Subject: WWII-L Digest - 15 Feb 1995 to 16 Feb 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 17 Feb 1995 00:08:07 -0500

There are 48 messages totalling 2256 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. New WWII PC'ism - Dresden bombing (3)
  2. ACORN unit info
  3. INF: USN Chronology 02-16-95
  4. Holocaust and Germans (3)
  5. 50TH: Dresden
  6. [INF] 16 FEB 45
  7. German Superweapon? (6)
  8. Soviet Tankers (was Michael Wittmann) (3)
  9. Re[2]: German Superweapon? (2)
 10. Draft Requirements (2)
 11. Dresden, Fire Storms
 12. MED: Pilot found in Dutch sea coming home
 13. Michael Wittmann (Villers Bocage)
 14. Japan's Grand Strategy
 15. Japanese tactics (part 5) (2)
 16. INF: 50 Years Ago - 17-FEB-1945
 17. 6 million ? (5)
 18. (none)
 19. Query: Lt. Col. Leon Vance
 20. Documentary and Limpet Mines
 21. Indian Freikorps...
 22. Hans Rudel Again!
 23. MEDIA:Aussies at Singapore
 24. Japanese tactics (part 6)
 25. Invasion vs. A-Bomb - Not
 26. Japanese tactics (part 4) (2)
 27. Japanese tactics (part 7?-- I may have lost count)
 28. Japanese tactics (part 3)
 29. Japanese tactics (part 8-- and hopefully last)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 02:06:50 PST
From:    Jim Brady <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: New WWII PC'ism - Dresden bombing

Quoting part of what Kelvin Bren Luther wrote:
>
>        When I first began writing I actually stopped to consider
>mentioning the holocaust as I assumed it would evoke the reaction you
>just issued.  I think this proves part of my point, why should anyone
>involved in a discussion about morality in WW II be dismayed by inclusion
>of the holocaust in the discussion?  How could it not be included?  I
>also half expected someone to make the point that it was allied knowledge
>of the holocaust that allowed them to bomb Dresden (was Hamburg not also
>firebombed?).

1. You're setting up straw men: I -- nobody here, in fact -- ever suggested the Holocaust had
nothing to do with morality issues. That's ludicrous. And so was your original post, which was
premised on the absurd notion that there was some sort of trend not to blame Germans or
Germany for Holocaust atrocities. Hell, even Holocaust deniers don't deny the Germans had
some type of program going.

2. You may have "half expected someone" to suggest Dresden was bombed as a response to
 Holocaust activities, but it certainly wasn't me --- so don't quote my posts and respond to
someone else's points, please. My entire beef was about the absurdities (as restated above)
and about the dull-headed use of the term "PC" in place of presenting a cogent argument.

3. I read the letter you posted from the NYT, and I still think you and that writer are worried over
 imagined concerns. The irony of Hitler's quest for the "Thousand-Year Reich" is that the stain
on Germany for carrying out the Holocaust is the only thing from Nazi Germany that will last a
thousand years. (And okay, in England or Canada you guys prefer to say "German" over
"Nazi". Fine. In the US, we often specifiy "Nazi" rather than the broad-brush and sometimes
inaccurate "German" label. Get over it.) You need to move on to some other issue, in my
opinion. And if you come up with something, why don't you address it to  the list directly and
not me, as it's unlikely I'll be interested personally in anything you have to write, considering
this sampling.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 08:38:16 CET
From:    "COL Donnell, Doug" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ACORN unit info

Bob Roy asked for information about the Stars and Stripes.

First, there is no US edition.  It's published in the Pacific and Europe.

Address for the European office is:  Stars and Stripes, Unit 29480,
APO AE 09211.   I'm sure they could help you with information on
subscriptions, back issues, etc.

                            Doug Donnell
                            Ruppertsweiler Germany

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 04:00:13 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 02-16-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
02/16 Fri. Aircraft from fast carrier task force (Vice Adm. M. A.
           Mitscher) bomb airfields, aircraft factories, and shipping
           in the Tokyo area, Japan; attack is repeated on 17
           February.
           Fire support vessels and carrier-based aircraft commence
           3-day prelanding bombardment and bombing of Iwo Jima,
           Volcano Islands.
           Cruiser and destroyer task force (Rear Adm. J. L. McCrea)
           bombards enemy shore installations at Kurabu Zaki,
           Paramushiro, Kurile Islands.
           Army forces, preceded by naval bombardment and attack by
           Army aircraft, land on Corregidor, Luzon, P. I.
            United States naval vessel sunk:
             Submarine BARBEL (SS-316), Pacific Ocean area,
              reported as presumed lost.
            United States naval vessels damaged:
             Destroyers INGRAHAM (DD-694) and BARTON (DD-722), by
              collision, Iwo Jima area,
              31 d. 45'N., 141 d. 54'E.
             Submarine chaser PC-1119, by coastal defense gun,
              Luzon area, P. I.,
              14 d. 23'N., 120 d. 35'E.
            Japanese naval vessel sunk:
             Minelayer NARIU, by submarine SENNET (SS-408),
              off Shikoku, Japan,
              32 d. 10'N., 135 d. 54'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Feb 1995 22:22:39 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Holocaust and Germans

Rudy...

        Precisely.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Feb 1995 22:08:55 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 50TH: Dresden

The "inspiration" and role models for the Dresden raid --

        Luftwaffe raids on Rotterdam, Coventry, Belgrade, London,
        Liverpool, Belfast, Glasgow .... and so on.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 07:23:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] 16 FEB 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
FRIDAY, 16 FEBRUARY 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  C-47, Douglas Skytrain
  L-1, Stinson Vigilant
  L-4, Piper Cub (Grasshopper)
  L-5, Stinson Sentinel
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 33 fighter-bombers attack
airfields in the Nanking area, railroad yards at Hsuchang and Tungpu, and hit
rail and river traffic from Wuhu to Hankow, in the Sinsiang area, and in
French Indochina, the Luang Prabang area, and from Muong Soui to the Mekong
River.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 12 B-25s bomb troops,
storage areas, and vehicles during offensive reconnaissance along roads S of
Lashio and from Hsenwi to Loilem; 31 P-47s support ground forces in the
Myitson area; about 160 fighter-bombers attack town areas, troop
concentrations, artillery positions, transportation targets, and general
targets of opportunity at Namtu, Wengkau, Hsipaw, Namhsawng-hawng, Hunhla,
Mong Yai, Sinkin, Panghung, Hatka, Na-kyeh, and Panglong and similar targets
at Kyawngsu, Kunsanlek, Namloi, Man-kyawng, Tonsing, Sam-Lau, and Mong Li.
Transports fly 632 sorties delivering men and supplies to forward bases and
dropping supplies to frontline troops.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  AIRBORNE OPERATIONS (IX Troop Carrier Command): The 77th Troop Carrier
Squadron, 435th Troop Carrier Group, moves from Welford Park, England to
Bretigny, France with C-47s.

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 833: 1,042 bombers and 197
fighters attack benzol plants, oil refineries and marshalling yards in C
Germany; 8 bombers are lost:
  1. 223 B-17s are sent to hit the marshalling yard at Hamm (208); targets of
opportunity are Osnabruck (1), Meppen (1) and Rheine (1); bombing is by H2X,
Micro H and some visual; 2 B-17s are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 95
damaged; 7 airmen are WIA and 11 MIA. Escorting are 44 of 45 P-51s.
  2. 375 B-17s are dispatched to hit the Harpenerweg oil refinery at Dortmund
(78) and oil refineries at Nordstern (104) and Minsterstein (112); 30 hit the
marshalling yard at Munster, a secondary target; targets of opportunity are
Langendreer (23) and other (2); bombing is by Gee-H with some visual; 5 B-17s
are lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 170 damaged; 8 airmen are WIA and 46
MIA. 38 of 39 P-51s escort.
  3. 362 B-24s are sent to hit marshalling yards at Osnabruck (174) and
Rheine (94) and the Salzbergen oil refinery (46); 31 hit Burgsteinfurt, a
target of opportunity; H2X and Gee-H are used; 1 B-24 is lost and 26 damaged;
10 airmen are MIA. 50 P-51s escort the B-24s.
  4. 63 of 76 B-17s hit the rail bridge at Wesel visually; 13 hit the
marshalling yard at Rheine, a target of opportunity, with H2X. Escorting are
45 of 51 P-51s.
  5. 6 B-24s fly a screening mission without loss.
  6. 4 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  7. 4 P-51s escort photo reconnaissance aircraft over Germany.
  8. 4 P-51s escort a B-17 on a "special sortie."

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 300+ B-26s and A-20s
bomb the Mayen, rail bridge, Rees communications center, Solingen turbo-jet
component works, Unna ordnance depot, and a target of opportunity; fighters
escort the bombers, fly patrols, sweeps, and armed reconnaissance, attack
bridge, railroads, and other special targets; the XIX Tactical Air Command
also supports the US VIII, XII, and XX Corps W of the Prum River, E of the
Sauer River, and in the Saarlautern area. The 158th Liaison Squadron, Ninth
AF (attached to Twelfth Army Group), moves from Somme-Suippe, France to
Celles, Belgium with L-1s, L-4s and L-5s.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): 630+ B-24s and B-17s bomb
airfields at Regensburg, Landsberg, and Neubiberg, Germany; marshalling yards
at Rosenheim, Germany, Hall, and Innsbruck, Austria, and Bolzano, and
Vipiteno, Italy, plus scattered targets of opportunity in Austria and N
Italy; P-38s and P-51s escort the bombers, fly reconnaissance missions, and
escort reconnaissance and supply operations.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, bad weather grounds
medium bombers; fighter-bombers cut rail lines at the S end of Garda Lake,
and bomb an ammunition and fuel dump E of Nervesa della Battaglia and an
ammunition dump E of Villafranca in Lunigiana.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Area)
  VI Air Service Area Command: The 316th Troop Carrier Squadron, VI Air
Service Area Command, moves from Kahuku to Bellows Field, Hawaii with C-47s.
  Seventh Air Force: 2 Guam Island-based B-24s on an armed reconnaissance
flight bomb Marcus Island in the N Pacific. 42 sent against Iwo Jima Island
are recalled due to total cloud cover over the target. During the night of
16/17 Feb, 4 Guam-based B-24s, striking separately, hit Susaki Airfield on
Chichi Jima Island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: Fighters attack
vehicles and trains in the S part of Formosa. On Luzon Island, 120+ A-20s and
B-24s pound Corregidor Island during the early daylight hours; amphibious and
airborne landings follow and the paratroops soon link up with the beachhead;
A-20s and fighter-bombers also bomb nearby Caballo Island; B-25s support
ground forces in the Mariveles area, hit facilities at Baguio and Santa Fe,
and bomb Camalaniugan Airfield. P-38s hit Likanan and Matina Airfields on
Mindanao Island and B-24s pound Kendari Airfield on Celebes Island.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 07:27:35 -0500
From:    "Steven Pudlo, Dept. Computer Svcs." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: German Superweapon?

Jack McKillop informs us;

>The New York Times reported today that paleontologists searching
>for fossils discovered the remains of a German superweapon that
>the nazis had tested at the end of the Second World War.  The
>device was found located on a submarine, which had beached in
>1945, and had been subsequently covered with sand after the crew
>had abandoned ship.  The superweapon, mounted just forward of
>the bridge, replaced the forward 105mm gun that could usually be
>found on older U-boats.  The device consisted of a large U-shaped
>mount with a huge elastic band connecting the two vertical sides
>of the mount.  It could be swiveled in any direction and was
>designed to fire projectiles up to five miles.  The elastic band
>was cranked back by a diesel-powered winch and released after
>placing a huge 1000-lb. ball-bearing in the center of the elastic.
>The ball-bearing hurtled through the air at speeds up to 740
>m.p.h. and was designed to sink ships as large as 10,000 tons.

<snip>

Ladies and Gentlemen;

At last! Concrete irrefutable proof that Julia Child was REALLY a double
agent! Anyone can see the comparison with this dreaded superweapon and
several of her culinary creations!

The little green men who are her REAL bosses must be proud!;-)

                                                                Steve

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Steven E. Pudlo  - [email-masked] |"Life may be a drag...
STC Programmer/Analyst - (203) 885-2343  |    But it sure beats the
Three Rivers Community-Technical College |       only known alternative"
574 New London Turnpike                  |                     (S.E.P.)
Norwich, CT. U.S.A. 06360                |No one gets out of it alive..
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 08:54:59 EST
From:    "H. Emery Ford" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Soviet Tankers (was Michael Wittmann)

On Wed, 15 Feb 95, Henry Sirotin wrote:

>Michael Wittman was the most successful *German* tank ace of WW II.
>How much do we know about Soviet tankers?

I would also like to know more about Soviet tankers.  I have seen an
interview, I can't remember on which program, of a women Soviet tanker.

Also, I read recently that because Soviet tanks had very few radios,
that they communicated with each other by hand signals!  Does anyone
know of this?  Would it be like left arm up means I'm turning right, and
left arm straight out means I'm going to turn left?

As a side query:  Were tanks of any nation particularly well prepared
for the possibility of chemical warfare?  It would seem that they would
be in light of WWI.

Thanks.

Emery

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 08:05:31 CST
From:    "SCHERRER, TIM" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re[2]: German Superweapon?

I have one of these in my collection--although the rubber has deteriorat
ed a bit.  I was wondering why a rubber band had waffenampts on it.  TAS

>
>>The New York Times reported today that paleontologists searching
>>for fossils discovered the remains of a German superweapon that
>>the nazis had tested at the end of the Second World War.  The
>>device was found located on a submarine, which had beached in
>>1945, and had been subsequently covered with sand after the crew
>>had abandoned ship.  The superweapon, mounted just forward of
>>the bridge, replaced the forward 105mm gun that could usually be
>>found on older U-boats.  The device consisted of a large U-shaped
>>mount with a huge elastic band connecting the two vertical sides
>>of the mount.  It could be swiveled in any direction and was
>>designed to fire projectiles up to five miles.  The elastic band
>>was cranked back by a diesel-powered winch and released after
>>placing a huge 1000-lb. ball-bearing in the center of the elastic.
>>The ball-bearing hurtled through the air at speeds up to 740
>>m.p.h. and was designed to sink ships as large as 10,000 tons.
>
><snip>
>
>Ladies and Gentlemen;
>
>At last! Concrete irrefutable proof that Julia Child was REALLY a double
>agent! Anyone can see the comparison with this dreaded superweapon and
>several of her culinary creations!
>
>The little green men who are her REAL bosses must be proud!;-)
>
>                                                                Steve
>
>-----------------------------------------------------------------------
>Steven E. Pudlo  - [email-masked] |"Life may be a drag...
>STC Programmer/Analyst - (203) 885-2343  |    But it sure beats the
>Three Rivers Community-Technical College |       only known alternative"
>574 New London Turnpike                  |                     (S.E.P.)
>Norwich, CT. U.S.A. 06360                |No one gets out of it alive..
>-----------------------------------------------------------------------

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 09:13:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Draft Requirements

Does anyone know what criteria was used for classifying people under
Selective Service in WWII, e.g., age, marital status, children, essential
job, college deferment, etc.?  I believe the criteria changed at various
stages during the war and I would appreciate data for any and all periods.

And does anyone know what the classification categories were and the
definition of each, i.e., 1A, 1H, 4F, etc.?

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 08:20:06 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Dresden, Fire Storms

> >        [Dresden] did give the USAAF some idea of what could later be
> done again
> >st
> >        Japan, when Curtis Lemay stopped the high altitude strategic
> bombing
> >        campaign and changed to low level incindiary attacks.
> >
> >Do you have a reference that states it was Dresden that inspired Lemay?
> >
> >(It's not that I doube the statement, I just haven't heard this
> >before.)
>
> Sorry, it's just conjecture on my part, and I should have labeled it so.
> But read the Lemay excerpt that Dennis Sparks just posted to the list.
> With no record of firebombing to speak of in Europe, something must have
> triggered his decision to take that route against Japan.  I can't help
> but believe the effects of Hamburg and Dresden were inthe back, if not
> front, of his mind.

In April of 1942, Jimmy Doolittle and a few B-25s attacked a few targets in
and around Tokyo.  Most of the targets were general infrastructure targets
like rail yards, factories, industrial centers, etc.

Each aircraft was to carry a mix of 500 pound demolition bombs and 500 pound
incendiary bombs.

The incendiary bombs were included for a couple of basic reasons -- to follow
up with the standard demolition bombs and hopefully ignite fires causing more
damage (obviously an opportunity with oil storage and refining facilities, for
example), but also because of a realization that Japanese contruction made
heavy use of wood, paper and other flammable materials (referenced by Hank
Potter, Navigator bomber #1).

The desire was to cause as much damage as possible with the few (16) planes
available.  Therefore, incendiaries were included.  An incendiary attack
against a target made primarily of flammable materials, means that even if
you miss the specific target, the subsequent fire may very well still take
out the intended target.  Not to mention the psychological and actual effect
on the area being hit.

The potential for incendiary attack was well known in 1942.  While later
experience, including Dresden, may have aided those opinions, the concepts
of an incendiary attack against the Japanese home lands pre-dates any of the
fire bombings by many years.

(BTW: the change to low-level B-29 raids did not include a change in attack
style.  The B-29s were changed to low level because Japanese anti-aircraft
weapons were not effective at low level.  While the risk increased for the
B-29 crews to fly as low as they did, Japanese anti-aircraft were unable to
accurately defend against them.  The increasing (and alarming) losses of
high-altitude B-29s forced a change in tactics, which brought in the risky
(and ultimately succesful) low-altitude raids.)

--
Robert J. Granvin
Southern Minnesota Wing Confederate Air Force

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 09:23:00 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Re: German Superweapon?

Ladies and Gentlemen;

At last! Concrete irrefutable proof that Julia Child was REALLY a double
agent! Anyone can see the comparison with this dreaded superweapon and
several of her culinary creations!

The little green men who are her REAL bosses must be proud!;-)

                                                                Steve

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

F Y I: To the above should be added her patented intercontinental ballistic
spatula, along with her design for the extremely lethal "artillery whisk"
(a kind of marriage between a crossbow and an eggbeater ... nuclear-powered,
of course).

-- Warren Thompson

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 09:47:49 -0500
From:    Cheryl Abdullah <[email-masked]>
Subject: MED: Pilot found in Dutch sea coming home

Retyped from the Tuesday Feb. 14 1995 _Columbus Dispatch_:
Cheryl                                    [email-masked]
--------------------
  The biggest aircraft graveyard in Europe has surrendered a fallen Ohio
airman after more than 50 years, and a grateful Dutch government has begun
efforts to return the combat pilot's remains to his Millersburg home.
  Flight Officer Frank D. Gallion, 29, was on his way to shepherd American
bombers when German fighter pilots shot down his P-47D Thunderbolt fighter
about 12:30 p.m. on Nov. 3, 1943, just inside the Dutch coastline.
  Gallion's fate remained unknown until Friday when Dutch military and
government agencies raised Gallion's plane from 10 feet of water in what
was known during World War II as the Zuider Zee.
  The giant lake, now the Ijsselmeer inland sea, lay along an aerial
highway leading from American bomber and fighter bases in England to
German targets, said Pierre Heijboer of the Dutch newspaper _de Volkskrant_.
  "It  was a big meeting point," Heijboer said yesterday.  "The Germans
knew about that."  Eventually "the lake became the largest airplane
graveyard in Europe."  He estimated that it holds the wreckage of about
700 Allied and German warplanes.
  The Dutch have placed a high priority whenever possible on the recovery
of American pilots who fought above their land, Heijboer said.
  "In my country, there is still a deep feeling of gratitude to the
American young boys who died in that war," he said.
  In Millersburg, in Holmes County, family members were informed of the
discovery by news accounts over the weekend...."This is one of the nicest
things that could happen to me in my old days," Gallion's surviving
brother, Ottmar, 77, told the newspaper....
-------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 00:47:39 +0900
From:    Akira Takiguchi <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Michael Wittmann (Villers Bocage)

     The legendary battle of Villers Bocage (VB) bought Michael (called
Michel) the "Schwertern" (swords) to his Knight's Cross.  But this was a
costly battle also to the Germans.  Paul Carell (in his _Sie Kommen_)
insists that "Historians say 7 Tigers destroyed, but Panzer IV's must
have been mistakenly counted as Tigers", but actually (at least) 6 Tigers
were disabled.  On this day (June 13th) 1st company of 101st Tiger battalion
suffered 3 NCOs (Ernst, Swoboda and Zellmer.  Carell was partially wrong
in saying "Stamm's Tiger and Ernst's were hit and the crew was killed")
and 6 men killed, 1 officer, 2 NCOs and 7 men injured.  2nd company (Wittmann)
suffered 1 man killed, 3 men injured.

     About the turret number - Wittmann was commanding Tiger "205" on June
6th ("5" denotes company commander - a rule used in troops related to
Leibstandate division).  This vehicle was intact on 7th, and photographed
running on N316 road near Morgny.

     After the receipt of Schwertern, a movie footage shows him on Tiger
"231".  There is a photograph that shows "231" towed by another Tiger,
believed taken just after the VB battle.  This led some researchers to
believe that he fought on "231" in VB.  Whether this is true or not is
still a mystery to me.  If the Tiger hit in front of "Mercerie Sonneterie
Laines" was Wittmann's, as told in Mr Agte's book, it is not likely to be
"231", because it stayed the same place after the bombing.  It is apparently
a Tiger from 2nd company (it does not have a Corps marking on the left
front).  If we were to believe the story that Wittmann's vehicle was
restored as told in Karl Kollatz (aka Franz Kurowski)'s book, "231" should
have been hit somewhere else (in this case, it means 7 Tigers hit).

Akira Takiguchi  ATSON Inc./ASAHI Net

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 11:18:48 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Soviet Tankers (was Michael Wittmann)

>Also, I read recently that because Soviet tanks had very few radios,
>that they communicated with each other by hand signals!  Does anyone
>know of this?  Would it be like left arm up means I'm turning right, and
>left arm straight out means I'm going to turn left?
>

The Isreali Army had (and may still have) a tradition that tank commanders
remain standing in the cuppola during action (thus the increadibly high
casualty rates for tank commanders).  One of the reasons for this was that
the Isreali Army was believer in using visual signals for movement and
engaging opposition forces.  They felt that the radios often became
cluttered with talk, would malfunction, or could be jammed by opposition
forces.  Once the tankers could not communicate with each other via radios,
the loss of control would be catastophic.  They felt that perhaps the
clearest and quickest way to communicate would be via the uses of colored
flags and a "semiphore" like code.

If you look at todays M1 tanks, tank commanders can communicate via
computer systems that will produce graphical movement orders on screens at
the commanders stations,  thus removing some of the confusion of the spoken
word.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 12:14:22 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japan's Grand Strategy

        First, I would like to publicly thank Mike for his riveting
installments on Japan.  If I could write half as well as he does off
the top of his head, I would quit my day job!

        Second, his articles have me wondering about a particular
aspect of Japan's strategy.  Mike (and others) have stated repeatedly
that Japan hoped to end the war within a few months; definitely within
one year by going for a "knock-out punch" that always eluded them.
However, they may have hoped to achieve the same favorable conclusion
by sending peace overtures to the US.  Did Japan ever send such
overtures to the US after the first four or five months of continuous
victories?  It seems to me that if you hope to end the war in a few
months, you would ask your opponent if he's had enough if you've been
beating him time after time.  If Japan didn't do so, how did they
expect to end the war favorably while the chance of this (perhaps
mythical) "knock-out punch" became more and more remote?  Were they
simply waiting for the US to capitulate?  I would imagine that the
Japanese would view such an act of capitulation as losing face so
how could they expect the US to surrender on their own accord?  Did
the Japanese have a desire to humiliate the US which was greater
than their desire to end the war?  I seriously doubt that such an
offer would have been well received by the US but the Japanese may
have picked up some propaganda points if it were known that they didn't
want to continue "a needless war."  They may also have hoped that such
a move may have had a devisive effect on the citizenry of the US.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
Oh, man, don't hit me with those negative waves so early in the morning.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 12:46:47 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japanese tactics (part 5)

        Looking at the performance of the Japanese Army on Guadalcanal, which
their own staff in later studies criticized as "bamboo spear tactics," it might
be assumed that the Japanese failed because they went away from what they did
best (infiltration and maneuver using jungle cover), in part as a result of
poor intelligence and apparent overconfidence.  However, a deeper analysis
suggests that in fact this was part of a larger phe

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 12:47:36 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 17-FEB-1945

On 17-FEB-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the British XXX Corps is
closing on on Goch. In the U.S. 3rd Army sector, the XII Corps is expanding
and consolidating the Our-Sauer bridgehead. The 26th Division continues
limited action in the Saarlautern bridgehead. In the U.S. 7th Army sector, the
XV Corps continues its limited offensive to straighten and shorten its lines.

Philippines - The XIV Corps begins heavy fire against Intramuros in Manila. In
the XI Corps area, East Force starts moving west on Bataan along the
Pilar-Bagac Road without opposition; while the South Force is working
northward from Mariveles. The Rock Force is systematically clearing
Corregidor.

Mindoro - The Palawan Task Force (composed of elements of the 41st Division)
is activated to make an assault, Operation Victor III, on Palawan. The
Division is also to clear the Zamboanga Peninsula on Mindanao in March.

Iwo Jima - Ships of the 5th Fleet and carrier and land based aircraft continue
to pound Iwo Jima. The underwater demolition team begin action. Carrier planes
from TF 58 continue to provide support for the Iwo Jima operation with attacks
on Japan.

Burma - The Indian 25th Division expands the bridgehead at Ru-ywa on the
Arakan Coast. The British 36th Division holds the Shweli River, bridgehead
against a major Japanese counterattack.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 13:16:58 -0500
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: New WWII PC'ism - Dresden bombing

On 16 Feb Mr. Brady wrote (emphasis added):

>the dull-headed use of the term "PC" in place of presenting *a cogent    >argument*

>in England or Canada you guys prefer to say "German" over "Nazi".        >Fine. In the US, we often specifiy "Nazi" rather than the broad-brush    >and sometimes inaccurate "German" label. *Get over it.*

To some people this is a very real issue. If you didn't see Rudy
Rosenberg's letter posted by Paul? Beal on 15 Feb at 21:27, I'll
be happy to post you a copy.

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 12:23:09 -0600
From:    Michael D Wallick <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Draft Requirements

The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 provided for four
classifications:

Class I:  Available for service immediately
      A:  Fit for general military or naval service
      B:  Fit only for limited military or naval service

Class II:  Deferred because of the importance to the nation of the services
being rendered in civilian life
      A:  Necessary men in essential business
      B:  Necessary men in nonessential business
      C:  Necessary federal, state, county, municipal employees and
necessary federal or state inferior officers
      D:  Elected state, county, municipal officers

Class III:  Deferred because of dependents within the meaning of the law
      A:  Dependent wives and/or children
      B:  Dependent mother or foster mother, an aged or invalid father or
foster father, an aged or invalid grandparent, a brother under 16 years
of age or sister under 18 years of age, or an invalid brother or sister of
any age

Class IV:  Deferred by law or because induction is undesirable for obvious
reasons, such as insanity, physical unfitness, alienage, etc.  This group
included high federal and state officers such as the governors and judges,
aliens who had not declared their intention of becoming citizens, ministers
and divinity students, and college students.  Those obviously unfit for
service included criminals, perverts, persons convicted of treason, and
registrants found to have physical, mental, or nervous disabilities.

Source:
Celler, Emanuel.  THE DRAFT AND YOU.  New York: Viking Press, 1940.

Michael Wallick

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 13:28:17 -0500
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Re[2]: German Superweapon?

Well, now we know what the Germans did with all those condoms
labeled "small" we dropped in that apocryphal PsyOps program.

HS

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 13:12:30 GMT+6
From:    Esaul Zermeno Bautista <[email-masked]>
Subject: 6 million ?

      Hi everyone!

          Always I've had the doubt about the existence of 6 millions
of Jews , all this because I was reading a book of Salvador Borrego E.
(Mexican Writer) in his book "Derrota Mundial" where he told that
before of the War there were 6 millions of Jews in all Europe and
when the war is over there was a magically resurrection of Jews in
all Europe.
Does anybody knows approximately how much Jews there were in all
Europe before of the war and how much after.

Other question is :
                   Legaly speaking  about the Judgement of Nuremberg
it was correct ?.

    Thanks in advance

      Esaul Alfredo

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 18:00:29 GMT
From:    Jim Auld <[email-masked]>
Subject: (none)

nomail

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 13:08:05 -0600
From:    Michael Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Soviet Tankers (was Michael Wittmann)

Emery,
As I understan it, Soviet tankers used flags to communicate vehicle to
vehicle. Soviet tactical doctrine emphasized mass assault on
pre-determined objectives that would result in a complete stoppage of an
assault if successful to await new orders. Very few maps were available
as well, which further lent to this massed doctrine. By the end of ther
war,Soviet tank production far outstripped Germany, which further lent
itself to the massed doctrine. The wave assault doctrine precluded the
need for enhanced communication capabilities between tanks, and also
assured control over units.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 14:17:08 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japanese tactics (part 5)

        Looking at the performance of the Japanese Army in the pivotal battle
of Guadalcanal, which a later Japanese staff study criticized as "bamboo spear
tactics," it might seem as if the Japanese failure resulted from getting away
from what they did best (infiltration and maneuver using jungle cover), in part
due to poor intelligence and apparent overconfidence.  However, a deeper
analysis suggests that this episode was merely a striking example of a
fundamental problem of Japanese Army tactics.  Namely, that because of material
deficiencies, and also a certain inflexibility at command and staff levels,
the Japanese ground forces were in general only truly effective when they were
permitted the time to extensively prepare for specific operations.  In other
words, detailed and meticulous planning could overcome to a large degree
problems arising from shortages of proper equipment, and thorough training for
specific missions could lessen the need to improvise in order to meet wholly
unexpected new situations (I'm trying to word this carefully because I'm aware
that in combat hardly anything goes exactly as planned-- an important part of
this argument is simply that the Japanese Army fought much better when it could
choose its own ground-- more so perhaps than most other major armies of the
period).  The later performance of the Japanese Army in defensive campaigns
which met the same criteria-- Tarawa, Biak, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa-- tends
to support this argument.  In all these battles the Japanese had prepared
extensively beforehand, fought on ground of their choosing, and proved pretty
effective in that they inflicted relatively high casualties on the attacking
forces, and in all of the above examples except Tarawa also succeeded in their
other chief objective of buying time.  But we'll return to the Army later.
        The Japanese air units also evidenced a marked deterioration of
tactical proficiency as the war progressed.  Although this also indicated a
certain lack of adaptability to changed conditions of combat, there were some
different forces at work in this phenomenon.  To discuss the air warfare
aspect, I plan to focus chiefly on fighter aircraft, since these were an
essential tool in gaining and maintaining the crucial local air supremacy.
        Initially the Japanese fighter tactics were aided by, and to a certain
extent geared to, the advantages offered by the technical features of their
aircraft, particularly the Navy's Mitsubishi Zero.  The Zero's biggest trump
card was its outstanding maneuverability, better than that of any Allied
fighter it was called upon to face.  The Zero was also as fast as or faster
than most of its competition in the first six months of the war, straight ahead
or climbing, and its two 20-mm cannon gave it adequate punch by contemporary
standards.  Finally, its striking power was increased by the plane's
exceptional range (during the Guadalcanal campaign Zeros regularly flew the
round trip of 560 miles EACH WAY from Rabaul to the 'Canal, sometimes hanging
around to dogfight until they were out of ammunition before heading home).
Japanese fighter tactics in '41-'42 were rather conventional.  As in most
nations, their pilots preferred to make diving attacks because of the increased
speed offered by the dive, but once combat was joined, they tended to mix it up
in old-fashioned WWI-style dogfights, exploiting their advantage in
maneuverability (and also the flying skills of their highly-trained pilots)
to the fullest.  Japanese Army pilots did the same with their
Ki-27 and Ki-43 fighters, which possessed even better maneuverability than the
Zero, but were slower and rather lightly-armed.  "Staying to fight," the
British called it, and the British tie-in is apt, because Japanese tactics in
many ways closely resembled those of the RAF during the Battle of Britain.  The
absolute domination acheived by the Zero, and to a lesser degree the Ki-43, in
the first six months of the war were also aided by the fact that the Japanese
often faced Allied aircraft which were markedly inferior.  For example, the
Brewster Buffalo was initially the chief RAF fighter plane in Malaya (a few
also saw action in Burma), it was used by the Dutch in Indonesia (along with
the Curtiss Hawk 75), and even as late as June '42, at the battle of Midway, 21
of the 25 Marine fighters which took off to defend the island against the first
Japanese raid were Buffalos.  The successful bombing attack which destroyed
most of the US Army P-40's on the ground in the Phillipines on the first day of
the war forced the Americans to rely heavily on the antiquated P-35 for the air
defense of that theatre in the face of the Japanese invasion.
        Eventually the Japanese air effort was to be crushed by the twin
hammers of attrition and enemy material superiority.  In the case of the air
units, it was not a question of abandoning tactics which had worked in the
past, like the Army on Guadalcanal, but rather of sticking with tactical
approaches which had previously been successful in the face of changed material
circumstances.  In the air as on the ground the Japanese were unable to adapt
to new and unforeseen conditions, and this was partly a result of the fact that
they were unable to train new pilots of the same exceptional calibre as the men
they were losing in such numbers.  For, even by 1942 standards, the Zero also
had weaknesses, chief of which was its absolute lack of protection for the
pilot or the fuel tanks (obviously, a contributing factor to the high
attrition).  Even aircraft such as the US Army P-40, the
Navy and Marine Grumman F4F Wildcat, and the British Hawker Hurricane proved
capable of holding their own against the Japanese fighters if properly
employed.  I've already mentioned that the Japanese had trouble adjusting to
the flexibility of the Navy/Marine system of fighting in pairs (the Army also
employed this, but initially seemed to be less adept at it).  In fact, they
never did adapt to it, and in 1945 were still flying in their three-plane "v"
formations or "vic's."  (some American pilots brought the teamwork of the
wingman system to an art form, most notably Dick Bong and Tom Lynch, who rolled
up 40 and 20 "kills" respectively, but flew P-38's as wingmen over New Guinea.
When this system was utilized properly it became a team of two equals, while
the Japanese "v" consisted more of a leader and two followers).  Another
effective American tactic, first developed by Chennault's people in Burma and
China using the P-40, was the diving hit-and-run style of combat, which
resulted in a high percentage of success against the poorly-protected Japanese
fighters, but minimized losses by refusing to play to the enemy strength by
getting drawn into prolonged dogfights.  This tactic was brought to perfection
by the P-38 (available in the Pacific by the second half of 1942), which could
climb higher than any Japanese fighter, outrun a Zero in level flight, and dive
with incredible speed.  Coupled with the heavy firepower characteristic of all
US fighters from 1942 on, these qualities made the Lightning a difficult weapon
to counter when used in diving, hit-and-run attacks (it took the US Army pilots
a bit of time to figure this out-- initially they were often drawn into
dogfighting the Zero and Ki-43, with poor results since although handy for a
two-engined aircraft the P-38 was no match for either enemy plane in a
tight-turning "rhubarb").  It is no coincidence that three of the top five
Allied aces in the Pacific, and the two highest-scoring US pilots of the war,
flew the P-38 (Bong, 40; Maguire, 38; Charles MacDonald, 27; the other two were
McCampbell, 34, who flew an F6F Hellcat off carriers, and "Pappy" Boyington, who
got his first six in a P-40 with the AVG in Burma, and the other 22 in a
Corsair in the Solomons).  BTW, there is again a striking similarity in this to
the British tactics vs the Germans in 1940 (the Germans preferring the diving
hit and run with their Me-109, which could out-dive and out-climb a Spitfire;
the Germans also used a tactical system based on pairs while the RAF at this
stage still flew three-plane vic's-- it was also no coincidence that in
strictly fighter vs fighter combats the Germans, when not tied down to flying
close support to bomber formations, usually emerged with a favorable "kill"
ratio-- see, among others, Len Deighton, "Fighter").
        There was also a definite technical component at work here.
Regardless of tactical approach, it was difficult for the Japanese to defend
against this sort of attack given the advantage in speed, climb, and diving
ability possessed by aircraft such as the P-38 and the F4U Corsair (first used
by the Marines in the Solomons in Feb '43).  It was to a degree only a matter
of the US pilots adopting the proper tactics for their particular aircraft.
Here I'd like to say that Japanese success was abetted by poor tactical
decisions, intelligence, etc, on many occasions.  For example, the Americans,
especially the US Army pilots, did not know how to fight the Zero for most of
1942, despite the fact that Chennault had made detailed reports on the
aircraft's characteristics soon after its first appearance in China in October
1940.  Thus they often mixed it up in dogfights, playing right into Japanese
hands.  (A similar playing into the enemy's hands might be cited in respect to
the ground combat in Malaya-- to paraphrase one author I read, the British had
too few troops deployed too far forward in order to guard airfields with too
few planes, which in turn were supposed to protect a naval base with too few
ships).  At any rate, I must break off.  I'll continue with the interaction of
technical, tactical, and industrial factors in the air fighting in my next
post.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 14:31:05 -0500
From:    "Steven Pudlo, Dept. Computer Svcs." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: German Superweapon?

>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>-------------------

>F Y I: To the above should be added her patented intercontinental ballistic
>spatula, along with her design for the extremely lethal "artillery whisk"
>(a kind of marriage between a crossbow and an eggbeater ... nuclear-powered,
>of course).

Not to mention the effect of her chili on all those American 'jets'...;-)

                                                Disgusting. Ain't it?
                                                                Steve
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Steven E. Pudlo  - [email-masked] |"Life may be a drag...
STC Programmer/Analyst - (203) 885-2343  |    But it sure beats the
Three Rivers Community-Technical College |       only known alternative"
574 New London Turnpike                  |                     (S.E.P.)
Norwich, CT. U.S.A. 06360                |No one gets out of it alive..
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 19:57:28 +0000
From:    Gudmundur Helgason <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: German Superweapon?

What the hell is that Julia Child stuff?? IF using some US local humor
*please* explain them to us foreign dummies.

Back to the topic, is that a real weapon or some crank? The Germans had
an anti-aircraft missle system called 'Ursul' or 'Ursel' that was to be
fitted onto the XXI subs in 1945. Never operational to my knownledge.

Also we could figure out if that alleged weapon exists or not if we know
WHICH u-boat was found fitted with it. There aint that many u-boats that
are yet listed missing (at least not in shallow waters).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gudmundur J. Helgason                              e-mail: [email-masked]
Olduslod 41                                              phone: (354)-5655270
220 Hafnarfjordur                                               (354)-5652270
ICELAND                                             Maintainer of ICELAND.FAQ
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 15:40:06 -0500
From:    "John E. Kollar" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: German Superweapon?

Giant slingshots, cool.
:-)

does it come with laser-guidance  :-)

John E. Kollar

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 15:03:19 EST
From:    Mary Hricko <[email-masked]>
Subject: Query: Lt. Col. Leon Vance

Hello everyone,

      In trying to locate information about my father's crew pilot, Lt.
Col. Louis A. Mazure, I came across a story written in the January 1945
issue of True. The story detailed the heroism of Lt. Col. Leon R. Vance
who with one foot shot off was able to crash land a Liberator in the
English channel and save all 11 members of the crew. Vance was supposedly
nominated for the Medal of Honor, but I'm not certain if he received it.

   My interest in the story involves learning more details of the crash.
Mazure had flown over 30 missions with my father before being reassigned
to this new crew and was considered one of the best fliers in the 8th.
Nine members of this new crew had flown 16 missions and according to my
father's account, this particular mission was a "milk run" - a short
distance inside the French Coast. When the plane crashed, the men were
rescued by the British Home Guard. The Bomber in which they flew had no
name nor markings. I don't have the date of the incident with me at the
moment, but I believe it occurred after October 1944.

  I have every intention of trying to find the members of this crew, and
I plan to write to Maxwell AFB for additional information. The crew
members were as follows:

     Pilot- Lt. Col. Louis A. Mazure (Indiana)
     CoPilot - Lt. Earl "Rocket" Carper (Illinois)
     Command Pilot - Lt. Col. Leon R. Vance (Oklahoma)
     Engineer- Sgt. Earl L. Hoppie (Illnois)
     Waist Gunners - Sgts. David Evans and Harry Siegrist (both from Ohio)
     Tail Gunner- Sgt Wiley Sallis (Mississippi)
     Navigator- Capt. John R. Kilgore (Texas)
    *Bombardier- Capt. ? Segal (?)
     Pilotage Navigator- Capt. Nathaniel Glickman (New York)
     Radio Operator- Tech Sgt. Quentin Skufca (Ohio)

I have (*) the Bombardier because I'm not certain of his name. if anyone
knows any of these crew members or has heard of Vance and this particular
incident, I would like to hear from you. Thanks again.

                                                  Regards,

                                                          Mary

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 14:53:52 -0600
From:    Tony Schuler <[email-masked]>
Subject: Documentary and Limpet Mines

Hello,

        Has anyone seen D-Day remembered? I see that it was nominated
for an Academy Award for Best Documentary.

        Also, could someone supply me with information on Limpet mines?

Thanks,

Tony Schuler

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 15:59:55 EST
From:    JITENDRA KHARE <[email-masked]>
Subject: Indian Freikorps...

Hello everybody,
I am trying to gather information on Indian Freikorps who fought alongside the nazis during the war. I know that some of them were stationed in Normandy.  Does anyone have information on any activities..? Jitendra Khare

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 16:29:15 -0500
From:    chris garcia <[email-masked]>
Subject: Hans Rudel Again!

A while back someone asked about who was the most highly decorated German
military man, and the discussion went on to Hans Rudel, stuka pilot and
most highly decorated vet.

If you have a good newstand available to you, you may find the new issue of
World War II magazine, with an interview with the Luftwaffe Ace Gunther
Rall.  Rall mentions Rudel in the interview:

WWII:  It has been said that Hans-Ulrich Rudel, the great stuka pilot,
was something of a maniac.  Did you know him?

Rall:  Absolutely he wasa bit of a maniac. I flew with him as his fighter
escort forr his group several times.  They were flying normal JU-87
missions, and we escorted them.  This was in Russia of course.  He wasa
great stuka pilot, no doubt- after all he shot up 519 tanks amoung other
things, which is quite something.  Afterr the war I was a fellow prisoner
with him in France, as guests of the Americans.  RRudel and I were in the
same camp, and later we were borrrowed by the Royal Air Force.  I was
sent to the British Fighter Leaders School at Tangmere.  This was for
interrogation which lasted three weeks.  I was there with Rudel as well,
and we slept in the same room.  Living very close together you get
acquainted, and you come to understand the thinking of such a man, but I
had known him before that.  Anyhow, I was really surprised at this
egocentric man; he was the greatest in his own mind, that sort.  It was a
little disgusting to me.
                               ******************
That's all on Rudel.  If you're an air combat buff, the interview is
worth reading.  It's the March issue with the Me262 on the cover.  For
those benighted amoung you who don't know Gunther Rall, he was the third
highest scoring fighter pilot of all time behind Hartman and Barkhorn.
275 confirmed kills from both fronts.  I saw hinm on the TV series "Wings
of the Luftwaffe" in the episode profiling the BF-109.  He was commenting
on many things, amoung them the little rear view mirror in the 109's
cockpit (familiar to gamers of LucasArts "Their Finest Hour") which he
said vibrated from the engine so much that it was useless.  He said if
you let an enemy fighter get in close enough to see him in the mirror
clearly, it was time to jump out of the plane.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 15:35:51 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 6 million ?

>       Hi everyone!
>
>
>           Always I've had the doubt about the existence of 6 millions
> of Jews , all this because I was reading a book of Salvador Borrego E.
> (Mexican Writer) in his book "Derrota Mundial" where he told that
> before of the War there were 6 millions of Jews in all Europe and
> when the war is over there was a magically resurrection of Jews in
> all Europe.
> Does anybody knows approximately how much Jews there were in all
> Europe before of the war and how much after.

The vast majority of publications, books and other statistics puts the
European Jewish population at a number closer to 15 million -- If I
remember my hand-wavingly repeated numbers correctly.

--
\\ Robert J. Granvin                                 User Services Specialist
// School of Statistics - University of Minnesota            [email-masked]
"The past tempts us, the present confuses us, & the future frightens us... and
our lives slip away, moment by moment, lost in that vast, terrible in-between."

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 15:16:59 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Holocaust and Germans

There are many little towns in Southern Germany where the Swastika is still
quite prominent and Americans were very cooly recieved. I had a jeep break
down in one on a very cold winter night, when the GIs asked for help, they
were pointed to a pay phone down the street and denied acccess to the
public room of the Gasthaus. When we arrived to fix the jeep we were asked
to tow it and fix it elsewhere... of course I did manage to road march my
tank company through the town a day or two later - didn't do anything bad,
just made sure I went right thru the middle and not around... a minor map
reading problem was my answer when the inevitable complaint came.
        I have heard of worse.

Jim O'Neil  From the interrogation of a German General at the end of WW II:

               "The reason the American Army does so well in War, is that War
                is Chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis"

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 17:52:23 -0500
From:    "Peter I. Hidas" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 6 million ?

There were over nine million Jews living in Europe before the Second
World War. There were 3.5 million living just in Poland. The Germans
and their allies murdered close to two-third of them.
Peter I. Hidas, Montreal

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 17:25:32 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA:Aussies at Singapore

>From the DoD Newswire 16 February 1995

:SINGAPORE RESEARCH BOOSTS WAR VETERANS' MORALE

    SYDNEY, Feb 15  - Claims of Australian cowardice during
Japan's World War Two invasion of Singapore were false, an Australian
historian said on Wednesday, the 53rd anniversary of the fall of the
then British colony.
     Historian Lynette Silver announced the findings of her research
as veterans of Australia's Eighth Division laid a wreath at a Sydney
cenotaph to honour the hundreds of Australians who died trying to
defend Singapore in 1942.
     British accusations of mass cowardice, desertion and drunkenness
by members of the Eighth Division were unearthed from war archives two
years ago, sparking a national outcry and prompting Silver to
investigate the documents.
     Silver dismissed the allegations on Wednesday as groundless and
said they were contained in mostly anonymous statements by British
officers upset at the loss of Singapore.
     Silver said she spent months trying to verify the accusations,
visiting Singapore, and scouring war archives.
     Australian front-line troops were obeying orders when they
retreated and allegations that Australians ran from battle and got
drunk at a local club were based on rumours, Silver told state radio.
     Some troops who were routed by the Japanese retreated to the club
because it was "the only place they knew," she said.
     "The rumour went around that this whole group of Australians had
deserted and all run back into Singapore city," she said, adding a
claim that Australian troops shot dead a British naval captain was an
"absolute fabrication."
     The dead captain's son handed her documents showing the captain
was still alive days after the alleged murder.
     Senior British officers had command over the Australians in the
defence of Singapore.
     "It's provided the truth," former Eighth Division soldier Wal
Mariner told Reuters after laying a wreath to the 2,000 Australians
who died fighting in what was then known as Malaya.
     "It was an insult not only to we survivors but to those who did
not survive," Mariner said. "It was a humiliation and unjust."
     Prime Minister Paul Keating angrily dismissed the allegations two
years ago as Britain's attempt to find a scapegoat for "the British
Empire's most humiliating debacle."
     In another commemoration in Australia on Wednesday, Keating in
Canberra told former prisoners of war Australians must not forget acts
perpetrated by the Japanese in World War Two.
     Of the 22,000 Australians taken prisoner by the Japanese, over
8,000 died in captivity, generally from cruel treatment, starvation
and disease.

=====

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        [email-masked]
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 18:32:01 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japanese tactics (part 6)

        The Japanese loss of a degree of tactical dominance they had once
possessed in the air was not attributable solely to failings in tactical
doctrine.  Squadron tactics aside, fighter combat in WW2 tended to be, in the
confusion that air combat often entailed, a highly individualistic, one-on-one
(or two-on-three) form of warfare.  As such, it was, perhaps even more than
most forms of combat, dependent on the qualities and quantities of machines
being employed.  In this respect the Japanese soon lost whatever edge they
possessed in the opening months.  For in the air the Japanese soon found
themselves both outnumbered and, technically speaking, outclassed.
        The ultimate expression of this Allied technical dominance was the
Grumman F6F Hellcat.  Designed specifically as an answer to the Zero, it was
faster than the Japanese plane, better-armed, and much better protected.
Though the Zero still had an advantage in maneuverability,  the Hellcat was not
too shabby in that category either, and certainly close enough that it was able
to bring its many distinctly superior qualities to bear.  The Hellcat first
flew in action during the US carrier raid on the Marcus Islands (Sept or Aug
'43, I'm separated from my sources).  By the time the war ended in August 1945
this type of fighter alone had claimed some 12,000 Japanese aircraft!!  This
kind of scoring was of course also made possible by three other factors, namely
the generally high quality of training of the US Navy pilots, the well-executed
and well-thought-out US tactics, and a growing numerical superiority.
Meanwhile, the Japanese Navy could do no better than update the Zero, the A6M5
version, which did not enter combat until 1944, incorporating modest
improvements which primarily included a 20-25 mph increase in speed (this still
left it about 20 mph slower than the Hellcat) and the replacement of its two
virtually useless 7.7-mm machineguns with heavier 12.7- or 13.2-mm models.
        With Army aircraft a similar qualitative gap was opening, although for
somewhat different reasons.  The Japanese Army produced a number of improved
fighter designs during the war, but Japanese industry was simply unable to
build them in sufficient numbers, or to supply many of the ones they did build
with reliable engines.  The Ki-44 was first built in 1942, though volume
production did not really get under way until the following year.  It was a
complete reversal of Japanese fighter design philosophy, forsaking the
cherished maneuverability and handling in favor of speed (especially in a dive)
and increased firepower.  The Ki-44 earned its official nickname Shoki
("Demon"), as its handling was so sluggish and tempermental it was considered
downright dangerous to fly.  In the second half of 1943 the Japanese Army
pilots did experience some tactical success with the Ki-44 in the China/Burma
theatre, employing their own form of high-low tactics, using groups of Ki-43's
supported by Ki-44's flying top cover.  If the American pilots tried to execute
diving attacks on the Ki-43 group, they exposed themselves to similar assaults
by the even higher Ki-44's (and of course if they approached from below they
found themselves mixing with the Ki-43's in a dogfight, where this supremely
maneuverable Japanese plane still had an advantage).  The arrival of the P-51
in the theatre at the end of 1943 put an end to the run of Japanese success
with this approach, since the P-51 was faster, could climb higher, and was much
more maneuverable than the Ki-44.
        The Army's Ki-61 also made an impression when it first saw combat in
New Guinea in April 1943.  It was very well protected for a Japanese fighter,
carried two imported German Mauser 20-mm cannon, could climb and dive well, yet
still retained the maneuverability to mix it up with any US fighter in a
dogfight.  Severe shortages of reliable engines sidetracked this promising
fighter.  The same was true of the Ki-84, which (to quote Gunston's
"Encyclopedia of Combat Aircraft of World War 2") "flew rings around
Chennault's 14th Air Force" when it first appeared in the China theatre in
mid-1944.  Fast and extremely maneuverable, the Ki-84's effectiveness was
sabotaged by unreliable engines and the jury-rigged fitting of several
unsuitable substitute power plants when the intended motors could not be
produced as fast as the airframes.   Thus the many Ki-84's dispatched for the
defense of the Phillipines often demonstrated substandard performance compared
with the original models that fought in China.
        Quantity as well as quality also played a role in the downfall of
Japanese airpower.  The US armed forces received some 13,700 P-40's during the
war, about 9,900 P-38's, and, more importantly, 12,000 Hellcats, and roughly
15,000 each of the P-47 and P-51 (both of which, though primarily used in
Europe, did see service in the Pacific, beginning as early as 1943)-- not to
mention the earlier F4F Wildcat, the Corsair, the P-39.  Meanwhile, the
Japanese Navy built 10,900 Zeros, but precious few of any other type.  They
only built about 400 of the excellent Shiden (in turn a Japanese answer to the
Hellcat, which it matched in speed, firepower, and protection while possessing
an edge in maneuverability) and about 480 of the Mitsubishi Raiden, a
cantankerous crate to fly but fast, especially in a dive, well-armed, and
well-armored.  These latter two types saw no combat to speak of until the final
year of the war, being used almost exclusively for the defense of the home
islands against the B-29 raids (now generally accompanied by swarms of P-51's).
The Mitsubishi A7M Reppu, successor to the Zero, had tremendous potential, but,
aside from prototypes, exactly one production model was completed before the
war ended.
        The Army air production had similar woes.  The Ki-43 Hayabusa, of which
5,600 were built, remained the chief fighter right up through most of 1944, in
spite of new and potentially better designs (two of the Army's top three aces
of the war, Anaki and Kuroe, were still flying the Ki-43 in defense of
Indonesian oil refineries in the fall of '44).  The Army received about 1,200
Ki-44's (most of them in '44, used for home defense with heavier armament,
including automatic 40-mm cannon in some models-- these acheived one of the
most successful interceptions of B-29's in the war on one occasion where they
brought down ten from a formation of 120, but even in this case two of these
were not by gunfire but by ramming by a special suicide squadron!), and also
some 2,700 Ki-61's and 3,500 Ki-84's.  The numbers for the latter aircraft may
seem reasonably impressive, but remember many of them were grounded much of the
time due to engine problems.  The Japanese built less than 300 of the extremely
promising Ki-100 of 1945 (which in its first combat over Okinawa shot down 14
Hellcats without a loss!), actually a Ki-61 with a new engine.
        To cope with this flood of newer and better American aircraft required
pilots of considerable skill, but the other great enemy of the Japanese air arm
was attrition.  I have already documented as an example the fate of the Navy's
elite land-based Lae Wing.  The carrier air units of Kido Butai suffered just
as grievously.  SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU, the Japanese Navy's two newest and best
fleet carriers, both missed the battle of Midway as a result of their
participation in the battle of the Coral Sea the previous month.  However, only
one of these ships was actually damaged at Coral Sea-- the other was unfit for
combat because of the severe depletion of its air complement, losses which
still hadn't been replaced several weeks after the fight.  And Midway was of
course an unmitigated disaster not only because of the loss in one day of four
of the six Japanese fleet carriers, but also because with them were lost a very
high percentage of their highly-trained, experienced pilots and aircrews (this
despite the fact that the Zero pilots of Kido Butai had one of their finest
hours in the battle, for example defensive air patrols downing 90 US planes for
the loss of 12 of their number, and the escorts on the Midway raid shooting
down 15 of the Marine fighters and damaging eight of the remaining ten while
only losing two Zeros and no bombers-- Fuchida and Okumiye, "Midway").  As
I've said before, these were men who simply could not be replaced (and one of
the more notable survivors of Midway, Lt-Commander Hirata Matsumura, commander
of HIRYU's torpedo squadron, who had put a torpedo into the WEST VIRGINIA with
the first wave at Pearl, was killed in one of the carrier battles during the
Guadalcanal campaign a few months later).  The terrible losses of both
land-based and carrier-based Japanese aviation during the Guadalcanal campaign
aggravated the problem, as did Yamamoto's unsuccessful attempt to regain the
initiative in the Solomon's with "Operation I-Go," an air offensive consisting
of a series of raids on US bases in New Guinea and Guadalcanal in April '43.
Yamamoto had transferred many of the remaining intact air units from his light
carriers to carry out this operation, and again losses were heavy.
        Training programs could not produce sufficient numbers of pilots of the
same quality as those who were lost in the war's first year and a half, for
reasons that will be obvious to anyone who read my post regarding Saburo
Sakai's training class.  In addition to the demands to turn out pilots in much
higher volume, there were difficulties caused by shortages of every kind,
including experienced instructors (few combat pilots could reconcile themselves
to this sort of rear-area duty, and anyway the experienced men were needed at
the front-- Nishizawa, for instance, was assigned as an instructor after the
recall of Lae Wing, but soon wrangled a transfer to a combat squadron in the
Phillipines).  Fuel shortages were particularly harmful as the war wore on,
curtailing training flights to such an extent that by 1944 Navy bomber pilots
were being trained by showing them films (made with the use of models) that
showed them what an attack on various types of enemy ships would look like from
their cockpits at various speeds (compare this with the realistic training
before the Pearl strike-- Toland).  I've also seen photos of pilots training
using a joy stick attached to a small model plane which then responded to the
controls like a real aircraft would so the trainee could observe.  These
examples are primarily from naval aviation, but the Army too by 1944 had
drastically curtailed the time prospective pilots spent in training before
being committed to battle.  In the final year and a half of the war Japanese
industry made an immense effort to concentrate on aircraft production, and
turned out a respectable number of planes, but (like, for example, the USSR
during much of the war) it couldn't turn out qualified pilots nearly as fast as
planes.  Since the aircraft built did no good on the ground, they were sent up,
qualified pilots or not, and the lopsided American air victories like the
"Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" surrounding the Saipan invasion were the result.
By the battle of Leyte Gulf (Oct '44), the remaining few Japanese carriers were
reduced to the role of decoys because they could no longer actually put up more
than a token few planes.  Tactics start with training, and by 1944 the Japanese
system was virtually bankrupt in this respect.  The devastating B-29 raids,
most dramatically the great Tokyo fire raids which began in March '45,
underscored the depths to which the once fearsome Japanese air arm had sunk,
and the convergence of all the factors which brought the air units to this
nadir.  By then, generally speaking, the Japanese had precious few planes that
were capable of bringing down the fast and well-armored Superfortress, and even
fewer pilots who could oppose the swarms of P-51's and Corsairs that ranged
freely over Japanese air space (two of the handfull of remaining great Japanese
aces, Koichi Kanno, who shot down 52 planes and invented-- in the Pacific, at
least-- the effective method of bringing down the tough B-17 by means of
head-on attacks; and Kinsuke Muto, one of the younger generation, with 35
victories to his credit-- he once single-handedly engaged 14 Corsairs in his
Zero near Tokyo, and shot down four-- were both killed over the homeland in the
summer of '45).
        Most of the numbers, specs, etc regarding aircraft in this post came
from either Gunston or Angelucci and Matriccardi, "World War 2 Aircraft, vol 2"

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 17:35:12 -0600
From:    Kelvin Brent Luther <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Invasion vs. A-Bomb - Not

On Wed, 15 Feb 1995, Bob Rogers wrote:

> John Skates' book "The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb" points
> out that use of the bomb was not considered something that would be done
> to prevent the invasion, but was one of a series of events (invasion,
> continuing blockade, entry of Russia into the war) that US policy makers
> hoped would force the Japanese government to accede to US unconditional
> surrender demands.  He supports something that I've suspected, that,
> despite the current fuss over casuality estimates surrounding the Enola
> Gay controversy, there was no decision made to "use the bomb to save
> US lives".  Obviously, US planners were quite happy to find that the bomb
> ended the war, but it's apparent that, at the time, the invasion planning
> and bomb use planning were somewhat seperate tracks (involving mostly
> different people) that, at the highest levels, were seen as complementary.
>
> The whole issue of casualies is a red herring that says more about our
> feelings about the bomb (and Allied leaders' post-war desire to justify
> their actions) than it does about US thinking in 1945.
>
> (By the way, it was me who said "Japan sowed the wind and they reaped
> the whirlwind" - something I firmly believe.  It fits nicely with a
> statement (on NPR) by a modern-day Dresdener (the mayor?) to the effect
> that, "Hitler had started the war, Germany had stared the war, now [at
> Dresden] the war had come back to Germany".)
>
> --
> Bob Rogers            Internet:  [email-masked]
> Instrumental, Inc.    GEnie:     R.C.ROGERS
> Minneapolis, MN USA   Phone:     612-920-6188
>
        I agree completely with this.  The Allies had considered the
option of blockade at Quebec and rejected it outright despite overtures
through the Soviets by Civilian Japanese officials with Hirohito's
consent.  For the first time there was the possibility of Japanese
surrender yet they did not pursue it.  Instead of demanding surrender
from Hirohito they send an inflammatory demand to the military.
Furthermore the enormous casualty figures expected from invasion were at
least partly based on the belief that every man woman and child would be
fanatically defending their country.  The peace overtures at least partly
waylay these fears.  It is very possible that a blockade and strategic
bombing from Okinawa would have allowed the civilians and Hirohito to
regain control in Japan.
                                K. Luther

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 17:50:50 -0600
From:    Kelvin Brent Luther <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Holocaust and Germans

        People do not seem to realise that even their lives are touched
today by the holocaust.  I.G. Farben the company that used huge ammounts
of camp labour and produced the killing agent Zyklon B like all of the
companies involved in atrocities was to be shut down after the war.
Instead it was split in three.  Please excuse bad spelling I am recalling
these names from memory.  Bayer Leverkusen, Badischeanilin und
Sodafabrik (BASF), and Farbwerke Hoechst, are the three companies today.
All three are in the top 10 or 15 manufacturing companies in the world.
Together they dwarf even General Motors currently #1 in the world.  Bayer
is a well known name as is BASF making everything from auto paint to
cassette tapes, and Hoechst is one of the largest pesticide and herbicide
producers as any farmer in North America will know.  I for one am
certainly glad to know that profiteering from the holocaust was punished
so forcefully.  People go on in ignorent bliss and say it was all in the
past but this is only the worst and most blatant case of Germany's
holocaust legacy and how it taints us all and will continue to do so
until some actions are taken however belated to rectify what should have
been done 50 years ago.
                                K. Luther

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 17:59:50 -0600
From:    Chuck Johnson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Japanese tactics (part 4)

Mike Yaklich wrote (in part):

> (in Japan the inter-service rivalry and often animosity between Army
> and Navy was even worse than in the US-- at least Roosevelt didn't
> have to promote Ernie King to keep some Army captain from blowing
                             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> his brains out, like the Japanese did with Yamamoto).
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Mike:

Would you like to explain this?  It doesn't ring a bell.

And BTW, I have really enjoyed reading your book -- for book it must
be, it's so long. :-)

Seriously, I've enjoyed your comments and opinions.  With a few footnotes,
it could be a Masters or even Doctoral Thesis. ;) Maybe.

Yours,
  Chuck Johnson -- [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 22:09:55 -0500
From:    Henry Herz <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 6 million ?

Yes, it was 6 million.  The population of Jews in pre- and post-WW II Europe is
very well documented.  One of the most impressive Holocaust related Internet
sites I've found is at URL http://www.ushmm.org/    I encourage you to check it
out.

-Henry

>       Hi everyone!
>
>
>           Always I've had the doubt about the existence of 6 millions
> of Jews , all this because I was reading a book of Salvador Borrego E.
> (Mexican Writer) in his book "Derrota Mundial" where he told that
> before of the War there were 6 millions of Jews in all Europe and
> when the war is over there was a magically resurrection of Jews in
> all Europe.
> Does anybody knows approximately how much Jews there were in all
> Europe before of the war and how much after.
>
> Other question is :
>                    Legaly speaking  about the Judgement of Nuremberg
> it was correct ?.
>
>     Thanks in advance
>

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 18:54:04 -0600
From:    Kelvin Brent Luther <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: New WWII PC'ism - Dresden bombing

On Thu, 16 Feb 1995, Jim Brady wrote:

> Quoting part of what Kelvin Bren Luther wrote:
> >
> >        When I first began writing I actually stopped to consider
> >mentioning the holocaust as I assumed it would evoke the reaction you
> >just issued.  I think this proves part of my point, why should anyone
> >involved in a discussion about morality in WW II be dismayed by inclusion
> >of the holocaust in the discussion?  How could it not be included?  I
> >also half expected someone to make the point that it was allied knowledge
> >of the holocaust that allowed them to bomb Dresden (was Hamburg not also
> >firebombed?).
>
> 1. You're setting up straw men: I -- nobody here, in fact -- ever suggested the
> Holocaust had
> nothing to do with morality issues. That's ludicrous. And so was your original p
> ost, which was
> premised on the absurd notion that there was some sort of trend not to blame Ger
> mans or
> Germany for Holocaust atrocities. Hell, even Holocaust deniers don't deny the Ge
> rmans had
> some type of program going.
>
> 2. You may have "half expected someone" to suggest Dresden was bombed as a respo
> nse to
>  Holocaust activities, but it certainly wasn't me --- so don't quote my posts an
> d respond to
> someone else's points, please. My entire beef was about the absurdities (as rest
> ated above)
> and about the dull-headed use of the term "PC" in place of presenting a cogent a
> rgument.
>
> 3. I read the letter you posted from the NYT, and I still think you and that wri
> ter are worried over
>  imagined concerns. The irony of Hitler's quest for the "Thousand-Year Reich" is
>  that the stain
> on Germany for carrying out the Holocaust is the only thing from Nazi Germany th
> at will last a
> thousand years. (And okay, in England or Canada you guys prefer to say "German"
> over
> "Nazi". Fine. In the US, we often specifiy "Nazi" rather than the broad-brush an
> d sometimes
> inaccurate "German" label. Get over it.) You need to move on to some other issue
> , in my
> opinion. And if you come up with something, why don't you address it to  the lis
> t directly and
> not me, as it's unlikely I'll be interested personally in anything you have to w
> rite, considering
> this sampling.
>
        My intent was not to imply you said things you didn't, as you
have (I am sure unintentionally) done the same thing to me.  As well I
did not purposefully address mail to you alone, I apologize for the
inconvenience.
        You are spreading straw as well when you write that no one is
trying to deny German guilt.  Obviously the point that was being made was
that what is written now influences future opinion.  Simply because
denial of German guilt now will be laughed at does not mean it will get
the same reaction in the future.  I myself do not believe German guilt
will ever be hidden, the evidence is too numerous.  On a more subtle
level is the ability to blame it on the Nazis which was the original
point.  This in a manners allows an individual German to shift the blame
to the evil Nazis at the same time implying the German people played no
role.  If this goes on long enough then people start to believe it, and
once they have found a means of avoiding their own guilt, especially over
such a painful issue, they will be very reluctant to give it up.  There
is no reason to believe that this could not happen in large numbers  in
Germany creating a population with no real feelings of personal
responsibility.  Watch the news.  Apart from neo-Nazis, the people
quickest to avoid a discussion of German guilt are the people who lived
through it.  The people who make a lot of noise crying for Germany to
continue facing up to her guilt are the generations that came afterward
or were children at the time.
        As well it would do the world some good if the Americans and
British would accept some holocaust responsibility for not making any
attempts to stop it.  Jews trained in Palestine parachuted into Europe on
suicide missions for the Brits.  Would they have not been willing to call
on Auschwitz?  Why did they not try even the most futile and desperate
efforts to stop it, or at least give the Germans a wake up call that the
world was watching.  It may not have stopped Hitler but it very well
could have made the German populace less prepared to stand idly by.
Germans involved tried to hide their involvement or save  isolated groups
of Jews close to the end in order to buy a little help after the war.
Would more have been inclined to halt or limit their involvement sooner
if they new the rest of the world was already watching?
        I'll leave you with this thought.  Why did propaganda depict the
Hun as baby killer in WWI yet the American and British public never heard
about the holocaust until the camps were liberated?
                        Kelvin Luther

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 20:06:06 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japanese tactics (part 7?-- I may have lost count)

        So far I've talked a good bit about both the Army and the air forces,
but haven't said much about the Japanese Navy.  In part that's because I'm not
as well-versed in naval tactics of the period, and thus feel less qualified to
spout off without risking a king-size foot in my mouth.  Nonetheless, I'd like
to make a few comments before attempting to finish off the Army's tactical
approach to the war and wrap this up.
        The Japanese Navy appeared to suffer less of a depreciation of tactical
prowess as the war went on, at least compared to the Army and the air units.
In part this was due to the fact that, despite the crushing loss of the big
carriers at Midway, Japanese fleet losses were not crippling-- except for their
transport and cargo fleet-- prior to the battle of Leyte Gulf in late 1944.
Therefore they lost a smaller percentage of their excellently-trained ships'
crews.  The tactical level of the Imperial Japanese Navy's "Combined Fleet" was
generally very high, a fact of which they provided repeated evidence at the
expense of the Allied navies.  In terms of the technical qualities of the ships
themselves, they were certainly combat-worthy, thought there were defects at
some levels.  The super-battleships YAMATO and MUSASHI were engineering
wonders, the biggest warships in the world at 68,000 tons combat-loaded,
carrying the biggest guns with their nine 460-mm (18.1-inch) pieces,
protected by incredibly thick armor (up to 25 inches thick on the main gun
turrets), and yet capable of moving at a speed equivalent to nearly 30 mph.
They may have been dinosaurs in an age of airpower (and both were eventually
sunk by US aircraft, though it took a remarkable number of bomb and torpedo
hits to accomplish it), but they were impressive all the same.  They had,
initially, more carriers in the Pacific than the Americans (but far less
capacity to build new ones-- the Japanese eventually built three more very
small fleet carriers, the US more than twenty of the excellent new ESSEX
class).  Their long-range ship's torpedoes, later nicknamed the "Long Lance,"
provided the Allies with a very nasty tactical surprise, first and most
noticeably at the battle of the Java Sea (Feb '42), where the covering force
for the invasion of the main Indonesian island of Java virtually wiped out a
combined fleet of American, British, Dutch, and Australian cruisers and
destroyers.  Their seamanship and gunnery were generally very good, and their
lack of radar (the first shipborne sets entering combat late '42-early '43) was
compensated for by exceptionally thorough training for night fighting, and by
better ship-mounted searchlights than the Allies had.  In fact, the Japanese
seemed to prefer night fighting, and as often as not (at least up till mid-'43)
got the better of it even without radar.
        Nonetheless, there were a couple of glaring problems with the Navy's
overall tactical doctrine.  Most fatal for the Japanese war effort, especially
in view of their need to import resources, particularly oil, from the newly-won
areas back to the homeland over long stretches of sea, was the utter lack of
attention paid to antisubmarine warfare and commerce protection.  Japan started
out with a cargo fleet barely a quarter of the size of Great Britain's, and
once the American submarines had sorted out their tactical and technical
(torpedo) problems to some extent losses soared.  Again, as with the Army on
Guadalcanal, martial emotion seemed to overcome common sense in this category,
as naval officers tried to avoid the unglamorous assignments to escort duties
while their counterparts and academy classmates were winning honors with the
fighting fleets.  A rational convoy system was established only very late in
the game, comparatively speaking, and even then with wholly inadequate
resources.  BTW, air resources to help protect the shipping routes were also
allocated in the stingiest possible manner.  Only very late in the war did the
Navy develop a plane specifically designed for this role, the Q1W Tokai, and
this aircraft (only about 150 of which were built at any rate) proved less than
adequate for the task and highly vulnerable to marauding American fighters
which were becoming increasingly active over Japanese home waters in 1945.
This lack of attention to defending their sea routes for commercial shipping
went far to assure Japan's eventual defeat.
        The Japanese also had problems, IMHO, in their doctrine for employment
of their own submarines.  Just as destroyer captains would rather seek glory
fighting with the fleet than escorting rusting merchantmen between islands, the
Japanese sought to use their considerable undersea fleet in direct support of
the surface forces, with attacks on enemy shipping routes having a generally
secondary priority.  Again, its my opinion that had they unleashed their subs
for more long-range commerce-raiding duties they could have caused the Allies a
lot more headaches (see, for instance, the British worries about a few subs in
the Indian Ocean and off Madagascar in Roskill, "The War At Sea," vol 2).
        Having said all that, I can briefly illustrate the point that while the
Army and the air units were suffering severely in the pivotal Guadalcanal
campaign, in part because their tactics there proved ineffective, the Navy was
still capable of holding its own.  The Japanese got in the first blow at Savo
Island in August, when Mikawa's force of heavy cruisers managed, incredibly, to
slip in among the Allied covering force, sink four Allied heavy cruisers, and
withdraw without loss (an American sub did however sink one Japanese cruiser as
Mikawa's fleet returned home).  An even more ambitious offensive venture by
Yamamoto at the end of the month aimed at luring the US carriers into a trap,
the same basic tactical formula attempted at Midway, but this ended in a
failure in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons (the plan was probably
overambitious anyway, as Yamamoto's two remaining fleet carriers faced three
US carriers).  The Japanese light carrier dangled as bait was pounced upon and
sunk by the US air units, but Yamamoto's air crews failed to deliver a
knock-out blow to the Americans, although they did badly damage the carrier
ENTERPRISE.  However, in the air fighting the Japanese once again came off
badly, losing (according to Liddel Hart, who I had handy as a reference) 70 of
the 80 planes they sent up, for only 17 US aircraft.   Needless to say, battles
of this sort did little to help the depleted state of the Japanese naval air
forces.  At the battle of Cape Esperance in early October, the American cruiser
force handed out more damage than it received, sinking one Japanese cruiser and
one destroyer for the loss of one destroyer, and also scoring 40 hits on the
Japanese flagship, cruiser AOBA, mortally wounding the Japanese commander
Admiral Goto.  Still, this whole action came about as cover for a Japanese
convoy bringing the bulk of Maruyama's 2nd Division in to Guadalcanal, and this
reinforcement was carried out successfully, so the main Japanese object was
also acheived, even if at cost.  The Japanese again showed their teeth in the
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands at the end of October, another carrier fight
which cost the Americans the carrier HORNET sunk and the ENTERPRISE again
damaged, while the Japanese had the SHOKAKU and a light carrier rather badly
damaged.  In the air however, the Japanese again came off worse, and counting
losses of their land-based aviation over Guadalcanal lost in this one week
another 100 aircraft.  Still, the Japanese Navy had been showing its prowess in
other areas.  Its submarines gave, during the Guadalcanal campaign, perhaps the
best demonstration of the proper application of their tactical doctrine,
mistaken or otherwise.  One of them hit the carrier SARATOGA at the end of
August, putting it out of commission for over a month, and on one day in
September a pack of Japanese submarines sank the carrier WASP and a destroyer,
and badly damaged the battleship NORTH CAROLINA.  During October the Japanese
fleet showed it still was a force to be reckoned with when two battleships
sailed up by night and bombarded the airfield on Guadalcanal with their 14-inch
guns (beginning a day known to the Marines there as "Dugout Sunday" because
they spent most of it under cover-- there were also several bombing raids),
followed the next night by a reprise by two Japanese cruisers.  Control of the
nocturnal waters around Guadalcanal remained up for grabs until mid-November.
Then, in the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the Japanese hit nearly every
ship in the American covering force, sinking a cruiser and two destroyers, but
themselves lost a battleship and a destroyer.  In the aftermath a Japanese sub
sank another cruiser, the JUNEAU (with the famous five Sullivan brothers).
The Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal immediately followed.  In this nocturnal
fracas the US battleship SOUTH DAKOTA, completely paralyzed by an untimely
failure of its electrical systems at the very outset, survived hits by 42
large-calibre shells, while the battleship WASHINGTON, profitting from the
diversion as the enemy pasted the SOUTH DAKOTA, sank the Japanese battleship
KIRISHIMA with a deluge of 16- and 5-inch shells.  This was a double Japanese
defeat because the naval operations had again been undertaken to cover the
passage of a major convoy of reinforcements to the island, but this convoy was
severely mauled by American air units.  This marked the turning point of the
prolonged battle of attrition, as the Japanese thereafter gave up their hopes
of mounting a fresh offensive to throw the Americans off the island, but the
Japanese Navy was still not defeated, nor did it show itself decidedly inferior
to the Americans in terms of tactics.  In fact, Japanese Rear-Admiral Raizo
Tanaka, in charge of the light forces providing direct support to the supply
and reinforcement runs, outwitted his counterparts again and again with what
his adversaries came to dub the "Tokyo Express" (it ran almost as frequently as
a train).  It was airpower, not superior naval force or tactics, which turned
Guadalcanal into a losing proposition for the Japanese, and if the naval
combats proved mutually costly they were at least relatively even in outcome.
It was attrition to the Japanese transport fleet, almost exclusively due to US
air attacks, that swung the balance at Guadalcanal.  As late as December '42
Tanaka's forces, now reduced to carrying supplies in by destroyer, and floating
them ashore in oil drums, delivered a sharp repulse to the Americans off
Tassafaronga Point.  Even though taken by surprise, their quick reactions and
their excellent "long lance" torpedoes resulted in sinking three US cruisers
for the loss of one destroyer, a pretty clear indication that Japanese naval
tactics were still first-class.  Another demonstration followed, when in early
February the Japanese managed to evacuate some 13,000 troops from the island
without the Americans even getting a whiff of the operation until it was
virtually over.  Even in the next Solomon island battle, when the Allies landed
on New Georgia, the Japanese were able to slip in and shell the landing sites,
and in a nocturnal battle in June they sank the cruiser HELENA for the loss of
one destroyer and successfully landed 3,000 reinforcements.
        If the Japanese Navy surface units did not experience the tactical
deterioration their ground and air forces did, they were hampered by a
strategic fixation which led them ultimately to their downfall.  Ever since
Midway Yamamoto and his successors had groped for the "decisive battle" that
eluded him at Pearl Harbor through the escape of the American carriers.  This
fixation led to the crippling failure at Midway, where luck and code-breaking
(IMHO) did as much to defeat the Japanese as any tactical failings, and then in
October 1944 to the great suicidal "banzai charge" of the Japanese surface
fleet at Leyte Gulf.  Even this need not have been suicidal, it just turned out
that way-- a crushing defeat from which the IJN could not recover.  I won't
comment on the battle itself-- the Japanese plan had some merit, its weak link
in action being the poor coordination with land-based air support, and both
sides made mistakes in a huge and complex operation.  The Japanese came within
a hair's breadth of inflicting serious losses on the US transport fleet, but,
deterred by the constant hostile skies and the courage of a small group of
escort carriers and their destroyers (and particularly frustrated by the lack
of air co-operation from their side) withdrew when the prize seemed within
their grasp.  That was essentially the last gasp of the Japanese fleet, but it
must be noted that they remained a respectable fighting force up until this
time.  Therefore the tactics of the fleet seem to bear less criticism than that
of the land and air forces.  Oil and shipping, however, remained the real
Achilles heel-- in the last year of the war Japanese shipping had been so
decimated by US subs that the fleet had to be based off Singapore in order to
be close to Indonesian oil sources.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 20:16:16 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 6 million ?

Dear Alfredo,

There were approximately 16 million Jews in the world in 1939,
nine million in Europe and seven million in the rest of the world.
The largest numbers, by country, were in the United States,
five million, Poland and Russia, three million each. Palestine-
the future Israel- had about 500,000, if my memory is right.

Of these communities, Russia lost somewhat more than half, and as
for Poland's 3,000,000, perhaps 50,000 were "magically resurrected"
in 1945. I would dearly love to ask Sr. Borrega where my own 30 or
so cousins, great uncles, great aunts, etc., went. Perhaps he knows;
the only ones we know about are two survivors, one of whom saw her
husband and year old son deliberately burned to death in front of her.
I don't think she was lying to me.

The best figures now available suggest that between 5.8 and 6.1 million
Jews died in Europe in World War II. I will be happy to get you more
specific figures if you want them. If your library has them, I might
suggest you check either Raul Hilberg's THE DESTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN
JEWRY or Lucy Dawidowicz's THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS. I am not sure if
either has been translated into Spanish, but I will try to find out.

Regards,

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 20:45:05 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: German Superweapon?

Dear Gudmunder,

About three or four months ago, an American cable TV network did a show
in which they noted the fabulous exploits of Julia Child, now a famous
American TV chef, in which they claimed she had been an OSS Jedbergh
agent, parachuting into France behind German lines in WW II. This was
news to a number of people, including Miss Child, who in fact spent
the war as an OSS secretary in Chungking and Kunming, China, where the
greatest risk was the water. This was a topic of some discussion on
WWII-L at the time, and the list of things we found she could be credited
with would take several meg to relate. Personally, I do not believe,
as some would claim, that she single-handedly encircled the Germans
at Stalingrad, or that she gave Fermi and Oppenheimer the formulas
for the bomb, but who knows? Not all the OSS records have been
declassified.

As for the weapon, it's an example of what happens when people like
me spend too much time in front of the tyrannical One-Eyed Electrogod
(the thing I am typing into and you are currently reading this on);
its a joke.

Regards,

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 18:39:31 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Japanese tactics (part 3)

Mike Yalkitch...
        The British forces defending Malaya from the Japanese invasion
included Australian, Indian, and United Kingdom regiments from England,
Scotland, and Wales.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 22:04:28 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japanese tactics (part 8-- and hopefully last)

        Ah, well, got the Navy and the air forces done, back to the Army to see
if we can wrap this up (would you believe I initially envisioned this as a
single post-- self-delusion is the best delusion of all).
        Okay, I left the ground forces at Guadalcanal, practicing their "bamboo
spear tactics."  I should say right off that it didn't take long for the
Japanese to demonstrate that, however muddled their recent tactics may have
been offensively, they were still fairly proficient at defensive fighting.
Digging in seemed to be a Japanese specialty.  Their bunkers, constructed out
of whatever materials were locally at hand-- coconut logs, coral, sand, dirt,
concrete if they had it-- were not only incredibly resilient to enemy fire, but
also in most cases very well-hidden.  They made extensive use of natural caves
wherever they found them (Iwo perhaps the ultimate example), expanding these
with further excavation into vast interconnected underground tunnels and
galleries.  At places like the hill north of Naha on Okinawa known to the
Marines as Sugerloaf they often used such well-concealed caves as sally ports
to emerge in the enemy rear for sudden charges (on the front slope of Sugarloaf
there was also a small trench, which most Marines who were there remember only
as an insignificant obstacle to hurdle when climbing the slope, but once the
advance had passed Japanese would emerge from more of those hidden caves,
occuppy the trench, and shoot the Marines down from behind-- Berry, "Semper Fi,
Mac") Ian Hogg, in "Barrage," tells of an incident in Burma where the Japanese
tunnelled their way entirely through a small hill, manhandled a 75-mm
regimental gun into the tunnel, then made a small opening in the side of the
hill facing the enemy, just big enough to fit the muzzle through, and proceeded
to bedevil the Brits with harassing fire whose source could not be determined.
Similarly, on Guadalcanal "Pistol Pete," the Marine name for a single 150-mm
howitzer hidden in cave on the island's lone mountain, also eluded detection
while repeatedly peppering the airfield over a space of weeks.  Likewise, a
20-mm AA gun on Sugarloaf could not be pinpointed exactly, even surviving
pastings with napalm.  There are many more examples (the big naval guns on Iwo,
for example, also used caves for concealment, emerging only to fire).  Even the
standard foxhole as the Japanese were taught to dig them was something more
than just a hole.  They called them "takotsubo," or "octopus traps," and they
were shaped (in the words of Toland, I think) kind of like a Christmas
stocking, so that there was a little horizontal shaft at the bottom in which
the occupant could take deep cover during bombardments.  As one Marine officer
quoted in a footnote in Hayashi's "Kogun" said, speaking of Okinawa, "we poured
a tremendous amount of metal down on those positions.  You wouldn't think
anything could survive that churning hell, but as soon as we attacked there
they were, even madder than before."(or something to that effect-- I may have a
word or two wrong, the book's not in front of me-- I try to make quotes exact
if I use quotation marks).  The Japanese were also adept at using reverse
slopes and concealed communications trenches.
        The mentality of the Japanese soldier, indoctrinated to fight to the
end, also made for a tenacious defender.  Two more examples: one, which I read
in a recent newspaper article here regarding Iwo Jima, was a lengthy quotation
from some message written by the Emporer to the nation, in which he clearly
spells out that to surrender is to disgrace not only oneself but one's entire
family (apparently even Hirohito wasn't a total peacenik).  The second, I
believe I read it in Toland (hey, I'm leaning on him a lot but the book is 700
pages or so), is that at the start of the war there was literally no Japanese
word of command for "retreat."  They had to invent one as things got hairy--
"ten-shin," the equivalent of the parade ground command, "about face--advance!"
        Anyway, the Allies quickly ran head on into this type of tenacious
defense around Buna and Gona on New Guinea, and on the island of New Georgia in
the Solomons, and it caused problems.  In both campaigns there were serious
criticisms of the American will to fight in the face of such a gritty, costly,
yard-by-yard, bunker-by-bunker resistance, where all the advantages of terrain
lay with the defender.  And in both cases, the difficulties encountered
prompted a radical new tactical solution-- which has essentially come to be
known as "island-hopping."  In the Solomons this meant that, with New Georgia
secured, the Allied forces (in both the Solomons and on New Guinea Australian
forces were also involved) skipped the next big island, Kolombangara, and
landed instead behind this position on Vella Lavella, taking the Japanese
completely by surprise (and cutting off the strong forces the Japanese had been
building up on Kolombangara).  In New Guinea it meant MacArthur learned to
descend suddenly deep in the Japanese rear, hopping along the jungle coast in
huge leaps, employing the mobility made possible by his superior air and naval
power (Manchester in "American Caesar" sings the praises of this system).  The
model worked extremely well, so that after Tarawa later in the year the US
forces leaped deep into the Japanese central Pacific complex to take Kwajalein
and Eniwatok, again acheiving surprise each time (and showing that the Japanese
defensive perimeter was not so secure, unless backed by real naval force, which
couldn't really exist unless covered with sufficient air power.  It was the air
that was the real weak link in the system, as the Japanese lost air superiority
due to the reasons previously discussed).  Finally the Allies allowed two of
the strongest Japanese bases, Rabaul and Truk, to simply wither on the vine,
while their large garrisons, scourged by repeated air attacks, slowly starved
to death (literally-- on Truk there were reports of cannabalism-- see Toland
and the accounts of two of the men in "Peace Is Our Duty"), awaiting landings
which never came.
        Here is another example of Allied tactics trumping the Japanese, this
time in the grand tactics sphere, but it is also an example of how air, land,
and sea were inextricably interrelated in the Pacific war.  Without air power
to cover the naval operations this strategy would not have been possible.
Still, the Japanese (again, note, being faced with new situations not
previously contemplated), though paralyzed to a large degree by the
island-hopping approach, had not lost the ability to contest the islands which
were invaded.  The tactics surrounding this problem once more showed, at first,
a serious inability to improvise.  For nearly two years, as the Japanese stood
on the defensive, they again showed a rather primitive tactical approach.
Their fixed defenses, especially at places like Tarawa, were formidable (note
that this was the portion of the defensive plan they had time to extensively
prepare).  But their creed, initially, was to stop the enemy at the waterline.
Thus their initial defenses were often quite strong.  But once the Marines or
the infantry had forced their way ashore, the Japanese again were unable to
react to the changed situation.  Their reaction almost invariably consisted of
unimaginative head-on counterattacks (only truly dangerous when they could use
the jungle to infiltrate thinly-held lines, as for example on New Georgia).  In
fact, once the fight seemed hopeless it was the general strategy to launch all
the remaining Japanese forces in desperate "banzai" charges (so-called because
that's what they usually yelled when charging-- it meant "ten thousand years,"
which was how long their heroic deeds were supposed to live in glory-- the
Japanese word for "charge" was "totsugeki").  Actually, these were virtually
suicide attacks, accomplishing little more than giving the Japanese soldiers a
chance to die honorably.  Though they could be horrifying to those on the
receiving end, they actually simplified the attacker's job by bringing the
enemy out into the open where they could be killed (remember John Ausland's
post about how glad his unit was to see the Germans attack during the Battle of
the Bulge, giving them a chance to eat shrapnel while the GI's stayed under
cover, instead of the other way around?).  Only very occasionally did these
desperate rushes accomplish anything-- on Saipan part of one US regiment was
overrun and suffered heavily.  Other such charges sometimes bordered on the
absurd, as at Guam, the location of the central liquor stores for the Japanese
fleet, where the attackers got falling down drunk before stumbling out to die
by the thousands under punishing US artillery fire.  This pattern, repeated at
Tarawa, on New Georgia, Kwajalein, Saipan, Guam, and various other places,
constituted yet another form of "bamboo spear tactics."
        However, as the war progressed the Japanese learned.  In the invasion
of Biak, an island just off the coast of New Guinea, a new tactical approach
was tried.  Here the Japanese did not try to defend the beaches, exposing
themselves to the crushing weight of Allied naval bombardments (and, once
problems of co-ordination were ironed out, air strikes).  Now the defenders
withdrew their main forces to strong positions inland, and waited for the
attackers to come to them in prepared positions.  Nor did they launch the
spectacular but suicidal "banzai" charges.  They stayed in their holes and
caves and sold their lives to the last man-- the new slogan became to take ten
enemy with them before dying.  This ushered in a new, and for the Allied
forces, much more brutal form of warfare, which reached its peak at Iwo Jima
and Okinawa.  It was not, perhaps, a war-winning strategy, but it was a
tactical system which would delay the outcome, and also ensure the enemy would
have to pay a terrible price for victory.  Who knew, perhaps the weak Yankee
willpower would sicken of such bloodlettings before total victory could be
acheived (this is what I believe would have awaited on the home islands).
        As I said, these tactics coalesced into a very effective system on Iwo
and Okinawa.  The Allied casualty lists reflected this effectiveness-- 26,000
men lost at Iwo, over 49,000 on Okinawa.  Combined with the desperate but
dangerous attempt to regain an aerial strike capability through the kamikazes,
which I don't feel like getting into (except to say that about 2,000 such
planes were used, as compared to over 5,000 which would have been available for
defense of Japan proper), it was clear that if they could no longer win they
could still make Allied victory costly.  Fighting in this manner, the Japanese
again (benefitting from the opportunity to previously prepare THEIR fight on
THEIR ground) showed considerable tactical sophistication.  Their artillery,
hoarded for the occasion and carefully ranged in, once more became a powerful
factor.  On Iwo they let the Marines come ashore, then opened up on precisely
ranged coordinates, creating ghastly carnage on the crowded beaches (reporter
Robert Sherrod, who had also been on Tarawa, was one of several who said he had
never seen so many dismembered limbs and corpses).  On Okinawa, General
Ushijima, commander of the Japanese 32nd Army which defended the island, chose
a defense zone north of Naha that straddled one of the Japanese Army's
principle artillery training grounds, so that the gunners knew every foot
(Manchester likened it to foreign troops attacking the US infantry at Fort
Benning).  Likewise, in the Phillipines, Yamashita wished to husband his forces
to defend Luzon, where he planned to pull back into the mountains and hold on.
Even at this stage of the war the plans for studious defense and delaying
actions were sometimes undermined by more hot-headed and optimistic officers
who still urged attack (have I mentioned that in the Japanese Army only the top
10% of officers got into the military academy and received staff training--
among the less sophisticated officers who made up the bulk of the officer corps
there was a widespread philosophical adherence to the pre-eminence of moral
over physical factors in warfare-- this was the background most of the
hot-heads came from, and not totally inappropriate to a material-poor army).
On Okinawa, Lt-General Isamu Cho, Ushijima's chief-of-staff, led the faction
urging offensive action.  Ushijima, an infantry commander in Burma and then
head of the military academy, was a reserved man who believed in following the
advice of subordinates (another tradition in the Japanese military-- as in the
German, the chief-of-staff often had more say in tactical matters than the
actual commander).  The Japanese command had taken pains to give him the best
possible staff, after all (including Capt Yahara as operations officer,
considered one of the brightest young minds on the Japanese general staff).
Cho, by the way, was a story in himself.  He was a very radical and political
soldier.  As a captain he had been involved in both the 1931 coup plots I
described earlier (he had suffered a short period of arrest, but only because
after being talked to by his superiors he still refused to give up the plot).
As chief-of-staff of the landing forces during the occupation of Indochina, he
had insisted on an assault landing even though the French were not planning to
resist (he thought calling it off would hurt the troops' fighting spirit), and
had hid in the ship's lifeboat so he could not be given orders to desist.  Cho
was also a fiery personality, said to drink even in the trenches on Okinawa,
and to have women from Naha's brothel district brought to him during the
campaign (Ienaga).  At any rate, on Cho's advice Ushijima was talked into an
offensive operation in the Maeda ridge area, which cost heavy casualties while
in the long run accomplishing little, despite incredibly determined efforts by
the battalions involved.  Cho and ushijima both committed suicide in the final
days of the Japanese resistance on Okinawa.  Yamashita, too, had to endure
pressure from his superiors, which forced him to commit to Leyte forces he
preferred to husband for the showdown on Luzon (like the 1st Division, which
had a reputation in the Japanese Army similar to that of the "Big Red One" in
the US-- it was known as the "Gem Division" because of its status, and at one
time both Yamashita and Tojo had simultaneously commanded regiments in the 1st)
        Finally, I want to say that, in keeping with my main theory (if you all
haven't lost sight of it amid this avalanche of detail), the fighting in China
also revealed deficiencies in Japanese tactics in fluid situations.  For nearly
eight years they proved unable to end their "doro-numa-senso" or "mud swamp
war" there.  In particular, it was the Communist guerillas in the north who
most consistently gave the Japanese fits, although the average Chinese showed
excellent soldierly qualities-- courage, incredible endurance in the face of
hardship, and usually the peasant's good feel for the ground-- and Chiang's
forces too could fight when they were allowed to and/or adequately led and
supported.  But the Japanese never developed an effective counter to Mao's
guerilla strategy.  Mao put it simply:
        "the enemy advances, we retreat
         the enemy halts, we harass
         the enemy retreats, we pursue"
        As early as the opening months of the China conflict a Communist force
led by Lin Piao, who was later to prove a major thorn in the Japanese side as
commander of the 8th Route Army, arguably the best Chinese army of the war, cut
off and virtually annihilated a Japanese brigade north of the Great Wall near
Shenkikwan.  Mao's people also aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the
populace, and proved successful at it-- not a tough proposition when you
consider the alternatives were either the "unique Japanese culture" or Chiang's
callous and corrupt system (I don't remember if it was Stilwell or Mao, neither
of whom liked him much, who after summing up Chiang's good and bad traits
concluded "but fundamentally he is a gangster").  Also, Mao's armies practiced
a strict discipline toward the local populations, whereas the warlord armies
which had plundered China for most of the century, starved and often unpaid by
corrupt officers, lived off the land and took what they wanted.  The Japanese
could not match Mao's mobile tactics in China's vast spaces, and with a
predominantly hostile population, and their only real recourse was genocide to
try to remove the guerilla's base of support.  This succeeded in killing or
driving off millions, but did not succeed in putting out the fire.  Whenever
the Japanese withdrew-- and although they won a lot of the firefights, like the
US in Vietnam, they couldn't be everywhere-- Mao's people oozed back into the
vaccuum and set up shop again.
        I guess I should quickly mention Burma, since I've covered nearly
everything else.  Here the Japanese strategic aim was simply to hold the
western portion of their perimeter, and that they succeeded in doing for more
than two years (again, note, fighting on ground of their own choosing).
However, in 1944, goaded by the penetrations of the Chindits (and to a lesser
degree Merril's marauders) in the porous jungle front, they launched their own
large-scale offensive (in part the hot-heads won here, too, over more reasoned
approaches).  Benefitting from surprise, good initial dispositions, and their
skill at infiltrating thinly-held fronts in jungle terrain, they made it to the
mountainous borders of India, but lack of sufficient resources to sustain the
offensive over utterly murderous terrain (which had very much been their friend
when fighting defensively), and hurt by woefully inadequate logistical
preparations, this last great offensive against the Europeans turned, by the
time the monsoons hit, into a disastrous failure which seriously prejudiced
their subsequent defense of the country.
        Okay, I guess that's it.  Oh yeah, the inevitable corrections:
        (as one of Yamamoto's subordinates said after Midway, "how will we ever
apologize to the Emporer?")
        1. Emporer Meiji's "Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors" was not
issued in the 1870's, but a decade later (I was confused with the introduction
of conscription in Japan, 1873)
        2. Japanese tank production during the war was closer to 6,000 vehicles
(I said 6,500)
        3. Admiral Ugaki did not radio back his "death poem" on his suicide
flight August 15th-- he had left that behind (his plane did send back a radio
message on their progress).  BTW, Ugaki was not a pilot, so he was in the
rather unique position of being a passenger in a kamikaze!
        If there's more I goofed on, I'm too brain-dead to recall, its up to
you out there to bust me.  When my fingers get back their feeling I will post a
brief spiel on war crimes and punishment.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 22:07:46 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Japanese tactics (part 4)

        I guess I was trying to say that interservice rivalry never reached the
point in the US where members of the Army tried to assassinate officers of the
Navy for political reasons (in 1939 Yamamoto was posted to command of the
Combined Fleet largely because it was felt he would be safer there-- when he
was Vice-Minister of the Navy dissident extremists whose numbers included Army
officers reportedly offered a 100,000-yen reward for killing him!)

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 15 Feb 1995 to 16 Feb 1995
*************************************************