Subject: WWII-L Digest - 19 Feb 1995 to 20 Feb 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 21 Feb 1995 00:01:04 -0500

There are 27 messages totalling 1235 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Ben Frank
  2. DIVISION ROSTERS/YEARBOOKS?
  3. INF: USN Chronology 02-20-95
  4. INF: 50 Years Ago - 21-FEB-1945
  5. Careers of Paul Hauser and Josef Dietrich
  6. Indian Freikorps...
  7. WASHINGTON, D.C. (2)
  8. New WWII PC'ism (4)
  9. Iwo Jima Memorial
 10. Is it true that they can trace a single document (4)
 11. Order of Battle (2)
 12. Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's
 13. REF: Tigers in combat, volume I
 14. <No subject given>
 15. [INF] USAAF 21 FEB 45
 16. TACT: Firestorm (2)
 17. BEN FRANK
 18. Whitmann vs Pool

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 19 Feb 1995 23:47:19 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Ben Frank

The American Broadcasting Company's network news for tonight (Sunday, 19
Feb) featured a piece on the Iwo Jima invasion.  One of the people
interviewed was our own Ben Frank!  We saw John Ausland on CNN during the
Normandy commeration, now Ben Frank for Iwo Jima.  Who is next?

Jack McKillop

!!!!!  Now you tell us!

OK Ben, didn't you know about this?

Next time, PLEASE give us some warning, so we can ALL see it!  :-)

Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA 22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 01:06:58 -0500
From:    "Matthew R. Burchette" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: DIVISION ROSTERS/YEARBOOKS?

Derek,
You might try the 2AD Museum located on Fort Hood.
There phone number (817) 287-8811
Address:
III Corps and Second Armoured Division Museum
P.O. Box 5917
Fort Hood, TX 76544
Good Luck!
Matthew

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 04:00:17 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 02-20-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
02/20 Tue. Army troops under cover of Marine aircraft are landed on
           Biri Island, P. I., to insure control of San Bernardino
           Strait. (See 19 February 1945.)
            United States naval vessels damaged, Iwo Jima area:
             Light cruiser BILOXI (CL-80), accidentally by United
              States naval gunfire,
              25 d. 47'N., 141 d. 15'E.
             Hospital ship SAMARITAN (AH-10), accidentally by United
              States naval gunfire,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             Attack transports NAPA (APA-157) and LOGAN (APA-196),
              by collision,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             Attack cargo ship STARR (AKA-67), by collision,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             LST 779, by coastal mortar,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
            Japanese naval vessel sunk:
             Destroyer NOKAZE, by submarine PARGO (SS-264),
              South China Sea,
              12 d. 48'N., 109 d. 38'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 07:11:53 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 21-FEB-1945

On 21-FEB-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the 51st Division
overcomes final resistance in Goch. The offensive in the U.S. 3rd Army
sector continues moving forward. The 90th Division takes Stricksheid,
Euscheid, Stalbach, Binscheid, Halenbach and Hickeshausen. The 11th
Armoured Division widens the breach in the West Wall and takes Roscheid. In
the XX Corps area, the 10th Armoured Division drives to their final
objective in the Sarr-Moselle triangle; taking Rehlingen, Nittel, Temmels,
Fellerich and Wawern. In the 7th Army sector, the 70th Division gains about
a third of Forbach as street fighting continues.

Italian Front - The 10th Mountain Division continues toward the crest of M.
Torraccia against strong opposition. The Brazilian 1st Division begins an
attack toward M. Castello.

Philippines - The XI Corps successfully concludes operations on the Bataan
Peninsula. Casualties total about 50 killed or missing in the operation.
The Japanese dead totals about 200. A small Japanese force remains in the
Mt. Natib area but it is eventually destroyed.

Iwo Jima - The VAC attacks north toward Airfield 2 and south toward Mt.
Suribachi. Progress is very slow and costly. The effective tank strength at
the end of the day is about 50%. While clearing northward, assault forces
encounter severe opposition from well-organized enemy positions around the
airfield. Elements of the 3rd Marine Division land on Yellow Beach to
support the attack on Airfield 2 and are attached to the 5th Marine
Division. Elements of the 5th are viciously opposed as it continues the
methodical reduction of Japanese positions as it reaches the base of Mt.
Suribachi. The Japanese make several local counterattacks and repeated
infiltration attempts during the night. Even though the Americans control
the air over Iwo Jima, a few Japanese planes do get through to attack
shipping and sink the Bismarck Sea.

Burma - Elements of the Indian 17th Division open a drive toward Meiktila
from the Nyaungu bridgehead.

The Homefront
-------------
Krepper Convicted - Carl Krepper, 60, former Luthern minister, has been
convicted on two counts of a charge of conspiring "to obstruct, interfere
with and injure the defense of the United States." Krepper was the contact
man for eight German saboteurs who landed in the United States during 1942.

1,209 Repatriated - The Swedish liner Gripsholm has docked at Jersey City,
N.J. with 587 wounded and disabled American and Canadian soldiers and
seamen returned from German prison camps, 548 U.S. civilians and 74 Latin
Americans. This completes the sixth wartime exchange for the Gripsholm.

Sugar Ration Cut - Price Administrator Chester Bowles reports that lower
supplies of sugar necessitates a cut in ration points to 20 pounds per
person, a cut of 5 pounds.

All-Star Baseball Game Dropped - Baseball officials have agreed to drop the
1945 All-Star game as a travel conservation measure. Whether the World
Series will be held depends on war developments.

Ringling Men Sentenced - Six key men of the Ringling Brothers and Barnum
and Bailey Circus have received jail terms ranging from six months to seven
years after pleading nolo contendere to manslaughter charges connected with
last July's disastrous fire in Hartford, Conn. The corporation has also
been fined $10,000. The Hartford fire death toll stands at 168.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 07:40:23 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Careers of Paul Hauser and Josef Dietrich

Hello, Chip!

No problem. If they were awarded the KC, I have all the dates of
award, and in many cases, their complete military career and
reason(s) for the award.

If you need help with this, I am your man.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 07:49:32 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Indian Freikorps...

Hello, Drew!

Will post it after I finish with the Copenhagen episode. Will post
more on this later on today.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 09:00:43 EST
From:    "Thomas L. Townsend" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WASHINGTON, D.C.

>
> John, at the Washington Navy Yard are the Marine Corps Historical Center,
> holds the Marine Corps Museum, and the Navy Museum. Also at permanent anch
> the USS Barry, and at the waterfront is a very interesting number of nava
      ^^^^^^^^^

Is that the USS Marion Barry?

:-)

-------------------------------------------------------------------
Tom Townsend                    6th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Co. A.
[email-masked]
         In the future I plan to be present in the past.
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 08:11:30 -0500
From:    James Ray Watkins <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: New WWII PC'ism

Nechama:

The main problem I have with this kind of argument is not whether its ture
or not, its what is covered up in putting the question this way. I think we
need to know the line between being a Nazi supporter, and being a more or
less passive participant. It seems to me that we study war, in part, so that
we can understand how to recognize the former and to avoid being the latter.
If we lump them together then we can never see the complex relationships
between them; we might not be able to see it, then, when it is ourselves who
are considering whether our actions constitute passive acceptance of evil.
Finding the 'bad guys' should be as precise as we know how, we need all the
help we can get. Knowing when we should be ressisting is one of the most
important results of scholarship. I, for one, want both Nazi and 'the German
people' as clearly deliniated as possible.

>In any case, I find the defense of the German people to be slightly
>divorced from reality.  There were Nazi supporters, and while not all
>Germans were, many supported the Nazi party in some form.  And they Nazi
>Party was made of the German people.  They were not a foreign group.
>
>Nechama Cox
>[email-masked]
>
Ray Watkins
A.I., Department of Rhetoric and Composition
English, University of Texas at Austin

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 08:38:08 CST
From:    "SCHERRER, TIM" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Iwo Jima Memorial

I was watching the Presidential Iwo Jima ceremony yesterday on C-SPAN
and I noticed the Iow Jima statue has an M-1 carbine with a bayonet lug
on it.  These were introduced after the war and the statue is incorrect.
I looked in the original photo and couldn;t see the carbine however I
know for sure they were issued with lugs post WWII.  The statue was made
in maybe '54 when they did have lugs.  I just figured they would do a
better job of researching for something as important as that memorial.

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 11:03:12 -0500
From:    "Patrick.Johnson." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Is it true that they can trace a single document

Drew,

        It has been years since I read Hitler's work so my memory is
faded on it. My point was that in the book Hitler articulated a desire to
remove the Jews from positions of power. You are probably right in saying
that Death Camps were not articulated in the work. Hitler probably knew
that politically Death Camps would not be popular.

Patrick
*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!!*!*!*!
[email-masked]                         Great Minds have Purpose
Annandale, Virginia                               others have Dreams.
                                                  -Washington Irving
!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 11:35:11 -0600
From:    Terrence Lindell <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Order of Battle

Dick,

Regarding your query about assignment of regiments to divisions, I would
suggest you look at Shelby L. Stanton, _World War II Order of Battle_
(New York:  Galahad Books, 1984).  I have found this to be an invaluable
reference tool.  I even saw a few copies for sale at a B. Dalton or
Waldenbook store over the weekend, for about $25.  It will not cover the
post-WWII era.  Nor will it offer explanations as to why some regiments
were moved around.  It will offer brief organizational histories of
divisions, including typical tables of organization for 1941 and 1944/45,
and brief histories of regiments during the war.

Terry Lindell
Department of History
Wartburg College
Waverly, Iowa  50677
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 12:37:50 -0500
From:    Ira Krakow <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: New WWII PC'ism

James,
> Nechama:
>
> The main problem I have with this kind of argument is not whether its ture
> or not, its what is covered up in putting the question this way. I think we
> need to know the line between being a Nazi supporter, and being a more or
> less passive participant. It seems to me that we study war, in part, so that
> we can understand how to recognize the former and to avoid being the latter.

  Excellent point!  For example, I'm sure a large number of Germans
worked in the bureaucracy that was needed to carry out these atrocities.
What about the people who scheduled trains to Auschwitz?  They were
probably just ordinary people who needed to feed their family and
needed the job, especially in wartime.  The penalties for speaking out
were exceedingly harsh and one person speaking out would probably not
make that much of a difference.  Yet, this person helped the effort,
perhaps not with the same enthusiasm as the SS guards at the camps.
So is enthusiasm the issue?  If you're just passive in the face of
evil, are you as guilty?

  I don't see these as black-and-white issues, but rather as part of
the complexity of the human condition.  I don't believe we'll ever
be able to draw the line.

Ira

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 12:24:25 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

Hello, All!

Here goes with another posting on the bombing of the Gestapo HQ in
Copenhagen.

The third plane of the first wave, following close behind Embry's,
also made a successful run on the target, but the fourth plane, some
seconds behind struck a tall light pole and crashed into Frederiksberg
Alle, near the Jeanne d'Arc Catholic School for children. Within
seconds, a pillar of smoke and flame rose above Frederiksberg Alle
directly in the target approach path that would be flown by the
planes of the second and third waves.

The impact of the crash sent a giant shudder through the Jeanne d'Arc
school where 482 children between the ages of seven and seventeen
were busy with their studies. Their teachers, all Catholic nuns,
immediately ordered the students to proceed toward shelter areas in
the basement of the building. The students responded as they had been
trained to respond; calmly and without undue haste. As they made
their way to the shelter areas, each student clasping the hand of a
designated partner, the deadly Mosquitos in the second and third
attack waves were speeding toward the school at nearly 300 miles per
hour, their pilots confused by the twin columns of smoke rising ahead
of them, one from Frederiksberg Alle in the immediate vicinity of
Jeanne d'Arc Catholic School and the other, some distance away, from
Shellhus.

The first two planes of the second wave realized in time that the
smoke rising from Frederiksberg Alle did not mark the target area.
They pulled away without dropping their bombs. But pilots coming in
behind them mistook the school for Shellhus and bombed the school
directly. Within less than three minutes, at least 8 of the 12 planes
in the second and third attack waves had dropped high explosive and
incendiary bombs on the school, scoring many direct hits. Those
pilots who realized that a ghastly error was taking place, went on to
carry out their assigned mission, attacking Shellhus with outstanding
accuracy, but it was the Catholic school filled with children and not
the Gestapo headquarters that bore the brunt of the attack that day.

More tomorrow.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 12:33:40 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: REF: Tigers in combat, volume I

Hello, Akira!

Yes, it would be very strange for any of those you mentioned such as
Rondorf and Knispel not having received the KC. It strikes me that
the figures you quote from the book are inflated. Your thoughts?

There were many Panzer aces who were awarded the KC with far fewer
tanks destroyed.

Consider the record of Friedrich Anding of the Grossdeutschland
Division. He wore 7 tank destruction badges on his uniform. He
received the KC and was suggested for the oakleaf decoration to it.

I would be interested to hear your thoughts.

  [Neither Knispel did
receive a Knight's Cross - strange, isn't > it? - what do you think?]
>
>       I have found a couple of small flaws and a major mistake (on
> the numbering system of sPzAbt 505).  No one is free from errors! :)

    Yes, but a researcher needs to double-check, triple-check, etc
his info and sources to avoid error. Makes me wonder about the rest
of the work. My two cents' worth anyway.

    Thanks for the note, Akira, and good to hear from you.

    All the best.

    Terry

 >
> Akira Takiguchi  ATSON Inc./ASAHI Net
>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 14:06:20 -0500
From:    Ira Krakow <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Is it true that they can trace a single document

Patrick,
>
>         It has been years since I read Hitler's work so my memory is
> faded on it. My point was that in the book Hitler articulated a desire to
> remove the Jews from positions of power. You are probably right in saying
> that Death Camps were not articulated in the work. Hitler probably knew
> that politically Death Camps would not be popular.
>

   Hitler's goal before the invasion of Poland was to deport the Jews,
not to exterminate them.  There were discussions with the French,
for example, to deport German Jews to Madagascar.  I don't believe
he discusses death camps anywhere in MEIN KAMPF, which was written
in 1923.  The problem Hitler had with this strategy was that there
were very few countries that would accept Jews.  A famous example
of this was the St. Louis, a ship which had many Jewish refugees
that sailed in August, 1939 from Europe with the idea of landing in
the U.S.  The State Department refused to admit them, the ship
stayed in Cuba for a while, and then when nobody wanted the refugees,
the ship went back to Europe.  I'm sure a number of refugees died
as a result.  (I wish Mr. Spielberg would have done a picture about the
St. Louis instead of Schindler's List.  It would have made for
a *much* more interesting exploration of good and evil than the
picture he did make.)

   Only after the war started did Hitler think about death camps.
The Wannsee Conference, held in Berlin in 1942, started the
planning and implementation of this.

Ira

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 14:33:00 CST
From:    Larry Goldberg <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Order of Battle

>Dick,
>
>Regarding your query about assignment of regiments to divisions, I would
>suggest you look at Shelby L. Stanton, _World War II Order of Battle_
>(New York:  Galahad Books, 1984).  I have found this to be an invaluable
>reference tool.  I even saw a few copies for sale at a B. Dalton or
>Waldenbook store over the weekend, for about $25.

---clip

>Terry Lindell
>Department of History
>Wartburg College
>Waverly, Iowa  50677
>[email-masked]

Saw it for $19.95 last Saturdau at Barnes & Noble.

Larry

___________________________________________________________________________
              "When the lions have gone, the hyenas dance."
                                A Kikuyu Proverb

___________________________________________________________________________
    Unfortunately (for you), these views represent those of my employer.
                Fortunately (for me), I am self employed.

       Larry Goldberg * [email-masked] * [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 18:21:16 -0500
From:    James Ray Watkins <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: New WWII PC'ism

>James,
>> Nechama:
>>
>> The main problem I have with this kind of argument is not whether its ture
>> or not, its what is covered up in putting the question this way. I think we
>> need to know the line between being a Nazi supporter, and being a more or
>> less passive participant. It seems to me that we study war, in part, so that
>> we can understand how to recognize the former and to avoid being the latter.
>
>  Excellent point!  For example, I'm sure a large number of Germans
>worked in the bureaucracy that was needed to carry out these atrocities.
>What about the people who scheduled trains to Auschwitz?  They were
>probably just ordinary people who needed to feed their family and
>needed the job, especially in wartime.  The penalties for speaking out
>were exceedingly harsh and one person speaking out would probably not
>make that much of a difference.  Yet, this person helped the effort,
>perhaps not with the same enthusiasm as the SS guards at the camps.
>So is enthusiasm the issue?  If you're just passive in the face of
>evil, are you as guilty?
>
>  I don't see these as black-and-white issues, but rather as part of
>the complexity of the human condition.  I don't believe we'll ever
>be able to draw the line.
>
>Ira
>
Ira:

Not to create a mutual admiration thread, but you too make an excellent
point. But I still think, as difficult as it is, we do need to draw those
lines. But we need to do it in a way which recognizes the problems. You may
argue with the details of Nuremburg, and other war trials, but not with the
concept of legal and social responsibility: that argumentation is exactly
our process of drawing the line. I would hope that these discussions are too.
Ray Watkins
A.I., Department of Rhetoric and Composition
English, University of Texas at Austin

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 16:30:41 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: New WWII PC'ism

Definition of "Nazi supporter" ?

One good criterion of a Nazi supporter would be someone who shoots at
anyone battling to overthrow Nazi germany.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 19:41:29 EST
From:    Jose Rios <[email-masked]>
Subject: <No subject given>

Unsubscribe now i just don't have the space for it

Jose L. Rios
elementary education major
East Carolina University

Greenville, NC 27858 (919) 758-4904
Bitnet: UGRIOS@ECUVM1 Internet: [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 19:56:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 21 FEB 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
WEDNESDAY, 21 FEBRUARY 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  C-47, Douglas Skytrain
  UC-64, Noorduyn Norseman
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  L-5, Stinson Sentinel
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  Spitfire, Vickers Supermarine

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 21 B-25s, supported by 12
P-51s, pound Taiyuan; 2 B-25s and 12 P-40s hit Yoyang; about 100 fighter-
bombers on armed reconnaissance attack troops, trucks, horses, railroad
targets, river shipping, and other targets of opportunity at many locations
throughout S and E China; the detachment of the 530th Fighter Squadron, 311th
Fighter Group, operating from Hsian with P-51s, returns to base at Kwanghan.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 16 P-47s provide close
support for ground forces in the Namhsan area; 15 support ground forces in
the Mongmit sector; 100+ fighter-bombers strike supply and troop
concentrations and make offensive sweeps of roads along the battleline areas.
Transports continue to land men and supplies at forward bases and drop
supplies to frontline troops. The 127th Liaison Squadron (Commando), 2d Air
Commando Group, based at Kalaikunda, India, sends a detachment to operate
from Akyab, Burma with UC-64s and L-5s.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  AIRBORNE OPERATIONS (IX Troop Carrier Command): Units moving from England
to France with C-47s: 75th Troop Carrier Squadron, 435th Troop Carrier Group,
from Welford Park to Bretigny and 79th Troop Carrier Squadron, 436th Troop
Carrier Group, from Membury to Melun.

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 2 missions are flown.
  Mission 839: 1,262 bombers and 792 fighters are dispatched to again attack
the tank plant, main railroad station, marshalling yards and locomotive shops
at Nurnberg, Germany using H2X radar; they claim 4-0-1 Luftwaffe aircraft on
the ground; 7 fighters are lost:
  1. 830 of 867 B-17s hit the marshalling yard; 11 others hit targets of
opportunity; 1 B-17 is damaged beyond repair and 298 damaged; 1 airman is KIA
and 6 WIA. Escorting are 373 of 391 P-51s; they claim 2-0-0 aircraft; 2 P-51s
are lost (pilots MIA).
  2. 375 of 395 B-24s hit the station and marshalling yard; targets of
opportunity are Speyer (1) and other (2); 63 B-24s are damaged; 1 airman is
KIA and 3 WIA. The escort is 175 P-47s and P-51s; they claim 2-0-0 aircraft;
3 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).
  3. 45 of 46 P-51s make a sweep of the Meiningen-Coburg-Nurnberg area; 1
P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).
  4. 98 of 101 P-51s escort Ninth AF B-26s; they claim 0-0-1 aircraft.
  5. 23 of 31 P-51s fly a scouting mission; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).
  6. 29 of 30 P-51s escort 10 F-5s and 7 Spitfires on a photo reconnaissance
mission over Germany.
  Mission 840: During the night of 21/22 Feb, 25 of 29 B-24s attack the
Duisburg power and gas stations using PFF; 2 B-24s are lost.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS
    First Tactical Air Force (Provisional): Units moving from Italy to France
with P-47s: 522d, 523d and 524th Fighter Squadrons, 27th Fighter Group, from
Pontedera to St Dizier; 526th Fighter Squadron, 86th Fighter Group, from Pisa
to Tantonville.
    Ninth Air Force: In Germany, the 9th Bombardment Division hits rail a
overpass and bridges, an oil storage depot, marshalling yards, communications
centers, and 13 targets of opportunity; 1,100+ fighter sorties are completed
as the IX, XIX, and XXIX Tactical Air Commands escort the bomber, attack
railroads, airfield, and other selected targets, fly armed reconnaissance
over wide areas including the US First Army area between Duren and Losheim,
and support the VIII, XII, and XX Corps along the Prum River, the West wall,
and in the Saar-Mosel triangle.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): During the night of 20/21 Feb,
1 B-17 and 13 B-24s drop supplies in N Italy. During the day 500+ B-17s and
B-24s with fighter escorts bomb Vienna, Austria railroad targets (C yards, S
station, and Matzleinsdorf marshalling yard), marshalling yards at Bruck an
der Mur, Wiener-Neustadt, and Zeltweg, Austria, and Sopron, Hungary, and
shipyards at Trieste and Fiume, Italy. HQ 1st Fighter Group moves from
Vincenzo Airfield to Salsola Airfield, Italy and the detachment of the 27th
Fighter Squadron ceases operating from Vincenzo and returns to base at
Salsola with P-38s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, night fighters and A-20s
on intruder missions during the night of 20/21 Feb, continue to attack
communications and supplies in the Po Valley; medium bombers, during the day,
bomb bridges at Dogna, Crema, and Romano di Lombardia; fighter-bombers devote
their main effort to close support of ground forces along the W and C US
Fifth Army front, and also hit communications to the N of the battleline and
in the Po Valley.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 24 P-47s from Saipan Island hit Pagan Island
with napalm. P-38s from Guam Island escort photo aircraft over Truk Atoll and
strafe aircraft on Moen Island and a wharf on Falas Island. 3 Guam Island-
based B-24s on an armed reconnaissance flight bomb the airfield on Marcus
Island in the N Pacific. During the night of 21/22 Feb, 6 B-24s fly
individual snooper raids from Guam against Chichi Jima Island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Luzon Island,
B-24s bomb Japanese positions in the hills W of Ft Stotsenburg, P-47s pound
Corregidor Island and strafe the Bagae-Pilar road and P-40s support ground
forces at Marikina, San Mateo, and on Corregidor Island; and Basco is hit by
B-25s, A-20s, and P-38s. In Borneo, B-24s bomb Kudat and Sandakan Airfields
while A-20s attack Jesselton Airfield and town. The 528th Bombardment
Squadron (Heavy), 380th Bombardment Group (Heavy), moves from Darwin,
Australia to San Jose, Mindoro Island with B-24s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

21/0054Z FEB

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 17:14:19 -0800
From:    Julian E Gomez <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Is it true that they can trace a single document

>were very few countries that would accept Jews.  A famous example
>of this was the St. Louis, a ship which had many Jewish refugees
>that sailed in August, 1939 from Europe with the idea of landing in
>the U.S.  The State Department refused to admit them, the ship
>stayed in Cuba for a while, and then when nobody wanted the refugees,
>the ship went back to Europe.  I'm sure a number of refugees died
>as a result.  (I wish Mr. Spielberg would have done a picture about the
>St. Louis instead of Schindler's List.  It would have made for
>a *much* more interesting exploration of good and evil than the
>picture he did make.)

There WAS a movie about this: Voyage of the Damned. Came out in the late
'70's, I think. In the movie the captain

Oops, that might spoil things for people who haven't seen it. Write if you
want to know what happened.

Windows 96 == Macintosh 85

        Dr. Julian "a tribble took it" Gomez
        Apple Computer, Inc.  408/862-1289 or 996-1010
        [email-masked]  [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 20:21:20 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WASHINGTON, D.C.

That is the John Barry. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 17:47:12 -0800
From:    Steve New <[email-masked]>
Subject: TACT: Firestorm

I tried to post this two days ago, and it never showed up.  So, should
someone get it twice, blame iy on my impatience.

>>>> [Dresden] did give the USAAF some idea of what could later be
>>>> done against Japan, when Curtis Lemay stopped the high altitude
>>>> strategic bombing campaign and changed to low level incendiary
>>>> attacks.

>>> Do you have a reference that states it was Dresden that inspired
>>> Lemay? (It's not that I doubt the statement, I just haven't
>>> heard this before.)

>> Sorry, it's just conjecture on my part, and I should have labeled
>> it so.  But read the Lemay excerpt that Dennis Sparks just posted
>> to the list.  With no record of firebombing to speak of in
>> Europe, something must have triggered his decision to take that
>> route against Japan.  I can't help but believe the effects of
>> Hamburg and Dresden were in the back, if not front, of his mind.

> In April of 1942, Jimmy Doolittle and a few B-25s attacked a few
> targets in and around Tokyo.  Most of the targets were general
> infrastructure targets like rail yards, factories, industrial
> centers, etc.

> Each aircraft was to carry a mix of 500 pound demolition bombs and
> 500 pound incendiary bombs.

> The incendiary bombs were included for a couple of basic reasons
> -- to follow up with the standard demolition bombs and hopefully
> ignite fires causing more damage (obviously an opportunity with
> oil storage and refining facilities, for example), but also
> because of a realization that Japanese contruction made heavy use
> of wood, paper and other flammable materials (referenced by Hank
> Potter, Navigator bomber #1).

> The desire was to cause as much damage as possible with the few
> (16) planes available.  Therefore, incendiaries were included.  An
> incendiary attack against a target made primarily of flammable
> materials, means that even if you miss the specific target, the
> subsequent fire may very well still take out the intended target.
> Not to mention the psychological and actual effect on the area
> being hit.

This is simply an example of the tactical use of incendiary
munitions, i.e. 1; to attack a target that would be particularly
susceptible to incendiary damage (fuel depots, etc.) or 2; maximize
local damage by starting ancillary damage.  To compare such efforts
with the strategic use of incendiary weapons (to turn major
portions of cities into ash and cinder) is to compare a campfire to
a blast furnace.  While the wood and paper construction of portions
of Japanese cities would have burned nicely at temperatures between
450 degrees to 600 degrees fahrenheit, the conditions in the middle
of the Tokyo firestorm were considerably worse:

"The inferno of flame and searing gases that destroyed much of
Shitamachi boiled up to temperatures that surpassed the white-hot
fire storms that Allied raids had loosed on Hamburg and Dresden.  The
fierce winds blowing across Tokyo that night prevented a sustained
fire storm from developing, but it fed oxygen into the blaze to
generate a more intense heat. The fire at ground level superheated
air that reached 1,800 degrees F. Metal melted while people and the
many wooden buildings spontaneously ignited." (2) (Sources listed
below)

> The potential for incendiary attack was well known in 1942.  While
> later experience, including Dresden, may have aided those
> opinions, the concepts of an incendiary attack against the
> Japanese home lands pre-dates any of the fire bombings by many
> years.

This too is incorrect.  While Army Air Force officers may have
believed, in 1942, that they fully understood the potentials of
incendiary attacks, they were going to learn differently in 1943,
when Hamburg went up in a firestorm, and again in 1945, when
Dresden burned.  The Firestorm was a phenomenon unique in the
experience of mankind, never experienced before WWII.  In fact,
before the firestorms were experienced, there was no plan to use
incendiary ordnance as part of the Army's strategic bombing
campaign.  General Lemay wrote:

"If there had been any serious planning before the war for the use
of incendiaries, I hadn't heard anything about it, and I don't
remember any mission that our group flew over Germany where we used
them. (Note:  LeMay was the CO of the 305th BG, one of the first of
the 8th AF's B-17 groups, from June 1942 until 15 May 1943.)" (1)

In fact, even after the Hamburg and Dresden experiences, General
Lemay's predecessors weren't using incendiary weapons against the
"wood and paper" Japanese cities, as Lemay continues...

"I'm sure that General Hansell knew as much about incendiaries as I
did, but he hadn't used them in any of the attacks he made against
Japan before I arrived in the Marianas.  (Note:  Hansell was LeMay's
predecessor as CO of XXI Bomber Command.)"  (1)

This was in 1945, when, after the Hamburg experience, the U.S. had
developed some truly scientific information on the impact of using
incendiaries against Japan, Lemay again...

"In March 1943, however, the USAAF had conducted a series of secret
tests with incendiaries at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. Antonin
Raymond, a New York architect with eighteen pre-war years of
experience in Japan, had been hired to design a town that would
simulate, in precise detail, a typical Japanese city.  Using
materials that were brought in from as far away as Hawaii, the
USAAF constructed a full scale Japanese town.  It was exact down to
the books on the shelves and the matting on the floor.  Even a
"fire brigade" was organized, equipped to simulate its typical
counterpart in Japan.  Attacks on this site, combined with the
research efforts of DuPont, Standard Oil, and the National Research
Defense Council, resulted in the new napalm-based M69 incendiary
bomb that became available at the end of 1944." (1)

My personal suspicion is that this failure to use incendiaries in
the strategic bombing role was simply based on military
conservatism, the old "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" complex.
USAAF strategic bombing meant high level, daylight, precision
raids with explosive ordnance.  This had been proven in blood since
1942, and no one saw any reason to change it.

Then came the abysmal performance of the B-29 in the strategic
bombing campaign against Japan.

"After his aircrews in their eighth attempt had failed to knock
out Tokyo's Masashima Aircraft Works ... General Curtis Lemay
concluded that ... the high level strategic bombing offensive
against military and industrial targets was a failure.  ... Lemay
was aware that a critical assessment had been circulated to the
Joint Chiefs claiming-correctly as it turned out after the
war-that "Japan's production capacity has not yet been
fundamentally weakened".  ... Lemay took only forty-eight hours to
decide to "throw away the book" and abandon precision bombing in
favor of incendiary raids."  (2)

The first target was to be, of course, Tokyo, and Lemay wasn't
going to miss a trick.  First, he was sending more bombers on
target than had ever been attempted in the Pacific...

"The first low-level incendiary attack was put on the schedule for
the night of March 9-10, 1945.  Tokyo would be our target - the
primary target, the secondary target, the *only* target.  Except for
the March 4 mission, in which 179 bombers (of 192 launched) hit
Tokyo, no B-29 raid had ever gone out with more than 150 bombers
earmarked for a single target, but this raid would consist of over
300 Superforts." (1)

Next, he made sure these aircraft carried more ordnance than ever
before...

"On March 9, Army Air Force crews assembled in the Quonset huts on
Tinian and Saipan for a mission briefing.  Their apprehension at
being told they would be making the first low-level attack that
night on Tokyo was replaced by shocked disbelief when they heard
that their aircraft were to be stripped of all guns except the
tail turret.  The weight saved by the dismantling and the gunners
left behind, in addition to the saving in fuel by not having to
form joint uptight formations or climb to 30,000 feet, enabled each
Superfortress to increase its bomb load by 65%, to over 7 tons."
(2)

It was clear that Lemay was pleased with the results.

"Less than twenty-four hours after they had returned from setting
40 percent of Tokyo ablaze, the three hundred B-29s were airborne
again, their navigators setting course north to Nagoya.  That
night they attempted to kindle a three square mile triangular area
in the heart of this industrial city.  It's more modern buildings
and better firefighting service managed to contain the
conflagration, but the tons of incendiaries caused widespread
destruction ... His next objective was Osaka.  On the night of
March 14, 9 square miles ... were razed ... Three days later,
similar treatment was meted out to the port of Kobe.  The 21st Air
Force was then sent back to destroy what remained after their
earlier raid on Nagoya.  After this operation, stocks of
incendiary bombs were running so low that many Superfortresses
were loaded again with high explosives." (2)

While I'll admit it's not a smoking gun, it's certainly enough to
convince me that Lemay was planning (or hoping) for a Firestorm
over Tokyo.  I admit that I've never paid particular attention to
General Lemay, and I don't own much material on him, so I can't
say it as fact but by his own admission:

        1.  He was aware of the secret tests at Dugway studying the
firebombing of Japanese cities (studies that resulted in the
development of the M69 incendiary bombs used in the attack.

        2.  He ordered the raids involving twice the number of
B-29s normally used to bomb Japan.

        3.  He stripped the B-29s of defensive weaponry to maximize
the ordnance they could carry.

        4.  He ordered a low-level attack, which was the only way
he could insure that the incendiaries would start fires close
enough to actually feed on and join up with each other.  Had the
M-69s been dropped from 30,000 ft. they would have been dispersed
all over the city and never have started a firestorm.

> (BTW: the change to low-level B-29 raids did not include a change
> in attack style.  The B-29s were changed to low level because
> Japanese anti-aircraft weapons were not effective at low level.
> While the risk increased for the B-29 crews to fly as low as they
> did, Japanese anti-aircraft were unable to accurately defend
> against them.  The increasing (and alarming) losses of
> high-altitude B-29s forced a change in tactics, which brought in
> the risky (and ultimately successful) low-altitude raids.)

Sorry, but this won't wash.  The Japanese Anti-Aircraft Artillery
(AAA) was extremely poor.  Not only was there no radar control, but
the guns couldn't reach the 30,000 ft altitude that the bombers
normally dropped at.  While the AAA could easily reach the bombers
at the 5,000 ft level of the firebombings, General Lemay felt that
the lack of adequate fire control at night made the increased risk
of being hit by AAA an acceptable one.  The bombers had to drop at
low level to prevent the bombs from dispersing too widely and
dissipating their effect.

Sources:

(1)  "Superfortress:  The B-29 and American Airpower", by Curtis E.
LeMay and Bill Yenne, pages 121-126.  Published by McGraw Hill,
1988, ISBN # 0-07-037164-4 (Thanks to Dennis Sparks)

(2)  "The Pacific War 1941-1945"  John Costello, Quill 1981,
ISBN 0-688-01620-0

Bomb, Incendiary, Oil, 6 lb., AN-M69:   2.8 lb. of jelled gasoline
and a .4 oz. black powder and magnesium ejection charge that
functioned to expel the cheesecloth sack of jellied gasoline
from the 2.88" X 19.5" sheet steel case.  Stabilized in
flight by muslin streamers. Fuzed with Fuze, Bomb, M1 which
is an impact type fuze with a 3-5 second delay. Charge
fragments burn from 8 to 20 minutes. Usually issued in
100 lb.(AN-M12) or 500 lb.(AN-M13) cluster bomb configuration
(Thanks to Michael P. LaForge)

> Robert J. Granvin Southern Minnesota Wing Confederate Air
> Force

> Date:         Wed, 15 Feb 1995 10:28:35 EST

--

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 21:14:16 -0500
From:    "Patrick.Johnson." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Is it true that they can trace a single document

Ira,
        I stand corrected.

Patrick
*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!!*!*!*!
[email-masked]                         Great Minds have Purpose
Annandale, Virginia                               others have Dreams.
                                                  -Washington Irving
!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*!*

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 21:31:29 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: BEN FRANK

I want to thank all the little people who made my appearance on ABC
possible--my makeup man, my publicist, my photographer, and, incidentally, no
autographs. Seriously, when you are interviewed for either a local or a network
telecast, you don't know exactly when you are going to be on, or if you are
indeed not going to wind up on the cutting room floor. I spent over an hour
with the interviewing, and what they showed was what they like to call a "sound
bite," less than 30 seconds. A friend, who is a retired colonel, Iwo Navy
Cross, wounded but maintained command of his company for the entire Iwo
operation and the only company commander to do so, I believe, and I were
interviewed live for about 15 minutes on CNN Friday morning. He was interviewed
for a local NBC news broadcast last night and called to tell me about it. His
whole bit was cut, and another friend, also a retd Col and Iwo company
commander was interviewed instead. I won't go into my philosophy re/TV
interviews, but for me it was not Warhol's 15 minutes of fame, but 15 seconds,
and I'll survive. Cheers, all. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 21:18:44 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACT: Firestorm

I certainly didn't intend to get into a highly detailed debate on the issue
of incendiary attacks as a generality or other details.  I merely wanted to
paint an image that some items, addressed as "unsuspected" were in fact,
quite known years before.

Incendiary bombs are, in many cases -- but not all -- just a tactical weapon.
However, my statement that the highly flammable nature of Japanese construction,
which utilized a high percentage of timber and paper, was well known prior to
Pearl Harbor and known as a distinct weakness.

16 B-25s cannot, by the nature of small numbers, inflict a lot of damage.
However, the intention was to cause as much damage as possible.  This is why
incendiaries were included in the raid where it could be argued that standard
high explosives would have been more effective against specific targets.  If
A rail yard could be damaged and a block of industrial district burned down,
so much the better.

(Reference: Henry "Hank" Potter, Navigator for Jimmy Doolittle, bomber #1.
Also, a technician who worked on the modification of the B-25 Mitchells in
Minneapolis during 1942).

As for B-29 raids and the change in altitude, the change was not to concentrate
ordnance, however the decreased altitude permitted more ordnance be carried.
The effectiveness of Japanese AA, which may be "poor" by our standards, was
even "poorer" at lower altitudes (Personal reference: Eugene Andreotti, B-29
Flight Engineer and other printed sources unfortunately not located).  I had
once seen a reference as to the effective altitudes of Japanese AA.  As the
altitude decreased, so did the effectiveness.  I'm still looking for that
reference.  :-)  But I have heard it independently from MANY B-29 crew members
that flew in the Pacific... and I've got a thing about first hand accounts...)

Dupuy makes several comments about the B-29 raids, including and paraphrasing:

B-29 raids at the end of 1944 normally flew at an altitude of about 30,000
feet.  Fierce resistance in the form of anti-aircraft and aircraft resulted
in the XXI Bomber Command losing about 6 percent of the planes which started
on each raid, seriously eroding morale (and exceeding the theoretically
acceptable maximum loss of 5%).

Lemay was ordered from the XX Bomber Command to the XXI in early 1945.  He and
Chennault developed new tactics -- with the purpose of reducing aircraft and
crew losses as the primary goal.  The consideration of Japanese building
methods -- well known and considered prior to the April, 1942 Doolittle Raid --
helped encourage a change from high explosive to incendiary ordnance (my notes
as referenced from various B-29 crew members).  The fact that this point of
information may have been "forgotten" for several years does not mean that it
was unknown before LeMay.  In fact, the fire fully incendiary bomb run proved
the argument.

In order to attempt reducing losses even further, most raids were moved to
nighttime.  Night helped protect the bomber crews from fighter attack and the
Japanese AA was even worse at night as they had never developed effective
night defensive tactics.

The first flight of B-29s using the new tactics flew with 334 B-29s at 7,000
feet in March, 1945.  Over 1,500 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped which
ended up being the most destructive raid in history.  This is raid where 15
square miles of city were destroyed and 83,000 people killed.  (My comments:
This one event proved the effectiveness of incendiary attack against a target
which is "naturally" flammable because of its design.  Not all things that are
known are considered until later -- Much like Billy Mitchell finding himself
in hot water with the military brass by proving that air power was an effective
tool and effectively killing his career by embarassing those that argued
against it.)

One of the major advantages of low level attack is the ability to triple the
bomb load.  The disadvantage is that there is little place to go if you have
a problem and bailing out of a damaged aircraft can be a real problem.

Most important (and the primary goal) of the new tactic was reducing the B-29
losses -- which was achieved.  Less than 1.5% of aircraft were lost, compared
to 6%.  Any other benefit of low level attacks is an added bonus.

In fact, the poor effectiveness of Japanese AA at low level and inability of
Japanese fighters to be effective at night meant that the biggest threat to
B-29 crews was other B-29 crews.  In many raids, mid-air low-level collisions
resulted in more losses than the Japanese could inflict.  There are many B-29
crew members that will tell you the real terror is looking out the window an
hoping you do NOT see a blue and white star and bar.  The addition of Iwo
Jima as an emergency strip also aided in the reduction of crew fatalities.

The main point attempted to be raised was that a lot of things were known before
they were used but, for various reasons, didn't get used until later.  Plus,
the key goal for changing the B-29 tactics was not to improve bombing
efficiency (though that's still an important factor), but to reduce bomber
losses by rendering the enemy's defenses less effective and taking advantage
of the deficiencies learned through trial and error.)  Broad strokes only
intended.

--
Robert J. Granvin
Southern Minnesota Wing Confederate Air Force

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 20 Feb 1995 21:53:40 -0600
From:    Mark J Weber <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Whitmann vs Pool

There is no comparison. You use 'vehicles' in your message. Wittman's
count was of 'tanks'. Big difference.

--
Dr. Mark J. Weber                       [email-masked]
Department of Management and Economics  tel (w) 612-641-2431
Hamline University                      fax (w) 612-641-2956
1536 Hewitt Ave.                        tel (h) 612-475-2960
St. Paul, MN 55104                      fax (h) 612-476-8309

On Sun, 19 Feb 1995, Matthew R. Burchette wrote:

> People,
> On Feb. 16th Terry wrote:
> >Wittmann was the most successful tank
> >ace of WWII. Johannes Boelter would be a close second.
> I have to disagree. There is an American tank ace that has been overlooked in
> the worst way. Staff segeant Lafayette G. Pool commanded a 76mm Sherman and
> while doing so was able to destroy...get this...258 enemy vehicles between 27
> June, 1944 and 15 Septenber, 1944! Pool was in command of an M4A1 VVSS
> Sherman, had the same crew through his tour, had three different tanks (all
> named In The Mood), but Pool survived the war. While with the 3AD south of
> Aachen, Pool had his Sherman blown out from under him by two rounds from a
> Panther (his favorite prey). His crew survived but Pool was blown from the
> turret and taken back to the states. Do the math people Pool was in the line
> only 80 days...Whitmann was in the line as a tank commander in excess of 25
> MONTHS. Not to bellitle what Whitmann did but my vote has to got to Lafayette
> G. Pool as tank commander overachiever of the war.
> Matthew
>

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 19 Feb 1995 to 20 Feb 1995
*************************************************