Subject: WWII-L Digest - 26 Feb 1995 to 27 Feb 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 28 Feb 1995 00:05:09 -0500

There are 22 messages totalling 1126 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. What if...? (3)
  2. ADMIN: Joe Barone
  3. Is something wrong with the list? (2)
  4. China/Japan part 2
  5. INF: USN Chronology 02-26-95 (2)
  6. INF: USN Chronology 02-27-95
  7. James W. Little obit
  8. China/Japan part 3
  9. Japanese Peace Offerings
 10. Westerly 4 of 5, Narciso summary
 11. Is it true that they can trace a single document
 12. China/Japan part 4
 13. TAC: Africa (was: What if?) (2)
 14. Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's
 15. A-bomb spies
 16. TACT:  Offensive AVG
 17. INF: 50 Years Ago - 28-FEB-1945

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 12:03:42 UTC+0100
From:    Ivan Demiguel <[email-masked]>
Subject: What if...?

Hi!
I'm new in this list, and I'd like to pass a interesting moments with all
of you.
One thing I would like to talk is about North-african front.
I think Axis could have won the campaign before operation "Torch".
After taking Tobruk, the German forces should have taken more care with
their supply lines.
This was one of the main problems Rommel had during the campaign and the
fatal error came when Kesselring canceled the operation "Hercules".
About the operation "Hercules" the Germans could have taken Malta easily
because during that period they had air superiority and the allied
land&air forces in the isle were minimal.
With Axis controling Malta the supply line would be secured and all convoys
to Egypt could be intercepted easily.
When Kesselring finally forgot "Hercules", Rommel only got a few troops more
and less supplies for them.
Rommel was a natural player, his victories were totally a success but the
risks too.
After taking Tobruk, Rommel had only one thing in his mind: reach
Alexandria, so he bet and...he lost.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 08:21:04 CST
From:    Robert Hohlt <[email-masked].>
Subject: ADMIN: Joe Barone

My appologies to the list in advance but I have no choice.

Joe Barone,  I have tried to e-mail privately to you
(to your address : [email-masked]) but since I never
get a response I assume it never gets to you.

I have been trying to go to nomail but the listserver says
I don't exist.

>> set wwii-l nomail
>You are not subscribed to the WWII-L list.

>Summary of resource utilization
>-------------------------------
> CPU time:        0.119 sec                Device I/O:        7
> Overhead CPU:    0.036 sec                Paging I/O:        2
> CPU model:        3090                    DASD model:     3380

Joe as an "Unsubscribed" WWII-Lister I am drowning in about 500+
WWII-L messages and would like some time off to sort through it.

Joe, please find out if I am subscribed to the WWII-L.
If I am subscribed by a different address then please
set me to nomail or unsubscribe me and let me subscribe
again to set the return address correctly.

Thanks

Robert Hohlt, Jr.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 08:51:39 -0600
From:    Drew Halevy <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Is something wrong with the list?

sane here, just a few postings each day-drew

Drew Philip Halevy      |
Grad Student            | Go tell the Spartans, thou who passest by,
Department of History   | That here obedient to their laws we lie.
University of Arkansas  |    Simonides c. 556-468 b.c.
[email-masked]   |

On Sun, 26 Feb 1995, C.K. Bryant wrote:

> On Sun, 26 Feb 1995, John Davis wrote:
>
> > I seem to be getting very few new massages lately. Is it my setup or is
> > something wrong with the mailing list??
>
> John
>
> Good question...come to think of it, I haven't had much mail the past few
> days either.
>
> Anyone else?
>
> C.K.
> *******************************************************************
> "The Riskier the road, the greater the profit."    / C.K. Bryant
>         The 62nd Rule of Acquisition               / W.I.U. English
> *******************************************************************
>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 10:08:25 EST
From:    Mike Oaks <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Is something wrong with the list?

On Sun, 26 Feb 1995 20:57:32 -0600,
C.K. Bryant  <[email-masked]> wrote:

>On Sun, 26 Feb 1995, John Davis wrote:
>
>> I seem to be getting very few new massages lately. Is it my setup or is
>> something wrong with the mailing list??
>
>John

Hi Folks,
  IMHO the list is doing just fine. Came in this morning and had about 50
plus messages queued up. Looks OK to me... Maybe the listowner can give
you a possible message count of what was sent on a particular day and you
can verify your count from that... Good Luck!!
                                             Mike

/====================================================================\
|    Michael A. Oaks                                                 |
|    Systems Analyst                  Music: A means to mark times   |
|    [email-masked]              stepping stones through |
|    Kennesaw, Georgia 30144                 your calendar of life.  |
|    Tel: (404)423-6049  Fax (404)423-6541          ~ ~ ~ ~      MAO |
|    VWAR-L #146 - - (Sgt. USAF = / AFCS / AFSS / AFDC)              |
|    Break, Break...Kadena, Kadena, Yokota, Yokota, Clark, Clark...  |
|    Break, Break...Request you echo the following broadcast...      |
|    (Some things you never forget...even after 25 years...)         |
\====================================================================/

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 09:58:40 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: What if...?

Ivan,
I am going to answer quickly and off the top of my head so some of the
facts may be off slightly but the concepts/truths are still sound.

>I'm new in this list, and I'd like to pass a interesting moments with all
>of you.
>One thing I would like to talk is about North-african front.
>I think Axis could have won the campaign before operation "Torch".
>After taking Tobruk, the German forces should have taken more care with
>their supply lines.

True! Rommel was always on the end of a tenuous supply line. He could not
fix this due to Hitlers priorities  on other fronts. Kesselring could not
prosecute the attack against Malta for the same reason, he had the combat
troops but not the logistical support (or much support from Hitler, who had
decided that Airborne Assaults were too costly after Crete). A Naval
Amphibious assault was wholly out of reach [no specialized landing craft
and a contested control of the sea - British Naval Radar gave them a
tremendous advantage at night and in poor visibility]. Command of the Air
is a powerful tool, but not decisive - even Desert Storm proved this;
ultimately you must have surface forces (Naval Ships or Army Forces) to
occupy and maintain control - this requires a way to keep these forces in
supply and the supplies to send. Germany was stretched rather thinly and
did not have any reserve of capacity or supply to comit. This is why
Kesselring had to cancel "Hercules". Basically Kesselring would have had to
cut Rommels supplies off to run "Hercules", anything lost would not have
been replacable, so even after the resumption of supply to what remained of
Rommels forces, there would have been less capacity. In the long term it
might have reduced losses to British depredation, but in the short term, it
might have cost them DAK!

>This was one of the main problems Rommel had during the campaign and the
>fatal error came when Kesselring canceled the operation "Hercules".
>About the operation "Hercules" the Germans could have taken Malta easily
>because during that period they had air superiority and the allied
>land&air forces in the isle were minimal.
>With Axis controling Malta the supply line would be secured and all convoys
>to Egypt could be intercepted easily.

Most all the Convoys to Egypt went around Africa, through Capetown, South
Africa - Malta would not have affected the Allies supplies; It would have
loosened the strangle hold on Axis supplies, however.
Allied aircraft flew across the South Atlantic and across Africa, South of
the Sahara. This put them beyond Axis interferance too.

>When Kesselring finally forgot "Hercules", Rommel only got a few troops more
>and less supplies for them.
>Rommel was a natural player, his victories were totally a success but the
>risks too.

Rommel was want to disregard his logisticians advice. logisticians tend to
be conservative, Rommel [and Hitler for that matter] were aggressive
optimists who felt they could push these estimates. They did several times
and got away with it; so they took it as a given - this was a mistake,
since what they really did was bet that the Logisticians "Safety Factor"
would not be needed, several times it wasn't, and a few times the opponent
was surprised by their ability to exceed "Logistic Capability"... in the
end they gambled too often and ended up losing at inoportune times.

>After taking Tobruk, Rommel had only one thing in his mind: reach
>Alexandria, so he bet and...he lost.

If Rommel was going to take the Suez, he had to do it on his own. The
British had learned that he was able to do "the Impossible", so they took
precautions to ensure he couldn't. It gave Rommel a "Greater than " Aura,
but it kept him from ever succeeding, he came close geographically, but was
never close in reality. Rommel could not have fought a successful battle in
the built up areas along the Suez, because he didn't have the forces, and
couldn't stand the attrition; his tanks would have been at a disadvantage
[close quarters], while the same close quarters were a British advantage!
Hitler would have had to significantly reinforced Rommel at the expense of
the Russian front to ever have a chance. Strategically, the Torch landings
would have found DAK even more out on a limb than they were. The Allies
could have maintained a front / threat down the East coast of Africa and in
the Sinai, so DAK could not have been pulled away after a victory.

I hope this explain the reasons/difficulties a bit more clearly.

Jim O'Neil  From the interrogation of a German General at the end of WW II:

               "The reason the American Army does so well in War, is that War
                is Chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis"

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 12:03:01 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: China/Japan part 2

Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]> writes:
> ... In 1943, even after a number of
> top-line units had already been withdrawn for the fighting against the
> Americans and their allies in the south, the Japanese still had some 620,000
> men and 14,000 motor vehicles on the Chinese mainland.

        One needs only to compare the number of Allied trucks at Anzio
to the Japanese number quoted above to realize that Japan truly suffered
a "paucity of resources" (as Mike puts it).  The Allies had 18,000 trucks
(all of which they couldn't possibly use) on the few square miles of the
Anzio beachhead whereas Japan had 14,000 vehicles for all of China.

(The Anzio number comes from Carl D'Este's book on Anzio.)
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
Crap Game: And who are those bunch of refugees over there?
 Odd Ball: Hey, it's the band!
Crap Game: The band? What do we need a band for?
 Odd Ball: Have a little faith, Crap Game, they're beautiful people!

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 26 Feb 1995 00:00:14 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 02-26-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
02/26 Mon.  United States naval vessels damaged:
             Light cruiser PASADENA (CL-65), by naval gunfire,
              south of Honshu, Japan,
              31 d. 20'N., 141 d. 15'E.
             Destroyer PORTERFIELD (DD-682), by naval gunfire,
              south of Honshu, Japan,
              33 d. 10'N., 143 d. 30'E.
             Minesweeper SAUNTER (AM-195), by mine,
              Luzon area, P. I.,
              14 d. 17'N., 120 d. 38'E.
             LST 121, by collision and grounding, Iwo Jima area,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             LST 760, and LST 884, by coastal defense gun,
              Iwo Jima area,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
            Japanese naval vessels sunk:
             Submarine I-368, by aircraft (VC-82) from escort carrier
              Anzio (CVE-57), Volcano Islands  area,
              24 d. 43'N., 140 d. 37'E.
             Submarine I-370, by destroyer escort FINNEGAN (DE-307),
              near Volcano Islands,
              22 d. 45'N., 141 d. 27'E.
             Submarine RO-43, by aircraft (VC-82) from escort carrier
              Anzio (CVE-57), near Volcano Islands,
              24 d. 07'N., 140 d. 19'E.
             Frigate SHONAN, by submarine HOE (SS-258), South China
              Sea,
              17 d. 08'N., 110 d. 01'E.
             Picket boat, by naval gunfire, south of Honshu, Japan.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 04:00:11 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 02-27-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
02/27 Tue.  United States naval vessels damaged, Iwo Jima area:
             Light carrier SAN JACINTO (CVL-30), by collision,
              23 d. 00'N., 139 d. 00'E.
             Destroyer COLHOUN (DD-801), by collision,
              24 d. 49'N., 141 d. 20'E.
             Oiler MERRIMACK (AO-37), by collision,
              23 d. 00'N., 139 d. 00'E.
             Attack transport PRESIDENT ADAMS (APA-19), by collision,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             Attack transport KNOX (APA-46), by collision,
              14 d. 49'N., 141 d. 21'E.
             Attack cargo ship TOLLAND (AKA-64), by collision,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             LST 779, by collision and grounding,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             LST 809, by collision,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
            German submarine sunk:
             U-317, by United States naval land-based aircraft
              (VPB-112), and British surface ships, English Channel,
              49 d. 46'N., 05 d. 47'W.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 13:38:27 EST
From:    "Dennis E. Sparks" <[email-masked]>
Subject: James W. Little obit

According to Saturday's paper, retired Brigdier General James W. Little
died on Wednesday at the age of 74.  A native of Lexington, Kentucky,
Little flew with the Flying Tigers in Burma and China during WWII, was
a squadron leader during the Korean War, and was the deputy chief of
staff of the 7th AF in Vietnam.  His decorations included the Silver
Star, DFC, Legion of Merit with cluster, Bronze Star, and the Air Force
Medal with five clusters.

I checked the index of fellow listmember Dan Ford's fine book on the
Flying Tigers, but Little was not listed.  I presume from this that he
flew with the 23rd(?) FG that succeeded the original Tigers.  If anyone
has more information on his career, could they please either post it to
the list or email me directly?

Dennis E. Sparks
[email-masked]
Lexington, Kentucky

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 13:59:48 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: China/Japan part 3

        Before returning to China, I wanted to complete my description of
Japanese dispositions for their southern offensive in December 1941, to
(hopefully) demonstrate how even at the start of their campaign of conquest
against the western powers their military resources were already in many
respects stretched to the limit.  As I was saying, there were four Japanese
armies earmarked for the southern operations.  Yamashita's 25th Army, with the
5th, 18th, and Konoye Divisions, assaulted Malaya and Singapore.  Homma's 14th
Army, composed of the 16th and 48th Divisions, attacked the Phillipines.
Iida's 15th Army, initially disposing of the 33rd and 55th Divisions, was to
invade Burma AFTER securing Thailand (fortunately for the Japanese, the Thai
government had pursued a policy generally friendly to Japan, and did not offer
organized resistance to Japanese occupation in Dec '41.  Thailand thereby
retained a greater degree of relative independence than most members of the
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," including the right to a military
establishment that contained a small navy and air force, which the Japanese
Army provided with fighter and light bomber aircraft among other military
equipment).  Imamura's 16th Army, with the task of taking Indonesia, was at
first the smallest of all, having 2nd Division, an infantry brigade, and 1st
Parachute Brigade (which in reality consisted of only a single battalion-- just
over 700 paratroopers-- linked with an "air regiment" of Ki-57 transports to
carry them).  In addition, the independent 38th Division-- another outfit of
China veterans-- was to attack the British in Hong Kong (where, aided by
Japanese marines, they profited from a significant numerical advantage).
Counting reserves held by Terauchi's Southern Area a total of 11 divisions were
available for the great push south.
        The Japanese Army did however commit a major portion of its air
resources to the move south.  In terms of ground combat units, barely one fifth
of the available forces were utilized in the first phase of this offensive (and
there was no second phase envisioned).  NOTE: the Japanese Army had some
2,400,000 men in uniform in December 1941, but soon thereafter began calling an
additional three million men to the colors.  In terms of air units, though,
about 700 of the Japanese Army's 1,500 front-line aircraft were earmarked for
the southern operations.  These were organized into two groups.  The 3rd Air
Group (Lt-Gen Michio Sugawara) included four fighter regiments, three light
bomber regiments, three heavy bomber regiments, and one reconnaissance regt.
It was employed in support of the Army efforts in Malaya/Singapore, then moved
to Indonesia in time for the landings on the main island of Java.
NOTE: the Japanese Army air forces, like the German and Soviet,
were organized strictly for the direct support of the Army ground units
(although, surprisingly, the separate command systems meant that the
cooperation between air and ground units often left much to be desired.
Yamashita, for example, who himself had formerly held the post of Inspector of
Army Aviation, complained of the inability of the air units to provide
effective support on Singapore, even though the Japanese by this time had
complete control of the skies there).  The 5th Air Group (Lt-Gen Eiryo Obata)
had two fighter regiments, three light bomber regiments, two heavy bomber
regiments, and one reconnaisance regt.  5th Air Group initially supported the
Army in the Phillipines, but in Feb '42 most of its units, especially the
bombers, were transferred to Burma.
        The fighter regts of 3rd Air Group were equipped with a mix of Ki-27
and Ki-43 fighters (the latter just entering large-scale service).  Fighter
units of 5th Air Group flew the Ki-27 in Dec '41.  The Ki-27, although
perhaps the most maneuverable military monoplane ever built, was already badly
outdated, being slow, armed with only two small 7.7-mm mgs, and very lightly
built (of course, in the Phillipines they were still a match for the US P-35,
although the surviving P-40's often gave them fits-- an example was "Buzz"
Wagner, one of the first US aces of the war, who got his first three "kills" in
one mission when he surprised a flight of Ki-27's over the Japanese landing
beaches near Aparri in 12/41).  Light bomber regts were still largely equipped
with either the (Mitsubishi) Ki-30 or the (Kawasaki) Ki-32 single-engined level
bomber, or in some cases even the older (but for its era-- the mid '30's--
fairly fast) Mitsubishi Ki-15.  However, in 1940 the Japanese began
manufacturing the Mitsubishi Ki-51 dive bomber, and this plane soon came to be
the Japanese Army's most important ground attack aircraft.  It boasted
excellent maneuverability, was, by Japanese standards, very well-protected and
structurally sturdy, and also its method of attack was considered more accurate
than the glide-bombing tactics favored by the earlier light bombers.
Furthermore, the Ki-51 was regarded as very reliable mechanically, not a small
consideration in the difficult and primitive conditions the Japanese Army
aviation was often forced to operate under in the field.  The ability of this
small aircraft to evade enemy fighters due to its maneuver qualities (much as,
for example, Hans Rudel operated his outdated Stuka in the face of heavy odds
right up through 1944 in Russia) led to the Ki-51 remaining in service
throughout the war, about 2,300 eventually being built.  However, it was only
beginning to enter service in 1941 (one of the first air attacks on Corregidor
island in Manila harbor was, for example, carried out by a flight of Ki-30's).
A serious drawback of the Ki-51 was its extremely light payload (only 441 lbs
of bombs!), but this was a quality shared by all the earlier single-engined
bombers, and also by the two-engined Kawasaki Ki-48 light bomber later employed
over Guadalcanal and elsewhere.
        Heavy bomber regiments in 1941 were equipped with the (Mitsubishi)
Ki-21 two-engined bomber.  This machine too served on through most of the war,
remaining in production until Sept '44 (with over 2,000 built), although it
showed itself vulnerable to modern enemy fighters from the very start, a
condition which modifications to add armor plate, extra defensive machineguns,
and even new engines which gave a higher speed failed to alleviate.  The
(Nakajima) Ki-49, first used in a raid on Darwin, Australia in Feb '42 and
intended to replace the Ki-21, proved disappointing in performance and no less
susceptible to enemy fighters (despite the fact that it was the first Japanese
Army aircraft to mount a 20-mm cannon, in a dorsal position covering the tail).
Just as with the Navy's P1Y, the Army eventually developed an outstanding
two-engined bomber in the Mitsubishi Ki-67.  It was incredibly maneuverable for
its size, capable of flying loops and making tighter turns than some Japanese
Army fighters!  It was also very well-armored, fast for a bomber, and fairly
well-armed with a 20-mm gun in a rotating turret on top and single 12.7-mm
(.50-cal) machineguns in the nose, tail, and on each side of the fuselage.
Just like the Navy P1Y, though, the Ki-67 entered service in quantity too late
to make a difference.  It was first used in combat (as a land-based torpedo
bomber) during the Phillipine Sea naval battle in June 1944, fought through the
rest of the Marianas campaign, and, with over 700 eventually built, saw action
over Iwo Jima and Okinawa in 1945.
        Since I got sidetracked on Japanese Army aircraft, I should mention
that when, in my earlier post referring to the P1Y, I said that it was the only
Japanese plane which had a chance of survival in the reconnaisance role, I was
referring to the only NAVY aircraft.  One of the Japanese Army's most
successful designs was the (Mitsubishi) Ki-46 two-engined reconnaisance plane,
which was the chief equipment of Army recce units throughout the war, and which
proved able to operate in hostile skies almost to the bitter end, as new
variants capable of flying higher and faster kept appearing at regular
intervals throughout the conflict.  Its survivability was based entirely on
these qualities, as most versions were either unarmed or carried a single
machinegun.  This was the aircraft Lt-Col Tsuji used for his clandestine flight
over northern Malaya just before the outbreak of hostilities.
        Time forces me to break off once again, but before I go I have to eat
some crow and admit to a major data inversion/brain cell lock in my last post.
I made reference to Russian-built (and sometimes Russian-flown) Chinese
fighters sometimes giving the Japanese all they could handle over Nanking in
Dec '37--WRONG!!  I was recalling (obviously not too clearly) some big fighter
battles over Chiang's capital, but the event which stuck in mind, the action of
12/2/37, actually turned out the other way around.  I.e., Japanese Navy A5M
fighters shot down ten Soviet/Chinese I-16's without a loss (the Mitsubishi
A5M, the Japanese Navy's first monoplane fighter, being in a sense a primitive
predecessor of the Zero).  Since I've quoted Saburo Sakai so often in these
posts, I should also mention that the first two of his 64 "kills" came in an
A5M over China, an I-15 biplane and an I-16 on two tours of duty there.

        Gotta go...

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 14:04:21 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Japanese Peace Offerings

Dear Arnaud,

Thanks for the back-up detail.

Regards,

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 14:24:13 -0500
From:    Cheryl Abdullah <[email-masked]>
Subject: Westerly 4 of 5, Narciso summary

What with the recent rash of comments about not receiving
messages, now is a good time for me to try yet again to post
the Narciso summary.  If anyone is seeing this for the
second time, my sincerest apologies.

For those of you who are new to the WWII-L: I am requesting
feedback on and corrections to the following summary of an
oral history transcript.  This serves a project in honor of
veterans living in Westerly, Rhode Island.  At this point
Alfred's story has been at the mercy of a transcriptionist
and myself, both unenlightened in military matters, so for
the sake of accuracy <grimace> please e-mail any and all
corrections to my address.  Many, many thanks.

Cheryl Abdullah             [email-masked]
-----------------------------------------------------------
Narrator: Alfred Narciso, U.S. Air Force, World War II
POB:  Westerly, RI

1

HIGHLIGHTS/ANECDOTES OF THE MILITARY EXPERIENCE:  Left
Westerly on Jan. 2, 1942 to undergo indoctrination at Ft.
Devens; from there went to Jefferson Barracks in Missouri
for basic training.  Proceeded to Rantoul, IL to attend the
Aircraft Training Center School (Chanute Field).  Then sent
"in about the 8th Phase" to the Boeing Aircraft factory
school in Seattle, WA followed by the 6th Bomb Group in
Tampa, FL at McGill Field.  After training there a couple of
months as an aircraft mechanic, went to Boise, Idaho, to
Gowen Field where he trained for about three more months
before being assigned to the original cadre of the 99th Bomb
Group.  Further training for the group took place at Walla
Walla, WA and Sioux City, IA. During the winter of 1942 the
99th's flight crews went to Texas while the rest of the
group went to Watertown, SD and later to Oklahoma City Air
Depot (Sinker Field), where they processed air traffic
overseas.  He then went to Camp Kilmer to undergo basic
military training.  His group finally boarded the S.S.
Alexander out of Camp Kilmer, NY, in April 1943.

2

At Oran, North Africa, they were assigned to the 12th USAAF
under General Doolittle (right after his Tokyo mission).
>From there they rode "40 and 8 trains"--slow, hot boxcars
for "40 men and 8 horses" that went to Navarin, their first
station.  The train ride was hot and many of the men (not
Narciso) got dysentery.  "[It] went so slow we could jump
off and run back.  Every so often it would stop at a water
tower to get water for the engine and then they would sling
the boom over, and we all tried to get under the boom to
fill our canteens with water and...wash your face....Oh, it
was terrible and we had to eat C rations...three or four
days."

Alfred felt that the conditions in North Africa were
especially horrible.  There was, due to sand and wind, "dirt
devils," or little spiral tornadoes that were a big problem
because they got sand in the engines.  He got to see camels
but did not fraternize with Arab locals.

3

At Navarin [sp.?] they linked up with their flight crews and
began working in earnest at bombing southern Italy, Sicily,
and "maybe" some of the Balkans.  The local civilians
comprised Arabs and some French.  They slept on the ground
without tents, showering from water carrier tanks that one
fellow would hand pump.  After Navarin they went to Tunis,
managing to steal tents once when the train stopped.  On the
way they came across a prison train heading west that was
loaded with German and Italian prisoners.  "I didn't know at
the time, but I think my cousin was on one of those trains
because he was in the Italian army in the North African
campaign.....Well anyway, one of our guys says to me, 'Well
we're going to Berlin,' and this German who spoke good
English says 'Ha, ha, I don't care.  I'm going to the United
States.'"

4

They stayed in Tunis for four months, "right after they
cleaned up the North African Campaign and through the
Kasserine Pass."  On the 10th of December he "hit" Foggia,
Italy, where he would be stationed until July 1945 working
as a crew chief (Technical Sergeant) in the 15th USAAF under
General Twining.  He managed a crew of four other men who
maintained an airplane.  They had nothing to do with the
armament, "All we did was take care of the running part of
the aircraft, no matter what was wrong with it--changed
engines, anything.  Changed wings that were shot up....We
[got] our percentage of losses.  We patched up more holes."

5

His group was credited with twelve campaigns, many of them
raids on Ploesti.  There was a shuttle mission to Russia in
which the bombers would bomb past "the point of no return"
and continue flying to a field in Russia.  There the planes
were serviced and reloaded with bombs they could drop on the
way back to home base.  The 8th USAAF used to fly from
England to Foggia under the same principle, and Narciso's
group would service them for another bomb run on their
return to England.

6

The Foggia airfield was on a large farm.  "We scouted around
and there were these two families that worked there.  I got
pretty friendly with both of them." Narciso was adopted by
"the sweetest little old lady" who lived with her two sons
in San Giovanni, about 20 kilometers outside of Forge in the
Apennine Mountains.  "I was the same age as one of her sons
who was in the Italian Army and imprisoned by the Germans
when Italy capitulated."  She missed her son, a prisoner in
Croatia, and if Narciso didn't report to her every day, she
would send her 10- or 12-year-old son to check up on him.
"They invited me up to their home...I met this priest and
this monk that had the stigmata that Christ had....Father
Pio."  Narciso got to visit the local monastery and he met
Pope Pius XII during an audience in Rome.

7

Narciso had an uncle Tony living in Italy south of Rome and
north of Cassino.  He and two of his buddies were able to
meet him because he was asked to stop by Rome and pick up a
repaired vehicle while going to rest camp.  Uncle Tony lived
in the mountains by a big river, and the bridge that crossed
over to the village was destroyed by American bombs.  "All
they had was a little raft that went across the river,
pulled by a cable.  We had the jeep, and the raft was only
made for one little cart and one little wagon, and we
finally loaded the jeep onto the raft and we almost sunk
it."  The river was swollen and, when they got to the other
side they were two feet below the landing.  Locals came down
and helped pull the jeep up to the landing.  Narciso asked
if there was anybody around by his name, and sure enough
there was a man named Tony who looked just like his father.
He studied Alfred's face but shook his head "no"-apparently
he was stranded in Italy when World War I broke out, trying
to gather his family to return to America, and was worried
that Italian officials might have been playing a trick.  But
when Alfred pulled out a picture of his parents, the matter
was settled and the whole village came out with wine for the
Americans.  He stayed in his father's homestead that night.
The Germans had previously used it for an observation post
and booby-trapped it upon leaving.  The local village men
removed the booby-traps, and "that was the highlight in my
[W.W. II] experience."

8
He came back to the States on a ship called Argentina in
late July or early August of 1945.  It took him seven days
to get from Naples to New York.  "...[T]he first they did
was to give...each of us a full carton of milk....By the
time we go on the train [for] Camp Kilmer, it was a
disaster!"  These boys had not had milk in 27 months, so
everyone had diarrhea.  When they got to Camp Kilmer, they
were then taken to a mess hall to feast on great big steaks
and mashed potatoes, but no one could eat because they
weren't used to fresh food.  He and another Westerly boy in
his squadron, Rudy Cugini, spent "30 glorious days in
Westerly, right here in the square on the night of V-J Day."
Other local boys Narciso met in the service were Billy
LaBrecque from Pawcatuck and, coming back, a short man known
as "Taco."   On the 1 Sept. 1945 he went back to Ft.
Devens..  He was scheduled to go to North Dakota to help
train B-29 crew members going to the Pacific, but the war
ended and "that was it."

Audio tape interview:     15 October 1992
Interviewer:              Beppo Boumenot
Written History Editor:   Cheryl Abdullah

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 14:55:44 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Is it true that they can trace a single document

Dear William,

I realized after I sent the message that this part was probably wrong-
I will check, but I think the Einsatzgruppen had responsibility for
Jews and CPSU Commissars. Others (intellectuals, etc.) were left to
other agencies.

BTW, regarding the election issue, do you think Hitler could have won
a free election in 1936-1941? I think he would have, certainly after
the Anschluss or Munich.

Regards,

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 14:54:51 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: What if...?

Ivan Demiguel said:
>One thing I would like to talk is about North-african front.
>I think Axis could have won the campaign before operation "Torch".
>After taking Tobruk, the German forces should have taken more care with
>their supply lines.
>This was one of the main problems Rommel had during the campaign and the
>fatal error came when Kesselring canceled the operation "Hercules".
>About the operation "Hercules" the Germans could have taken Malta easily
>because during that period they had air superiority and the allied
>land&air forces in the isle were minimal.
>With Axis controling Malta the supply line would be secured and all convoys
>to Egypt could be intercepted easily.
>When Kesselring finally forgot "Hercules", Rommel only got a few troops more
>and less supplies for them.
>Rommel was a natural player, his victories were totally a success but the
>risks too.
>After taking Tobruk, Rommel had only one thing in his mind: reach
>Alexandria, so he bet and...he lost.

I agree with you concerning Malta, and I have also read it in certain texts,
but I'm unsure about Hilter's commitment on that battle front. His "Barbarossa"
ideas were festering along about then. He must have been VERY frustrating to
deal with. The Generals must have wanted him dead from the start. They knew
their limits much better than he. -Al

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 16:21:15 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: China/Japan part 4

        Just to finish on the aerial tangent I went off on, the Army aviation
detailed in my last post was supported by nearly 1,000 naval aircraft.  The two
main arms of this Navy contribution were Kido Butai, the carrier strike force,
whose six fleet carriers disposed in Dec '41 a total of 360 aircraft (counting
shipboard recconnaisance and spotter seaplanes on the escorting cruisers), and
the land-based 11th Air Fleet, with another 480 planes (there were additional
aircraft on the various light carriers).  These air units were also employed to
some degree in all the main Army theatres, although in Burma their use was
limited to the southern and central portions of the country.  BTW, one of 11th
Air Fleet's wartime commanders was Admiral Takijiro Onishi, the man who later
developed the kamikazes.
        To return to the subject, as I outlined, the Japanese started with the
following forces:
        14th Army (Phillipines); 16th & 48th Div
        15th Army (Burma); 33rd & 55th Div
        16th Army (Indonesia); 2nd Div, 1 infantry & 1 airborne brigade
        25th Army (Malaya); 5th, 18th, & Konoye Div
        38th Div (independent-- Hong Kong)

        Even given the relatively small western forces available to defend the
areas attacked, it required quite a bit of shuffling to prosecute the offensive
as planned with the resources available.  Yamashita in Malaya and Singapore
helped the cause by concluding his campaign exactly on schedule.  Thus his 18th
Div could be diverted to Burma in March, just as the main push there was
getting under way.  Homma in the Phillipines, on the other hand, received
considerable heat because MacArthur and Wainwright's defense of Bataan
peninsula on Luzon put him seriously behind schedule.  Despite this, after the
capture of Manila, his situation was considered by higher HQ to be well enough
in hand that the experienced 48th Division was withdrawn from 14th Army in
January 1942, and transferred to 16th Army for use in Indonesia (it can be seen
how tight-- and incredibly optimistic, although in general events tended to
validate this optimism-- the Japanese schedule was.  This, of course, was only
because they were trying to do so much with so little).  Homma received, as
replacement for the departed veteran division, the 65th Brigade, formerly
stationed on Formosa/Taiwan.  Besides being smaller numerically, and lacking
prior combat experience, this formation was primarily a garrison unit, composed
of older men (although it did have a degree of organic tank support).  Needless
to say, the substitution did little to help Homma complete his conquest of
Luzon, especially as he was now up against the main Bataan defense line.  Nor
did the transfer of most of his air units to Burma in February.  In the end,
new reinforcements (especially of air and artillery support) had to be
dispatched to allow Homma's men to finally break the Bataan defenses in April,
but it was a black mark against the general career-wise.
        We also saw how the 15th Army in Burma was reinforced by two more
divisions, the 18th and the 56th (from 25th Army and Area reserve,
respectively) as well as two tank regiments.  This shuttling of forces was all
well and good when meticulously planned operations were going more or less as
scheduled.  When the first plan was completed and new, unexpected necessities
arose in the southern area, it was a different story.   Soon many of the best
Japanese divisions were being sucked away from China into the south Pacific.
        The decision to occupy New Guinea as part of the plan to isolate and
perhaps invade Australia led, in May 1942, to the creation of a new formation,
the 17th Army, commanded by Gen. Haruyoshi Hyakutake.  This "army" was at first
barely worthy of the name.  At its creation the forces assigned to it consisted
of the South Seas Detachment of three battalions, the Ichiki Detachment of two
battalions, the Aoba Detachment (built around the three battalions of 4th
Regiment), the independent 41st Regt (again, three battalions), and the 35th
Brigade (in reality the three battalions of the 124th Regt with a brigade HQ
attached).  Furthermore, these relatively paltry forces soon found themselves
with responsibility not only for New Guinea, one of the world's largest
islands, measuring over 1,000 miles from end to end, but also for opposing the
US counteroffensive in the adjacent Solomons at Guadalcanal.  Initially
Guadalcanal had been a Navy operation.  As a subsidiary operation to the
aborted Port Moresby (New Guinea) landings which led to the Coral Sea battle,
in May 1942 the Navy put ashore at Tulagi (right next to Guadalcanal) a marine
battalion, personnel and equipment for a radio station, a seaplane base unit,
and a dozen floatplane (A6M2-N) versions of the Zero fighter.

        Unfortunately time constraints force me to break off again.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 16:50:49 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: TAC: Africa (was: What if?)

        The problem with North Africa was that the German strategic policy
was never to "win" in this theater.  Africa was viewed as being in the
Italian sphere of influence and the Germans weren't too motivated in
promoting Italy's interests.  In fact, at the strategic level, the
Germans were actually opposed to promoting Italy's strategy.

        Jim O'Neil correctly points out that the DAK (and Italians) were
consistently plagued with logistics problems.  The Italian Navy's primary
role was to support the Axis forces in Africa (and the Balkans).  However,
the shipping capacity of the Libyan ports simply could not handle the
volume of materiel required to support the forces in Africa.  As early
as December 1940, the Italians realized this and tried to use the French
Tunisian ports.  The Germans vehemently opposed their use by the Italians
and protected Vichy interests in the area.  When the Germans (DAK) entered
the scene, the Italians earmarked nearly 50% of their shipping capacity to
the Germans despite the fact that they made up a smaller percentage of Axis
troops in Africa.  Also, the Germans demonstrated chronic tardiness in
getting supplies to the Italian ports, thereby disrupting shipping
schedules further.  As a result, some ships left port underloaded with
supplies only for Italian forces on board.  Complaints by the Germans,
especially Rommel and Kesselring, about Italian competence to supply the
Germans were completely unfounded at best and disingenuous at worst.

        Malta served the British more as a base to interdict Italian
shipping to Africa than as a depot to supply the British in Africa.
When the island was neutralized via air power, the Italians enjoyed
few shipping losses despite the British use of Ultra.  (Despite popular
history to the contrary, the British showed an uncharacteristic timidity
in sending their surface ships to interdict the Italians.  Only when
they had a numerical superiority flavored with an aircraft carrier or
two did they venture from Alexandria and Gibraltar for the sole purpose
of interdiction.) The problem with Malta arose when the Axis (especially
the Germans) withdraw the aircraft that had been used on Malta for other
missions (Russia).  This allowed the island to recover and interdict
Italian shipping once again.  The invasion of Malta wasn't all that
necessary for a victory in Africa provided that the Axis could keep
it neutralized.

        With all that said, the Italians were so driven by the idea of
invading Malta that they had enlisted the aid of the Japanese to determine
the requirements for such an amphibious assault.  (At the time, Japan was
the only nation, Axis or Allied, with amphibious invasion experience.)
Italy had built many landing craft earmarked for this invasion.  When it
never occurred, they were later used to transport supplies to Africa.

        As for Rommel taking the Suez, I must ask, What would it have
accomplished?  And for whom?  Neither Italy nor Germany really needed
it and the British would have merely withdrawn further into the Middle
East where they would no doubt have been supplied from ports in the
Persian Gulf.  (Claiming that it would have been a natural launching
point for invading the Caucasus may indicate that the claimant has
played too much Risk rather than sound strategy! :-) The victory would
have been a hollow one and Axis supply lines would have been stretched
even further.  Italy had invaded Egypt in 1940 primarily to create (or
extend) a new Roman Empire (or some such silliness).  I doubt that
Germany would have given Egypt to Italy even had all British forces
capitulated.  Germany's interests simply didn't lie in that direction
but, by the same token, Hitler was loath to aid Italy's ascension.
Italy simply didn't have the industrial capacity (even if the US
wasn't helping Britain) to do it alone.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
Crap Game: 14,000 gold bars!  Where are they?
    Kelly: In a bank...
Crap Game: In a bank?  Aren't you getting a little ambitious?
    Kelly: ...behind enemy lines.
Crap Game: Behind enemy lines... This could be the perfect crime!

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 16:00:03 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

Hello, Mike!

Glad you enjoyed it. Will be posting more interesting info in the
coming days.

Please stay in touch, and thanks again.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 18:14:59 -0600
From:    Kelvin Brent Luther <[email-masked]>
Subject: A-bomb spies

        I am curious to hear opinions on the possibility Oppenheimer was
the Soviets key man in the Manhattan project.  I can't remember the guys
name but some former KGB guy has implied there was someone very high up
and many speculate that it was Oppenheimer himself.  Apparently
everything else this guy has spoken of since the demise of the Soviet
Union has been verified and he seems to be held in high regard (I believe
he recently wrote a book about the cold war).  I am sure someone out
there has probably read it.  A question:  was Fermi in Alamagordo, his
may be another sufficiently famous name to be a possibility?

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 17:47:21 -0800
From:    Steve New <[email-masked]>
Subject: TACT:  Offensive AVG

There was a fascinating special last night on the Discovery channel
concerning the AVG.

One particular aspect of the program would have certainly made a hit a
few months ago when we were covering a what-if Japan didn't attack Pearl
Harbor scenerio.

It seems that when General Chennault went to the US to get aircraft and
pi;ots for the AVG, he was promoting a far more ambitious program than
was finally adopted.  Chennault wanted bombers that he could use to
attack the Japanese islands from China.

Initially, it appears, there were powerful people in the government who
wanted to give him that offensive punch, including FDR himself.
However, General Arnold (never a friend of Chennault) talked FDR out of
it, warning that the bombing of Japan by American merceneries flying
American built aircraft might provoke a Japanese response against the
US.

Since this was a period when Roosevelt was desperate for a few more
months of "peace" so that we could complete the buildup of the
Phillipines, he acquiesced to General Arnold's argument, and restricted
the US support for the AVG to the 100 P-40s and 100 pilots we all know
so well.

The interesting part is that Roosevelt had a change of heart.  In
response to the Japanese take-over of French Indochina Roosevelt signed
the Joint Board Plan on 23 July 1941. (They actually showed sections of
the plan on the screen, thank goodness for VCRs and freeze frame).

The plan (also signed by the Acting Secretary of War and the Secretary
of the Navy (but pointedly left unsigned by Hap Arnold) called for 100
P40s, 100 P-43s, 100 modified Lockheed Hudson bombers, 100 pilots and
160 ground crew.

The plan clearly stated that the ombers were to be used against targets
in Japan.  One section listed Bases and targets and the distances
between, ie.

           Chuchow    Hanchow     Kanchow     Kian     Manila(?)
Nagasaki    730       1150        1060        1020     1460
Kobe       1060       1485        1410        1360      -
Osaka      1085       1510        1435        1385     1780
Tokyo      1355       1780        1690        1645     2010

The second wave of men and equipment was actually at sea on its way to
China when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and it appears that it
got diverted to support Allied efforts somewhere in the Pacific.

Considering how unprepared for air attack the Japanese proved to be when
Jimmy Doolittle & company took off from the Hornet, it's interesting to
speculate how the Japanese would have reacted to Chinese bombers
attacking them, if, perhaps, General Arnold's initial opposition hadn't
delayed the decision to make the AVG an offensive operation.

--

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 21:19:49 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 28-FEB-1945

On 28-FEB-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the II Corps moves forward
along the Rhine. In the U.S. 9th Army sector, the offensive moves along at a
steady rate. The 29th Division advances rapidly towards Monchengladbach. The
2nd Armoured Division is within five miles of Neuss, which is six miles from
the Rhine. In the 1st Army sector, the 1st Division is advancing along the
Neffel. The 9th Division reaches Berg and crosses the Rur. The 9th Armoured
Division also crosses the Rur. In the 3rd Army sector, the XX Corps pushs
north towards Trier.

Eastern Front - Moscow announces the capture of the Pomeranian communications
centers of Neustettin and Prechlau and further gains in Breslau in Silesia.

Philippines - General Krueger orders the XIV Corps to open Balayan and
Batangas Bays, southwest of Luzon. With the reduction of opposition in the
Legislative building, only the Agriculture and Finance buildings remain to be
cleared in Manila. Elements of the 6th Division reach the crest of Mt.
Pacawagan, which is largely clear. In the I Corps area, the 25th Division
starts toward Puncan. In the 8th Army sector, TF Victor IV is activated under
Mindoro for the assault on the Zamboanga area of Mindanao Island. At Palawan,
Attack Group Victor III arrives off Puerto Princesa. Elements of the 41st
Division land without opposition. The town of Puerto Princesa and its
airfields are quickly seized and radar installations are established.

Iwo Jima - The VAC continues to attack toward the O-2 line, several hundred
yards distant against heavy resistance.

Burma - The Indian 17th Division begins the assault on Meiktila against strong
opposition.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 21:18:30 -0600
From:    Michael Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Africa (was: What if?)

This current thread about North Africa is very interesting. It certainly
does not support the "fortress europe mentality" being written about in
some of the histories being currently published suggesting such a
strategy as being foremost in the German military strategy. By not
concentrating or taking africa seriously, surely German military planners
saw the possibilities of the establishment of bases of operation against
europe? Then again, they thought they could knock Russia out of the war
before England could regroup and retrain. Any ideas on why England was
not targeted first? Had England fallen, that leaves africa or greenland(?)
as a base of operation?

                   **************************************
                          Michael Davis, Principal
                            Peotone High School
                        Number One Blue Devil Drive
                           Peotone, Il 60468 USA
                           (708) 258-3236 office
                            (708) 258-6991 fax
                       e-mail: [email-masked]
                      "Chance favors the prepared mind."

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 27 Feb 1995 22:16:25 EST
From:    SKIP WILDER <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INF: USN Chronology 02-26-95

        Theron Keller's daily post for 2-26-45 states that PASADENA (CL-65) AND
PORTERFIELD (DD-682) were damaged by naval gunfire south of Honshu, Japan.  I
assume they were not damaged by friendly fire; presumably there was a surface
engagement with the Japanese.  Can anyone provide additional detail on this encounter?

------------------------------------------------------------
|    Skip Wilder               |                           |
|    [email-masked]       |"The road to hell is paved |
|    FAX (703)528-2103         | with good intentions."    |
|    McLean, Virginia, U.S.A.  |                           |
------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 26 Feb 1995 to 27 Feb 1995
*************************************************