Subject: WWII-L Digest - 16 Feb 1995 to 17 Feb 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 18 Feb 1995 00:01:33 -0500

There are 48 messages totalling 1867 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Draft Requirements
  2. Japan's Grand Strategy (2)
  3. Grampas Secrets (fwd) (fwd)
  4. INF: USN Chronology 02-17-95
  5. INF: 50 Years Ago - 18-FEB-1945
  6. [INF] USAAF 17 FEB 45
  7. New WWII PC'ism (2)
  8. Michael Wittmann [death on Aug 8 44] (4)
  9. Indian Freikorps... (3)
 10. Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's
 11. Enola Gay
 12. German Superweapon?
 13. USS Indy (2)
 14. Japanese tactics (part 6)
 15. Afterthoughts on Japanese tactics
 16. WEAP: "German" look of M24
 17. ACORN UNIT INFO
 18. Michael Wittmann
 19. 8th AA
 20. 6 million ? (2)
 21. And furthermore...(Japan, appendix) (2)
 22. Soviet Tankers (was Michael Wittmann) (2)
 23. Re[2]: German Superweapon? (2)
 24. Holocaust and Germans (2)
 25. War crimes trials-- the last, final, absolutely ultimate Japan post!
 26. The Ursel rocket launcher (not much though)
 27. Dresden, Fire Storms
 28. MEDIA:Marines to Iwo
 29. MEDIA:Nazi Salute
 30. MEDIA:Propaganda Posters
 31. Enola Gay Exhibit
 32. Japan (oops!)
 33. Spotter ?
 34. OOPS Re: Spotter ?
 35. Order of Battle

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Feb 1995 21:11:00 -0800
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Draft Requirements

At 12:23 PM 2/16/95, Michael D Wallick wrote:
>The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 provided for four
>classifications:
[...]

>Class IV:  Deferred by law or because induction is undesirable for obvious
>reasons, such as insanity, physical unfitness, alienage, etc.  This group
>included high federal and state officers such as the governors and judges,
>aliens who had not declared their intention of becoming citizens, ministers
>and divinity students, and college students.  Those obviously unfit for
>service included criminals, perverts, persons convicted of treason, and
>registrants found to have physical, mental, or nervous disabilities.

Did this include members of congress?  I mean if it includes governors,
judges, criminals, and perverts it must include members of congress, right?

John Riegsecker                                 (206) 756-3566
Dept of Mathematics and Computer Science        [email-masked]
University of Puget Sound

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 00:09:26 EST
From:    "Cassady B. Craft" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Japan's Grand Strategy

Hey Joe, great question(s).  I think that they really wanted Teddy Roosevelt
to come back from the beyond and negotiate another Nobel Peace Prize!
On a more serious note, the "how could they believe the US could surrender
due to the great loss of face involved" is a culturally correct arguement
that does not take into account the tremendous racism that was involved.
Just as many in the US saw the Japanese soldier as snaggle toothed, scrawny,
and near-sighted (My goodness, remember the Gilligan's Island episode with
the midget sub?), many Japanese saw the white races (both Britain and the US)
as a little weak-kneed.

As for whether they desired to humiliate the US more than end the war, that
would be extremely hard to determine (whose word would you take and in what
context?).  More likely, they knew that they were on the tiger's back and
had absolutely no idea how to get off (save another TRoosevelt emerging,
but from where?).  I could be wrong here.  I just don't know of peace
overtures, etc.  If there are a bunch/some/any/one, I'm sure that someone
on the list will be happy to point that out.

Cassady Craft
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 00:57:48 EST
From:    "Cassady B. Craft" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Grampas Secrets (fwd) (fwd)

A friend of mine is looking for information on what his grandfather (described
below) was doing as part of secret operations during WW II.  He is British
if you can't tell, and studying for Ph.D exams which you can probably tell
by the hurried tone and abbreviations.  If there are any questions, please
direct them to me or the list and I will pick them up and send them on if
necessary.  Any and all help will be greatly appreciated.  It would be
nice to solve this "mystery" before Chris has to leave the states for
"home."  Thanks in advance.

Cassady Craft
e-mail [email-masked]
or
[email-masked]
----------------------------Original message----------------------------
I've deleted the message that I sent but this is the gist...

member VR (wireless reserve) joins up.
a/c training (selection process for defiants/radar op...failed!)
serves at Q-site on Thorney Island
serves with 7 sqdr (Oakington/cambs) on Stirlings
completes tour of ops - ground service for a while
revolunteers for flying service
joins 101 sqdr (Oakington and Bourne) on Wellingtons (see "bomber sqdr at
      war", Ian Allen) - 101 later part of 5 grp ? (radio/spec ops)
flys 13 ops (inc Milennium on Cologne etc)
attacked over Borkum by Bf109s (at night wilde sau?)
crash land at Coltishall (norfolk)
invalided out of service 16months later (1943)
 honourable discharge with mentions of superior wireless skills etc

all normal all regular
now the "big secret", gets a radio (at home...in Bedford) and an obsever
corps uniform (never member tho') and does "something secret that he won't
tell me about!" odd because he's really open about everything else and
we're really close...but he remains adamant (invoking Official secrets act
which is wierd for him!:) )
I don't expect it is anything spectacular....speaks no german (monitoring?)
could be something he is "ashamed" of? (Like you suggest cass, monitoring
allied aircrews for radio silence/positions/bomb dumping etc?)
....but am very interested to find out what I can so I can grill him next
summer! I believe I read something about using ex aircrew in a Ham radio
magazine but have lost it (not specific either)
general query...use of ex aircrew/raido ops after discharge for RAF.
any clues ...intriguing possibilities (Bletchley isn't far away, loads of
bases all round) operating from home (Bedford)
      any assistance  suggestions
chris

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 04:00:19 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 02-17-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
02/17 Sat.  United States naval vessels damaged:
             Battleship TENNESSEE (BB-43), by coastal defense gun,
              Iwo Jima area,
              24 d. 44'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             Heavy cruiser PENSACOLA (CA-24), by coastal defense gun,
              Iwo Jima area,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             Destroyer LEUTZE (DD-481), by coastal defense gun,
              Iwo Jima area,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             Destroyer DORTCH (DD-670), by strafing, Iwo Jima area,
              30 d. 01'N., 141 d. 45'E.
             Destroyer WALDRON (DD-699), by intentional ramming of
              Japanese picket boat, Iwo Jima area,
              29 d. 27'N., 141 d. 34'E.
             Tug HIDATSA (ATF-102), by mine, Luzon area, P. I.,
              14 d. 25'N., 120 d. 30'E.
            Japanese naval vessels sunk:
             Transport NO. 114, by Army aircraft, off Formosa,
              23 d. 04'N., 120 d. 30'E.
             Coast defense vessel NO. 56, by submarine BOWFIN
              (SS-287), off Honshu, Japan,
              33 d. 53'N., 139 d. 43'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 07:27:16 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 18-FEB-1945

On 18-FEB-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the British XXX Corps
begins the assault on Goch. The 51st Division enters the town from the
northwest. In the U.S. 3rd Army sector, the VIII Corps resumes its
offensive by attacking south through the West Wall defences west of Pruem.
The early morning assault takes the Germans by surprise. Elements of the
90th Division take Grosskampenberg and Leidenborn. The XII Corps attacks
northeast towards the Pruem River against scattered resistance. In the 7th
Army sector, the 70th Division overruns Oeting and also takes Etzling,
Lixing and Grosbliederstroff.

Italian Front - In the U.S. 5th Army sector, elements of the 10th Mountain
Division scale the steep Sarasiccia-Campania cliff and take the Germans by
surprise. This is in preparation for the main attack on M. Belvedere and M.
Castello.

Philippines - The XIV Corps continues pre-invasion fire on Intramuros in
Manila. In XI Corps area, South Force meets East Force at Limay on Bataan.
Rock Force continues clearing Corregidor.

Iwo Jima - The pre-invasion bombardment continues, with special attention
on the landing beach area. TF 58 sails from the Japan area for Iwo to
assist in the invasion when poor weather prevents any further attacks on
Japan.

The Homefront
-------------
Tire Plant Seized - The Army has seized the America-Enka Corp. textile
plant in Enka, N.C. that has been strike-bound. The plant is used to
produce textiles used in the making of heavy duty tires.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 07:49:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 17 FEB 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
SATURDAY, 17 FEBRUARY 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  B-29, Boeing Superfortress
  F-7, Consolidated Liberator
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  P-61, Northrop Black Widow

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): 4 B-25s provide air coverage for a naval task
force en route to Paramushiru Island.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 30 B-25s bomb Linfen and
Yuncheng; a single B-25 hits railroad targets of opportunity from Hengyang to
Lingling; 27 P-40s and P-51s attack animal transport, barracks, railroad
targets, and the town area at Puchi; 16 P-47s hit the Hankow-Wuchang area; 37
other fighter-bombers attack railroad yards and targets of opportunity and
road and river traffic near Tsinan, Changsha, and Kweiyi, and at Sinyang,
Linfen, and Lung Hai.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): 14 P-47s support ground forces in
the Mongmit-Myitson area; 140+ fighter-bombers strike at troop
concentrations, supply points, transport, animal concentrations, tanks, and
arms and ammunition stores are pounded in N Burma including at Hko-lawng,
Hai-pu, Na-kyeh, Man Sang, Samlan, Hkummanmao, Mong Lang, Na-leng, Honwo, and
Loi-pyek; and 10 B-25s bomb troops and supplies at Hai-hseng. 603 transport
sorties are flown. The detachment of the 24th Combat Mapping Squadron, 8th
Photographic Reconnaissance Group, operating from Chanyi, China with F-7s
returns to base at Guskhara, India.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  AIRBORNE OPERATIONS (IX Troop Carrier Command):

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 834: 895 bombers and 183
fighters are dispatched to hit synthetic oil plants in Germany and the
Frankfurt marshalling yard; deteriorating weather forces the recall of 261
B-17s and 288 B-24s; the weather was so bad that some aircraft controls froze
and several had to jettison their bombs during assembly; 3 B-17s and 2 of the
recalled B-24 force are lost in addition to 1 P-51. 346 B-17s are sent to hit
the marshalling yard at Frankfurt (260); targets of opportunity are the
Giessen marshalling yard (45), Aschaffenburg (12), Hanau (10) and other (4);
3 B-17s and 2 B-24s are lost, 1 B-17 and 1 B-24 are damaged beyond repair and
106 B-17s damaged; 17 airmen are KIA, 2 WIA and 38 MIA. The escort is 151 of
167 P-51s; 1 is lost (pilot MIA) and 1 damaged beyond repair. 12 P-51s fly a
scouting mission and 4 escort photo reconnaissance aircraft over Germany.
The 862d Bombardment Squadron (Heavy), 493d Bombardment Group (Heavy)
(attached to 3d Air Division), moves from Debach to Wormingford, England and
begins flying weather reconnaissance missions with B-17s and P-51s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 31 B-26s strike the
Mayen rail bridge and a target of opportunity at Reinfeld; fighters of the IX
and XIX Tactical Air Commands fly patrols, sweeps, and armed reconnaissance;
the XXIX Tactical Air Command (Provisional) cancels operations due to bad
weather.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): About 500 B-17s and B-24s
attack the marshalling yard, station, and benzol plant at Linz, steel works
at Judenburg, tank works at Steyr and Sankt Valentin, marshalling yards at
Graz, Wels, Bruck an der Mur, and Villach, Austria; plus shipyards and
harbors at Fiume and Trieste, Italy, and Pula, Yugoslavia. P-38s and P-51s
escort the bombers, fly reconnaissance missions, and supply drops, strafe
rail lines in the Vienna-Linz, Austria area and aircraft at Ardning and
Grafenstein Austria, and fly weather and photo reconnaissance.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, medium bombers bomb
bridges at Chiusaforte, Bressanone, Crema, and Dogna; fighters and fighter-
bombers hit communications targets in the Po Valley and damage bridges at
Nervesa della Battaglia, Cittadella, Calliano, Ala, and Pordenone; also
bombed are guns and dumps from the S of La Spezia E to the battle area below
Bologna.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 42 B-24s from Saipan Island blast defense
installations and a bivouac area on Iwo Jima Island; 3 others, on an armed
reconnaissance flight, bomb Marcus Island; 3 B-24s from Guam Island,
escorting a photo plane over Truk Atoll bomb Param, Uman, and Eten Islands in
the atoll. 5 B-24s from Saipan fly individual snooper strikes during the
night of 17/18 Feb, against Chichi Jima Island. The air echelon of the 548th
Night Fighter Squadron, VII Fighter Command, begins operating from Saipan
with P-61s (ground echelon is enroute from Hawaii to Iwo Jima).

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): Mission 35: 8 of 9 B-29s from Saipan bomb the
submarine pens on Dublon Island, Truk Atoll without loss.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s, with fighter
support attack the airfield, railroad yard, and aluminum plant at Takao,
Formosa. On Luzon Island, A-20s support ground forces in the Mariveles area
and hit caves and dugouts in hills W of Ft Stotsenburg; A-20s, B-25s, and
fighter-bombers attack Tuguegarao and the coastal town of San Fernando. B-24s
pound Miri Airfield in Borneo. HQ 375th Troop Carrier Group moves from Biak
Island to San Jose, Mindoro Island.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

17/1247Z FEB

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 07:51:15 EST
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: New WWII PC'ism

On Mon, 13 Feb 1995 19:37:17 +0000 Nechama Cox said:
>Now I am not going to say that the German people on the whole are evil or
>bad people, but there was an overwhelming majority of people in Germany who
>supported Hitler.  It was not a Nazi army.  It was a German army. The Nazis
>were not a force that came in and invaded Germany, took over for a while
>and then left when they were beaten at the end of World War II.

An "overwhelming majority"?  In what sense?  Electoral?  The Nazis never won
a majority of the vote, you do realize.  Upon what other data do you base
your claim?

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 07:23:43 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Michael Wittmann [death on Aug 8 44]

Hello, Gudmundur!

Thanks for the note and the info.

> His final score was 138 tanks killed and lots of other vehicles.

    His final tally on the other vehicles was 132.
>
> PS: Terry, I am sure you will have something better than this, but I
> wanted to help anyway :)

    I don't know about that, but Akira's post would answer most
questions about Michael Wittmann.

    If anyone is interested in his combat career or military
assignments, I can post that info.

    All the best, Gudmundur, and thanks again.

    Terry
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Gudmundur J. Helgason                              e-mail: [email-masked]
> Olduslod 41                                              phone: (354)-5655270
> 220 Hafnarfjordur                                               (354)-5652270
> ICELAND                                             Maintainer of ICELAND.FAQ
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 07:25:10 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Indian Freikorps...

Hello, Jitendra!

I have the history of this "division", if you are still interested in
acquiring it. Please advise. Will post to the list if there is enough
interest.

Please advise.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 07:40:19 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

Hello, All!

Sorry I wasn't able to post another installment on the bombing of
Gestapo/SD HQ in Copenhagen. It got rather hectic around here
yesterday, and there was no time to post the info below. So, here
goes.

Weather conditions on the morning of 21 Mar, although not perfect,
were good enough for the mission to proceed. The bombers took off
first, closely followed by their Mustang escorts and set course
across the North Sea for a section of the Jutland coastline where
intelligence reports had indicated German anti-aircraft defenses were
the weakest. Visibility was poorer than expected and the flight
across the North Sea was rough and bumpy. Salt spray coated the
windshields, reducing the pilots' visibility still further. Despite
the poor visibility, the planes made good their approach to the coast
of Jutland and, once over land, kept closely to their flight plan,
crossing over the island of Zealand south of Kalundsborg shortly
before 11 a.m., exactly on schedule. With Zealand beneath them, the
bombers headed for a large lake south of Copenhagen where the three
waves were supposed to separate. The first wave of six planes had
orders to continue straight on with its bombing run; the second wave
was supposed to circle the lake once, and then go in for the attack;
the third wave was supposed to circle the lake twice before following
the other planes toward the target. By these maneuvers, the three
waves would reach Shellhus separately by one minute intervals, a
necessary precaution even in an attack that hinged on surprised for
its success. Distance and time had to separate the attacking waves.
Otherwise there was a danger that the planes in the second and third
waves would run into explosions from bombs dropped by planes
preceding them.

Everything went as scheduled south of Copenhagen. The second and
third waves began their circling maneuvers while the first wave
streaked for the center of town. The lead planes reached the target
at 11:14 a.m. Its bombs smashed precisely into the bottom floor of
Shellhus. The second plane of the first wave, piloted by Air Vice-
Marshal Basil Embry and navigated by Peter Clapham, came in a split
second later. After the war, Embry described the bombing run:

Peter said, "That's the target. Straight ahead of us over those small
lakes." We were now tensed for the moment of bomb release. Suddenly a
bridge appeared ahead of us and I saw some poles, possible light
standards sticking up. I eased the airplane up a little and then down
again a few feet. By this time, Peter had the bomb doors open, and
the target seemed to be approaching us very fast. I pressed the bomb
release and pulled up just over the top of Shell House, and then down
again almost to street level.

Hope this has been of interest. More tomorrow or Monday.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 07:44:04 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Michael Wittmann [death on Aug 8 44]

Hello, Brad!

> OK, I guess I have missed some of this, where can I read more about
> this guy?

    There are two books that come to mind that deal with
Michael Wittmann, albeit within the context of other related topics.
These are:

    Die Ritterkreuztraeger der Waffen-SS by Ernst-Guenther
Kraetschmer (a whole chapter is devoted to him).

    Panzerkampf im Bild by Willy Fey

  There are others, but these come to mind immediately.

  Hope this helps.

  Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 08:29:39 EST
From:    Ken Koester <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Enola Gay

On Tue, 14 Feb 1995 13:41:23 -0500 John E. Kollar said:
>I will admit that one can not 'prove' any number, so for that point,
>60,000 is still wrong because it never happened.  But then that is not
>important, what is important is what the powers that be though casualties

Actually, to a working historian that *must* be important, all-important:
one cannot idly make statements of the type "X is absolutely wrong as
opposed to Y" without backing it up.  This is more important as a
principle than what number actually makes sense for Operation Olympic/Coronet.
I mean, it's completely fundamental for scholarship of *any* type.
Admittedly, there are considerable and wearisome limits to scholarship
on the net:  most of us have day jobs, reference work is time-consuming,
typing in mega-posts can be tedious, the instantaneous response capability
of email is seductive but destructive to reasoned thought, etc.  But it
is still possible to give reasoned responses & to point out lapses in
reason, and that should be standard, particularly if a list--which is to
say the humans making up the list--prides itself on just such behaviour.

>p.s. sorry for the earlier post about $30 million dollars, et al.  But
>your posts were a little to acidic for me to understand your reasoning.

Dear me!  And I thought I was being so elegant, compared to the diatribes
that have accompanied this topic!  I suppose we must simply resolve to
try harder (-:  (Apology accepted, BTW, although no offense given (-: )

ken koester
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 07:56:36 -0600
From:    Drew Halevy <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Indian Freikorps...

>
> I have the history of this "division", if you are still interested in
> acquiring it. Please advise. Will post to the list if there is enough
> interest.
>
I would like to see this-Drew

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 08:58:28 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Michael Wittmann [death on Aug 8 44]

Terry,
        Please do post your additional information on Wittman.
Thanks,
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 09:00:04 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: German Superweapon?

Gudmundur,
        Do you have any additional information on the Ursul or Ursel
system.  Please post it if so.
Thanks,
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 08:25:51 -0600
From:    "Sue Hattabaugh, Valparaiso University" <[email-masked]>
Subject: USS Indy

Did anyone else see the PBS special on the Indianapolis this week?
Very moving. Interviews with survivors, etc.
Question: I was under the impression that the reason no one knew
of the missing ship was that the Indy had been under a radio silence
order due to the delivery of the bomb. The narration of the film
said that a garbled message was received by another ship.  Does
anyone know?
As an aside: One of the most memorable scenes in the movie "Jaws"
was when Quint was telling the story of the Indianapolis and what
happened with the sharks.  It has stayed with me.
Sue
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 15:37:02 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Japanese tactics (part 6)

On Thu, 16 Feb 1995, Mike Yaklich wrote:

> and increased firepower.  The Ki-44 earned its official nickname Shoki
> ("Demon"), as its handling was so sluggish and tempermental it was considered
> downright dangerous to fly.

An excellent series Mike -- but this time I have to disagree with you. It
is a persistent error in many sources. Shoki is a figure from mythology
that combats demons, not a demon itself!

The Ki.44 was indeed considered dangerous for some time, and only issued
to veteran squadrons.  But when the aircraft was given to younger pilots,
less indoctrinated into the close-turning style of air combat, they soon
adapted to it. As an aside: the small wing and generous side area of the
Ki.44 were purposely designed to make it a good gun platform. In shooting
contests at the flying schools, Ki.44s invariable scored the highest
points.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 09:59:58 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Afterthoughts on Japanese tactics

        I knew I wouldn't be able to wrap it up in one shot.  For the sake of a
kind of completeness, just a few words about Japanese Army equipment.  I don't
want to get into a detailed analysis of the Arisaka rifle or anything like
that, just to clarify what I meant when I said the Japanese Army had to fight a
poor man's war.  I'm referring primarily to the lack of the heavy and mechanized
equipment which generally characterizes modern war.  I had earlier mentioned
that General Tomoyuki Yamashita, conqueror of Malaya and Singapore, had seen
his career sidetracked somewhat during the late '30's as a result of belonging
to the wrong faction within the Army.  One aspect of this "exile' was
Yamashita's posting on a Japanese military mission to observe the armies of
Europe in 1940.  On his return Yamashita underscored what I've said about the
serious deficiencies in modern Japanese equipment vis a vis the major European
powers.  His was however another voice crying in the wilderness, as the
Japanese did not have the industrial capacity to carry out an immediate
upgrading, and the leadership was unwilling to postpone their war plans while
the Japanese Army attempted to procure better equipment.
        This did not mean that the Japanese were totally unable to fight a
modern ground war.  They could still, for instance, obtain a high degree of
mechanization for certain specific operations (like that of Yamashita's own
25th Army in Malaya, alluded to earlier).  However, this was the exception
rather than the rule-- in most Japanese divisions there were very few motor
vehicles, with pack animals and human porters carrying out many of the
transport duties (of course, in jungle terrain this was not always a drawback).
Likewise, at certain places the Japanese could amass respectable concentrations
of artillery (i.e., the Bataan breakthrough, Singapore, the reduction of
Corregidor, also at Iwo Jima and Okinawa later in the war).  Once again,
though, these were exceptions, and what they all had in common (here's my
underlying thesis rearing up its ugly head again) was that the Japanese were
given sufficient time to prepare for these specific battles, and concentrate
the resources they needed.  Choosing where and when to fight, scarce weapons
and equipment could be hoarded for the big show.  Regular formations in the
field, however, generally lacked this kind of support.  In particular, Japanese
logistic preparations for the normal operations of field units were
substandard, often to an extreme.  On Guadalcanal, in many portions of the New
Guinea campaign, in the 1944 Burma offensive, and in many other battles the
troops suffered heavily from malnutrition and even starvation due to the wholly
inadequate supply arrangements.  An interesting offshoot of this was the even
more inadequate provisions for medical treatment of the sick and wounded.
Although the bulk of the accounts I've read show that the Japanese demonstrated
the same solicitude and care for their casualties that would normally be found
in any other army, there were also a number of instances (perhaps overplayed in
attempts to demonstrate the fanatic qualities of the Japanese military effort)
in which the severely wounded were apparently subtly encouraged to commit
suicide to save their comrades the trouble of caring for them.  I believe that
these were only a relative minority, though, and that the Japanese generally
provided their sick and wounded with the best medical care they could.
However, skeletal medical establishments in field units and a widespread
shortage of medicines and supplies hampered these efforts.
        Tank warfare was a glaring example of Japan's insufficient material
preparation to fight a true 20th-Century ground war in the conventional (i.e.,
European-- forgive my ethnocentricity) sense.  Only rarely did the Japanese
employ sufficient armor to do much more than supply incidental infantry
support.  The biggest Japanese tank assaults I've read about were an attack by
about 50 vehicles that overran a depleted British battalion west of Singapore
city, and a nocturnal counterattack by 44 tanks against the Marines near
Garapan on Saipan, which was shattered by US artillery, including naval guns
directed by Marine observers.  Earlier in the Malaya campaign the Japanese won
a key victory when 30 tanks broke through and panicked the British out of a
strong position on the Slim river.  I should add that Japanese tanks were built
almost exclusively with infantry support (not tank-vs-tank combat) in mind--
witness the short 57-mm guns on their medium models in 1941-42, useless against
enemy armor-- and in this role they performed adequately (the one reasonably
advanced feature of Japanese tanks were their efficient diesal engines).  Only
from the latter part of 1942 did the Japanese adapt to the threat of western
armor by installing the 47-mm antitank gun in their "modified" Chi-Ha (and the
Chi-He, which did not start reaching the troops in any quantity before '42).
Initially the chief US tank in the Pacific was the light Stuart, but even this
was adequate to deal with the Japanese models-- it was faster, better-armored
than even the Japanese mediums, and its 37-mm gun could penetrate the
poorly-protected Japanese vehicles at normal battle ranges.  By 1944 the
Americans were employing the Sherman widely in the Pacific theatre, and with
its 75-mm gun and three inches of frontal armor this vehicle was far superior
to the Ha-Go, Chi-He, and Shinhoto Chi-Ha which made up the bulk of the
Japanese tank forces.  The American-made Grant tank employed by the British in
Burma from 1942 onward also proved heavier and, despite its somewhat awkward
lay-out, far superior to any Japanese armor there, as the Japanese found out in
the one instance (in 1944-- see William Slim, "Defeat Into Victory") when their
tanks tried to engage the British vehicles.  Small-scale tank-vs-tank
encounters almost always ended badly for the Japanese, though these were
relatively rare since the Japanese had so few tanks.  Two more examples are on
Biak, where a small group of light tanks led a Japanese counterattack and wound
up engaging some Shermans. The Japanese were decimated, as their 37-mm guns
could not penetrate the Sherman's armor.  Also on Peleliu an encounter between
a company of Marine Shermans and some Japanese tanks ended quickly with the
one-sided destruction of the Japanese force (Berry's "Semper Fi, Mac" includes
an interview with one of the Marine tankers).  As I said, Japanese tanks were
in general so few that such encounters were relatively rare.  On Okinawa there
were only 27 tanks in 32nd Army's lone tank regiment.  On Iwo a reinforcement
of 28 tanks was sunk en route by the Allies.
        The Japanese did make efforts to introduce improved armored and
antitank equipment, but these efforts did not come to fruit until late in the
war, and limited industrial capacity meant that more modern equipment appeared
in only very small quantities, much of it never getting overseas at all.  The
Japanese often found themselves countering the Sherman with such suicidal
expedients as satchel charges and the "lunge mine," a hollow charge on the end
of a stick, which the soldier thrust against the side of the tank, taking out
the enemy and usually himself in one blast.
Similarly, very little effort was devoted to upgrading the basic combat
equipment of the Japanese infantry.  About the only large-scale program in this
regard was the introduction of 7.7-mm versions of the standard rifle and light
machinegun (to replace the 6.5-mm), and even this, though begun in 1939, did
not start showing up in the field in quantity much before 1944. A puzzling
aspect of the Japanese small arms production was their failure to produce
submachineguns in quantity.  These were, in most cases, relatively cheap and
easy to manufacture, and with their short range and high rate of fire proved
ideal weapons for jungle combat.  Furthermore, the one occasion on which
weapons of this type were employed by the Japanese Army in the war, by the
Army's Parachute Brigade during its drop attempting (unsuccessfully) to secure
the oil refineries at Balikpapan in Indonesia in Feb '42 before they could be
destroyed, the weapons (though a
rather old-fashioned design as smg's went) were reported to have been highly
effective (Hogg).  Meanwhile, the Americans by 1943 were bringing into combat
their semi-automatic M1 Garand (Patton called it "the greatest battle implement
ever devised"), which provided a much higher rate of fire than the
hand-operated bolt-action Arisaka.  American firepower, with their abundant and
excellent array of support weapons to back the M1, was so great that on
Kwajalein a rumor spread among the Japanese that the US forces were using some
sort of metal detector, because as soon as a Japanese soldier left his hole, he
was instantly cut down.  This was just another factor the Japanese had to deal
with tactically as the war progressed.
NOTE: William Manchester, in "Goodbye Darkness" claims the Garand was inferior
to the bolt-action Springfield it replaced, which was the weapon carried by US
forces in the Pacific in 1942. Manchester doesn't give his reasons, probably
better accuracy for the Springfield and the fact that its simple action didn't
give the jamming problems which sometimes troubled the M1, but the testimony
I've read from those on the receiving end indicates that they were almost
universally impressed by the M1's high rate of fire.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

PS: one correction, one clarification, one ?

        On February 26, 1945, Japanese pilot Kinsuke Muto engaged 12 Corsairs
in his Zero (not 14), shooting down four
        Shoichi Sugita, including his victories in early '45, finished as
Japan's second-highest scoring ace, with (according to Sakai's estimate)
80 victories (I mentioned 70 in 1944)
        On reflection, I'm wondering if I'm mistaken saying that Lin Piao
commanded the Communist 8th Route Army in China, because I know that in the
late '30's that army was commanded by another legendery Communist fighter, Chu
Teh.  It was definitely Lin Piao who won the battle at Shenkikwan, though.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 10:03:37 -0500
From:    "Matthew R. Burchette" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: "German" look of M24

People,
I think the main reason that the M-24 was shown to the troops is because it
was the first U.S. tank (besides the M-18) to use a torsion bar suspension.
This was the suspension that the Germans used almost exclusively. FYI, the
M-18 had the same recognition problems that the M-24 did.
Matthew

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 10:04:19 -0500
From:    "Matthew R. Burchette" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: ACORN UNIT INFO

Ben,
How did this tie into the Seabees? Were they one and the same or a seperate
unit of engineers?
Matthew

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 10:04:25 -0500
From:    "Matthew R. Burchette" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Michael Wittmann

Akira,
You wrote:
>Michael Wittmann's death (not only that!) is a myth.  I am afraid
>it is almost impossible to know "the answer".
Are you saying he's not dead? :)\
Matthew

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 09:47:27 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: USS Indy

> Did anyone else see the PBS special on the Indianapolis this week?
> Very moving. Interviews with survivors, etc.
> Question: I was under the impression that the reason no one knew
> of the missing ship was that the Indy had been under a radio silence
> order due to the delivery of the bomb. The narration of the film
> said that a garbled message was received by another ship.  Does
> anyone know?
> As an aside: One of the most memorable scenes in the movie "Jaws"
> was when Quint was telling the story of the Indianapolis and what
> happened with the sharks.  It has stayed with me.

With any luck, we (and anyone) will be able to meet many of the survivors.
They're 50th reunion is being held in Indianapolis (no surprise) this year.
They've asked us to bring our PBY to the reunion, which we're working on.

I don't have many details on the reunion yet, but it should be quite a
complete one and just chock full of opportunities for researchers and first
hand accounts...

--
\\ Robert J. Granvin                                 User Services Specialist
// School of Statistics - University of Minnesota            [email-masked]
"The past tempts us, the present confuses us, & the future frightens us... and
our lives slip away, moment by moment, lost in that vast, terrible in-between."

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 16:02:11 +0000
From:    Nechama Cox <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: New WWII PC'ism

>>Now I am not going to say that the German people on the whole are evil or
>>bad people, but there was an overwhelming majority of people in Germany who
>>supported Hitler.
>
>An "overwhelming majority"?  In what sense?  Electoral?  The Nazis never won
>a majority of the vote, you do realize.  Upon what other data do you base
>your claim?

While I realize that they never had a landslide election or anything, there
was a lot of wide spread support, and if definate proof is needed, look at
the number of people who said after Kristalnacht, "no this is wrong."  The
things that happened during WWII to the Jews could not have happened if the
German people on the whole did not support Hitler and the Nazi Party.

Nechama Cox
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 09:21:35 PST
From:    Lee Gnatzig <[email-masked]>
Subject: 8th AA

-------------------------------------
Name: lee gnatzig
E-mail: [email-masked]
Date: 02/07/95
Time: 16:13:56

My passion is the 8th Airforce, particularly the 381st Bomb group out of Ridgewell England. My
dad was a pilot and operations officer for the 535th Squadron from 2/44 to 10/44. I have been
collecting information, pictures and artifacts from this time period and am always looking for
more of everything. I have information to provide and am looking for further anecdotes and other
facts. Anyone sharing the same interest may e-mail me privately or through the list. Thank you.
Lee

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 10:44:06 -0800
From:    John Holtz <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 6 million ?

Greetings:

The exhaustive _Encyclopedia of the Holocaust_ (New York:  Macmillan,
1990) provides an extensive appendix discussing Jewish populations and
losses in Europe.

The relevant table on p. 1799 shows the following:

Initial Jewish Population = 9,796,840
Minimum Loss = 5,596,029
Maximum Loss = 5,860,129

jwh

--
John W. Holtz, Asst. Professor       INTERNET: [email-masked]
Sangamon State University Library       PHONE: (217) 786-6633
Springfield, IL  62794-9243               FAX: (217) 786-6208

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 11:53:45 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: And furthermore...(Japan, appendix)

        Since some of you out there probably think I'm writing a book on-line,
here's the appendix:

        SIX REASONS WHY THE MITSUBISHI ZERO HAD A REPUTATION

        1. Singapore, Jan 21, 1942: the British had received, earlier in the
month, a reinforcement of Hawker Hurricane fighters in crates aboard a ship.
On January 20th a group of unescorted Japanese bombers were unpleasantly
surprised to find these had been assembled, and came up to intercept.  The
British claimed eight bombers.  The next day, Jan 21, the bombers came back,
but this time with an escort of Zeros.  The British lost five Hurricanes, and
never got near the bombers.
        2. Suribaya (Java), Feb 19, 1942: a composite group of 23 Zeros, drawn
from two squadrons and composed entirely of pilots with combat experience
dating back to the China campaign, stages a sweep over Suribaya, an Indonesian
Allied fighter base.  An estimated 50 Allied fighters came up to oppose them, a
mix of US Army P-40's and Dutch Brewster Buffalos and Hawk 75's.  The Japanese
claimed 40 planes as "confirmed" or probables (Saburo Sakai, one of those
pilots, believes the number shot down or damaged was actually more like 28-30--
I must admit I've been lazy here and haven't crosschecked the numbers from the
Allied side-- I seem to recall reading long ago in some semi-official US source
where nothing near that high was reported, but this gave only US and not Dutch
figures.  At any rate Sakai reports that when the sweep was repeated the next
day, NO Allied fighters came up to oppose them, so whatever the actual numbers
it must have been a butt-kicking).  The Japanese lost three planes, but one of
those was their commander, Lt. Aita, whose Zero exploded.
        3. Midway, June 4, 1942: the Japanese air strike on Midway which
started the battle was intercepted by 25 Marine fighters from the island (21
Buffalos and four Wildcats).  The escort of 36 Zeros shot down 15 and damaged
all but two of the other Marine fighters, for a loss of two Zeros.
Furthermore, the bombers they were escorting suffered no losses to the Marine
fighters-- in fact, they only had to endure one brief firing pass by a single
fighter, so occupied were the latter with the Zeros.
        4. New Guinea, June 16, 1942: in four different combats the elite Lae
Wing, which had 21 Zeros up for most of the day, shot down 20 US Army P-39 and
P-40 fighters without losing a plane (they also badly shot up a group of ten
B-26 bombers, but failed to bring any down).  In two of the engagements the
Japanese took smaller groups of US fighters by surprise and "bounced" them in
diving attacks.  Sakai, who was one of the pilots, shot down four planes, his
best day of the war.
        5. Bougainville, Feb 14, 1943: an Allied air raid on the Japanese-held
island is intercepted by Zeros in what the US airmen came to call "the St
Valentine's Day Massacre."  Ten Allied aircraft are lost to the Zeros,
including two B-24 bombers and four P-38's, while the Japanese lose three
Zeros.
        6. Darwin (Australia), May 2, 1943: Three Australian Spitfire
squadrons, led by top Australian ace Clive "Killer" Caldwell, intercept a
large-scale Japanese air raid on the port.  The Australians lose eight fighters
shot down and another seven Spitfires shot up so badly they had to crash-land,
while five Zeros are shot down.

        I should also add a few spectacular solo performances, like Hiroyoshi
Nishizawa downing six Wildcats over Guadalcanal on a single mission before
running out of ammunition (Aug 7, 1942), Kenji Okabe shooting down seven US
planes in one day over Rabaul (Aug '43), and Kinsuke Muto single-handedly
taking on a dozen Corsairs over Japan and bringing down four (Feb 26, 1945).
All were accomplished in the Zero.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 10:19:42 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Soviet Tankers (was Michael Wittmann)

>
>Also, I read recently that because Soviet tanks had very few radios,
>that they communicated with each other by hand signals!  Does anyone
>know of this?  Would it be like left arm up means I'm turning right, and
>left arm straight out means I'm going to turn left?
>
Yes, an arm out to the left means go left etc in US hand and Arm signals.
Usually colored flags in some sequnce were used, along with pointing and
gestures when that was possible. The primary concept was "go where I go, do
as I do"

>As a side query:  Were tanks of any nation particularly well prepared
>for the possibility of chemical warfare?  It would seem that they would
>be in light of WWI.
>
Not to my knowledge. The US M-3 Lee had some sort of filter as I remember,
but it was not continued in the M-4 (all this from memory, so if you have
better info, speak up).

Jim O'Neil  From the interrogation of a German General at the end of WW II:

               "The reason the American Army does so well in War, is that War
                is Chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis"

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 10:20:01 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Re[2]: German Superweapon?

>I have one of these in my collection--although the rubber has deteriorat
>ed a bit.  I was wondering why a rubber band had waffenampts on it.  TAS
>
>
>
Yes, wasn't this the W-1 "Whomper Gerat"?... saved precious gunpowder at
the expense of precious diesel fuel?

Jim O'Neil  From the interrogation of a German General at the end of WW II:

               "The reason the American Army does so well in War, is that War
                is Chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis"

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 07:50:56 -1000
From:    Jim Adams <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Holocaust and Germans

Jim O'Neil - what time period is your story refering to?  Recent?  Thanks.

****************************************************************************
Jim Adams                       [email-masked]
Cultural Resource Manager
USS Arizona Memorial, NPS       (808) 422-2771  extension 130
1 Arizona Memorial Place
Honolulu, Hawaii 96818
****************************************************************************

On Thu, 16 Feb 1995, Jim O'Neil wrote:

> There are many little towns in Southern Germany where the Swastika is still
> quite prominent and Americans were very cooly recieved. I had a jeep break
> down in one on a very cold winter night, when the GIs asked for help, they

snip snip>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 13:07:53 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: War crimes trials-- the last, final, absolutely ultimate Japan post!

        I figured having written so much I should put an epilogue and some
thoughts.  I wanted to talk about war guilt and war crimes trials etc involving
the Japanese.  Everyone can relax because I don't plan to treat this at length.
        The Japanese military system, at the command level, approximated the
German model in many respects.  What I mean especially is that the role of
commanders, particularly at the higher levels, was more that of a figurehead,
while much of the actual planning and even a lot of the tactical
decision-making was done by the staff.  (just as in the German Army the nominal
commander, Von Brauschitsch, probably had less input than his Chief-of-Staff,
Halder, or the credit for the textbook panzer campaign of the aging Von
Rundstedt's army group in Poland is usually given to his Chief-of-Staff
Manstein).  At high command levels in Japan I've already cited the example of
the relationship of Ushijima and Cho on Okinawa.  Another even more prominent
example would be Kido Butai, where at both Pearl Harbor and Midway the
commander of the force, Admiral Nagumo (himself there primarily due to
seniority-- he was an engineering and torpedo specialist with little experience
in naval aviation) deferred to his Chief-of-Staff Admiral Kusaka-- Nagumo did
not act against Kusaka's "advice" in a single instance I can think of.  BTW,
Nagumo was good at accepting responsibility-- as figurehead naval commander on
Saipan in '44, he committed suicide when the island fell despite the fact that
he had very little input into its defense.  This system was important to bear
in mind when considering the history of "gekokujo," explaining in part why such
apparent insubordination was often accepted at face value by senior officers,
who were used to receiving advice from subordinates.  It also explains the
influence relatively junior officers like Lt-Col Tsuji were able to exert on
affairs.
        The problem was, that when the Allies began to attempt to punish real
and alleged war crimes on the part of the Japanese, they basically proceeded by
eliminating the commanders on whose watch these crimes had occurred.  Some of
these men no doubt had some culpability, but the problem was that many of the
worst outrages had actually been carried out by more junior officers, and these
often escaped punishment completely.  In fact, the corresponding removal,
during the occupation of Japan, of the titular heads of many Japanese
institutions (for example the schools) actually opened the way for the
advancement of men who had been the real hot-heads.  A classic example of this
sort of miscarriage of justice was probably the case of General Masaharu Homma,
commander of the 14th Army which overran the Phillipines in early '42.  Homma
was by most acounts a moderate man, who was unaware of the worst outrages, and
who, once learning of some of the atrocities, tried to put a stop to them.  In
fact, the chief instigator of the Bataan Death March as well as other unsavory
episodes (such as the killing of Phillipine Supreme Court Chief Justice Santos,
who had been considered a friend of Japan and who offered to collaborate) was
none other than the aforementioned Masonobu Tsuji, who personally lobbied many
field and staff level officers below the rank of general about the need for a
fearsome "revenge."  Eventually Homma was recalled from his post, in part due
to what was regarded by his superiors to have been a poor performance in the
conquest of the Phillipines-- he fell far behind the tight Japanese
schedule--but also because of his reputation of being too soft with the locals!
In fact, in retrospect his trial and execution had all the hallmarks of a
personal act of revenge sanctioned if not instigated by MacArthur, whom Homma
had basically defeated, the biggest stain on the US general's pre-Korea record
(see "American Caesar," among others). BTW, General Hitoshi Imamura, whose 16th
Army conquered and garrisoned Indonesia, was also subjected to pressure from
his boss, Field-Marshal Terauchi in Saigon, for going too easy in his
occupation policies (remember, though, that Indonesia was one of the best
examples of good relations between the natives and the occupiers).  Among
Imamura's acts was the release of anti-Dutch Indonesian freedom fighter Sukarno
from prison.  While promising nothing and advising Sukarno personally that it
would be better if the population cooperated, he allowed Sukarno to form a
council to review and present Indonesian greivances.  Imamura won Terauchi's
grudging approval for his policies by inviting his superior to come to the
islands in person and judge their effects, but as we have seen, this was rather
an exception in the Japanese attitude toward occupied areas.
        It was also under MacArthur that Yamashita was tried and executed.  He
perhaps deserved it given the beastly actions of his troops in Malaya and
Singapore, particularly the mass executions of Chinese in the latter, but the
basis of the trial under MacArthur was his actions in the Phillipines, and one
of the chief complaints against him was the devastation of Manila-- which had
been done by Navy officers in direct violation of Yamashita's specific orders!!
Two US Supreme Court justices who reviewed the case condemned the verdict, but
that didn't save Yamashita.  Several other big names in the pre-war Japanese
government were also tried in the Pacific version of Nuremburg.  Tojo, one of
the biggest fish, botched a suicide attempt (he didn't shoot himself in the
head, he said, because he wanted his body to be recognized so people would know
he had atoned for his mistakes). He was tried, found guilty, and executed, this
complex man apparently undergoing a sincere immersion in the Buddhist religion
in his final months (his jailors even called him the "little monk").  Since
I've quoted a few "death poems" here are the two left by Tojo:
        "Although I now depart, I shall return to this land
         As I have yet to repay my debt to my country"

and,    "It is time for farewell
         I shall wait beneath the moss
         Until the flowers are fragrant again
         In the islands of Yamato"
        (NOTE: Yamato the ancient name for Japan)
        Among the big shots, General Sugiyama killed himself, as did Prince
Konoye, who took poison after enduring the humiliation of a trial.
        But to return to the theme, the problem was that too many of the junior
officers who perpetrated and even instigated the worst atrocities never came to
trial (an exception the British/Australian trials of many prison camp officers
and guards on the island of Ambon).  The recent posting to the list regarding
Unit 731, the experimental biological warfare unit, is perhaps the most
disgusting example, with the US promising amnesty to these fiends in return for
the results of their "experiments" on human subjects.  But let's return to
Lt-Col Tsuji.  Here is a man regarded by many as an outstanding, upright
soldier, embodying all the best martial qualities.  He lived a spartan life,
eschewed luxuries, and on one occasion was supposedly so disgusted by the
excesses of his comrades that he set fire to a geisha house in China which had
several brother officers inside.   In the preface to Tsuji's book "The Fall of
Singapore," some British general (I don't recall who, might have been
Alexander?) wrote a fine elegy along the lines of "hey, he's just a good
soldier like one of us, but on the other side."  Yet this is, IMHO, one of the
worst war criminals the Japanese produced (see Toland, for example, on his
activities in the Phillipines, and the grudges he later nursed against more
moderate officers who tried to oppose him-- on Guadalcanal he outright lied to
slander the reputation of General Kawaguchi to a superior, based on bad
relations between the two when Kawaguchi had tried to save Santos).  He later
said he deserved "a sentence of ten thousand deaths" for his mistakes as a
staff officer on Guadalcanal-- that is, his military, tactical mistakes.  He
never showed the slightest remorse for his expousal of the policy of "revenge"
which led to the Bataan Death March and other atrocities (IMHO, his role in
that alone should have been enough to get him fried).  Nor did he emulate the
others who followed the bushido code more rigidly, and carry out upon himself
the death sentence he said he deserved for his part in the defeat.  And this
makes me wonder, how a man who seemed the embodiment of the samurai spirit
could manage to excuse himself from this ultimate judgement, when others less
responsible but perhaps more worthy in spirit committed seppuku in atonement.
Would that make the colonel something of a hypocrite??  It is personalities
like Tsuji which makes me question the sincerity of the whole Japanese military
code, at least by the more hot-headed junior officers who often drove Japanese
policy.  It seems their adherence to the code of bushido was somewhat
selectively applied in their own cases.  BTW, Tsuji, after Guadalcanal, was
posted to an infantry unit in Burma, where he survived the war.  He later
returned to Japan, after travelling through Indochina disguised as a monk
(couldn't this brave warrior have faced the music like a man?), and later was
even elected to the Japanese parliament!  And I guess that's a fitting place to
end this diatribe.

        Now I want to do some apologizing of my own.  I am aware that my
critiques of some aspects of WW2 and pre-WW2 Japanese society, or at least the
military part thereof, have been pretty heavy-handed.  It might surprise the
reader to hear me say that, oddly enough, I do have an interest in and an
appreciation for many aspects of Japanese culture, which I do think is unique
and in many ways admirable.  I have perhaps over-used the sarcastic reference
to "unique Japanese culture" in order to make my points.  I sincerely regret if
I have offended anyone by this, and in particular make abject apologies to any
listmembers who may be signed on in Japan.  I hope the fact that I have stuck
to historical facts as I know them will in part atone for any offense I may
have caused.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 12:22:40 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Soviet Tankers (was Michael Wittmann)

>
>The Isreali Army had (and may still have) a tradition that tank commanders
>remain standing in the cuppola during action (thus the increadibly high
>casualty rates for tank commanders).  One of the reasons for this was that
>the Isreali Army was believer in using visual signals for movement and
>engaging opposition forces.  They felt that the radios often became
>cluttered with talk, would malfunction, or could be jammed by opposition
>forces.  Once the tankers could not communicate with each other via radios,
>the loss of control would be catastophic.  They felt that perhaps the
>clearest and quickest way to communicate would be via the uses of colored
>flags and a "semiphore" like code.
>
It also helps you to be situationally aware - a life saver... thats why the
M-1 has the Israeli designed hatch that locks over your head, providing
some protection. You get a 6" high  gap to look through, and view all
around your vehicle.

>If you look at todays M1 tanks, tank commanders can communicate via
>computer systems that will produce graphical movement orders on screens at
>the commanders stations,  thus removing some of the confusion of the spoken
>word.
>
They also still get flag sets as part of their basic issue items, last I
checked. Hand and Arm Signals still have a place in modern Tanks.

Jim O'Neil  From the interrogation of a German General at the end of WW II:

               "The reason the American Army does so well in War, is that War
                is Chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis"

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 19:24:27 +0000
From:    Gudmundur Helgason <[email-masked]>
Subject: The Ursel rocket launcher (not much though)

>
> Gudmundur,
>         Do you have any additional information on the Ursul or Ursel
> system.  Please post it if so.
> Thanks,
> Brad Coon
>
Hmm, I have the bad habit of flapping my lips where they should not :) I
only have this 3-line comment in the German Warships 1915-1945 vol. 2
where it says (in the chapter about the fabulous XXI-class subs);

    "...'Ursel' rocket launching tubes with SP [what is that?] guidance
system for use against shadowing aircraft were planned at the stern."

   The question that pops immediately into my mind is: WHY???. I mean the
XXI was designed (and actually performed better) to run underwater at
all times. They did not even have any insignas or icons.

Terry Moore: HELP! :) Have you anything on this stuff?

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gudmundur J. Helgason                              e-mail: [email-masked]
Olduslod 41                                              phone: (354)-5655270
220 Hafnarfjordur                                               (354)-5652270
ICELAND                                             Maintainer of ICELAND.FAQ
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 15:18:05 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Japan's Grand Strategy

        Joe, that's a great question.  I'll admit right up front that I have no
idea of whether they tried it or not-- you would think that if they did it
would be public knowledge.  Now you've aroused my curiosity.  Next time i'm
down at the main campus library I'll have to peek at Cordell Hull's memoirs
again, it should be in there if it happened.  Also I'm surprised if Toland
wouldn't mention it, he goes into the diplomatic stuff a lot.  If they didn't
try a peace offer, I agree with you that it seems rather illogical not to.  I
mean, even Hitler extended an olive branch to the British after the French
campaign (and he was in a similar situation, having succeeded beyond his
wildest dreams tactically, but now without plans on how to proceed, since
success on the battlefield had not brought the war to an end).  Of course, I
also doubt we would have entertained the idea seriously, after Pearl Harbor,
after the double-dealing diplomacy we were aware of through reading Japanese
codes, and after our experience with the often insulting attitude of former
Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who had pretty much made his own foreign policy
without reference to Tokyo at some points in the pre-war negotiations.  All
that still doesn't mean it wouldn't have been a good idea to try it.  Hope
someone out there can shed some more light on this.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

PS: Joe, if you know of anybody out there who would give me a job writing, my
day job has its moments but its not all that great!

PPS: bonus points!! so far Sadkovich has turned up four references to
operations of the Italian marines which I did not previously have!

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 14:38:39 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Michael Wittmann [death on Aug 8 44]

Hello, Brad!

Will begin on Monday or earlier if I can.

All the best.

Terry
>         Please do post your additional information on Wittman.
> Thanks,
> Brad Coon
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 14:43:45 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Dresden, Fire Storms

Hello, Steve!

Would like to add a thought to your post.

> It was most definately not anticipated.  It may have been, my recall is
> sketchy here, the first firestorm experienced in recorded history.

    No. The first maelstrom occurred in the Hamburg raid of 1943,
August, I believe. This was a joint operation utilizing British and
American bombers in a round-the-clock effort.

 The
> captured German film of the event is just awesome, flames shooting
> sideways along the streets for a hundred feet due to the intense winds
> created by the fire.

    You may be thinking of the film (color) that was shot by the
mayor of Hamburg to record what happened. You are absolutely correct
in describing the horror of such a result.

    Thank you.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 15:46:01 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA:Marines to Iwo

>From the DoD Newswire 17 February 1995

:MARINES RETURN TO IWO JIMA

   IWO JIMA, Japan  -- Fifty years after one of the bloodiest
battles of World War II, U.S. Marines have once again landed on Iwo
Jima. This time, however, they are armed with paint brushes, lawn
mowers and portable toilets.
   Sixty Marines this week began preparing for the return of more
than 1,000 veterans of the battle for the small Pacific island, a
fight that has come to symbolize the brutality of war.
   The Marines have begun cleaning monuments, cutting back jungle
undergrowth and pouring cement pedestals for flag-raising
ceremonies.
   For many, Iwo Jima is hallowed ground.

=====

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        [email-masked]
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 15:47:29 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA:Nazi Salute

>From the DoD Newswire 17 February 1995

:NAZI SALUTES RAISE RIGHT-WING SOCCER SPECTRE

     LONDON, Feb 16  - The Nazi salutes of rioting English
soccer fans have raised the spectre of right-wing extremists hijacking
the grandstands of Europe.
     "The extreme right has its tentacles into the terraces of
Europe," the European parliament's socialist group said after an
England-Ireland match was abandoned on Wednesday night.
     Politicians, police and soccer experts all warned that the
scourge could spread across the continent, besmirching the image of a
sport hit by the Heysel stadium tragedy in Brussels 10 years ago when
39 fans died after rioting.

====

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        [email-masked]
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 15:48:40 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA:Propaganda Posters

>From the DoD Newswire 17 February 1995

:UNIQUE WWII PROPAGANDA POSTERS TO BE AUCTIONED

    LONDON, Feb 16  - A rare collection of British World War
Two propaganda posters belonging to the man who commissioned them will
be sold on March 2, Onslows auction house said on Thursday.
     Edwin Embleton, 87, was art director at the Ministry of
Information during the war and supervised the production of such
famous posters as the "Careless Talk Costs Lives" series.
     "I played a useful part, perhaps, in the production of all
propaganda at home and abroad," Embleton told Reuters. "At the age of
87, I can't really expect to get a lot of pleasure out of them for
much longer."
     Onslows, which specialises in the sale of English travel and war
propaganda posters, estimated posters by the illustrator Fougasse
would fetch between 400-700 pounds ($625-$1,094) each.
     A further 80 general propaganda posters were expected to sell for
between 30-200 pounds ($47-$312).

=====

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        [email-masked]
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 14:51:49 -0600
From:    JEFF ROBERTS <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Enola Gay Exhibit

> On Wed, 1 Feb 1995 13:01:59 -0400 Mike Yaklich said:
> >And who is this Bernstein dude(I almost want to read his stinking book just so
> >I can see what he adduces as evidence for a figure of 60,000 casualties-- it
> >would seem pretty obvious that Okinawa on a larger scale would be the most
> >plausible scenario, and didn't we lose close to 50,000 men there?).  Has there
> >been a line of scholarship on this question that I missed that provided some
> >real hard evidence to support the revisionist line on casualties?

> Ken Koester replied with:
> I'd say there are two questions:  scholarship on how the estimates were
> produced in the first place & "theoretical" scholarship on "accurate"
> estimates.  I'm sure there has been some; these are too obvious questions
> for enterprising doctoral candidates to ignore (-:  The obvious starting
> point for the whole question of the bomb or not the bomb would be the
> strategic bombing survey made in the fall of '45 and '46.

Ken:
In your recent posts you have often made very valid reference to various
criteria which historians must consider before making their assessments.
Consequently I am most surprised that you would consider the Strategic
Bombing Survey as "the obvious starting point" for scholarship on
accurate estimates of invasion casualties.

One of the most important factors which historians must assess in use
of sources is the PURPOSE of the work being examined.  I ask you, what
was the purpose of the Strategic Bombing Survey?

There was no longer a war going on.  Nobody was going to die in the
immediate future.  There was no pressing need for such a survey, nor
for that matter, was there even a need for accuracy in that survey.

Does it really surprise you that several months after war's end, the
Army Air Corps/soon to be Air Force would conclude that they could have
won the war all by themselves if the atomic bomb had not come along?
Air forces have been arguing that they could win wars all by themselves
since the days of Guilio Douhet and Billy Mitchell.  Some folks have
said similar things about the Gulf War.  Yet I would argue that in
fact an air force has never won a war all by itself, save perhaps
(ironically) for the dropping of the atomic bombs! (which the
Strategic Survey seems to imply were unnecessary).

Would continued conventional bombing really have ended the war, even
in combination with other measures?  I doubt it, basing my doubts on
an interpretation of that intangible "Japanese tenacity", but then we
can never prove that they would not have surrendered.  My point, though
is not that the authors of the Strategic Bombing Survey were *wrong*,
rather that they had every reason to exaggerate their own importance
and contribution, and little or no reason not to.

I can see three potential goals of the survey: 1.  To glorify the con-
tribution of those who served.  2.  To provide some sort of framework
for planning or assessing future operations.  3. To use the survey in
efforts to secure Congressional support for a variety of programs from
maintainence of existing facilities to new development.  All three are
understandable if not in fact commendable pursuits.  All three would
also benefit by the claim that "we had the war in the bag even without
the atomic bomb."

The Strategic Bombing Survey can be a useful document in many regards,
but it is not the place to begin an examination of the atomic bomb
issue.  Its claims, when placed in context, do little to buttress the
weak arguments of those who would belittle projected Olympic/Coronet
casualties.  Its conclusions are hardly definitive fact, they are
merely optimistic conjecture.

Jeff Roberts
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 16:06:50 EST
From:    JITENDRA KHARE <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Indian Freikorps...

Hello, It would be great if you could post it. However I would also like to get a copy of the book.  Could you send me whatever info you might have?
Thank you.

Jitendra KHARE
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 16:16:00 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japan (oops!)

        Major typo alert!  Anybody who plowed through all my lengthy posts on
this subject should be advised that flying fingers syndrome accidentally
crunched a sentence regarding the naval battle of Tassafaronga Point (Dec '42).
The US forces there lost one cruiser sunk and three damaged, all by "long
lance" torpedoes of Japanese destroyers.  Somehow that got truncated to "three
cruisers sunk."  Thought I'd better 'fess up before one of the naval experts
out there keelhauls me.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

PS: According to Sakai, Muto was flying a Zero when he took on 12 Corsairs over
Japan in Feb '45-- that doesn't necessarily mean its right, all memoirs tending
to be "war stories," but it was the only source I had.  Unless I'm totally
mistaken, part of Sakai's amazement at the feat was based on the fact that Muto
was flying a plane most Japanese pilots considered suicidally outclassed by
early '45.  He definitely would have had better odds in a Shiden-Kai.  As far
as I know, the Navy's Matsuyama Wing was the first group to fly the Shiden in
combat (Sakai describes flying one as a test pilot only a few months before the
group was formed).  It was formed in Jan '45, but didn't really get active
until March, and Muto was not a member of that unit.

PPS: To Emanuel Gustin-- thanks for the information on the true name of the
Ki-44.  Hey, if a source as knowledgeable as Bill Gunston had it wrong (I think
that's where I got it) I sure don't mind wearing a little egg on my face.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 14:45:19 -0800
From:    Jim Benn <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Holocaust and Germans

I just returned from a trip through southern Germany this Fall, and saw
not a single swastika.  I believe it is against German law to display
them.  I did see many monuments to the German dead of WWII, with the
traditional Iron Cross, but none of them were political.
Jim Benn.

On Thu, 16 Feb 1995, Jim O'Neil wrote:

> There are many little towns in Southern Germany where the Swastika is still
> quite prominent and Americans were very cooly recieved. I had a jeep break
> down in one on a very cold winter night, when the GIs asked for help, they
> were pointed to a pay phone down the street and denied acccess to the
> public room of the Gasthaus. When we arrived to fix the jeep we were asked
> to tow it and fix it elsewhere... of course I did manage to road march my
> tank company through the town a day or two later - didn't do anything bad,
> just made sure I went right thru the middle and not around... a minor map
> reading problem was my answer when the inevitable complaint came.
>         I have heard of worse.
>
> Jim O'Neil  From the interrogation of a German General at the end of WW II:
>
>                "The reason the American Army does so well in War, is that War
>                 is Chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis"
>

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 23:53:45 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Spotter ?

On Fri, 17 Feb 1995, Stefaan Vanhastel wrote:

> 1. Heb je www pages ?

Ik heb WWW pages opgezet op http://www.vestnett.no/vulcan/index.html.
Naast de lijst van acroniemen (een wat oudere versie) staat er een
database op van vliegtuigtypes. Er is ook een beeldarchief, plus wat
kleinere bestanden.

> 2. Ben je een spotter ? Interesse in: techniek/squadrons/serienummers ?

Nee, ik ben geen spotter en aan serienummers heb ik nooit veel aandacht
besteed. Het enige wat ik in die richting gedaan heb is een lijst
bijhouden van Britse en Duitse WWII lettercodes voor vliegtuigen. Ik moet
ook ergens een lijst hebben van USAF Wing codeletters. Een deel van die
dingen staat op de WWW site.

> ([email-masked] als ik het juist heb - reeds meer dan tien
> leden :-) hebben ook een www page opgezet waarin ze Order of Battles gaan
> plaatsen. Op die manier hopen we die lijsten redelijk recent te houden,
> en kunnen we vanuit de www pages naar elkaar doorverwijzen.
> Aangezien ik reeds enorm veel lijsten van je tegengekomen ben op
> internet, vroeg ik me misschien af of je er geen hebt met de structuur
> van luchtmachten... om het even welke ?

Nee, die heb ik niet. Het is al vrij moeilijk om de rest van de lijsten
aan te vullen en te onderhouden. Ik ben niet van plan er nog bij te
maken... Misschien kan je een aankondiging plaatsen op het net, ook op
e-mail lijsten als [email-masked] en [email-masked].
Er zal ongetwijfeld wel iemand zijn die materiaal ter beschikking heeft.
(N.B. Geen van beide lijsten accepteert berichten van niet-leden. Ik wil
eventueel wel een bericht doorsturen.)

> die je (met credits :-) op een www site wil laten zetten (tenzij je er
> zelf een hebt natuurlijk - in dat geval zou ik misschien een paar links
> kunnen leggen) ? Je lijst met acronyms is natuurlijk een goed voorbeeld...

Je kan links leggen zoals je dat wil, of de informatie kopieren. Laat me
weten waar spotter-www pages komen; ik heb zelf ook een lijst van links
op de WWW page.

Er is overigens een lijst van 'aviation server administrators' op WWW,
namelijk http://adswww.harvard.edu/IAC/iac_homepg.html. Een lijst van
luchtvaart www-pages wordt onderhouden door Dr. Guenther Eichhorn
<[email-masked]> (Je kan die ondermeer vinden op
http://adswww.harvard.edu/GA/ga_servers.html.). Hij zal het
waarschijnlijk apprecieren als je hem ook een seintje geeft.

Emmanuel

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 18 Feb 1995 00:08:20 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: OOPS Re: Spotter ?

Sorry. That message was not intended for the list: I put the address in
the Cc: field to paste it into the text, but forgot to delete it
afterwards.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 18:12:27 -0500
From:    "Matthew R. Burchette" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Re[2]: German Superweapon?

Yeah, yeah, yeah!
I've heard of that! The thing was a modified FLAK device a Grosse Rubberische
Abwehr Kannon or GRAK. The kannon part was thrown in to throw off the Allied
intelligence. Good thing it did not get into major production.
Matthew

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 19:32:14 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 6 million ?

Dear John,

The Encyclopedia of the Holocaust totals have since been increased by
new material discovered in the Baltic States after their liberation.
There was a NY Times article about this in 1993, I believe. The
number now hovers around 6 million; frankly, I have doubts about any
figure that gives losses (or populations, for that matter) down to
the digit. The various Jewish organizations probably based their
population counts on organized Jewish communities (synagogue and
organization memberships, etc.) This may not take into account
unaffiliated Jews, those who broke with the tradition, either as
converts or apostates, or those with only one Jewish parent
(especially if that parent was the father.) The Germans recognized
none of these distinctions. It is therefore possible that all
published numbers are undercounts.

Regards,

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 16:51:53 -0800
From:    Steve New <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: And furthermore...(Japan, appendix)

You wrote:

>
>        Since some of you out there probably think I'm writing a book
on-line,
>here's the appendix:
>
>        SIX REASONS WHY THE MITSUBISHI ZERO HAD A REPUTATION
>
>        1. Singapore, Jan 21, 1942: the British had received, earlier
in the
>month, a reinforcement of Hawker Hurricane fighters in crates aboard a
ship.
>On January 20th a group of unescorted Japanese bombers were
unpleasantly
>surprised to find these had been assembled, and came up to intercept.
The
>British claimed eight bombers.  The next day, Jan 21, the bombers came
back,
>but this time with an escort of Zeros.  The British lost five
Hurricanes, and
>never got near the bombers.
>        2. Suribaya (Java), Feb 19, 1942: a composite group of 23
Zeros, drawn
>from two squadrons and composed entirely of pilots with combat
experience
>dating back to the China campaign, stages a sweep over Suribaya, an
Indonesian
>Allied fighter base.  An estimated 50 Allied fighters came up to oppose
them, a
>mix of US Army P-40's and Dutch Brewster Buffalos and Hawk 75's.  The
Japanese
>claimed 40 planes as "confirmed" or probables (Saburo Sakai, one of
those
>pilots, believes the number shot down or damaged was actually more like
28-30--
>I must admit I've been lazy here and haven't crosschecked the numbers
from the
>Allied side-- I seem to recall reading long ago in some semi-official
US source
>where nothing near that high was reported, but this gave only US and
not Dutch
>figures.  At any rate Sakai reports that when the sweep was repeated
the next
>day, NO Allied fighters came up to oppose them, so whatever the actual
numbers
>it must have been a butt-kicking).  The Japanese lost three planes, but
one of
>those was their commander, Lt. Aita, whose Zero exploded.
>        3. Midway, June 4, 1942: the Japanese air strike on Midway
which
>started the battle was intercepted by 25 Marine fighters from the
island (21
>Buffalos and four Wildcats).  The escort of 36 Zeros shot down 15 and
damaged
>all but two of the other Marine fighters, for a loss of two Zeros.
>Furthermore, the bombers they were escorting suffered no losses to the
Marine
>fighters-- in fact, they only had to endure one brief firing pass by a
single
>fighter, so occupied were the latter with the Zeros.
>        4. New Guinea, June 16, 1942: in four different combats the
elite Lae
>Wing, which had 21 Zeros up for most of the day, shot down 20 US Army
P-39 and
>P-40 fighters without losing a plane (they also badly shot up a group
of ten
>B-26 bombers, but failed to bring any down).  In two of the engagements
the
>Japanese took smaller groups of US fighters by surprise and "bounced"
them in
>diving attacks.  Sakai, who was one of the pilots, shot down four
planes, his
>best day of the war.
>        5. Bougainville, Feb 14, 1943: an Allied air raid on the
Japanese-held
>island is intercepted by Zeros in what the US airmen came to call "the
St
>Valentine's Day Massacre."  Ten Allied aircraft are lost to the Zeros,
>including two B-24 bombers and four P-38's, while the Japanese lose
three
>Zeros.
>        6. Darwin (Australia), May 2, 1943: Three Australian Spitfire
>squadrons, led by top Australian ace Clive "Killer" Caldwell, intercept
a
>large-scale Japanese air raid on the port.  The Australians lose eight
fighters
>shot down and another seven Spitfires shot up so badly they had to
crash-land,
>while five Zeros are shot down.
>
>        I should also add a few spectacular solo performances, like
Hiroyoshi
>Nishizawa downing six Wildcats over Guadalcanal on a single mission
before
>running out of ammunition (Aug 7, 1942), Kenji Okabe shooting down
seven US
>planes in one day over Rabaul (Aug '43), and Kinsuke Muto
single-handedly
>taking on a dozen Corsairs over Japan and bringing down four (Feb 26,
1945).
>All were accomplished in the Zero.
>
>        Regards
>
>        Mike Yaklich
>
>
Don't forget Saburo Sakai being bounced by 10 Hellcats over Iwo Jima,
and surviving the dogfight.

--

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Feb 1995 20:04:52 -0600
From:    Dick Kimberly <[email-masked]>
Subject: Order of Battle

Somewhere on this huge list is someone who knows how regiments were
assigned to divisions, whether these were permanent assignments, and if
the same regiments carry over to the Korean affair.

This is my SECOND REQUEST for help on this.  Am I the only one on the
list who prefers the regimental concept?

Dick

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 16 Feb 1995 to 17 Feb 1995
*************************************************