. Remember the casualties from island hopping were about 3 to
>1 against the Japanese, and the japanese people were told that the american
>fleet had been decimated and the imperial japanese fleet was on the brink of
>totally eliminating the US presence in the pacific. Apparently their perception
>of the truth today is similarly skewed.
>
>Even afte Nagasaki was bombed, many of the military elite wanted to continue
>fighting. They capitulated only when directed to by the emporer himself. Even
>then there were attempts to quash the surrender.
>
>No, they weren't getting over any shock, nor were they trying desperatly to
>surrender via diplomatic channels.
>
>Source: Reader's Digest Illustrated History of World War II, and THIS LIST!
>

Dropping the bomb may have been "correct", but I don't think it is
completely a black and white question.  Questioning the need for the bomb
is not restricted to leftist, 60's peacenik revisionists.  For example:

Japan was negotiating with Russia to end the war in May.  Konoye, the
intended emissary had been instructed to "secure peace at any price,
notwithstanding its severity".  If that failed, Sakomizu alledged that
Suszuki and Togo decided that they would make direct overtures to the
United States.

"Concerning the absoluteness of her defeat there can be no doubt.  The time
lapse between military impotence and political acceptance of the inevitable
might have been shorter had the political structure of Japan permitted a
more rapid and decisive determination of national plicies."

"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the
testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's
opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability
prior to 1 Novemeber 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic
bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and
even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

SOURCE:  _Japan's Struggle to End the War_, The United States Strategic
Bombing Survey, 1 July 1946

"To the average observer in the West in mid-1945, the Japanese decision to
comply with Allied terms appeared to be the direct result of the bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union's declaration of war agains Japan
on 9 August, and the Allied promise not to alter the legal position of
Emperor Hirohito.  Yet, with the advantate of hindsight and a detailed
knowledge of developments within Japan in the weeks preceding the
surrender, a leading historin on the subject makes clear that the 'decision
-- in embryo -- had long been taking shape.'"

SOURCE: _Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb_, "Green Book Series", 1984
(The quote within the quote is from Robert J.C. Butow, Japan's Decision to
Surrrender, 1954)

"Once it had been tested, President Truman faced the decision as to whether
to use it.  He did not like the idea, but was persuaded that it would
shorten the war against Japan and save American lives.  It is my opinion
that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no
material assistance in our war against Japan.  The Japanese were already
defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and
the successful bombing with conventional wapons."

"It was my reaction that the scientists and others wanted to make this test
because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project.  Truman knew
that, and so did the other people involved."

SOURCE: _I Was There_, Fleet Admiral William D Leahy, 1950 (Chief of Staff
to Roosevelt and Truman)

John Riegsecker                                 (206) 756-3566
Dept of Mathematics and Computer Science        [email-masked]
University of Puget Sound

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 11:01:08 -0500
From:    Matthew Savoie <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP:  Book Review

Just found this book review in the Jan-Feb 1995 edition of Armor magazine
from the U.S. Army' Armor Center at Fort Knox, KY:

Standard Guide to U.S. World War II Tanks and Artillery by Konrad F.
Schreier Jr., Krause Publications, 700 East State Street, Iola, Wis. 54990.
$24.95

In the last few years, several authors have published guides to the tanks
and artillery fielded by the U.SW. during World War II.  Konrads F. Schreier
Jr. has written what is probavly the best guide available.  The book is
exhaustive, listing every tank, half track, artillery piece, air defense
gun, and armored car used in WWII by the U.S., eith er in combat or in
training.

The book has 255 pages of text, an incredible amount of information.  Nearly
forgotten systems such as the 1005mm M3 towed howitzer and the tank mounted
multiple rocketlauncher are covered.  One sequence of photographs covers the
process used to move and emplace the 36 in "Little David" mortar.  That is
not a misprint - it had a bore of 36b inches!  It was developed to destroy
fixed fortifications and was not deployed with any combat troops.

If the book had only described the weapons, it would be useful.  What makes
it invaluable is the discussion of artillery fire control and ammunition.
While U.S. artillery systems were comparable with any other country's, the
U.S. system of fire control was the best.  American artillerymen had
mastered the methods of delivering fire on the target in a very short timer.
The effectiveness of U.S. artiellery during WWII was appreciatated by U.S.
soldiers, envied by our allies, and admired by our enemies, even as they
sought cover.

Included in the book is a short section on ammunition, a subject normally
overlooked by those who discuss armor and artillery.  The concentration is
on the systems, but falls short in recognizing that, aside from the shock
power of movement, tanks and artillery normally kill targets with delivered
ammunition.

The only real criticism of the book is the failure to include armor
thickness and penetyration capabilities of all the armor systems, either as
part of the vehicle description of in a comprehensive chart.  Failure to
include this information makes it difficult to understand why U.S. soldiers
felt undergunned and underarmored.  The author's statement about the ability
of the 76mm HVAP projectile to kill Panther and Tiger tanks overstates the
round's ability to actually kill those tanks.  While the HVAP projectile
could penetrate thier side armor at a long range, the Shermans had a serious
range disadvantage when engaging the Panther and Tiger tanks over the
frontal arc.

If you are interested in WWII tanks and artillery, you should purchase this
book.  The book is very readable and the price is reasonable.

Gerald A. Halbert
545 Willwood Drive
Earlysville, VA

--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew M. Savoie           |  "There is only one tactical principal that   |
Western New England College |    that remains unchanged.  It is to inflict  |
1215 Wilbraham Road         |    the maximum amount of death, wounds, and   |
Box 1830                    |    destruction in the minimum amount of time."|
Springfield, MA 01119       |              - General George S. Patton, Jr.  |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 10:13:12 -0600
From:    "William L. Huber - SAA" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: MEDIA:Nazi Papers Auction

> > :NAZI PAPERS WITHDRAWN FROM AUCTION AFTER OUTCRY
> >
> >     LONDON, Feb 2  - Nazi papers from the extermination camp
> > Bergen-Belsen, one of which bears the signature of Adolf Hitler, were
> > withdrawn from an auction on Thursday after public protests that the
> > timing was tasteless.
>
> James,
> I've always been under the impression that there were no papers or other
> such documentation which could tie Hitler to the final solution. All his
> orders were given orally (or so I've been led to believe). Any idea what
> these papers were about? Just wondering.
> David Rising

Yes, that is pretty interesting because David Irving, noted Hitler
apologist, has a standing offer of about $100,000.00 for evidence
proving that Hitler knew anything about the final solution.  I bet
that would have something of an impact on the bidding had they been
sold on the block.

I have never heard of that auction house before, has anyone on the
list heard of them or dealt with them?  A lot like that you would
expect to see in Southebys or Hermann Historca.

Cheers, Bill Huber / [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 08:44:55 -0800
From:    Patrick Charles <[email-masked]>
Subject: Senator Robert Dole

        I was watching Letterman on Friday night and Senator Robert DOle
was on the show.  At the end he mentioned that in the audience was his
buddy who pulled him out of the foxhole when he was wounded.  I know that
Dole was severly injured during the war, but I have never heard the
story.  Does anyone know the story?

Patrick J. Charles
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 11:20:13 -0600
From:    Drew Halevy <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Senator Robert Dole

I worked on Dole's 1988 capiagn for a little bit, and I saw a 10 minute
capaign tape about him. although i am not sure of the details of his
wound, i do know that he was so badly wounded that it was expected he
would be severly crippled. he return to Kanasas after the war weighing
under 100 lbs (i think) and started his own rehabilitation program
(remember, at this time he is in his late teens, early twenties) he was
able to recover to the point that he only lost use of his right hand.he
actually a very interesting person and quite a story. -Drew

Drew Philip Halevy      |
Grad Student            | Go tell the Spartans, thou who passest by,
Department of History   | That here obedient to their laws we lie.
University of Arkansas  |    Simonides c. 556-468 b.c.
[email-masked]   |

On Mon, 6 Feb 1995, Patrick Charles wrote:

>         I was watching Letterman on Friday night and Senator Robert DOle
> was on the show.  At the end he mentioned that in the audience was his
> buddy who pulled him out of the foxhole when he was wounded.  I know that
> Dole was severly injured during the war, but I have never heard the
> story.  Does anyone know the story?
>
> Patrick J. Charles
> [email-masked]
>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 11:51:34 GMT+6
From:    Esaul Zermeno Bautista <[email-masked]>
Subject: Peruvian Ecuadoran War

       At this moment I have not the exactly date, but the origin of
the Peruvian Ecuadoran war it soar to the colonial epoque, when
Ecuator for some reason have a debt and wants to pay with a portion
of territory , but this portion was given by the King of Spain at
this time to Peruvian Governement.
But the really problem emerge when years later both countries knows
the existence of oils fields and when oil take more importance.

  Hope this help.

     Alfredo.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 09:05:44 GMT+6
From:    Esaul Zermeno Bautista <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Xerox Copy

      I too would be interested in this. Please let me know how you
plan to distribute it.

      Alfredo.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 12:05:52 CST
From:    "SCHERRER, TIM" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re[2]: Senator Robert Dole

I beleive Dole was serving with the 10th Mountain Division in Italy
during the time he was wounded.  Please correct me if I am wrong but
that is what my memory tells me.  TAS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 13:01:26 -0500
From:    "Steven Pudlo, Dept. Computer Svcs." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Enola Gay Exhibit

Hello John;

>Dropping the bomb may have been "correct", but I don't think it is
>completely a black and white question.  Questioning the need for the bomb
>is not restricted to leftist, 60's peacenik revisionists.  For example:

Agreed that it is not a black and white affair, but it seems to have been
a lot 'whiter' than represented. There is a knee-jerk reaction to anything
connected to the BOMB, though that is mostly the product of our collective
conditioning since the bomb was dropped.

>Japan was negotiating with Russia to end the war in May.  Konoye, the
>intended emissary had been instructed to "secure peace at any price,
>notwithstanding its severity".  If that failed, Sakomizu alledged that
>Suszuki and Togo decided that they would make direct overtures to the
>United States.

If you beleive that they were really serious, or if the US beleived they
were. It seems to have been a stalling tactic of the japanese at the time.

>"Concerning the absoluteness of her defeat there can be no doubt.  The time
>lapse between military impotence and political acceptance of the inevitable
>might have been shorter had the political structure of Japan permitted a
>more rapid and decisive determination of national plicies."

Has anybody ever looked into what the japanese people really knew at that
point in time? Their sources of information were loading them up with
porpoganda about how they were winning, and suddenly they didn't...

-sorry, I had to delete a bunch of really good stuff.

The fact is that Americans were dying in the war. Americans like some of those
on this list. To say that they were expendable because the war was gonna last
only a few months longer is rather cynical, ain't it? I for one am glad that
these people survived the war, and I don't feel the least bit guilty.

You shouldn't either given the japanese casualty rate of 300+% american.

In either event, this is a rather moot argument. The bombs were dropped, and
there is little point in wallowing in guilt for what was then, the proper
decision (IMHO).

We can differ in our opinions yet maintain mutual respect. Others can chime
in on both sides because this is an engrossing topic, but I think I've said
enough.

Take care, John, and thanx fer th' response.
                                                                Steve
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Steven E. Pudlo  - [email-masked] |"Life may be a drag...
STC Programmer/Analyst - (203) 885-2343  |    But it sure beats the
Three Rivers Community-Technical College |       only known alternative"
574 New London Turnpike                  |                     (S.E.P.)
Norwich, CT. U.S.A. 06360                |No one gets out of it alive..
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 13:04:27 EST
From:    Mary Hricko <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Senator Robert Dole

Dear Patrick,

             A while back 60 minutes did a spot on Dole and there was
a discussion concerning Dole's war experience. From what I recall, Dole
was seriously wounded (almost died) and spent a great part of the war
in a hospital. Evidence of his injury still exists.You may have noticed
that he seldom uses his one arm and hand. I think he suffered severe
nerve damage and can hardly move his fingers (in that one hand). During
the interview with Morly (I think it was Morly), Dole actually broke
down and cried when recalling the incident. It was very moving to see
how deeply he was affected.

                           Mary

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 13:25:39 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: admin (sorry)

        Joe, I have no idea what the hell happened but you probably wound up
with a bunch of messages bounced from my account.  Some force beyond my control
apparently quintupled the amount of space my directory was taking up.  The
computer folks here still don't know what caused the problem, but they gave me
10,000 additional blocks while they work on it so the problem should be cleared
up as far as it effects you...sorry for the inconvenience, but I didn't do
nuthin' (I left Thursday with approx 560 blocks used out of an allowance of
2000 + 100 permitted overdraft.  I came back to see my usage at 3400+!!  Even
after I deleted all my messages that arrived in the last three days I was still
at 2600+ and couldn't do anything (like compress or alert you with a message or
even set "no-mail" because it was telling me I was over quota.  Again, my
apologies for any inconvenience this caused.
PS I "speed-deleted" some 100+ messages, not counting at least 7 that bounced,
so I probably missed a bunch of good stuff.

PPS; sorry, Joe, but I think I referred to the LUPO as a "destroyer escort,"
not exactly accurate either but I like to use the term because "torpedo boat"
creates confusion with MTB's, PT's, etc...

Abjectly yours

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 13:32:24 EST
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INFO: Gestapo and SD

Thanks for your advice.  I'll definitely go get that Canaris book.  I've
read it once but have forgotten about it.  When I went to get it months
ago it was out.  I'll look for the SS-Alibei book.  As for the administration
of the camps, both the SD and Gestapo were restricted on pain of death
(probably only a little exaggeration here).  These two were controlled
by Heydrich and later Kaltenbrunner (I think).  But Himmler was smart
enough not to put so much power in one person's hands so the administration
of the camps fell to the Totenkopf division.  This is readily seen by the
Death's Head on their collar insignia.  Thanks for the help and I'll let
you know when I get this paper done.  Nothing like going to school to
make me finish things.

Bill Lippert

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 14:44:08 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Senator Robert Dole

>        I was watching Letterman on Friday night and Senator Robert DOle
>was on the show.  At the end he mentioned that in the audience was his
>buddy who pulled him out of the foxhole when he was wounded.  I know that
>Dole was severly injured during the war, but I have never heard the
>story.  Does anyone know the story?
>

Senator Dole was injured in Italy during the war.  If you ever see him live
or on television, you will notice that one of his hand is clenched close
and usually has a pen stuck in the palm.  I think this is a result of his
injuriesfrom an artillery attack.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 13:09:29 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 25mm AT gun

Mike,
I saved your post - I have never heard of this, tho' it parallels the
German Stielgranate... did the French invent it first? I would appreciate
any info on range, effectiveness, quantity produced and penetration you
could provide along with any production and service dates. I am not
familiar w/ "DST", is this like a FOMCat?

>the french hotchkiss-puteaux at gun also had a 2kg
>HEAT projectile. since this was an over-calibre round,
>it was slipped over the end of the muzzle and propelled with
>a blank cartridge. Source: DST-1160G-514-78-Vol2, May 1978.
>
>i'll be nomail until 6 Feb.
>
>******************************************************************************
>* Mike LaForge                                                               *
>* U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety (USATCES)                 *
>* Explosives Safety Logistics Division (ESL)                                 *
>* Defense Environmental Restoration Program - Formerly Used Defense Sites    *
>* (DERP-FUDS)                                                                *
>* DSN: 585-8762  FAX: 585-6009  COMM: 815-273-8762                           *
>******************************************************************************

Jim O'Neil  From the interrigation of a German General at the end of WW II:

               "The reason the American Army does so well in War, is that War
                is Chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis"

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 15:03:06 -0500
From:    Tim McFeely <[email-masked]>
Subject: USA Air Corps in North Africa

I have several questions and was wondering if the dedicated List members
might be able to help or at least point me in the right direction.

1.) I was wondering if someone might have an order of battle for the Air
Corps in North Africa after Operation Torch? I am primarily interested in
fighter or fighter/bomber units equipped with aircraft such as P-40's etc.

2.) What would a combat loadout consist of for the above aircraft? I realize
different missions require different loadouts. What would be typical for
interdiction type missions?

Thanks in advance for any and all answers.

Tim McFeely
Ocean State FreeNet
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 15:18:39 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: more on Japanese coup, etc

        I wanted to add a few more thoughts on the abortive coup of August 1945
(now that I seem to be back up and running, e-mail wise).  First, I thought I
should provide the full name of General Shizuichi Tanaka, commander of Eastern
Army, since it strikes me that he was one of the few actors in this drama who
acted impeccably from start to finish.  He refused to even listen to the coup
proposal, and his HQ, especially his chief-of-staff, were instrumental in
ending the attempt.  Later he committed suicide to atone for his own failures
in the defense of the homeland.  I also wanted to mention that, as ambiguous as
his attitude toward the planned insurrection seemed to be, General Anami, the
War Minister, certainly performed a supreme act of atonement for his own
omissions.  Anami committed hara-kiri in the traditional manner, and selected
one of the most painful variants, making two cuts in his own belly.
        I also wanted to elaborate on the history of gekokujo and its role in
shaping the politics of pre-war Japan, but as time presses I'll save that for
another post later today.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 14:02:07 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: MEDIA:Nazi Papers Auction

Hello, Bill!

Interesting. My thoughts exactly regarding your post. Makes me wonder
about their authenticity. Any thoughts?

> Yes, that is pretty interesting because David Irving, noted
Hitler
> apologist, has a standing offer of about $100,000.00 for evidence
> proving that Hitler knew anything about the final solution.  I bet
> that would have something of an impact on the bidding had they been
> sold on the block.

    Would be interested to know the subject matter on which his
signature is found.

> I have never heard of that auction house before, has anyone on the
> list heard of them or dealt with them?  A lot like that you would
> expect to see in Southebys or Hermann Historca.

    Thanks, Bill! Will be in touch.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 15:42:50 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: administrative problems

        Joe, if you were forced to unsubsribe me due to bouncing messages is
there a way to turn me back on?? (I'm innocent, I tell ya).  Hopefully the
problem will not recur as I've now got more spare blocks than I know what to do
with-- getting nervous 'cause I haven't seen any messages for a while.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 16:02:57 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: torpedo boats

        Joe, referring to the Italian "torpedo boats" such as the LUPO and the
SAGITTARIO as "destroyer escorts" is something I took from Bragadin-- although
its not precisely accurate (U.S. DE's, being purpose-built for their role,
had much better ASW equipment and heavier AA armament, among other things) it
seems to fill the bill.  Many European nations, especially those which were not
oceanic naval powers, built such craft in the first half of the century, mainly
as attack vessels for coast defense tasks.  Since "torpedo boat" for me
conjures up visions of McHale's Navy, I was looking for a less confusing term
to use in referring to these craft.  While not exactly correct in terms of
intended task (although Italian, German, and other "torpedo boats" of this type
were often found in an escort role), "destroyer escort" is at least more
indicative of the size and displacement of these ships, typically in the
500-1,000 ton range-- i.e., a scaled-down destroyer.  Bragadin, de Belot, and
others generally use 1,000 tons as the dividing line-- bigger ships are
classified as destroyers (although this is still fuzzy in some cases, like the
British HUNT class ships, which were about 1,000 tons but built with the
destroyer escort role in mind.  Also some of the US DE's exceeded 1,000 tons).
I myself find it simpler to conform to this naval shorthand, so please excuse
my over-simplification.  This confusion extends not only to Italian vessels.
The Norwegian Navy in April 1940 had no actual destroyers operational (two were
building), but most accounts of the naval campaign there (including Norwegian
accounts) speak of Norwegian destroyers.  They are also talking about "torpedo
boats"-- Norway had three old WW1 540-tonners and four new 620-tonners.  There
is then the question of what to call the Norwegian STEGG, TRYGG, and SNOGG--
also "torpedo boats," but only 220 tons, and without anywhere near the
firepower (or sea-keeping ability) of the bigger torpedo boats (the 600-tonners
mounted three 100-mm
guns, the 540-tonners six 76-mm; the 220-ton vessels had two 76-mm, all of them
had multiple torpedo tubes).  So I'm using the term "destroyer escort" as a
blanket term for these 500-1,000 ton "mini-destroyers," regardless of whether
they were initially built for escort or torpedo attack as their primary
envisioned role.  That way I save the term "torpedo boat" for the smaller
(under 300 tons) craft like the TRYGG-class vessels and the Italian MS.

PS While I'm nit-picking, I might as well include myself on the list.  I
earlier referred to author Erminio Bagnasco as "Ernesto" (sorry)

PPS I just had a message pop up so I guess I'm not unsubscribed.  Sorry for the
fuss.
Regards

Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 15:20:52 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Shooting Downed Pilot (was: Law of Armed Conflict)

Hello, Chuck!

> > . . .  In his book "The First
> > and The Last"  Galland recounts his last combat flight, when a Thunderbolt
> > bounced him and shot up his Me262 jet fighter.  Although he was seriously
> > wounded, and was running on one engine, he decided against bailing out
> > knowing the american pilots would strafe him in his chute.  Jet and
> > Rocket Fighter pilots were especially singled out for this. . . .
>
> Is there anyone on the Allied side that can confirm that this was done?

    There are documented accounts where both sides did this sort of
thing. To my knowledge, it was not common practice, but things in the
air did happen.

    Hope this helps.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 21:30:45 +0000
From:    Nechama Cox <[email-masked]>
Subject: Polish Jews

Hi!

I ama grad student in London doing research on Economic Warfare during World
War II.

I just read a document saying that the Polish Government was interested in
arranging relief shipments from Portugal for the Jews in the Ghettos.
Apparently the UK was considering allowing through the blockade shipments
of "not more than 4 tons of parcels monthly containing foodstuffs native to
Portugal and not of a kind imported through the blockade."

Am I crazy, or does this sound a little unlikely?

Am I correct in assuming that this was just a way to get around the
blockade?  Why else would the Polish Government be interested in making
sure the Jews in the Ghettos were taken care of?

Has anyone heard of this before?

***************************************************************************

Nechama Cox                                         ()        ()
                                                    ||        ||
[email-masked]                                ||        ||
                                                  <~~~~>    <~~~~>
27 Heathway Court                                  {@@}      {@@}
Finchley Road and West Heath Road                  {**}      {**}
Hampstead, London                                  {@@}      {@@}
NW3 7TS                                            ----      ----
                                                  /    \    /    \
(081) 458-6510                                   |______|  |______|

**************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 14:37:24 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP:  Book Review

>Just found this book review in the Jan-Feb 1995 edition of Armor magazine
>from the U.S. Army' Armor Center at Fort Knox, KY:
>
>Standard Guide to U.S. World War II Tanks and Artillery by Konrad F.
>Schreier Jr., Krause Publications, 700 East State Street, Iola, Wis. 54990.
>$24.95

Thanks, I for one am interested!

>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Matthew M. Savoie           |  "There is only one tactical principal that   |
>Western New England College |    that remains unchanged.  It is to inflict  |
>1215 Wilbraham Road         |    the maximum amount of death, wounds, and   |
>Box 1830                    |    destruction in the minimum amount of time."|
>Springfield, MA 01119       |              - General George S. Patton, Jr.  |
>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Jim O'Neil  From the interrigation of a German General at the end of WW II:

               "The reason the American Army does so well in War, is that War
                is Chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis"

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 16:37:10 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Senator Robert Dole

        Wasn't Dole with the 10th Mountain Division in Italy when he was
wounded.  I saw it on a documentary about mountain troops a couple years ago,
unless I've gotten Mr Dole mixed up with some other politician.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 15:38:08 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Lend-Lease Act

Hello, Kevin!

> My name is Kevin, and I am an 8th grader.  My history paper on the Lend-Lease
> Act is being submitted to a regional history contest.  I am concentrating on
> the events leading up to the passage of the Act.  My teacher says that i need
> to add some primary sources to my paper.  Can anyone out there help me?  Are any
>     of you WWII veterans who remember this?

    You might read a book called "Fifty Ships that Saved the World"
and I cannot think of the author currently. It is a paperback that
came out some years ago, and goes into the area of your research in
great detail.

    Plus almost any between-the-war history of the US will deal with
this topic.

    Hope this helps.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 15:16:52 -0600
From:    "Tim J. Watts" <[email-masked]>
Subject: WHAT-IF: Roosevelt and the Bomb

A hypothetical question for those who know more about FDR.  If all else
had remained the same, but Roosevelt had not died in April, 1945, would
he have dropped the bomb on Hiroshima in August 1945?

Tim J. Watts
Valparaiso University

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 15:55:28 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Fortune Magazine

Laurie,

        You write:

> The survey is quite long, and broken into topics called, "The next war",
> "Germany and Japan", "The atomic bomb", "High command", and "Truman and
> transition".  I have a very poor photocopy if anyone is interested in the
> rest of it.

        I would love to get a copy of this survey.  It sounds rather
fascinating, especially if viewed with 20/20 hindsight.  Please let me
know if it is possible to get copy and, if so, how much it would cost.
Thanks.

                Joe Barone
                [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 14:13:28 -0800
From:    Jim Curry <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Bismark

As I recall, the rescue effort was called off because of a report that a
U-boat was in the area.  Any ship dead in the water waiting to board
survivors would have been a sitting duck.  There actually was a German
sub nearby; U-74 picked up three sailors from the Bismarck.
Jim Curry
[email-masked]

On Sun, 5 Feb 1995, John Davis wrote:

> I was watching the National Georgraphic special on the Bismark last night and
> was really troubled when it started talking about the Bismark survivors and
> how the Dorchester (sp?) was attempting to rescue the survivors and then
> decided to call off the rescue leaving most of them to die. The show did not
> go into very much detail on this incident. Could anyone shed any further
> light on this? Why did the captain order the rescue called off? Did he ever
> receive any type of censure for doing this?
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> John Davis                           | [email-masked]
> Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 22:38:08 +0000
From:    Gudmundur Helgason <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Bismark

>
> As I recall, the rescue effort was called off because of a report that a
> U-boat was in the area.  Any ship dead in the water waiting to board
> survivors would have been a sitting duck.  There actually was a German
> sub nearby; U-74 picked up three sailors from the Bismarck.
> Jim Curry
> [email-masked]
>
There were several subs in the area (among them U.556 which literally
had a sitting duck shot on the broadside of King Georpe V and other
ships in that group, but he had to torpedoes aboard).

No sub was in a real proximity with the last action though, U.74 came at
least a day later and picked up these men quite a bit from the actual
sinking of Bismarck.

The Germans had a line of 5 or 6 subs to assist Bismarck but only 2 got
anywhere near it. U.74 was supposed to get the War Diary from Lutjens but
was too late.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gudmundur J. Helgason                              e-mail: [email-masked]
Olduslod 41                                              phone: (354)-5655270
220 Hafnarfjordur                                               (354)-5652270
ICELAND                                             Maintainer of ICELAND.FAQ
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 18:58:33 -0500
From:    "Peter I. Hidas" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Shooting Downed Pilot (was: Law of Armed Conflict)

During the war, that is in 1944, <I was a ten years old boy and witnessed
Red Army soldiers firing on chutes as they descended on Budapest during
the siege of the Royal Castle. They ceased firing once they discovered
that the parachutes were delivering supplies.
Peter I. Hidas, Montreal

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 19:03:43 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: brief history of "gekokujo" (relates to August 1945 coup attempt)

        In the mid-'twenties Japan was governed by a sort of parliamentary
system dominated by two political parties (although these were a bit more
loosely organized than the typical western political party).  The Seiyukai
party favored expansion abroad.  In foreign and fiscal policy it was the more
daring of the two, willing to undertake deficit spending in order to boost the
military budget and expand the armed forces.  The Seiyukai's most famous figure
was General Giichi Tanaka, who held the post of Prime Minister for several
years (up until 1928).  This was the "author" of the notorious "Tanaka
Memorial," which has been called the Japanese "Mein Kampf," although in fact,
as far as can be determined, it never existed at all as an actual document.
Tanaka's "memorial" was more in the form of the Prime Minister's philosophical
expousal of an expansionist policy, believing that only by bringing needed
resources under Japanese control could the nation survive and prosper, and
willing to undertake a military solution to bring this about.  The Seiyukai was
also militantly anti-Communist on the home front.  There were two very severe
crack-downs on Japanese Communists during Tanaka's premiership.   Abroad,
Tanaka's government looked to keep the situation in northern China, the first
and most obvious area of Japanese "interests," as fluid as possible so as to be
ripe for later intervention.  With this in mind, Japanese troops twice
intervened to keep Chiang Kai-Shek's Kuomintang from bringing the northern area
under control during Chiang's great unification campaign to subdue the various
independent warlords.  Oddly enough, the Seiyukai did have some interest in a
more progressive program of social welfare in Japan, for instance enacting some
long-overdue child labor laws.  I should also mention that both parties were
tainted by the widespread corruption characteristic of Japanese parliamentary
politics at this time (the Seiyukai probably a little less than its adversary
the Minseito).  Some of the wave of assasinations which were to mark the early
1930's were directed specifically against business tycoons thought to be the
source of some of this graft, and the fight against corruption leant some
legitimacy and sympathy to the young radical assassins.
        One of the first major political assasinations, and also one of the
first acts of junior Army officers pursuing their own independent foreign
policy, occurred in June 1928.  Officers of the Kwantung Army, stationed in
northern China and tasked with the protection of the Manchurian railway (to
which the Japanese had rights, including the right to patrol a thin corridor
along the railway for security purposes), plotted the assasination of Chang
Tso-lin, the warlord who controlled mineral-rich Manchuria.  Warlord Chang
travelled in an armored train, but there was one spot where a spur used by
Chang's train passed under the Japanese-owned Manchurian railway.  With the
help of engineers (who fashioned a special shaped charge for the mission), a
powerful charge was set off just as Chang's train passed under the Japanese
rail bridge.  This had the desired effect, and Chang Tso-lin died of his
injuries.  However, the effect in Japan was quite different than that
anticipated.  The Emporer himself (whose role in the Japanese government was
in practice almost exclusively advisory) demanded the culprits in this
international outrage be punished.  Tanaka agreed, but met such fierce
resistance from the Army, especially the War Minister, that he backed down, and
refused to prosecute the officers responsible.  As a result, the Emporer let it
be known he would accept Tanaka's resignation as Prime Minister, and the
rival Minseito party came to power.  Tanaka himself, who had quite an appetite
for licquor and women, died in 1929, dropping dead from a heart attack as he
returned home from a night of partying at a geisha house.
        The Minseito was far more conservative than the Seiyukai in some
respects.  They were less a group of military expansionists and more a party of
banking and big business.  While they were far more willing to look for
international cooperation in foregin policy, on the home front their fiscal
conservatism gained many enemies in the military.  Balanced budgets meant
shrinking funds for the military, and their move to return to the gold standard
meant severe unemployment and belt-tightening among large segments of the
Japanese population.  This was the soil in which "gekokujo," the "bottom
overturning the top," was to flourish.
        In 1930 the government of Prime Minister Hamaguchi, having won the
support of the more moderate admirals of the Japanese Navy, decided to sign the
Washington Naval Armaments Treaty.  This had been hotly debated, and wildly
opposed by many of the more hard-line members of the Navy itself, because it
accepted an inferior position for the Japanese Navy vis-a-vis the US and
Britain.  The earlier London Treaty had already limited the Japanese to three
battleships for every five possessed by the US.  The Washington agreement
extended the limitations to cruisers as well, and the Americans pressed for a
ratio of ten (US) to six (Japanese).  The Japanese argued for at least ten to
seven (citing for instance the far greater capacity to rapidly build new ships
in wartime possessed by the US), but eventually Hamaguchi agreed to the 10:6
ratio on paper, with a "handshake" agreement by the US not to actually build
beyond the 10:7 ratio.  There was much criticism of this decision on
nationalistic grounds, and in November 1930 it came to a head when Hamaguchi
was assasinated by a member of an extremist right-wing nationalist organization
(such secret societies proliferating rapidly in the period now beginning).
        The year 1931 was a watershed in this policy of deliberate,
politically-motivated military insubordination.  In September of that year,
having failed to gain control of Manchuria following the death of Chang
Tso-lin, the Kwantung Army arranged a faked act of sabotage against their
railroad, using this as an excuse to proceed with a military occupation of the
entire province to "restore order."  The Japanese Army high command and the
government had both been made aware of this contemplated action, and the
government ordered the Army to stop it.  A general was therefore dispatched to
personally journey to Manchuria and order the dissidents to desist.  It was bad
enough that categorical orders were not issued by radio, but the emissary
dispatched showed an amazing lack of urgency.  When he arrived in Manchuria,
instead of hastening to Kwantung Army HQ to stop the impending action, he
allowed himself to be diverted into spending the night at a fashionable geisha
house before pursuing his mission.  This was a "win-win" situation for the
Army.  If the coup failed, they could still claim without strictly lying that
they had made an attempt to stop it, and they would have a senior officer on
the spot to save face by making sure the proper heads rolled.  On the other
hand, if the takeover succeeded, they could still deny direct complicity and
claim they had tried unsuccessfully to intervene, while the Army would benefit
greatly in material, strategic, and political terms from the action.  Needless
to say, before this officer could intervene the Kwantung Army was swiftly and
smoothly occupying the entire province.  This was
a paradigm to be repeated many times in the upcoming five years, as the Army
command distanced itself from actual complicity in the acts of its more radical
junior officers, but reaped the rewards whenever such acts succeeded.  Even
more illustrative of the Army attitude were two other occurrances in 1931.  In
March a group of generals plotted a seizure of power, and in October two
colonels planned a coup to take control of the government following the
successful coup in Manchuria.  Both plots were discovered by the Army high
command, but in both cases the conspirators were not charged or even
reprimanded with anything worse than a transfer to some position out of harm's
way and out of sight of the government.   The message, one would think, was
pretty clear.
        These signals sent out by the Army's upper echelons were not long in
bearing fruit.  In February 1932 Finance Minister Inoue, who had consistantly
opposed increases in the military budgets, was assasinated.  The next month
another assassin thrust a pistol into the back of the head of Baron Dan, head
of the Mitsui banking and industrial conglomerate, as the tycoon was getting
into his car, and pulled the trigger (another blow against high-level
corruption by the money interests).  Then, in May, Prime Minister Inukai, a
distinguished gentleman of 73 years, was shot down in his own official
residence, in broad daylight, by a group of uniformed naval cadets (Army cadets
and civilian members of extremist right-wing groups were also part of the
plot).  In many of these outrages, the assassins allegedly planned to commit
suicide immediately after their actions in order to apologize, but in fact it
seldom worked out that way.  The subsequent trial of the leading conspirators
was a media circus, which provided a spectacular national platform for the
radicals to air their views (the "testimony" of the accused frequently took the
form of long, nationalist speeches which the prosecution in no way tried to
obstruct.  This is the particular episode that makes up the bulk of Byas' book
"Government by Assasination").  Eventually 110,000 signatures were collected on
appeals to the judges for leniency given the obvious sincerity and patriotic
motives of the accused.  One group, to show the earnestness of their support,
enclosed with their letter a jar containing one little finger from each member,
neatly severed and pickled.   None of the conspirators was sentenced to death,
and virtually all were out on parole within a few years.  Far from disavowing
the actions of the assassins, the Army command let the government know that if
it a new government was to be formed strictly according to "parliamentary
principles" (i.e., by the majority party from its own members, without
including the military), that further disquiet within the Army was a certainty
(the implication being that the high command would be unable to restrain its
junior officers from similar acts in the future).
        While the rule of terror spread with the tacit support of the Army
command on the home front, the officers of the Kwantung Army were pushing their
expansionist policy with concrete acts abroad.  Although the Navy tended to be
more moderate, having a strong centrist faction (one of the leaders of the
moderates being Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, the Navy Minister at the time of the
August 1945 coup, also Prime Minister for a time prior to Pearl Harbor).  It
was also "less xenophobic," to quote Ronald Spector (from "Eagle Against The
Sun").  Still, in 1932 Japanese marines in Shanghai tangled with a Chinese army
that came too close to what they regarded as their sphere of influence, an
incident in part fabricated to draw attention away from Manchuria, the
occupation of which was being widely protested on the international scene.  But
the Japanese program was continuing apace.  In March 1932 the "independent"
nation of Manchukuo was proclaimed in the former Chinese province of Manchuria,
and in September of that year it was officially recognized by the Japanese
government, whose puppet it was in every sense.  In 1933 the Japanese pushed
even further, quickly overwhelming the adjacent province of Jehol in two steps.
They also pushed armed forces across the Great Wall into the next province,
Hopei, not gaining full control, but forcing a negotiated settlement with the
Chinese commander in Peking, the "Ho-Umezo Agreement" (yes, the same General
Yoshijiro Umezu who was Chief-of-Staff of the Japanese Army in August 1945-- in
1933 he was commander of the Japanese forces in China), which gave the Japanese
increasing influence and opportunity in that province.  The Japanese also in
1933 made successful efforts to subvert Inner Mongolia, essentially buying off
the most powerful local warlord, Li (who then helped them in military actions
to force open the door to Jehol), and Prince Teh Wang, a decendant of Genghis
Khan.  A puppet government for Inner Mongolia was formed with Wang as its chief
and Li as his number two, totally dependent on Japanese money and military
support (sorry, Greg, that's as close as I'm gonna get to Taana Tuuvu or
whatever).  The net result of these efforts was impressive.  I forget the exact
figures (I read them in Edgar Snow's "Red Star Over China"), but by 1936 the
Japanese controlled anywhere from two-thirds to 75-80%, depending on the
commodity in question, of what had formerly been China's deposits of oil, coal,
and iron ore.
        In China proper, meanwhile, interesting developments were also
occuring.  Originally Stalin's foreign policy had supported the large and
powerful coalition movement of the Kuomintang, and the small Chinese Communist
Party had been ordered to join and support the KMT.  But in April 1927 Chiang
Kai-Shek, an anti-Communist at heart, turned on the Communists.  A worker's
strike in Shanghai was the occasion for a massacre, some 10,000 being killed by
Chiang's army, and nationwide about 15,000 Communists were tracked down and
disposed of.  Chou En-Lai, the top Communist subordinate to Chiang during the
coalition days, barely escaped Shanghai.  Mao Tse-tung, still a virtual
unknown, began to regroup the movement as a guerilla army in the hills.  While
unwilling to come to blows with the stronger Japanese (he backed down when they
intervened to stop his great unification campaign, allowing the status of
northern China to remain fluid and beyond his direct control-- that's why
Chiang could not have his capital in Peking, he simply didn't control it),
Chiang went after Mao's guerilla movement with everything he had.  Beginning in
1930, he launched four huge anti-guerilla campaigns, all unsuccessful (although
he did manage to capture and execute Mao's young wife, along with her even
younger sister).  Finally, in the summer of 1934, advised by the German general
Von Seekt, architect of the Reichswehr, and employing some 900,000 troops and
about 300 aircraft capable of ground attack, Chiang's forces undertook a
deliberate encircling movement, constructing a circle of fortifications with
concrete bunkers, machineguns, and barbed wire around the guerilla territory.
Inside was Mao with 140,000 followers.  By August the monumental encirclement
was nearly complete.  In October, with about 100,000 men (including only 35
women), Mao's forces succeeded by the barest margin in breaking out of the
trap, thus beginning the fabled "Long March."  Chased all around China by
Chiang's forces, travelling through unbelievably primitive areas inhabited in
some cases by tribes barely out of the stone age, they eventually trekked some
6,000 miles, before finally being able to establish a secure new base around
Yenan in the northwest of the country.  According to Communist figures around
80,000 of them died along the way, but a nucleus escaped.  Mao's forces were
blockaded in Yenan, but Chiang did not have the strength any more to try to
finish them off.  The Yenan period became a time of gathering strength and
working out programs embracing virtually every facet of Chinese life-- it was a
laboratory for Mao's people to perfect the methods by which they eventually won
the country.  Meanwhile, the chief portion of the blockading Kuomintang forces
was actually made up of the refugee army of the Manchurian warlord Chang
Xueh-liang, son of the assasinated Chang Tso-lin.  The younger Chang never
accepted the Japanese murder of his father and domination of his homeland, and
he yearned to fight the Japanese, but was sent by Chiang Kai-shek against the
Communists instead.  Thus in 1936 Chang Xueh-liang used a visit by Chiang
Kai-shek to kidnap the national leader.  The Communists were informed, and sent
Chou En-lai to negotiate with Chiang.  A new agreement was worked out, wherein
Chiang in return for his freedom and continued support in power promised to
join with the Communists to fight the Japanese.  The brief resurgence of
Chinese fighting spirit against Japanese incursions was a major contributing
factor to the starting of the full-scale war against China in 1937.
        While these portentious events were proceeding in China, the 2/26
Incident of 1936 rocked the home front.  Again a wave of assassinations was
launched by dissident young officers.  In addition to the attempts against
Admiral Suzuki and Prime Minister Okeda described in my earlier posts (Okeda's
escape was aided when a relative of his, gunned down outside while trying to
flee, was mistaken for the Prime Minister), the rebels successfully murdered
Keeper of the Privy Seal Lord Makoto Saito (a retired admiral who was another
of the Navy's moderates), Finance Minister Takahashi, and General Watanabe,
Inspector General of Military Education (hence chief advisor on postings and
promotions).  An unsuccessful attempt was also made on the life of the
Emporer's Privy Councilor, Prince Saionji.  The rebels briefly controlled
Tokyo, and surrounded the Imperial Palace.  This grim episode brought down at
least a semblance of actual retribution from the Army command (some alleged
they simply executed the ringleaders with a bare attempt at due process in
order to cover up complicity at higher levels), but it also marked the
beginning of the Army's complete ascendancy in domestic politics.  The Army
devised a very effective method of control, through the person of the War
Minister, who in practice was always a serving officer of the Army.  If the War
Minister resigned, his replacement could by practice only be named with the
approval of a triumvirate of Army officers-- the outgoing War Minister, the
Chief-of-Staff of the Army, and the Inspector General of Military Education had
to agree on the successor.  If these gentlemen refused to recommend a
replacement, or could not agree (a convenient diplomatic cover for refusal), it
amounted to a vote of no confidance in the government from the Army.  Since the
War Minister was a cabinet position, and no government could have a cabinet
with the position unfilled, a timely resignation from the War Minister could
bring down any government not meeting the Army's approval.  In fact, General
(later Field Marshal) Shunroku Hata, later commander in chief of the huge
Japanese armies in China (1941-44), did exactly that, resigning as War Minister
in July 1940 in order to bring down the government of the moderate-minded Prime
Minister Admiral Yonai.  This was a major step in paving the way for the chief
of the Army's dominant expansionist faction, General Hideki Tojo, to eventually
gain the Prime Minister's post, and lead the nation into war with the west.  I
should also add that even with more control over the dissidents after February
1936 (and the dissidents, of course, had less reason to rebel as the Army and
the nation came more and more to adopt the basic outlines of their program),
the threat of assassination of opponents still existed.  When another of the
moderate admirals, Isoroku Yammamoto, was Vice-Minister of the Navy, radicals
had supposedly placed a 100,000-yen price on his head, and his subordinates
used to joke grimly that riding in the Vice-Minister's car was to be avoided at
all costs.  Other moderates in the Navy eventually promoted Yammamoto to
commander-in-chief of the combined fleet in 1939, in large part to free him
from this threat, as it was felt he would be much safer aboard his flagship.
This is the background of political manipulation through insubordination and
assassination which forms the context and historical background for the August
1945 coup attempt.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Feb 1995 01:04:10 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Peruvian Ecuadoran War

Peru, Ecuador, the war of 1941...

>From "Jane's combat aircraft of WWII", and from information provided by
other members of WWII-L, the following aircraft are listed as being in
service with their airforces:

Peru
  Bombers   : Fairey Gordon, Douglas 8A-3P, Caproni Ca.135, Caproni
              Ca.310 Libeccio
  Fighters  : Curtiss Falcon, Curtiss Hawk, Chance-Vought Corsair,
              North-American NA-50
  Recon.    : Douglas O-17, Fairey Fox
  Transport : Barkley-Grow 8TP, Grumman G-21A, Stinson, Junkers
              Ju 52, Faucett F.19
  Trainers  : Stearman, Vultee 54
Ecuador
  Fighters  : Republic P-35
  Transport : Junkers Ju 52/3m, Bellanca
  Trainers  : North American NA-16, Curtiss-Wright R-19,
              Curtiss-Wright 16E, Fairchild M-62, Ryan PT-20

I searched for some more information on some of these:

The North-American NA-50 was a development of the NA-26, itself a
development with retractable landing gear of the NA-16, the precursor of te
AT-6. The NA-50 was a single-seater with a 870hp Wright R-1820-77 engine.
It was armed with two 7.62mm Colt-Browning guns, and could carry up to
550lb of bombs. It had a maximum speed of 475km/h, a range of 1040km and a
ceiling of 9750m. Peru bought seven NA-50s in early 1939. These saw action
in 1941. Two were lost, one shot down by AAA and one lost due to premature
explosion of an underwing bomb. The similar, but heavier armed NA-68 was
built for Thailand, but requisitioned by the USAAF, that used them as P-64
trainers. (US Army Air Force Fighters, part 2, by Gordon & Swanborough)

The Faucett F-19 was an eight-seat high-wing transport of mixed
construction, powered by a single P&W Hornet S1E3-G engine. The version in
service with the Peruvian military was equipped as seaplane.
(Jane's combat aircraft of WWII).

The Caproni Ca.135 was a twin-engined bomber of mixed contruction. Peru
bought 32, probably powered by 800hp Isotta-Fraschini Asso engines.

The Northrop/Douglas 8A was the export version of the A-17 Nomad, a light
single-engined bomber. This was a development with retractable landing
gear of the earlier A-16. The basic A-17A was powered by a 825hp
P&W R-1535-13 engine, had a crew of two, and was armed with four
forward-firing .3in machine guns and one flexible gun in the aft cockpit.
They had a speed of 354km/h, a ceiling of 5915m and a range of 1920km.
The DB-8 was widely exported, and license-built in Sweden as the B.5. But
its performance was not very good. Dutch attempts to use the DB-8 as a
fighter were a failure. The DB-8A-3P was a high-altitude version for
Peru, of which ten were built. The USAAF also seized 34 more DB-8-A5
aircraft built for Peru, and used them under the designation A-33.
(Combat Aircraft of World War Two, Elke C. Weal)

The reference to the Douglas O-17 is probably an error. The O-17 was
actually built by Consolidated. But the Aviacion Naval Peruana received six
Douglas O-38P reconaissance aircraft in 1932. The O-38P was a biplane with
an enclosed cockpit, powered by a P&W R-1690 engine. Small numbers of O-38s
were also built for the Air National Guard and the USAAC.
(Bernard Lestrade, in Le Fana de l'Aviation Avril 1993).

The Fairey Gordon was a development of the ubiquitous Fairey IIIF
reconnaissance aircraft and light bomber, with a new engine, the
Armstrong Siddeley Panther radial. The Gordon was a rigged and braced
biplane with open cockpits. In 1941 it was a clear anachronism, but in
the same year some RAF Gordons saw combat in Iraq, during a brief revolt
against British rule. Some were sold to Peru, but I did not find how many.

The reference to the 'Vought Corsair' does not clarify whether it concerns
the Vought O2U or O3U two-seat reconaissance aircraft, or the F4U fighter.
The former was certainly sold to Peru. It was a biplane powered by a P&W
R-1690 Hornet engine. Top speed was 290km/h, service ceiling 6070m. It was
armed with one forward-firing .3in and one aft-firing .3in.
(Combat Aircraft of World War Two, Elke C. Weal)

The Barkley-Grow T8P-1 was an eight-seat all-metal monoplane transport,
powered by two 400hp P&W Wasp Junior engines. Max level speed 338km/h.
(Jane's Encyclopedia of Aviation)

The Grumman G-21 is the Grumman JRF 'Goose' twin-engined amphibian.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 18:18:45 -0600
From:    "Tim J. Watts" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INF: 50 Years Ago - 05-FEB-1945

There was a short blurb on here several weeks ago about Col. Roosevelt
bumping several GI's bound for leave off a transport plane, so he could
ship a dog to his wife.  I suspect this may have been the incident that
set off the delay.  (BTW, in the 1944 election campaign, wasn't his father
FDR accused of doing something similar with Fala, his scottish terrier?)

Tim J. Watts
Valparaiso University

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 18:24:26 -0600
From:    "Tim J. Watts" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Senator Robert Dole

As a native Kansan, I think you are are required to know some of the
details.  On April 14, 1944, Lt. Dole was attempting to lead his unit
up some hill in Italy.  Machine gun fire ripped his right arm and shoulder.
I think he spent some time in between the lines before he was rescued.
He was sent back to the States and put in a VA hospital in Topeka (?).  No
one expected him to live and he got down to less than 100 pounds.
(I did see a picture of him at the time and he looked like he came out
of Dachau.)  Unbelievably, he regained his will to live, went through
rehabilitation, and graduated from law school.  Personally, I think he
was (and probably still is) too mean to die.  (No offense meant to any
supporters of Dole; I think he has done a lot for the state of Kansas.)

Tim J. Watts
Valparaiso University

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 16:52:47 -0800
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Enola Gay Exhibit

At 1:01 PM 2/6/95, Steven Pudlo, Dept. Computer Svcs. wrote:
[..]
>>"Concerning the absoluteness of her defeat there can be no doubt.  The time
>>lapse between military impotence and political acceptance of the inevitable
>>might have been shorter had the political structure of Japan permitted a
>>more rapid and decisive determination of national plicies."
>
>Has anybody ever looked into what the japanese people really knew at that
>point in time? Their sources of information were loading them up with
>porpoganda about how they were winning, and suddenly they didn't...

I realize that the American Air Force had reasons to make the bombing look
effective, but here are some quotes from _Mission Accomplished_, Prepared
by the Assistant Chief of Air Staff -- Intelligence Headquarters Army Air
Forces, 1946.

p.26  "While Tokyo radio was trying to make the Japanese and the world at
large believe that the fire raids were merely hardening the people's will
to resist, the actual effects were far different.  Mr. Koizuma, Chief of
the Plice Bureau of the Home Ministry, had this to say:

'Morale change was chiefly due to a loss of certainty of victory, which
grew through successive defeats into a loss of faith in government news,
then in government safeguarding civilians, and finally into a losss of
faith in the military.  Control measures withing the purview of the police
were largely measures dealing with rumors, fine and impironment in a few
cases, plice visits, lecturing and converting persons to whom rumors were
traceable.'"

"' United States leaflets grew in influence until thery were widely believe
in June and July 1945...'"

p 27.  Dr Kawai, chief Editorial writer of the Nippon Times (B.A. M.A. Ph.D
Stanford)

"'When the B-29 raids began the people really knew the war was lost.
Before that they knew some islands had been lost, but islands mean nothing
to the ordinay man.  When the big raids came, the feeling of defeat began.
But the B-29 raids were beyond the point of criticism.  People felt that
they were all in for it, and there was no purpose in criticism, at least
not increase of criticisim of the government.'"

"' The amount of defeat feeling varied with the individual, but by the time
the Marianas were captured, the intellectuals were certain the the war was
lost.  The real terror for the people came with those leaflets naming the
places to be bombed.  When you did that and then bombed the places named,
then there was real terror.'"

"The visible evidence of destruction made Japanese propaganda, minimimizing
the danger from the B-29's look sick."  There follows an interesting
"mathematical proof" by the propagandists that the US would run out of
B-29's and aircrews.

[..]

>In either event, this is a rather moot argument. The bombs were dropped, and
>there is little point in wallowing in guilt for what was then, the proper
>decision (IMHO).
>
>We can differ in our opinions yet maintain mutual respect. Others can chime
>in on both sides because this is an engrossing topic, but I think I've said
>enough.
>
>Take care, John, and thanx fer th' response.

Agree 100%.  For the record, given the times I think it would have been
impossible to reach another conclusion.  I just like looking at the other
side of the question.

John Riegsecker                                 (206) 756-3566
Dept of Mathematics and Computer Science        [email-masked]
University of Puget Sound

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 16:51:00 -0800
From:    Julian E Gomez <[email-masked]>
Subject: Enola Gay cartoon

Apparently one of the news services ran a cartoon showing the Enola Gay
dropping a bureaucrat out the bomb bay with a fist full of papers, saying
"Listen up, imperialist lackeys! I'm from the Smithsonian and I'm rewriting
history! I say the Japanese were victims! I sayyyyyy......."

"I was a precocious child and obviously destined to be a scientist."

        Dr. Julian "a tribble took it" Gomez
        Apple Computer, Inc.  408/862-1289 or 996-1010
        [email-masked]  [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 20:35:54 -0500
From:    Henry Herz <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: admin (sorry)

THIS IS EXACTLY THE KIND OF FASCINATING INFORMATION I SUBSCRIBE TO WWII-L TO
READ!  PLEASE POST MORE PERSONAL COMPUTER DETAILS TO FURTHER JAM MY MAILBOX!
>
>         Joe, I have no idea what the hell happened but you probably wound up
> with a bunch of messages bounced from my account.  Some force beyond my
> control
> apparently quintupled the amount of space my directory was taking up.  The
> computer folks here still don't know what caused the problem, but they gave
> me
> 10,000 additional blocks while they work on it so the problem should be
> cleared
> up as far as it effects you...sorry for the inconvenience, but I didn't do
> nuthin' (I left Thursday with approx 560 blocks used out of an allowance of
> 2000 + 100 permitted overdraft.  I came back to see my usage at 3400+!!  Even
> after I deleted all my messages that arrived in the last three days I was
> still
> at 2600+ and couldn't do anything (like compress or alert you with a message
> or
> even set "no-mail" because it was telling me I was over quota.  Again, my
> apologies for any inconvenience this caused.
> PS I "speed-deleted" some 100+ messages, not counting at least 7 that
> bounced,
> so I probably missed a bunch of good stuff.
>
> PPS; sorry, Joe, but I think I referred to the LUPO as a "destroyer escort,"
> not exactly accurate either but I like to use the term because "torpedo boat"
> creates confusion with MTB's, PT's, etc...
>
> Abjectly yours
>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 20:31:51 -0600
From:    Terrence Lindell <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WORLD WAR 2 MUSIC

On Feb 5 Sidney Allinson quoted the first and last lines of a WWII folk
song, sung to the tune of the Colonel Bogey March, that commented on
Hitler's anatomy.  Without repeating Sidney's contribution, let me
add the middle two lines:

        "Goering's are rather awf'lly small.
         Himmler is soewhat sim'lar,"

In Hitler's case, there has been some speculation that this may have
been true.  See Hans W. Gatzke, "Hitler and Psychohistory:  A Review
Article,"  _American Historical Review_ 78 (April, 1973): 394ff, and
the correspondence concerning the article in the AHR 78 (October, 1973):
1155ff. (I'll bet that sends some people to musty stacks to check old
some old periodicals!)  I don't know enough about the current state of
scholarship on Hitler's personal life to comment and I couldn't find
anything in Joachim Fest's Hitler_ to substantiate it.  John Toland's
_Adolf Hitler_ cites a Soviet autopsy (p. 1223) that might support the
claim.

In my Historiography class I have students each read one article from a
list on psychohistory, including the article I cite above.  This
particular issue sometimes gets mentioned in the oral reports, much to
the interest of the rest of the class.  Last year I told students that
I was uncomfortable repeating the lyrics of the song to the class, I would
leave a copy in a manila folder on the desk and those who were interested
could look at it.  I had to step lively to avoid being run over.

Terry Lindell
Wartburg College (for whom I am not speaking)
Department of History
Waverly, Iowa  50677
[email-masked]

PS:  Sidney,  Several weeks ago you asked about a current address for
the Society for Military History.  I couldn't respond then because of
technical difficulties.  If you still need it, let me know.  Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 21:01:19 -0600
From:    "C.K. Bryant" <[email-masked]>
Subject: ADMIN: Trying to avoid flame (was RE: admin (sorry)

Joe and the others who weren't offended by Mike's post:

Knowing that the ADMIN is the abbreviation to indicate that a post is
administratively related, I was not at all offended by Mike Yaklich's
post.  However, the following response struck me as being totally
uncalled for.  I thought of responding to Mr. Herz directly, but figured
I would be asking for flames.  So in an effort to get support from the
other regulars at WWII in the event of further flames from Mr. Herz, I
posted here.  I may need some support guys.  Thanks,

C.K. Bryant

-----added post-----
Date:         Mon, 6 Feb 1995 20:35:54 -0500
From: Henry Herz <[email-masked]>
Subject:      Re: admin (sorry)

> THIS IS EXACTLY THE KIND OF FASCINATING INFORMATION I SUBSCRIBE TO
> WWII-L TO READ!  PLEASE POST MORE PERSONAL COMPUTER DETAILS TO FURTHER
> JAM MY MAILBOX!

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 22:24:02 EST
From:    "Carl Wernke - [email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: DOC: Re: Operation OLYMPIC - Estimate of casualties

 X-To: [email-masked]

 From Tim McFeely ([email-masked]) at Fri, 3 Feb 1995 09:25:38 -0500

 Tim wrote:
 > This thread has argued about anticipated or projected casualties.
 > 60,000 to 1,000,000. As far as I am concerned 1 was too many (bombs away),
 > but I didn't write this post to argue that point.

 The following documents were obtained from MacArthur Memorial Archives,
 Norfolk, VA., and are germane to the point at hand:

                                                          _COPY_

  PRIORITY                                                16 June 1945

  TO  :  GHQ AFPAC (MACARTHUR)

  FROM:  WASHINGTON

  NR  :  W-17477  15TH

      Request by 17 June (Washington) the estimate you are using for
  planning purposes of battle casualties in OLYMPIC up to D+90.

                                            Marshall

      TOO:  160615 I
      TOR:  SC MSG CEN 160831 I
      TOR:  AG R/C AFPAC (O) 160942 I
      MCN:  XB 151

      CORRECTED DISTRIBUTION:

         _ACTION COPY TO_: G-1
         _INFORMATION COPIES TO:

            G-3
            G-4
            AG - Director Opns Div

 =============================================================================

      PRIORITY                                                     COPY

                                                     G-1     17 JUNE 1945

      FROM:   CINCAFPAC

      TO  :   WARCOS

      Estimate of OLYMPIC battle casualties for planning purposes (C-19571)
      Reurad W-17477 as follows:

                            D to D+30:  50,800
                        D+30  to D+60:  27,150
                        D+60  to D+90:  27,100

      The foregoing are estimated total battle casualties from estimated
      return to duty members are deducted. Not included in the fpregoing are
      non battle casualties which are estimated at 4200 for each 30 day period.

===============================================================================

                                                      _COPY_

     URGENT                                          19 JUNE 1045

     FROM:  General Marshall
     TO  :  General MacArthur (Personal)
     WAR  18528 19 June

            The President is very much concerned as to the number of casualties
     we will receive in the OLYMPIC operation. This will be discussed with
     the President about 3:30 PM today Washington time. Is the estimate given
     in your C-19571 of 50,800 for the period of D to D+30 on pland for
     medical installations to be established or is it your best estimate of
     the casualties you anticipate from the operational viewpoint. Please
     rush answer.       End of part 1 of 2-
                All Documents marked:  REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
                                       ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER
                                            720354
    Carl Wernke

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 23:24:00 EST
From:    "Carl Wernke - [email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: DOC: Re: Operation OLYMPIC - Estimate of casualties (pt 2 of 2)

 X-To: [email-masked]

 URGENT                                                      _COPY_

                                                             19 June 1945
 FROM:  General MacArthur

 TO  :  General Marshall (Personal)

 C-19848

     Estimate of casualties contained in my C-19571 was a routine
 report submitted direct by a staff section without higher reference
 for medical and replacement planning purposes. The estimate was
 derived from the casualty rates in Normandy and Okinawa the highest
 our forces have sustained as 3.8 men per thousand per day. The total
 force involved was estimated as 681,000 with one  half engaged the
 first 15 days and the entire strength thereafter. The estimate is
 purely academic and routine and was made for planning alone. It had
 not come to my prior attention. I do not anticipate such a high rate
 of loss. I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive
 loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive
 effect will eventuall save lives by eliminating wasteful operations
 of a nondecisive character. I regard the operation as the most
 economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect
 it must be remembered that the several preceeding months will involve
 practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a
 decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be
 greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently
 ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I
 most earnestly recommend no change in OLYMPIC. Additional subsidiary
 attacks will simply build up our final total casualties.

 Sent Telecon:  181225Z

                                          AG Records has Orig

                      Document Stamped:
                                      REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
                                      ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER
                                            720354
                      End part 2 of 2

  Carl Wernke

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 22:33:05 -0600
From:    Chuck Johnson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japanese Nukes

> > > >...BTW, Japan does have a nuclear program now which has
> > > >produced warheads _and_ missiles which are arguably superior to the
> > > >American and Soviet (Russian) ones....
> > > >Cheers,
> > > >David Rising
> > > >

> David-

> Exsqueeze me!!!  I have NEVER heard that the Japanese have nuclear weapons
> (reactors, yes).  That would be in violation of their constitution.  My
> understanding is that only the US, former USSR, Britain, France, PRC, India,
> Israel & probably Pakistan and South Africa have nukes.  Would you please
> provide a reference for that claim for Japan.  Thanks.

> -Henry Herz

Henry,

I believe you are correct -- Japan does not have nukes and it would be a
severe violation of their "pacifist" constitution to have them -- but it
it is true that they have something approaching the capability to build
them and the missile systems to deliver them.  For an excellent fictional
account of how that could happen, I recomend "Debt of Honor" by Tom Clancy.
It's not all that far-fetched.  Well, maybe it is -- who really knows?

That being said, this subject is very far off-topic -- at least the modern
portion of it is.  If you want to discuss the Tom Clancy book, I suggest
the Usenet Newsgroup "alt.fan.Tom_Clancy" (or close to that).  There has
been some discussion in the past.

Yours,
  -- Chuck Johnson -- [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Feb 1995 23:36:17 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: MARINE CORPS CHRONOLOG

In response to all who have given a thumb's up on a Marine Corps chronology, I
shall begin posting. The first posting will be on 10 February, since that is
the first date that anything of importance occurred Marine Corps-wise in 1945.
Thanks for the positive encouragement. Ben Frank

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 5 Feb 1995 to 6 Feb 1995
***********************************************