Subject: WWII-L Digest - 27 Feb 1995 to 28 Feb 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 1 Mar 1995 00:01:08 -0500

There are 25 messages totalling 1161 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. [INF] USAAF 28 FEB 45
  2. INF: USN Chronology 02-28-95
  3. INF: 50 Years Ago Archives
  4. <No subject given>
  5. Mailing List Problems Revisited (2)
  6. INF: USN Chronology 02-27-95
  7. TAC: Africa (was: What if?) (4)
  8. ADMIN: low traffic
  9. A-bomb spies (2)
 10. Concentrating on Africa
 11. China/Japan part 5
 12. China/Japan sources
 13. endlossung/Germans or Nazis? (4)
 14. Patton biography
 15. Re2: A-bomb spies
 16. [INF] USAAF 1 MAR 45
 17. MEDIA:Iwo Jima Today

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Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 00:29:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 28 FEB 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
WEDNESDAY, 28 FEBRUARY 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  C-46, Curtiss Commando
  C-47, Douglas Skytrain
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  Mosquito, deHavilland
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  Spitfire, Vickers Supermarine

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 2 B-25s attack targets of
opportunity in the Hsiang River Valley while 2 P-51s hit targets of
opportunity NE of Hengyang; a single B-24 damages a cargo vessel in the S
China Sea; the 11th Bombardment Squadron (Medium), 341st Bombardment Group
(Medium), based at Yangkai with B-25s, sends a detachment to operate from
Laowhangpin.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 28 P-47s support forces of
the British 36 Division in the Mongmit area; 75 fighter-bombers continue
pounding troop concentrations, supply dumps, and road traffic behind enemy
lines. 552 transport sorties are flown, landing men and supplies at forward
bases and dropping supplies to frontline troops.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  AIRBORNE OPERATIONS (IX Troop Carrier Command): Units moving from England
to France: HQ 313th Troop Carrier Group from Folkingham to Achiet; HQ 314th
Troop Carrier Group and the 32d and 61st Troop Carrier Squadrons from Saltby
to Poix with C-47s.

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 3 missions are flown.
  Mission 854: 1,104 bombers and 737 fighters are dispatched to make PFF
attacks on rail targets in Germany; they claim 18-0-11 Luftwaffe aircraft; 1
B-17 and 5 P-51s are lost:
  1. 378 B-17s are sent to hit marshalling yards at Soest (143), Hagen (151)
and Schwerte (74) using Gee-H; 1 other hits a target of opportunity; 1 B-17
is lost; 3 airmen are MIA. 106 of 112 P-51s escort without loss.
  2. 346 B-24s are dispatched to hit the Arnsberg (95) and Bielefeld (81)
viaducts, the Siegen marshalling yard (77) and the Henschel tank plant at
Meschede (79); 1 other hits the Neustadt road junction, a target of
opportunity; all attacks are made using Gee-H; no casualties. Escorting are
117 of 123 P-51s; 1 is lost (pilot MIA).
  3. 364 of 380 B-17s hit the marshalling yard at Kassel, the secondary
target; 6 others hit 6 targets of opportunity; the attacks are made using H2X
radar; no casualties. The escort is 113 of 118 P-51s; they claim 0-0-1
aircraft in the air and 10-0-4 on the ground; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).
  4. 308 of 318 P-51s fly a strafing run in the Wurzburg-Munich area; they
claim 8-0-6 aircraft on the ground; 3 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).
  5. 18 of 20 P-47s fly a fighter-bomber mission against Ablar, Offenbach and
Werdorf marshalling yards and factory buildings without loss.
  6. 16 P-51s escort 4 F-5s and 1 Spitfire on photo reconnaissance missions
over Germany.
  Mission 855: 11 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany during
the night without loss. 1 Mosquito flies a SKYWAVE mission over Germany.
(SKYWAVE is a special navigational mission to calibrate LORAN equipment.)
  Mission 856: 22 of 24 B-24s bomb the Freiburg rail depot during the night
using PFF methods; no losses.
  The 36th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 1st Air Division [attached to 482d
Bombardment Group (Heavy)], moves from Cheddington to Alconbury, England with
B-24s (the 36th is engaged in radio countermeasures operations).

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 340+ A-20s, B-26s and
A-26s bomb rail bridges at Mayen, Niederscheld, and Colbe, the Unna ordnance
depot, Kamp road junction, Siegen and Sankt Wendel marshalling yards, the
town of Rheinburg, and targets of opportunity; fighters escort the bombers,
fly sweeps, patrols and armed reconnaissance, attack special targets, and
support the US 3d Armored Division at the Paffendorf bridgehead, US Ninth
Army elements near Monchen-Gladbach and Neuss [the 2d Armored Division
reaches a point within 6 miles (9.7 km) of the Rhine River], and the VIII,
XII, and XX Corps between the Prum and Kyll Rivers and near Trier.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): About 680 B-17s and B-24s bomb
marshalling yards at Lienz, Austria; Ora, Bolzano, Vipiteno, Vicenza,
Fortezza, Bressanone, Brunico, Brescia, and Conegliano, Italy, and bridges at
Albes and Verona-Parona di Valpolicella, Italy; 109 P-51s provide escort; 75
P-38s divebomb the Sankt Veit an der Glan marshalling yard in Austria and
strafe rail lines in the Sankt Veit, Austria-Klagenfurt, Austria-Villach,
Austria-Ljubljana, Yugoslavia areas; other P-38s and P-51s (about 25) strafe
rail traffic around Bruck an der Mur, Innsbruck, Klagenfurt, and Worgl,
Austria and Passau, Germany, and attack Bjelovar Airfield in Yugoslavia,
destroying an enemy-held B-24 and P-38; reconnaissance and supply flights are
maintained.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy during the night of 27/28
Feb, A-20s attack a few marshalling yards, bridges, rail lines, and general
movement but because of bad weather are recalled by midnight; XII Tactical
Air Command fighter-bombers continue to pound communications and other
targets, including Ghedi and Vicenza Airfields, ammunition dumps near
Codroipo and W of Villafranca di Verona, and a shell loading plant SW of
Piacenza; medium bombers bomb bridges at Ala, Santa Margherita d'Adige, San
Michele all'Adige, Ponte di Piave, and Pordenone, and a railway embankment at
Salorno.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 8 Guam Island-based B-24s pound Susaki Airfield
on Chichi Jima Island. 23 B-24s from Angaur Island bomb Sasa Airfield on
Mindanao Island. During the night of 28 Feb/1 Mar, 6 B-24s from Guam, flying
separate harassment strikes, bomb Susaki Airfield again. The ground echelon
of the 548th Night Fighter Squadron, VII Fighter Command arrives on Iwo Jima
Island from Hawaii (air echelon is operating from Saipan Island with P-61s).

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: In Borneo, B-24s
strike Sandakan and Labuan Airfields and B-25s fly a napalm raid against
Sanga Sanga Airfield. B-24s bomb Caldera Point and B-25s hit San Roque
Airfield on Mindanao. The 70th Troop Carrier Squadron, 433d Troop Carrier
Group, moves from Hollandia, New Guinea to Dulag, Leyte Island with C-46s and
C-47s. The 431st and 433d Fighter Squadrons, 475th Fighter Group, move from
Dulag, Leyte to Clark Field, Luzon Island with P-38s (they are operating from
San Jose, Mindoro Island). The 530th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 380th
Bombardment Group (Heavy), moves from Darwin, Australia to San Jose, Mindoro
with B-24s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

28/0527Z FEB

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 04:00:20 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 02-28-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
02/28 Wed. Army troops are landed at Puerto Princesa, Palawan
           Island, P. I., by naval attack group (Rear Adm. W. M.
           Fechteler); landing is preceded by naval bombardment,
            United States naval vessels damaged, Iwo Jima area:
             Destroyer BENNETT (DD-473), by aircraft bomb,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             Destroyer TERRY (DD-513), by coastal defense gun,
              24 d. 48'N., 141 d. 33'E.
             Submarine chaser PCS-1461, by collision,
              24 d. 46' N.,141 d. 19'E.
             Attack cargo ship WHITLEY (AKA-91), by collision,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             LST 641 and LST 787, by collision,
              24 d. 46'N, 141 d. 19'E.
            German submarine sunk:
             U-869, by destroyer escort FOWLER (DE-222) and French
              surface vessel, off Morocco,
              34 d. 30'N., 08 d. 13'W.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 07:22:46 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago Archives

The February 1945 "50 Years Ago" articles are now available for downloading
from my "50 Years Ago" archives. In addition to past "50 Years Ago" articles,
these archives also include a number of additional WW II related articles and
files that I've found to be especially interesting. I am constantly adding
new files to my archives so you may want to check back on a regular basis.

The best way to access the "50 Years Ago" archives is through the World Wide
Web. The WWW URL is "http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html".  You may also
download the files by anonymous FTP. I have included instructions for doing
this below.

Instructions for downloading files by FTP -

The 50 YA articles are stored by month. To retrieve the articles by FTP, open
host "ftp.webcom.com", enter "anonymous" when prompted for login ID, enter
your Internet mail address when prompted for password. To change to the
directory where the articles are stored enter "cd /pub/jbd/www". Enter
command "ls" to get a listing of all the files available. The file name
identifies the month for 50 YA articles (example - sep1944.txt, contains the
September 1944 articles).

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 07:41:06 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: <No subject given>

Hello, Gudmundur!

Glad to answer your question.

> >
> I know little about this except what I read in the superficial Time-Life
> books. So was  Matthias Hetzenaur the "greatest" sniper in WWII? I have
> seen some Soviet Snipers (among them the ace of Stalingrad) which scored
> around 300 "kills". Anyone know this?

    Hetzenauer, who is still alive, BTW, was the most successful
German sniper of WWII, perhaps of the war. However, I cannot verify
this, but I have heard of no other with a higher kill tally.

    Hope this helps.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 08:47:02 -0500
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: Mailing List Problems Revisited

This mail thing is really strange. I only received about 8-9 messages
yesterday from the list total, while usually we have anywhere from 40-80 a
day. My question is - did anyone else receive a much larger number than what
I did? I'm talking about ones dated yesterday only. What is really strange is
last night I posted my 50 YA article for the 28th. I have not received it
back yet. This morning I posted my little month end blurb about my archives.
I have received it back. I need to find out if this slow down is 1) a problem
with the list itself, 2) just very little traffic in general or 3) a problem
on my end with my ISP.

I'm posting this at 8:43 EST on Tuesday. I want to see how long it takes for
it to come back.

John

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 09:50:55 -0500
From:    Pat Marsden <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INF: USN Chronology 02-27-95

On Feb 27,  4:00am, Keller, Theron P. wrote:
> Subject: INF: USN Chronology 02-27-95
> 02/27 Tue.  United States naval vessels damaged, Iwo Jima area:
>              Light carrier SAN JACINTO (CVL-30), by collision,
>               23 d. 00'N., 139 d. 00'E.
>              Destroyer COLHOUN (DD-801), by collision,
>               24 d. 49'N., 141 d. 20'E.
>              Oiler MERRIMACK (AO-37), by collision,
>               23 d. 00'N., 139 d. 00'E.
>              Attack transport PRESIDENT ADAMS (APA-19), by collision,
>               24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
>              Attack transport KNOX (APA-46), by collision,
>               14 d. 49'N., 141 d. 21'E.
>              Attack cargo ship TOLLAND (AKA-64), by collision,
>               24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
>              LST 779, by collision and grounding,
>               24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
>              LST 809, by collision,
>               24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
>-- End of excerpt from Keller, Theron P.

Wow.  Someone wasn't looking where they were going.
Does anyone know if this is a record for the most
collisions in one day?  It would be interesting to know what
percentage of the ships at Iwo were involved in collisions.
Over the past few days there seems to have been quite a few.

patrick

--
Patrick D. Marsden            | Naval Research Laboratory    | (202)-404-8229
Computational Physics, Inc.   | Code 7641                    | Opinions are mine
Planetary Atmospheres Section | Washington, D.C.  20375      | and mine alone.
http://power.nrl.navy.mil     | [email-masked]  |    * RKBA *

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 10:05:54 -0500
From:    Frederick J Milford <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Mailing List Problems Revisited

John,

Message below received in Columbus DTG 28/0847/R.  Seems to be working fine.

Fred
>
> This mail thing is really strange. I only received about 8-9 messages
> yesterday from the list total, while usually we have anywhere from 40-80 a
> day. My question is - did anyone else receive a much larger number than what
> I did? I'm talking about ones dated yesterday only. What is really strange is
> last night I posted my 50 YA article for the 28th. I have not received it
> back yet. This morning I posted my little month end blurb about my archives.
> I have received it back. I need to find out if this slow down is 1) a problem
> with the list itself, 2) just very little traffic in general or 3) a problem
> on my end with my ISP.
>
> I'm posting this at 8:43 EST on Tuesday. I want to see how long it takes for
> it to come back.
>
> John
>

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 09:25:47 -0600
From:    "William L. Huber - SAA" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Africa (was: What if?)

>                                                             By not
> concentrating or taking africa seriously, surely German military planners
> saw the possibilities of the establishment of bases of operation against
> europe?                                                             war

Hi Michael,

The Germans considered Africa a sideshow not really worthy of an all
out effort.  Hitler sent the Afrika Korps to bolster the Italians who
were doing badly against the British 8th Army and its Colonial Allies.
When the Afrika Korps showed up in Africa they were still wearing
their continental wool uniforms and the tanks were Panzer grey in
color.  Rommel's orders were to stop the British.  He did this by
attacking much to the initial dismay of the high command.  After a
string of successes this dismay quickly turned to delight and Rommel
was showered with promotions, decorations and press accolades.

The venture into the Balkans was not part of the German battle plan
either but ended up being included because the Greeks were giving the
Italians a rough time and making them look bad.  Some historians
suggest that the battle of Russia was lost because of the delay in the
start of Barbarossa due to forces having been diverted to Greece.
They feel that had the Germans been able to jump off against the
Russians in Spring rather than the middle of the Summer the outcome
would have been different.  Who knows, but that's what some say.

>                                           Any ideas on why England was
> not targeted first? Had England fallen, that leaves africa or greenland(?)
> as a base of operation?
>
>                    **************************************
>                           Michael Davis, Principal

It was.  The Battle of Britain began just as the Battle of France
ended.  It was thought that Britain could be forced to surrender by
air operations but airplanes don't hold ground as well as infantry
troops.  Operation Sealion was the German High Commands plan to
assault the beaches of Britain but the Germans apparently thought
better of the idea as the Kriegsmarine was not up to challenging the
Royal Navy in its home waters and had a critical shortage of transport
for the troops.  Losses to the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain
forced the Germans to realize that they could not support an invasion
by air either in transport or by providing protection to an invasion
fleet.  Had the Germans attempted Sealion the war might have ended
much sooner.  But then the Germans might not have attacked Russia had
losses in Britain been too high so its hard to say.  There are a
zillion factors and a case can be built for any outcome.

This is a high level overview but books have been written on both of
these topics if you want to get into the nitty gritty of it.

Cheers, Bill Huber / [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 10:44:09 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: ADMIN: low traffic

        I just checked the archives and every message saved there
was received by me.  There were 21 messages posted yesterday, and,
so far, there have been eight for today.  You must check the Date:
field of the message to see when it was sent since the listserver
seems to be doggo slow with propogation delays of a half day or
more.  I shouldn't complain but what can you expect from some clunky,
old IBM mainframe!  :-)
--
Joe Barone, WWII-L listowner
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 11:39:44 -0600
From:    Jon Stevens <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: A-bomb spies

On Mon, 27 Feb 1995, Kelvin Brent Luther wrote:

>         I am curious to hear opinions on the possibility Oppenheimer was
> the Soviets key man in the Manhattan project.  I can't remember the guys
> name but some former KGB guy has implied there was someone very high up
> and many speculate that it was Oppenheimer himself.  Apparently
> everything else this guy has spoken of since the demise of the Soviet
> Union has been verified and he seems to be held in high regard (I believe
> he recently wrote a book about the cold war).  I am sure someone out
> there has probably read it.

sounds like Sudaplatov (sp?).  I can't remember the name of the book though.
I think there was some debate on the veracity of the book also.

Jon Stevens - [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 13:16:05 EST
From:    Richard Kaplan <[email-masked]>
Subject: Concentrating on Africa

As usual Bill Huber summed up global strategy in succinct, accurate,
and well reasoned explanations.  To reinforce his position on why Africa was a
sideshow for the Germans, I rely on much of what Gerhard Weinberg keeps coming
back to in World at Arms: what were Germany's ultimate war aims?  From an
ideologic and strategic point of view they were living room in the East, and
natural resources in the East (read Caucases oil).  Africa would logically come
under German domination as Germany took over the assets (what is a colony?) of
the European nations.

The delay imposed on the German attack on the Soviet Union by the Italian Greek
fiasco was compounded fatally by the German attack on Yugoslavi

I haven't finished the book, but Weinberg keeps on returning to the ideologic
reasons for waging war.  As hard as the idea is to comprehend, it does make
understanding Hitler's motivations more logical.

                                        Richard Kaplan
                                        Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 14:39:34 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: China/Japan part 5

        Hyakutake's 17th Army was formed in May 1942 with relatively slim
resources.  The various detachments added up to a total of 14 battalions plus a
few smaller supporting units, equal in effect to a division and a half in terms
of number of rifle battalions, but lacking the same scale of artillery,
logistics support, etc, usually found in the divisional structure.  It was bad
enough that this scratch assemblage was supposed to secure the world's second
largest island land mass, but, added to that, the problem of the Marine
landings on Guadalcanal and Tulagi soon occupied much of Hyakutake's attention.
Initially the Ichiki Detachment was sent to Guadalcanal, followed by the
understrength 35th Brigade under Kawaguchi.  As stated in an earlier post,
largely due to faulty intelligence on the size of the enemy forces (some 16,000
Marines had paricipated in the first stage of the Guadalcanal/Tulagi operation)
the Japanese instead of waiting until they could concentrate these units into a
respectable strike force frittered them away piecemeal in tactically primitive
frontal assaults (Ichiki attacked with 800 men of the nearly 2,000 in his unit,
not even waiting for the rest to be landed; Kawaguchi had about 2,400
men in his attack force).  Meanwhile, on New Guinea itself, the abandonment of
the landings at Port Moresby, the largest port facing Australia, due to the
naval battle at Coral Sea, led to a renewed effort which began that summer.
Now a Japanese force spearheaded by Maj-General Horii's "South Seas Detachment"
was, after landing on the north shore of New Guinea, to push its way through to
Moresby overland, crossing the imposing, steep, jungle-clad slopes of the Owen
Stanley mountain range.  The "South Seas Detachment," BTW, had been originally
created with the mission of attacking Guam, but the 300 American military
personnel on the island surrendered to the Japanese marines who made the first
landing there, leaving the "South Seas Detachment" available for other
employment.  Eventually the even smaller batch of Australian troops opposing
Horii managed to bring the enemy to a halt (literally within sight of Moresby),
which soon turned into a progressively chaotic withdrawal along the tenuous
Japanese supply line (here the lack of logistical support became graphically
clear as starvation and disease once again claimed an unacceptable share of the
Japanese force-- what returned to the Japanese bases at Buna and Gona was a
sick, malnourished remnant, to which was added the fact that their commander,
Horii, drowned during the retreat).  I should mention that the Australians in
this campaign benefitted from the fact that the opportunities for jungle
infiltration were again somewhat limited-- the jungle was so thick, and the
mountains so impassable in most places, that most of the fighting, and most
possible movement, took place within a short distance of the Kokoda Trail that
led across the mountains to Moresby.  Some of the fiercest fighting was for
possession of the "Wairopi Bridge" along this trail-- a small suspension
pedestrian bridge over a gorge ("wairopi" was pigdin for "wire rope").  Even
so, the Australians were repeatedly forced back, sometimes by shorter
infiltrations through the thick growth along the trail, but often only after
having inflicted disproportionate casualties in the frontal assaults the
Japanese were forced to make.  The outnumbered Australians repeatedly launched
their own counterattacks in small-scale actions with hand grenades, especially
as the Japanese started withdrawing.  They held by the skins of their teeth,
but hold they did.
        At any rate, it soon became clear to the Army command that greater
resources were going to be required to successfully evict the Americans from
Guadalcanal and the Australians (soon to be joined by MacArthur's US troops)
from New Guinea.  Hyakutake, realizing the importance of stopping the first
American counteroffensive at Guadalcanal, himself transferred his headquarters
to the island, and also had as much of 17th Army's heavy artillery as could be
successfully transported brought in soon afterward (as readers of my earlier
posts know, this however only amounted to some 25 pieces, not counting a few
75-mm AA guns).  By October major reinforcements had arrived in the form of
the 2nd Division, transferred from quiescent Indonesia, and the 230th Regiment
of the 38th Division, the unit which in 12/41 had conquered Hong Kong.  Again,
these were not enough, as the Americans had overcome their initial naval
reticence and were bringing their own reinforcements in at an increasing rate.
(the replacement of "Fuelin' Frank" Fletcher with Admiral "Bull"
Halsey marked the decisive moment of this change in attitude toward total
commitment to supporting the forces on Guadalcanal-- Fletcher, according to
S.E. Morison and others, seemed to always be returning to base for more fuel at
the decisive moment, and had deserted the Marines completely early in the
battle, not even waiting for their transports to be fully unloaded --
it was probably another piece of American luck at Midway
that he arrived at the battle late on board the hastily-repaired YORKTOWN, his
flagship, and allowed Admiral Spruance to direct the battle.  Fletcher's signal
to Spruance on his arrival, "will conform to your movements," may have been his
greatest service to the war effort.  There might be a revisionist line on
Fletcher, so I might be setting myself up for a flogging on this one.  Like I
said earlier, naval matters are not my strong suit.)
        With the failure of the Japanese October offensive the Army and Navy
geared up for one final effort to drive the US forces from the island.  As we
have seen, the negative outcome of the naval and air battle aborted this
initiative.  But the Japanese Army in November 1942 undertook a thorough
reorganization of their forces in the southeast in order to counter the growing
Allied activity there, and prepare for the next phase of anticipated enemy
offensive operations.  A new Area command was called into being, responsible
for both New Guinea and the Solomons.  General Imamura, commander of the 16th
Army in Indonesia, was promoted to command of this new "8th Area Army" (NOTE:
in the Japanese forces an "Area Army" was a formation with two or more of the
regular field armies-- which themselves were the size of a European corps--
under their control.  They thus corresponded to the western "army" in size.  To
avoid confusion I've usually used the term "Area" and tend to drop the "Army"
after it).  Imamura's new command contained 17th Army, now focused solely on
the Solomons and the great base of Rabaul just to the north of this chain, and
the newly-created 18th Army, under General Hatazo Adachi.  At first, 18th Army
wasn't much of an army.  In 11/42 it had only the remnants of the "South Seas
Detachment" and the Yamagata Detachment of three battalions under command.
However, the Japanese were about to divert major reinforcements to this
theatre.  In December 1942, they made several large-scale moves.  The 6th
Division, which had established the reputation as one of the best fighting
units in the entire Japanese Army during lengthy campaigning in China (also
known, feared and respected by their Chinese adversaries), was assigned to 17th
Army.  It eventually wound up on Bougainville, the northernmost of the major
islands in the Solomons chain, where it joined the "4th Southern Garrison Unit"
of three battalions.  The 51st Division was assigned to 18th Army, and brought
to Rabaul pending further employment.  Two other divisions, the 20th from Korea
and the 41st Division from China, were assigned to Imamura's 8th Area command
(both eventually wound up in New Guinea).  Finally, the 65th Brigade was
transferred from the Phillipines and shipped directly to Buna, New Guinea.
        It was the attempt to move the 51st Division to New Guinea in March
1943 that brought about the "Battle of the Bismarck Sea," actually less of a
battle than a slaughter of Japanese shipping by Allied aircraft.  The first
component of the division, amounting to some 7,000 men, was sent in eight
transports escorted by eight destroyers.  Allied planes sank all eight
transports and four of the escorts, for the loss of five aircraft.  This battle
was renowned for the successful use of the "skip-bombing" technique by American
B-25 two-engined bombers (a lower-level attack similar to kids skipping stones
across the water, much more accurate than higher-altitude level bombing).
Australian pilots flying British-built Beaufighters, two-engined nightfighters
with a powerful forward-firing armament that included four 20-mm guns, also
contributed to the carnage, in which about half of the 51st Division troops
were killed or drowned.  This incident played a major role in convincing
Yamamoto (in what was the last month of his life) to attempt to regain the
initiative in the air in that region, leading to the "I-Go" bombing offensive
against Guadalcanal and Allied bases in New Guinea, which however only resulted
in more losses to the dwindling number of well-trained Navy pilots.
        While I'm back on air matters, a couple more notes regarding the
fighting over the Solomons, etc.  The first Japanese landings at Tulagi in
early May '42 were detected by the Allies, and attacked by B-17 four-engined
bombers, which sank a destroyer from the invasion force.  The B-17, to a
certain extent, was in 1941-42 what the B-29 was to the Japanese in 1945.  That
is, its toughness and heavy armament of ten or more .50-calibre machineguns
made this big plane a very tough target for the Japanese fighter pilots.  I
mentioned earlier that Koichi Kanno made a name for himself among the Japanese
Navy pilots by developing a successful tactic to attack these aircraft,
approaching from directly in front in a slow roll while firing.  The B-17's
biggest "blind spot" in terms of firepower, at least in the early war versions,
was dead ahead (later extra guns were added to cover this).  The Germans
evolved a similar tactic for attacking the B-17.  As a compensating factor, the
usual B-17 attack method of relatively high-altitude level bombing was
demonstrated to be rather inaccurate when attempting to hit a target like a
moving ship, and the Japanese sailors came to scoff at these kind of assaults,
although there were occasional losses to these attacks, as above, also during
the first landings on Luzon in the Phillipines, and one of the early
reinforcement runs to Guadalcanal.
        I also wanted to say, in regards to another air battle over the
Solomons, the Feb 14, 1943 Allied raid on Bougainville that I referred to in an
earlier post, the reason it was called the "St Valentine's Day Massacre" (other
than the obvious) is that of the ten Allied planes shot down (for three Zeros),
eight were fighters.  Not only that, many were of the newest and best US
fighter types--i.e., four P-38's, two Marine Corsairs, and two P-40's.  Another
demonstration that it took the Allied pilots a little time to evolve their own
proper tactical approach to fighting the Zero.  BTW, it was over Bougainville
in August '43 that Okabe shot down seven US planes in one day.
        In spite of all these reinforcement moves, the next Solomon island to
be invaded, New Georgia, was not strongly garrisoned.  Against the US Army
division and a supporting force of Marine commandos that were landed, Maj-Gen
Sasaki had initially on the island only the 229th Regiment, reinforced as the
battle progressed by the 230th Regt (of the 38th Division-- this regiment had
been evacuated from Guadalcanal) and two of the battalion-sized Kure "special
naval landing forces."  Thus Sasaki's mission was envisioned from the start to
be only a holding action.  The bulk of 38th Division wound up on Rabaul, where
it sat out the war in isolation.
        I will break off here, ready to return to China.  Hopefully this
diversion will illustrate how limited the Japanese resources were, and also how
to fight the Americans et al in the south it was necessary progressively to
withdraw troops from the north, especially China (note that at least three of
the reinforcing divisions alluded to above came directly from that theatre).
This could only hurt the effectiveness of Japanese forces on the mainland, but
more of that next time.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 13:57:54 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Africa (was: What if?)

Hello, Joe!

I had to bite on this one!

>         As for Rommel taking the Suez, I must ask, What would it have
> accomplished?

    I don't think there is any doubt that had the Suez been seized by
the Germans, the British would have been finished in Africa, perhaps
forever, even if the Allies had evicted the Germans later. I think to
the British mind, the Suez Canal was the linchpin of any British
hopes of eventually defeating Rommel, and had it been captured, would
have dealt them a severe strategic blow as well as to their morale.

    Strategically, had the Germans been able to exploit such a move,
the possibilities would have been endless, particularly with linking
up with von Kleist's panzers in Southern Russia. I state that the
possibility would have existed, and I really doubt that the Germans
would have had the military power to exploit such an intriguing
possibility.

    My thoughts anyway.

   Thanks and all the best.

   Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 14:59:07 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: China/Japan sources

        Guess I've been getting sloppy again, so its time to 'fess up about my
sources.  Most of what I've put (or am planning to put) into these China vs
Japan posts comes from one or more of the following (in no particular order);

        Basil Liddel Hart, "History of the Second World War"
        Barbara Tuchman, "Stilwell and the American Experience In China"
        Ronald Spector, "Eagle Against the Sun"
        "The Stilwell Papers" (don't have editor's name handy)
        Saburo Ienaga, "The Pacific War 1931-1945"
        William Manchester, "American Caesar"
        William Manchester, "Goodbye Darkness"
        Saburo Hayashi, "Kogun"
        Edgar Snow, "Red Star Over China"
        William Slim, "Defeat Into Victory"
        Theodore White, "In Search Of History"
        Samuel Elliot Morison, v.14 (I think the title is "The Pacific War
                Won")
        William Gunston, "Illustrated Encyclopedia of World War II Combat
                Aircraft"
        Angelucci and Matriccardi, "World War 2 Airplanes"

        I'm sure there's a few I'm forgetting.  I also used the Pantheon Press
book "Mao For Beginners" as a handy reference source.  Its in comic book format
and unabashedly socialist in outlook, but its crammed with facts that I didn't
want to bother tracking down in Snow and other places.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 14:10:23 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Africa (was: What if?)

Hello, Bill!

Would like to add my two cents' to this.

  Rommel's orders were to stop the British.

    Rommel was also told not to provoke them. He was there in a
purely defensive role in the beginning, but saw that the British were
becoming steadily weaker as the front there was seen to be winding
down. British units began being pulled out and employed elsewhere,
and saw an opportunity he couldn't pass up, namely to attack. His
adversary was namely General O'Connor.

  He did this by
> attacking much to the initial dismay of the high command.  After a
> string of successes this dismay quickly turned to delight and Rommel
> was showered with promotions, decorations and press accolades.

    True enough!

>
> The venture into the Balkans was not part of the German battle plan
> either but ended up being included because the Greeks were giving the
> Italians a rough time and making them look bad.  Some historians
> suggest that the battle of Russia was lost because of the delay in the
> start of Barbarossa due to forces having been diverted to Greece.
> They feel that had the Germans been able to jump off against the
> Russians in Spring rather than the middle of the Summer the outcome
> would have been different.  Who knows, but that's what some say.

    I think it could have made a difference.

    Thanks, Bill!

    Will be in touch.

    All the best.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 15:23:35 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

        Saw the following in the local paper (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette) and it
seemed to be relevent to an ongoing discussion line I've been reading (in my
breaks from boring you all about Japan).  The writer is a local journalist
describing a recent trip to Germany and Auschwitz.
        "On the bus back to Krakow a German engineer tells me he is bothered by
the fact that it has become conventional, when discussing the Holocaust, to
refer to "Nazi" death camps.
        "I wish we would simply refer to them as GERMAN camps" (NOTE; emphasis
mine, I remember this point coming up in previous discussions)
        He notes that Hitler was not only elected-- he was a known quantity.
Few leaders had provided their populace with a clearer road map of where they
want to go than Hitler did in "Mein Kampf."
        Demonic terms such as "Nazi," he adds, only serve to insulate us from
uncomfortable truths. (end quote)

        The above does not necessarily reflect my opinion on this topic, but I
thought it might be relevent.  The writer's name is Andres Martinez.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 15:18:33 EST
From:    Richard King <[email-masked]>
Subject: Patton biography

To all Patton experts:

If you had to choose ONE biography of General Patton to place in
your local library, which would it be (okay, give me two or three
of the best biographies)? My Patton bios are pretty slim, as I
found out lately, and there isn't much in print. Can anyone
recommend the best ones to obtain? Actually, I was trying to
help a student find information for an essay titled something
like "Was Truman correct to stop Patton from initiating war
against Russia?" I'm not finding much about this, although
I remember something about Patton keeping German troops well
fed and armed in preparation for WWIII, but I can't find a cite.
Patton apparently wrote and said privately some very anti-Russian
things, but he didn't live long enough after the war ended to
be a great problem for Truman, I don't think (if indeed he was
a problem for Truman). Anyone have any reading suggestions for us?
Thanks, WWII-Lers!
Richard King ([email-masked])

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 16:55:51 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: A-bomb spies

A **LOT** of debate on Sudaplatov. See the New York Review of Books review
by Thomas Powers, among other accounts.

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 20:30:01 EST
From:    Bill Je ne sais pas le Francaise Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC: Africa (was: What if?)

On Tue, 28 Feb 1995 13:57:54 GMT-6 Robert T. Moore said:
>
>    Strategically, had the Germans been able to exploit such a move,
>the possibilities would have been endless, particularly with linking
>up with von Kleist's panzers in Southern Russia. I state that the
>possibility would have existed, and I really doubt that the Germans
>would have had the military power to exploit such an intriguing
>possibility.
>
>    My thoughts anyway.
>
>
>   Thanks and all the best.
>
>   Terry

      Perhaps the Germans could not have really used the seizure of the
Suez and the rest of Africa as a viable route to Russia.  However, I
don't think that Stalin could have ignored the _possibility_ of an incursion
through that area.  As a result, he would have had to have diverted some
resources to the area for possible operations against the Germans.
     Additionally, the Suez, Alexandria, and Cairo might not have been
important for the Germans but for the British they were essential given
the number of citizens and the cutural value that the cities held.
     In the end, the Germans would not have had much direct to gain from
winning Africa, but the Allies had a lot to lose by its loss.  And if
the Allies' loss is the Axis' gain, Africa was an important theater.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 20:36:10 EST
From:    Bill Je ne sais pas le Francaise Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

Hello Mike,
   I don't think that the camps were German because they were administered
by many other Europeans.  Nazi is probably a more accurate description.
If you want to tie Nazism with Germanism that's acceptable, but to stretch
the camps to sole Germanship ownership, administration, and responsibility
ignores what many other Europeans (Austrians, Poles, Estonians, etc.) did
to contribute to the Holocaust.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 19:41:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re2: A-bomb spies

On 28 Feb 95 Henry Sirotin wrote:

A **LOT** of debate on Sudaplatov. See the New York Review of Books review
by Thomas Powers, among other accounts.

Henry,
     What I find strange is that all of the debate concerning that book
is coming from within the U.S.  I have heard that the book was a best-
seller in the U.K.  Further, it is my understanding that once scholars
had begun to examine the KGB archives, Sudaplatov statements have been
born out.  Just my two cents!

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 20:53:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 1 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
THURSDAY, 1 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  L-4, Piper Cub (Grasshopper)
  L-5, Stinson Sentinel
  Me 262, Messerschmitt
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  P-61, Northrop Black Widow

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 6 B-25s and 5 P-51s pound
the S side of Ishan while 17 other P-51s hit the E and W sections of the
city; 9 P-51s attack targets of opportunity of Chinchengchiang while 4 others
hit troops and road traffic between Chinchengchiang and Hwaiyang. During Mar
45, the detachment of the 11th Bombardment Squadron (Medium), 341st
Bombardment Group (Medium), operating from Laowhangpin with B-25s returns to
base at Yangkai; the 26th Fighter Squadron, 51st Fighter Group, based at
Kunming with P-51s sends a detachment to operate from Liangshan during the
month; the 74th Fighter Squadron, 23d Fighter Group, based at Luliang with
P-51s sends a detachment to operate from Tushan until Aug 45; the 426th Night
Fighter Squadron, Fourteenth AF (attached to 312th Fighter Wing), moves from
Chengtu to Shwantliu with P-61s (a detachment is operating from Hsian); and
the 449th Fighter Squadron, 51st Fighter Group, based at Chengkung with
P-38s, sends a detachment to operate from Mentsz while the detachment at
Yunnani returns to base.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): HQ 444th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy)
begins a movement from Dudhkundi, India to the Mariana Islands.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 27 P-47s support ground
forces in the Mogok area; 16 fly close support strikes near Lashio; 14 P-47s
damage the approaches of the bypass bridge at Na-lang, but leave the bridge
serviceable; about 100 fighter-bombers attack troops, supply areas,
communications targets, a ferry landing, and general targets of opportunity
along the battlefronts and immediately behind Japanese lines. Large-scale
transport operations continue.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  AIRBORNE OPERATIONS (IX Troop Carrier Command): During Mar 45, the 62d
Troop Carrier Squadron, 314th Troop Carrier Group, moves from Saltby, England
to Poix, France.

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 2 missions are flown.
  Mission 857: 1,228 bombers and 488 fighters are dispatched to attack
marshalling yards in C and S Germany; 3 plants suspected of manufacturing Me
262 jet engine parts could not be attack due to clouds; most attacks are made
using H2X radar; the fighters claim 12-0-8 Luftwaffe aircraft; 7 P-51s are
lost:
  1. 452 B-17s are sent to hit marshalling yards at Bruchsal (115),
Reutlingen (69), Neckarsulm (85), Heilbronn (107) and Gottingen (36); 25 hit
Heidelberg, the secondary target; some visual attacks are made; 27 B-17s are
damaged. Escorting are 92 of 100 P-51s; 2 are lost (pilots MIA) and 2 damaged
beyond repair.
  2. 253 of 321 B-24s bomb the Ingolstadt marshalling yard; 62 others hit the
secondary target, Augsburg; 1 B-24 is damaged beyond repair. 181 of 194 P-51s
escort claiming 1-0-0 aircraft in the air; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).
  3. 420 of 449 B-17s hit the marshalling yard at Ulm; 2 others hit a target
of opportunity; some attacks are visual; 2 B-17s are damaged beyond repair
and 3 damaged; 16 airmen are KIA and 2 WIA. The escort is 147 of 152 P-51s;
they claim 1-0-0 aircraft in the air and 9-0-7 on the ground; 3 P-51s are
lost (pilots MIA).
  4. 6 B-24s fly a screening mission without loss.
  5. 31 of 32 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  6. 9 of 10 P-51s escort 8 F-5s on a photo reconnaissance mission over
Germany.
  Mission 858: 11 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 340+ B-26s, A-20s and
A-26s attack the ordnance depot at Giessen, communications centers at
Pulheim, Rheinbach, Rommergkirchen, and Stommeln, the rail bridge at Pracht,
a road bridge, and 8 targets of opportunity; fighters escort the bombers, fly
alerts, scheduled patrols, and armed reconnaissance, hit assigned ground
targets and support the US 3d Armored Division at the Erft River bridgehead
near Paffendorf, the 9th Armored Division between Neffelbach and Rotbach
Creeks, the XIX Corps in the Monchen-Gladbach area, the VIII Corps astride
the Prum River, the XII Corps between the Prum and Nims Rivers and along the
Kyll River, and the XX Corps in the Trier area; and in the Netherlands, the
XVI and XIII Corps in the Venlo area and along the Niers River. During Mar
45, HQ IX Fighter Command moves from Verviers, Belgium to Bruhl, Germany.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO): US Army Forces in the Middle East
(USAFIME) takes over NW Africa from MTO US Army and is redesignated the
Africa-Middle East Theater (AMET).

  AAF, MTO: "A" and "D" Flights of the 121st Liaison Squadron, AAF, MTO,
operating from Vittel, France with L-4s and L-5s, return to base at Florence,
Italy.

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): In Austria, 630+ B-24s and
B-17s bomb the Moosbierbaum oil refinery and alternate targets and targets of
opportunity including marshalling yards at Sankt Polten, Amstetten, Villach,
Klagenfurt, Knittelfeld, Feldbach, and the marshalling yards at Jesenice and
Maribor, Yugoslavia, plus several scattered targets of opportunity; 220+
fighters provide escort; 22 P-38s bomb the Moosbierbaum refinery and Tulln
marshalling yard (afterward 12 of them strafe the Wiener-Neustadt-Gloggnitz)
rail lines); 47 other P-38s strafe rail traffic around Graz and W of Vienna.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy during the night of 28
Feb/1 Mar, A-20s fly intruder missions against targets at Lecco and in the
Parma area, starting large fires and causing several explosions during a
strike on the Casarsa delta Delizia temporary railroad bridge, and hit
bridges at Nervesa delta Battaglia and Sacile; weather cancels all daytime
operations except for reconnaissance and supply runs.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): HQ VII Fighter Command is removed from control
of Seventh AF and transferred to AAFPOA and moves from Ft Kamehameha, Oahu,
Hawaii to Iwo Jima Island, Volcano Islands during Mar 45.
  In the Bonin Islands, 7 B-24s from Guam Island, Mariana Islands, bomb
Susaki Airfield on Chichi Jima Island; 1 other hits Haha Jima Island; during
the night of 1/2 Mar, 5 B-24s make separate harassment strikes on Susaki
Airfield and the town of Okimura on Haha Jima.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: In Formosa, B-24s
bomb the Takao aluminum plant, Tainan Airfield and nearby satellite field
and fighters hit buildings at Keishu and storage tanks, railroad yards, and
targets of opportunity. On Luzon Island, Philippine Islands, troops on
Corregidor Island and W of Ft Stotsenburg are hit with napalm. In Borneo,
B-24s bomb Tarakan Island, Labuan Island, and Manggar Airfields. B-25s hit
Zettle Field on Jolo Island, Philippine Islands. HQ Thirteenth AF moves from
Morotai Island, Moluccas Islands to Leyte Island, Philippine Islands and HQ
XIII Fighter Command moves from Leyte to Puerto Princesa, Palawan Island,
Philippine Islands. HQ 18th Fighter Group moves from Lingayen, Luzon to San
Jose, Mindoro Island, Philippine Islands; the 531st Bombardment Squadron
(Heavy), 380th Bombardment Group (Heavy), moves from Darwin, Australia to San
Jose, Mindoro with B-24s. During Mar 45, HQ V Bomber Command and HQ V Fighter
Command moves from Mindoro to Clark Field, Luzon.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

01/0152Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 20:08:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: MEDIA:Iwo Jima Today

On Fri, 24 Feb 1995, James E. Irwin reprinted the following from the
DoD Newswire 21 February 1995

:IWO JIMA AFTER 50 YEARS

   On the western side of the island is a hospital cave reopened in
1984 by a Japanese veterans group that found the mummified remains of
53 soldiers. Jumbled piles of medical dressings, rice bowls, teapots,
rolls of communications wire and other relics remain untouched.
   Military personnel tell of finding their way into unexplored
tunnels and finding a virtually intact communications center, a
kitchen, a tunnel full of mortar shells, and other relics.

Does anybody know if this was covered by National Geographic or some
other magazine?  I would be interested to read any article about the
discovery of these kinds of artifacts.

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 21:02:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

On Tue, 28 Feb 1995, William Lippert wrote:

   I don't think that the camps were German because they were administered
by many other Europeans.  Nazi is probably a more accurate description.
If you want to tie Nazism with Germanism that's acceptable, but to stretch
the camps to sole Germanship ownership, administration, and responsibility
ignores what many other Europeans (Austrians, Poles, Estonians, etc.) did
to contribute to the Holocaust.

At the risk of starting a flame-war, I have to take exception with the
mention of the Poles as having played a part in the Holocaust.  Over
one million Polish Catholics were killed by the Germans during WWII, not
to mention the undetermined number that were murdered by the Soviets.
Auschwitz and other concentration camps had there share of Polish
Catholics as well as Polish Jews (Dr. Jozef Garlinski, a former prisoner
at Auschwitz,has written an excellent book on the subject _FIGHTING
AUSCHWITZ_).  The Poles were the only ethnic group in Europe not to
supply the Germans with soldiers (that excludes those Poles who were
forced into the German Army, because they did so unwillingly and never
served in "Polish" units).  Finally, need I remind anyone of the actions
surrounding the death of St. Maximilian Kolbe at Auschwitz.
     I do not, for a minute, deny that some individual Poles may have
participated in the Holocaust.  It seems ironic to me, however, that one
often hears more about Polish "anti-semitism", than the anti-Semitic
policies of the collaborationist Vichy government, or Mussolini's Italy,
or Franco's Spain, or the Croats, Lithunians, Ukrainians, or Russians.
My point is that almost every ethnic group in Europe has been accused of
anti-Semitism, but the Poles were the only ethnic group not to willingly
participate in the Holocaust by collaborating with the Germans or by
willingly contributing to the German war effort.
     While the French were collaborating with the Germans, the Poles
represented the fourth largest Allied army in Western Europe (after the
U.S., U.K., and Canadians).  Likwise, the Polish Home Army was at least
three times larger than the French Maquis, but most of the space in the
history books devoted to resistence has been given to the French.  Ok,
I'm sure that those are enough examples to get me in quite a bit of
trouble.  Just my two cents!

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 28 Feb 1995 22:36:09 EST
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

On Tue, 28 Feb 1995 20:36:10 EST Bill Je ne sais pas le Francaise Lippert said:

Sorry about that header - my computer is screwing up on me.

Bill Lippert

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 27 Feb 1995 to 28 Feb 1995
*************************************************