Subject: WWII-L Digest - 22 Feb 1995 to 23 Feb 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 1995 00:02:16 -0500

There are 32 messages totalling 1556 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. WHY IWO JIMA?  PART 1
  2. INF: USN Chronology 02-23-95
  3. INF: 50 Years Ago - 24-FEB-1945
  4. Hitler and the Jews (2)
  5. Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's
  6. (INF) QUES ON IWO JIMA
  7. Unit 731 (3)
  8. Hitler and the Germans
  9. (INF) Ques on Iwo Jima
 10. World War Two "Bloopers"
 11. Scheduling Japan's defeat (4)
 12. 3rd Army Chronology
 13. addiction to Japan
 14. Is it true that they can trace a single document (2)
 15. REF: Tigers in combat, volume I
 16. Greatest sniper in WWII
 17. Additional lecture at Wright Pat
 18. Japanese Peace Offerings (2)
 19. Japan points 3 & 4 (& there ain't no more...)
 20. [INF] USAAF 24 FEB 45
 21. ADMIN: Alarming message
 22. Re[2]: Japanese Peace Offerings
 23. NMSU
 24. Japan-- loose ends and further thoughts

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 00:45:56 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: WHY IWO JIMA?  PART 1

I look forward to reading your "Why Iwo Jima?" off the net and I feel certain
that it will be rewarding, Jack. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 04:00:12 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 02-23-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
02/23 Fri.  United States naval vessels damaged, Iwo Jima area:
             Submarine chaser PC 877, by collision,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'F
             LST 684, by coastal defense gun,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             LST 716, by grounding,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             LST 792, by coastal defense gun,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
            Japanese naval vessels sunk:
             Frigate YAKU, by submarine HAMMERHEAD (SS-364),
              off Indochina,
              12 d. 39'N., 109 d. 29'E.
             Submarine chaser No. 35, by Army aircraft,
              South China Sea,
              10 d. 15'N., 107 d. 31'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 06:29:43 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 24-FEB-1945

On 24-FEB-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the U.S. 9th Army sector, elements of the 84th Division
attack to enlarge the bridgehead.  In the XIX Corps area, the 29th Division
completes the capture of Juelich and reduces the Citadel with the assistance
of flame-throwing tanks. In the 1st Army sector, the VII Corps expands the
Roer River bridgehead. In the 7th Army sector, the 63rd Division renews
limited attacks northward, completing the reduction of the Welferding
salient.

Italian Front - The 10th Mountain Division reaches the summit of M.
Torraccia.

Philippines -  The 37th Division overcomes organized resistance in
Intramuros. Fire is placed on the last three strongpoints in Manila: the
Legislative, Finance and Agriculture buildings. The 1st Cavalry Division
drives toward Antipolo. In XI Corps area, Rock Force clears all of
Corregidor except for 3,000 yards at the east end of the island.

Iwo Jima - The VAC attacks toward a limited objective line O-A, extending
across the island 800 yards north of Airfield 2. The 5th Marine Division
continues to mop up on Mt. Suribachi.

The Homefront
-------------
Men Up To 34 To Face Draft - The Selective Service has announced that men
up to the age of 34 will have to meet more rigid specifications to be
eligible for deferment from the draft.

8 U.S. Prisoners Flown Home - The first eight American prisoners of war
liberated from German prison camps by the Russians, reach Washington after
a record flight of 56 hours from Moscow.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 07:37:39 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Hitler and the Jews

The "American Lippert" (NOTE: Are there any other Lipperts? :) ) wrote:

>Regarding Mein Kampf and the Final Solution:
>     I am not inclined to believe that Hitler intended and pursued with
>a great vigor the extermination of the Jews while writing Mein Kampf.
>At most, I believe it was a fantasy or a possibility ....
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

OK, Hitler likely was not planning mass extermination back in the Landsberg
years. However, perhaps he was thinking "unthinkable thoughts" for some time
before the Final Solution was arrived at. Perhaps Himmler as well. MEIN
KAMPF did not make genocide inevitable.

-- Warren Thompson

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 06:54:11 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Copenhagen Gestapo HQ's

Hello, All!

Sorry for the hiatus, but I have been covered up. Here goes with
another installment on the bombing of Shellhus.

Casualties ini the school were tragically high. When Danish firemen
finally got the blaze under control late that afternoon and began
sifting through the wreckage, they found the bodies of 86 dead
children, including 42 who had been huddled together in a cellar
shelter area and 17 adults.

Casualties at Shellhus were far lighter. Although the building had
been rocked by high explosives and set afire by incendiaries, the
death toll numbered only 35. Among the dead were 9 Danish prisoners
housed in cells on the top floor and 26 Gestapo employees who had
been caught on the lower floors by the Mosquitos.

Despite the tragic bombing of the Jeanne d'Arc School, the Freedom
Council reacted joyfully to the raid. Even while fires still burned
in Shellhus and the school, the Council sent a message to London via
Ole Lippmann: "City wild with excitement about Shellhus bombing.
Reliable sources maintain 30 Danish patriot hostages were liberated,
among them the two leaders. Warmest congratulations." The Council's
figures were only slightly inaccurate. When a later count was made,
it was discovered that 27, not 30, resistance leaders had actually
made their escape, but this 27 included the two Freedom Council
members, Mogens Fog and Aage Schoch.

More tomorrow.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 08:41:30 EST
From:    "SGM Robert S. Rush" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: (INF) QUES ON IWO JIMA

>Iwo was a
>bloody battle, but I contend that you cannot compare one battle with another
>vis a vis casualties, or compare Belleau Wood to Antietam. They were different
>places with different terrains. The number of troops in each was different as
>well as the length of the battle. Tarawa was 76 hours, and it was bloody. Iwo
>was 36 days of hard, bloody, frontal attacks, and it resulted in a butcher's
>bill. And Okinawa was 82 days, and had heavy casualties, but how can you
>compare it with Iwo, Peleliu, and the like? I was not on Iwo, but have studied
>it and have interviewed a number of Iwo veterans, officers for the most part,
>about the battle.

Ben, couldn't agree with you more on comparing battles by using casualty
figures.  A poorly fought battle and a well fought battle might yield the
same amount of casualties.  I was (I guess) asking, how were your Marines
able to carry on for 27 days with no cover, (no treebursts, but think I
would have preferred 10 yards of visibility to being seen by the enemy
from hundreds of yards away, and no place to hide.)  Did your organizations
whittle away to nothing, or did they receive replacements during the heat
of battle.

Lastly, I read that you conducted interviews with participants of the battle.
Where there any after action interviews held immediately after the battle
with the surviving Marines?  I live about twenty miles from the Navy Yard.
Perhaps I could come visit one day?

Thanks,
Rob
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 09:54:30 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: Re: Unit 731

F Y I: There is another book on Unit 731:

        Sheldon Harris, FACTORIES OF DEATH: JAPANESE SECRET
                BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, 1932-45, AND THE AMERICAN
                COVER-UP. Routledge, 1994. 297 pp.

-- Warren Thompson

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 22:49:33 +0700
From:    "Peter E. Beal" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Hitler and the Germans

On Wed, 22 Feb 1995, William Lippert wrote:

> Hello All,
>    Recently, what with the Anniversary of Dresden and other events, there
> has been a discussion of who was responsible for both the war and/or the
> crimes: Hitler or the Germans.  The author of "Foundations of the Nazi
> Police State", George C. Browder, highlights this debate as it has
> been pursued in academia.
>    There are two paradigms of analysis: the "Hitlercentrist" which stresses
> the role of Hitler and, to a lesser extent, his main followers as the
> center of Nazi Germany and its history; and the "revisionist" or "polycentrist"
> theory, which don't deny the importance of Hitler but believe that 1) Hitler's
> leadership style was chaotic and resulted in an administrative mess and that
> 2) Hitler rarely made decisions, was indecisive, and was subject to the
> control of other social, economic, and political centers.   Please note that
> the term "revisionist" does not reflect a political field of thought (i.e.
> PC), but that it is a revision of the past paradigm of Hitlercentrism.
>     This is an important debate in many ways because it indirectly addresses
> the issue of German guilt.  It also indirectly addresses the issue of "what
> if there was no Hitler?"  The Hitlercentrist view, as some have mentioned
> here, removes the Germans from guilt.  "When the Nazi experience becomes a
> product of the will of the Fuehrer - an aberration of German history, a unique
> phenomenon in Western history - the result is both an alibi that deflects
> further probing and a smokesccreen that obscures insights into how similar"
> events might occur.
>    If one accepts the polycentrist idea, that the Reich was the result of
> not only Hitler and Himmler et al. but the workings of individuals and
> ideas involved in the evolution and maintenance of the Reich, then the
> Germans bear a much greater amount of guilt.
>    I won't give my opinion here, yet, but I'm interested to see what other
> people think?  Is it just an ambiguous question to begin with?
>
> William Lippert
> The American University
>

Lest we forget, large and increasing number of Germans freely voted for
Hitler in the 1930's.  Most of those who did not actively support him did
not actively oppose him.  Even the head of the SA stated that his best
units were comprised of ex-Socialists.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 10:21:00 -0500
From:    "Steven Pudlo, Dept. Computer Svcs." <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Unit 731

>        Sheldon Harris, FACTORIES OF DEATH: JAPANESE SECRET
>                BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, 1932-45, AND THE AMERICAN
>                COVER-UP. Routledge, 1994. 297 pp.

I like how when the story finally gets out, the americans still get blamed!

                                                                Steve
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Steven E. Pudlo  - [email-masked] |"Life may be a drag...
STC Programmer/Analyst - (203) 885-2343  |    But it sure beats the
Three Rivers Community-Technical College |       only known alternative"
574 New London Turnpike                  |                     (S.E.P.)
Norwich, CT. U.S.A. 06360                |No one gets out of it alive..
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 10:10:43 -0600
From:    Drew Halevy <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Hitler and the Jews

>
> OK, Hitler likely was not planning mass extermination back in the Landsberg
> years. However, perhaps he was thinking "unthinkable thoughts" for some time
> before the Final Solution was arrived at. Perhaps Himmler as well. MEIN
> KAMPF did not make genocide inevitable.
>
> -- Warren Thompson
>
> [email-masked]

Very true, I think that a key element is that much of Germany's actions
from 1939-1945 were ad hoc, in the sense that there was no "master plan"
as much as they made it up as they went along.-Drew

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 10:31:27 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: (INF) Ques on Iwo Jima

--========================_9147092==_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

>Jim,
>
>I would really appreciate it.  s-mail address
>Rob Rush
>2592 Washington Ave
>Ft Meade, MD 20755
>
>Thanks a million.
Rob,
I was told I could send it by E-Mail so I am going to try - let me know if
it works, I have more I will have to send Surface any way so you will get
it either way

--========================_9147092==_
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--========================_9147092==_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"

Jim O'Neil  From the interrogation of a German General at the end of WW II:

               "The reason the American Army does so well in War, is that War
                is Chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis"

--========================_9147092==_--

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 11:19:14 -0600
From:    Terrence Lindell <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: World War Two "Bloopers"

Jeff,

I much enjoyed your post on WWII revisionism.  I also have a file of
student bloopers that have amused me through the years and I occasionally
share one with my classes to encourage people not to make the same mistake.
Or maybe it isn't always a mistake.  I'm still not sure if it was a
spelling error or boredom that caused one student to describe key Federalist
legislation during the Quasi-War with France as the Alien and Sedation Acts!

>From my own files:

        After WWI Hitler joined a right winged group.

        After the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Tito leaves command of
          the Japanese naval operations.

        The attack on Arnhem was called Marvin's Garden.

        Churchill wanted to liberate the Falklands before Russia could
          get there.

        The Germans expected D-Day at Calina.

        Truman lifted the Office of Price Controls.

        The US refused to join the League of Nations to keep away from
          dangling alliances.

        The atomic bomb made America a major supper power.

        The Japanese attacked Pearl Habor very badly killing over 20,000
          people and distroying many ship.

On publishing the piece, I have seen similar items in the Wilson Quarterly,
Reader's Digest (reprinted from somewhere, but I don't know where), and
the newsletter of the American Historical Association.  The newsletter of
the Organization of American Historians might be another possibility, but
the AHA seems more likely due to the non-US content.

I would encourage you to consider some editing.  There are a number of places
where your students used language that would raise eyebrows in polite
company.  It will be difficult to find a publisher with academic ties that
will be interested in those portions.  You will need to assess whether
they add enough to the humor (and I believe they can be omitted) to risk
the increased chances of rejection.

Good luck with it.

Terry Lindell
Department of History
Wartburg College
Waverly, Iowa  50677
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 17:12:00 UTC
From:    "Edward S. Miller" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Scheduling Japan's defeat

  An article I wrote called "Savvy Planning" is in the Spring '95 Military
History Quarterly (MHQ).  In August 1943 "Savvy" Cooke, the chief USN
strategist, persuaded Allied leaders to plan defeat of Japan within one year
after Germany.  Until then, V-J day was expected in 1947 or 1948.
  If there is interest I'll post the article here, in sections.  It's about
250 lines long with a comparative timetable.

Edward S. Miller    Stamford, Conn.   [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 13:14:15 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 3rd Army Chronology

  The publisher of a reference which I glean quite a bit from to post
the 3rd Army Chronology wants whatever $ they can screw an "otherwise"
honest hobby historian out of,... therefore the absent chronology.

  If they only recognized the free advertisement they're getting. Alas,...
If I read something really special, I'll post it _in my own words_. 'Promise.

thanks,... bye

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 13:56:09 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: addiction to Japan

        Okay, time to admit its an addiction and get professional help, but in
the meantime I hope, having done all that typing, I won't be begrudged
commenting on four more topics...
        1. The reason Prince Toshishiko Higashikuni became the Prime Minister
of the first post-surrender Japanese government is that on August 16, 1945,
having made the peace, Admiral (ret.) Suzuki resigned the post, presenting his
profound apologies to the Emporer for twice forcing Hirohito to make decisions.
        2. Since I spoke of Leyte Gulf yesterday, I wanted to mention that the
entire Army command, at every level, unanimously opposed this naval operation
(another example of disharmony between the services, and possibly a
contributing factor to the problems of coordinating land-based air support with
Kurita's fleet).  Also, in April '45 the Emporer asked Navy Chief-of-Staff
Admiral Toyoda, who had ordered the operation, "Was not the use of our warships
at Leyte Gulf inappropriate?"  Masonori Ito notes that, according to the
subtleties of the Japanese language, merely by phrasing the question this way
(instead of a positive construction using "appropriate" rather than
"inappropriate") Hirohito was expressing his displeasure.
        If I had been thinking clearly yesterday I would have found a way to
work the heavy cruiser TONE into that paragraph on Leyte Gulf.  This ship was
one of the many damaged but not sunk by US air attacks at Leyte, but earlier in
the war the vessel had unwittingly played a crucial role in one of the decisive
naval battles.  At Midway, June 4th, 1942, the TONE's single-engined
reconnaisance floatplane had been assigned to search the sector where the US
carriers, whose proximity was still unsuspected, were actually located.  A
problem with the catapult delayed the seaplane's takeoff for half an hour, with
fatal results for the Japanese.  I skipped over Midway in looking at the naval
war, in part because I figured the story is so familiar to most on the list,
and in part because it seemed like pure luck played such a large role in the
outcome.  However, I should say that it was not luck, but superior American
intelligence work, and a corresponding ineffective handling of intelligence by
the Japanese, which set the scene for these fortuitous occurences.  The
Japanese plan was simple-- attack the Midway base, too vital for the US Navy to
abandon without a fight, and then annihilate the American fleet with the
waiting carriers of Kido Butai when they showed up to defend it.  US Navy
cryptologists had broken enough of the Japanese code to discern the outlines of
the operation, and thus instead of Japanese carriers awaiting the expected
arrival of the US flat-tops, it was the American carriers who were unexpectedly
already on the scene when the Japanese appeared.  Even here luck played a part,
since a planned change of the Japanese code had been postponed due to the
difficulties of distributing the replacement code to far-flung units around the
vast Pacific theatre-- once the new code was belatedly introduced it took the
Americans several months to once again break it.  Conversely, a
well-intentioned failure of Japanese intelligence distribution also led to the
decisive chain of events.  Japanese air reconnaisance determined that the US
fleet had left Pearl Harbor.  Yamamoto, sailing with the main battle fleet a
few hundred miles behind the carriers of Kido Butai, received this information,
but chose not to break strict radio silence to inform Nagumo, reasoning that
Kido Butai had probably picked up the same transmission.  In fact they had not,
and thus Nagumo and Kusaka proceeded to fight the early stage of the battle as
if their plan was going as scheduled.
        The Midway battle was a classic example of the "for want of a nail"
paradigm.  In order to prudently guard against the unexpected appearance of the
American fleet, the first strike against Midway island was carried out by the
less experienced bomber pilots of Kido Butai, while the best pilots were held
back, their aircraft armed with torpedoes and anti-ship ordinance, ready for an
immediate strike against enemy surface units.  These newer pilots failed to do
enough damage to completely neutralize the airfields on Midway, and when their
commanders reported this, with no apparent sign of the US Navy, Nagumo
authorized the planes of the second wave to be re-armed with conventional bombs
and sent in to finish off Midway.  That was where TONE's earlier delay figured
in.  When the TONE's seaplane did belatedly spot and report the presence of the
US warships, the planes aboard the carriers were hastily switched back to
torpedo and anti-ship armament once more.  They were only minutes away from
being launched for their own strike when the American aircraft arrived first.
The US carrier planes, meanwhile, were supposed to arrive all at once in a
coordinated attack.  However, their own problems of coordination aided them, as
the torpedo bombers arrived first, and all by themselves.  These were
slaughtered by the Japanese (in one of the three squadrons only one man
survived), but at the same time they pulled the Japanese fighter cover down to
water level, out of position when the US fighters and divebombers appeared on
the scene.  The Japanese carriers, their flight decks covered not only with
bombed-up, gassed-up, fully armed aircraft, but also littered with bombs
hastily removed in the last change-over, were just combustible chain reactions
waiting to happen.  In about four minutes three of the four Japanese fleet
carriers (the SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU were missing, not yet recovered from Coral
Sea) were converted into floating infernos, and the course of the Pacific war
was radically altered.  The Japanese valiantly tried to continue the fight with
their last carrier, the HIRYU, and managed to sink a US carrier in their own
air strike, but at dusk, with hardly any fighters left for air defense, another
American attack finished the HIRYU too-- and perhaps any real Japanese chance
for victory in the Pacific.
        In a footnote I should mention that the TONE was one of the few large
Japanese warships that survived the war still afloat, although it had been
badly damaged by a US carrier plane raid in home waters in the summer of 1945.
I should also mention that the US material advantage in logistical and shore
support affected the Midway battle.  At Coral Sea the previous month the sides
had fought to a tactical draw, the Japanese losing a light carrier sunk (one of
five they possessed in 1942) and a fleet carrier damaged, while the US lost a
fleet carrier sunk and one damaged.  The battle did however prevent an intended
Japanese landing on the south coast of New Guinea.  It was important tactically
because it was the first time in history a naval battle had been fought without
the opposing ships ever actually sighting each other (i.e., entirely by air),
and also the first time in six months of war that the Japanese had lost a
warship larger than a destroyer.  But the crucial fact about Coral Sea was that
while the Japanese allowed two of their carriers to miss Midway while
recovering from this fight, the Americans hastily patched up the damaged
YORKTOWN and had it back at sea for Midway.  Had the Japanese been able to
recover with similar haste, even after the loss of the KAGA, AKAGI, and SORYU
the Midway battle would have still been three carriers against three, and the
outcome might have been far different.
        Midway trivia: the battle marked the first use of the Japanese Navy's
fast new D4Y Suisei dive-bomber, two of these planes being used as carrier
recconnaisance planes during the fight.  In my analysis of the air fighting I
didn't say much about Japanese bomber and attack aircraft, but in the case of
the Navy the story paralleled that of their fighters.  I.e., initially they had
machines which were up to the tasks assigned them, but this superiority was
lost with the appearance of newer and better Allied fighters in increasing
numbers.  The Japanese Navy eventually developed some very good designs, but
did not get them into action in sufficient quantities until it was too late to
redress the balance, especially since most of their best pilots were by then
dead.  The best example was the Navy's superb P1Y Ginga land-based bomber (like
the D4Y a Yokosuka design), fast, maneuverable, well-protected, and with
excellent range for a smaller two-engined aircraft.  Eventually over 1,000 were
built, but the plane did not enter action in any quantity until early 1945, and
then was hampered by shortages of fuel, pilots, and spare parts.  A number were
however employed from bases in Japan during the Okinawa campaign, where the
Japanese Navy used them not only as bombers, but also for reconnaisance, since
this was about the only aircraft suitable for that role that had a reasonable
chance of surviving in the hostile skies of 1945.
        Related Yokosuka and seaplane trivia: an E14Y scout plane was the only
aircraft to bomb the continental United States during the war.  In what was
basically a publicity stunt in 1942, one of these small one-man floatplanes was
launched from the submarine I-25, and dropped four 167-lb phosphorous
incendiary bombs over a forest in Oregon, hoping to start a forest fire-- but
most of you probably know that, I've seen it previously posted to the list.
BTW, I really enjoyed the post regarding the Japanese proposal to bomb the
Panama Canal staging the raid with long-range seaplanes.  In March 1942, in
another propaganda stunt, the Kawanishi H8K (a huge, four-engined, well-armed
and incredibly long-ranged flying boat) did attempt to raid Hawaii after
refueling at sea from a submarine, but cloud cover over Oahu aborted the
effort.
        Before getting to points 3 and 4 in another post, I wanted to reply to
David Murnain to say;
        1. you're probably right regarding the air action over Darwin on May 2,
1943.  My notes on that action are from so long ago I don't even remember the
source I found the info in, but I do recall that the description only gave the
number of Australian Spitfires that crash-landed, and did not give the cause.
I just assumed the forced landings were battle-damage related.
        2.  I didn't speak about the performance of the Australians in the
jungle per se, but will note that in the New Guinea fighting, especially the
early clashes along the Kokoda Trail where the outnumbered Australians
performed miracles, they did show themselves superior to the Japanese in jungle
warfare.  In Malaya, however, that was not necessarily so.  Although the
Australians in general fought bravely, they did not in most cases demonstrate
any greater aptitude versus the Japanese tactics than the other British
commonwealth forces.  I do recall one well-executed ambush of Japanese tanks by
Australian antitank gunners in Johore province-- here the Japanese reverted to
"bamboo spear" mode a bit, as the unit commander jumped from his damaged
vehicle to charge on foot and got himself killed.  I would suggest that this
might only support my theory regarding preparation, in that the Japanese troops
fighting in New Guinea were part of an improvised campaign and lacked extensive
special jungle training, while in the case of the Malaya campaign I've already
opined (and hopefully demonstrated) that the opposite was the case.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 14:06:39 -0500
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Is it true that they can trace a single document

Planning for the mass extermination of Jews began in the winter of 1940-41,
implemented by the March 1941 decision to include four special purpose
Einsatzgruppen in Barbarossa. These four commandos, whose only mission
was exterminating Jews, killed perhaps 1,250,000 by the end of October.
The Wansee Conference, originally called for November 1941, was responsible
for organizing the *second* phase of the extermination, the elimination
of Jews in territories already occupied. This suggests the decision to
go from deportation to extermination was made in 1940, and further suggests
mass killing was in the back of the Nazi leadership's mind all along.
What changed was the fact that Germany's position after the fall of
France was considered impregnable in Europe, and the real agenda could
now be applied.

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 13:39:45 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: REF: Tigers in combat, volume I

Hello, Bill!

Can answer this question.

> Terry, did Mattias Hetzenaur win his Knights Cross for efforts in a
> single action or was it for his "career" total as a sniper?  He would
> be the best example I can think of in determining how KCs were
> awarded (career vs single action criteria).

    No. He was awarded his Knight's Cross for killing or wounding
500+ enemy in his military career. He was the German Army's leading
sniper. Thus, it wasn't for a single act.

    Referencing the Luftwaffe's standards for award of all levels of
the KC, they had established a point system for pilots, and once the
minimal points for each level was attained, a decoration was
forthcoming. I have this info, if anyone is interested. Also, aerial
combat was quantified. Please let me know.

    All the best.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 13:42:14 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Unit 731

Hello, Chip!

What is the publication info on this book? I would be most interested
in acquiring a copy of it. Please advise.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 20:31:23 +0000
From:    Gudmundur Helgason <[email-masked]>
Subject: Greatest sniper in WWII

>
> > Terry, did Mattias Hetzenaur win his Knights Cross for efforts in a
> > single action or was it for his "career" total as a sniper?  He would
> > be the best example I can think of in determining how KCs were
> > awarded (career vs single action criteria).
>
>     No. He was awarded his Knight's Cross for killing or wounding
> 500+ enemy in his military career. He was the German Army's leading
> sniper. Thus, it wasn't for a single act.
>
>     Referencing the Luftwaffe's standards for award of all levels of
> the KC, they had established a point system for pilots, and once the
> minimal points for each level was attained, a decoration was
> forthcoming. I have this info, if anyone is interested. Also, aerial
> combat was quantified. Please let me know.
>
>     All the best.
>
>     Terry
>
I know little about this except what I read in the superficial Time-Life
books. So was  Matthias Hetzenaur the "greatest" sniper in WWII? I have
seen some Soviet Snipers (among them the ace of Stalingrad) which scored
around 300 "kills". Anyone know this?

Also, does anyone know what happened to snipers when captured?
Did they more harsh treatment than the regular troops?

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gudmundur J. Helgason                              e-mail: [email-masked]
Olduslod 41                                              phone: (354)-5655270
220 Hafnarfjordur                                               (354)-5652270
ICELAND                 Editor: http://rvik.ismennt.is/~gummihe/Islandia.html
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 13:38:54 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Scheduling Japan's defeat

>  An article I wrote called "Savvy Planning" is in the Spring '95 Military
>History Quarterly (MHQ).  In August 1943 "Savvy" Cooke, the chief USN
>strategist, persuaded Allied leaders to plan defeat of Japan within one year
>after Germany.  Until then, V-J day was expected in 1947 or 1948.
>  If there is interest I'll post the article here, in sections.  It's about
>250 lines long with a comparative timetable.
>
>Edward S. Miller    Stamford, Conn.   [email-masked]

I would be very interested, Thank You

Jim O'Neil  From the interrogation of a German General at the end of WW II:

               "The reason the American Army does so well in War, is that War
                is Chaos, and the American Army practices it on a daily basis"

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 15:43:50 EST
From:    "Dennis E. Sparks" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Additional lecture at Wright Pat

For those of you on the list within driving distance...

The USAF museum at Wright Patterson AFB, near Dayton, Ohio, hosts
a monthly lecture series from September through March each year.
Announced at last night's lecture is the late addition of another
guest speaker.  On 19 April, Charles Sweeney will deliver a lecture
on the two atomic bomb missions.  As some of you may recall, Sweeney
flew on both missions.  He flew his own assigned aircraft, a B-29
named "The Great Artiste", outfitted with scientific instruments,
accompanying Tibbets in "Enola Gay" to Hiroshima.  When selected to
deliver the second atomic bomb, he switched aircraft with Fred Bock.
Bock flew "..Artiste", while Sweeney carried the bomb in "Bock's Car".
("Bock's Car" has been on display at the museum for many years.)

I certainly plan to attend this lecture, and hope that some others
on the list will want to attend.  The lecture series is free and
open to the general public.  If the museum follows it's usual format,
the lecture will begin at 7:30 PM, and will be followed by a question
and answer session with Sweeney, closing with an autograph session.

Last night's lecture was by Maj. Gen. Ramsey Potts, who flew the
1 August 1943 mission to Ploesti with the 93rd BG, and later commanded
the 453rd BG (the one with Jimmy Stewart) and the 389th BG.  All three
groups flew the B-24 Liberator.

On 23 March, the speakers for the last of the previously scheduled talks
will be Travis Hoover and Tom Griffin, two of Doolittle's Raiders.
Hoover flew the 2nd B-25 off the deck of the Hornet, and Griffin was
the navigator on the 9th(?) B-25.

Dennis E. Sparks
[email-masked]
Lexington, Kentucky

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 15:48:49 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Scheduling Japan's defeat

Please do post it.  Thanks,
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 15:48:55 EST
From:    "Carl Wernke - [email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Scheduling Japan's defeat

 Edward S.Miller wrote on Thu, 23 Feb 1995 17:12:00 UTC
 >If there is interest I'll post the article here in sections. It's about
 >250 lines long with comparative timetable.

 Ed,

 Keep the Japan thread going. Please continue posting !

 Carl Wernke

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 15:50:29 CST
From:    "SCHERRER, TIM" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japanese Peace Offerings

I haven;t been following the Japanese posts very closely--maybe I missed
it this--sorry if it is a duplication.

At NMSU we are in the prcess of attempting a name change to Truman State
University.  The main opposition that has surfaced has surrounded
Truman's decision to drop the A-Bomb.  I am preparing to write a defense
of Truman based upon casualty estimates.  One item I can not answer to
yet was a claim that the Japanese had made peace offerings to the US.
5w's about these and were they even taken seriously.  I'd like to launch
my own A-bomb back and I need to have this clarified to answer the
ridiculous if not assinine things being said here.  TAS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 18:57:31 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japan points 3 & 4 (& there ain't no more...)

        3. I also referred yesterday to losses of American armor on Okinawa.
To cite a couple of examples: On the sector facing Wana gorge, a canyon leading
to Okinawa's ancient hilltop capital Shuri, a Marine tank unit that started
with 60 Shermans lost so many to enemy action or breakdowns that when Shuri was
finally taken it only had six tanks still operating (this is from some notes I
made long ago during readings, don't recall the source, might even have been
Ben Frank's book "Okinawa: Touchstone to Victory" but I'm not sure-- could also
have been Spector).  One of the first attacks on the hill known as Sugarloaf
in the adjoining sector was made by George Company, 22nd Regt, 6th Marine
Division, supported by four Shermans.  Three of the four tanks were knocked
out, and 13 of the 15 crewmen in these Shermans were killed or wounded, many
by small arms fire after abandoning their stricken vehicles (Berry, "Semper Fi,
Mac").  Both of these incidents further underscored good defensive tactics
making full use of terrain and artillery resources, and showed, once again,
what the Japanese could do when properly prepared.  In front of Shuri the
Japanese capitalized on the inability of the US Shermans to traverse the muddy
rice paddies, thus being restricted to the roads, and on the fact that they had
previously ranged-in target areas on those roads.  They simply waited until the
American attacks had reached one of the pre-ranged grids, and then poured down
murderous artillery barrages on the tanks and their supporting infantry.  On
Sugarloaf during the course of the fighting a number of US tanks were claimed
by a single 75-mm gun hidden on an adjacent reverse slope and firing in enfilade
using hollow-charge shells.  I also recall the use of 550-lb aerial bombs as
land mines, triggered electronically when the tank passed over them, but do not
recall if that was Okinawa or Iwo Jima being referred to.  The density of
defensive firepower amassed by the Japanese on both islands also demonstrates
what could be acheived with preparation.  On Okinawa, on a stretch of front
two-and-a-half miles wide, within a depth of a mile-and-a-half the Marines
encountered 41 tripod-mounted and 83 bipod-mounted Nambu machineguns; 16 50-mm
and two 81-mm mortars; seven 47-mm antitank guns; two 70-mm pack howitzers; and
six 75-mm field guns (Spector).  Iwo Jima had similar concentrations of
firepower, with 361 various Japanese artillery pieces on that small island (not
counting an additional 100 antiaircraft guns).  Even at Tarawa earlier in the
war, aside from a couple heavy 8-inch naval guns removed from the defenses of
Singapore to protect the seaward approaches, the lagoon where the Marines
landed was covered by 100 machineguns.  I should note that at Tarawa, as at
Iwo, the Japanese actually managed to inflict more casualties than they
suffered-- Admiral Shibasaki's force on the atoll totalled almost 5,000 men,
but of these only 2,600 from two Japanese marine units were fighting troops,
and the rest laborers.  Marine casualties amounted to over 3,000 men.  However,
the battle at Tarawa was still a demonstration of the drawbacks of the tactic
of defending at the water's edge.  Despite many mistakes in planning and
coordination, the Marines with their naval artillery support had probably
killed half the defenders by the end of the first day, and completely cut off
Shibasaki's communications with those nominally under his command (definitely a
factor in averting a nocturnal counterattack to which the shaken and still
disorganized Marines would have been highly vulnerable).  Tarawa was a costly
lesson for the USMC in the value of proper preparation-- one which, BTW, they
took to heart, so that most of the same mistakes were avoided in future
amphibious operations-- but still the little island was overrun in a couple of
days, showing the Japanese tactical doctrine of defending at the waterline also
had its flaws.
        While mentioning Okinawa etc I wanted to correct a quotation I
paraphrased in an earlier quote.  The exact quote of a Marine officer (from
Hayashi's "Kogun") regarding the deeply dug-in Japanese defenses on Okinawa was
as follows:  "We poured a tremendous amount of metal in on those positions, not
only from artillery, but also from ships at sea.  It seemed as if nobody could
possibly be living in that churning mass where the shells were striking and
roaring.  But when we next advanced, the Japs would still be there, even madder
than they had been before."
        4. I've talked about a lot of Japanese commanders, thought I'd give my
quick $.02 review of the guys on our side, since their personalities also
affected strategy and tactics as well.  MacArthur is the guy I have the most
trouble with, probably because I personally find his vanity, politicking, and
self-aggrandizing qualities more than a little distasteful (also his knack for
twisting the truth to make MacArthur look good, no matter who suffered).  It
seems to me his career alternated between serious blunders and brilliant
strategic and grand tactical maneuvering.  I.e., he lets his air force (with
its impressive fleet of four-engined B-17's) get surprised on the ground and
wiped out hours after Pearl Harbor, but then conducts a supremely difficult
double withdrawal into the Bataan perimeter almost without a hitch (however,
his whole plan for Bataan is predicated on early relief which is not in the
cards).  On New Guinea, he loses a lot of men and momentum trying to winkle out
the Japanese from Buna and Gona, disingenously blames the Australians, who are
fighting a lot better than the US infantry at this stage, for their poor
fighting spirit and performance-- but then proceeds to conduct a clinic in deep
envelopment tactics utilizing the possibilities of air and naval power for the
rest of the campaign there (obviously learning from his own mistakes).  I read
in Manchester that Mac's casualties for the entire campaign in New Guinea and
the Phillipines, over two years of fighting, were less than the US forces
suffered in one battle at the Bulge in Europe.  Yet there are some who question
both the necessity of reconquering the Phillipines and his decision to land on
Leyte as a first step.  Finally, in Korea he pulls off the brilliant Inchon
landings to almost win the war in one swoop, then gets "surprised" by a couple
million Chinese and almost driven into the sea.  Clearly an enigmatic
commander, and hard to get a grip on because most authors either love him or
hate him.  One thing that does seem pretty clear is that the reputation of
"Dugout Doug" was largely undeserved-- MacArthur throughout his career
demonstrated a degree of personal courage in the face of physical danger that
became increasingly inappropriate for a senior commander.  I remember an
account (I believe it was from Belote's "Corregidor") of him watching an
early bombing of Corregidor, out in the open, and when a stick of bombs fell
too close his aide, a Phillipino sergeant, had to shield the general's head
with his own helmet-- catching a piece of shrapnel in the hand holding the
helmet while doing so! (Mac also got bruised on the shoulder by a piece of rock
hurled by the blast).  After his brilliant descent on Hollandia, taking the
Japanese completely by surprise with his landings hundreds of miles in their
rear, and seizing one of New Guinea's best natural harbors almost without loss,
Mac had the bomb shelter outside his HQ there bulldozed under because it
spoiled the look of the lawn (even though repeated air attacks in one case put
a 20-mm round into his bedroom, a few feet from his head).  And I always liked
the line he uttered when on one of his surprise visits to the frontline during
an amphibious landing.  Going up to the very front, he was warned by a young
lieutenant that they had just killed a Japanese sniper where he was walking.
Mac replied, "Good, son, that's just the thing to do with them."
        Stilwell was a brilliant organizer and promising commander who was
given the absolutely thankless job of working as the go-between and theoretical
military commander with Chiang Kai-shek, who of course had his own completely
separate political and military agenda, and, since Stilwell had predominantly
Chinese troops under his command, could and did consistently undermine his
orders.  Surrounded by enemies and difficulties-- Chennault in China, the
British in India, and the "China lobby" on the home front could all be
considered his opponents on many counts-- disgusted by the corruption and
double-dealing of Chiang's army and government, the acid-tongued Stilwell took
on the impossible, and to a remarkable degree succeeded in eventually forging a
fighting force despite the odds.  The campaign he launched in northern Burma
before his recall is particularly impressive considering the myriad difficulties
he faced, only to be rewarded with a recall due to political considerations.
        Holland M. ("Howlin' Mad") Smith, commander of the Marine V Amphibious
Corps which waged the central Pacific campaign, fighting among other places at
Tarawa, the Marianas, and Iwo Jima, was the prototype Marine general.  His
pioneering attention to the tactics and equipment of amphibious warfare in the
pre-war years paved the way for the US Marine Corps' often spectacular
acheivements in the Pacific, but, like Stilwell, his acrid personality and "no
BS" approach tended to land him in hot water with his superiors.  Another
impressive Marine general was the versatile Roy Geiger.  On Guadalcanal he
commanded the "Cactus Air Force," as the Marine air units there were known
("Cactus" being the code name for the island during the planning stages of the
operation).  On Okinawa he became the first Marine to command a US army in the
field.  For most of that campaign 10th Army, the American invading force, had
been commanded by Army General Simon Bolivar Buckner, successful defender of
the Aleutians earlier in the war.  Buckner and Geiger were both front-line
generals who liked to let their men see them, even in the forward foxholes.  In
June 1945, in the final days of the Okinawa campaign, this trait got Buckner
killed-- during a front-line visit he was hit in the chest with a piece of
shrapnel from a pattern of Japanese artillery shells, and Geiger (who commanded
the Marine component of the American forces there) was named his successor.
        Finally, I should mention the British general William Slim, commander
in the Burma theatre after the initial disasters there.  He did an outstanding
job of building up the morale and combat efficiency of a commonwealth force
which was at the absolute bottom of war priorities in the minds of the Allied
planners, and eventually prosecuted an offensive that recovered most of the
country.
        To be honest, I have no idea why I just included the above in the Japan
series I unwittingly embarked on a few weeks ago.  Mental fatigue maybe.
        Loose ends: the Japanese at Midway were also delayed in launching their
strike against the American carriers by clearing their carrier decks to
retrieve first the Midway strike force, then the first defensive fighter
patrol.  A more extreme example of risking big ships to save pilots and aircrew
was provided by the US in the final phase of the Phillipine Sea air/sea battle.
The American carriers turned on their lights to guide their planes back to the
ships after dark had fallen, even though this made them a sitting duck for
potential submarine attacks (or any Japanese planes still about).  Although 72
US planes had to ditch in the water anyway, effective rescue efforts saved all
but 49 of their crewmen (16 pilots and 33 aircrew).
        On the subject of economic warfare, besides seizing the oil of
Indonesia (supplemented by smaller fields in Malaya and Burma), possession of
Malaya, Singapore, Burma, and the Phillipines gave the Japanese control of
two-thirds of the world's natural rubber supply, and 85% of its tin.
        Finally, to support my point more fully regarding the questions raised
by David Murnain (ironically, I agree with his contentions to a large degree,
and admit he has better data on 5/2/43 than I possessed), I would say that
arguing in favor of the relative unpreparedness of the Japanese initially
fighting the Australians in New Guinea was the fact that the force there, which
at first was built around the "South Seas Detachment" of three battalions, was
created specifically for seizing and holding bases in landing operations, and
that their degree of familiarity with New Guinea jungle conditions (horrid
almost beyond description-- trails sometimes knee-deep in slime from rotting
vegetation, razor-sharp kunai grass, constant humidity which among other things
caused cuts and wounds to fester almost instantaneously, one of the world's
largest collections of indigenous poisonous snakes and insects, etc) might be
demonstrated by the fact that their initial commander, General Horii, drowned
trying to cross a swift, rain-swollen jungle stream (contrast with the
extensive bridging preparations in Malaya).  I might also add that the fact the
Australians were fighting so close to home in this campaign might also have
added to their determination and effectiveness.  To be honest, the Australian
participation in the Pacific war is not something I've devoted a lot of
attention to (I'm aware they often got the difficult, dangerous, and
unglamorous end of the bargain in the southwest Pacific-- i.e., winkling out
deeply-dug-in, suicidal Japanese die-hards far from the spotlight
in places from New Guinea to the Solomons to the reconquest of Indonesia-- am
I right in thinking the Australians did the dirty work on Vella Lavella, or was
that the New Zealanders??  See, I told you I have a lot to learn in this area.
I'm also aware that the Australians taught the Americans in New Guinea a lot
about how to fight and survive in that jungle hell).  I expect there are others
on the list who can talk about this much better than I, and judging from his
posts David Murnain is probably one of them.

        If I feel like it, I will post another appendix tomorrow, a short
description of Japanese parachute drops during the war (a subject I remember
seeing on the list a while back).

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 18:52:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Japanese Peace Offerings

On 23 Feb 95, Tim Scherrer wrote:

> At NMSU we are in the prcess of attempting a name change to Truman State
> University.  The main opposition that has surfaced has surrounded
> Truman's decision to drop the A-Bomb.  I am preparing to write a defense
> of Truman based upon casualty estimates.  One item I can not answer to
> yet was a claim that the Japanese had made peace offerings to the US.
> 5w's about these and were they even taken seriously.  I'd like to launch
> my own A-bomb back and I need to have this clarified to answer the
> ridiculous if not assinine things being said here.  TAS

Tim,
     I'm not going to address the question of Truman's use of the A-Bomb
but rather to ask why a university in New Mexico would wish to be named
after President Truman?  Truman is from Missouri and (although I have a
particularly low opinion of Truman which is in no way related to his use
of the A-Bomb) I would think there would have to be someone from New
Mexico or the Southwest who would be more appropriate for that honor.
Just wondering!

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 20:45:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 24 FEB 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
SATURDAY, 24 FEBRUARY 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  B-29, Boeing Superfortress
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  F-7, Consolidated Liberator
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  Spitfire, Vickers Supermarine

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): 4 B-25s on a shipping sweep attack the
Hayakegawa River in the Kurile Islands; returning, the B-25s sight and
photograph a Japanese bomb-carrying balloon.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): 5 B-24s on individual sweeps over the
S China Sea and Gulf of Tonkin claim 4 vessels sunk.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): Mission 38: In an all-incendiary attack, 105
of 116 B-29s hit the Empire Dock area at Singapore, Malayan States, burning
out about 40 per cent of the warehouse area; 1 B-29 is lost; this is the last
100-aircraft strike by the XX Bomber Command. HQ 58th Bombardment Wing (Very
Heavy) and HQ 468th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy) begin a movement from the
Hijli Base Area and Kharagpur, India respectively to the Mariana Islands.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 8 P-47s in close support
of the ground forces near Lashio pound vehicle and a troop concentration; 12
B-25s and about 125 fighter-bombers strike against targets immediately behind
the lines, hitting troops, supply areas, occupied towns and villages,
vehicles, and general targets of opportunity. Transports complete 600 sorties
carrying men and supplies to forward areas.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 2 missions are flown.
  Mission 845: 1,114 bombers and 592 fighters are dispatched to hit oil
refineries and rail targets using H2X radar; they claim 1-0-3 Luftwaffe
aircraft on the ground; 2 bombers and 11 fighters are lost:
  1. 362 B-17s are sent to hit the Albrecht (278) and Harburg (70) oil
refineries at Hamburg; 6 others hit a target of opportunity; 26 B-17s are
damaged; 2 airmen are WIA. 181 of 195 P-51s escort; 4 are lost (pilots MIA).
  2. 280 B-24s are dispatched to hit the Misburg oil refinery (104) and the
marshalling yard at Lehrte (61); 76 hit the secondary target, the marshalling
yard at Bielefeld; targets of opportunity are Hannover (11), Lingen (2) and
other (5); 1 B-24 is lost, 1 damaged beyond repair and 16 damaged; 4 airmen
are KIA, 3 WIA and 12 MIA. Escorting are 166 of 179 P-51s; 5 are lost (pilots
MIA).
  3. 383 B-17s are sent to hit the Deschimag U-boat yards at Bremen (200) and
the Bremen W rail bridge (134); targets of opportunity are Minden (12),
Osnabruck (8), Quackenbruck (5) and Brinkum (1); 1 B-17 is lost, 1 damaged
beyond repair and 162 damaged; 7 airmen are WIA and 9 MIA. The escort is 93
of 98 P-51s; they claim 1-0-3 aircraft on the ground; 2 P-51s are lost
(pilots MIA).
  4. 70 of 76 B-17s hit the Wesel rail bridge using Micro H; 22 B-17s are
damaged. 29 P-51s escort without loss.
  5. 12 of 13 B-17s fly a screening mission.
  6. 43 of 46 P-51s fly a freelance mission for the bombers without loss.
  7. 28 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  8. 17 P-51s escort 19 F-5s and 4 Spitfires on photo reconnaissance missions
over Germany.
  Mission 846: 12 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany during
the night.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, nearly 500 B-26s, A-20s
and A-26s hit 5 communications centers, 2 marshalling yards, 3 rail bridges,
6 town areas, and a target of opportunity as part of interdiction operations
against troops during the Rhineland campaign; fighters support the 8th and
104th Infantry Divisions in the Duren area, the XIII and XIX Corps at the
Roer River bridgehead area, and the VIII, XII, and XX Corps E of and along
the Prum River and in the Saarlautern area.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): 500+ B-17s and B-24s (with
fighter escorts) attack the Udine, Padua, Verona, and Ferrara marshalling
yards and Ferrara railroad bridge in Italy; marshalling yards at Graz and
Klagenfurt, Austria;  and several targets of opportunity. During the previous
night 20 B-24s continue supply drops in N Italy.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy during the night of 23/24
Feb, A-20s bomb marshalling yards, including those at Castelfranco Veneto,
Rovereto, Villafranca di Verona, and Legnago, and airfields at Villafranca di
Verona, Ghedi, and Bergamo; medium bombers bomb rail lines, bridges, bridge
approaches, and fills at Bozzolo, Santa Margherita d'Adige, San Michele
all'Adige, Pizzighetone, and Lavis, and severely damage the Sesto Calende
industrial complex; fighter-bombers hit communications, mainly airfields,
railroad bridges, lines, and marshalling yards at several points including
Villafranca, Calliano, N of Nervesa della Battaglia, N of Santa Margherita
d'Adige, Bergamo, Pavullo nel Frigano, Isola della Scala, and Motta di
Livenza; fighters and fighter-bombers support US Fifth Army forces, hitting
gun positions in advance of the battlefront, at Montese and E of Modena, and
blast targets in the battle area as the 10th Mountain Division reaches the
summit of Monte Torraccia.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 28 B-24s from Angaur Island bomb Ising on
Mindanao Island. 3 B-24s on armed reconnaissance from Guam Island bomb the
airfield on Marcus Island in the N Pacific. During the night of 24/25 Feb, 5
B-24s out of Guam fly individual snooper strikes against the airfield on
Chichi Jima Island and the town of Okimura on Haha Jima Island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Luzon Island,
strikes in support of ground forces continue, especially W of Ft Stotsenburg;
fighter-bombers attack forces holding out on Corregidor Island in Manila Bay;
B-24s bomb Sepinggaiig and Manggar Airfields in Borneo. B-25s sweep off the
China coast, bombing the naval base at Ryukyu-Sho, Formosa. The 20th Combat
Mapping Squadron, 6th Photographic Reconnaissance Group, based at Dulag,
Leyte Island begins operating from San Jose, Mindoro Island with F-7s. The
390th Bombardment Squadron (Medium), 42d Bombardment Group (Medium), based at
Sansapor, New Guinea, begins operating from Morotai Island with B-25s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

24/0143Z FEB

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 09:48:09 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: ADMIN: Alarming message

I received the following message this morning and I also noticed that
some bounced mail intended for another listmember had the same content.
I wish to know if other listmembers received it so that I can report
this to the listserver site.  If you should read this after, say,
2PM EST on Feb 23, please do *not* respond as I will have sufficient
responses (hopefully) by then.  Also please respond to me directly as
well rather than to the list.  Thanks.

> Thu, 23 Feb 1995 00:30:52
>
> You have been  removed from the WWII-L list (World War II Discussion List)
> by Roger Fajman <[email-masked]>.

Luckily, it doesn't seem to have had any effect, but it looks like someone
tried to make it happen.  If there was malicious intent, I'll ensure that
this malefactor (who isn't even on the list) is punished appropriately.
--
Joe Barone, WWII-L listowner
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 20:45:12 CST
From:    "SCHERRER, TIM" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re[2]: Japanese Peace Offerings

NMSU is Northeast Missori State University.  Does that explain
everything else??  TAS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 21:36:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <[email-masked]>
Subject: NMSU

Tim,
    Boy, am I red-faced! :-)

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 22:43:35 -0500
From:    chris garcia <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Japan-- loose ends and further thoughts

Thanks for that great post on the Zero!  Aircraft are my favorite
subject.  Can you repost the Six points on the Zero?  I think I missed it
and I'd liketo reread.  I have the book "Zero!" by Martin Caiden, but
haven't read it yet.  I remember reading somewhere the Zero was designed
in collaboration with the British DeHavviland  co.  do you know anything
about that?

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 23 Feb 1995 19:50:52 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Is it true that they can trace a single document

        "the natural hostility of the German peasant towards the Jews
                must be whipped into a frenzy..."

                        Party instructions for National-Socialist leaders,
                                        March 15, 1931.

--

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 22 Feb 1995 to 23 Feb 1995
*************************************************