Subject: WWII-L Digest - 4 Mar 1995 to 5 Mar 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 1995 00:01:04 -0500

There are 19 messages totalling 1075 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Intelligence on Tirpitz
  2. Polish resistance
  3. [INF] USAAF 4 MAR 45
  4. [INF] USAAF 5 MAR 45
  5. [INF] USAAF 6 MAR 45
  6. WANT: and WEAP:  Translator needed for Czech halftrack manual
  7. NOST: Re-enactors sought to portray WWII Japanese forces (2)
  8. Greenland P-38F restoration
  9. Battle of the Bulge
 10. Glacier Girl (3)
 11. INF: USN Chronology 03-05-95
 12. Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 3
 13. Gas at Iwo Jima
 14. INF: 50 Years Ago - 06-MAR-1945
 15. NOST/VET: Iwo trip question
 16. Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 4

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 21:35:36 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Intelligence on Tirpitz

For information about the St Nazaire raid, read:

        THE GREATEST RAID OF ALL.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 11:54:48 +0000
From:    Nechama Cox <[email-masked]>
Subject: Polish resistance

I was just reading a book on the begining of the war and there was a
mention to the Jewish defence of Warsaw when Poland was attacked in 1939.
I have not hear of this before and I would be interested in any information
on the topic that people could send my way.

Thanks,

Nechama Cox
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 09:29:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 4 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
SUNDAY, 4 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  B-29, Boeing Superfortress
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): 4 B-24s on a sea sweep damage a
destroyer escort in the S China Sea.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): Mission 42: In China during the night of 4/5
Mar, 11 of 12 B-29s, staging from Luliang, mine the confluence of the Hwangpoo
and Yangtze Rivers and the Tai-hsing Narrows at Shanghai and 1 B-29s drops
mines at Tungting Lake without loss.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 100 fighter-bombers attack
troop concentrations, villages, roads, tanks, trucks, animal transport, and
supplies along and immediately behind the battlelines running from the SW to
NE across C Burma; Meiktila is largely occupied by forces of the Indian 17th
Division.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 2 missions are flown.
  Mission 863: 1,028 bombers and 522 fighters are dispatched to bomb targets
in SW Germany; bad weather causes 300+ aborts; 1 B-24 and 1 P-51 are lost:
  1. 373 B-17s are sent to hit the jet aircraft plant at Schwabmunchen (69)
and military vehicle plant and ordnance depot at Ulm (223); 59 hit the
secondary, the marshalling yard at Ulm; targets of opportunity are Reutlingen
(12) and other (1); bombing is by Gee-H; 2 B-17s are damaged beyond repair
and 9 damaged; 3 airmen are WIA. Escorting are 150 of 156 P-51s; 1 is damaged
beyond repair.
  2. 274 B-24s are dispatched but weather prevents them hitting the
primaries; targets of opportunity are Aschaffenburg (18), Tuttlingen (11),
Astadtaach (10), Pforzheim (8), the marshalling yard at Stuttgart (11), the
railroad at Sonaueschingen (10), Stuttgart (50) and other (36); bombing is by
H2X radar with some visual bombing; 1 B-24 is lost and 19 damaged; 8 airmen
are KIA. 139 P-47s and P-51s escort without loss.
  3. 376 B-17s are dispatched but weather prevents them attacking the
primaries; secondary targets hit are the marshalling yards at Ingolstadt (69)
and Ulm (75); targets of opportunity are Ausbuch (1) and other (3); H2X radar
is used for bombing; 2 B-17s are damaged beyond repair and 7 damaged; 17
airmen are KIA. The escort is 172 of 186 P-51s; 1 is lost (pilot MIA) and 1
damaged beyond repair.
  4. 5 B-17s fly a scouting mission.
  5. 21 of 22 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  Mission 864: 1 B-17 and 11 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and
Germany during the night without loss.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, about 180 B-26s, A-20s,
and A-26s strike marshalling yards and a rail junction at Recklinghausen,
Lenkerbeck, and Herne, communications centers at Bruhl, Sechtem, and
Rheinbach, and several other targets including a rail bridge and towns;
weather limits fighter operations; a few fighters fly armed reconnaissance E
of the Rhine River and others fly cover for the XX Corps.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): 630+ B-24s and B-17s, with
fighter escort, bomb marshalling yards at Sopron (2 yards) and Szombathely,
Hungary; Knittelfeld, Zeltweg, Graz, Sankt Veit an der Glan and Wiener-
Neustadt, Austria; Zagreb (2 yards) and Lbubljana, Yugoslavia; and several
scattered targets of opportunity; other B-24s, with P-51 escort, drop
supplies in Yugoslavia; F-5s, P-38s and P-51s fly reconnaissance and
reconnaissance escort operations. The 309th Fighter Squadron, 31st Fighter
Group, moves from San Severo to Mondolfo, Italy with P-51s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, good flying weather
permits a full-scale effort; medium bombers hit 7 railroad bridges on the
Brenner line and in NE Italy; the Salorno railroad fill receives a
particularly good concentration of bombs; XXII Tactical Air Command P-47s
concentrate on communications targets in the Po Valley, knocking out a span
of the Cittadella railway bridge; Brazilian P-47s blast an ammunition dump at
Villafranca di Verona; during the night of 3/4 Mar, A-20s bomb the bridge and
bridge approaches at Casarsa della Delizia, Ostiglia, and Nervesa della
Battaglia, the radar station at Vignola, and lights, motor transport, roads,
and other targets of opportunity at over 30 places in the C Po Valley.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 10 B-24s from Guam Island bomb Susaki Airfield
on Chichi Jima Island; during the night of 4/5 Mar, 3 B-24s make separate
harassment raids on the airfield. Lieutenant General Barney Mc Giles becomes
Commanding General of AAFPOA and Deputy Commander of the Twentieth AF.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): Mission 39: A B-29 makes an emergency landing
on Iwo Jima Island; this begins a series of over 2,400 such emergency
landings on the island during World War II. 192 Mariana Islands-based B-29s
are airborne against Musashino (Musashi), Japan but heavy clouds prevent
bombing the primary; 159 B-29s bomb the secondary target, the urban areas of
Tokyo, and 18 others hit alternate targets; 1 B-29 is lost. This aborted try
at Musashino marks the end of XXI Bomber Command's effort to knock out the
Japanese aircraft industry by high-altitude, daylight precision bombing. (The
indirect effect of causing Japanese industrialists to lose confidence in
their supposed immunity from air attacks exceeds the effect of actual bomb
damage to the aircraft industry).

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Mindanao Island,
B-24s bomb Sasa and Likanan Airfields and the town of Zamboanga. On Luzon
Island, B-24s bomb targets of opportunity in the Cagayan Valley, gun
positions, ammunition storage, and targets of opportunity at Antipolo and
Wawa, supply dumps and the town area at Bamban, fortifications on Caballo
Island in Manila Bay, and airfields at Aparri and Tuguegarao. The detachments
of the 431st and 433d Fighter Squadrons, 475th Fighter Group, operating from
San Jose, Mindoro Island with P-38s, return to base at Clark Field, Luzon.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

05/1428Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 09:36:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 5 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
MONDAY, 5 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  UC-78, Cessna Bobcat
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  L-5, Stinson Sentinel
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In French Indochina, 30 B-25s knock
out bridges at Phu Xuyen, Thinh Duc, Phu Ly, Ninh Binh, and Phu Lang Thuong
and damage a bridge at Kep. In China, 2 B-25s, escorted by 8 P-47s, knock out
a bridge at Changtuikuan while 4 bomb Chikhom. 40+ P-51s and P-40s on armed
reconnaissance hit road, rail, and river traffic, town areas, and other
targets of opportunity in French Indochina, the C Yangtze River area, and
elsewhere in S and E China.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 50+ P-47s support forces
of the British 36 Division in the Mogok sector and forces of the Chinese 50th
Division in the Mansam area; 46 P-47s and 12 B-25s hit troop concentrations
in the battle areas and attack supply areas, road traffic, and general
targets of opportunity behind enemy lines. 664 air supply sorties are flown
to forward areas.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  AIRBORNE OPERATIONS (IX Troop Carrier Command): HQ 52d Troop Carrier Wing
moves from Cottesmore, England to Amiens, France.

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 3 missions are flown.
  Mission 865: 429 bombers and 689 fighters are dispatched to hit oil targets
in Germany; the primary target for the B-17s is the synthetic oil plant at
Ruhland but weather forces them to hit the secondary target; all bombing is
with H2X radar; 1 B-17 is lost:
  1. 233 of 303 B-17s hit the secondary target, the marshalling yard at
Chemnitz; targets of opportunity are Plauen (34) and Fulda (9); 1 B-17 is
lost and 15 damaged; 9 airmen are MIA. Escorting are 369 of 420 P-51s; 3
P-51s are damaged beyond repair and 1 pilot is KIA.
  2. 120 of 126 B-24s hit the Harburg oil refinery at Hamburg without loss.
The escort is 186 P-47s and P-51s without loss.
  3. 27 P-51s attack the marshalling yard at Kreuztal; 1 P-51 is damaged
beyond repair.
  4. 28 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  5. 14 P-51s escort 4 F-5s on a photo reconnaissance mission over Germany.
  Mission 866: 21 of 24 B-24s bomb the Wiesbaden rail station by PFF markers
during the night.
  Mission 867: 9 of 11 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands, France and
Germany during the night.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 565 B-26s, A-20s and
A-26s attack 6 marshalling yards, a communications center, an ordnance depot,
a city area and targets of opportunity with the aim of obstructing
reinforcements and supplies to German forces being pushed back across the
Rhine River; fighters escort the bombers, drop leaflets in the Cologne-Bonn
area, and fly armed reconnaissance over the Ruhr and Hamm-Duisburg area.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Bad weather limits operations
to supply, escort, and reconnaissance missions. HQ 306th Fighter Wing moves
from Lesina to Fano, Italy; HQ 325th Fighter Group and the 317th and 319th
Fighter Squadrons move from Lesina to Rimini, Italy with P-51s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, A-20s hit lines of
communications in the N Po Valley during the night of 4/5 Mar; results are
generally good; bad daytime weather grounds the medium bombers; XXII Tactical
Air Command fighter-bombers and fighters operate on a greatly reduced scale,
mostly in the C Po Valley, hitting bridges at Casarsa della Delizia, Nervesa
della Battaglia, Ostiglia, and Ostellato, and attacking the town of Vignola.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): Susaki Airfield on Chichi Jima Island is
pounded by 11 B-24s from Guam Island; during the night of 5/6 Mar, 5 more hit
the airfield in individual snooper strikes. 22 B-24s from Angaur Island,
Palau Islands, bomb Matina Airfield on Mindanao Island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-25s hit San Roque
Airfield on Mindanao Island. On Luzon Island, B-24s with fighter support hit
troops in the Antipolo area while fighter-bombers dive-bomb San Pablo, hit
Fort Drum in Manila Bay, attack troops W of Ft Stotsenburg, and support
guerrilla forces NE of Lingayen Gulf. Targets on Formosa are hit by fighters
on sweeps and B-24s on armed reconnaissance; the fighter sweeps are
especially effective against railroad targets. B-25s hit Zettle Field on Jolo
Island. HQ 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) moves from Morotai Island to Samar
Island; the 25th Liaison Squadron, FEAF (attached to Thirteenth AF), moves
from Biak Island, New Guinea to Dulag, Leyte Island with UC-78s and L-5s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

05/1434Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 09:42:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 6 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
TUESDAY, 6 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  P-61, Northrop Black Widow

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): A mission to the Kurile Islands is cancelled
due to inclement weather.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 4 B-25s bomb Chikhom; about
50 fighter-bombers hit storage, troops, railroad targets, and river and road
traffic around Hankow, along the Pinghan railroad, Kaifeng, Suchow, Hsuchang,
Changsha, Yoyang, Liuyang, and Hengyang, and on railroads from Liuliho to
Chengtung and from Tungpu to Tatung.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 31 P-47s support British
36 Division forces in the Mogok area; 12 B-25s join 60+ fighter-bombers in
striking troop concentrations, road traffic, supply and fuel dumps, and other
targets in the vicinity of the battlefront and in areas close behind enemy
lines. Transport operations continue on a large scale with 663 sorties
completed to forward areas throughout the day.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 868: 12 B-24s drop
leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany during the night. 5 B-24s fly
CARPETBAGGER missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 260+ A-26s, and B-26s
hit Recklinghausen, Siegburg, and Opladen marshalling yards, Siegburg storage
depot, and the town of Bochum as a target of opportunity; weather grounds
the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands; the XXIX Tactical Air Command
(Provisional) flies alerts and covers the US XVI Corps as it completes a
drive to the Rhine River in the Rheinburg area.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Bad weather restricts all
operations except reconnaissance and a supply mission, with escort, to
Yugoslavia. The 302d Fighter Squadron, 332d Fighter Group, is inactivated
at Ramitelli Airfield, Italy.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, medium bombers pound
communications in the Brenner Pass and hit bridges at Pordenone, Ossenigo,
Enego, Ora, Pizzighetone, and San Ambrogio di Valpolicella; fighters and
fighter-bombers concentrate on close support of the US Fifth Army S and SW
of Bologna; during the night of 5/6 Mar, a few A-20s bomb targets of
opportunity in the Po Valley.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 11 Guam Island-based B-24s again pound Susaki
Airfield on Chichi Jima Island; 5 more hit the airfield during the night of
6/7 Mar in separate strikes. HQ 15th Fighter Group arrives on Iwo Jima Island
from Hawaii and the air echelon of the 548th Night Fighter Squadron moves
from Saipan Island, Mariana Islands to Iwo Jima with P-61s (there are now 28
P-51s and 12 P-61s on the Iwo Jima).

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Mindanao
Island, B-24s pound the San Roque and Zamboanga areas. On Luzon Island, other
B-24s, B-25s, and fighter-bombers hit the Antipolo area, bomb Balete Pass and
Ft Drum and Caballo Island in Manila Bay and support guerrillas near San
Fernando. B-25s and P-38s attack Hainan Island and considerably damage Samah
Airfield on the island. Fighters sweeping over Formosa hit the Koshun area.
HQ 347th Fighter Group and the 67th, 68th and 339th Fighter Squadrons move
from San Jose, Mindoro Island to Puerto Princesa, Palawan Island with P-38s
(the 67th and 339th are operating from Morotai Island); the 419th Night
Fighter Squadron, XIII Fighter Command, moves from Middelburg Island, New
Guinea to Puerto Princesa, Palawan (the squadron is operating from Morotai
Island with P-38s and P-61s).

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

05/1441Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 09:47:03 -0500
From:    Lynn Goodhue <[email-masked]>
Subject: WANT: and WEAP:  Translator needed for Czech halftrack manual

Posting this for my husband, Fred Goodhue, on whose behalf I have
joined this list.  Please respond to list, or directly to me at
[email-masked].  Thank you!
===============
   A New England-based WWII German Re-enactment unit has recently
purchased a 1950's vintage Czechoslovakian halftrack.  It is
essentially the same vehicle as the WWII German SdKfPz 251.  It
will be used for public displays and tactical re-enactments.
   The need, here, is for an individual who could translate
selected portions of the technical manual from Czech to English.
Please let me know if anyone can be of assistance with this
project.  Thanks.

Fred Goodhue (c/o Lynn Goodhue)
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 09:47:51 -0500
From:    Lynn Goodhue <[email-masked]>
Subject: NOST: Re-enactors sought to portray WWII Japanese forces

Posting this for my husband, Fred Goodhue, on whose behalf I have
joined this list.  Please respond to list, or directly to me at
[email-masked].  Thank you!
=================
   A WWII United States Marine Corps re-enactment unit was set up
about a year ago here in New England. We collect and preserve
uniforms and equipment from that time period. So far we have
participated in four public displays where we interpret the Corps
wartime experience.
   I am aware of a tactical battle re-enactment that was held in
the Chicago area about seven years ago involving USMC  and re-
enactors portraying Japanese troops.  I am interested in
duplicating that effort here in the Northeast.  I am searching
for any individual or unit that currently portrays Japanese
forces or is interested in developing that impression for a
tactical event sometime late summer 1995.
   Thanks for help on this request.

Fred Goodhue
Williamsburg MA
c/o Lynn Goodhue
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 10:01:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Greenland P-38F restoration

As a followup to Dennis Sparks' excellent article on the Grennland
P-38 restoration project:

Bluie West 1 (BW1) was Narsarssuak, Greenland
Bluie West 8 (BW8) was Sondre Stromfjord, Greenland

Narsarssuak (now Narssarssuaq) is at 61-10N and 45-26W; Sondre
Stromfjord (now Sondrestrom AB) is 67-01N and 50-42W.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 10:20:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Battle of the Bulge

Yesterday, Saturday 4 Mar, WNET, the PBS station in New York City,
broadcast the complete 26 chapters of VICTORY AT SEA.  I remember
my father and I watching this in 1952 when I was 16.  One of the
problems I have with this program is that they paste in any film
they can find.  For example, it is my understanding that the 1st
Marine Division (Reinforced) went into Guadalcanal sans cloth,
camouflaged helmet covers and armed with M1903 Springfields, BARs
and Reising Model 50 or 53 submachine guns yet the episode on this
invasion showed Marines with helmet covers, M1 Garands and M1
carbines.

Perhaps Ben Frank could give us the truth of this operation.  Did
the Marines have cloth helmet covers, M1 Garands, M1 carbines, etc.
and can you give us the lowdown on the Reising gun which I
understand was quickly ditched.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 10:21:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Glacier Girl

 >        Just recieved the summery of the P-38F restoration project.  While
 >I'm excited to hear that another of these beautiful aircraft will grace us
 >with its presence, I'm disturbed that non-original markings will be applied
 >to it.  As an aviation historian, currently acquiring my Masters Degree in
 >museology, I feel it is of vital importance to preserve historical
 >material as accurately as possible.  This accuracy should be all the more
 >important if, as was stated, this is the only P-38F.  Considering how
 >much money was spent salvaging the aircraft as well as restoring it, it's a
 >shame that the aircraft will not be "truly" original.
 >
 >Michael E. Smith
 >[email-masked]

AMEN!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Jack McKillop

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 12:02:00 EST
From:    "Roger D. Corrie" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Glacier Girl

>        Just recieved the summery of the P-38F restoration project.  While
>I'm excited to hear that another of these beautiful aircraft will grace us
>with its presence, I'm disturbed that non-original markings will be applied
>to it.  As an aviation historian, currently acquiring my Masters Degree in
>museology, I feel it is of vital importance to preserve historical
>material as accurately as possible.  This accuracy should be all the more
>important if, as was stated, this is the only P-38F.  Considering how
>much money was spent salvaging the aircraft as well as restoring it, it's a
>shame that the aircraft will not be "truly" original.
>
>Michael E. Smith
>[email-masked]

  If Glacier Girl is the only non-original marking on the aircraft, you guys
that are upset, are picking the fly doo out of the pepper.  Cut the
mechanics who are refurbishing this aircraft some slack.  The odds are there
probably are several WWII vets involved in the restoration.  I assure you
the original ground crew who painted her would not mind this new one showing
their pride by painting a new pin-up girl.  For those of you who have never
been on a ground/maintenance crew for a combat aircraft, they have as much
pride, if not more, than the aircrew that fly them in these fighting
machines.  Watch the word "truly original" when it comes to aircraft, is
this when it come off the factory floor, after the first combat damage
repair, at the time of crash?  And every aircraft mechanic I have known will
tell you especially with the older aircraft that there will be many times
some very ingenious engineering done to fix an aircraft in combat. Most
aviation historians tend to concentrate on the machinery and the aircrews,
spend some quality time with the ground crews you won't regret it.  This is
not intended as a flame, just food for thought, there is always someone at
the other end of any complaint.
CPORog (Roger D. Corrie)            CAG Devil 00 is down I need 5!!!
[email-masked]
http://www.infi.net:80/~cporog/     Is that 5 maintenance min. or 5 real min?
804-427-2200

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 12:31:53 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Glacier Girl

> >        Just recieved the summery of the P-38F restoration project.  While
> >I'm excited to hear that another of these beautiful aircraft will grace us
> >with its presence, I'm disturbed that non-original markings will be applied
> >to it.  As an aviation historian, currently acquiring my Masters Degree in
> >museology, I feel it is of vital importance to preserve historical
> >material as accurately as possible.  This accuracy should be all the more
> >important if, as was stated, this is the only P-38F.  Considering how
> >much money was spent salvaging the aircraft as well as restoring it, it's a
> >shame that the aircraft will not be "truly" original.
> >
> >Michael E. Smith
> >[email-masked]
>
>   If Glacier Girl is the only non-original marking on the aircraft, you guys
> that are upset, are picking the fly doo out of the pepper.  Cut the
> mechanics who are refurbishing this aircraft some slack.  The odds are there
> probably are several WWII vets involved in the restoration.  I assure you
> the original ground crew who painted her would not mind this new one showing
> their pride by painting a new pin-up girl.  For those of you who have never
> been on a ground/maintenance crew for a combat aircraft, they have as much
> pride, if not more, than the aircrew that fly them in these fighting
> machines.  Watch the word "truly original" when it comes to aircraft, is
> this when it come off the factory floor, after the first combat damage
> repair, at the time of crash?  And every aircraft mechanic I have known will
> tell you especially with the older aircraft that there will be many times
> some very ingenious engineering done to fix an aircraft in combat. Most
> aviation historians tend to concentrate on the machinery and the aircrews,
> spend some quality time with the ground crews you won't regret it.  This is
> not intended as a flame, just food for thought, there is always someone at
> the other end of any complaint.

I've been keeping fairly silent on this issue because both views on it are
legitimate, at least to a degree.

I'm no expert aircraft rebuilder, but I and others have been involved in
the restoration (past, present and future) of a number of aircraft.  The
most substantial one at the moment is an excrutiatingly rare P-51C Mustang,
which is literally a rivet-out rebuild.

All aircraft which are restored to flying condition are never 100% completely
authentic because of certain requirements... Flight instruments, hydraulic
fittings, electrical requirements, required markings (N number), etc.  Most
of these "inauthenticities" are invisible.  The rest are kept to the
most minimum possible.

When the Mustang is completed (just like Miss Mitchell), there will be no
extraneous markings.  There will be information carried with the aircraft in
the form of a plaque which recognizes the individuals and groups who have
played a major part in the restoration.  But that self-recognition will not
be a part of the aircraft itself.  The worst example of an absolutely class
A-1 restoration "ruined" by self commemoration is the Collings Foundation
B-24.  And I support them implicitly.

Painting the name "glacier girl" and adding a nose-art is fairly minor, but
I know I object to it.  If the art is added in the form of a decal that is
90's artwork, then I will object loudly.  If it's a legitimate early 1940's
painted style that _might_ have been added, then I'll think about it.

However, the thing that is always kept in the mind of those restoring an
artifact to "museum quality" is that we are commemorating the men and women
who used or were served by that artifact.  Museums do not use the artifact
to commemorate themselves via the artifact.  When that's done, it's always
in the form of an external plaque indicating where it came from.

Is the addition of non-original nose art and a name a serious problem?  It
depends on what you are trying to accomplish.  We wouldn't do it, because
our goal always comes under the heading of "living museum."  But the
modification may be minor enough in an otherwise excellent restoration to
be "Acceptable."  Just stay away from the desire to "self-commemorate."
That detracts from the whole reason we should be doing what we're doing.

--
\\ Robert J. Granvin                                 User Services Specialist
// School of Statistics - University of Minnesota            [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 13:11:32 CST
From:    "SCHERRER, TIM" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: NOST: Re-enactors sought to portray WWII Japanese forces

At seven acres outside of Chicago on Memorial Day they did a few display
abttles--and I think there were a few events at a place called Buffalo
Rock.  The biggest problem with Pqcific Theater events is you ned up
with 100 marines and 5 japanese reenactors.  A friend of mine did
japanese at that event so maybe he could help out some.  TAS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# [email-masked]                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 04:00:20 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 03-05-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
03/05 Mon.  United States naval vessel damaged:
             LST 641, by collision, Iwo Jima area,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
            Japanese naval vessels sunk:
             Submarine chaser NO. 110, by Army aircraft,
              Netherlands East Indies area,
              08 d. 36'S., 119 d. 19'E.
             Minesweeper No. 15, by submarine TILEFISH (SS-307),
              north of Ryukyu Islands.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 17:16:55 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 3

        Since I'm close to winding this up, I'd like to briefly sum up the
points I was trying to make, in case they somehow got lost in the blizzard of
details I've been throwing out here.
        The same economic constraints which gave the impulse to Japanese
expansion in the first place also imposed absolute limitations on the nation's
military-industrial capabilities.  In spite of its impressive navy, Japan in
1930-45 was closer to a regional than a world power.  (And remember, at the
start of that period the country was also suffering severely from the
depression, coming after what was already a period of belt-tightening: I made
earlier reference to the hardships engendered by the Minseito party's economic
policy, and Ed Miller pointed out that some Japanese were literally starving
during this period).  Despite their limitations, the Japanese found themselves
at some point or other during this period at war with the world's three
greatest powers in terms of industrial, human, and natural resources-- i.e.,
the US, USSR, and Great Britain with its Commonwealth and Empire.
Additionally, during practically the entire period in question Japan was
involved in trying to control the huge territories and population of China
through covert or open military means.  This was clearly far more than the
Japanese military or economy could handle-- Ienaga, among others, has argued
that even the attempt to dominate China was beyond Japan's resources, and
events appear to have borne him out.
        Considered in more detail, the Japanese military effort was, aside from
the background limitations outlined above, further handicapped by the fact that
such a huge proportion of its limited resources were tied down in the China
campaign throughout the course of hostilities with the west.  Thus the Japanese
were doubly condemned to fight a "poor man's war" against the Americans,
British, et al.  Nonetheless, in their opening campaigns they were able to
utilize the advantages of thorough and meticulous preparations to maximize
their limited means and win a series of lightning victories.  These advantages
included the opportunity to collect thorough intelligence on their targets over
a period of months or even years under peacetime conditions; the possibilities
of concentrating scarce resources for specific operations; the time to complete
thorough staff preparations; and in many cases the ability to provide
specialized training for the forces involved.  Much like a practitioner of many
of the martial arts, they were able to hurt a bigger, stronger opponent
utilizing strategy and skill to strike hard blows in the decisive spot.
However, when this series of often brilliant initial victories failed to bring
the war to a successful conclusion, the inherent limitations of the Japanese
war potential began to be exposed.  Surrendering the initiative to the Allies,
which was the existing  state of affairs by the second half of 1942, deprived
the Japanese of all the advantages described above, since they were no longer
able to choose where and
when to fight, and dispose their limited means accordingly.
When forced to improvise, the Japanese generally proved considerably less
adept, and furthermore, their initial advantage in intelligence also vanished
relatively early.    From Midway on it was the Allies who were able to read the
Japanese codes and anticipate many of their enemy's moves.  The initiative and
strategic and tactical mobility allowed by the Allied, especially the American,
material advantage in ships and aircraft made certain that for the remainder of
the war it was likey that the Japanese were going to be forced into this
posture of reacting, like it or not.
        It will probably take me until next post to explore further how the
Japanese eventually came to deal with this changed strategic and tactical
situatio n, since my VMS is experiencing a major case of the slows, and I'm a
little pressed for time.  Any typos here aare likely a resault of that as well,
since I'm not getting a display as I type this.  So I'd like to take a moment
to deal with a couple of real and potential glaring errors in my recent
postings.I was caught in one major boo-boo, when I referred to a
Roosevelt-Churchill agreement that only 10% of US resources would go the
Pacific (it was, as someone on the list was kind enough to point out, actually
30-70).  I like the fact of having all those potential editors out there to
keep me honest, so I'd like to ask if anyone can help me on another point..  I
think I said that the coastwatchers were instrumental in informing the Allies
about the construction of the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal, which led to
the landings there (the operation was already in the stages of preparation with
the objective of near-by Tulagi). But then I saw in Liddel-Hart, which I've
been using as a handy refernce, that the airfield was detected by Allied air
reconnaisance.  Can anyone shed some light on this detail?  I can't find my
copy of Graeme Kent's "Guadalcanal: Island Ordeal" which I think was the source
for the stuff about the coastwatchers, but it might have just been crossed
brain cells.  Finally, I want to confess that I don't have biographical details
on Admiral Raizo Tanaka after the spring of 1943, which is  a shame as he was a
pretty interesting officer.. I have read a fair bit about Tanaka 's career
previous to the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, enough to know that he was the
Japanese Navy's chief expert on troop transport and transport protection, kind
of the Japanese Kelly Turner.
        Oh, yes, and I wanted to clear up some ambiguous sentence structure in
the last post to explain that the Japanese 36th Division did not actually join
the 18th Army in New Guinea, but rather was posted independently to Wakde
island near New Guinea's northwest tip, and to some adjacent islands and
coastal areas of New Guinea itself.  Here the division fought many actions
against MacArthur's forces in the late spring-early summer of 1944.

        Well, I have to break off, its just too irritating to have to type like
this.  Will try again soon.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 14:43:37 -0800
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Gas at Iwo Jima

In the book _Iwo Jima_, Richard Newcomb, it is stated on pages 204-205 of my
paperback copy, that the use of gas was considered at Iwo.  According to
the book, a report written by Major General John Sydney Lethbridge
recommended that the transmitter at Iwo Jima be jammed and then the
island was to be soaked with gas shells.  Part of the plan was to change
the yellow banding on gas shells so that the gunners would not know they
were firing gas shells.  Supposedly Nimitz was for it, but it was
denied by FDR.  Newcomb also says that neither Japan nor the US had
signed the Geneva Convention outlawing gas.  Anybody know more about
this?

John Riegsecker
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of Puget Sound

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 19:42:26 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 06-MAR-1945

On 06-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the British 43rd Division
prepares for the final offensive on Xanten. The Canadian 3rd Division takes
Sonsbeck. In the U.S. 9th Army sector, Operation Grenade comes to an end;
with the XVI, XIII and XIX Corps moving up to the Rhine. In the 1st Army
sector, the offensive against Cologne continues with the 3rd Armoured
Division attacking from the north and the 104th Division from the south. In
the 3rd Army sector, the offensive along the Kyll continues.

Eastern Front - Troops of the 2nd White Russian Front complete the
reduction of Grudziadz, a key point in the German defence system on the
lower Vistula in Poland. The 1st White Russian Front makes substantial
gains in northern Pomerania, where Belgrad is cleared.

Philippines - I Corps is ordered to speed action toward the Balete
Pass-Sante Fe-Imugan area.

Iwo Jima - After the most intensive massed artillery preparation of this
operation, supplemented by naval gunfire, the VAC renews efforts to break
through to the O-3 line but is still so bitterly oppossed that progress is
negligible. Elements of the 3rd Marine Division achieve the most gain in
the center, about 200 yards. Progress on the flanks is limited to 100 yards
or less. Seventh Air Force fighters land on Airfield 1 to support ground
operations.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 17:08:37 -0800
From:    Chris Albee <[email-masked]>
Subject: NOST/VET: Iwo trip question

A pretty specific plea:

If anyone knows of any Iwo Jima veterans from New Hampshire who are going on
next week's trip to Guam and Iwo, please get in touch.   I would love to know,
as my dad may be going, and a NH paper may commission him to write an
article.  They had asked him if anyone from NH was going, which would
make it more interesting to their local readers.

Are any list members going?

If he goes, I'll try to report after he gets back, if there is interest.

Thanks!
cea

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 22:27:49 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 4

        Ah, that's better.  VMS' arteries have unclogged.
        When I mentioned in my previous, aborted post that the preparation for
the successful early Japanese offensives included thorough staff work, I meant
not only in regard to tactical considerations, but even more so regarding
logistics, an area the Japanese often neglected.  An example would be the
Malaya campaign which I have often cited as the Japanese Army machine operating
at peak efficiency.  One case in point was the special training and equipment
of the three engineer regiments in 25th Army, who came to specialize in bridge
construction and repair.  Each regiment, among other things, had at its
disposal 20 heavy trucks to carry construction materials and heavy equipment
for this purpose.  Tsuji also praises the special efforts of the Army's
railroad repair and maintenance unit, which apparently also was very well
prepared for its tasks in this campaign.
        I should mention in regards to prominent Japanese staff officers Col.
Tokushiro Hattori.  Hattori was head of the operations department at Imperial
General HQ from the start of the war until December 1942, then again from
October '43 to August '44 (in the period between he served as secretary to the
War Minister, the same job Saburo Hayashi, to whose book I have often referred,
held in August '45).  Hattori personally took charge of developing the plan
for breaking through the Bataan defenses in April '42, a battle which went off
more or less like clockwork-- after bombing attacks and a barrage by 150 guns
and howitzers against two and a half miles of ridgeline (which American WWI
veterans in the Bataan defenses called worse than the Argonne in that previous
conflict famed for its dense artillery concentrations) the Japanese troops were
able to virtually walk through the defenses in many sectors.   Hattori was also
considered one of the Army's leading experts on naval matters, and held a
number of posts involving liason with the Navy or acting as naval consultant in
Army councils.  In February 1945 he was assigned to command an ordinary
infantry regiment, the 65th, in China, and survived the war.
        One other important point about staff preparation-- and although I've
mentioned it before the importance of this cannot be overstated in regard to
the Japanese-- is the fact that only the top 10% of Japanese officers received
the advanced staff training that was usually a prerequisite for high command.
These men were, in general, serious students of the art of war, with a solid
grounding in logistical and strategic realities.  The other 90%, most of whom
could not realistically expect more than, with luck, to retire as colonels
after a few decades of service, tended to be far less imbued with analytical
skills.  Among this majority of Japanese officers who populated the middle
and lower ranks of the officer corps, there was a strong tendency to give
prominence to spiritual and moral factors over the material.  Just like the
Japanese folk hero Musashi Miyamoto, the great swordsman and philosopher who
once fought a hundred men singlehanded and won (and who was, by the way, a
real historical figure from the early period of the Tokugawa shogunate-- a
historical novel about Musashi published in the pre-war years has been called
the Japanese "Gone With The Wind," not least because of its unprecedented
popularity), these men believed that if their spirits were pure and brave they
could triumph even against prohibitive odds-- and that, failing that, they
would at least find the repose of a hero's death.  Thus having the services of
staff officers like Hattori or Tsuji available in general greatly improved the
chances of proper preparations and dispositions, while local initiatives by the
field officers of the type just described were more likely to result in "bamboo
spear tactics."  I should mention that perhaps Tsuji's widespread appeal and
influence in the Japanese Army was due to the fact that he combined aspects of
both personalities.  He was a quite competent and well-trained staff officer,
but he was also very emotional, very concerned with the spiritual qualities of
the warrior mind, and able to inspire those emotions in others.  Tsuji's
aggressive personality enabled him to pull off outlandish stunts and get away
with them.  For instance, early in the Malaya campaign, having returned direct
from the battlefield, unhappy with one aspect of the support the forward
elements were receiving, he stormed into the quarters of General Sosaku Suzuki,
Yamashita's chief-of-staff (and of course Tsuji's superior), and began to
violently upbraid the general for being in his pajamas while there was a battle
going on.  Rather than reprimand Tsuji for his rude and abusive behavior,
Suzuki, apparently shamed, hurriedly changed into his uniform so he could
listen to Tsuji's complaints.  Need I stress that with the Japanese system of
subordinates often having the most input into the actions carried out under the
name of the figurehead commanders, the men who thought more of moral force than
physical possibilities often had considerable influence in the field.
        All the moral force in the world was not, unfortunately for the
Japanese, able to overcome the superior material resources of the Americans in
most cases.  Last post I spoke of Adachi's 18th Army and its assaults around
Aitape.  Their dedication was admirable.  After moving beyond the scope of the
18th Army's interior communications, they forced their way through 90 miles of
dense jungle to reach the American positions, taking a month in the effort and
living on half rations.  Their assaults were courageous and fierce, and at
times their tactics appear to have been pretty good at the local level.  They
forced many small American withdrawals in 25 days of attacks, at one point
actually made a breakthrough and cut off most of a US regiment, which was
surrounded for four days before relieved.  But, seriously short of both trained
infantry and ammunition, and almost entirely lacking in artillery support,
Adachi's men could not by mere spirit triumph over their material shortcomings.
They lost almost half their force in a month, and the survivors were never
really a factor in the subsequent fighting on New Guinea-- a whole army was
thrown away in a splendid but ultimately useless gesture.  Of course, Adachi
didn't have a whole lot of choices-- fight his way out or starve-- and he chose
the most courageous path.  But the simple fact that American air and naval
resources, by making moves like MacArthur's Hollandia hop possible, could and
did put bypassed Japanese forces like 18th Army in untenable circumstances, was
tantamount to admission that superior material had largely rendered the
Japanese strategic and tactical position hopeless.
        The end game of the campaign in the Solomons and around Rabaul was a
further illustration, and also a demonstration of the war-winning potential of
the US Navy "Magic" intercepts and other codebreaking efforts.  Even Kusaka's
naval units were at last coming to be overwhelmed in these waters.  The
Bougainville landings at Empress Augusta Bay led to another naval scrap between
evenly-matched forces of US and Japanese light cruisers and destroyers.  But
the Americans were learning, and the four new US cruisers avoided the "Long
Lance" torpedoes launched at them in this action, while giving a gunnery clinic
that sank the Japanese light cruiser SENDAI and a destroyer without loss.  But
this was just a warm-up for a more serious riposte against the November '43 US
landings,  Koga's operation "Ro-Go."  Koga dispatched to Rabaul a force of
seven heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and four destroyers.  They were
supposed to slip in and ravage the Allied fleet under Halsey which was
covering the landings, but whose two carriers had no ships heavier than a light
cruiser to protect them.  But US codebreakers, who deciphered a message
confirming the ships' arrival at Rabaul, alerted Halsey to the danger.  Halsey
was, well, something that rhymes with "Halsey."  Although he looked bad later
in his career, leaving San Bernardino strait uncovered at Leyte Gulf and in
1945 sailing his fleet right into a destructive typhoon, his guts and
aggressive instincts served the Allies well in the Solomons.  Halsey knew his
only chance was to hurt the enemy cruisers before they left port, when they were
still easy to find and relatively easy to hit.  He launched all his carrier
planes to raid Rabaul, even though Allied estimates put the Japanese air
strength there as high as 150 planes (probably an overestimate, as it turned
out).  Fortune favored the Americans.  Rain and heavy clouds covered the US
carrier force, shielding it from detection by Japanese air reconnaisance.  But
Halsey managed to launch his own planes, and the weather over Rabaul was clear.
The operation was a success, three of the heavy cruisers and three destroyers
being damaged, and Koga was forced to scrap "Ro-Go."  As at Midway, luck had
played an important role in saving the American carriers, but the success of
the US codebreakers had put them in the position to be lucky.
        The last act of the Solomons drama was the landing of US forces on Cape
Gloucester, at the other end of New Britain from the Japanese base of Rabaul
(and where the Japanese were constructing a new airfield).  The Marines started
coming ashore on Christmas 1943.  The superior Allied mobility put the Japanese
in the same quandary once again.  They could either allow the Americans their
new base, or they could struggle through miles of virgin jungle to try to
attack them, allowing the enemy the advantage of the defender.  Essentially,
they left the Americans their lodgement, although they did dispatch forces to
engage, but not on the same scale as at Bougainville.  Weather, with incessant
rain, caused more problems than the Japanese-- I've read a couple of references
to the fact that at least 30 Americans were killed by falling trees, the sodden
ground being too liquified for the root structures to hold the large trees
upright.  Rabaul, the once-powerful base which held as many as 100,000 Japanese
military personnel, was simply left to wither on the vine.  Its defenses
against landings were reportedly quite formidable-- but the landings never
came.  Instead there were air attacks and progressive starvation, as the war
simply passed Rabaul by, and its Japanese defenders with it, another monument
to the success of the "island-hopping" strategy.
        The hour is late and I'm tired so will pick up the thread tomorrow.
Still to come, the change in Japanese tactics for fighting amphibious landings
(as evidenced by the contrasting battles of Biak and Saipan in June '44) and a
word or two about Japanese forays into high-tech, plus my promised final
appendix.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 4 Mar 1995 to 5 Mar 1995
***********************************************