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Status: O

There are 33 messages totalling 1420 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. QUERY: Women's WWII Literature (2)
  2. INF: USN Chronology 03-02-95
  3. Col. Bates
  4. Patton biography (5)
  5. Richard I.Bong (3)
  6. MEDIA:WWII Truck Found
  7. ADMIN: Introduction to WWII-L
  8. endlossung/Germans or Nazis? (2)
  9. China/Japan part 7
 10. Re2: A-bomb spies
 11. Info on USN Battle Stars (2)
 12. B-29 sans defensive weapons (2)
 13. Nissen  and Quonset Huts
 14. INF: Tokyo RAid and Chinese casualties
 15. MEDIA:Col. Bates Dies
 16. The Ursel rocket launcher (not much though)
 17. Jim Irwin
 18. [INF] USAAF 3 MAR 45
 19. Bio: Richard Ira Bong (2)
 20. INFO ON USN BATTLE STA
 21. INF: 50 Years Ago - 03-MAR-1945
 22. A-bomb spies

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 1 Mar 1995 23:55:47 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <ub076@FREENET.VICTORIA.BC.CA>
Subject: Re: QUERY: Women's WWII Literature

Marguerite (Margaret) Higgins comes to mind as a fine war correspondent.


--

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 04:00:14 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <tkeller@LOGICON.COM>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 03-02-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
03/02 Fri. Cruiser and destroyer task group (Rear Adm. F. E. M.
           Whiting) bombards Japanese positions on Okino Daito
           Jima, Ryukyu Islands.
           Destroyers bombard enemy on Parece Vela Reef in the
           Philippine Sea.
            United States naval vessels damaged, Iwo Jima area:
             Attack cargo ship STOKES (AKA-68), LST 224,
              LST 247, LST 634, by collision,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
             LST 642, by grounding,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <ljewell@EXPERT.CC.PURDUE.EDU>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
tkeller@logicon.com

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 07:05:57 -0500
From:    Kevin Kamphaus <kamphaus@PETSYS.AE.GE.COM>
Subject: Col. Bates

Does anyone know the specifics about the court marshalls mentioned in the Col.
Bates obit?

Also, the Stalag Luft III survivor I mentioned yesterday was named Pollock.



Thanks,

Kevin Kamphaus
kamphaus@petsys.ae.ge.com

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 07:21:05 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <RTMOORE@PCAD-ML.ACTX.EDU>
Subject: Re: Patton biography

Hello, Richard!

Here goes with the Patton bios I possess.

The Last Days of Patton by Ladislas Farago
George Patton-General in Spurs by Alden Hatch
War as I Knew it by General George Patton
Patton:Ordeal and Triumph by Ladislas Farago
Portrait of Patton by Harry H. Semmes
Lucky Forward by Colonel Robert S. Allen
Patton by Charles Whiting
The Patton Papers by Martin Blumensen 1885-1940
 "   "      "      "  "       "       1940-1945

 Hope this has been of help.

 Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 08:48:30 -0500
From:    QUACK <MUSCORJ@HSDWL.UTC.COM>
Subject: Re: Patton biography

Has anybody been to the Patton Museum at Fort Knox?
A report would be appreciated.

Ron

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 09:08:46 GMT+6
From:    Esaul Zermeno Bautista <EZERMENO@DPED.DPED.UAA.MX>
Subject: Re: Richard I.Bong

    Hello everybody !!


         I want to thank you all for  helped me

         giving me information.


         Esaul Alfredo.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 22:46:31 +0700
From:    "Peter E. Beal" <bealp@MORAKOT.NECTEC.OR.TH>
Subject: Re: MEDIA:WWII Truck Found

On Wed, 1 Mar 1995, James E Irwin wrote:

> >From the DoD Newswire 27 February 1995
>
> =====
>
> :EGYPTIAN ARMY FINDS WORLD WAR TWO TRUCK IN DESERT
>
>     CAIRO, Feb 26 - The Egyptian army has recovered a World
> War Two supply truck lost in the Western Desert more than 50 years
> ago, Al-Hayat newspaper reported on Sunday.
>      The vehicle, which had belonged to the British-led Allies, was
> more than 2,000 km (1,300 miles) from the town of Al-Alamein where the
> Allies fought a major tank battle with German forces in 1942.
>      The truck was loaded with gas containers, milk produced in 1941,
> bullets, oil and other supplies, and was spotted by an Egyptian
> military aircraft on a routine patrol, officials told the newspaper.
>      Egyptian army mechanics said the vehicle was in good condition
> and they had been able to fix its engine and tyres.
>
And what about the drivers/crew?

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 11:21:09 -0500
From:    Barone <m1b@SSD.RAY.COM>
Subject: ADMIN: Introduction to WWII-L

Revision: 1 February 1995
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Just some minor corrections and additions.  - Joe]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Welcome to WWII-L, a list dedicated to the discussion of the greatest
cataclysm of the Twentieth century (and, hopefully, the last.)  My name is
Joe Barone and I am the listowner.  I can be reached at m1b@ssd.ray.com.

        WWII-L will be self-moderated.  This means that each of you will
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        Our subject is HUGE and not everyone will be interested in everything
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        Threads have been known to mutate so that the Subject: line no longer
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        Since messages may arrive at sites out of order, it's always a good
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        Abbreviations are another subject that needs attention.  While many
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        Some subjects have been beaten to death or evoke strong emotional
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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//      JOB Echo=No
Database Search DD=Rules
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search WEAP: in WWII-L
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Several members of the list provide daily updates of events that
occurred 50 years ago.  Much of this information is archived.  Below are
the addresses for retrieving archives of this information and much more.

WWII-L ARCHIVES:
  1. ubvm.cc.buffalo.edu in directory WWII_L

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES is archived at two sites:

  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory /pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in
        /pub/history/military/airforce/ wwii_chronology

50 YEARS AGO TODAY is archived at:

  1. ftp.netcom.com, in directory /pub/jbd/www

50 YEARS AGO OF NAVAL ACTIVITIES and other historical goodies:

  1. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu in directory /pub/history and all subdirectories

        To access these archives using ftp, connect to the desired system,
enter "anonymous" when prompted for login ID, then enter your Internet mail
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directories.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Copyright issues are a major problem on the Internet.  As far as
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material to be reproduced only if it is done free of charge and is not
altered in any form unless, of course, the owner has other requirements
that would supercede this policy.

        This is my first draft so I would appreciate any feedback from
members.  My intent is to prevent people from acquiring gain, finanical
or otherwise, from information that appears on this list without getting
the consent from the authors of that information.  If anyone can word
this intent better than I did above, I would like to hear from you.
Thanks.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

If I haven't suffciently confused you, send me e-mail and I'll finish
the job. :-)  I can be reached at the following address:

Joe Barone, WWII-L Listowner
m1b@ssd.ray.com
W: (401) 842-4054
Always wit' da negative waves, Moriarty!  Always wit' da negative waves!

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 23:20:02 +0700
From:    "Peter E. Beal" <bealp@MORAKOT.NECTEC.OR.TH>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

On Wed, 1 Mar 1995, Kelvin Brent Luther wrote:

> On Tue, 28 Feb 1995, Alex Bielakowski wrote:
>
> > On Tue, 28 Feb 1995, William Lippert wrote:
> >
> >    I don't think that the camps were German because they were administered
> > by many other Europeans.  Nazi is probably a more accurate description.
> > If you want to tie Nazism with Germanism that's acceptable, but to stretch
> > the camps to sole Germanship ownership, administration, and responsibility
> > ignores what many other Europeans (Austrians, Poles, Estonians, etc.) did
> > to contribute to the Holocaust.
> >
> > At the risk of starting a flame-war, I have to take exception with the
> > mention of the Poles as having played a part in the Holocaust.  Over
> > one million Polish Catholics were killed by the Germans during WWII, not
> > to mention the undetermined number that were murdered by the Soviets.
> > Auschwitz and other concentration camps had there share of Polish
> > Catholics as well as Polish Jews (Dr. Jozef Garlinski, a former prisoner
> > at Auschwitz,has written an excellent book on the subject _FIGHTING
> > AUSCHWITZ_).  The Poles were the only ethnic group in Europe not to
> > supply the Germans with soldiers (that excludes those Poles who were
> > forced into the German Army, because they did so unwillingly and never
> > served in "Polish" units).  Finally, need I remind anyone of the actions
> > surrounding the death of St. Maximilian Kolbe at Auschwitz.
> >      I do not, for a minute, deny that some individual Poles may have
> > participated in the Holocaust.  It seems ironic to me, however, that one
> > often hears more about Polish "anti-semitism", than the anti-Semitic
> > policies of the collaborationist Vichy government, or Mussolini's Italy,
> > or Franco's Spain, or the Croats, Lithunians, Ukrainians, or Russians.
> > My point is that almost every ethnic group in Europe has been accused of
> > anti-Semitism, but the Poles were the only ethnic group not to willingly
> > participate in the Holocaust by collaborating with the Germans or by
> > willingly contributing to the German war effort.
> >      While the French were collaborating with the Germans, the Poles
> > represented the fourth largest Allied army in Western Europe (after the
> > U.S., U.K., and Canadians).  Likwise, the Polish Home Army was at least
> > three times larger than the French Maquis, but most of the space in the
> > history books devoted to resistence has been given to the French.  Ok,
> > I'm sure that those are enough examples to get me in quite a bit of
> > trouble.  Just my two cents!
> >
> > Alex Bielakowski
> >
>         I don't any major disagreements with what you said, but I do feel
> that the Poles along with the Ukrainians were some of the most
> anti-semitic people in Europe.  Much of this stems from their long period
> of being ruled by the Austrians and the Hungarians.  In the Austrian
> Empire the Germans and then Hungarians were obviously the most favored
> groups.  The Poles and Ukrainians were at the bottom and the Jews were
> the middle men taking care of most of the busines end, collecting rent
> etc.  There was and still is a huge resentment of the Jews based on
> this.  Today there are a miniscule amount of Jews in Poland yet whenever
> there is mention of something bad economically someone will blame them.
>         Finally, the only country not to contribute to the holocaust was
> Bulgaria.  They refused to export their Jewish population to Poland, and
> were the only European country in the German domain to see a war time
> increase in their Jewish population.  It was possible for people to
> resist collaborating with the holocaust and your right, France deserves
> to be exposed for their unparalleled amount of collaboration.
>                         Kelvin Luther
>
Implicitly the question is, could you be an anti-Nazi/anti-German and
still be an antisemite?  I think the Poles managed.  In pre-WWII Poland
jewish university students were not allowed to sit (they had to stand) in
the lecture halls.  Poles did not exactly support the resistance in the
Warsaw Ghetto.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 13:10:34 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: China/Japan part 7

        I promised I'd return to China in my next post.  I neglected to mention
that I would be travelling there by way of Indonesia and Burma.
        Just to tie up loose ends from my last post, the fall of Java was a
foregone conclusion after the destruction of the Allied naval and air forces in
the region (of 111 US aircraft rushed to Indonesia in early '42, only 23
bombers and a handfull of P-40's remained by the last week of February; British
Hurricanes based on Java suffered similar attrition).  The Japanese amphibious
landings also took the form of a pincer movement, with the main force of
Imamura's 16th Army landing on the western tip of the island near Batavia,
while a somewhat smaller force came ashore further east.  The landings were
carried out on March 1st, Batavia fell the next day, and the Dutch command on
the island surrendered a week after that (Admiral Helfrich and the senior
British and American commanders were flown out first).  Once the Japanese were
ashore there was little hope of successfully opposing them, for the Dutch
ground forces on Java were not only outnumbered and outgunned, but they could
hardly even be called Dutch.   The bulk of the rank and file was composed of
native Indonesians, and the majority of these had no love for their Dutch
colonial masters.  In fact, the Japanese were subsequently able to find some
33,000 volunteers for their own native "Java Defense Force," disposed in 66
battalions of about 500 men each to supplement the inadequate Japanese forces
in defending the large island against possible Allied invasion.  On Bali, which
I mentioned earlier as particularly friendly to the Japanese, another 1,500
volunteers took over most of the garrison duties, as there were virtually no
Japanese combat troops on that island.  The experience of the Indonesian
volunteers was not, however, a particularly happy one, as they soon came to
greatly resent the second-class treatment handed out to anyone not racially
Japanese (this on top of the already brutal Japanese military discipline).  One
unit even revolted and fought their Japanese "advisors."  In a tie-in to one of
today's hot ecological issues, small parties of Japanese also came under attack
from time to time from the Dyak tribesmen of the western Borneo rainforests,
who realized that the large-scale logging operations carried out by the
Japanese there was destroying the environment which provided their sustenance.
        The Japanese raised foreign troops to aid their occupations in a few
other places.  In Burma, the Japanese had since 1940 been providing covert aid
to the Burmese independence movement through the so-called Minaimi
Organization.  After overrunning most of the country, they tapped the services
of a leading spokesman for Burmese independence, the dimunitive,
Cambridge-educated Dr. Ba Maw.  Ba Maw had been the president of the token
parliament the British had allowed the locals, but that didn't stop the British
from arresting him after a 1940 speech they considered seditious (in that
speech Ba Maw had mentioned that the British claimed to have been fighting the
First World War to "make the world safe for democracy," and to have renounced
any territorial ambitions, but that after gaining a million and a half square
miles of new territory as a result of the war-- Ba Maw's figure-- their
attitude changed drastically).  In the second half of 1943 the Japanese finally
allowed the creation of a supposedly independent Burma headed by Ba Maw.
However, as with Manchuria and most other states of the "Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere," the actual degree of Burmese independence was so minimal
as to be unnoticable.  Even cabinet official's of Ba Maw's government riding in
marked official cars were stopped and rudely searched by common soldiers at
Japanese Army security checkpoints in Rangoon.  Nonetheless, in 1943 a "Burma
National Army" was also formed, totalling about 55,000 men.  This force was
intended for garrison duties in the country, to free up Japanese troops for the
fighting fronts, but the humiliating treatment handed out by the Japanese to
the Burmese at all levels eventually made the armed forces a hotbed of
opposition.  In the spring of 1945, Burma National Army units under the
leadership of Aung San revolted, first in Mandalay and then throughout the
country, and fought a number of heated engagements with the now-retreating
Japanese.  The British later reformed most of these units as a "Free Burma
Army."
        As an aside, I should mention that the Japanese population at home was
totally taken in by propaganda regarding the mission and purity of intent of
the supposed Japanese anti-colonial crusade embodied in the "Greater East Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere."  In this respect I would venture that "Suzuki-san" (the
contemporary Japanese expression equivalent to "John Doe" or "John Q. Public")
wasn't much different than his or her western counterparts, in that the
majority trusted their government to do the right thing most of the time.  One
of the winning entries in a newspaper contest to develop slogans for the
"Co-Prosperity Sphere" (quoted in a Toland footnote) was, "With firmness we
fight, with kindness we build."  I've already said enough about the true face
of Japanese "liberation" from the colonial powers that anyone who's struggled
through my posts can see the irony of that one.  The trouble is that, even
today, the propaganda about freeing Asia from white domination seems to be
continued, but that's a different thread...
        The only foreign troops that actually fought in front-line actions on
the side of the Japanese against the westerners were some of the India National
Army.  This body was formed in 1942, primarily from Indian prisoners of war.
Its military leader was Mohan Singh, a former captain in a Punjab regiment now
promoted to general by the Japanese.  The spiritual head of this army was the
Bengali leader of the Indian independence movement Subhas Chandra Bose.  Bose
did not share the philosophy of non-violent passive resistance which was the
main tactic of the larger independence movement led by Gandhi and Nehru.  BTW,
both Gandhi and Nehru were arrested by the British and interned for most of the
war, an action that set off major riots across India, which British troops had
to be called in to quell.  Bose had established a Provisional Government of
India with German support and himself as head of state, and he came to the
Pacific to lead the Indian forces there.  At any rate, by the end of summer
1942 about 40,000 of the 55,000 Indian soldiers captured (mostly in Malaya and
Singapore) had joined the INA, about half of them fairly early, indicating
perhaps a true patriotism or a keener sense of opportunism, and the other half
after experiencing a couple months of what life in a Japanese POW camp was like.
This force got its opportunity for combat in the Japanese Burma offensive of
1944.  About 7,000 men formed part of the Japanese spearhead pushing towards
Imphal.  The first troops to reach Indian soil fell to their knees and kissed
the ground, shouting "Jai Hind" (roughly, "long live India").  Bose had even
printed up new currency to be used once he set up his government on Indian
territory.  But the advance stalled, the Indians claiming that the Japanese
division which was supposed to support them had abandoned them (in support of
this theory is the fact Mutaguchi subsequently relieved the division's
commander).  Neither the Japanese nor the British apparently considered the INA
troops worth much as fighters, but it seems they at the very least knew how to
die.  Of those 7,000 men only 2,600 were still alive that summer after the
Japanese retreat.
        Hey, which brings us back to China.  There, too, the Japanese had their
puppets, and these sometimes had armed forces under their control.  However,
except for the troops of warlords in Japanese pay like Li and Sung, who were
used as cat's-paws to open the way for Japanese expansion prior to the outbreak
of open warfare in 1937, it appears few Chinese ever actually fought for Japan.
The Japanese did however set up their own Chinese government after the fall of
Nanking.  Its head was Wang Ching-wei, formerly a prominent member of the
Kuomintang, but a man who always had his own program.  In the Kuomintang's
underground days prior to World War I, Wang had gained repute in the party for
an attempt to assassinate a high government official, which failed when the
bomb he threw did not go off.  Wang was considered one of Chiang's top
lieutenants, and a potential rival for power.  He had his own quasi-independent
power base in the three Wu-han cities.  When Chiang had turned on the
Communists, Wang broke away and made an alliance with the Communists.  However,
a few weeks later he too changed his mind and expelled them from his
organization.  He tried to form his own nationalist government in the early
1930's.  Wang Ching-wei rejoined the Kuomintang in 1938, but, after lengthy
secret negotiations with the Japanese, he defected again in December of that
year.  This led to the proclamation, in 1940, of a Chinese government headed by
Wang and recognized by the Japanese as the legal government of China.  Of
course, the Japanese lost no time in opening negotiations with this government
(which in fact was so powerless that even the design of its flag was a matter
for prolonged and bitter negotiation with the Japanese) with the object of
getting Wang to recognize Japan's right to Manchuria.  Wang's death in 1943
removed this problematic and bizarre personality from the scene.

        That's it for today: tomorrow, back to the war in China.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

PS I've received a number of messages, questions and requests regarding these
posts, I saved them all and will try to respond to every one when I get the
time.  I beg your patience until I finish cranking out the last two or three
posts to finish this series.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 13:13:59 -0500
From:    "John E. Kollar" <KILLAR@MARY.FORDHAM.EDU>
Subject: Re: Patton biography

Terry, if you don't post the list of Patton, could you send me a copy?

John E. Kollar

killar@mary.fordham.edu

Thanxs.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 13:23:49 -0500
From:    Henry Sirotin <hhs@EVEREST.HUNTER.CUNY.EDU>
Subject: Re: Re2: A-bomb spies

Dear Alex,

Best sellerdom doesn't mean accuracy, and I'm not surprised all the
debate on Sudaplatov is in the US. Britain's man-on-the-scene,
Klaus Fuchs, is a known quantity. Who are the scholars who have
access to the KGB archives? I know the Party archives, the Presidium
archives, and some of the military archives have been all or partly
opened, but last I heard the KGB material was still restricted on
all but a VERY selective basis. Volkogonov, for example, couldn't
get in for his books. Much of Sudaplatov is probably true, although
the Russians themselves have officially noted mistaken claims in the
book as to what responsibilities he had and when he had them. Finally,
I think it is a mistake to talk about the "KGB archives." Soviet
archives in general are circles within circles, and that title covers
a lot of ground. Volkogonov ran into this problem with Alger Hiss-
Hiss heard Volkogonov had access to the "KGB archives" and wrote
to V for an exoneration. V actually had the use of *some* files,
specifically relating to US PoW issues, and wrote that he had seen
nothing relating to Hiss, who promptly trumpeted this as a vindication.
V had no idea the contretemps he was getting into in terms of American
politics. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, NO ONE has had access
to either KGB or GRU archival material on espionage against the US.

Regards,

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 13:29:07 -0500
From:    "C. MICHAEL SHORT, ASSOCIATE DEAN OF STUDENT LIFE" <SHORT@AB.WVNET.EDU>
Subject: Re: Patton biography

I've been to Patton's museum a couple of times.  They have a nice display
outside of WW II armor.  Lots of WW II stuff inside including a good Patton
film.  It takes a couple of hours to go through if you hurry a bit.  If you are
lucky the armor brigades training at Fort Knox be training in their tanks and
you can watch them, too.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 13:44:00 EST
From:    "Roger D. Corrie" <cporog@INFI.NET>
Subject: Info on USN Battle Stars

1. How were Battle Stars awarded?

2. Where did ships display them? Especially DD, and what did they look like?

3. Did crewmembers have/wear any decorations to represent Battle Stars?

4. On a USN DD Destroyer how were aircraft kills represented, Flag or
Aircraft Symbol?

Thanks in advance
|   CPORog(Roger D. Corrie) - Email cporog@infi.net  -  Phone 804-427-2200
|  |
   |
|                   19th Century Scientific American online                  |
|          http://www.history.rochester.edu/saonline/saonline.htm Phone
|  |
   |
|                       Appletons' Cyclopedia                                |
|                                 of                                         |
|                       Applied Mechanics online                             |
|          http://www.history.rochester.edu/appleton/apple.htm               |
|                                                                            |
|                             Home Page                                      |
|                   http://www.infi.net:80/~cporog/                          |
|____________________________________________________________________________|

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 14:01:37 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <wrb1@CORNELL.EDU>
Subject: B-29 sans defensive weapons

A while ago there was a thread as to the switch from high altitude B-29
raids being replaced by low altitude incendiary raids.  I had posted where
I read that they also removed the gunners and defensive weapons for these
raids. I poseted this minus any sources since I couldn't remember where I
had read it - wel last night I stumbled across my source: John Costello's
"The Pacific War 1941-1945" and in it:

        "On March 9, Army Air Force crews assembled in the Quonset huts on
Tinian and Saipan for a mission briefing.  Their apprehension at being told
they would be making the first low-level attack that night on Tokyo was
replaced by shocked disbelief when they heard that the aircraft were to be
stripped of all guns except for the tail turret.  The weight saving in fuel
by not having to form joint uptight formations or climb to 30,000 enabled
each Superfortress to increase its bomb load by 65 percent, to over 7
tons."


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 13:22:29 CST
From:    "SCHERRER, TIM" <AD16@NEMOMUS.BITNET>
Subject: Re: QUERY: Women's WWII Literature

Try _One Woman's Army_ (might be war rather than army) by Charity Adams
published by Texas A&M press.  Excellent book on the WAC's, blacks in
the military, as well as a great book on leadership.  TAS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# AD16%NEMOMUS@ACADEMIC.NEMOSTATE.EDU                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 13:25:45 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <RTMOORE@PCAD-ML.ACTX.EDU>
Subject: Re: Richard I.Bong

Hello, Esaul!

Tell me what you need about Mr. Bong.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 15:10:45 -0500
From:    Henry Sirotin <hhs@EVEREST.HUNTER.CUNY.EDU>
Subject: Nissen  and Quonset Huts

To all,

Is there a difference between Nissen and Quonset Huts? Were these
British and American terms for the same thing? If not, how did
they differ?

TIA,

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 14:34:48 -0500
From:    Henry Sirotin <hhs@EVEREST.HUNTER.CUNY.EDU>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

I think we went through this on this list two months ago (or was it
Milhist-l?)

1) While no organized Polish group took part in the Holocaust, and hundreds
of Poles risked their lives to save Jews, thousands more actively collaborated  with the Germans. The most likely reason there was no organized collaboration
was that Poland, unlike most occupied German territory, was directly ruled
by the Germans. I seriously doubt a Polish puppet government would have
behaved any differently than, say, Vichy. To cite St. Maximilian Kolbe
in this context is insulting. Kolbe was one of the most notorious
anti-Semites in prewar Poland, a journalist and politician who crusaded
on this issue. This fact would almost certainly have been known to
John Paul II when he named Kolbe, and was brought out almost immediately
thereafter, yet the process of canonization continued. Among the million,
wasn't there ONE Catholic Pole with more wholesome credentials who could
have been honored? Finally, the only pogrom in Europe *since* the Holocaust     killed 40-50 Jews in Kielce, Poland, in 1946. As I noted in an earlier post,    apparently some thought the Holocaust insufficient.

Alex is quite right in noting the Polish contribution to the Allied war
effort is usually understated- note especially the codebreaking work-
but this is a separate issue.

2) Italy took anti-Semitic actions only in response to real or perceived
requirements of the alliance with the Nazis. I don't think Italy had any
anti-Jewish laws until c.1938, a very sizable number if not most of the
Italian Jewish community survived the war, and Italian commanders in
Yugoslavia intervened to save Jews.

3) Finland saved its entire native Jewish population of 1700+. The only
Jews it turned over were 8 non-Finns demanded by the Gestapo on political       and criminal grounds, who were included in a larger group of about 25 of
all backgrounds. To their credit, the Finns fully investigated this act
and to this day it is considered a national scandal. Another 100 or so
non-Finnish Jews were also protected. President Mannerheim's response to
increasing German pressure to surrender the Jews was to attend services
at a leading Helsinki synagogue.

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 15:18:19 -0500
From:    Henry Sirotin <hhs@EVEREST.HUNTER.CUNY.EDU>
Subject: Re: Patton biography

The decision to curtail Patton was not Truman's alone- so far as I am
aware, the entire European US Army hierarchy concurred.

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 15:24:43 EST
From:    Mike Oaks <moaks@KSCMAIL.KENNESAW.EDU>
Subject: Re: INF: Tokyo RAid and Chinese casualties

On Wed, 1 Mar 1995 08:32:19 -0500,
Ron Babuka  <wrb1@CORNELL.EDU> wrote:

>        As per a thread that floated arround a coupe of days ago - from  "I
>Could Never Be So Lucky Again"  Gen James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle:
>
>        Chaing was seething about the enemy onslaught and sent a cable to
>the U.S. State Department:
>
snip snip snip

Ouch, Ron, that was alot of people to die due to the Doolittle raid. I've
heard somethings in the past about japanese retribution but nothing to this
scale...again, Ouch! I'm interested in the war in China and especially
about Japanese atrocities. Could you please refer me to a few good books
dealing with these subjects??
Thanks in advance!!
            Mike Oaks

/====================================================================\
|    Michael A. Oaks                                                 |
|    Systems Analyst                  Music: A means to mark times   |
|    moaks@kscmail.kennesaw.edu              stepping stones through |
|    Kennesaw, Georgia 30144                 your calendar of life.  |
|    Tel: (404)423-6049  Fax (404)423-6541          ~ ~ ~ ~      MAO |
|    VWAR-L #146 - - (Sgt. USAF = / AFCS / AFSS / AFDC)              |
|    Break, Break...Kadena, Kadena, Clark, Clark, Request you echo...|
|    (Some things you never forget...even after 25 years...)         |
\====================================================================/

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 15:27:28 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Re: MEDIA:Col. Bates Dies

        I just want to echo Jim Curry and say that "Hit Hard" is one heckuva
good read for those who like war memoirs, or just well-written personal
history.  Also appropriate for those who ignored Black History Month, just
completed-- this can be your make-up assignment.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 16:37:42 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <wrb1@CORNELL.EDU>
Subject: Re: Info on USN Battle Stars

>1. How were Battle Stars awarded?

Battle stars were awarded to ships (and men) when assigned to a specific
combat operations or campaigns.  (i.e. for example my father and his ship
recieved a battle star for the bombardment at Palau along with all other
ships involved in their campaign, a battle star for the Phillipines
campaign, plus a battle star for his ships individual combat at Ormoc Bay).
Also there are silver and bronze battle stars awarded to sailors.

>2. Where did ships display them? Especially DD, and what did they look like?

My fathers destroyer (DD-692 Allen M. Sumner) did not have it's battle
stars painted on the ship during the the war


>3. Did crewmembers have/wear any decorations to represent Battle Stars?

Battle stars (bronze or silver)  are "pinned" on top of campaign ribbons.


>4. On a USN DD Destroyer how were aircraft kills represented, Flag or
>Aircraft Symbol?


On my fathers destroyers, each destroyer VERIFIED sunk had an painted
figure of a ship going under (1/2 ship at 45 degrees to surface) and each
VERIFIED aircraft sunk had an painted figure of an aircraft placed on the
bridge.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 15:42:18 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <RTMOORE@PCAD-ML.ACTX.EDU>
Subject: Re: The Ursel rocket launcher (not much though)

Hello, Gudmundur!

Will see what I can find. I should have something on this.
More later.

All the best.

Terry
>
> Terry Moore: HELP! :) Have you anything on this stuff?
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Gudmundur J. Helgason                              e-mail: gummihe@ismennt.is
> Olduslod 41                                              phone: (354)-5655270
> 220 Hafnarfjordur                                               (354)-5652270
> ICELAND                                             Maintainer of ICELAND.FAQ
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 13:46:30 -0800
From:    Steve New <newst@IX.NETCOM.COM>
Subject: Re: Richard I.Bong

You wrote:

>
>Esaul Zermeno Bautista writes:
>>
>>        I'm looking information about Richard I .Bong
>>        specially in wich airplane he realize more scores.
>>
>
>
>        My source indicates that Bong scored 40 victories overall, and
the
>only plane mentioned in most of the accounts is the P-38 Lightning.  It
>appears that he flew P-38s for most, if not all, of his combat career.
 As
>to the specific P-38 variants he might have flown, or individual tail
codes
>of his aircraft, I have no information handy.  Bong's main wingman
during his
>career appears to have been Capt. Thomas J. Lynch, who himself scored
20
>victories.  Bong was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honour for his
>voluntary, repeated engagement in combat.  Toward the end of the war, I
seem
>to recall that he was posted back to the U.S. to prevent the Pacific's
leading
>ace from being shot down (a definite public relations nightmare), and
to
>bolster war production/war bonds back home.  Bong appears to have been
a big
>hit on the factory/war bond circuit, and I've seen pictures of him
buzzing
>various plants in his natural aluminum-finished P-38.  He was killed in
>August 1945 while testing a new airplane (I don't know what type) at
Muroc,
>California.
>
>Source: Thomas Parrish (ed.) _The Simon and Schuster Encyclopedia of
World
>        War II_.  New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978.
>
>
>Hope this helps.
>
>--
>----------
>Jon Perkins--Ottawa, Canada
>jperkins@ccs.carleton.ca
>
>
Bong was killed testing the prototype P-80 for lockheed.


--

Steve L. New
newst@ix.netcom.com
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 19:46:00 -0500
From:    Colin Brace <BRACEC@A1.MGH.HARVARD.EDU>
Subject: Re: Jim Irwin

       For Jim Irwin,
                      Sorry to blast the list with this, but the messages
       sent to Jim Irwin keep getting rejected. Jim, would you please give
       your kind permission for me to forward your post on the finding of the
       British Army truck in Egypt? I would like to post it to the Britsh
       auto enthusiast list, as I think they would be interested. Thank you
       for your informative postings, and thank you, Joe Barone & all list
       members for your patientce.

       Colin Brace WA1KWA

       bracec@a1.mgh.harvard.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 20:20:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 3 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
SATURDAY, 3 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): 4 B-24s over the Gulf of Tonkin and
the S China Sea attack shipping targets of opportunity, claiming 1 vessel
sunk and 3 damaged. In French Indochina, 3 B-25s hit Kep, damaging several
locomotives and boxcars and hit a bridge and 12 P-51s hit targets of
opportunity between Vinh and Nam Dinh (2 direct hits are scored on the bridge
at Minh Koi) while 2 others blast a HQ building in Hanoi.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 24 P-38s and P-47s support
forces of the Chinese 50th Division near Mansam; 16 support the British 36
Division in the Mogok area; 10 P-47s knock out the Na-lang bridge while 2
B-25s drop delay-action bombs in good pattern around the Loi-leng bridge; 10
B-25s join 80+ fighter-bombers in an attack on troops, supplies, tanks,
trucks, gun positions, and transport elephants behind enemy lines, 29 of
the fighter-bombers concentrate on the Kankang area. 643 air supply sorties
are completed.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 2 missions are flown.
  Mission 861: 1,102 bombers and 743 fighters are dispatched to bomb oil
refineries, oil plant equipment works, motor transport factory, tank plant,
and rail bridge in NC and E Germany; they claim 25-2-37 Luftwaffe aircraft;
9 bombers and 8 P-51s are lost:
  1. 114 B-17s are sent to hit the oil refinery at Misburg (23); 82 hit the
secondary target, the Hanomag tank factory at Hannover; and 2 hit Lemford, a
target of opportunity; bombing is by H2X radar; 11 B-17s are damaged; 9
airmen are KIA and 5 WIA. Escorting are 44 of 46 P-51s; they claim 0-0-1
aircraft in the air; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).
  2. 222 B-17s are sent to bomb the oil plant at Ruhland (24) and bomb
visually; 166 hit the secondary target, the marshalling yard at Chemnitz
using H2X; targets of opportunity are Plauen (11) and other (16); 2 B-17s are
damaged beyond repair and 63 damaged. 193 of 214 P-51s escort claiming 3-0-0
aircraft in the air and 10-0-23 on the ground; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).
  3. 94 B-24s are dispatched to hit the Nienburg Bridge (41); 48 hit the
secondary target, the marshalling yard at Bielefeld and 1 hits a target of
opportunity; attacks are visual; 3 B-24s are damaged. The escort is 19 of 21
P-51s without loss.
  4. All 219 B-24s dispatched hit the Rothensee oil refinery at Magdeburg
visually; they claim 1-0-0 aircraft; 4 B-24s are lost and 77 damaged; 3
airmen are WIA and 39 MIA. The escort is 129 of 144 P-51s; they claim 0-0-2
aircraft in the air; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA).
  5. The primary targets for 453 B-17s are the Wilke (53) and Brussing (77)
oil plants and the MIAG munitions plant (61) at Brunswick and oil refineries
at Dollbergen (37), Dedenhausen (53) and Nienhagen (56); 38 hit the
secondary, Hildesheim (38); targets of opportunity are the marshalling yard
at Bielefeld (36), Herford (23) and other (2); most attacks are visual; they
claim 1-2-4 aircraft; 5 B-17s are lost and 53 damaged; 1 airman is WIA and 41
MIA. Escorting are 169 of 180 P-51s; they claim 0-0-4 aircraft in the air and
9-0-2 on the ground; 2 P-51s are lost (pilots MIA) and 1 damaged beyond
repair.
  6. 100 of 107 P-51s fly a fighter sweep in the Leipzig-Magdeburg area; they
claim 1-0-3 aircraft in the air; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).
  7. 30 of 31 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  Mission 862: 18 of 24 B-24s bomb the marshalling yard at Emden using PFF.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, the 9th Bombardment
Division hits Wiesbaden, Giessen, Bergisch Born, and Nahbollenbach ordnance
and storage depots, rail bridges at Remagen and Simmern, a communications
center at Heimersheim, motor transport concentration at Schwelm, the
Rheinbach ammunition dump, Kirn marshalling yard and town, and several
targets of opportunity; fighters fly bomber escort, hit special targets, fly
patrols and armed reconnaissance, and support the US 9th Infantry Division,
3d Armored Division, and VII Corps astride the Erft River W of Euskirchen and
the area near Roggendorf W of the Rhine River, the XIII, XVI, and XIX Corps E
of Sevelen, NE of Krefeld, and W of the Rhine in the Dusseldorf area, and the
VIII, XII, and XX Corps in the area between the Prum and Kyll Rivers and
along the Mosel River in the Trier area.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Rapidly deteriorating weather
cancels bombing operations. In Austria, P-51s strafe rail traffic between
Leibnitz and SW of Spittal an der Drau and attack the airfield S of Graz;
P-38s fly reconnaissance and reconnaissance escort. 1 B-24, of 6 dispatched,
drops supplies in N Yugoslavia. HQ 31st Fighter Group and the 307th and 308th
Fighter Squadrons move from San Severo to Mondolfo, Italy with P-51s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, overcast skies and
turbulent winds hamper medium bomber missions against communications in the
Brenner area, allowing only limited success against targets; the Crema and
Fidenza Bridges in the Po Valley are damaged; XXII Tactical Air Command
fighter-bombers, destroy a sugar refinery at Verona and achieve good results
against communications and dumps in the C Po Valley and Brenner area; other
fighters and fighter-bombers support the US Fifth Army S of Bologna; A-20s
during the night of 2/3 Mar, hit roads, ammunition supplies, and vehicles at
several points in the Po Valley, particularly in the Bologna-Modena regions,
and bomb the Legnano marshalling yard.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 10 B-24s from Guam Island pound Susaki Airfield
on Chichi Jima Island in an afternoon strike, and 4 more, flying individual
strikes, hit the same target during the night of 3/4 Mar. The 467th and 468th
Fighter Squadrons, 508th Fighter Group, move from Kahuku to Mokuleai, Hawaii
with P-47s.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: In Formosa, B-24s
pound the Tainan area and Kiirun while fighters hit numerous targets of
opportunity and fighter-bombers bomb Koshun Airfield. B-25s bomb San Roque
Airfield on Mindanao Island, Philippine Islands. B-24s and B-25s attack
Zettle Field on Jolo Island. Ternate on Samar Island and Echague on Luzon
Island and Caballo Island in Manila Bay are bombed by A-20s. B-25s, aborting
a strike against Formosa, bomb the airstrip at Basco on Batan Island,
Philippine Islands.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  jem3@cc.bellcore.com  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

03/0118Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 20:19:28 EST
From:    Brian Nicklas <NASAD003@SIVM.SI.EDU>
Subject: Re: Bio: Richard Ira Bong

Bong's most famous aircraft was a Lockheed P-38J-15-LO, AF serial
42-103993, nicknamed "Marge," after his girlfriend Marjorie
Vattendahl.  A 20x24 inch B&W photograph of Marge was tinted (colored)
and pasted onto the nose of the aircraft, along with 25 Japanese
flags.  The photo was Marge's graduation photo from Superior State
Teachers College.
The plane was lost in March 1944, while being flown by another
pilot (who safely bailed out).
Majorie Vattendahl and Richard Ira Bong were married on February 10, 1945
in Superior, Wisconsin.
Dick Bong was killed August 6, 1945 while flying a Lockheed P-80A-1-LO
AF serial 44-85048 on an AF acceptance flight from the Lockheed plant
in Burbank, California.
The P-80A was from the first production batch, not a prototype.
The Bong Memorial in Poplar, Wisconsin has a P-38 mounted as if in flight,
painted to depict 42-103993 "Marge."
Sources: Lockheed Aircraft since 1913 by Rene Francillion, Naval Institute
Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1987.
Ace of Aces: The Dick Bong Story by Carl Bong and Mike O'Conner,
Champlin Museum Press, Mesa, Arizona, 1985.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 20:48:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: B-29 sans defensive weapons

 >A while ago there was a thread as to the switch from high altitude B-29
 >raids being replaced by low altitude incendiary raids.  I had posted where
 >I read that they also removed the gunners and defensive weapons for these
 >raids. I poseted this minus any sources since I couldn't remember where I
 >had read it - wel last night I stumbled across my source: John Costello's
 >"The Pacific War 1941-1945" and in it:

SNIP   SNIP   SNIP

You have to look at each firebomb raid individually becase the
requirements changed with each.  For the Tokyo raid on the night of
9/10 Mar, Major General Curtis Emerson LeMay, Commanding General
XXI Bomber Command, had originally suggested that all guns be
removed from some of the B-29s and using the, along with regularly
armed B-29s, exclusively in night incendiary raids.  The average
load of ammunition in the B-29 was 8,000 roads which weighed 3,200
pounds (1,452 kg).  Only the tail guns were manned.

On the night of 11/12 Mar, the B-29s hit Nagoya; each B-29 carried
200 rounds of 50 caliber (12.7 mm) ammunition for the tail guns.
On the night of 13/14 Mar, 274 B-29s hit Osaka.  The low wing was
given 50 caliber ammunition for the lower forward and aft turrets
in addition to the tail guns.


-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  jem3@donuts0.bellcore.com  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 21:02:01 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <ben.frank@HIS.COM>
Subject: INFO ON USN BATTLE STA

Battle stars were worn on theater ribbons, such as the Asiatic-Pacific theater,
for instance. A battle star represented a battle in which the individual or
ship participated, but the Navy Board of Awards established which action
warranted a battle star. Large campaign ribbons were generally painted on the
bridges or the sides of the bridges of combat vessels and each time a battle
star was awarded for an action, it was painted in. An individual could wear a
theater ribbon if he served in the theater, but was only entitled to have
battle stars if he participated in cmapaigns for which battle stars were
designated. Thus, someone who served his whole time in the war at Pearl Harbor
and never went into combat, would wear the Asiatic-Pacific theater ribbon
bereft of stars. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 21:13:28 EST
From:    John Davis <jbdavis@NANDO.NET>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 03-MAR-1945

On 03-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, contact is made between the
British XXX Corps and the American XVI Corps at Walbeck, southwest of
Gelderen. In the U.S. 9th Army sector, the offensive of the 35th Division is
slowed because of heavy resistance from German parachutists. The XII Corps is
also facing heavy German resistance. In spite of this the 84th Division still
captures Rath and advances on towards Homberg. In the 1st Army sector, the
VII Corps is advancing rapidly towards the Rhine, taking Glessen and
Dansweiller. The 1st Division and 9th Armoured Division reach the Erflt. The
2nd Division crosses the Rur at Heimbach and continues pushing south towards
Gemund. In the 3rd Army sector, the 4th and 87th Divisions are pinned down
near Ormont and Reuth. The 11th Armoured Division cross the Prum and attacks
towards the Kyll, taking Fleringen. The 5th Division secures a small
bridgehead on the east of the Kyll.

Philippines - In the XIV Corps area, the 37th Division overcomes final
resistance within Manila. Elements of the 11th Airborne Division conclude
operations to clear Manila Bay with the reduction of resistance in the
Ternate area.

Iwo Jima - The VAC makes slow progress toward the O-3 Line against
increased resistance.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | jbdavis@nando.net
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 21:22:52 EST
From:    Paul <PGREGOR@KENTVM.KENT.EDU>
Subject: Re: A-bomb spies

I thought Klaus Fuchs was the one responsible for passing the bomb secrets--
Seems discovery or Arts and Entertainment's series Spies (I forget which)
did an episode on this.... I do also recall that there was some suspicion
cast on Oppy during the Mccarthy witch hunts but can't remember that source
either.

                                            Paul Gregor

                                             Kent State

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 21:28:24 EST
From:    Paul <PGREGOR@KENTVM.KENT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Bio: Richard Ira Bong

I think General Yeager makes comment on Bongs death in his book,
   briefly.


                                   Paul Gregor
                                    Kent State

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 1 Mar 1995 to 2 Mar 1995
***********************************************

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Status: O

There are 26 messages totalling 1364 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. MEDIA:WWII Truck Found
  2. INF: Tokyo RAid and Chinese casualties
  3. INF: USN Chronology 03-03-95
  4. Patton Museum
  5. Weather Reports
  6. B-29 sans defensive weapons (2)
  7. Patton biography (2)
  8. Nissen  and Quonset Huts
  9. China/Japan part 8 (2)
 10. endlossung/Germans or Nazis?
 11. Greenland P-38F restoration
 12. China/Japan part 9
 13. Endlosung (was:Is it true that they can trace a single document) (2)
 14. Richard I.Bong
 15. China/Japan conclusion
 16. Japanese tactics revisited
 17. INF: 50 Years Ago - 04-MAR-1945
 18. Japanese tactical afterthoughts part 2
 19. Battle of the Bulge
 20. INFO ON USN BATTLE
 21. Glacier Girl
 22. THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 00:19:45 -0500
From:    "Matthew R. Burchette" <Mathoo@AOL.COM>
Subject: Re: MEDIA:WWII Truck Found

The drivers and crew were not in as good as shape as the truck I'd warrent!

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 23:13:34 -0800
From:    Pedro A Loureiro <loureiro@SCF.USC.EDU>
Subject: Re: INF: Tokyo RAid and Chinese casualties

There is quite a lot of information on Japanese atrocities in China,
especially if you can read Chinese.  But even the English language
materials are quite voluminous.

If you have Mosaic, or Netscape, you can actually tap into the Chinese
University of Hong Kong's World Wide Web pages on the Nanjing Massacre.
The address (WWW) is: http://www.arts.cuhk.hk/NanjingMassacre/NM.html
Unfortunately, I have found that it is very difficult to bring up the
Nanjing home-page directly.  The best way to access it is by going into
the Chinese University's menu (http://www.cuhk.hk/) and then pick the
History Department.  You will then find the Nanjing option.  In the event
that you do not have an image browser, you can access the file through
lynx or gopher.

Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley have written many accounts about Japanese
atrocities.  A recent book by Haruko and Theodore Cook, Japan at War: An
Oral History, also has recollections by the Japanese themselves.

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (War Crime Trials)
is another good source.

Also look through the journal, Journal of Studies of Japanese Aggression
Against China.


Pedro Loureiro

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 04:00:12 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <tkeller@LOGICON.COM>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 03-03-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
03/03 Sat. Army troops land on Masbate, Burias and Ticao
           Islands, P. I.; landings are supported by naval
           gunfire and Marine aircraft.
           Submarine TUNA (SS-203) lands supplies on northeast
           coast of Borneo.
            United States naval vessel damaged, Iwo Jima area:
             Attack transport BOLIVAR (APA-34), by coastal
              defense gun,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
            Japanese naval vessel sunk:
             Oiler HARIO, by mine, off French Indochina,
              18 d. 10'N., 109 d. 40'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <ljewell@EXPERT.CC.PURDUE.EDU>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
tkeller@logicon.com

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 04:56:07 -0500
From:    Jeff Olson <jeff.olson@TFD.IGLOU.COM>
Subject: Patton Museum

QK.Has anybody been to the Patton Museum at Fort Knox?
.A report would be appreciated.

I've been there a couple of times and can assure you it is well worth
the side trip to Ft. Knox if you are ever in the Louisville, Ky area.
The museum is dedicated to armor of all types and eras.  There are
displays of tanks from many countries.  Patton, of course, is well
covered.  Lots of memorabilia including his "personal" van.  As I
recall they also have a research library but I don't know what it
contains.

Jeff Olson
---
. 1st 1.11 #1611 . jeff.olson@tfd.iglou.com

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 07:41:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Weather Reports

The Associated Press (AP) is reporting that Harry Geise, a
meteorologist who started giving detailed and long-term weather
forecasts on radio station WLS in Chicago has died at age 75.  What
is pertinent to this group is that he started reporting these weather
forecasts in 1941; the US Government forced him to stop in early
1942 because it was believed that these reports would assist German
U-boats in the Atlantic.

Requiescat in pace.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  jem3@donuts0.bellcore.com  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 07:32:26 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <RTMOORE@PCAD-ML.ACTX.EDU>
Subject: Re: B-29 sans defensive weapons

Hello, Ron!

Martin Caidin in his book "A Torch to the Enemy" states the same.
The weight saved from removing the gunners and defensive armaments
allowed the Superforts to carry more bombs.

Thanks for the post.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 10:03:10 -0500
From:    Matthew Savoie <msavoie@KRAKEN.MVNET.WNEC.EDU>
Subject: Re: Patton biography

Terry,
        Please post the list of Patton bios.  Thanks.
Matt


--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew M. Savoie           |    "Not to know what happened before you were |
Western New England College |    born is to remain always a child."         |
1215 Wilbraham Road         |         - Cicero                              |
Box 1830                    |                                               |
Springfield, MA 01119       |    msavoie@wnec.edu                           |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 10:05:57 -0500
From:    Matthew Savoie <msavoie@KRAKEN.MVNET.WNEC.EDU>
Subject: Re: Patton biography

Terry,
        Thanks for the list.
Matt
--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew M. Savoie           |    "Not to know what happened before you were |
Western New England College |    born is to remain always a child."         |
1215 Wilbraham Road         |         - Cicero                              |
Box 1830                    |                                               |
Springfield, MA 01119       |    msavoie@wnec.edu                           |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 11:16:09 -0500
From:    Barone <m1b@SSD.RAY.COM>
Subject: Re: Nissen  and Quonset Huts

Henry Sirotin <hhs@EVEREST.HUNTER.CUNY.EDU> write:
> Is there a difference between Nissen and Quonset Huts? Were these
> British and American terms for the same thing? If not, how did
> they differ?

        Since moving to Rhode Island, I have heard that Quonset Huts
acquired that name because they were first constructed at Quonset
Air Station in Rhode Island.  That's about all I can offer on this
topic, though.
--
Joe Barone
m1b@ssd.ray.com
Mulligan!?  On time and on target!?  Cripes!

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 12:14:38 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Re: B-29 sans defensive weapons

        I believe LeMay also mentions the removal of defensive armament on the
B-29's for low-level missions in "Superfortress."  He also speaks of the
difficulties air gunners had adjusting to the sighting system for the
remotely-operated gun positions.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 13:41:59 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: China/Japan part 8

        Meanwhile, back in China...
        ...there was a war going on.  Although the English-speaking reader may
not run across too much about it in most of the general histories of the Second
World War in the Pacific, it was definitely real to both the Chinese and
Japanese.  In December 1941 there were 22 Japanese divisions deployed in China,
twice the number used in the great southern offensive (just for the record, the
total forces employed in the first three months of the Japanese southern
offensive, including reserves, totalled 11 divisions, 5 brigades, 9 tank
regiments, and the three-battalion "South Seas Detachment."  To clear up
confusion on the number of brigades, since I replied to someone's question by
listing only one, there was one infantry brigade in the opening wave.  The
figure above counts reserves, and also includes the 1st Parachute Brigade, with
only one battalion of actual paratroopers).  In mid-1943 there were in China 26
divisions (including one armored division) and a dozen brigades (including a
horse cavalry brigade), and in August 1945 there were still 28 divisions (one
armored) in China proper (none of these figures counting Manchuria or
Mongolia).  Thus the Japanese commitment in China remained huge, even appearing
to grow as the war progressed (this is however deceiving, as the number of men
per division was definitely higher in 1941; from 1943 onwards many of the
divisions in China were the inferior type "C" divisions, and even the brigades
there in 1943, except for the cavalry, were in most cases distinctly
second-line formations in terms of manpower, training, and equipment).
Nonetheless, Japan remained tied down in China in a large way-- while, on the
other side, and despite the agreements between Roosevelt and Churchill to
concentrate 90% of the Allied war effort in Europe, there were at the end of
1942 more US Army troops in the Pacific than in the Mediterranean and European
theatres.  Japan's commitment in China condemned them to repeat on a strategic
scale the same tactical errors they had demonstrated on Guadalcanal-- i.e.,
being unable to concentrate sufficient forces for the task, they frittered away
many of their best, combat-experienced divisions piecemeal (2nd Division on
Guadalcanal, 6th Division on Bougainville, 1st Division on Leyte, etc).  These
battle-hardened veterans, once lost, could not be replaced.  Although I haven't
read it myself (Toland summarizes it extensively, and Ienaga also makes
reference to it), the recollections of Corporal Kiyoshi Kamiko, a squad leader
in the "Gem" (1st) Division, apparently show both the fighting qualities and
the high attrition suffered by these forces, the pride of the Japanese Army.
Kamiko's unit, during the fighting for the eminence on Leyte known to the GI's
as "Breakneck Ridge," repeatedly threw back American assaults with little more
than rifles, light machineguns, and grenades (and, in one case, the timely
intervention of one heavy artillery piece and four field guns), plus their own
wits and tenacity.  But after the second round of US attacks Kamiko's company
was already down to 25 men, and would soon be critically short of
ammunition as well.  Kamiko was one of a handfull from his division to survive.
        Nor were the units in China necessarily in for soft duty.  In fact, it
was quite the opposite, as this vast unheralded war continued without pause.
The spectacular events of the war between Chiang and the Japanese-- the trench
fighting around Shanghai, the capture and despoilation of Nanking, the shocking
Japanese defeat and near-catastrophe in Shantung province (offset by the fact
that the Japanese were still making spectacular advances virtually everywhere
else), and the destruction of the Yellow river dykes as a Chinese delaying
tactic-- all occurred in 1937-38.  But in 1939 the Japanese Army launched an
offensive against the guerillas in Shansi province, employing three divisions
and on a few occasions surreptitiously using poison gas, while the Navy mounted
its own expedition to take Hainin island in the south.  The year 1940 brought
the ferocious "Hundred Regiments Offensive" by the Communist guerilla armies
in the north, leading to heavy casualties for both sides.  This led to a
large-scale counteroffensive against Mao's forces in the north in 1941, which
caused the Communists further heavy losses.  Still, this hydra was almost
impossible to kill.  By 1944 the Communist forces had again risen to at least
half a million men, by the most conservative Japanese estimates (the estimates
range considerably higher).
        Meanwhile, in the south, Chiang had withdrawn from the war in China
proper to the greatest degree possible, but it takes both sides to make a
peace.  The Doolittle raid on Japan in the spring of 1942 brought a brutal
response in the form of offensive action by some 53 Japanese battalions, who
pushed inland up to 200 miles in an attempt to capture the surviving crewmen
from the raid, and (according to a post I just saw-- was that Jack McKillop?--
if not, great post whoever did it) killing a quarter million Chinese civilians
in reprisal.  This was, of course, going on simultaneously with the "Three All"
policy to depopulate the real and suspected Communist strongholds in the north.
In the winter of 1942-43, five Japanese divisions began what was actually an
extensive foraging operation to bring in foodstuffs for the off-season, but
since this advance seemed to be aimed straight for Chungking, Chiang's Chinese
had to take it seriously.  Chiang's troops did enough fighting in this one that
they fired off roughly half their remaining stocks of ammunition in the
process-- a real problem since, with the Burma road cut, resupply could only
come from the tedious and difficult supply flights over the Hump, as the
mountains separating China from India were known to the fliers.  The capacity
of this extensive resupply by air was extremely limited, and in terms of
resources employed for results gained it was not a very efficient way of waging
war from the Allied point of view.
        In Burma, Stilwell was doing everything he could to reopen a ground
route, primarily with Chinese forces.  Chiang had experienced second thoughts
about his agreement to let Stilwell train (and equip with US weapons) thirty
divisions in India, worrying about the political implications of having such
high-quality troops outside his direct control.  He soon began sabotaging the
plan, and the quality of men (there were constant arguments over the quantity
as well) left much to be desired.  One US processing center for arriving
Chinese recruits in India found 100% of the men that passed through suffering
from some form of disease.  General Wedemayer, Stilwell's successor when
"Vinegar Joe" was finally recalled in 1944, said that even then most of the new
soldiers could not even stand a short hike without collapsing from exhaustion,
and many were literally on the verge of dying from starvation when they came to
the American camps.  Nevertheless, Stilwell's campaign in 1943 proved
successful.  Employing deep penetration tactics and flanking movements in the
tenuous, jungle-covered front, he surprised the Japanese by reaching the key
center of Myitkina.  In the course of this campaign Stilwell drove his small
composite American group, famed as "Merrill's Marauders" (from their
commander's name) to the point of exhaustion.  Merrill himself suffered a heart
attack and had to be evacuated.  But this group worked miracles before becoming
too worn down to continue, and penetrations by Chinese forces also proved
effective (one Chinese unit spent almost a week in "attack preparations"--
i.e., moving through thick jungle to get into attack position.  Another Chinese
force made the deep penetration to take Kamaing that resulted in the Japanese
in Myitkina being cut off from supplies).  The Myitkina battle dragged on for
months, turning into a siege as both sides misestimated the other's
capabilities.  Stilwell did not initially realize how strong the Japanese
garrison, composed largely of men from the experienced 18th Division, was, nor
how tough the pillboxes and other defenses would be to take in frontal warfare.
The Japanese, for their part, seriously overestimated the strength of the
attacking forces.  Though prolonged and costly, the capture of Myitkina was a
definite Allied victory.
        The year 1944 saw the last successful large-scale Japanese ground
offensive of the war.  Not surprisingly, this effort came in China.  I saw
recently on the list the plans Chennault put forth to bomb Japan into
submission using bases in China.  Pearl Harbor delayed but did not terminate
the implementation of this plan.  By 1944 Chennault's 14th Air Force, using
advanced bases in southeast China, was causing the Japanese severe headaches.
Given the tight supply situation in China, the proper use of resources was a
topic of serious disagreement between Chennault and Stilwell.  The latter
argued that it was pointless to build up an air force and the extensive ground
organization that supported it without first having in place a land army
capable of defending their bases against Japanese attack.  Stilwell's dire
predictions came true when the Japanese launched their "Ichi-Go" offensive in
south China during April 1944.  There were 12 Japanese divisions, counting
reserves, employed in this operation (hey, speaking of great names, how about
General Banzai, one of the senior Japanese commanders in this operation?).  In
theory the Chinese had 34 of their own divisions to face them.  In practice,
there were many instances where the Chinese fled from much smaller Japanese
units.  Chennault's air units pounded the advancing Japanese, but could not
stop them (they still controlled the skies to a large degree, in spite of the
Japanese introduction during this operation of their excellent new Ki-84
fighter, which often won in individual engagements but was not yet available in
sufficient quantity to make a real difference).  The tenacious defense of
Hengyang by Chinese Maj-General Fong Tsien-Chueh, who held the city for six
weeks, was an exception to the general pattern of the ground fighting, and in
the end only delayed rather than halted the Japanese.  By the end of summer
Chennault's main bases-- the chief objective of the exercize-- had been
overrun, and the offensive continued on into the fall before petering out due
more to vast spaces and the Japanese scarcity of resources than to Allied
action.
        And with the last successful major Japanese offensive of the war I'll
have to break off.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 14:54:14 EST
From:    Roger Coon <coon@CVAX.IPFW.INDIANA.EDU>
Subject: Re: China/Japan part 8

All of this discussion of the CBI theater has piqued my interest in
that part of the war.  Any suggestions out there from the list as
to the best history of the Sino-Japanese war in particular and the
CBI theater in general?
As always, thanks in advance,
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 14:00:51 -0600
From:    Kelvin Brent Luther <umluther@CC.UMANITOBA.CA>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

On Thu, 2 Mar 1995, Henry Sirotin wrote:

> I think we went through this on this list two months ago (or was it
> Milhist-l?)
>
> 1) While no organized Polish group took part in the Holocaust, and hundreds
> of Poles risked their lives to save Jews, thousands more actively collaborated
> with the Germans. The most likely reason there was no organized collaboration
> was that Poland, unlike most occupied German territory, was directly ruled
> by the Germans. I seriously doubt a Polish puppet government would have
> behaved any differently than, say, Vichy. To cite St. Maximilian Kolbe
> in this context is insulting. Kolbe was one of the most notorious
> anti-Semites in prewar Poland, a journalist and politician who crusaded
> on this issue. This fact would almost certainly have been known to
> John Paul II when he named Kolbe, and was brought out almost immediately
> thereafter, yet the process of canonization continued. Among the million,
> wasn't there ONE Catholic Pole with more wholesome credentials who could
> have been honored? Finally, the only pogrom in Europe *since* the Holocaust
> killed 40-50 Jews in Kielce, Poland, in 1946. As I noted in an earlier post,
> apparently some thought the Holocaust insufficient.
>
> Alex is quite right in noting the Polish contribution to the Allied war
> effort is usually understated- note especially the codebreaking work-
> but this is a separate issue.
>
> 2) Italy took anti-Semitic actions only in response to real or perceived
> requirements of the alliance with the Nazis. I don't think Italy had any
> anti-Jewish laws until c.1938, a very sizable number if not most of the
> Italian Jewish community survived the war, and Italian commanders in
> Yugoslavia intervened to save Jews.
>
> 3) Finland saved its entire native Jewish population of 1700+. The only
> Jews it turned over were 8 non-Finns demanded by the Gestapo on political
> and criminal grounds, who were included in a larger group of about 25 of
> all backgrounds. To their credit, the Finns fully investigated this act
> and to this day it is considered a national scandal. Another 100 or so
> non-Finnish Jews were also protected. President Mannerheim's response to
> increasing German pressure to surrender the Jews was to attend services
> at a leading Helsinki synagogue.
>
> Henry Sirotin
>
        I believe the Danes also managed to save most of their Jewish
population ferrying them to Sweden just before they were to be rounded
up.  I cannot remember how the roundup was leaked but it may have been
the Danish gov't itself before it was taken over by the Nazis and
controlled.  Was this the impetus for the Germans taking over the Danish
gov't, anyone?
        I believe there was more than just one pogrom after the war, many
occuring in places like the current Belarus and Moldova
(Chisinau/Kishenev comes to mind) as well as Yugoslavia.
                                Kelvin Luther

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 16:20:33 EST
From:    "Dennis E. Sparks" <sparks@ALPHA.CAER.UKY.EDU>
Subject: Greenland P-38F restoration

Wednesday, I revisited the Greenland P-38F restoration.  For those on
the list who don't know what I'm talking about, this is the P-38 that
was recovered from under the ice in Greenland in 1992.  I visited the
restoration effort in May 1994 and posted a note to the list about it.


Brief history:  In the early morning hours of 15 July 1942, seven P-38Fs
of the 1st FG and two 97th BG B-17Es departed from the Bluie West 8
airstrip on Greenland and headed for Iceland.  These aircraft were a
part of Operation Bolero, the ferrying of combat aircraft to England.
One of the P-38s soon returned with a runaway propeller, while the others
continued on towards Iceland, 845 miles away.  After five hours of
flying in steadily worsening weather, a coded radio report was received
that seemed to indicate that weather conditions at the airfield near
Reykjavik was closing down rapidly. (Later, there was some evidence
to support the contention that the radio transmission was from a
German U-boat attempting to mislead them.)  The flight turned and
headed back to BW-8.  Two hours from there, they received a report from
BW-8 that the weather was too bad for landing, so they turned toward
Bluie West One, even further away.  After almost nine hours in the
air, the aircraft were forced down on the icecap by lack of fuel.
While the crew were rescued after four days, the aircraft were not
recovered, and lay undisturbed for 50 years, covered by an ever
deepening blanket of snow.

In the summer of 1992, one of the P-38s was recovered from under 270
feet (83 meters) of snow and ice.  Melting their way through the ice,
the recovery team melted a cavern around the aircraft and dismantled
it, lifting it in pieces through a 4 foot by 16 foot trench they had
created.  The recovery and subsequent transportation to Middlesboro,
Kentucky to begin restoration cost more than US$600,000, with about
another $700,000 spent so far on the restoration.  The aircraft is
being restored to flying condition, with an expected completion date
of 1996.  It is reputed to be the only "F" model P-38 in existence
(with the exception of course of five remaining under the ice in
Greenland).

Current Status:
Much progress has been made since I last saw the aircraft in May 1994.
The inboard sections of the wing are now completed, as is the right
outer wing panel.  The engines are undergoing restoration in
Indianpolis, Indiana.  The right engine is finished, and work is
progressing on the left engine.  The engine mounts look finished,
and they were installing the engine control cables and linkages while
I was there.  The booms are complete back to near the tails, which
are still absent.

The central nacelle containing the cockpit and armament is taking shape.
The forward and upper sections of the canopy are sitting in place, though
the cockpit itself is still empty.  According to project manager Bob
Cardin, this aircraft actually started life as a P-38E, being converted
to an "F" model while still on the assembly line.  It still retained
the sideways-folding upper section of the canopy of the earlier model,
a feature that is being preserved on the restored aircraft.  For those
of you unfamiliar with the P-38, it had a fixed forward windscreen and
aft canopy sections.  The central portion was in three pieces, with
two side pieces that rolled up very much like the side windows on an
automobile, and a third section overhead.  This overhead portion was
hinged on the right side of the earlier models, and hinged at the rear
beginning with (about) the "F" model.  Early models of the P-38 featured
a thick piece of armored glass situated inside the forward windscreen.
This armored glass was recovered in good shape and will be placed in
the aircraft when it is on display on the ground, but will be removed
to improve visibility when the aircraft is being flown.

The original nose section, which housed the guns, is installed and is
being finished.  A second nose section is also on display, with the
original guns and ammunition cans temporarily installed in it.  The
guns will be moved when the nose is complete.  The guns were among the
first items removed from the aircraft when it was being removed from
the ice.  They were successfully test fired, using the 50 year old
ammunition, after being brought to the surface.  The remaining
ammunition is now in storage, and replica ammunition loads will be
carried on the restored aircraft.

The landing gear struts have been returned from England where they
underwent a year and a half long restoration.  The struts are not
yet installed.  The original wheels could not be salvaged, and
replacements have been secured.  The tires still were still inflated
when recovered, and samples of the 50 year old air were saved.  The
original main wheels had wheel covers attached, and they had been
painted insignia blue.  I have no idea if this was some form of
squadron marking or simply the pilot's preference.

A pair of drop tanks from Lefty Gardner have been restored and painted.
New self-sealing rubber liners for the fuel tanks are on hand.

Currently wearing a fresh coat of zinc chromate green primer, the
aircraft will be repainted in the same olive drab over gray scheme
that it wore when new.  The insignia were the blue disc with the
white star, and oddly, the red disc in the center of the star.
(A section of the upper left wing and left boom with the national
insignia are on display.)  This puzzled me, as the red disc was
ordered removed in May 1942.  Bob confirmed that the red discs had
indeed been painted over with what he described as "white fence
paint", which easily rubbed off when the aircraft was recovered.
Other than the various stencilled markings, the only other markings
on the aircraft was the tail number.  The restoration crew has
named the aircraft "Glacier Girl", and a suitable piece of nose
art has been designed, to be applied when the aircraft is painted.
A piece of graffiti dating from the construction of the aircraft that
was uncovered under the inboard radiator on the right boom has been
preserved.

Dennis E. Sparks
sparks@alpha.caer.uky.edu
Lexington, Kentucky

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 16:27:15 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: China/Japan part 9

        As anyone who read my last post on this subject will realize, the
Japanese war in China, much as it may be ignored in many English-language
texts, was hardly a subsidiary operation.  On the contrary, it continued to
consume a major portion of the Japanese Army's resources.  A good example of
the relative scales involved would be the spring of 1942, when the Japanese
employed 53 battalions for a mere punitive expedition in south China, while at
the same time they allotted 14 battalions to face the Allies in New Guinea and
the Solomons.  Or reflect on the fact that the three divisions employed in the
anti-guerilla operations in Shansi in 1939 constituted a force equal in size to
those which conquered Malaya or the Phillipines.  Or that the 12 divisions for
the "Ichi-Go" offensive of 1944 was one more complete division than initially
used in the entire push south in 1941 (albeit the relative sizes and firepower
of the divisions involved were undoubtably quite different).  At any rate, it
could be argued that it was in fact the immense demands of this "sideshow" in
China that condemned the Japanese Army to fight a "poor man's war" everywhere
else.
        I haven't spoken much about Mao's Communist forces recently.  They were
most definitely still around and kicking, even if they had suffered serious
blows in 1941-42.  In fact, the "Ichi-Go" offensive in the south represented a
major opportunity for Mao's forces, who had previously had to face some of the
strongest Japanese military pressure being exerted on the China front.  While
the Japanese were preoccupied in the south, Mao's Communist guerillas oozed
into the neglected northern areas and set up shop.  Soon the Communists could
count under their control four entire northern provinces, with a combined
population of some 68 million inhabitants.  Mao's power base was secure, not
only for the duration of this war, but for the coming reckoning with Chiang.
        In 1941, already a bad year for the Communists as they faced a serious
and costly Japanese counteroffensive, Chiang's forces had broken their uneasy
truce with the Reds (Chiang gave evidence throughout that he still considered
the internal Communists a greater threat than the external invaders, even
allowing tentative peace feelers to be extended to the Japanese).  One of
Chiang's armies attacked the Communist New Fourth Army, with which it was
supposed to be cooperating.  Chiang's troops fell on the Communist rear
echelons, and inflicted some 5,000 casualties in this surprise attack.  This,
of course, marked the end of any cooperation between the Communist and
Nationalist forces.
        BTW, it was not only left-leaning western journalists like Edgar Snow
who found many admirable qualities in Mao's forces.  Most of the US military
officers who served in missions to the Communists shared those sentiments, and
some got in hot water during the McCarthy era of the early 50's as remarks made
praising the organization, discipline, and efficiency of Mao's movement were
later cited as evidence they were "soft on Communism."  Also BTW, I earlier
wondered if Chu Teh had been commander of the 8th Route Army.  Well, yes, in a
sense (but not the sense I had in mind at the time).  Chu Teh, Mao's
indispensible right arm as I think Snow put it, was the commander-in-chief of
the Communist armies ever since their inception in 1927.  He was also a simple,
robust soldier in his personal habits, in particular having a great love for
the game of basketball, which he helped to introduce into the Chinese Communist
army as a recreational activity.  It was said he still played the occasional
pick-up game of hoops when he was 80 (though I bet he lost a step or two).
This is reminiscent of those photos of Mao swimming rivers at an age when most
people are in the geriatric ward.  Of course, Mao also was a firm believer in
hard physical exercize, and except for his heavy cigarette smoking, lived a
relatively simple lifestyle himself.  In 1918, when Mao was 25, he founded the
"New Citizens Society," a group which among its other activities believed in
tough physical training of a military nature.  They did such things as swim in
the rivers even in November, or sleep on the open ground when it was already
covered with frost.  Mao at this time wrote "Exercize should be savage and
rude."  He valued physical stamina, and the ability to do such things as leap
up on horseback and then shoot a rifle.  Mao himself had, as an 18-year-old,
served a six-month stint as a soldier in the Republican armies in 1911.
        A quick historical diversion.  The downfall of the effective power of
China's ruling dynasty came about in 1911.  The leading party for change was
the young Kuomintang (not pretending to know Chinese, but it translates more or
less as "National Peoples' Party").  Its head was Dr. Sun Yat-sen.  Dr Sun came
from a wealthy family.  He had received a western education, although he did
not generally leave the far east to do so.  But he had seen cultures other than
the Chinese first-hand.  Sun summed up China's condition thusly:
        "In spite of our 400 million people gathered together in one China, we
are in fact a sheet of loose sand (NOTE: Sun was speaking before WWI).  We are
the poorest and weakest state in the world, occupying the lowest position in
international affairs.  The rest of mankind is the carving knife and the
serving dish, while we are the fish and the meat."  Sun believed that China
should be run by and for the Chinese, preferably by and for Chinese who were
like himself of the respectable, educated upper-middle classes.  He came to
head a government in 1911, but quickly realized that he did not have enough of
a political, financial, and military power base in the country to actually
rule.  Therefore he resigned a mere fifteen days after taking office.  The
foreign powers, including the US, and also the old mandarin nobility whose
priveleged position was threatened by Sun's proposed meritocracy of businessman
and professionals, generally supported the corpulent northern warlord Yuan
Shi-kai, who came to rule in Peking with the help of western diplomatic
recognition (and money).  The country remained divided until Chiang undertook
his military campaign to unify it following Sun's death.  And of course there
were also the Japanese.  Their efforts to expand on to the Chinese mainland,
beginning in Korea and Manchuria, had already led to war with China in 1894 and
with the Russians in 1903-05.  Foreign diplomatic intervention had prevented
the Japanese from realizing the full fruits of their victories in each case.
However, during World War I, when Japan joined the Allied nations, its chief
role in the war was to invade the German-controlled portion of China (Tsingtao,
where the good beer comes from-- what a coincidence), defeat the small German
forces stationed there, and then-- stay.  Chinese indignation was great at
having German colonialism simply replaced by Japanese (to say nothing of the
untouched colonial holdings of the US, Britain, France, Italy)-- China had
also, under diplomatic pressure, eventually declared war on Germany.
Realization that that was exactly the case led to the first rail strike in
Chinese history in 1919, as a protest.

        Well, gotta go.  Conclusion of China/Japan to follow.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 16:27:35 -0600
From:    Kelvin Brent Luther <umluther@CC.UMANITOBA.CA>
Subject: Re: Endlosung (was:Is it true that they can trace a single document)

On Sun, 26 Feb 1995, Bill the Late-replier wrote:

>     I might accept that Hitler and the other honchos had a fantasy, if you
> will, that the Jews would be exterminated.  But the "systematic" events
> that expelled the Jews from society weren't all that systematic.  They
> might have followed a logical course, but what other course could they
> have followed?
>     In the end, as I was going to say, Hitler might have thought, "it
> would be nice if we could exterminate the Jews".  But to say that there
> was a concrete, realistic "architecture of genocide" (to use my Professor
> Breitman's term) is stretching the ablitiy of people in general to
> see into the future.
>
> William Lippert
> The American University
>
        I can understand where some of the arguments for your point of
view come from, but what I can't get past is the idea that people didn't
know where the policies against the Jews were heading.  We in North
America look at the buildup to the holocaust and say that the German
people could not have known where it was heading.  I think they did.
They obviously could not have known the scope it would reach but they
understood systematic anti-semitism.  They had been practicing it for
centuries.  The actions against the Jews from the early thirties on was
simply the most recent manifestation of it.  I think it would not be
incorrect to assume that the way the Jews were being treated and the laws
being enacted against them would lead any honest contemporary observer to
the conclusion that Jews were going to be murdered because of those
policies.  It is reasonable to assume a number of ten thousand would not
be stretching the imagination.  The simple fact that it reached the scale
it did does not preclude the people willing to stand by while the SA and
SS beat Jews to death in the streets from guilt for the final outcome.
As time wore on it also becomes hard to believe people did not realise
where it was heading.  I think Kristalnacht is probably the point of no
return for German guilt.  This was where there could have been no
question about where the Nazis had taken the German people.  I think that
at this point anyone who could have imagined 10 000 deaths previously
would have easily imagined ten times that many or more.
        After Kristalnacht there were people still willing to speak out.
Had enough people joined the chorus regardless of where Hitler and the SS
took Germany afterwards the German people could have had some claim
to at least partial innocence.  There is no reason to believe that Nazis
efforts against the Jews would not have been set back had there been a
public outcry against their policies at this time.  If it had simply
driven their actions underground then there likely would not be as much
of an issue over the guilt of the German populace.
                                Kelvin Luther

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 18:40:56 -0500
From:    chris garcia <moonie@AMANDA.DORSAI.ORG>
Subject: Re: Richard I.Bong

On Wed, 1 Mar 1995, Jim O'Neil wrote:

> >       I'm looking information about Richard I .Bong
> >       specially in wich airplane he realize more scores.
> >
>
> Esaul Alfredo,
>
> He flew a P-38 "Lightning" for all 40 of his victories. They were all in
> the South-West Pacific Area [New Guinea - New Britian area] against the
> Japanese.
>
> Jim O'Neil   Indecision is the cornerstone of Military Flexibility
>
I don't know much about Richard bong but I will add what I remember from
a TV documentary:
He was a very "straight" kind of guy who didn't join in the traditional
drinking and partying of fighter pilots.  He never drank alchohol, and
when he broke american ace Eddie Rickenbacker's record, Rickenbacker sent
him a case of scotch.  he gave the scotch to his friends and stuck to
Coca Cola.  Bong went to the states where he married his high school
sweetheart, and was killed when test flying (1945?) the Air Force's new
jet fighter, the P-80 "Shooting Star".

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 18:51:16 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: China/Japan conclusion

        We have seen how the war between China and Japan served not only as a
chief underlying cause of the eventual hostilities between Japan and the west,
but also that the Chinese conflict remained a focus for an immense proportion
of Japan's limited military resources.  Nor was the campaign there a picnic
for the soldiers involved, although a Japanese private posted to China probably
had a better chance of surviving the war than most of those sent to fight the
Allies anywhere else.  For the common soldier, given the huge distances and the
limited mechanization available (which Joe Barone, I see, made an excellent
observation on, comparing the degree of US motorization in one small
bridgehead, Anzio, with that of the entire Japanese forces in China), it was a
campaign of long, grueling marches, in which stragglers were often set upon and
murdered by vengefull villagers, all too many of whom had past experience of
Japanese atrocities.  It was also a campaign where the enemy was often
invisible, in that the guerillas could and did vanish into the civilian
population.  I should also mention that part of the preparation for "Ichi-Go"
was a widespread propaganda campaign, including the dropping of thousands of
leaflets, attempting to separate Chiang and the Chinese from the westerners.
To aid in this pursuit, and give some credibility to the theme that the
Japanese were the true friends of China, the Army made strenuous efforts to
enforce discipline, and even to re-educate the troops to prevent outrages
against the civilian population (the fact that these efforts yielded a fair
degree of success belies the excuse that the worst excesses in China were the
result of troops out of their officers' control.  It appears more like the
Japanese command just didn't try very hard to maintain order-- in fact, there
is a great deal of evidence to suggest that atrocities were encouraged at all
levels.  I keep remembering Ienaga speaking of an incident where after a
small-scale massacre a Chinese baby was found lying in the road by a Japanese
soldier, who asked his commanding officer what to do with it.  The
answer-- "kill it!")
        By 1945, though, the Japanese sun in China was definitely setting.  The
catastrophic defeat in Burma in early 1944 had set the stage for the reopening
of the Burma Road.  On the Japanese side, Mutaguchi and most of his staff were
relieved of command after the disaster.  A new formation, 33rd Army, was
created from the remnants of the Japanese forces in Burma, commanded by General
Masaki Honda.  Honda did a pretty good job of organizing a defense in central
and southern Burma, and whenever the British had to hit his positions head-on
they found the going tough.  However, after the loss of virtually an entire
army in the spring even the best improvisations could no longer hold back the
tide, and Japan's days in that country were clearly numbered.  In the north,
Stilwell's forces attempted to renew their push, hurt by the fact that the
Chinese forces which were supposed to be helping them by attacking the Japanese
from the Chungking side of the old Burma road made little progress, then were
largely diverted to stem the Ichi-Go assault.  Behind Stilwell, armies of US
engineers were busy hacking a new road out of the jungle, alleviating the need
of fighting through the strong defensive positions along the old thoroughfare.
Wherever Stilwell advanced, the road more or less followed him.  This
gargantuan task, a monumental feat of engineering, was, BTW, carried out
with the labor of thousands of black Americans working in construction
battalions.  Since we just passed Black History Month, I should mention that
patriotic African-Americans, despite all the disadvantages and barriers of an
institutionalized racism in the armed forces, played a notable role in the
Pacific whenever they were given the chance.  As many on the list know, one of
the first American war heroes was a black man, "Dorie" Miller of the US Navy.
At that time blacks were only allowed two basic jobs in the Navy-- they could
be stewards, a demeaning position which was essentially a shipboard waiter; or
they could be ammunition handlers, a job which involved hard manual labor, and
was dangerous to boot.  Miller was a steward on the battleship WEST VIRGINIA at
Pearl Harbor, who during the attack took over an abandoned .50-calibre mount
and was credited with shooting down three Japanese planes.  He was decorated
but remained a steward, and died in 1943 when the light carrier he was serving
on was sunk by a Japanese submarine during the Tarawa/Makin operation.
        The new road came to be known as the Ledo road, since it passed through
that town, but to the engineers who built it it was known as "Pick's Pike,"
after Maj-General Lewis Pick, who was in charge of construction.  The first
truck convoy went through to China on the new road in January 1945, and the
reopening of the land link certainly put a stamp on the Japanese defeat on the
Chinese mainland.  The final act in clearing the Japanese out of that corner of
northern Burma in January 1945 was the taking of the 7,500-foot peak known as
Huilungshan.  Journalist Theodore White ("In Search of History") vividly
described the action, which he witnessed, as a textbook demonstration of
military art, involving primarily Chinese troops with US air support.  The
degree of efficiently which could be acheived by properly trained, equipped,
and led Chinese troops was clearly evident.  After air strikes which included
the dropping of fragmentation bombs and napalm, the massed Allied artillery
began firing precisely ranged, precisely timed eight-minute salvos-- three
times an hour.  Under cover of each short barrage the Chinese infantry would
advance another stage up Huilungshan's slope, until at last they cleared the
peak with a spirited bayonet charge.
        Meanwhile in the north, the Japanese were able to mount
locally-successful offensive operations (some of which involved the 3rd Armored
Division) well into 1945, but the end was in sight there as well.  The Japanese
never found an adequate answer for Mao's guerilla tactics.  They took ground,
at times they inflicted casualties, but they never actually won.  August 1945
found the Communists still in control of large areas of northern China.  When
the bulk of the 300,000-strong Kwantung Army in Manchuria laid down its arms in
the face of the strong Soviet invasion, it was widely reported that a good many
of those arms were quickly transferred to the Chinese Communists, although many
have subsequently disputed this assertion (which would be hard to verify or
disprove, if only because so many captured Japanese weapons were already being
used by Mao's forces).  Japan was defeated, but the war in China was far from
over.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

PS: Two more to go: a final word on tactics, and an appendix briefly discussing
"the last battlewagon war."

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 20:20:00 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Japanese tactics revisited

        I thought I'd try to pass quickly over some of the campaigns of the
Pacific war to which I've referred briefly or not at all in my earlier posts,
and see if I can fit them into the overall pattern I've conjured up.
Particularly, I wanted to look at New Guinea and the post-Guadalcanal Solomons
campaigns.
        A good place to start would be New Georgia.  Despite the belated
recognition of the Japanese general staff of the pivotal role of the
Guadalcanal battle, and the disappointing outcome of same (in the land
fighting, about 25,000 Japanese died, compared to roughly 1,500 Americans-- the
latter about 1,000 Marines, and 500 of the US Army troops who were the majority
on the island by November), some aspects of the fighting on New Georgia, the
next Solomon isle to be attacked, might have been encouraging.  The Japanese
certainly contested the battle with a ferocity  which did not convey any
feeling of inferiority or defeat.  However, there were also some very
disturbing tendencies which continued to show themselves during the battle.
The Japanese ground forces on New Georgia were initially
very small, but they were supported by some of the best air and light naval
units the Japanese Navy had left.  Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, who as Nagumo's
chief-of-staff had actually been the controlling force behind the carriers of
Kido Butai from Pearl Harbor to Midway, was now Japanese naval commander at
Rabaul, responsible for the Solomons.  Rear-admiral Raizo Tanaka, of the famed
"Tokyo Express," still had his light cruisers and destroyers ready to plague
and bewilder the enemy (BTW, though "Tokyo Express" was an American nickname,
the Japanese too had their amusing slang.  The Navy preferred not to
risk transports in enclosed waters with uncertain air support, feeling more
comfortable shipping in reinforcements either in destroyers, which were fast
and could protect themselves, or in small motorboats, which could hide easily
and slip from island to island under cover of dark.  These were known to the
Japanese respectively as "Rat Express" [destroyers] and "Ant Freight.")
        The first American landings at Rendova, a small island within artillery
range of the chosen landing beaches at New Georgia, were carried out on the
last day of June 1943.  The Japanese air response was furious.  They threw in
just about everything they had, but after the losses of the previous year,
culminating in the unsuccessful "I-Go" air offensive, they were already running
out of planes and pilots.  Most of the Japanese attacks suffered
disproportionate losses, further aggravating the situation, but they came on
with great determination, and on many occasions some bombers broke through the
American fighters and flak to do some damage of their own.  On the first day of
the Rendova landings, a Japanese plane put a torpedo into the assault transport
that was serving as the flagship for Admiral Kelly Turner, the emerging
American master of amphibious operations.  On the third day ashore, a whole
formation of Japanese bombers made it in virtually untouched to drop their
loads over an American artillery position and a small peninsula crammed with
troops, where an engineers' dump of gelignite explosives went up, more than 150
people being killed or wounded by the blast.  US casualties to air raids on the
day reached 200 men.  On the fourth of July, the fifth day ashore, the Japanese
arranged a fireworks display by sending over 18 bombers escorted by 66
fighters.  The need to provide such a heavy escort alone says volumes about the
way the Japanese were losing even parity (much less their previous superiority)
in the air combat.  Four bombers managed to reach the main beaches, where their
bombs caused 19 casualties, but the Japanese lost another 11 planes, which was
certainly not offset by the pinpricks they were inflicting (there was one
occasion during this series of raids when the Japanese actually completed an
attack mission without losing a single plane, but this was an exception).  BTW,
while speaking of the Japanese "poor man's war," one aspect comes to mind in
the American "rich man's war" which is not often stressed in the accounts of
the Pacific fighting, namely the superb job done by American antiaircraft
gunners during most of the period from 1943 on.  It was just another example of
the superior American metal that I seem to keep reading of heavy Japanese
losses to AA fire.  Meanwhile, on the Japanese side I vividly recall, from
Yoshida's "Requiem For Battleship Yamato," an incident where an officer on that
Japanese ship gives a clinical explanation in terms of physics describing why
the Japanese ship-mounted 25-mm AA gun (usually emplaced on triple mounts) was
with its inferior muzzle velocity incapable of shooting down the fast new
American aircraft-- this lecture being given while about 250 of those aircraft
were buzzing around attacking the doomed battleship.
        At any rate, on July 3rd Kusaka had received further air
reinforcements, but it was clear the Japanese were already scraping the bottom
of the barrel in this regard.  The Japanese Navy had created a new, land-based
21st Air Fleet, and this was sent to Kusaka.  But this "air fleet" consisted in
fact of 20 Zero fighters, a dozen assorted attack planes, and two reconnaisance
planes.  To beef up the forces at Rabaul further, the Navy transferred in the
entire air complement from one of their small new fleet carriers, a total of 25
more Zeros and 28 single-engined bombers.   (BTW, most of this detail comes
from D.C Horton, "New Georgia."  Horton was a coastwatcher during the campaign.
I should mention that these courageous Australians, who hid in the jungle with
radios keeping an eye on Japanese movements, provided a supremely valuable
intelligence for the Allies in the Solomons.  It was a coastwatcher who tipped
the Americans off to the building of an airfield on Guadalcanal, giving the
impetus for that entire campaign.  Many, including Horton, later went in ahead
of the main landings around New Georgia with special scout units.  The superb
local intelligence of the coastwatchers added to the efforts of the American
codebreakers, whose clever men with clever mechanical computers made possible
events such as Midway and the assassination of Yamamoto.  The Americans, of
course, in this respect owed something of a debt to the Ultra-related work of
the British, who in turn owed a debt to the French and especially the Poles.
Ultra and its derivatives, one of the truly great war-winning intelligence
weapons of WW2, was truly an Allied affair.)
        In July Kusaka also received naval reinforcements, as Admiral Koga sent
him three more cruisers and three destroyers from Combined Fleet.  In the naval
battles, now almost entirely by night as the daytime American air presence was
too strong, the Japanese still held their own.  There were a series of sharp
clashes around New Georgia, all involving Japanese attempts to bring more
troops into the island or its neighbors.  In the first of these battles, the
Japanese sank the US cruiser HELENA but lost one destroyer sunk and another
beached.  Both sides considered this a setback, the Americans because they lost
a cruiser to an inferior force and did not prevent the Japanese landings
entirely, the Japanese because they had only managed to put 850 men ashore.  In
a second battle soon after, US forces ambushed another supply run, and a rapid
outpouring of accurate radar-directed fire sank the light cruiser JINTSU,
Tanaka's long-time flagship.  However, in a virtual repeat of the affair off
Guadalcanal's Tassafaronga Point in 12/42, the Japanese responded quickly, and
the deadly "Long Lance" torpedoes struck three American cruisers and a
destroyer.  Only the destroyer sank, and the cruisers were not as badly damaged
as in the previous reversal, but the Japanese managed to land all their troops,
and this was a definite tactical defeat for the US units.   BTW, by this time
one or two of Tanaka's ships had radar too, although the Americans still seem
to have held the advantage in both technical capabilities of the equipment and
in its effective combat use (unless I'm mistaken, one of the first sets in the
Japanese Navy was in fact on the JINTSU).  It was also in a nocturnal clash at
this time that a Japanese destroyer rammed and sank John F. Kennedy's PT-109.
        The Japanese did receive a stiff setback in a subsequent naval battle
when they tried to reinforce the neighboring island of Kolombangara (also
within artillery range of New Georgia) in early August.  Four Japanese
destroyers were intercepted by six US destroyers, the latter having received
intensive special training as a unit in nightime torpedo attacks.  Even without
the "Long Lance," the Americans hit hard.  Three of the four Japanese ships
were sunk without US loss, and about 900 troops were drowned.
        Meanwhile, on land, once the American forces made the short hop across
to New Georgia, covered by the artillery on Rendova, the outnumbered Japanese
proved tough opponents.  Their complexes of pillboxes studded with machineguns,
and enough 37- and 47-mm antitank guns to make the US armor wary, imposed
constant delays, and a large-scale counterattack (which was less of a suicide
charge and more of an infiltration of a perimeter not yet established in depth)
provided some tense moments.  Progress was so slow that General Hester,
commander of the US Army division which did most of the fighting, was relieved
of his command.  The results were encouraging enough that Sasaki, the Japanese
commander, believed he could hold Kolombangara, which was being continually
reinforced.
        The Japanese command, however, dismayed at the growing US air and sea
power, had decided not to make a further stand in the central Solomons.  This
was fortunate, for during the rest of the campaign there the Allied forces were
to demonstrate a mastery not only in the air but also in ground tactics.
Admiral Halsey premiered the tactic of "island-hopping" by skirting
well-garrisoned Kolombangara to descend on Vella Lavella further north in late
August.  The Japanese were taken by surprise, but their Navy was still equal to
the task of safely withdrawing most of the troops from both isolated
Kolombangara and Vella Lavella.  One incident in the withdrawal from the latter
island in early October showed the Japanese Navy had still not lost its
effectiveness in surface combat.  A force of nine destroyers, five subchasers,
and three small torpedo boats was taking away some of the last defenders, when
they were surprised by three American destroyers.  Each side lost a destroyer,
but the Japanese evacuation was successfully completed.  BTW, I earlier
wondered whether it was Australian or New Zealand forces that did most of the
dirty fighting on Vella Lavella.  You knew I had to go look it up.  In fact it
was the New Zealanders.  New Zealand fighter units flying P-40s were also
active in the Solomons, and participated in some of the first big fighter
sweeps over Rabaul in late '43-early '44.
        The final Solomon battle, Bougainville (spring '44), some of the worst
traits of Japanese Army tactics evidenced on Guadalcanal resurfaced.  General
Hyakutake, hampered again by poor intelligence, launched a full scale attack on
the Allied forces which had come ashore at Empress Augusta bay.  His 15,000 men
attacked an Allied force of 62,000, and suffered accordingly.  This once again
makes an interesting comparison with Sasaki's grudging defense of New Georgia,
where the slow choreography of the American invasion gave the Japanese adequate
time to prepare, even if with scant resources, and where major delays were
thereby imposed.  At Bougainville poor intelligence and more "bamboo spear"
tactics threw away any chance early on.
        Forgive a certain lack of coherence in this post, I had less time to
collect my thoughts before writing.  More thoughts in a minute (for what
they're worth).

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich


------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 20:51:51 EST
From:    John Davis <jbdavis@NANDO.NET>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 04-MAR-1945

On 04-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the 43rd Division pushes
southeast towards Xanten. The Canadian 2nd and 3rd Divisions complete the
capture of the Hochwald and Balberg forests. The 53rd Division takes
Geldern. In the U.S. 9th Army sector, the 5th Armoured Division cuts the
road linking Rheinberg with Mors. The 2nd Armoured Division takes
Kaldenhausen and finishes mopping up in the area around Urdingen and
Vietelsheide, bringing operations in the Cologne lowlands to a close. In
the U.S. 1st Army sector, the 99th Division is advancing north on the line
Derikum-Ukrath. The 104th Division breaks into the outer defences of
Cologne. The 9th Division takes Derikum and Hausweiler. In the 3rd Army
sector, the 4th and 87th Division resume their advance.

Eastern Front - Russian troops break through to the Baltic coast, splitting
the Germans remaining in Pomerania. THe 2nd White Russian Front reaches the
coast at Koeslin while elements of the 1st White Russian Front thrust to
the coast near Kolberg.

Italian Front - The 10th Moutain Division makes good progress taking M.
Acidola, Madonna di Brasa and M. della Croce.

Philippines - In the XI Corps area, the 43rd Division begins a westward
push into the Zambales Mountains west of Clark Field.

Iwo Jima - The VAC continues to attack with 3 divisions but is unable to
advance appreciably. A B-29 makes an emergency landing on Iwo.

Burma - The Indian 17th Division has largely completed the capture of
Meiktila.

Japan - 192 B-29's participate in a precision attack on the Musashino
aircraft factory in Tokyo.

The Homefront
-------------
Roosevelt Anniversary - Today is the 12th anniversary of President
Roosevelt's first inaugaration.

Curfew Violator's Seized - Police have arrested 15 patrons of a rooming
house speakeasy in New York City on charges of disorderly conduct for
violating the nation-wide midnight curfew. They are charged a fine of $5
each.

Sam Snead Wins Again - Sam Snead is on a real roll, he has won his 6th golf
tournament of the year by winning the Jacksonville Open.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | jbdavis@nando.net
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 20:51:01 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Japanese tactical afterthoughts part 2

        The New Guinea campaign presents a totally different picture than most
of the other battles studied.  This is one area of the Pacific in which the
Japanese were, IMHO, completely outfought and out-thought at almost every stage
of the action.  MacArthur, the Allied commander, followed what may be
considered a familiar pattern, in that he looked pretty bad in the early going,
but like a genius later on.   His disdain for the Australian efforts, which
combined superhuman endurance with a remarkable degree of jungle savvy, is hard
to explain except by impatience and, with US troops bogged down in the
Buna-Gona fighting, scapegoating to preserve his own sacred reputation and ego.
Even before the Buna portion of the campaign unfolded, after Australian forces
had triumphed over both the enemy and the elements to evict the Japanese from
Milne Bay at New Guinea's southeastern tip, MacArthur ordered General Blamey,
the Australian and initially the overall Allied ground commander, to go to the
island personally to "vitalize" the Australian efforts.  This treatment should
have been received as a great affront by Blamey, one of the most courageous and
experienced of all Allied commanders, whose troops were doing the brunt of the
fighting and doing it successfully (Blamey, after being repeatedly wounded in
World War I, fought in both the European and Pacific theatres during World War
2).  At any rate, the campaign for Buna cost the Allies 8,500 casualties, and
is one of the low points of MacArthur's career as a commander (I must say also,
in response to a point raised earlier by David Murnain, that in the pursuit of
the Japanese back to Buna an Australian brigade executed a tactical coup worthy
of the Japanese in Malaya or Burma when they penetrated through the jungle in a
wide flanking move and cut off part of the retreating Japanese force).
        Still, MacArthur at Buna-Gona should get points for learning.  What he
learned was the price of attacking the Japanese head-on in prepared jungle
positions.  It was a mistake he did not make on that scale again during the
campaign (at least on New Guinea itself).  The rest of his campaign there was a
masterpiece of movement and deep strategic penetration, cutting the enemy up
and leaving him as helpless as the Allies had been to oppose the dissection of
Indonesia a year earlier.  And the comparison is apt, because it was exactly
the Allied advantage in air and naval forces which allowed such swift,
unexpected descents deep in the enemy rear.  The most stunning example of
MacArthur's new strategy and tactics was Hollandia (although the actions around
the Huon peninsula in the fall of the previous year weren't too shabby, either)
In April 1944 MacArthur's forces swooped down upon Hollandia, New Guinea's best
natural harbor, located at that time 580 miles behind the front lines!!  The
Japanese were taken totally by surprise.  Of the 11,000 Japanese military
personnell in the area, only 500 were combat troops.  The Japanese commander
there, Major-General Toyozo, had only assumed his post ten days before.
Casualties were negligable, except to the Japanese, who lost about 3,000 men.
US troops coming ashore found unmanned defenses, including bunkers with cunning
fields of fire where, in the opinion of one officer, "a squad could hold up a
division."  Some of the landing troops found empty quarters with full bowls of
rice sitting out, having obviously surprised the occupants at their meal (just
as the US landings did on Guadalcanal).   This move trapped General Adachi and
the 40,000 troops of his 18th Army (since also reinforced by 36th Division) far
down the coast.  Adachi and his men showed amazing tenacity and determination.
They moved through hundreds of miles of jungle, and in July they reached and
attacked MacArthur's forces near Aitape.  Adachi by then had 20,000 men left,
but only 8,000 of them were actually infantry, the rest combed-out rear area
personnel.  The attacks continued for 25 days.  Fighting with the courage of
desperation, at one point the Japanese actually acheived a partial breakthrough
of the American positions.  But in the end it was just more "bamboo spear"
tactics, and Adachi lost 9,000 men without having any positive effect on the
outcome of the campaign.

        Fatigue forces me to break off.  I will finish up with one last post
about the change in Japanese tactics to face Allied amphibious invasions, plus
a few thoughts on the Japanese forays into high-tech.  Hopefully a break will
enhance my writing clarity so the point of these last posts will be evident.


        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 21:49:34 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <ben.frank@HIS.COM>
Subject: Battle of the Bulge

While skimming the internet with PBS on in the background, I heard an
announcement that on Saturday night at 1930 EST, a program on the Battle of the
Bulge will be televised. Enjoy, Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 21:51:47 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <ben.frank@HIS.COM>
Subject: Re: INFO ON USN BATTLE

I have to correct you on one fact, Ron. Battle stars on combat ribbons were
bronze. The silver star represented five awards. So a person with one silver
star and a bronze star would indicate that for the Asiatic-Pacific campaign
ribbon, for example, the individual wearing the ribbon participated in six
campaigns. For personal decorations, if you received five of a Navy Cross, for
example, you would wear a gold star--gold and silver stars are larger than the
bronze star, by the way. For the naval services, the guide to decorations is
the "Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual," which is always in a state of being
updated. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 21:43:09 EST
From:    William Lippert <WL1958A@AMERICAN.EDU>
Subject: Re: Endlosung (was:Is it true that they can trace a single document)

Kevin,
   First, I will address the issue of whether or not the Germans were guilty.
It's not an easy question, of course, and there's no definite answer.  But
if you call them guilty because they did not protest after Kristallnacht,
I would disagree.  What could they do?  By this time the regime was firmly
in place and the police had cowed the populace into submission.  I also
think, besides from the general state of oppression, the population had
been dulled by constant propoganda, terror, and social repression.
   The strength of the regime was not that the population was particularly
enthusiastic with the regime - this can be seen by the Nazis only capturing
30% or so of the free vote - but that it was not socially acceptable to
reject any aspects of the regime, let alone openly protest.  I find this
somewhat analogous to the current PC trend - it is not the government or
any particular authority that is responsibility for PC, but social controls
such as rejection by friends, social isolation, etc.   Add to this the
actual government intervention and you come up with a formula for silence.
    And you bring up another good point - how could the Germans not know
where Hitler was headed?  First, just because they might have thought that
the regime was going to eventually exterminate Jews doesn't mean that there
was a concrete plan for doing so.  But that is another matter.
    We do, of course, can easily say, "where else were the Germans headed
other than extermination of the Jews?"  But it was much harder to think
that between 1933 and 1939.  First, what person would want to think that?
It is, in my opinion, a pretty inconceivable idea - up there with conspiracy
theories that run around college campuses.  Most of the German people
believed, during this time, that Jews were merely going to be removed
from Germany through forced emigration - which was the policy at this
time.
    Between 1939 and 1945 they had other things to worry about.  Besides,
how many Jews were there in Germany at this time?  Most of the more respectable
ones (versus the poor and socially isolated) had already left the Reich.
The disappearance of a few Germans here and there should not have been
particularly strange - they were being, according to the authorities and
word on the street - shipped East for resettlement.  I'm inclined to believe
that this explanation was believed not only because it was more realistic
but because it was more palatable.
      One reason the Germans never objected was because the regime carried
out "genocide in stages".  The SPD and supporters of the Republic had the
same problem from 1923 to 1933.  The Nazis carried out a coup in stages -
it was not a dramatic march on Berlin and seizure of power, but a gradual,
incremental coup by gaining Reichstag votes, local leadership, etc.  The
problem with the opponents of the Nazis was that there was no singular event
in which they could say, "look at this!"  By the time the opposition figured
out what was going on it was too late - Hitler was Chancellor.
     The Nazis used this same strategy, and I am not inclined to believe
it was intended (it was functionally evolved), of doing things in slow,
almost indiscernable stages.  It started out with boycotts, was emphasized
by speeches, cemented in laws, culminated in riots, involved forced emigration,
and only near the end culminated in mass extermination.  At no singular point
was the final solution eminent and thus, at no single time could the people
protest.
    The Allies, too, were hoodwinked for a long time by "aggression in stages".
It is well known how Hitler gradually neutralized the great powers; violating
parts (but only parts) of the Versailles Treaty, then tearing it up, occupying
the Saar, taking Austria, the Munich Agreement, and seizing the rest of
Czechoslovakia.  It was only until Sept 1939 that the Allies woke up and
finally figured out what Hitler was up to.  It is easy for us to see that
Hitler was headed on a war path from the beginning of his regime.  But
it was, history has shown us, much more difficult for the English and
French to see it.
    What the Germans and Great Powers experienced, in psychological terms,
was "systematic desensitization".  For example, if you try sticking your
hand in 150 degree water or 32 degree water (it doesn't get colder under
normal conditions) it will fell hot or cold.  But if you start the water
at room temperature or slightly higher and then gradually warm or cool it,
at no specific point can you call it "hot or cold".  There is a threshold
at which the temperature can be quantified, but it is considerably higher
than if one has an immediate immersion to the temperature in question.
    In the end, I kind of feel sorry for the Germans.  They fell victim
to perfectly human thoughts and feelings.  It was not that they were
a bad people but that they, in the end, too human with all of its strengths
and weaknesses.  Whether or not they were guilty is another question which
I will address in another post.
    Thanks for your input, Kelvin, and I look forward to hearing your response
to the above.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 22:40:07 -0400
From:    Michael E Smith <S003MES@DESIRE.WRIGHT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Glacier Girl

        Just recieved the summery of the P-38F restoration project.  While
I'm excited to hear that another of these beautiful aircraft will grace us
with its presence, I'm disturbed that non-original markings will be applied
to it.  As an aviation historian, currently acquiring my Masters Degree in
museology, I feel it is of vital importance to preserve historical
material as accurately as possible.  This accuracy should be all the more
important if, as was stated, this is the only P-38F.  Considering how
much money was spent salvaging the aircraft as well as restoring it, it's a
shame that the aircraft will not be "truly" original.

Michael E. Smith
S003MES@DESIRE.WRIGHT.EDU

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 22:28:29 EST
From:    William Lippert <WL1958A@AMERICAN.EDU>
Subject: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

I thought that, because of the talk recently about the Endlosung (which
was, curiosly enough, begun by some discussion about documents) and German
guilt.  This is a question that has persisted, very passionately, from
the beginning of the war to today.  I don't think it will ever be resolved
for good reason.

     I remember reading an editorial in Life magazine - written in 1943 or
so - about the Germans and whether or not they were bad people.  Actually,
it was a response letter in the front.  Anyway, the editorial had said that
the Germans were a good people and that Hitler had hoodwinked them.  The
response letter made the claim that it was the Germans who brought the
regime to power and the Germans who supported the regime.
    The argument, or indeed philosophical discourse, continued into the
Nuremberg trials - who to punish?  On the one had, it was clear that many
of the people on trial did what they did (though the degree of involvement
was often disputed).  Indeed, many of the perpetrators of crimes were on
the prosecution!  Inevitably, everyone blamed everyone but themselves.  The
most common people to blame were the ones that were already dead or gone:
Bormann (no one liked him anyway), Hitler, Himmler, etc.  On the other hand,
they blamed the actions on the individualy initiative of people under them.
In the trials, the question of German guilt in general did not come up
(as it would not be very German to blame the population) but there was
a sense of collective guilt within the regime that was played up to excuse
individual guilt.
     And so there are three groups responsible for the Nazi crimes: the
Germans as a whole, the regime as a whole, and the top individuals only.
Today the Germans, for the most part, tend to blame the regime.  Survivors
of the war both at Nuremberg and in subsequent memoirs tried to shift
responsiblity to everyone but themselves - "orders are orders" continued
to be a big claim.  And, of course, the actual individuals who were
"truly", that is whom everyone could agree upon, were conveniently dead.
    On the part of the German people, they would make the various claims
that they were lied to, subdued in the police state, and compelled by
loyalty and love of the Reich to, in the least, keep their mouths shut.
And then, of course, they denied knowing of the more negative events and
seemed to experience a collective amnesia after the war.
    The middlemen had several defences: orders, jobs, loyalty, oaths,
and just forced to do so.  They portrayed themselves as tools, albeit big
and effective ones, of the state.  Thus, Jost, head of an Einstazkommando,
Mueller, Gestapo deputy, and countless other bureaucrats and SS Generals
and state deputies and secretaries recieved relatively small sentences, if
any, compared to the crimes of the time.
    And the higher men like Speer and Goring, blamed both the dead, one another
, and people under them.  Speer makes the case in his memoirs that he tried
to confess to a collective guilt and that he and the other leaders on trial
had to pay for the crimes of the regime and of Germany.  This thread of
seeming self-sacrifice reduces his personal guilt and makes him seem like
a martyr.  Others might have asked (and perhaps did) why they should pay
individually for crimes in which everyone had a part in?
    And that, in the end, is a tough question - who should pay the price?
Is it fair for Speer and Doenitz and Ribbentrop to be the scapegoats for
the entire nation?  Or is it fair for all the Germans to pay for the
crimes of a few?  Or should the average bureacrat pay the price for simply
doing his job, with little recourse, both under the command of people
like Goebbels or Himmler and for the benifit of the German people as a
whole who are not much less guilty than themselves?
    These, I think, are hard questions.  Anyone have any thoughts on this?

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 2 Mar 1995 to 3 Mar 1995
***********************************************

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Status: O

There are 14 messages totalling 600 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. ANNOUNCEMENT
  2. TAC: Africa (was: Wha (2)
  3. China/Japan part 8
  4. Endlosung (was:Is it true that they can trace a single document) (2)
  5. Westerly 5 of 5, Phelps summary (3)
  6. INF: 50 Years Ago - 05-MAR-1945
  7. List Active?
  8. QUEST: German Executors (2)
  9. Intelligence on Tirpitz

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 01:41:13 -0600
From:    Monte Turner <msturner@UKANAIX.CC.UKANS.EDU>
Subject: ANNOUNCEMENT

Announcing the "Grand Opening" of

***E-HAWK: The Electronic Headquarters for the Acquisition of War Knowledge***
http://kuhttp.cc.ukans.edu/history/ehawk/

        E-HAWK is the Web's most comprehensive information server on topics
relating to the U.S. military.  Its components include:

* U.S. Military Internet Resources: After extensive researching, we have
compiled a huge catalog of all U.S. military internet sites - including Web
pages, FTP sites, Gophers, even Bulletin Boards!  Try us for pointers to any
publicly accessible (and some restricted) sites maintained by the Department
of Defense.
* Current Events: Up-to-date information on events of military interest,
including pointers to some of the best news services on the Web, Public
Affairs gophers, Usenet current-events and military newsgroups, a catalog of
e-mail discussion lists, and upcoming events announcements.
* Military Science: Still under construction, this section will contain a
range of documents on various aspects of the art of war, including
logistics, tactics, strategy, technology, and intelligence.
* Officers' Club: The recreational side of E-HAWK, including a collection of
graphics, veterans' information, and internet utilities.

And presenting:
***MIL-HIST***
http://kuhttp.cc.ukans.edu/history/milhst/

        It's so big we had to make it a separate page! The military history section
of E-HAWK covers everything from the modern day on back. Incorporating *De
Re Militari*, the classical and medieval military history infoserver of the
De Re Militari association, Mil-Hist has an extensive collection of
documents, bibliographies, and pointers to other military history on-line
resources.  We've even got the archives of the DEREMI-L and MILHST-L e-mail
discussion lists, beautifully HTML'ed for your reading and research pleasure!
        Mil-Hist is conveniently organized in chronological format, with the
following divisions:

* De Re Militari: Classical and Medieval periods, to the 16th century.
* Pre-Nineteenth Century: Including the revolutions in America and France
* Nineteenth Century: Including the Napoleonic wars in Europe, but excluding:
* American Civil War: There's so much material on this war, we had to give
it its own page.
* 1900-1919: The War to End All Wars, the Spanish-American War, the
Russo-Japanese War, and more.
* 1919-1945: The Inter-War years and World War Two.
* 1945-1961: The Early Cold War period and the Korean War.
* 1961-1973: The Vietnam and Arab-Israeli conflicts.
* 1973-Present: Grenada, Afghanistan, and the Gulf War.


        We hope that you will find E-HAWK and Mil-Hist convenient, friendly, and
exceptionally useful. If you have any questions, comments, recommendations,
or requests, please e-mail us at:

(E-HAWK) rufus@falcon.cc.ukans.edu or msturner@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
        or
(Mil-Hist) msturner@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu or jphughes@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

        Thanks... We hope to hear from you soon!


Monte Scott Turner                                             msturner@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu
                         De Re Militari - Association Manager
 Assosciation for the Advancement of Classical and Medieval Military Studies
                   Discussion List - Deremi-l@ukanaic.cc.ukans.edu
Information Server - http://kuhttp.cc.ukans.edu/history/deremil/deremain.html
                            Snail Mail: 2913 University Drive
                                    Lawrence, Kansas 66049

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 05:02:00 UTC
From:    John Cantley <j.cantley@GENIE.GEIS.COM>
Subject: Re: TAC: Africa (was: Wha

What if the Italian and German air groups had maintained some semblance of
air superiority and choked the area between Sicily and Tunis. They tried to
bomb Malta into submission. They maintained some superiority but not for a
prolonged period. If Rommel was actively supported with needed suplies he
could have done much more. If the Axis forces made the Mid-Med area a death
bed for any British naval force in the area. This could have been a great
boost to the abilities of Rommel.

John Cantley

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 15:57:30 +0700
From:    "Peter E. Beal" <bealp@MORAKOT.NECTEC.OR.TH>
Subject: Re: China/Japan part 8

A small correction.  The first Roosevelt-Churchill conference after the
U.S. entered the war decided that resources would be split 70% (not 90%) for
Europe and 30% for the Pacific.

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 04:59:00 UTC
From:    John Cantley <j.cantley@GENIE.GEIS.COM>
Subject: Re: TAC: Africa (was: Wha

Re: Why was England not targeted first?

Hilter was a lunatic and hooked on drugs?

John Cantley

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 09:30:51 -0500
From:    James Ray Watkins <dawgonpete@MAIL.UTEXAS.EDU>
Subject: Re: Endlosung (was:Is it true that they can trace a single document)

I'm probably going to regret this... Isn't the problem with German (or
Japanese) guilt that you are trying to assign responsibility to something
that no one person 'did'? In a sense, yes, all of Germany is the guilty
party; and in a sense, too, it was the Nazis. Its difficult to say the
German people 'should' have done this or that, because we know how powerful
the Nazi repression of dissent was. And yet we can't imagine the war being
fought without the 'consent' of the populace. If I may, I would like to
offer another line of investigation from Anthropology.

Its possible to understand 'how it is that a war happens' (and the War, I
think, would include the extermination of the Jews) not only in terms of the
thinking and actions of individuals, but in terms of the thinking and
actions of institutions. It can be hard to get your mind around that idea,
and the analogy to 'individuals' set up by words like 'thinking' is not
quite accurate. This is not to say that individuals are not responsible for
their actions, of course, but to give a particular kind of context to their
choices. The book I am thinking of is called, -How Institutions Think-, by
Mary Douglas (Syracuse University Press, 1986, Syracuse New York).

Douglas even trys to identify (again the analogy is rough) the way
institutions 'forget'- I'm thinking here of what has been called the
'collective amnesia' of Germany. The point is to try to identify a specific
relationship between those organizations whose aims and goals led to the
War, and those others whose aims may have been differant, but didn't, in the
end, stop it. In Douglas' terms, then, there is something much more profound
at work when something like a War happens, something much more dangerous
than the hatred of one group for another. It literally becomes 'impossible'
to 'think' certain things: in Germany, from what these posts have implied,
it was very rare to find anyone, on 'our' side or 'theirs' who could
formulate the notion that the Nazis were actually setting up the
institutions through which they would systematically kill 6 million people.

Consider how difficult it was in the 1800s to find an American who argued
that the US government's policies amounted to genocide, or even that Native
American culture was valuable in its own right. And, in both cases, even
when someone did 'think' the 'unthinkable' (as some did) it didn't become
translated into any of the institutional forms that ressistance might have
taken. Not just 'might' have taken, 'had' to have taken, because just as you
can't fight a war without institutions, no one person could have prevented
the Holocaust, or the destruction of Native American culture. I take the
risk of that last analogy, because I want to point out that it is easy for
us to say that no one in the 1800s could think that way, the anachronism is
obvious. But with soemthing 'closer' to our own time (only 50 years) we tend
to think that the Germans must be held to our standards. And well they
should, but the difficult question remains: what standards can we use?

On the one hand looms relativism and on the other a kind of a-historical and
moral egotism. The failure of the German people was more than the failure of
individuals, it was the failure of individuals to act in concert, a failure
of institutions in the broad sense. I think that what we might do is to
develop an undertanding of the failure of people to take institutional
responsibility. The 'guilt' to be assigned would be the 'guilt' of not
acting in concert; the 'mistake' a problem of our relationships to our
larger organizations. This would enable us to, on the one hand, avoid the
hubris of hindsight, and on the other, to not fall into the trap of ethical
and moral leveling out of responsibility. Clearly cultures and institutions
are not all equal, and just as clearly we have all made our share of
mistakes. The 'right' and 'wrong' we might all agree on is the 'right' and
'wrong' of our actions through and in institutions. Again, this is not to
deny individual responsibility, but to be specific about what you mean by
responsibility.

A couple of points before I duck my head and hide. First, there is some
'common sense' to this idea of institutional responsibilty. The Germans
banned the Nazi party, in part, because there is no other way to get at
banning Nazi thinking. Laws against 'hate crimes' are similar in this way.
And second, I would note that, in some sense, it contiues to be difficult in
some quarters to 'think' that 6 million people (Jews and others) were
sytematically exterminated. That idea, to become 'real' and 'effective' has
had to be, literally, 'institutionalized' in the form of books, museums,
education, television, and so on. Some would argue that, even now, after all
that has happened and all that effort we would still forget unless an effort
is made to prevent it. I agree. And I think that we should judge the
Germans- and ourselves- by the efforts we are or are not making to prevent,
institutionally, this forgetting. And I agree, to end my little speech,
because it is not individuals who are solely responsible for remembering,
but our institutions as well.

My question to this 'institution' of experts and interested listeners like
myself: can you describe for us how instituions of German culture in the
1940s made it difficult to 'think' the 'reality' of the Holocaust?
Ray Watkins
A.I., Department of Rhetoric and Composition
English, University of Texas at Austin

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 16:06:54 -0500
From:    Cheryl Abdullah <cabdullh@FREENET.COLUMBUS.OH.US>
Subject: Westerly 5 of 5, Phelps summary

Here's an easy-going one to end the "series" with my ubiquitous request to
send corrections and comments to my private e-mail address.  There may be
more summaries posted in the future, who knows.  Again my thanks in
advance for the generous support you folks have given in correcting these.

Cheryl                                    cabdullh@freenet.columbus.oh.us

-----------------
HUBBARD PHELPS, Photographer's Mate, U.S. Coast Guard
Civilian premilitary occupation:  Transport pilot, Northwest
Airlines, until 1939; fashion photographer, partner of Ralph
Rawlings, (New York) until W.W. II

Awards:  American Theater, Good Conduct; also "the one they
took out of the barrel that said World War II."

Military Experience:  Phelps was a "swabbie" who wore bell
bottom pants.  He joined the Coast Guard and was sent to
boot camp at Manhattan Beach.  When he found out that he
would be sent to Cooks and Bakers School, he got a
lieutenant friend of his to arrange for him to become a
security guard instead.  He went to Connecticut State Police
Academy (Bethany) where he took State Police training.  He
also trained to become Watch Officer for the Captain of the
Port in New York, but instead he applied for and was
transferred to Intelligence photo lab, where he worked for
eight months.

Because he was a nonrated officer, officials changed his
status to Photographer's Mate and transferred him to
Washington, DC, where he worked for the Coast Guard Public
Relations Department.  Most of the time he was a passenger
on a coast-wise cutter that, along with three Navy Patrol
Crafts (PCs), escorted convoys between New York and Key
West, FL, and Key West and Galveston, TX.  During this
period he saw no combat but "if you saw something, you took
a picture of it."  Each Navy and Coast Guard ship had one
photographer on board.  "We did an awful lot of the hometown
work, taking pictures of the crew and the officers."  Phelps
got married during 1942.  He was prohibited from defensive
duties or watches by orders of Admiral Washee of the Coast
Guard, but some skippers had him trained in the use of a
20mm or 50 caliber just in case.  His first priority was to
take pictures.  He spent many of the long hours at sea
getting to know people after asking for background
information to accompany their photos.  He did see
submarines, and a friend of his photographed the sinking of
a German sub.  He also rode a Canadian Corvette out of Cuba
or the Azores.

In 1943, he went to Oran where "The harbor was loaded with
ships....You could just tell that they were preparing for
something, but being a little swabbie, you didn't ask
questions."  While stationed in Oran, he bought French
perfume and had his camera checked out.  "Cameras didn't
last too long, they would get damaged at sea and you
couldn't clean them too well."  He otherwise had little to
do in Oran and avoided contact with the natives, whom he did
not trust.  He pitied the Army guys, "They didn't know what
side the French guys were on and when I was there, they
still didn't know."  He met some acquaintances while in
Oran.  One of them, Edgar Marston of Watch Hill, spoke
fluent French and was serving in the French Foreign Legion.
Phelps later sailed aboard a ship escorting the invasion of
Sicily and, upon arrival there, had his only exposure to
combat.   He saw German bombers flying with their bomb bays
open, some of which flew over and dropped bombs toward his
ship--a scary sight that he photographed.  That particular
release of bombs hit two nearby ammunition ships, and "all
hell broke loose."

After the invasion he was stationed for three months in
Rockland, ME, while assigned to the Air/Sea Rescue
Attachment.  "We would go out every day in the middle of
winter and let the boats ice up and see if they break up or
see how much they could take."  For some reason the
government sent a Florida swamp glider up to Rockland and
two Air Corps boys put skis on it and "went tearing down the
main street of Rockland in the middle of the night.  It was
funny, they were doing about 80 mph with no brakes."

He later went to sea again "on the normal back-and-forth
trip."  He was in Naples for two days after it was taken.
He took many pictures of the wreckage in Naples harbor.
While on liberty, he and two friends happened upon an open
warehouse full of German supplies and uniforms.  Phelps
found a German flight jumpsuit that he tried on.  It fit, so
he took it to use when he went back to flying.  His friends
took a machine gun, he stuck a "very nice" automatic pistol
in his pants, they had drinks, and then his friends were
arrested by MPs on the way back.  Phelps later displayed
this German flight uniform, along with a helmet and goggles
he picked up, at the Westerly "World War II Remembered"
exhibit.

Phelps also picked up a lot of SS collar devices which were
actually made of silver thread.  He knew about the silver
because he studied Hitler as far back as 1936, his interest
being aroused because a friend's son enlisted in a German
military school.  The boy, who several times stood 30-40
feet away from Hitler, called home saying "Dad, I have got
to get out of here.  These people are all crazy....They are
not human."  Phelps also took from Naples about 12 or 15 of
the "German ranks and stuff," which were stolen from his
home around 1992.

Photographers had Subsistence in Quarters (S&Q) and he could
pay to eat with the Navy or the Army.  He preferred to eat
in the Army chow.  "I didn't pay half the time because the
cook could have cared less."  He received rank pay, although
he did get combat duty salary when he was overseas.  After
Italy, Phelps came home.


Audio tape interview:     22 February 1994
Interviewer:              Julia B. Kerr
Written History Editor:   Cheryl Abdullah
                          cabdullh@freenet.columbus.oh.us

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 16:24:48 EST
From:    John Davis <jbdavis@NANDO.NET>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 05-MAR-1945

On 05-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the U.S. 9th Army sector, the 5th Armoured Division
takes Orsoy on the Rhine as well as Rheinkamp. The XIX Corps reaches
Rheinhausen. The 3rd Armoured Division enters Cologne. Elements of the
104th Division, advancing east towards Cologne, capture Junkersdof. The
three corps of the 3rd Army cross the Kyll at several points. In Germany,
boys 16 and over are to be enrolled in the regular armed forces.

Eastern Front - Units of the 1st White Russian Front take Stargard and
Naugard. Fierce battles contine in East Prussia and on the northern end of
Latvia.

Philippines - The 37th Division is ordered to garrison duty in Manila. In
the XIV Corps area, the 11th Airborne Division begins operations to open
Balayan and Batangas Bays, south of Luzon. In the I Corps area, Philippine
Guerrilla Forces now control the north coast of Luzon west of the mouth of
the Cagayan River as well as the west coast except for Vigan. The 33rd
Division continues northward toward Baguio and San Fernando, threatening to
close pincers on the Japanese between it and the guerrillas. The 25th
Division completes the mop-up of the Puncan area.

Iwo Jima - The VAC remains in place, improving its current position and
reorganizing for a concerted effort on the 6th.

The Homefront
-------------
United Nations Invitations - The United States has invited 39 nations to
attend the April San Francisco conference to draw up a charter for an
international organization to maintain the peace in the post-war world.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | jbdavis@nando.net
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 17:14:13 -0500
From:    Max Calderwood <maxc@URSUS1.URSUS.MAINE.EDU>
Subject: List Active?

Is this list, WW2 still in operation?

Please reply to me directly.


Thanks for your help,



Max C.

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 18:54:44 EST
From:    Jonathan Perkins <jperkins@CCS.CARLETON.CA>
Subject: Re: Westerly 5 of 5, Phelps summary

Cheryl Abdullah writes:
>
>
> -----------------
> HUBBARD PHELPS, Photographer's Mate, U.S. Coast Guard
> Civilian premilitary occupation:  Transport pilot, Northwest
> Airlines, until 1939; fashion photographer, partner of Ralph
> Rawlings, (New York) until W.W. II
>
> [snip..........]  He was prohibited from defensive
> duties or watches by orders of Admiral Washee of the Coast
> Guard, but some skippers had him trained in the use of a
> 20mm or 50 caliber just in case.  His first priority was to
> take pictures.

Nit-picking: That's properly termed a ".50 calibre", which was the common
term used to represent the standard US heavy machine gun then in service.
This was the Browning M2 and its derivatives, which were usually air-cooled.
In naval service, and in some ground-based anti-aircraft roles, these were
also sometimes water-cooled.  A "50 calibre" (i.e. no decimal point) would
signify a LARGE naval gun.  The 20mm, if you want to be specific, would
have been the ubiquitous 20mm Oerlikon automatic cannon, which was fitted
to naval vessels of all types in either single or twin mounts.


> He spent many of the long hours at sea
> getting to know people after asking for background
> information to accompany their photos.  He did see
> submarines, and a friend of his photographed the sinking of
> a German sub.  He also rode a Canadian Corvette out of Cuba
> or the Azores.
>

Interest: Any idea what the name of the Canadian corvette was?


[snip..........]


Interesting interview, even though he might not have seen as much action as
others you've interviewed.  Do remember: war is 90% (or more) sheer boredom
and 10% (or less) stark terror.....


--
----------
Jon Perkins--Ottawa, Canada
jperkins@ccs.carleton.ca

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 19:16:26 EST
From:    Jonathan Perkins <jperkins@CCS.CARLETON.CA>
Subject: Re: Westerly 5 of 5, Phelps summary

Oooops!  Greatest of apologies to all on the list.  Forgot to edit the
mail header before sending my reply out....


--
----------
Jon Perkins--Ottawa, Canada
jperkins@ccs.carleton.ca

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 18:18:22 -0600
From:    Kelvin Brent Luther <umluther@CC.UMANITOBA.CA>
Subject: Re: Endlosung (was:Is it true that they can trace a single document)

        You use a very good analogy to describe how the Germans were
drawn into compliance with Hitler and relate it to how he violated the
Versaille treaty again and again.  I agree that he gradually instituted
his programs in order to lull people into acceptance.  I don't know that
I can accept this as an excuse for not doing anything.  When you talk of
him lulling the British and French into acquiescing to his demands you
imply they did not know where he was heading until he became so overt
with his policies that they couldn't miss it.  I believe they knew where
he was headed, they simply were not willing to take the necessary action
at that time to stop him.  They did not have to acquiesce at Munich or
any other point but they did, all the while fooling themselves and hoping
he would stop and knowing that he almost certainly would not.
        We do the same thing today, only we are not risking a world war.
Everyone knew after the brief fighting in Slovenia that Croatia was next,
and that Bosnia would follow.  Everyone knew from Croatia that atrocities
would be committed in Bosnia but we did nothing.  These are political
decisions based on what we are willing to do, not based on our knowledge
of what events are occuring or are bound to occur.  For this reason we
all have some amount of guilt with regards to this (although Europe
should accept most of it) and likewise the Germans must accept guilt for
their unwillingness to speak out before it reached a point where they
couldn't.  This is why I mentioned Kristalnacht.  I simply feel this was
their last chance to give a significant blow to Hitlers Jewish policies
and they missed it by keeping silent.
                                        Kelvin Luther

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 21:48:26 EST
From:    William Lippert <WL1958A@AMERICAN.EDU>
Subject: QUEST: German Executors

Hello all,
    I am working on yet another paper - this one for my Abnormal Psychology
class.  It is going to be a hypothetical case dealing with an immigrant
to the US that was part of one of the Einsatzkommandos.  During the war,
he was responsible for the direct liquidation of some 30,000 people in
the East.
   My theory is that this was a difficult thing to do and would inevitably
carry with it lifetime psychological scars - for some people at least.
Anyone have any good sources on the psychological effects - both immediate
and long term - that the EK individuals experienced?  Incidentally, I am
going to be writing about delayed (fifty year, in fact) Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder.
   Anyone familiar with this mental disorder?  There has been a lot of
literature about it regarding Vietnam Vets; its effects magnified because
of the political atmosphere both there and in the US.  Additionally, it
has gone by other names: shell shock in WWI, combat fatigue in WWII.  It
can have many results: loss of memory, anxiety, and even phobias.
   Thanks in advance.
   By the way, is there something wrong with the list?  I haven't gotten
much today.

William Lippert

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 10:24:53 +0700
From:    "Peter E. Beal" <bealp@MORAKOT.NECTEC.OR.TH>
Subject: Re: QUEST: German Executors

I posting this for two reasons.  The first is in response to Mr. William
Lippert's request for informaion of the impact of the activities of the
Einsatzgruppen on their members.  The second is the question of the
culpability and knowladge of the German people as a whole for the
Holocaust.

I suggest "The Final Solution: Origins and Implementation", David
Cesarni, Editor; Routledge, London and New York, 1994.

This is a collection of 17 papers prepared in connection with a
conference on the Holocaust in early 1992, in London.  Almost all the
writers are Jewish scholars of the Holocaust although Mr. Christopher R.
Browning, whose book "Ordinary Men", has been mentioned here, is among them.

For Mr. Lipperts purposes, the notes to each paper contain extensive
references to German and other documents.  I am sure that he can find
some useful things among them.

However, any reader of this book will certainly come to the conclusion
that the German people as a whole, and not just those in the immediate
vicinity of the camps, learned exactly what was happening.  For example,
in a letter that reached the Security Service after it was sent to
Ribbentrop's wife in November, 1944, a private from Saxony asked, inter
alia:

"do you really think we soldiers don't know what bestial murders have
been perpetrated by our SS in Russia?  Where for example are the 145,000
Jews of Lemberg who were there when they were transported little by
little on trucks and shot not far from Lemberg?"

Since at least two thirds of all German soldiers who served in WWII must
have served, at one time or another, on the East Front, it is
inconceivable that if a private knew every else did not know as well.

Regarding the impact the killings had on the members of the
Einsatzgruppen, Himmler visit their operations once and was shaken by
what he saw.  Nevertheless, he steeled himself for the necessary task.

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 23:10:38 -0500
From:    Jodi Berls <Jberls@AOL.COM>
Subject: Intelligence on Tirpitz

     I've read that the British commando raid against the French port of
Saint Nazaire was conceived and carried out because of fears that the Germans
would move the battleship Tirpitz there to make use of the Joubert drydock.
But I haven't seen anything that indicates whether the Allies had any hard
information that the German navy planned to send it there. Some authors seem
to be suggesting the drydock was targeted on the assumption that Tirpitz very
likely would end up there *some day* because Joubert was the only drydock on
the French coast big enough to handle it.
     So my question is: Did the Allies have any actual intelligence that this
move would be made, or were they just guessing, and if they had intelligence
to that effect, what kind? I would be most grateful if anyone can answer
this, and/or cite sources.

Jodi Berls
jberls@aol.com

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 3 Mar 1995 to 4 Mar 1995
***********************************************

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Status: O

There are 19 messages totalling 1075 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Intelligence on Tirpitz
  2. Polish resistance
  3. [INF] USAAF 4 MAR 45
  4. [INF] USAAF 5 MAR 45
  5. [INF] USAAF 6 MAR 45
  6. WANT: and WEAP:  Translator needed for Czech halftrack manual
  7. NOST: Re-enactors sought to portray WWII Japanese forces (2)
  8. Greenland P-38F restoration
  9. Battle of the Bulge
 10. Glacier Girl (3)
 11. INF: USN Chronology 03-05-95
 12. Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 3
 13. Gas at Iwo Jima
 14. INF: 50 Years Ago - 06-MAR-1945
 15. NOST/VET: Iwo trip question
 16. Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 4

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 4 Mar 1995 21:35:36 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <ub076@FREENET.VICTORIA.BC.CA>
Subject: Re: Intelligence on Tirpitz

For information about the St Nazaire raid, read:

        THE GREATEST RAID OF ALL.


--

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 11:54:48 +0000
From:    Nechama Cox <nechama@BOREALIS.COM>
Subject: Polish resistance

I was just reading a book on the begining of the war and there was a
mention to the Jewish defence of Warsaw when Poland was attacked in 1939.
I have not hear of this before and I would be interested in any information
on the topic that people could send my way.

Thanks,

Nechama Cox
nechama@borealis.com

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 09:29:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 4 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
SUNDAY, 4 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  B-29, Boeing Superfortress
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): 4 B-24s on a sea sweep damage a
destroyer escort in the S China Sea.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): Mission 42: In China during the night of 4/5
Mar, 11 of 12 B-29s, staging from Luliang, mine the confluence of the Hwangpoo
and Yangtze Rivers and the Tai-hsing Narrows at Shanghai and 1 B-29s drops
mines at Tungting Lake without loss.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 100 fighter-bombers attack
troop concentrations, villages, roads, tanks, trucks, animal transport, and
supplies along and immediately behind the battlelines running from the SW to
NE across C Burma; Meiktila is largely occupied by forces of the Indian 17th
Division.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 2 missions are flown.
  Mission 863: 1,028 bombers and 522 fighters are dispatched to bomb targets
in SW Germany; bad weather causes 300+ aborts; 1 B-24 and 1 P-51 are lost:
  1. 373 B-17s are sent to hit the jet aircraft plant at Schwabmunchen (69)
and military vehicle plant and ordnance depot at Ulm (223); 59 hit the
secondary, the marshalling yard at Ulm; targets of opportunity are Reutlingen
(12) and other (1); bombing is by Gee-H; 2 B-17s are damaged beyond repair
and 9 damaged; 3 airmen are WIA. Escorting are 150 of 156 P-51s; 1 is damaged
beyond repair.
  2. 274 B-24s are dispatched but weather prevents them hitting the
primaries; targets of opportunity are Aschaffenburg (18), Tuttlingen (11),
Astadtaach (10), Pforzheim (8), the marshalling yard at Stuttgart (11), the
railroad at Sonaueschingen (10), Stuttgart (50) and other (36); bombing is by
H2X radar with some visual bombing; 1 B-24 is lost and 19 damaged; 8 airmen
are KIA. 139 P-47s and P-51s escort without loss.
  3. 376 B-17s are dispatched but weather prevents them attacking the
primaries; secondary targets hit are the marshalling yards at Ingolstadt (69)
and Ulm (75); targets of opportunity are Ausbuch (1) and other (3); H2X radar
is used for bombing; 2 B-17s are damaged beyond repair and 7 damaged; 17
airmen are KIA. The escort is 172 of 186 P-51s; 1 is lost (pilot MIA) and 1
damaged beyond repair.
  4. 5 B-17s fly a scouting mission.
  5. 21 of 22 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  Mission 864: 1 B-17 and 11 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands and
Germany during the night without loss.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, about 180 B-26s, A-20s,
and A-26s strike marshalling yards and a rail junction at Recklinghausen,
Lenkerbeck, and Herne, communications centers at Bruhl, Sechtem, and
Rheinbach, and several other targets including a rail bridge and towns;
weather limits fighter operations; a few fighters fly armed reconnaissance E
of the Rhine River and others fly cover for the XX Corps.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): 630+ B-24s and B-17s, with
fighter escort, bomb marshalling yards at Sopron (2 yards) and Szombathely,
Hungary; Knittelfeld, Zeltweg, Graz, Sankt Veit an der Glan and Wiener-
Neustadt, Austria; Zagreb (2 yards) and Lbubljana, Yugoslavia; and several
scattered targets of opportunity; other B-24s, with P-51 escort, drop
supplies in Yugoslavia; F-5s, P-38s and P-51s fly reconnaissance and
reconnaissance escort operations. The 309th Fighter Squadron, 31st Fighter
Group, moves from San Severo to Mondolfo, Italy with P-51s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, good flying weather
permits a full-scale effort; medium bombers hit 7 railroad bridges on the
Brenner line and in NE Italy; the Salorno railroad fill receives a
particularly good concentration of bombs; XXII Tactical Air Command P-47s
concentrate on communications targets in the Po Valley, knocking out a span
of the Cittadella railway bridge; Brazilian P-47s blast an ammunition dump at
Villafranca di Verona; during the night of 3/4 Mar, A-20s bomb the bridge and
bridge approaches at Casarsa della Delizia, Ostiglia, and Nervesa della
Battaglia, the radar station at Vignola, and lights, motor transport, roads,
and other targets of opportunity at over 30 places in the C Po Valley.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 10 B-24s from Guam Island bomb Susaki Airfield
on Chichi Jima Island; during the night of 4/5 Mar, 3 B-24s make separate
harassment raids on the airfield. Lieutenant General Barney Mc Giles becomes
Commanding General of AAFPOA and Deputy Commander of the Twentieth AF.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): Mission 39: A B-29 makes an emergency landing
on Iwo Jima Island; this begins a series of over 2,400 such emergency
landings on the island during World War II. 192 Mariana Islands-based B-29s
are airborne against Musashino (Musashi), Japan but heavy clouds prevent
bombing the primary; 159 B-29s bomb the secondary target, the urban areas of
Tokyo, and 18 others hit alternate targets; 1 B-29 is lost. This aborted try
at Musashino marks the end of XXI Bomber Command's effort to knock out the
Japanese aircraft industry by high-altitude, daylight precision bombing. (The
indirect effect of causing Japanese industrialists to lose confidence in
their supposed immunity from air attacks exceeds the effect of actual bomb
damage to the aircraft industry).

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Mindanao Island,
B-24s bomb Sasa and Likanan Airfields and the town of Zamboanga. On Luzon
Island, B-24s bomb targets of opportunity in the Cagayan Valley, gun
positions, ammunition storage, and targets of opportunity at Antipolo and
Wawa, supply dumps and the town area at Bamban, fortifications on Caballo
Island in Manila Bay, and airfields at Aparri and Tuguegarao. The detachments
of the 431st and 433d Fighter Squadrons, 475th Fighter Group, operating from
San Jose, Mindoro Island with P-38s, return to base at Clark Field, Luzon.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  jem3@cc.bellcore.com  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

05/1428Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 09:36:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 5 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
MONDAY, 5 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  UC-78, Cessna Bobcat
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  L-5, Stinson Sentinel
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In French Indochina, 30 B-25s knock
out bridges at Phu Xuyen, Thinh Duc, Phu Ly, Ninh Binh, and Phu Lang Thuong
and damage a bridge at Kep. In China, 2 B-25s, escorted by 8 P-47s, knock out
a bridge at Changtuikuan while 4 bomb Chikhom. 40+ P-51s and P-40s on armed
reconnaissance hit road, rail, and river traffic, town areas, and other
targets of opportunity in French Indochina, the C Yangtze River area, and
elsewhere in S and E China.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 50+ P-47s support forces
of the British 36 Division in the Mogok sector and forces of the Chinese 50th
Division in the Mansam area; 46 P-47s and 12 B-25s hit troop concentrations
in the battle areas and attack supply areas, road traffic, and general
targets of opportunity behind enemy lines. 664 air supply sorties are flown
to forward areas.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  AIRBORNE OPERATIONS (IX Troop Carrier Command): HQ 52d Troop Carrier Wing
moves from Cottesmore, England to Amiens, France.

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 3 missions are flown.
  Mission 865: 429 bombers and 689 fighters are dispatched to hit oil targets
in Germany; the primary target for the B-17s is the synthetic oil plant at
Ruhland but weather forces them to hit the secondary target; all bombing is
with H2X radar; 1 B-17 is lost:
  1. 233 of 303 B-17s hit the secondary target, the marshalling yard at
Chemnitz; targets of opportunity are Plauen (34) and Fulda (9); 1 B-17 is
lost and 15 damaged; 9 airmen are MIA. Escorting are 369 of 420 P-51s; 3
P-51s are damaged beyond repair and 1 pilot is KIA.
  2. 120 of 126 B-24s hit the Harburg oil refinery at Hamburg without loss.
The escort is 186 P-47s and P-51s without loss.
  3. 27 P-51s attack the marshalling yard at Kreuztal; 1 P-51 is damaged
beyond repair.
  4. 28 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  5. 14 P-51s escort 4 F-5s on a photo reconnaissance mission over Germany.
  Mission 866: 21 of 24 B-24s bomb the Wiesbaden rail station by PFF markers
during the night.
  Mission 867: 9 of 11 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands, France and
Germany during the night.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 565 B-26s, A-20s and
A-26s attack 6 marshalling yards, a communications center, an ordnance depot,
a city area and targets of opportunity with the aim of obstructing
reinforcements and supplies to German forces being pushed back across the
Rhine River; fighters escort the bombers, drop leaflets in the Cologne-Bonn
area, and fly armed reconnaissance over the Ruhr and Hamm-Duisburg area.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Bad weather limits operations
to supply, escort, and reconnaissance missions. HQ 306th Fighter Wing moves
from Lesina to Fano, Italy; HQ 325th Fighter Group and the 317th and 319th
Fighter Squadrons move from Lesina to Rimini, Italy with P-51s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, A-20s hit lines of
communications in the N Po Valley during the night of 4/5 Mar; results are
generally good; bad daytime weather grounds the medium bombers; XXII Tactical
Air Command fighter-bombers and fighters operate on a greatly reduced scale,
mostly in the C Po Valley, hitting bridges at Casarsa della Delizia, Nervesa
della Battaglia, Ostiglia, and Ostellato, and attacking the town of Vignola.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): Susaki Airfield on Chichi Jima Island is
pounded by 11 B-24s from Guam Island; during the night of 5/6 Mar, 5 more hit
the airfield in individual snooper strikes. 22 B-24s from Angaur Island,
Palau Islands, bomb Matina Airfield on Mindanao Island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-25s hit San Roque
Airfield on Mindanao Island. On Luzon Island, B-24s with fighter support hit
troops in the Antipolo area while fighter-bombers dive-bomb San Pablo, hit
Fort Drum in Manila Bay, attack troops W of Ft Stotsenburg, and support
guerrilla forces NE of Lingayen Gulf. Targets on Formosa are hit by fighters
on sweeps and B-24s on armed reconnaissance; the fighter sweeps are
especially effective against railroad targets. B-25s hit Zettle Field on Jolo
Island. HQ 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) moves from Morotai Island to Samar
Island; the 25th Liaison Squadron, FEAF (attached to Thirteenth AF), moves
from Biak Island, New Guinea to Dulag, Leyte Island with UC-78s and L-5s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  jem3@cc.bellcore.com  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

05/1434Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 09:42:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 6 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
TUESDAY, 6 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  P-61, Northrop Black Widow

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): A mission to the Kurile Islands is cancelled
due to inclement weather.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 4 B-25s bomb Chikhom; about
50 fighter-bombers hit storage, troops, railroad targets, and river and road
traffic around Hankow, along the Pinghan railroad, Kaifeng, Suchow, Hsuchang,
Changsha, Yoyang, Liuyang, and Hengyang, and on railroads from Liuliho to
Chengtung and from Tungpu to Tatung.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 31 P-47s support British
36 Division forces in the Mogok area; 12 B-25s join 60+ fighter-bombers in
striking troop concentrations, road traffic, supply and fuel dumps, and other
targets in the vicinity of the battlefront and in areas close behind enemy
lines. Transport operations continue on a large scale with 663 sorties
completed to forward areas throughout the day.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): Mission 868: 12 B-24s drop
leaflets in the Netherlands and Germany during the night. 5 B-24s fly
CARPETBAGGER missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 260+ A-26s, and B-26s
hit Recklinghausen, Siegburg, and Opladen marshalling yards, Siegburg storage
depot, and the town of Bochum as a target of opportunity; weather grounds
the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands; the XXIX Tactical Air Command
(Provisional) flies alerts and covers the US XVI Corps as it completes a
drive to the Rhine River in the Rheinburg area.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Bad weather restricts all
operations except reconnaissance and a supply mission, with escort, to
Yugoslavia. The 302d Fighter Squadron, 332d Fighter Group, is inactivated
at Ramitelli Airfield, Italy.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, medium bombers pound
communications in the Brenner Pass and hit bridges at Pordenone, Ossenigo,
Enego, Ora, Pizzighetone, and San Ambrogio di Valpolicella; fighters and
fighter-bombers concentrate on close support of the US Fifth Army S and SW
of Bologna; during the night of 5/6 Mar, a few A-20s bomb targets of
opportunity in the Po Valley.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 11 Guam Island-based B-24s again pound Susaki
Airfield on Chichi Jima Island; 5 more hit the airfield during the night of
6/7 Mar in separate strikes. HQ 15th Fighter Group arrives on Iwo Jima Island
from Hawaii and the air echelon of the 548th Night Fighter Squadron moves
from Saipan Island, Mariana Islands to Iwo Jima with P-61s (there are now 28
P-51s and 12 P-61s on the Iwo Jima).

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Mindanao
Island, B-24s pound the San Roque and Zamboanga areas. On Luzon Island, other
B-24s, B-25s, and fighter-bombers hit the Antipolo area, bomb Balete Pass and
Ft Drum and Caballo Island in Manila Bay and support guerrillas near San
Fernando. B-25s and P-38s attack Hainan Island and considerably damage Samah
Airfield on the island. Fighters sweeping over Formosa hit the Koshun area.
HQ 347th Fighter Group and the 67th, 68th and 339th Fighter Squadrons move
from San Jose, Mindoro Island to Puerto Princesa, Palawan Island with P-38s
(the 67th and 339th are operating from Morotai Island); the 419th Night
Fighter Squadron, XIII Fighter Command, moves from Middelburg Island, New
Guinea to Puerto Princesa, Palawan (the squadron is operating from Morotai
Island with P-38s and P-61s).

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  jem3@cc.bellcore.com  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

05/1441Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 09:47:03 -0500
From:    Lynn Goodhue <LGOODHUE@SMITH.SMITH.EDU>
Subject: WANT: and WEAP:  Translator needed for Czech halftrack manual

Posting this for my husband, Fred Goodhue, on whose behalf I have
joined this list.  Please respond to list, or directly to me at
lgoodhue@smith.edu.  Thank you!
===============
   A New England-based WWII German Re-enactment unit has recently
purchased a 1950's vintage Czechoslovakian halftrack.  It is
essentially the same vehicle as the WWII German SdKfPz 251.  It
will be used for public displays and tactical re-enactments.
   The need, here, is for an individual who could translate
selected portions of the technical manual from Czech to English.
Please let me know if anyone can be of assistance with this
project.  Thanks.

Fred Goodhue (c/o Lynn Goodhue)
lgoodhue@smith.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 09:47:51 -0500
From:    Lynn Goodhue <LGOODHUE@SMITH.SMITH.EDU>
Subject: NOST: Re-enactors sought to portray WWII Japanese forces

Posting this for my husband, Fred Goodhue, on whose behalf I have
joined this list.  Please respond to list, or directly to me at
lgoodhue@smith.edu.  Thank you!
=================
   A WWII United States Marine Corps re-enactment unit was set up
about a year ago here in New England. We collect and preserve
uniforms and equipment from that time period. So far we have
participated in four public displays where we interpret the Corps
wartime experience.
   I am aware of a tactical battle re-enactment that was held in
the Chicago area about seven years ago involving USMC  and re-
enactors portraying Japanese troops.  I am interested in
duplicating that effort here in the Northeast.  I am searching
for any individual or unit that currently portrays Japanese
forces or is interested in developing that impression for a
tactical event sometime late summer 1995.
   Thanks for help on this request.

Fred Goodhue
Williamsburg MA
c/o Lynn Goodhue
lgoodhue@smith.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 10:01:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Re: Greenland P-38F restoration

As a followup to Dennis Sparks' excellent article on the Grennland
P-38 restoration project:

Bluie West 1 (BW1) was Narsarssuak, Greenland
Bluie West 8 (BW8) was Sondre Stromfjord, Greenland

Narsarssuak (now Narssarssuaq) is at 61-10N and 45-26W; Sondre
Stromfjord (now Sondrestrom AB) is 67-01N and 50-42W.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  jem3@donuts0.bellcore.com  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 10:20:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Re: Battle of the Bulge

Yesterday, Saturday 4 Mar, WNET, the PBS station in New York City,
broadcast the complete 26 chapters of VICTORY AT SEA.  I remember
my father and I watching this in 1952 when I was 16.  One of the
problems I have with this program is that they paste in any film
they can find.  For example, it is my understanding that the 1st
Marine Division (Reinforced) went into Guadalcanal sans cloth,
camouflaged helmet covers and armed with M1903 Springfields, BARs
and Reising Model 50 or 53 submachine guns yet the episode on this
invasion showed Marines with helmet covers, M1 Garands and M1
carbines.

Perhaps Ben Frank could give us the truth of this operation.  Did
the Marines have cloth helmet covers, M1 Garands, M1 carbines, etc.
and can you give us the lowdown on the Reising gun which I
understand was quickly ditched.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  jem3@donuts0.bellcore.com  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 10:21:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Re: Glacier Girl

 >        Just recieved the summery of the P-38F restoration project.  While
 >I'm excited to hear that another of these beautiful aircraft will grace us
 >with its presence, I'm disturbed that non-original markings will be applied
 >to it.  As an aviation historian, currently acquiring my Masters Degree in
 >museology, I feel it is of vital importance to preserve historical
 >material as accurately as possible.  This accuracy should be all the more
 >important if, as was stated, this is the only P-38F.  Considering how
 >much money was spent salvaging the aircraft as well as restoring it, it's a
 >shame that the aircraft will not be "truly" original.
 >
 >Michael E. Smith
 >S003MES@DESIRE.WRIGHT.EDU

AMEN!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Jack McKillop

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 12:02:00 EST
From:    "Roger D. Corrie" <cporog@INFI.NET>
Subject: Re: Glacier Girl

>        Just recieved the summery of the P-38F restoration project.  While
>I'm excited to hear that another of these beautiful aircraft will grace us
>with its presence, I'm disturbed that non-original markings will be applied
>to it.  As an aviation historian, currently acquiring my Masters Degree in
>museology, I feel it is of vital importance to preserve historical
>material as accurately as possible.  This accuracy should be all the more
>important if, as was stated, this is the only P-38F.  Considering how
>much money was spent salvaging the aircraft as well as restoring it, it's a
>shame that the aircraft will not be "truly" original.
>
>Michael E. Smith
>S003MES@DESIRE.WRIGHT.EDU

  If Glacier Girl is the only non-original marking on the aircraft, you guys
that are upset, are picking the fly doo out of the pepper.  Cut the
mechanics who are refurbishing this aircraft some slack.  The odds are there
probably are several WWII vets involved in the restoration.  I assure you
the original ground crew who painted her would not mind this new one showing
their pride by painting a new pin-up girl.  For those of you who have never
been on a ground/maintenance crew for a combat aircraft, they have as much
pride, if not more, than the aircrew that fly them in these fighting
machines.  Watch the word "truly original" when it comes to aircraft, is
this when it come off the factory floor, after the first combat damage
repair, at the time of crash?  And every aircraft mechanic I have known will
tell you especially with the older aircraft that there will be many times
some very ingenious engineering done to fix an aircraft in combat. Most
aviation historians tend to concentrate on the machinery and the aircrews,
spend some quality time with the ground crews you won't regret it.  This is
not intended as a flame, just food for thought, there is always someone at
the other end of any complaint.
CPORog (Roger D. Corrie)            CAG Devil 00 is down I need 5!!!
cporog@infi.net
http://www.infi.net:80/~cporog/     Is that 5 maintenance min. or 5 real min?
804-427-2200

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 12:31:53 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <rjg@STAT.UMN.EDU>
Subject: Re: Glacier Girl

> >        Just recieved the summery of the P-38F restoration project.  While
> >I'm excited to hear that another of these beautiful aircraft will grace us
> >with its presence, I'm disturbed that non-original markings will be applied
> >to it.  As an aviation historian, currently acquiring my Masters Degree in
> >museology, I feel it is of vital importance to preserve historical
> >material as accurately as possible.  This accuracy should be all the more
> >important if, as was stated, this is the only P-38F.  Considering how
> >much money was spent salvaging the aircraft as well as restoring it, it's a
> >shame that the aircraft will not be "truly" original.
> >
> >Michael E. Smith
> >S003MES@DESIRE.WRIGHT.EDU
>
>   If Glacier Girl is the only non-original marking on the aircraft, you guys
> that are upset, are picking the fly doo out of the pepper.  Cut the
> mechanics who are refurbishing this aircraft some slack.  The odds are there
> probably are several WWII vets involved in the restoration.  I assure you
> the original ground crew who painted her would not mind this new one showing
> their pride by painting a new pin-up girl.  For those of you who have never
> been on a ground/maintenance crew for a combat aircraft, they have as much
> pride, if not more, than the aircrew that fly them in these fighting
> machines.  Watch the word "truly original" when it comes to aircraft, is
> this when it come off the factory floor, after the first combat damage
> repair, at the time of crash?  And every aircraft mechanic I have known will
> tell you especially with the older aircraft that there will be many times
> some very ingenious engineering done to fix an aircraft in combat. Most
> aviation historians tend to concentrate on the machinery and the aircrews,
> spend some quality time with the ground crews you won't regret it.  This is
> not intended as a flame, just food for thought, there is always someone at
> the other end of any complaint.

I've been keeping fairly silent on this issue because both views on it are
legitimate, at least to a degree.

I'm no expert aircraft rebuilder, but I and others have been involved in
the restoration (past, present and future) of a number of aircraft.  The
most substantial one at the moment is an excrutiatingly rare P-51C Mustang,
which is literally a rivet-out rebuild.

All aircraft which are restored to flying condition are never 100% completely
authentic because of certain requirements... Flight instruments, hydraulic
fittings, electrical requirements, required markings (N number), etc.  Most
of these "inauthenticities" are invisible.  The rest are kept to the
most minimum possible.

When the Mustang is completed (just like Miss Mitchell), there will be no
extraneous markings.  There will be information carried with the aircraft in
the form of a plaque which recognizes the individuals and groups who have
played a major part in the restoration.  But that self-recognition will not
be a part of the aircraft itself.  The worst example of an absolutely class
A-1 restoration "ruined" by self commemoration is the Collings Foundation
B-24.  And I support them implicitly.

Painting the name "glacier girl" and adding a nose-art is fairly minor, but
I know I object to it.  If the art is added in the form of a decal that is
90's artwork, then I will object loudly.  If it's a legitimate early 1940's
painted style that _might_ have been added, then I'll think about it.

However, the thing that is always kept in the mind of those restoring an
artifact to "museum quality" is that we are commemorating the men and women
who used or were served by that artifact.  Museums do not use the artifact
to commemorate themselves via the artifact.  When that's done, it's always
in the form of an external plaque indicating where it came from.

Is the addition of non-original nose art and a name a serious problem?  It
depends on what you are trying to accomplish.  We wouldn't do it, because
our goal always comes under the heading of "living museum."  But the
modification may be minor enough in an otherwise excellent restoration to
be "Acceptable."  Just stay away from the desire to "self-commemorate."
That detracts from the whole reason we should be doing what we're doing.

--
\\ Robert J. Granvin                                 User Services Specialist
// School of Statistics - University of Minnesota            rjg@stat.umn.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 13:11:32 CST
From:    "SCHERRER, TIM" <AD16@NEMOMUS.BITNET>
Subject: Re: NOST: Re-enactors sought to portray WWII Japanese forces

At seven acres outside of Chicago on Memorial Day they did a few display
abttles--and I think there were a few events at a place called Buffalo
Rock.  The biggest problem with Pqcific Theater events is you ned up
with 100 marines and 5 japanese reenactors.  A friend of mine did
japanese at that event so maybe he could help out some.  TAS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# AD16%NEMOMUS@ACADEMIC.NEMOSTATE.EDU                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 04:00:20 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <tkeller@LOGICON.COM>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 03-05-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
03/05 Mon.  United States naval vessel damaged:
             LST 641, by collision, Iwo Jima area,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
            Japanese naval vessels sunk:
             Submarine chaser NO. 110, by Army aircraft,
              Netherlands East Indies area,
              08 d. 36'S., 119 d. 19'E.
             Minesweeper No. 15, by submarine TILEFISH (SS-307),
              north of Ryukyu Islands.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <ljewell@EXPERT.CC.PURDUE.EDU>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
tkeller@logicon.com

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 17:16:55 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 3

        Since I'm close to winding this up, I'd like to briefly sum up the
points I was trying to make, in case they somehow got lost in the blizzard of
details I've been throwing out here.
        The same economic constraints which gave the impulse to Japanese
expansion in the first place also imposed absolute limitations on the nation's
military-industrial capabilities.  In spite of its impressive navy, Japan in
1930-45 was closer to a regional than a world power.  (And remember, at the
start of that period the country was also suffering severely from the
depression, coming after what was already a period of belt-tightening: I made
earlier reference to the hardships engendered by the Minseito party's economic
policy, and Ed Miller pointed out that some Japanese were literally starving
during this period).  Despite their limitations, the Japanese found themselves
at some point or other during this period at war with the world's three
greatest powers in terms of industrial, human, and natural resources-- i.e.,
the US, USSR, and Great Britain with its Commonwealth and Empire.
Additionally, during practically the entire period in question Japan was
involved in trying to control the huge territories and population of China
through covert or open military means.  This was clearly far more than the
Japanese military or economy could handle-- Ienaga, among others, has argued
that even the attempt to dominate China was beyond Japan's resources, and
events appear to have borne him out.
        Considered in more detail, the Japanese military effort was, aside from
the background limitations outlined above, further handicapped by the fact that
such a huge proportion of its limited resources were tied down in the China
campaign throughout the course of hostilities with the west.  Thus the Japanese
were doubly condemned to fight a "poor man's war" against the Americans,
British, et al.  Nonetheless, in their opening campaigns they were able to
utilize the advantages of thorough and meticulous preparations to maximize
their limited means and win a series of lightning victories.  These advantages
included the opportunity to collect thorough intelligence on their targets over
a period of months or even years under peacetime conditions; the possibilities
of concentrating scarce resources for specific operations; the time to complete
thorough staff preparations; and in many cases the ability to provide
specialized training for the forces involved.  Much like a practitioner of many
of the martial arts, they were able to hurt a bigger, stronger opponent
utilizing strategy and skill to strike hard blows in the decisive spot.
However, when this series of often brilliant initial victories failed to bring
the war to a successful conclusion, the inherent limitations of the Japanese
war potential began to be exposed.  Surrendering the initiative to the Allies,
which was the existing  state of affairs by the second half of 1942, deprived
the Japanese of all the advantages described above, since they were no longer
able to choose where and
when to fight, and dispose their limited means accordingly.
When forced to improvise, the Japanese generally proved considerably less
adept, and furthermore, their initial advantage in intelligence also vanished
relatively early.    From Midway on it was the Allies who were able to read the
Japanese codes and anticipate many of their enemy's moves.  The initiative and
strategic and tactical mobility allowed by the Allied, especially the American,
material advantage in ships and aircraft made certain that for the remainder of
the war it was likey that the Japanese were going to be forced into this
posture of reacting, like it or not.
        It will probably take me until next post to explore further how the
Japanese eventually came to deal with this changed strategic and tactical
situatio n, since my VMS is experiencing a major case of the slows, and I'm a
little pressed for time.  Any typos here aare likely a resault of that as well,
since I'm not getting a display as I type this.  So I'd like to take a moment
to deal with a couple of real and potential glaring errors in my recent
postings.I was caught in one major boo-boo, when I referred to a
Roosevelt-Churchill agreement that only 10% of US resources would go the
Pacific (it was, as someone on the list was kind enough to point out, actually
30-70).  I like the fact of having all those potential editors out there to
keep me honest, so I'd like to ask if anyone can help me on another point..  I
think I said that the coastwatchers were instrumental in informing the Allies
about the construction of the Japanese airfield on Guadalcanal, which led to
the landings there (the operation was already in the stages of preparation with
the objective of near-by Tulagi). But then I saw in Liddel-Hart, which I've
been using as a handy refernce, that the airfield was detected by Allied air
reconnaisance.  Can anyone shed some light on this detail?  I can't find my
copy of Graeme Kent's "Guadalcanal: Island Ordeal" which I think was the source
for the stuff about the coastwatchers, but it might have just been crossed
brain cells.  Finally, I want to confess that I don't have biographical details
on Admiral Raizo Tanaka after the spring of 1943, which is  a shame as he was a
pretty interesting officer.. I have read a fair bit about Tanaka 's career
previous to the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, enough to know that he was the
Japanese Navy's chief expert on troop transport and transport protection, kind
of the Japanese Kelly Turner.
        Oh, yes, and I wanted to clear up some ambiguous sentence structure in
the last post to explain that the Japanese 36th Division did not actually join
the 18th Army in New Guinea, but rather was posted independently to Wakde
island near New Guinea's northwest tip, and to some adjacent islands and
coastal areas of New Guinea itself.  Here the division fought many actions
against MacArthur's forces in the late spring-early summer of 1944.

        Well, I have to break off, its just too irritating to have to type like
this.  Will try again soon.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 14:43:37 -0800
From:    John Riegsecker <RIEGSECKER@UPS.EDU>
Subject: Gas at Iwo Jima

In the book _Iwo Jima_, Richard Newcomb, it is stated on pages 204-205 of my
paperback copy, that the use of gas was considered at Iwo.  According to
the book, a report written by Major General John Sydney Lethbridge
recommended that the transmitter at Iwo Jima be jammed and then the
island was to be soaked with gas shells.  Part of the plan was to change
the yellow banding on gas shells so that the gunners would not know they
were firing gas shells.  Supposedly Nimitz was for it, but it was
denied by FDR.  Newcomb also says that neither Japan nor the US had
signed the Geneva Convention outlawing gas.  Anybody know more about
this?

John Riegsecker
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of Puget Sound

riegsecker@ups.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 19:42:26 EST
From:    John Davis <jbdavis@NANDO.NET>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 06-MAR-1945

On 06-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the British 43rd Division
prepares for the final offensive on Xanten. The Canadian 3rd Division takes
Sonsbeck. In the U.S. 9th Army sector, Operation Grenade comes to an end;
with the XVI, XIII and XIX Corps moving up to the Rhine. In the 1st Army
sector, the offensive against Cologne continues with the 3rd Armoured
Division attacking from the north and the 104th Division from the south. In
the 3rd Army sector, the offensive along the Kyll continues.

Eastern Front - Troops of the 2nd White Russian Front complete the
reduction of Grudziadz, a key point in the German defence system on the
lower Vistula in Poland. The 1st White Russian Front makes substantial
gains in northern Pomerania, where Belgrad is cleared.

Philippines - I Corps is ordered to speed action toward the Balete
Pass-Sante Fe-Imugan area.

Iwo Jima - After the most intensive massed artillery preparation of this
operation, supplemented by naval gunfire, the VAC renews efforts to break
through to the O-3 line but is still so bitterly oppossed that progress is
negligible. Elements of the 3rd Marine Division achieve the most gain in
the center, about 200 yards. Progress on the flanks is limited to 100 yards
or less. Seventh Air Force fighters land on Airfield 1 to support ground
operations.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | jbdavis@nando.net
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 17:08:37 -0800
From:    Chris Albee <cea@NETCOM.COM>
Subject: NOST/VET: Iwo trip question

A pretty specific plea:

If anyone knows of any Iwo Jima veterans from New Hampshire who are going on
next week's trip to Guam and Iwo, please get in touch.   I would love to know,
as my dad may be going, and a NH paper may commission him to write an
article.  They had asked him if anyone from NH was going, which would
make it more interesting to their local readers.

Are any list members going?

If he goes, I'll try to report after he gets back, if there is interest.

Thanks!
cea

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 22:27:49 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 4

        Ah, that's better.  VMS' arteries have unclogged.
        When I mentioned in my previous, aborted post that the preparation for
the successful early Japanese offensives included thorough staff work, I meant
not only in regard to tactical considerations, but even more so regarding
logistics, an area the Japanese often neglected.  An example would be the
Malaya campaign which I have often cited as the Japanese Army machine operating
at peak efficiency.  One case in point was the special training and equipment
of the three engineer regiments in 25th Army, who came to specialize in bridge
construction and repair.  Each regiment, among other things, had at its
disposal 20 heavy trucks to carry construction materials and heavy equipment
for this purpose.  Tsuji also praises the special efforts of the Army's
railroad repair and maintenance unit, which apparently also was very well
prepared for its tasks in this campaign.
        I should mention in regards to prominent Japanese staff officers Col.
Tokushiro Hattori.  Hattori was head of the operations department at Imperial
General HQ from the start of the war until December 1942, then again from
October '43 to August '44 (in the period between he served as secretary to the
War Minister, the same job Saburo Hayashi, to whose book I have often referred,
held in August '45).  Hattori personally took charge of developing the plan
for breaking through the Bataan defenses in April '42, a battle which went off
more or less like clockwork-- after bombing attacks and a barrage by 150 guns
and howitzers against two and a half miles of ridgeline (which American WWI
veterans in the Bataan defenses called worse than the Argonne in that previous
conflict famed for its dense artillery concentrations) the Japanese troops were
able to virtually walk through the defenses in many sectors.   Hattori was also
considered one of the Army's leading experts on naval matters, and held a
number of posts involving liason with the Navy or acting as naval consultant in
Army councils.  In February 1945 he was assigned to command an ordinary
infantry regiment, the 65th, in China, and survived the war.
        One other important point about staff preparation-- and although I've
mentioned it before the importance of this cannot be overstated in regard to
the Japanese-- is the fact that only the top 10% of Japanese officers received
the advanced staff training that was usually a prerequisite for high command.
These men were, in general, serious students of the art of war, with a solid
grounding in logistical and strategic realities.  The other 90%, most of whom
could not realistically expect more than, with luck, to retire as colonels
after a few decades of service, tended to be far less imbued with analytical
skills.  Among this majority of Japanese officers who populated the middle
and lower ranks of the officer corps, there was a strong tendency to give
prominence to spiritual and moral factors over the material.  Just like the
Japanese folk hero Musashi Miyamoto, the great swordsman and philosopher who
once fought a hundred men singlehanded and won (and who was, by the way, a
real historical figure from the early period of the Tokugawa shogunate-- a
historical novel about Musashi published in the pre-war years has been called
the Japanese "Gone With The Wind," not least because of its unprecedented
popularity), these men believed that if their spirits were pure and brave they
could triumph even against prohibitive odds-- and that, failing that, they
would at least find the repose of a hero's death.  Thus having the services of
staff officers like Hattori or Tsuji available in general greatly improved the
chances of proper preparations and dispositions, while local initiatives by the
field officers of the type just described were more likely to result in "bamboo
spear tactics."  I should mention that perhaps Tsuji's widespread appeal and
influence in the Japanese Army was due to the fact that he combined aspects of
both personalities.  He was a quite competent and well-trained staff officer,
but he was also very emotional, very concerned with the spiritual qualities of
the warrior mind, and able to inspire those emotions in others.  Tsuji's
aggressive personality enabled him to pull off outlandish stunts and get away
with them.  For instance, early in the Malaya campaign, having returned direct
from the battlefield, unhappy with one aspect of the support the forward
elements were receiving, he stormed into the quarters of General Sosaku Suzuki,
Yamashita's chief-of-staff (and of course Tsuji's superior), and began to
violently upbraid the general for being in his pajamas while there was a battle
going on.  Rather than reprimand Tsuji for his rude and abusive behavior,
Suzuki, apparently shamed, hurriedly changed into his uniform so he could
listen to Tsuji's complaints.  Need I stress that with the Japanese system of
subordinates often having the most input into the actions carried out under the
name of the figurehead commanders, the men who thought more of moral force than
physical possibilities often had considerable influence in the field.
        All the moral force in the world was not, unfortunately for the
Japanese, able to overcome the superior material resources of the Americans in
most cases.  Last post I spoke of Adachi's 18th Army and its assaults around
Aitape.  Their dedication was admirable.  After moving beyond the scope of the
18th Army's interior communications, they forced their way through 90 miles of
dense jungle to reach the American positions, taking a month in the effort and
living on half rations.  Their assaults were courageous and fierce, and at
times their tactics appear to have been pretty good at the local level.  They
forced many small American withdrawals in 25 days of attacks, at one point
actually made a breakthrough and cut off most of a US regiment, which was
surrounded for four days before relieved.  But, seriously short of both trained
infantry and ammunition, and almost entirely lacking in artillery support,
Adachi's men could not by mere spirit triumph over their material shortcomings.
They lost almost half their force in a month, and the survivors were never
really a factor in the subsequent fighting on New Guinea-- a whole army was
thrown away in a splendid but ultimately useless gesture.  Of course, Adachi
didn't have a whole lot of choices-- fight his way out or starve-- and he chose
the most courageous path.  But the simple fact that American air and naval
resources, by making moves like MacArthur's Hollandia hop possible, could and
did put bypassed Japanese forces like 18th Army in untenable circumstances, was
tantamount to admission that superior material had largely rendered the
Japanese strategic and tactical position hopeless.
        The end game of the campaign in the Solomons and around Rabaul was a
further illustration, and also a demonstration of the war-winning potential of
the US Navy "Magic" intercepts and other codebreaking efforts.  Even Kusaka's
naval units were at last coming to be overwhelmed in these waters.  The
Bougainville landings at Empress Augusta Bay led to another naval scrap between
evenly-matched forces of US and Japanese light cruisers and destroyers.  But
the Americans were learning, and the four new US cruisers avoided the "Long
Lance" torpedoes launched at them in this action, while giving a gunnery clinic
that sank the Japanese light cruiser SENDAI and a destroyer without loss.  But
this was just a warm-up for a more serious riposte against the November '43 US
landings,  Koga's operation "Ro-Go."  Koga dispatched to Rabaul a force of
seven heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and four destroyers.  They were
supposed to slip in and ravage the Allied fleet under Halsey which was
covering the landings, but whose two carriers had no ships heavier than a light
cruiser to protect them.  But US codebreakers, who deciphered a message
confirming the ships' arrival at Rabaul, alerted Halsey to the danger.  Halsey
was, well, something that rhymes with "Halsey."  Although he looked bad later
in his career, leaving San Bernardino strait uncovered at Leyte Gulf and in
1945 sailing his fleet right into a destructive typhoon, his guts and
aggressive instincts served the Allies well in the Solomons.  Halsey knew his
only chance was to hurt the enemy cruisers before they left port, when they were
still easy to find and relatively easy to hit.  He launched all his carrier
planes to raid Rabaul, even though Allied estimates put the Japanese air
strength there as high as 150 planes (probably an overestimate, as it turned
out).  Fortune favored the Americans.  Rain and heavy clouds covered the US
carrier force, shielding it from detection by Japanese air reconnaisance.  But
Halsey managed to launch his own planes, and the weather over Rabaul was clear.
The operation was a success, three of the heavy cruisers and three destroyers
being damaged, and Koga was forced to scrap "Ro-Go."  As at Midway, luck had
played an important role in saving the American carriers, but the success of
the US codebreakers had put them in the position to be lucky.
        The last act of the Solomons drama was the landing of US forces on Cape
Gloucester, at the other end of New Britain from the Japanese base of Rabaul
(and where the Japanese were constructing a new airfield).  The Marines started
coming ashore on Christmas 1943.  The superior Allied mobility put the Japanese
in the same quandary once again.  They could either allow the Americans their
new base, or they could struggle through miles of virgin jungle to try to
attack them, allowing the enemy the advantage of the defender.  Essentially,
they left the Americans their lodgement, although they did dispatch forces to
engage, but not on the same scale as at Bougainville.  Weather, with incessant
rain, caused more problems than the Japanese-- I've read a couple of references
to the fact that at least 30 Americans were killed by falling trees, the sodden
ground being too liquified for the root structures to hold the large trees
upright.  Rabaul, the once-powerful base which held as many as 100,000 Japanese
military personnel, was simply left to wither on the vine.  Its defenses
against landings were reportedly quite formidable-- but the landings never
came.  Instead there were air attacks and progressive starvation, as the war
simply passed Rabaul by, and its Japanese defenders with it, another monument
to the success of the "island-hopping" strategy.
        The hour is late and I'm tired so will pick up the thread tomorrow.
Still to come, the change in Japanese tactics for fighting amphibious landings
(as evidenced by the contrasting battles of Biak and Saipan in June '44) and a
word or two about Japanese forays into high-tech, plus my promised final
appendix.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 4 Mar 1995 to 5 Mar 1995
***********************************************

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Status: O

There are 21 messages totalling 1321 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Gas at Iwo Jima (3)
  2. Patton biography
  3. QUEST: German Executors
  4. INFO ON USN BATTLE
  5. Battle of the Bulge
  6. HIST: PTSD
  7. 50TH: THREE DAY PARIS PASS (2)
  8. Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the Bulge) (2)
  9. Educating the young
 10. Glacier Girl
 11. Intro to list
 12. [INF] USAAF 7 MAR 45
 13. INF: 50 Years Ago - 07-MAR-1945
 14. TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS (2)
 15. GAS AT IWO JIMA
 16. Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 21:11:08 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <ub076@FREENET.VICTORIA.BC.CA>
Subject: Re: Gas at Iwo Jima

'Dont know about the circumstances on Iwo Jime, but it is a fact that some
Japanese units in Burma used gas hand-grenades. These weapons were German-
made. Probably given to the Japs for "combat testing". British troops
reported being attacked by gas hand-grenades in 1944.
However, there were only a few isolated incidences of their use.


--

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 07:32:53 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <RTMOORE@PCAD-ML.ACTX.EDU>
Subject: Re: Patton biography

Hello, Matt!

Glad it was of some assistance. If you need anything else, please let
me know.


All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 07:38:58 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <RTMOORE@PCAD-ML.ACTX.EDU>
Subject: Re: QUEST: German Executors

Hello, William!

I associate this trauma with the Bataan Death March survivors. Much
work has been done in this area. You might contact a VA hospital, if
one is nearby, for some info.

Hope this helps.

All the best.


Terry

 Post Traumatic
> Stress Disorder.
>    Anyone familiar with this mental disorder?  There has been a lot of
> literature about it regarding Vietnam Vets; its effects magnified because
> of the political atmosphere both there and in the US.  Additionally, it
> has gone by other names: shell shock in WWI, combat fatigue in WWII.  It
> can have many results: loss of memory, anxiety, and even phobias.
>    Thanks in advance.
>    By the way, is there something wrong with the list?  I haven't gotten
> much today.
>
> William Lippert
>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 08:44:59 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <wrb1@CORNELL.EDU>
Subject: Re: INFO ON USN BATTLE

>I have to correct you on one fact, Ron. Battle stars on combat ribbons were
>bronze. The silver star represented five awards. So a person with one silver
>star and a bronze star would indicate that for the Asiatic-Pacific campaign
>ribbon, for example, the individual wearing the ribbon participated in six
>campaigns. For personal decorations, if you received five of a Navy Cross, for
>example, you would wear a gold star--gold and silver stars are larger than the
>bronze star, by the way. For the naval services, the guide to decorations is
>the "Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual," which is always in a state of being
>updated. Ben Frank


Thanks Ben, I was unsure of the actual difference between a bronze and
silver battle star and was hoping that someone would jump in to rescue me.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 09:00:35 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <wrb1@CORNELL.EDU>
Subject: Re: Battle of the Bulge

.
>
>Perhaps Ben Frank could give us the truth of this operation.  Did
>the Marines have cloth helmet covers, M1 Garands, M1 carbines, etc.
>and can you give us the lowdown on the Reising gun which I
>understand was quickly ditched.
>

Reising Submachine Gun

        This weapon was designed by Eugene Reising and manufactured by the
Harrington & Richardson Comapny for the US Marine Corps between 1941 and
1945.  Its was an unusual and unnecessarily complex design, firing from a
closed bolt and using 12 or 20-round box magazines.  While the design was
technically sound, it was not well thought out from the combat point of
view, and in service the gun was found to be extremely sensitive to dirt
and dust, often jamming at inopportune moments.
        The greater part of the production of the Reising submachine gun
was taken by the US Marine Corps and it was extensively used by them in the
campaigns of the South Pacific.  The British government also purchased a
small number.  However, it was not popular and was eventually relegated to
be used as a training weapon and for use with the USA by factory guards and
police forces.

from Encyclopedia of World War II editor John Keegan

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 09:18:07 -0500
From:    THOMPSON@LVC.EDU
Subject: HIST: PTSD

My wife, a Vietnam veteran, is a psychiatric nurse practitioner at a VAMH.
Most of her patients (sorry, they now call them "clients") are Vietnam vets
suffering this condition (she does have a goodly number, as well, who are
WWII and Korea vets with similar problems; e.g., one WWII combatant had had no
apparent problems till Reagan made his visit to the Bitburg cemetary ... he
thereafter began flashbacks to the Battle of the Bulge).

If you have specific questions, I'll be happy to pass them to her.

-- Warren Thompson

thompson@lvc.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 08:32:24 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <John.Ausland@GMAIL.GAR.NO>
Subject: 50TH: THREE DAY PARIS PASS

  Oslo, March 6, 1995
  As readers of my messages know, I passed up no opportunity to get a
respite from the war.  The highlight was a trip to Paris, shortly
after we broke through the Siegfried Line.
  Usually, I shaved and cleaned up before returning to the 29th Field
Artillery Battalion headquarters from my job as liaison officer to an
infantry battalion.  However, on one occasion I did not, because I was
so furious after a radio team from battalion that I was relying on to
relay messages went to sleep.
  The net result of this performance was that my battalion commander
decided I needed a rest and gave me a three day pass to Paris.  Here
is the letter I wrote home about this:

          Dear Folks, February 23, 1945, Germany

          Let me begin with a report on my recent pass to Paris. We
          left our units in Germany at about 0900 February 16. From
          there we went to division rear, where all the men from the
          various units of the division collected. By the time I reached
          there, I was thoroughly ill - a result of several weeks of GIs
          and a rough ride in a two and a half ton truck.
          Nevertheless, I was on my way and not about to turn back.

          Perhaps you wonder how I got this pass. Well, behind it is
          quite a story. You see, I'll go sometimes for weeks without
          seeing anyone back at our battalion CP. This time varies
          with how long a particular fight lasts. Sometimes during a
          fight there either isn't time or one doesn't feel like washing
          or shaving. However, before I go back to battalion I always
          clean up. The other day, however, I went back without
          shaving.

          You see, when you come back looking fresh, everyone says,
          "Well, you all are really living the life of Riley, aren't you?"
          However, when I went back looking worn and haggard,
          everyone said, "It must be rough up there. You need a rest,
          Aus. I've never seen you look so bad."

          Two days later I received orders to report back to battalion
          to go to Paris.

          Well, anyway we started out for the city. I stretched out in
          the back of a truck, went to sleep, and by the time we got
          there the next noon I felt much better.

          In Paris the Red Cross billeted us at the Washington Club,
          or Hotel Louvre, which is at the opposite end of the street
          from the Opera. The afternoon was spent in cleaning up and
          planning the next several days.

          But let me tell you about the hotel itself. A Capt. Miles,
          from our division headquarters, and I shared a double room,
          with private bath. The room would compare favorably with
          one in the New Yorker or Pennsylvania in New York. On
          each floor was a "key girl" who kept the room keys. As an
          additional service, she would sew insignia, etc. on your
          clothes for you.

          The dining room served breakfast from 0800 to 1000, lunch
          from 1200 to 1400, supper from 1800 to 2000. The food
          was quite good and, while the portions were not too
          generous, one could get seconds. Between meal hours, the
          donut bar was open, where one could get donuts and coffee.

          In the hotel lobby, there an information desk operated by
          French women volunteers who speak English - and,
          incidentally, have a good knowledge of the city.

          Now to our first evening in Paris. Really no more exciting
          than an evening in any large city. We went by metro
          (subway) from Palais Royal to Pigalle. Pigalle is one of the
          less desirable sections of Paris. We went to the Club Moulin
          Rouge, which is described by some as a clip-joint. And it is.

          A glass of orange juice to use as a chaser cost 80 francs
          ($1.60). A bottle of champagne 1000 francs ($20). Capt.
          Miles and Lt. Parker, who is one of the engineer officers that
          works with our infantry regiment, and I took in the floor
          show and somehow acquired some very friendly girls.

          No doubt you will wonder at this. Well, you need not, for
          there is no woman shortage in Paris. One can walk the five
          squares from the Hotel Louvre to the Opera and will be
          stopped no less than fifteen times. In bars or clubs they
          swarm about like flies. Their price is a package of cigarettes,
          chocolate bars, or, if you insist, money.

          About five came over to the table. We offered them drinks.
          They accepted. In no time at all they had drunk all our
          scotch. Even that was all right, but when they started to
          quarrel among themselves as to which of them would take
          which of us home with them and two girls came to blows,
          we decided it was time to leave.

          Sunday morning we got up at eight, had breakfast, and
          went on a tour of the city. Saw the tomb of Napoleon at the
          Hotel des Invalides, the Eifel Tower, the Louvre, Notre Dame,
          Place de la Concorde (location of the Tate's and my
          experience last summer), Arc de Triomphe, etc. Very
          interesting tour.

          In the afternoon Parker and I went to the opera, seeing
          Rigoletto. The performance was quite good, but the settings
          were positively out of this world. I've never seen anything as
          good.

          The opera house itself is reportedly the largest theater in the
          world; certainly it is the most beautiful I've ever seen. Large
          staircases, imposing chandeliers, excellent murals. Really
          very impressive.

          There's one thing though that really gets you, not only at
          the opera but in all of the city. That is the emphasis on
          tipping. Boy, they're really tip conscious.

          Sunday evening we went to the Folies Bergere.

          Monday morning I slept. In the afternoon, I ran into Marlene
          Dietrich, and I mean ran into her. When going into the
          officer's clothing store, she was coming out the door I was
          going into. A violent collision, apologies, and she went on.
          I didn't. I turned around to stare. They're not worth a
          million dollars, but nearly!

          In the evening, we made the rounds of the bars. The others
          met girls to whom they took a fancy. I returned to the hotel
          about midnight. (Damn it, why did I have to receive such
          Puritanical rearing?)

          Tuesday morning I did a little shopping at the Louvre
          Department Store, through which one could stroll for hours.
          In the afternoon I had my picture taken. Then back to here
          in Germany.

          Love, John
          END EXCERPT FROM LETTERS HOME: A WAR MEMOIR

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 12:46:26 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <hhs@EVEREST.HUNTER.CUNY.EDU>
Subject: Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the Bulge)

Dear Jack,

Re Victory at Sea: "any film they can find" ain't the half of it.
My favorites are in "Midway is East," the third episode, where half
of the battle of Midway is from the fictional Coral Sea battle in
the movie "Air Force," the Japanese carrier gunners are shooting
down Japanese aircraft off Leyte in 1944, and the account of the
success of the American dive bombers is illustrated with multiple
shots of TBF torpedo launches. Maybe that's the real secret of the
American victory- hidden squadrons of TBF/TBMs off a (time-travelling?)
carrier group. The series producers did find some great shots of
armed TBDs taking off, though. These could have been authentic.

Regards,

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 12:55:12 -0500
From:    Howard Holden <Howardhol@AOL.COM>
Subject: Educating the young

My name is Howard Holden.
I am an intern at an educational branch of Turner Broadcasting Systems (you
know, TBS, the folks who bring you the Cartoon Network and Beverly
Hillbillies reruns).
Turner Adventure Learning (TAL) pipes live shows into class rooms and allows
kides to send in questions via this amazing new medium.
We also hold online forums for kids with experts in various fields.
We have a project coming up in May centered around VE Day, and we are looking
for individuals who might spend some online time with the youngsters.  We
would especially like personal accounts of WWII and VE Day.
Anyone interested?  I have to mention, we can't pay.
Please e-mail me privately, and thanks for the time.  I'm sorry to clutter
your list.

Howard
Howardhol@aol.com

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 14:13:46 EST
From:    Roger Coon <coon@CVAX.IPFW.INDIANA.EDU>
Subject: Re: Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the Bulge)

It wasn't just victory at sea.  I recall seeing a program on one of A&E's
military oriented series.  The announcer was describing the sinking of
a Japanese battleship (the Yamato?) but the film footage was of a
WW I Austrian battleship capsizing after having torpedoed by Italian
torpedo boats.
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 14:13:48 EST
From:    Mike Oaks <moaks@KSCMAIL.KENNESAW.EDU>
Subject: Re: 50TH: THREE DAY PARIS PASS

On Mon, 6 Mar 1995 08:32:24 +0100,
JOHN AUSLAND  <John.Ausland@GMAIL.GAR.NO> wrote:

>  Oslo, March 6, 1995
>  As readers of my messages know, I passed up no opportunity to get a
>respite from the war.  The highlight was a trip to Paris, shortly
>after we broke through the Siegfried Line.

John,
   Great post. Shows there was life other than in the trenches. Thanks for
the insight.
  If I remember correctly, you stated your "Memiors" was already out of
print. Are there any plans for a new edition or do you know of any stores
that may have retained a copy that I may purchase or did you ever perfect
the "electronic" edition? (love those run on sentences)
   Let me know and keep the "memories" coming...
                                            Mike Oaks

/====================================================================\
|    Michael A. Oaks                                                 |
|    Systems Analyst                  Music: A means to mark times   |
|    moaks@kscmail.kennesaw.edu              stepping stones through |
|    Kennesaw, Georgia 30144                 your calendar of life.  |
|    Tel: (404)423-6049  Fax (404)423-6541          ~ ~ ~ ~      MAO |
|    VWAR-L #146 - - (Sgt. USAF = / AFCS / AFSS / AFDC)              |
|    Break, Break...Kadena, Kadena, Clark, Clark, Request you echo...|
|    (Some things you never forget...even after 25 years...)         |
\====================================================================/

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 15:13:39 -0500
From:    Barone <m1b@SSD.RAY.COM>
Subject: Re: Gas at Iwo Jima

John Riegsecker <RIEGSECKER@UPS.EDU> writes:
> In the book _Iwo Jima_, Richard Newcomb, it is stated on pages 204-205 of my
> paperback copy, that the use of gas was considered at Iwo.  According to
> the book, a report written by Major General John Sydney Lethbridge
> recommended that the transmitter at Iwo Jima be jammed and then the
> island was to be soaked with gas shells.  Part of the plan was to change
> the yellow banding on gas shells so that the gunners would not know they
> were firing gas shells.  Supposedly Nimitz was for it, but it was
> denied by FDR.  Newcomb also says that neither Japan nor the US had
> signed the Geneva Convention outlawing gas.  Anybody know more about
> this?

        I cannot answer this particular question but I've read that it
was also (or more accurately, previously) considered at Biak in 1944.
This comes from the the January 1991 issue of "World War II", a bi-monthly
publication.  MacArthur wanted to seize the island of Biak off the
northern coast of New Guinea in order to use its airfields for the
invasion of the Philippines and also to bottle up the Japanese on New
Guinea.  The Japanese defense strategy on the island was to use the
caves overlooking the airfields to keep the Americans from capturing
the airfields and, if they did, to keep them from using them.

        After about four weeks of fighting, with only one airfield
captured but unusable, Eichelberger, the second commander of the Task
Force "briefly considered the use of poison gas against the enemy, but
was dissuaded by the objections of his own staff."  Unfortunately, this
line is so vague that I cannot determine how seriously this was considered.
It does make me wonder what kind of latitude field commanders had
concerning the use of poison gas.  I inferred from the quoted line
above that Eichelberger had the gas readily available and that he did
not require authorization from some higher authority in order to use
it; only the arguments of his staff persuaded him not to use it.
--
Joe Barone
m1b@ssd.ray.com
Hey!  Did you lose my aerial photographs?

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 16:09:37 EST
From:    Roger Coon <coon@CVAX.IPFW.INDIANA.EDU>
Subject: Re: Gas at Iwo Jima

One must also wonder what kind of gas.  I would guess mustard gas
rather than one of the nerve agents???
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 15:14:25 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <rjg@STAT.UMN.EDU>
Subject: Re: Glacier Girl

> Is the pilot of this P-38 still alive? Why doesn't someone ask him
> about the name, assuming he (she?) was not just a ferry pilot. If the
> plane was unnamed, the pilot was taking it into combat, and he approves
> the name, why would it be inauthentic to use it- it's not made up out
> of whole cloth, but is a legitimate part of this aircraft's individual
> history. In effect, this plane is being returned to service on public
> relations duty, and "Glacier Girl" is part of its reinstallation.
> I specifically note that I don't suggest this for other restorations,
> most emphatically when the markings bear no relation to the actual
> service history of the type, but I think this is a special case,
> such cases should be considered individually, and so long as the
> application of the design conforms with WW II practice (Robert
> Granvin's point) is acceptable. Just my .02.

This is essentially why I personally waffle a bit on the issue.  I would
still prefer it not be applied, but it can be construed as acceptable, even
to the purist.  :-)

Whether the pilot is around or not is probably immaterial as this was a
ferry flight.  No real history or purpose had yet been established for
the aircraft.

Where my primary red-alert goes off was with the question of self-recognition.
I do not believe, even in this case, that nose art and a name should be
applied as a way to recognize the mechanics and others who rebuilt the
aircraft.  If it makes the mission of the aircraft a bit easier, however,
in this unusual situation, then it's OK.

As far as self-recognition, we do it all the time with our aircraft.  When
our B-25 shows up at an airshow, everything around it says Southern Minnesota
Wing and Confederate Air Force.  We talk about the history of the plane, but
we also talk about what it takes to do this kind of restoration.  The key,
however, is the realization that we're talking about "around the airplane."
With the exception of a small plaque in the nose (unobtrusive and removable
without any damage to the aircraft's authenticity) and the N number that the
FAA requires, the aircraft is as pure as we can make (and that work
continues).  If the aircraft itself commemorated ourselves, and not the
history it's supposed to represent, then we did something wrong.

(When it was mentioned to cut the mechanics some slack, there is no rush more
pronounced than watching something you spent a lot of time working on finally
operate -- and, unlike most people -- those that worked on it usually get to
take part in the operations to the point where it actually can get _boring_ :-)

That's basically where I differ on the issue and still revolves around the
question of "why are you doing this?"  You can do the exact same thing for
both good reasons and wrong reasons.  :-)

So on "Glacier Girl," I remain with mixed emotions, but confident that the
right reasons are the driving force.

--
\\ Robert J. Granvin                                 User Services Specialist
// School of Statistics - University of Minnesota            rjg@stat.umn.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 16:30:00 -0400
From:    John Baxter Jones <JONESJB@CONRAD.APPSTATE.EDU>
Subject: Intro to list

Good Afternoon, Everyone,
     Just wanted to introduce myself as a newby on the wwii-l list. My
name is John Baxter Jones; I am a member of the Social Studies Dept.
faculty at Watauga High School, Boone, NC.
     I teach World History (standard fare) and Peace & War (warfare cause
and effect/international relations), a course I, fortunately, was allowed
to develop based upon a lifetime fascination/interest/study of warfare and
my own experiences gained from 2 tours in Vietnam, 1966--'68, with the 4th
Inf. Div. (1st tour) and 25th Inf. Div. (2nd tour).  Also conduct guest
lectures (upon request) at nearby Appalachian State University (Death &
Dying classes and ROTC leadership classes).  I am presently wrapping-up
the rough draft of a novel based upon my experiences in Vietnam.
     My Dad, TSgt. Earl Thomas Jones (1922--1979) was a veteran of the
Pacific Theatre, WWII; serving 1942 thru 1946 (3rd Army Air Corps
<Southeast U.S.>; 13th Army Air Corps <Southwest Pacific>; and Occupation
Forces, Japan), and thus, the stimuli for my nearly 40 years of study of the
phenomena.  My earliest memories of my Dad (when I was 3-4 years
old) were of he and my uncles (European Theatre veterans) sitting around a
campfire, late on brisk coon hunting nights, sharing the stories of their
individual wartime experiences, some funny...most not, and me sitting at
their feet, totally fascinated by these guys who would remain my heroes
for a lifetime.
     They spoke not in boast nor braggadocio, but in almost reverential
tones of the things they had seen and took part in.  Throughout those
years until I went off to war, myself, Dad taught me..made sure I knew..
that there was no glory in warfare,..only death, carnage, and
destruction; but he also taught me that every one must share in the
defense of our freedoms and our principals and that I would do my part
when the time came.  I knew as early as 5 years old that I would serve in
the U.S. military, in some capacity, in the future...it was a given..
Despite the many controversies surrounding the role of America in
Vietnam, I'm glad I served...I was allowed to walk in my Dad's shoes.
That was enough for me.
     I hope I can make a contribution to this list, but, moreso, I want
to learn from the combined knowledge that is apparent here.


Respectfully,

John B. Jones

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 19:37:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 7 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
WEDNESDAY, 7 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  Spitfire, Vickers Supermarine

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): In the Kurile Islands; 8 B-25s, dispatched to
strike a reported convoy, abort due to weather; so do 8 B-24s after departing
on a shipping sweep and a strike on Kataoka, Shimushu Island.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 4 B-25s and 9 P-40s blast
railroad targets N of Kiaotow; single B-25s hit truck convoys in the Hsiang
River Valley, the waterfront at Changsha, and a bridge and other targets of
opportunity on the Pinghan railroad; 130+ fighter-bombers attack numerous
targets throughout S and E China, concentrating on railroad, road, and river
targets in the areas around Nanking, Yoyang, Sintsiang, and Changsha.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 30 P-47s support troops of
the British 36 Division in the Mogok area; 18 others support elements of the
Chinese 50th Division near Mansam; elements of the Chinese 38th Division
occupy Lashio; 12 B-25s and 35 fighter-bombers attack road targets, troops,
vehicles, and a variety of targets of opportunity immediately behind enemy
lines. Transports fly 630 sorties supplying forward areas with men and
equipment.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 3 missions are flown.
  Mission 869: 946 bombers and 322 fighters are dispatched to hit oil and
communication targets using PFF; 1 P-51 is lost:
  1. 246 B-24s are sent to hit the marshalling yard at Soest (144) and the
Schildesche water viaduct at Bielefeld (80); Gee-H and H2X radar are used
for bombing; 1 B-24 is damaged beyond repair and 3 damaged; 10 airmen are KIA.
Escorting are 77 P-47s and P-51s.
  2. 344 B-17s are dispatched to bomb the Horderverein (24) and Harpenerweg
(62) oil refineries at Dortmund; secondary targets hit are the marshalling
yards at Paderborn (11), Siegen (113) and Giessen (87); Gee-H and H2X radar
are used; 1 B-17 is damaged beyond repair and 20 damaged; 1 airman is KIA.
The escort is 74 of 85 P-51s.
  3. 340 B-17s are sent to hit the Emscherlippe benzol plant at Datteln
(173) and the Rauxel benzol plant at Castrop (77); secondary targets hit
are the marshalling yards at Siegen (43) and Giessen (28); 1 other hits a
target of opportunity; Micro H and H2X radar are used; 56 B-17s are
damaged. 75 of 76 P-51s escort the bombers.
  4. 6 B-17s and 6 B-24s fly a screening mission.
  5. 4 B-17s fly a scouting mission.
  6. 37 of 38 P-51s fly a sweep of the Dummer Lake-Kassel-Koblenz area.
  7. 23 P-51s escort 5 F-5s and a Spitfire on a photo reconnaissance mission
over Germany; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).
  8. 24 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  Mission 870: 11 of 12 B-24s drop leaflets in Germany and the Netherlands.
  Mission 871: 19 of 20 B-24s bomb Dortmund during the night using PFF; 1
B-24 is lost.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): Weather cancels combat operations
except for the XXIX Tactical Air Commands support of the US XVI Corps along
the Rhine River in the Wesel area. The 39th Photographic Reconnaissance
Squadron, 10th Photographic Group (Reconnaissance), moves from St Amand to
Jarny, France with F-5s (flights are operating from Gosselies and Le Culot,
Belgium).

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Continued bad weather limits
operations to a supply drop in Yugoslavia and routine reconnaissance and
escort missions; all bombing operations are cancelled and 42 P-51s sent on a
strafing mission against railroad communications in Austria are recalled. The
318th Fighter Squadron, 325th Fighter Group, moves from Lesina to Rimini,
Italy with P-51s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, B-25s continue
interdiction of enemy communications, damaging a railroad bridge at Longarone
and railroad fills at Peri and Ossenigo; the XXII Tactical Air Command
concentrates on communications in the NE, Po Valley and fuel and ammunition
dumps in the C part of the Valley with generally good results; during the
night of 6/7 Mar, A-20s hit the Ostiglia crossing and bridges at Nervesa
della Battaglia and Casarsa della Delizia, and bomb targets of opportunity in
the Brenner area.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 11 Guam Island-based B-24s hit Susaki Airfield
on Chichi Jima Island and the town of Okimura on Haha Jima Island; 5 more hit
Susaki Airfield during the night of 7/8 Mar in individual harassment strikes.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Luzon Island,
B-24s hit the Balete Pass area while A-20s and fighter-bombers hit troop
concentrations and gun positions near Antipolo and near San Fernando, NW of
Ft Stotsenburg, and in the Bayombong-Solano area and targets of opportunity
in the Lake Taal area, the towns of Santa Fe, Lallo and Vigan, and on Caballo
Island in Manila Bay; numerous ground support missions are flown throughout
Luzon.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  jem3@cc.bellcore.com  |                       FDR              |
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07/0035Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 21:19:31 EST
From:    John Davis <jbdavis@NANDO.NET>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 07-MAR-1945

On 07-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the Canadian II Corps
prepares for the final attack on Xanten. In the U.S. 1st Army sector, the
4rd Armoured Division and the 104th Division capture Cologne. Elements of
the 9th Armoured Division establish bridgeheads over the rivers Ahr and
Rhine. Other elements of the division manage to capture a bridge at
Remagen, the only one that the Germans have not been able to blow up. In
the 3rd Army sector, the 87th Division advance quickly to the northeast
towards the Ahr. Elements of the 11th Armoured Division take Dockweiler,
Boxberg and Kelberg.

Philippines - In the XIV Corps area, the 6th Division and 1st Cavalry
Division continue preparations for a coordinated drive east against the
Shimbu line. Elements of the 11th Airborne Division advance through
undefended Taal. In the I Corps area, elements of the 33rd Division take
the Aringay bridge and town without opposition.

Iwo Jima - The VAC begins to attack in the center before dawn, withholding
preparatory fire and moving forward with great secrecy. The units of the
3rd Marine Division on the right of the center are pinned down after a
limited advance at daybreak. On the left of the center, the division is not
able to move forward either. On the left flank, the 5th Marine Division
makes limited progress, where the terrain is a greater handicap than the
enemy. On the right flank of the corps the 4th Marine Division is unable to
move and continues to mop up in the read areas. Since the use of naval
gunfire is now greatly restricted most of TF 54 leaves for Ulithi.

The Homefront
-------------
House Passes Draft Of Nurses - The House of Representatives has passed, 347
to 42 and sends to the Senate, a bill that would draft all nurses aged 20
through 44 who are not married and have no dependent children

New Tank Shown - The War Department has announced its newest tank, which
carries a 90-mm. gun and is the most powerful yet built by the U.S. The
tank, has been named the General Pershing and is described as the answer to
the German Tiger tank.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | jbdavis@nando.net
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 21:34:26 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <ben.frank@HIS.COM>
Subject: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

By the way, Mike. Hattori wrote on of the best histories of the war from the
Japanese point of view, believable, and I feel accurate. And above all,
objective. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 21:58:31 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <ben.frank@HIS.COM>
Subject: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

Mike, the initial plans for Cactus was an assault on Florida Island and Tulagi,
I believe, because Tulagi had one of the best anchorages in the Pacific.
Because there were no maps of Guadalcanal other than the sketches drawn by
Australian planters who had been in the area, LtCol Merrill B. Twining, Asst
G-3 of the 1st MarDiv, and Maj William B. McKean, another member of the G-3
section, were flown by B-17 on a photoreconnaissance mission over the area. It
was only then that it was discovered that the Japs were building an airfield on
Guadalcanal, which changed the strategic picture entirely, and this meant that
the supply line from the US to Australia would truly be in danger. That is when
the primary target was changed to Guadalcanal. If you read the official
histories as well as my namesake's "Guadalcanal," you will know that the 1st
MarDiv never did get good maps of the island.
        By the way, while I have everybody's attention, in the Washington Post
yesterday, there was a story which said that the government, out of
appreciation for Japanese sensitivities, is not going to call or commemorate
V-J Day as V-J Day. The story says that the US and Japan agree that marking
WWII's end must be in low key. According to the article, and I quote,
"...Washington has assured Tokyo that U.S. government representatives at
commemorative events will avoid using the traditional term "V-J Day," short for
"Victory-over-Japan Day, to describe the end of the Pacific War. Instead, all
American material will simply refer to the "end of the war." I am absolutely
appalled and totally pissed off at this pusillanimous action on the part of the
government. It is an insult to all veterans of the Pacific War, living and
dead, and I call upon the members of this list to take whatever action is
within their limits to sound off on the matter. When I cool down sufficiently,
I intend writing a letter to the Post. Whether it is published, is another
story. An accompany article is headed: "V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era." What a
crock! Ben Frank, spring loaded in a pissed off position.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 22:30:44 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <ben.frank@HIS.COM>
Subject: GAS AT IWO JIMA

It is true that gas, like other options, was considered for Iwo. As a matter
fact, planners had gridded a map of Iwo to determine where the shells were to
be dropped. But one has to realize that Iwo is an island with ocean breezes
constantly flowing over it, and the gas undoubtedly would have be dispersed
before it could do much damage. In the Army green back series, the history of
the Chemical Corps by Dale Birdsell and Brooks Kleber deals with this matter. I
alway wondered when reading operation plans and orders that while there was a
chemical warfare defense plan, there was neve a chemical warfare offensive
plan, and even to this day, I don't know where the gas in the Pacific was
stored and who had the ultimate authority to authorize use of it. I would
suppose gas might have been stored in the Hawaiian Islands and that Nimitz had
the authority, although I doubt if he would have made a move without either
presidential or JCS sanction. Just a supposition. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 23:17:02 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

        June 1944 marked a turning point in how the Japanese organized their
resistance to the great Allied amphibious offensive.  But before I get to that,
I'd like to add a few comments on items recently mentioned.
        I mentioned some of the contributions of African-Americans in the
Pacific theatre in regard to Black History Month.  I guess I should also add
that the Bougainville campaign marked the baptism of fire for the US Army's
only black regular infantry units to fight in the Pacific.  The 93rd Division
included two regiments, the 24th and 25th Regts., whose enlisted men were
entirely African-American (officers down to company commander level remained
white).  The 93rd fought a Joe and Willie in the Pacific kind of war-- a lot of
no-respect, backwater, dirty clean-up work far from the press corps and the
glory.  Their war was mainly mopping-up and secondary operations.  Of course,
these were not secondary operations to the Japanese, who still fought to the
death in most cases.  At any rate, company K of the 25th Regiment made a rather
inauspicious debut on Bougainville in April 1944.  On its very first combat
patrol, the company was surprised by a Japanese machinegun (as US forces also
rediscovered later in Vietnam, in thick jungle a single machinegun covering a
stretch of trail could make for a deadly ambush, and the Japanese used this
tactic a lot in the Pacific).  As the unexpected bursts tore into their ranks
and men went down, confusion set in among the inexperienced K company.  Two of
the American platoons began firing, and then started firing at each other.
There were more casualties, and then a platoon sergeant panicked and ran, many
of his men following.  In spite of the efforts of the white company commander
to get his men to stay put and cease firing, a general skedaddle took place.
The men of K company left behind ten dead men, as well as equipment including a
radio and a mortar, and dragged twenty more wounded back with them.  This
initiation to battle was doubly unfortunate, as it gave the critics of the use
of African-Americans as combat troops (and there were many of them in the
largely-segregated and in many quarters highly prejudiced military
establishment) ammunition to use in making their case.  Never mind that both
black regiments of the 93rd Division subsequently fought reasonably well.  They
later participated in the fighting on Saipan, and then in the
operations against Morotai and the Moluccan islands (fall '44), as the division
was kept pretty busy for the rest of the year.  On Saipan the 24th Regt won a
unit citation for its energetic and efficient operations during the mopping-up
phase of the battle there, and on Morotai a patrol from the 25th Regt captured
one of the highest-ranking Japanese officers to be taken alive on the island.
        Although more than a million African-Americans served in the US armed
forces during the war, which saw the first black general, the first black
fighter ace, and other acheivements (the man who would be the first black
admiral was serving as an officer on a subchaser), one is tempted to agree with
Spector when he dismisses those accomplishments as mere window dressing.  For
most African-American servicemen, World War 2 was a sentence to hard labor,
because it was in various types of labor units that most found themselves.  I
earlier mentioned the construction of the Ledo road through the Burmese jungle,
a task involving much back-breaking labor under extremely difficult
circumstances, and where roughly three-fifths of those backs were black.  The
US Marine Corps was another example.  Later in the war the Marines formed black
combat units, but they were base defense battalions-- self-contained outfits
which could be sent in to secure and if necessary defend small island outposts
like Wake or Midway.  By the time these units had been trained the need for
such battalions had passed, since there were no outposts that were actually
threatened with Japanese invasion by that stage in the war.  Lots of
African-American Marines did see combat, though-- as ammunition handlers (i.e.,
labor units) in amphibious assaults.  These units landed either with the first
waves or soon after.  Their job was to rapidly unload ammunition and create
local dumps (this was frequently done under fire), then usually to carry some
of that ammunition to the forward troops, staying near the front lines to serve
as stretcher bearers to bring the wounded back.  In this manner black Marines
took part in the landings on Saipan and Iwo Jima, among other places.  On
Pelleliu one such unit was observed, after serving as stretcher bearers all
day, to slip away in small groups led by noncoms to go and do their bit in the
front lines as fighters after dark.  The Army Air Force also had a number of
predominantly-black aviation engineer battalions (again, a euphemism for what
were essentially construction and labor units) which saw either combat or a
great deal of hard work behind the lines in the Pacific.  One such battalion,
the 810th, arrived in the Pacific on one of the first American reinforcement
convoys in early 1942, served among other places in Noumea, Guadalcanal, Biak,
and the Phillipines in non-combat assignments, did not return home until four
months after the Japanese surrender, and in all that time did not spend a single
day in a rest camp.  Another black construction battalion, the 811th, got to
trade shots with holdout Japanese snipers while trying to repair, expand, and
maintain an airfield on Iwo Jima.
        Unfortunately, institutionalized prejudice was often the lot of the
African-American military man.  General Vandegrift, the Marine commander on
Guadalcanal who was later elevated to the post of Marine Corps commandant, was
among the more sensible and admirable American commanders when he announced,
"The Negro Marines are no longer on trial.  They are Marines, period."
However, his attitude was not necessarily the majority view among white
officers (its not the Pacific theatre, but I keep thinking of the book "Hit
Hard" where officers training the 761st Tank Battalion in the deep south
frequently sang "I'm Dreaming of a White Battalion" in their mess).  Another
Marine general warned against sending black Marines to American Samoa because,
essentially, he was afraid they'd have too much sex with the "primitively
romantic" (as he put it) native women.  In Sydney, Australia, US military
authorities made virtually all of the city's most popular bars, nightclubs,
theatres, and restaraunts off limits to black personnel.  Even Australian
government officials formally complained of the discrimination shown against
African-American military personnel by their own white officers, claiming it
could only lead to violence and unrest.  MacArthur smugly assured them that
there was no prejudice or discrimination in the American military, and business
went on as usual.  The worst outbreak of racial tension occurred late in the
war on Guam (showing that things got no better as time went on), between black
naval base personnel and white Marines.  The Marines used to cruise by the
black barracks in trucks shouting racial epithets, which soon drew the response
of the black sailors rushing out to pelt the trucks with stones.  The incident
came to a head when a black sailor was shot by a white sailor.  That night
there was, basically, a drive-by shooting at the black barracks-- unidentified
individuals in a truck spraying shots into the black compound as they drove by.
An inquiry by the naval authorities into the spreading violence (including more
shooting incidents) concluded in part that the African-American sailors had
overeacted by confusing a few exceptional examples with prejucial policies on
the part of the military at large, of which it found no evidence (this in a
Navy that practiced segregation as a matter of practical policy!).  I cite
these things to show that I realize that the US of A was not always Mr Clean
either in regard to the way we did things, so that when I mention things like
the Japanese for no apparent reason hacking 400 officers and men of the
Phillipino 91st Division to death with swords during the Bataan Death March no
one will think I'm getting too sanctimonious and picking on the Japanese.
        I also realize I might have stepped into a minefield by making a couple
of positive-sounding references to Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner in my last
few posts.  Actually, all I said was that he was considered the US Navy's
resident expert on amphibious operations, which it is obvious he was.  Among
other operations, he was the man in charge of the landing and covering forces
at Guadalcanal, New Georgia, the Marianas, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.  Turner was
also considered to be one of the most brilliant officers in the whole Navy, not
least of all by Turner himself.  He was certainly a difficult man, supremely
egotistical and overbearing (all the qualities that really turn me off in
MacArthur).  Spector quotes correspondent Robert Sherrod as saying that Turner
couldn't go from ship to shore "without telling the coxswain how to bring the
boat alongside."  His propensity for sticking his inquisitive nose into the
land fighting did not win him any friends among the Marines in the early
Solomons campaign.  Vandegrift was highly annoyed at his attempt to advise the
Marines on the ground fighting on Guadalcanal, and the command set-up Turner
organized for New Georgia has also been critized as inefficient and
counter-productive.  Furthermore, the Marines have a bone to pick with Turner
over Iwo, where he was one of the Navy commanders who decided that a
concentrated three-day naval bombardment of the island would be adequate, in
spite of Marine requests for a ten-day artillery preparation.  The naval
bombardment on Saipan was also considered less than optimally effective,
although in this case it must be admitted that the ships under Turner's direct
command did the bulk of the damage, while other bombarding groups suffered from
poor targeting decisions and inexperience in supporting shore operations.
Also, I wanted to mention that my calling Admiral Tanaka "the Japanese Kelly
Turner" was a referral to his specialization in troop and invasion transport,
not to any unpopular angles of the Japanese admiral's personality.  Overall,
the US Navy was populated with some pretty good commanders in the admirals'
ranks.  Chester Nimitz, the Pacific commander-in-chief, emerges as an
operational mastermind and cool-headed war leader, Ray Spruance was (IMHO)
prudent without being timid, and the American Navy also had the benefit of a
solid second line of subordinate admirals like Mitscher, Jesse Ohlendorf, and
the Chinese-American "Ching" Lee.
        Having said all that, I want to get back to June 1944.  The Marianas
marked the final hurrah for the prevailing Japanese tactical approach to defense
against amphibious landings, which was to try and stop the invaders at the
water line, or, if they succeeded in getting ashore, to immediately hurl them
back into the sea with strong counterattacks.  Saipan was the first of the
Marianas islands attacked, and it was also important because it was considered
part of Japan proper (having been another fruit of Japan's First World War
participation-- it was administratively considered as belonging to the district
including Tokyo).  Saipan was also an island imperative to hold because it was
within range of the Japanese homeland for the new B-29 Superfortress heavy
bomber.  This amazing aircraft, despite repeated problems during development,
once combat-ready proved a potential war-winning weapon (and when combined with
the atomic bomb it was exactly that).  It had a range of 2,800 miles, could
carry up to 20,000 lbs of bombs, could operate loaded at 32,000 feet, and
reached a speed of 355 mph (for comparison, the Japanese Navy's two fastest
fighters to see service during the war, the Shiden and the Raiden, had top
speeds of less than 370 mph and just over 380 mph respectively-- and there were
less than 900 planes of both types combined built!).  On top of that, the
four-engined B-29 was heavily armored, and featured sophisticated defensive
armament, including four small domes, two on top and two beneath the plane,
each mounting a pair of .50-calibre machineguns and controlled from three
remote sighting stations in the fuselage.  There was also a tail position with
two more .50's plus a 20-mm cannon.  However, in early operations the air
gunners had difficulty adjusting to the remote sighting arrangements, and many
of the most successful B-29 raids on Japan were conducted using aircraft
stripped of all armament except for the tail position in order to cut weight
and thus increase speed and range (as I've seen reference to, other than in
LeMay's "Superfortress," in recent list discussion).
        At any rate, for such an important island, the Japanese command
arrangements were noticeably in disarray.  The Marianas were part of the
jurisdiction of the Japanese 31st Army, commanded by Lt-General Hideyoshi Obata
(not to be confused with the previously-mentioned Lt-Gen Eiryo Obata, the air
commander).  Actually, the overall command for the Marianas per se was in the
hands of the Navy's Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the small but fit officer (in his
long-ago youth he had been a championship wrestler) recently famed as commander
of Kido Butai, the carrier strike force.  Just as Nagumo with Kido Butai had
usually deferred to the advice of his chief-of-staff Kusaka, in the Marianas he
essentially abdicated the actual ground command to the local Army leadership--
a reasonable action, as there were on Saipan at the time of the American
landings about 25,000 Army personnel, compared to only 6,100 marines and naval
base personnel organized into fighting units.  Obata's 31st Army, however, had
a lot more than Saipan to worry about.  The area controlled and defended by
this army was huge.  Obata had a lot of units under command, but they were
spread over a great deal of territory.  In the Marianas, where he made his
headquarters, he had the 43rd Division and the 47th Brigade on Saipan, another
division and one brigade on Guam, and a regiment on Tinian.  He also had
a division and two brigades in the Palaus islands, where many of them wound up
fighting the US Marines on Peleliu.  There was another division and two
brigades on Truk (soon to be joined by another China veteran division, which
however suffered greivous losses of both equipment and men to US submarines en
route.  Truk, like Rabaul, was bypassed and left to starve, which was exactly
what happened.  In spite of attempts to turn every plot capable of being
cultivated into vegetable gardens, there were even reports of cannabalism on
Truk before the war ended.  The book "Peace Is Our Duty" I mentioned in some of
my early posts includes the recollections of a soldier and a marine
antiaircraft gunner who were stuck on Truk).  Finally, there was also the 109th
Division on Iwo Jima.  All that territory and all those units meant that Obata
spent a lot of time away from his HQ.  In fact, when the Americans landed on
Saipan he was away on an inspection tour to the Palaus.  That meant the command
of the defenses devolved on Lt-Gen. Yoshitsugu Saito, commander of the 43rd
Division, who outranked Obata's chief-of-staff (and the Japanese, like many
militaries of the period, were sticklers for propriety in terms of promotions
and the seniority lists).  Saito was not a great choice to command in a crucial
battle.  He had little experience as a commander of troops in the field, and
previous to taking over 43rd Division had served in the Army's horse
procurement department.
        The campaign for Saipan played out exactly like most of the central
Pacific amphibious operations that had preceded it.  The Japanese defense of
the beaches was tenacious.  They had a variety of weapons including 5.5-inch,
6-inch, and 8-inch naval guns emplaced to cover the landing zones, and in spite
of the use of a new model of armored amphibious tractor mounting a 75-mm
howitzer in its tank-like turret US losses in getting ashore were pretty heavy,
some 1,500 killed or wounded.  Once ashore, the Americans near Garapan were hit
with repeated counterattacks, mostly by night, and several including Japanese
armor.  These attacks failed to dislodge the invaders, and cost the Japanese
heavy casualties which hurt their later attempts to defend the island (although
they were still able to impose serious enough delays that the Marine commander
Holland Smith created a furor among his US Army counterparts when he fired
Ralph Smith, the general commanding one of the Army divisions ashore-- the
Army was outraged at having one of its own fired by a Marine, and the
controversy went all the way up to the top levels of the government, where
Holland Smith's action was eventually backed).  When the end appeared to be in
sight, the Japanese threw their customary suicide "banzai" charge, in this case
coming closest to actually succeeding.  The charge overran two battalions of a
US Army infantry regiment, killing or wounding 650 soldiers (the third
battalion was too well dug-in above a rocky gulch), but about 4,300 Japanese
died in the effort.  Two images from things I read about Saipan stick with me.
One (from Manchester, "Goodbye Darkness") is that of a Marine colonel who sat
on a stump, smoking a cigar, throughout the night attack against the beachead
which involved 44 Japanese tanks, calmly calling down naval artillery fire
against the attackers.  The other is of an Army Lt-Colonel, commander of one of
the battalions overrun in the suicide charge, who, already wounded, stood like
the fictitious image of Custer at the Little Big Horn, a pistol in each hand,
and fired at the oncoming Japanese until both weapons were empty.  Then he took
over a .50-calibre machinegun and kept that firing until he was killed.  And
there is, of course, the most ominous image of all, that of some 22,000
Japanese civilians killing themselves by jumping off cliffs.  This was the
first Pacific battleground to have Japanese civilians present in any number,
and the sight of the mass suicides could not have been much comfort to Marines
and GI's later contemplating the kind of resistance they would find in an
invasion of Japan proper.
        Saipan was a grevious defeat for the Japanese.  For the Americans, the
"butcher's bill" was fairly high, over 16,000 casualties counting naval losses.
The subsequent assault on Tinian, however, was a masterpiece of amphibious
tactics, and was concluded with less than 2,000 total casualties.  Guam, the
final major Marianas island to be taken, was also bitterly contested, and cost
over 7,000 men.  Still, the loss to the Japanese was much higher, and not only
in terms of casualties.  For the Japanese Navy had tried and failed in its
attempt to smash the invasion forces in a "decisive battle."  Instead, the
Japanese got the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" and the effective end of
Japanese naval air power.  It was also shown that the Navy's ability to
intervene successfully against further American offensive operations was open
to serious question, while the Army had failed to defend a territory considered
part of Japan itself.  The impotence shown caused a great crisis among the
higher circles of the Japanese government, and occasioned the fall of Tojo's
government from the power it had held since the war's start.  Nagumo and Saito
both committed suicide when Saipan fell.
        Still, an example of a better way to organize defensively for the
future was also at hand.  The island of Biak, off the northwest coast of New
Guinea, was almost considered a subsidiary target to MacArthur's forces, busy
fighting for the control of the nearby Wakde island area.  It was not exactly
in the front line of Japanese defenses, either.  The Japanese commander on Biak
was a colonel, Col Naoyuki Kuzume.  He had about 11,000 men under his command,
drawn from a variety of small units of various degrees of combat efficiency.
Kuzume's improvised defensive strategy, a basic field expedient, proved a
turning point in Japanese defensive tactics for the war.  Instead of trying to
stop the invaders at the waterline, he withdrew inland, and sheltered his
forces in numerous caves improved for defense by further excavation.  He only
exposed his men to the murderous fire of the Allied artillery on ships and
ashore when they were making counterattacks, and these were much better thought
out than the massed reactions to other invasions like Saipan.  Kuzume's
defensive scheme gave the Americans more than they bargained for (here it was
the US planners who underestimated, and the initial landing force consisting of
part of one Army division was hardly bigger than Kuzume's defending
congregation).  His defense of the island lasted from late May till late July,
and at the height of the fighting his counterattacks even compelled the
Americans to abandon one of their landing beaches.  This, it seemed, was a
model to be emulated, and it was.  By the time the US Marines landed on
Peleliu in September, another subsidiary action expected to be a walkover,
Kuzume's pattern had become the accepted Japanese defensive doctrine, and
Peleliu too turned out to be a long, vicious, and costly campaign.  As I
explained earlier, this new tactical policy would reach its bloody conclusion
with the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
        I should mention too that the Japanese used tank forces for their
counterattacks on both Biak and Peleliu, which initially took the US forces
somewhat by surprise.  It should not have done so, because the Japanese
actually employed their armor pretty widely.  In fact, they used tanks whenever
they had them.  Japanese tanks spearheaded at least three or four attacks in
Malaya, were used in mass (by Japanese standards) on Singapore, were also
employed in fairly large numbers in northern Burma.  Tanks were used in smaller
numbers at every stage of the fighting in the Phillipines (the first couple
vehicles to be put ashore on Corregidor made up Wainwright's mind to surrender
the island, since they landed within a quarter of mile of his HQ in the vast
Malinta tunnels, and he had no antitank weapons).  There were Japanese tanks at
Milne Bay in New Guinea, even a Ha-Go on Tarawa that caused considerable
consternation among the Marines until a 37-mm antitank gun was hand-lifted over
the seawall to knock it out.  I've already referred to the fact that on Saipan
there were at least three attempts to use tanks in the early counterattacks,
including one mass assault with 44 vehicles.  It was not a failure of doctrine,
or a reluctance to employ modern weapons and machinery, it was more a failing
of the Japanese industry and economy to supply the Japanese Army with
sufficient numbers of machines of sufficient quality, a theme I have echoed
often before.  The Japanese were willing to
fight a modern, technological war-- they just didn't have enough of the
technology.  The problem lay in the fact that at Peleliu they could only launch
a tank attack with a mere 13 vehicles, or that at Biak it was a case of light
tanks with 37-mm guns against Shermans (which opposed the Japanese tanks on
Peleliu as well).  In fact, looking at these battles tends to suggest that the
Japanese had a highly developed appreciation for the value of armor, especially
in the infantry support role, and tried to employ tanks whenever possible to
beef up their offensive operations.  On Okinawa, the Japanese counterattacks
undertaken near the Maeda ridge were supported by the only tank regiment they
had, a total of 14 medium and 13 light tanks.  This offensive, probably
ill-conceived (and a definite departure from Ushijima's defensive strategy)
gained some ground due to superhuman exertions by the leading battalions,
though at the cost of fearsome casualties.  Well-directed US gunfire accounted
for most of the Japanese tanks at an early phase.  By the time of the assault
on the town of Tanabaru, in the sector the tanks were operating, there were
only nine light tanks left to support the attack.  The town and the surrounding
hills were taken, but six of the remaining tanks were knocked out in the
effort.  The rifle battalion led by the young Captain Ito, which spearheaded
the attack in this sector (helped by the tanks) had less than 150 of its
original 600 men remaining when it was ordered to withdraw.
        The Japanese could sometimes be extremely clever in adapting to their
low-tech war.  They adapted to poor supply in jungle environments by learning
to forage, watching the monkeys and eating what they ate.  For the night
attacks which they favored, their officers smeared phosphorescent plants on
their backs, or pinned strips of white cloth to the backs of their uniforms, so
their men could follow them in the dark.  These same officers, however, were
still going into combat armed with swords (in addition to the troublesome
little Nambu pistol, useless at much beyond point-blank range).  But their
ingenuity could be admirable.  In the 1920's the ordinance board under Colonel
Nambu developed the machinegun designs that would see the Japanese Army through
most of the Second World War.  These designs were mostly pirated from the WW1
French Hotchkiss, a mechanism not entirely suited to some of the roles to which
the Japanese adapted it.  The Nambu mgs were hardly designer's dreams, the best
that could probably be said for them was that, with meticulous care and
cleaning (which, given the Japanese training, was generally the case) they
worked reasonably well most of the time.  Somehow Nambu's people had managed to
increase the weight of the tripod-mounted version to 122 pounds, much heavier
than the original Hotchkiss (even though the Nambu initially fired a less
powerful cartridge), and something of a load for the average Japanese soldier,
who was only five foot three.  No problem, the Japanese worked out a system
whereby poles could be inserted into slots on the feet of the tripod, allowing
three or four men (and a heavy machinegun crew always included at least that
many) to pick it up and carry it in teams, more or less like a stretcher, with
the added advantage that it could be plopped down ready to fire immediately.
The machinegun company in each Japanese rifle battalion (these, BTW, usually
had four rifle companies instead of the three that were the norm in western
armies) had two platoons, each platoon having two machinegun squads (two
tripod-mounted mgs each) plus an ammunition squad.  The latter consisted of ten
or more backs to be used as human pack animals hauling extra ammunition,
another example of Japanese adaptation to their low-tech environment.
        But that sort of improvisation could hardly cope with the impressive
industrial and technological acheivements of the US and the other Allies.  I
read with interest on this list a little while back where the Japanese also had
been conducting research into the possibilities of atomic weapons.  It seems
the Japanese had competent scientists who were hot on the trail theoretically,
but lacked among other things the uranium to experiment with.  I think that,
even more, what they lacked was the TWO BILLION DOLLARS the Americans were able
to throw at the problem.  Japan just didn't have the luxury of that sort of
expenditure for mere research and development.  The Japanese, later in the war,
were also experimenting with jet and rocket aircraft.  The Japanese Navy's
"Kikka" ("Orange Blossom") jet attack plane was a two-engined design based on
the German Me-262, but smaller.  It actually flew successfully on August 7,
1945-- significantly, the day after the dropping of the Hiroshima a-bomb,
showing how far behind the Japanese actually were in the high-tech war, and the
impossibility of ever catching up.  A second flight ended badly when an
improperly-installed takeoff assistance rocket caused a crash on take-off, but
aside from the prototypes 17 production models were in various stages of
completion when the war ended.  The Kikka (built by Nakajima) would have had a
top speed of over 440 miles per hour, capable of carrying over 1,700 lbs of
bombs or one torpedo.  The Army had its own version, the Karyu ("Fire Dragon"),
on the drawing board, a closer copy of the Messerschmidt 262 which would have
been a fighter with a speed of 520-530 mph and an armament of four automatic
cannon.
        The Navy also experimented with the Mitsubishi J8M rocket-plane.  This
was based on the German Me-163 Komet, the Germans having rendered this small
aid to their ally in sending an engine and some drawings from the Me-163A to
Japan by submarine.  A complete Me-163B along with the full set of construction
plans was to be sent later, but the submarine carrying these items was sunk en
route, so the Japanese had to reconstruct much of the aircraft themselves.
Nonetheless, the J8M was ready for its test-flight in July 1945.  However, its
engine failed shortly after take-off, resulting in a crash which killed the
test pilot, Inuzuka.  This was its only flight.  The design would have acheived
a speed of 555 mph during its short powered flight, and was to have been armed
with two 30-mm cannon.  The Army planned to give priority to the production of
its own version, the Ki-202, but these never flew before the surrender.
        The only rocket-powered aircraft to see service with the Japanese was a
suicide weapon, the Yokosuka MXY "Okha" ("Cherry Blossom," although the Allied
sailors called it "Baka," Japanese for "fool").  With a powerful 2,600-lb
explosive charge in its nose, the Okha was carried aloft by specially-adapted
G4M two-engined bombers.  It was released at high speed and altitude about 50
miles from the target, gliding most of the way in at speeds reaching 290 mph.
The engine was only switched on for the last 30 seconds, boosting the
aircraft's speed to as much as 600 mph before impact.  The first success of this
weapon was a hit scored on the battleship WEST VIRGINIA off Okinawa on April
1st, 1945.  On April 12, another "Baka" sank the destroyer escort MANNERT L.
ABELE, and hits were scored on another destroyer and three transports by these
manned rocket bombs during the campaign.  Nearly 800 Okhas were eventually
built, including 45 glider versions for pilot training purposes, but only a
small percentage of these were actually employed in action.
        And here, with the kamikazes, is a good place to wind it all up.
Because, with their dearth of resources necessary for modern warfare, for the
Japanese that is what "Special Weapons" came down to.  Not atomic bombs or V2
rockets, but suicide planes.  Here once again it is possible to discern that
underlying belief in the superiority of spiritual attributes translated into
material terms.  The biggest kamikaze operation of the war came off Okinawa.
Operation "Ten-Go" commenced on April 6th, 1945, when nearly 700 suicide planes
were unleashed against the Allied fleets off Okinawa.  This was a long-prepared
attempt to fight the elusive "decisive battle" once more, but despite the
horror of this form of attack the results were not decisive, although three
destroyers, two important ammunition ships, and an LST were sunk, with ten
other vessels, mostly escort ships, damaged.  The Japanese pilots, BTW, had
orders to ignore all but the biggest warships and aim for the loaded
transports.  It seems this was often disregarded, since the destroyer pickets
came to suffer most heavily from this form of attack.  Although the big raid on
April 6th did not strike the serious blows planned, there would be nine more
kamikaze operations organized under "Ten-Go" and involving at least 50 and
sometimes as many as 300 aircraft before Okinawa was finally secured.  A total
of 34 Allied ships were sunk by these assaults off Okinawa, and casualties
among sailors ran into the thousands.
        I should say that the first suicide air attack of the war actually came
on the first day of the war, at Pearl Harbor.  A Japanese fighter commander
named Iida in the second wave got into a kind of western shoot-out with a brave
American at the airfield he was strafing.  The American had a BAR (Browning
Automatic Rifle, the weapon used to provide automatic fire support in the
typical US rifle squad), and he had companions in the armory inside the
building to pass him new, loaded BAR's every time he emptied a 20-shot clip.
After Iida's first pass, the American shouted "Pass me another BAR, I think I
got the sonofabitch!"  He had indeed-- Iida's Zero was hit in the fuel tank,
and with the leak would probably not make it back to his carrier.  So the
Japanese officer deliberately crashed his plane into a hanger.  The first
planned suicide attack, however, came off the north coast of New Guinea at the
end of May 1944, and was made by four Japanese Army Ki-45 two-engined aircraft.
        The Ki-45 was originally designed as a heavy fighter plane.  When new
versions appeared mounting a 20-mm or 37-mm nose cannon (in addition to one or
two 12.7-mm mgs) the type had some success in a shipping attack role off New
Guinea, and it was also encountered in many roles in the China-Burma theatre,
including reconnaisance, long-range fighter, and ground attack.  The aircraft's
chief virtues were good maneuverability for a two-engined plane, and decent
speed.  In 1944 the surviving examples were converted to "Kai-C" nightfighter
versions, mounting (in addition to a 20- or 37-mm and two 12.7-mm in the nose)
two 12.7-mm mgs behind the cockpit firing obliquely upward, similar to the
German "Schragemusik" configuration.  One of the reasons for the US interest in
China, BTW, was that it was originally (before the capture of the Marianas and
the transfer of operations to Tinian) planned to base B-29's there to raid
Japan.  The first B-29 raids against the Japanese homeland were in fact
launched from eastern China just before the Japanese "Ichi-Go" offensive
overran their bases in the summer of 1944.  They also targeted industrial
complexes and harbors in Manchuria from the Chinese bases, and raided
Indochinese and southeast Asian coastal areas as well.  The Japanese Army in
1944 countered the first B-29 missions by establishing two large night fighter
bases across their paths, one at Hanoi in the south, and one at Anshan in
Manchuria.  Ki-45's based at Anshan on one occasion in the summer of 1944
brought down seven B-29's in a single night, but this success was a rare
exception.  The use of the Ki-45 as a nightfighter was hindered by the fact
that the aircraft carried no radar, due to production difficulties with the
radar set.  And that is why I included this description, and the whole topic of
Japanese night fighters, as another example of the Japanese shortcomings in the
high-tech war.  The Japanese Navy had their own two-engined nightfighter, the
Nakajima J1N1-S Gekko ("Moonlight").  It had a radar in the nose, mounted four
20-mm cannon (all in oblique fixed mounts, two firing upward and two firing
down), and furthermore the aircraft was so maneuverable it could turn as
tightly as many single-engined fighters.  But the Gekko could not climb high
enough or fly fast enough to intercept the B-29, and at any rate only 475 of
the nightfighter version were built during the war.

        As a final note, I wanted to add to my China posts that during the
"Ichi-Go" offensive the Chinese group of American-trained and -equipped
divisions known as "Y-Force," which was attacking along the Burma road from the
Chinese side, was in September (as the Japanese were reorganizing for one final
push in the main offensive) itself attacked by the Japanese in a subsidiary
operation.  I forgot to mention that.
        Also, as a parting kudo for our friends down under, I should mention
that an Australian fighter squadron which had fought in North Africa, equipped
with Kittyhawks, gave the Japanese, even the Zero, all they could handle over
New Guinea in the early going there, when Lae wing was generally ruling the
skies.  The Kittyhawk, for those who don't know, was essentially a souped-up
P-40 with a Spitfire (Rolls-Royce) engine installed, boosting the speed by
15-20 mph over current P-40 versions.  This was also the plane flown by
Australia's top ace Clive Caldwell for most of his career in North Africa (he
later switched to a Spitfire).

        One appendix to go.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 5 Mar 1995 to 6 Mar 1995
***********************************************

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Subject:  WWII-L Digest - 6 Mar 1995 to 7 Mar 1995
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Status: O

There are 56 messages totalling 2298 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Intelligence on Tirpitz (2)
  2. Battle of the Bulge
  3. Victory At Sea (3)
  4. TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS (4)
  5. VJ Day (6)
  6. Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5 (4)
  7. "Ching" Lee
  8. INF: Changes in German High Command
  9. more on "Glacier Girl" P-38F (3)
 10. Polish resistance
 11. VJ Day "remembered"
 12. Johnson Automatic Rifle
 13. NOST:  UK Sites (2)
 14. THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt (2)
 15. WEAP: Johnson Rifle
 16. WELCOME TO LIST
 17. LETTERS HOME
 18. Glacier Girl
 19. Victory at Sea, et.al.
 20. INF: 'Bradley, concerning Patton
 21. Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the Bulge)
 22. INFO. German Camp Numbers?
 23. INFO. German Professor Abbreviations (2)
 24. WW I list info? (2)
 25. More on Bong (3)
 26. Last Japan appendix-- the battlewagon war
 27. endlossung/Germans or Nazis?
 28. [INF] USAAF 8 MAR 45
 29. The Last Battlewagon War part 2
 30. Is Japan Sorry?
 31. 50TH: THREE DAY PARIS PASS
 32. INF: 50 Years Ago - 08-MAR-1945
 33. Re2: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt
 34. V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 01:21:28 -0500
From:    Jodi Berls <Jberls@AOL.COM>
Subject: Re: Intelligence on Tirpitz

Sydney Allinson wrote:

> THE GREATEST RAID OF ALL

I've heard this title mentioned elsewhere, but frankly, the title struck me
as, uh, somewhat hyperbolic, and I was a little reluctant to launch an
all-out search for it (I understand that it's out of print). I guess what
troubles me is that, while the greatness of the heroism required to undertake
the Saint-Nazaire raid is unquestionable, whether the raid itself was all
that "great" is well open to debate. Is this book the only real source, and
is the text as flowery as the title?

Jodi Berls
jberls@aol.com

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 12:31:07 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <ub076@FREENET.VICTORIA.BC.CA>
Subject: Re: Battle of the Bulge

I also recall that the United States Marines also used the
JOHNSON AUTOMATIC RIFLE.
An unusual design, with a rotary magazine.
'Far as I know, the US Marines were the only force to use this weapon in
any numbers. After WW2, the Johnson was purchased to equip the Dutch
army fighting insurgents in the Duth East Indies - now Indonesia.

Anyone else have comment about the Johnson rifle?

Sidney.


--

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 07:07:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Victory At Sea

As I reported last Saturday, WNET, the PBS station in New York
City, broadcast the complete 26 epsiodes of VICTORY AT SEA; they
repeated it on Sunday afternoon.  I and others are very critical of
the film used on this show and that is a true statement.  However,
on second thought, there are a few things I would like to say in
defense of this show.

1. It was aired in 1952 just seven years after the end of the war.
Much of the material we now have available was not available at
that time.

2. This show was produced by a commercial television network, the
National Broadcasting Company (NBC).  Compare this quality program
with the trash that is now broadcast on the commercial networks.

3. Richard Rodgers composed the music for the show.  What a
score!!!

4. Leonard Graves was the narrator.  What a voice!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Just my two cents.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  jem3@donuts0.bellcore.com  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 07:12:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Re: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

Ben Frank writes:


 >        By the way, while I have everybody's attention, in the Washington Post
 >yesterday, there was a story which said that the government, out of
 >appreciation for Japanese sensitivities, is not going to call or commemorate
 >V-J Day as V-J Day. The story says that the US and Japan agree that marking
 >WWII's end must be in low key. According to the article, and I quote,
 >"...Washington has assured Tokyo that U.S. government representatives at
 >commemorative events will avoid using the traditional term "V-J Day," short for
 >"Victory-over-Japan Day, to describe the end of the Pacific War. Instead, all
 >American material will simply refer to the "end of the war." I am absolutely
 >appalled and totally pissed off at this pusillanimous action on the part of the
 >government. It is an insult to all veterans of the Pacific War, living and
 >dead, and I call upon the members of this list to take whatever action is
 >within their limits to sound off on the matter. When I cool down sufficiently,
 >I intend writing a letter to the Post. Whether it is published, is another
 >story. An accompany article is headed: "V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era." What a
 >crock! Ben Frank, spring loaded in a pissed off position.

OK Ben, now that you are pissed off, let me piss you off some more.  In
yesterday's (Mon, 6 Mar) edition of the New York Times, there was an
article stating that many members of the Japanese legislature do not want
to appologize to other Asian countries for the Japanese actions during
WWII.  It seems that the Japanese "were liberating these fellow Asians from
the white man's colonialism" or some such bovine excrement.  I saved the
article and will post excerpts from it tonight.  But Ben, before you read
it, please take your Valium and fasten your seat belt!

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  jem3@donuts0.bellcore.com  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 07:29:45 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <RTMOORE@PCAD-ML.ACTX.EDU>
Subject: Re: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

Hello, Ben!

I wholeheartedly agree with your comment below!

What agenda does the government have to try and "play down" what the
vets tried so hard to accomplish? To me this is back-stabbing of the
worst sort.

Thanks for the post and allowing my two cents' worth on this.

All the best.

Terry

> "...Washington has assured Tokyo that U.S. government representatives at
> commemorative events will avoid using the traditional term "V-J Day," short for
> "Victory-over-Japan Day, to describe the end of the Pacific War. Instead, all
> American material will simply refer to the "end of the war." I am absolutely
> appalled and totally pissed off at this pusillanimous action on the part of the
> government. It is an insult to all veterans of the Pacific War, living and
> dead, and I call upon the members of this list to take whatever action is
> within their limits to sound off on the matter. When I cool down sufficiently,
> I intend writing a letter to the Post. Whether it is published, is another
> story. An accompany article is headed: "V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era." What a
> crock! Ben Frank, spring loaded in a pissed off position.
>

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 08:39:25 -0500
From:    "Roger D. Corrie" <cporog@INFI.NET>
Subject: Re: Victory At Sea

It seems the older and more expert we get the more critical we are, I have a
very fond memory of setting in the den with my father and watching these
shows. It made me ask questions of him I would never have thought of at that
age. I gained a lot of respect for my dad when I saw his ship the USS Evans
after the four kamakazi aircraft had hit his ship, I started asking some
questions when dad went to his bedroom and brought out some papers and very
small little sack.  He showed me the presidential citation write up the ship
and let me hold the little sack.  I learned it was a prayer booklet taken
off one of the Japanese pilots.  I also learned he had given the parachute
to my grandmother.  The pray book is now on board the USS Alabama in the
Chiefs Quaters, which is a memorial to the Evans.  Victory at sea still does
today what it did for me then, it makes the children ask questions of their
fathers and granfathers. It may not be perfect, but in the eyes of this
third generation retired Chief Petty Officer I see all the shipmates that
went before!
CPORog (Roger D. Corrie)            CAG Devil 00 is down I need 5!!!
cporog@infi.net
http://www.infi.net:80/~cporog/     Is that 5 maintenance min. or 5 real min?
804-427-2200

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 08:43:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: VJ Day

Ben Frank writes:
 >        By the way, while I have everybody's attention, in the Washington Post
 >yesterday, there was a story which said that the government, out of
 >appreciation for Japanese sensitivities, is not going to call or commemorate
 >V-J Day as V-J Day. The story says that the US and Japan agree that marking
 >WWII's end must be in low key. According to the article, and I quote,
 >"...Washington has assured Tokyo that U.S. government representatives at
 >commemorative events will avoid using the traditional term "V-J Day," short for
 >"Victory-over-Japan Day, to describe the end of the Pacific War. Instead, all
 >American material will simply refer to the "end of the war." I am absolutely
 >appalled and totally pissed off at this pusillanimous action on the part of the
 >government. It is an insult to all veterans of the Pacific War, living and
 >dead, and I call upon the members of this list to take whatever action is
 >within their limits to sound off on the matter. When I cool down sufficiently,
 >I intend writing a letter to the Post. Whether it is published, is another
 >story. An accompany article is headed: "V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era." What a
 >crock! Ben Frank, spring loaded in a pissed off position.

For those of you who wish to blast someone, Bill Clinton's e-mail
address is:

      PRESIDENT@WHITEHOUSE.GOV

Have at 'em!

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  jem3@donuts0.bellcore.com  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 08:49:32 -0500
From:    QUACK <MUSCORJ@HSDWL.UTC.COM>
Subject: Re: Victory At Sea

"I and others are very critical of the film used on this show and that is a
true statement."
What are you getting at? What do you and the others find objectionable?
Just wondering, Ron

Ron Musco
Poquonock,CT  The Statewith the #1 Women's Basketball Team in the country.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 08:48:24 EST
From:    Roger Coon <coon@CVAX.IPFW.INDIANA.EDU>
Subject: Re: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

Ben,
        As soon as I read your message I sent off an e-mail to Clinton
making my feelings known about this.  For those of you who don't know,
his address is PRESIDENT@WHITEHOUSE.GOV
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 10:36:02 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <wrb1@CORNELL.EDU>
Subject: Re: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

>        I wanted to mention that my calling Admiral Tanaka "the Japanese Kelly
>Turner" was a referral to his specialization in troop and invasion transport,
>not to any unpopular angles of the Japanese admiral's personality.  Overall,
>the US Navy was populated with some pretty good commanders in the admirals'
>ranks.  Chester Nimitz, the Pacific commander-in-chief, emerges as an
>operational mastermind and cool-headed war leader, Ray Spruance was (IMHO)
>prudent without being timid, and the American Navy also had the benefit of a
>solid second line of subordinate admirals like Mitscher, Jesse Ohlendorf, and
>the Chinese-American "Ching" Lee.


Does anyone out there have any bio info on "Ching" Lee - I have never heard
of this gentleman.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 10:59:44 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <wrb1@CORNELL.EDU>
Subject: "Ching" Lee

I answered my own question - "Ching" Lee is Read Adm. Willis Lee of Task Force
64 and the Battle of Guadalcanal.

"Stand Aside, I'm coming through. This is Ching Lee"

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 09:49:27 -0500
From:    James Ray Watkins <dawgonpete@MAIL.UTEXAS.EDU>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

Ben Frank:

I probably don't want to step in here, but how would the U.S. government do
this? I do not mean this as a rhetorical question. It does seem distorting,
and insulting, but then again, does anyone know how to remember a war
without igniting exactly the old hatreds that the vets fought to stop? Seems
less like PC than a real problem to me. Would it work to have the Japanese
assist (given that they would fight that); if so, how? I think if we are
going to write the President we should have something more specific than
'that sucks!' I'm curious because, even if I sympathize with Vets, I don't
see any answers coming out of the complaints. What kinds of risks do you
think it would be worth taking, given the power of the Japanese
economically? It this a problem that isn't a problem? That is, the Japanese
would hem and haw but do nothing? If not, what do you think they would do?
Sorry for just questions, but I would really like to see how this could work
out: something concrete I would be willing to put my name to.


Ray Watkins
A.I., Department of Rhetoric and Composition
English, University of Texas at Austin

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:38:10 EST
From:    Alan Wild <AWILD@URIACC.URI.EDU>
Subject: INF: Changes in German High Command

   General Model had been promoted to German commander-in-chief on the
western front, replacing Rundstedt. Known as a zealous nazi, it was assumed
that Hitler was placing nazi party in high command on the western front
as he had done on the eastern front. This additional political control of
the high command was obviously forseen by Hitler, who wanted to bring the
German nation down with him.

-Al

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:43:05 EST
From:    "Dennis E. Sparks" <sparks@ALPHA.CAER.UKY.EDU>
Subject: more on "Glacier Girl" P-38F

In response to the comments generated by my post on the restoration
efforts on the P-38F recovered from under the ice on Greenland...

The six P-38s were part of the 94th FS of the 1st FG - the famous
"Hat in the Ring" squadron of WWI fame.  The pilots for the six
aircraft were Lts. Carl F. Rudder, Harry L. Smith, Dallas "Spider"
Webb, Robert B. Wilson, Robert H. Wilson (no relation), and the
section leader for "Tomcat Yellow", Joseph B. "Brad" McManus.

McManus was the first to land.  Low on fuel, he had lowered his flaps
and landing gear in order to make a slow pass over what seemed to be
a promising emergency landing area.  As he opened his throttles to
climb away, both engines coughed and died from lack of fuel and he
settled in.  When the gear broke through the crust of ice and sank into
the slushy snow, the nosewheel snapped backwards and the aircraft
flipped over on its back, losing its left prop in the process.  McManus
survived with only a sprained shoulder.

The other five P-38s and one of the B-17s belly landed, with the pilot
of one of the P-38s shutting down his engines and feathering his props
before landing.  Because of the potential for less damage, this is the
aircraft that was recovered in 1992.  The second B-17 continued to circle
overhead for about a half hour, continuously transmitting its position
and the situation before it too was forced down bay lack of fuel.
Radio operators at both Bluie West One (BW1) and BW8 were able to get
a fix on the location.  A C-47 dropped supplies by parachutetwo days
later (17 July), and on 19 July, a PBY guided a rescue team with a dogsled
to the downed aircraft.  McManus and the two Norden bombsights from the
B-17s rode out on the dogsled, while the rest of the crew hiked 15 miles
across the ice to a waiting rescue boat.

It's my underestanding that the pilot of the aircraft that was recovered
in 1992 survived WWII, dying in the 1970s or so.  The recovery team
borrowed photographs from his next of kin to help pinpoint the relative
positions of the aircraft.  Several articles were returned to his
family after the aircraft was recovered.  BTW, Brad McManus was part of
the recovery team.

In response to questions regarding the recovery/restoration team's naming
of the aircraft, and designing a piece of nose art, to my knowledge the
aircraft originally carried no name or artwork.  As I may have mentioned
before, the only decoration appears to have been the insignia blue paint
on the wheel covers.  I still haven't heard anyone associated with the
restoration effort definitely indicate that the nose art will be painted
on the aircraft.  Perhaps they will merely display it on a signboard, but
I tend to doubt it.  The artwork is not very risque, and the style is
reminiscent of WWII-era pinups as in Esquire magazine, for example.

My personal preference (which is of almost entirely no consequence), is
that they do not paint it on.  But, while I'm no expert at aircraft
restoration, it does look like the team is going to extraordinary effort
to restore it to original condition, and I for one can overlook this
bit of vanity/public relations effort.  I hope that it does tour for
a while on the airshow circuit, giving people a chance to see this
unique piece of aviation history in flight.

After mailing off photographs of the aircraft to several people on the
list, I still have 30 or 40 shots left over.  If anyone else is interested,
drop me a note, and I'll be glad to send you a few.

Dennis E. Sparks
sparks@alpha.caer.uky.edu
Lexington, Kentucky

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:04:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <ABIELAK@LUCCPUA.IT.LUC.EDU>
Subject: Re: Polish resistance

On 5 March, Nechama Cox wrote:

> I was just reading a book on the begining of the war and there was a
> mention to the Jewish defence of Warsaw when Poland was attacked in 1939.
> I have not hear of this before and I would be interested in any information
> on the topic that people could send my way.

Nechama,
     I have never read anything about a Jewish defense of the city of
Warsaw, but considering the fact that a significant portion of the
city's population was Jewish I would think that a great many Jewish
Poles would have helped to defend the city.  The city of Warsaw resisted
the Germans' attacks for so long that the western Europeans were
impressed by their efforts.  The London Polish government in exile
awarded the city the Vituti Militari, the highest award for valor
that the Poles had (comparable to the CMH).  Only once before had an
entire city been awarded the medal, the city of Lwow was awarded the
medal during the Russo-Polish War of 1919-1921.  The Germans were so
upset by the Poles stubborn resistence that they executed the mayor
after he was captured.  I hope this helps answer your question.

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 09:29:02 PST
From:    Alan Hepburn <alan@BERLIOZ.NSC.COM>
Subject: VJ Day "remembered"

Can the person who posted the information about changing VJ Day
to "the end of the war" Day please post a source?  I've got
several people wanting some corroboration before they start
yelling at people!  Thanks!

---

Alan Hepburn             |                                                 |
National Semiconductor   |           DON'T   TREAD   ON   ME               |
Santa Clara, Ca          |                                                 |
alan@berlioz.nsc.com     |                                                 |

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:38:40 -0600
From:    Jon Stevens <jstevens@DAVID.WHEATON.EDU>
Subject: Re: Johnson Automatic Rifle

What caliber was this rifle? 30.06?

Was this rifle found to be a "dud" like the Reising smg in combat conditions?

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:37:27 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <rjg@STAT.UMN.EDU>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

> Ben Frank:
>
> I probably don't want to step in here, but how would the U.S. government do
> this? I do not mean this as a rhetorical question. It does seem distorting,
> and insulting, but then again, does anyone know how to remember a war
> without igniting exactly the old hatreds that the vets fought to stop? Seems
> less like PC than a real problem to me. Would it work to have the Japanese
> assist (given that they would fight that); if so, how? I think if we are
> going to write the President we should have something more specific than
> 'that sucks!' I'm curious because, even if I sympathize with Vets, I don't
> see any answers coming out of the complaints. What kinds of risks do you
> think it would be worth taking, given the power of the Japanese
> economically? It this a problem that isn't a problem? That is, the Japanese
> would hem and haw but do nothing? If not, what do you think they would do?
> Sorry for just questions, but I would really like to see how this could work
> out: something concrete I would be willing to put my name to.

Actually, many holiday or commemorative names have been changed over time.
Sometimes logically, sometimes unfortunately.

Every 4th of July, we Americans celebrate a day where we won our independence
by force from our now friend and ally, England.  On the other hand, Memorial
Day -- a day to remember those who have given their lives for our freedoms,
has been reduced to a paid day off of work and beer and picnic parties.

VJ day is not a holiday.  Nor is VE day.  Nor are these officially recognized
every year, such as Independence Day.

This year is the 50th anniversary of the final year of WWII.  Many of those
who lived through this time are still with us.  Although with a different
feel, there will even be VE Day commemorations in Berlin.

No one wants to revive or rekindle any old hatreds or angers.  The whole
purpose of commemoration is to remember the history, what happened and
why.

Japan is our friend today.  So is Germany, Italy, Spain, Mexico, England
and many other countries we found ourselves at war with at some point or
another.  By remembering those times when we were not friends and allies
may just help us preserve that friendship.

It's mostly a subconscious anger brewing at our own leaders.  WWII was a
bloody, brutal war and many people are still alive with first hand knowledge
and remembrance of it.  To protect the "Sensitivities" of our now-friend, then
enemy is enough to generate some sort of anger and frustration.

But "downplaying" the term "VJ Day" is usually not enough.  Why are people
angry today at this?  Because it's not the first occurrence of bowing in to
the questions we keep asking ourselves.  Many people, most of whom weren't
around 50 years ago, haven't come to terms with Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  A
sort of self-guilt has been created.

The U.S. intervened in the post-office and cancelled a stamp depicting the
A bomb in order to protect the sensitivities of our Japanese friends.  The
cancellation of the Smithsonian exhibit on the Enola Gay was roundly
criticized by the Japanese as a lost opportunity to "tell the true story"
around the event.  The Japanese government has requested that the U.S. does
not even invite them to WWII Commemorations and to respect their sensitivities,
the U.S. agreed.  Now, we will downplay VJ Day -- the day ALL of WWII came to
an end and all major hostiltiies and killing ended -- in order to protect
the sensitivities of Japan.

Japan is our friend and ally.  We should never forget it.  We shouldn't build
displays that try to create or revive animosities or anger.  But we also should
not deny history, what was done and what was sacrificed.

People aren't angry that the U.S. is downplaying the term VJ Day.  They're
getting angry because it is just one more in a long list of self-deprecating
actions that do an injustice to the memory of those who served then and those
who still survive today.  Most everyone has come to terms with their history.
If Japan has not, or refuses to, that is not anyone else's responsibility but
their own.  It is not our responsibility to subdue a major event in our own
history in order to protect those sensitivities.

This commemoration is a once-in-a-half-century event.  There will be another
remembrance of it in 50 years.  If it ever receives major recognition after
that, it will be on a 100 year basis.

For God's sake, it's not a holiday.  It's a remembrance of a major world-
shaking earth-shattering event that changed the world forever and created a
"ripple effect" that will be felt for centuries to come.

Commemorations must be tasteful and professional.  They must be truthful and
accurate.  They must be historical and educational.  They must be neutral and
not political.  They must not, however, be damaged because of political
agenda or fears.  That's just an insult to all who served -- Allied and
Japanese alike.

--
\\ Robert J. Granvin                                 User Services Specialist
// School of Statistics - University of Minnesota            rjg@stat.umn.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 09:45:20 -0800
From:    Chris Albee <cea@NETCOM.COM>
Subject: NOST:  UK Sites

I'm heading to London in a few weeks, and would like to hear any opinions
about the various WWII-related sites and museums within day-tripping
range of london.

Hard facts (locations, costs, hours, etc.) would be welcome as well.

Thanks,
chris

chris albee, cea@netcom.com

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 10:26:00 CST
From:    Richard Battig <BATT@KSUVM.BITNET>
Subject: Re: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

While I must agree with you on this subject, President Clinton is our President
and should be titled as such.  If you do not like him, that is your right as
an American.  He however deserves the title.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:56:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <ABIELAK@LUCCPUA.IT.LUC.EDU>
Subject: Re: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

On 3 March, 1995, William Lippert wrote:

>     And that, in the end, is a tough question - who should pay the price?
> Is it fair for Speer and Doenitz and Ribbentrop to be the scapegoats for
> the entire nation?  Or is it fair for all the Germans to pay for the
> crimes of a few?  Or should the average bureacrat pay the price for simply
> doing his job, with little recourse, both under the command of people
> like Goebbels or Himmler and for the benifit of the German people as a
> whole who are not much less guilty than themselves?

William,
     I am not about to excuse Speer or Ribbentrop, but I have always
believed that Doenitz got a raw deal.  From what I have read, his only
"war crime" was that he was named Hitler's successor.  In fact, wasn't
part of the reason that Hitler picked him related to the fact that
Doenitz had remained outside of the politics of the Third Reich and
remained primarily a military man?  Just wondering!

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 13:20:22 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <wrb1@CORNELL.EDU>
Subject: WEAP: Johnson Rifle

I don't think my first posting got through so I'll repost (if the first
shows up I'll have egg on my face ;))

        Captain Melvin M Johnson Jr (USMCR) produced his first working
semi-automatic rifle in 1936, though it was to go through several changes
and modifications before it was perfected.  In 1940 he submitted it as a
possible service rifle, and a bitter partisan wrangle ensued between
supporters of johnson and those in favor of the Garand.  But the facts were
beyond despute.  The Garand had been in production for four years; 50,00
were inservice, and the 'bugs' were out of it; whereas the Johnson was a
relatively unknown quantity which would take quite a while to reach the
same state of perfection - and 1940 was no time for the US Army to change
horses mid-stream.
        However, others were in more desperate straits and the Netherlands
East Indies Army ordered 50,000 rifles.  Manufacture began, and the US
Marine Corp, unable to obtain Garand rifles as fast as it needed them, also
bought several thousand.  Production continued throughout the war, though
the USMC gradually replaced the Johnson with the Garand as supplies became
available and the Johnson was only used by the OSS and similar special
forces in the end.  Its reliability was not as good as the Garand and it
was continually being modified during production in the hope of improving
matters.
        The Johnson rifle was unusual in that it operated on the short
recoil principle, probably the only succesful military rifle ever to do so.
It had several ingeneous features, notably the rotary magazine which could
be topped up even with the bolt closed.  The barrel could be removed for
carrying, a feature which attracted intrest from the US Airborne forces who
used some of them.  After the war, however, the Johnson rifle was withdrawn
and has not been produced since.
        Johnson also produced a machine gun which used the same operating
principle as did the rifle.  It was fitted with a bipod and fed from a box
magazine on the left side which could be topped up from the right side of
the gun without having to remove it.  It was offered to the US Army and
turned down, but tthe Dutch Government ordered several thousand for use in
the Netherlands East Indies.  Before this order was completed the Japanese
overran the Indies and the balance of the production order was taken by the
US Army Rangers and the US Marines.  Though it was an excellent design and
made to high standards, it was too delicate to stand the rough and tumble
of combat and was prone to jam at inconvenient moments

The Encyclopedia of World War II  John Keegan

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 09:22:44 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <John.Ausland@GMAIL.GAR.NO>
Subject: WELCOME TO LIST

  FOR JOHN BAXTER JONES
  I want to welcome you to the list.  Thanks for the background about
you.  I note you were in the 4th Infantry Division in Viet Nam.  By
coincidence, I was in it in WWII, as users of this list know.  I post
from time to time excerpts from my memoir LETTERS HOME: A WAR MEMOIR.
Hopefully you saw the recent one on my leave in Paris.
  I suppose you know there is a 4th Division Association and hope you
are a member.  If not, send me an EMAIL message, and I will tell you
about it.
  Regards, John Ausland, Oslo, Norway

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 09:18:41 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <John.Ausland@GMAIL.GAR.NO>
Subject: LETTERS HOME

  FOR MIKE OAKS AND NEWCOMERS
  Glad you enjoyed the story of my leave in Paris.  Having helped, in
a modest way, liberate it, I still have a love affair with that city
and have enjoyed my many visits there since the war.
  You are right that my LETTERS HOME: A WAR MEMOIR is out of print.  I
have not plans to do another printing, because it is so much work to
market it.  I have, however, made a electronic version, which should
appear on the World Wide Web someday but I have no idea when.  The
fellow who plans to do it has difficulty getting around to it.
  In the meantime, I am peddling the book on disk.  Anyone sending me
an EMAIL message will get a flyer about this.
  Another thought.  The book is in a few libraries in the US.  For
example, the Firestone Library at Princeton, my alma mater, has a
couple copies.  There is also one at the Library of Congress.  Perhaps
your local library can borrow a copy for you on an interlibrary loan.
  Regards, John Ausland

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:41:08 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <jconeil@PRIMENET.COM>
Subject: Re: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

Ron Babuka,

>>the Chinese-American "Ching" Lee.
>
>
>Does anyone out there have any bio info on "Ching" Lee - I have never heard
>of this gentleman.
>
I don't have a lot, But I assure you he was not Chinese American! The
"Ching" nickname was from an assignment in the Asiatic Fleet and he was a
recognized gunnery/battleship "expert".

Jim O'Neil   Indecision is the cornerstone of Military Flexibility

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:41:19 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <jconeil@PRIMENET.COM>
Subject: Re: more on "Glacier Girl" P-38F

>In response to the comments generated by my post on the restoration
>efforts on the P-38F recovered from under the ice on Greenland...
>
>After mailing off photographs of the aircraft to several people on the
>list, I still have 30 or 40 shots left over.  If anyone else is interested,
>drop me a note, and I'll be glad to send you a few.
>
>Dennis E. Sparks
>sparks@alpha.caer.uky.edu
>Lexington, Kentucky
Dennis,
My 19 year old would very much like to have some of the pictures - he is
just getting really interested in WW II. I would be interested as well, as
a long time wargamer/history nut. Please send to :
Jim O'Neil
PO Box 555
Hereford, AZ 85615

Thanks,


Jim O'Neil   Indecision is the cornerstone of Military Flexibility

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 13:16:49 -0500
From:    Barone <m1b@SSD.RAY.COM>
Subject: Re: more on "Glacier Girl" P-38F

Dennis E. Sparks <sparks@ALPHA.CAER.UKY.EDU> writes:
> After mailing off photographs of the aircraft to several people on the
> list, I still have 30 or 40 shots left over.  If anyone else is interested,
> drop me a note, and I'll be glad to send you a few.

        Can anyone scan these photos in and be made available via ftp?
--
Joe Barone
m1b@ssd.ray.com
What's he want a yacht for?  There ain't no money in yachts...

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 13:14:29 -0600
From:    "William L. Huber - SAA" <whuber@SADIS01.KELLY.AF.MIL>
Subject: Glacier Girl

X-Orig-From: "Robert J. Granvin" <rjg@STAT.UMN.EDU>

 {regarding nose art on reconstructed aircraft that had none
originally - at least not on that particular aircraft}

> This is essentially why I personally waffle a bit on the issue.  I would
> still prefer it not be applied, but it can be construed as acceptable, even
> to the purist.  :-)

Robert Granvin's point is well taken.  I guess it depends on who the
target audience is.  If its a bunch of aeronautical engineers who are
concerned with airframe design then nose art is distracting.  If its
a 7th grade class history field trip then AUTHENTIC nose art would
give the plane more of a persona and in that sense a historical
context.  Commemorating the men vs the machine as Robert said earlier.

Consider if the Enola Gay had not had a name painted on it, what would
we have been having so much discussion about? - that B-29 that dropped
the first atomic bomb ?  Enola Gay is a nice handle for the concept.

>From a strictly geewhiz perspective {the only one I feel qualified to
promulgate where aircraft are concerned :-) } it is the planes with
the really cool Vargas girl nose art and racy logos that sell the
postcards at museums.  A guy I work with here at Kelly went to Wright
Patterson on business and went to the museum after the conference.  He
doesn't know a Fokker from a Foxbat but what did he take a picture
of?? - the B-24 named "Strawberry Bitch" and he has it displayed on
his desk as I write this.

So I say, as long as its appropriate to the era, nose art is ok if it
is to displayed to the public.

Cheers, Bill Huber / whuber@sadis01.kelly.af.mil

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 14:34:27 EST
From:    Doug McCabe <mccabe@OUVAXA.CATS.OHIOU.EDU>
Subject: Re: Victory at Sea, et.al.

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication


   Date:  07-Mar-1995 02:34pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"WWII-L@UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Re: Victory at Sea, et.al.


         Aside from such PC things as commemorating the end of the war in
    the Pacific as opposed to V-J Day another personal temperature-riser
    are the inexcusable uses of visuals not even closely related to the
    topic at hand.  _Victory at Sea_ is just one example and, somewhat
    cognizant of Jack's excuses for this series, it strikes me that this
    problem is rooted in simple laziness.
         There are thousands and probably millions of feet of film from the
    war in, yes, hundreds of repositories requiring hundreds of hours to
    search for the right material.  A hassle, but look at the alternatives:
    minor to gross misrepresentations of that war, which when added all
    together, present a warped sense of what happened.
         This is not a new problem.  Here in the US it dates back to the
    very first photographed war.  Brady, Gardner and others were all guilty
    of intentionally mislabeling photos, claiming to capture images of
    famous and infamous people or events - making the image fit the image.
    One might have thought that with modern times and sophistication such
    actions would have disappeared but perhaps man's vanity, laziness, and
    desire for profit overshadows mere historical accuracy.
         The problem even continues to this day.  A few years ago I saw a
    book on the Vietnam War which used two photos of an M-60 machinegun
    crew, several pages apart, shot from two different angles but labeled
    as different battles in two different places and times.
         Books are sometimes just as bad.  Cornelius Ryan (someone I'm
    close to since his archives are here) even used a photo in _A Bridge
    Too Far_ which turned out to be the 1940 German attack on Holland
    instead of an Allied resupply mission.  To his credit he had future
    editions corrected.  (I have attempted to do the same thing with the
    upcoming re-release of the book scheduled for this spring.)
         Granted, we who have images sould do a better job of getting the
    word out.  But these days there really is no excuse for dumping into
    programs wrong images just to have visuals or action.
         Then there are my complaints about bad maps in books.... I'll have
    to save that pet peeve for some other time.

    Doug McCabe



Received:  07-Mar-1995 02:34pm

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 13:46:16 EST
From:    Alan Wild <AWILD@URIACC.URI.EDU>
Subject: INF: 'Bradley, concerning Patton

As you must imagine, the Tweflth Army Group would be privy to most of the
intelligence which the individual Armies had at their disposal, if not
the Corps commanders. Any discrepancy should be in the timing involved;
sooner or later Twelfth Army group should know the intell that was present.
That bit of reasoning I had moments after reading the following Forward,
written by Gen. of the Army Bradley about Gen Patton. The Forward is to
_Before the Colors Fade_ by Fred Ayer, Jr.

   "A leader - military or civilian - must be judged by results. Patton was
certainly a successful battle leader. He had a battle sense - a sixth sense
if I may call it that - which enabled him to foresee situations that were
developing and make dispositions to meet them. Some officers commented about
this even in maneuvers held just prior to World War II. I remember one
outstanding wartime example. After crossing the Moselle River near Coblenz
with about three divisions and moving rapidly south, he suddenly stopped
his advance and collected his forces. Some members of my 12th Army Group
staff expressed surprise and wondered why he did not keep going as the
advance was going so well. Knowing Patton's feel for battle, I suggested
there must be a reason which George felt but which was not apparent from
the information we had. True, the next day he was hit by a strong counter-
attack which he was able to repel because he had stopped and regrouped.
He then continued his advance." -Gen. Bradley, 1964




   The book has some memorable photos in it of Gen. Patton kneeling before
Prince Baudouin of Belgium, whom incidently was about 6 or 7 years old,...
There is also a photo just after his "leak" in the Rhine. Note that he
beat Montgomery across the Rhine by about 8-10 hours using bridging units.
Montgomery called for an enormous operation including a parachute drop
on the opposite bank, smoke, and some 18,000 men. It was an historical
event, since no modern army had crossed the Rhine in combat, and the
List knows that Patton didn't like being outstaged when it came to his
potential place in history.

-Al

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 14:50:58 -0500
From:    "John E. Kollar" <KILLAR@MARY.FORDHAM.EDU>
Subject: Re: Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the Bulge)

The footage of that Austrian Battleship rolling over gets alot of play

in many different shows.  :)

John E. Kollar

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 15:10:58 -0500
From:    "Matthew R. Burchette" <Mathoo@AOL.COM>
Subject: INFO. German Camp Numbers?

People,
Can anyone out there either tell me the numbers that the Germans assigned to
their concentration and extermination camps or point me to a source? The
camps were all give a number begining with KZ. Such as KZ 123 for Nordhausen.
You get the picture. I would like to have these on file for future refs.
Thanks all,
Matthew Burchette

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 15:17:30 -0500
From:    "Matthew R. Burchette" <Mathoo@AOL.COM>
Subject: INFO. German Professor Abbreviations

People,
Here is another one for you. I am in the midst of reading a book on the V-1
and V-2 projects. There keep popping up abbreviations in front of scientists
names that I have no idea what they mean. Help! What does Dipl. Ing. and Dr.
Ing. mean when used in front of a persons name?
Thanks,
Matthew Burchette

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 15:20:32 -0500
From:    "John E. Kollar" <KILLAR@MARY.FORDHAM.EDU>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

Ray,

When I read Ben Frank's post the first thing I did was mail in to the
President, but I do see your point on this.  The memories of war are
nasty, but they should be otherwise we would think that war was a good
things (unintentionalized bastardization of quote), but the Japanese gov.
is getting really weird ideas on what happened in WWII, the last time
a nation this big a revision of history was in Germany circa 1930 when
people actually believed that their army had not been defeated in 1920.
When people start changing history, or revising it, the lessons that history
taught are changed.  Many Japanese are actually beginning to think that
they were 'freeing' the rest of East Asia (but don't ask the other
East Asians that question), which is wrong.  On the other hand, what
if Japan wants to tie her economy in to this?  We can play hardball too,
with the rest of east asia with us against Japan, and if we 'allow'
Iran to cut off the gulf to Japanese shipping, well...  My point is
I don't think the Japanese government would tie this in to the economy,
but they want to see how far they can push us to 'revise' our history,
and from their point of view everything they have done so far, from
the Abomb-stamp, to the Enola Gay, to the VJday they have won every,
battle, so why not continue pushing?  Maybe they can even get us to
change our flag from the flag that went up over so many criminally
murdered Japanese to a more benign format? (facetious)

John E. Kollar

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 15:23:14 EST
From:    Roger Coon <coon@CVAX.IPFW.INDIANA.EDU>
Subject: WW I list info?

Sorry to bother this list with this query but I am certain some of you
would know the answer.  Would someone post directly to me the address
of the WW I list?
Thanks,
Brad Coon
coon@cvax.ipfw.indiana.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 16:30:28 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: More on Bong

        Since I shot off a quick reply on a list question regarding Richard
Bong, the top-scoring US fighter ace of the war, I wanted to make a few factual
adjustments (I won't say "correct my mistakes" because these are minor details
which do not really materially affect the accuracy of the incidents I
described.  Anyway, I was shooting from the hip).  Anyhow, in the incident I
referred to from spring 1943 (over Oro Bay, New Guinea), where Bong found
himself first with a Zero flying "wingman" for his P-38, then, escaping that
danger, went from the frying pan to the fire as he found himself confronted
with a whole flight of Zeros, that flight numbered nine Japanese planes, not
eight as I stated in the post (makes more sense when you consider the Japanese
operated in three-plane elements).  Also, when Bong spoke of the benefits of a
gunnery course he took between his two tours of combat duty, his actual words
were that had he taken it before his first tour he would have shot down 80
planes (instead of the 40 he is credited with-- in my post I misquoted Bong as
saying he would have had 20 more "kills."  Both minor points, I'm sure you'll
agree, but, hey, accuracy is accuracy.)  Most of this material, BTW, came from
Ray Tolliver, "Fighter Aces."
        While we're talking about Bong, I should also mention that in the fall
of 1944 he almost had a shot at his Japanese Army opposite number while
escorting a bombing raid over Balikpapan, Borneo (a mission which Bong
disobeyed orders to fly-- he was already due to be rotated out and was grounded
until the transport orders came through).  During that action Bong jumped three
Japanese Army Ki-43 fighters led by Lt. Satoshi Anabuki (proof-reading through
my Japan posts after the fact I see my flying fingers somehow truncated his
name to "Anaki").  Anabuki, commander by this time of 381st Sentai (roughly
equivalent to a squadron), I've seen credited with anywhere from 50+ to 70+
aerial victories-- the sources I've seen vary widely on Japanese Army aces.  If
the latter figure (70+) is correct, Anabuki would have been, as far as I know,
the Japanese Army's top fighter ace.  Whatever his actual score, the fact that
he was still alive in the second half of 1944 despite flying the Ki-43 alone
indicates he must have been a pretty good pilot (though by '44 he was flying
the improved version, with a little better speed and a tiny semblence of armor
protection).  At any rate, in fall '44, en route to the oil refineries of
Balikpapan, Bong jumped a three-plane element led by Anabuki, and shot down one
of the two trailing fighters.  Anabuki, however, alerted by the fate of his
wingman, utilized the superb maneuverability of his Ki-43 to break away, and
the two aces never actually locked horns.
        I should also say that losing one's wingman while concentrating on
attack maneuvers was a common fighter pilot's mistake, apparently easy to do in
the confusion and split-second decisions of high-speed fighter combat.  Even
experienced fighter pilots often did it.  Bong was lucky in his close scrape
over Oro Bay, but his survival is probably due to the fact that he remembered
to make sure his wing was covered before he got wrapped up in his attack.  One
famous American fighter pilot who didn't remember to check in a similar
situation paid for the omission with his life.  Col. Neal Kearby shot down 22
Japanese planes in a P-47 over New Guinea.  He won the Congressional Medal of
Honor for a mission over Wewak in October 1943.  Kearby was leading a
four-plane flight on a reconnaisance patrol over Wewak, a major Japanese base
(one of those that MacArthur's campaign deftly bypassed-- it was later taken by
Australian forces making an overland approach).  Their mission was completed,
they were low on fuel and headed home, when Kearby spotted a lone Japanese
fighter, apparently on patrol, pounced on it, and shot it down.  Then they also
saw a formation of a dozen Japanese bombers escorted by 36 fighters.  Despite
the odds of 12-to-1 against, and their low fuel situation, Kearby led his
flight into the attack.  He himself shot down three planes on his first deadly
pass through the Japanese formation.  Then, as a confused melee developed,
Kearby brought down two more Japanese fighters that were hanging on the tails
of other planes from his flight.  At last he led his Thunderbolts into the
safety of some clouds, and they headed for home, Kearby having bagged six enemy
aircraft in one mission.  As I said, Kearby met his death in a later action,
when, intent on shooting down a Japanese fighter, he did not notice that he had
lost his wingman.  Another Japanese fighter latched on to his tail, and
although this enemy plane was soon shot down by another American fighter, it
had already poured its fatal bursts into Kearby's P-47.  BTW, German ace Gerald
Barkhorn was shot down by Soviet number two ace Aleksandr Pokhryshin in similar
circumstances, when the Luftwaffe ace forgot to check his wing while boring in
on a Russian aircraft (Barkhorn survived a crash-landing but suffered arm and
leg wounds in the incident, from the summer of 1944).

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 15:41:49 -0600
From:    "C.K. Bryant" <muckb1@UXA.ECN.BGU.EDU>
Subject: Re: INFO. German Professor Abbreviations

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, Matthew R. Burchette wrote:

> People,
> Here is another one for you. I am in the midst of reading a book on the V-1
> and V-2 projects. There keep popping up abbreviations in front of scientists
> names that I have no idea what they mean. Help! What does Dipl. Ing. and Dr.
> Ing. mean when used in front of a persons name?
> Thanks,
> Matthew Burchette
>

Dipl. Ing.  is short for Diplom Ingenieur which world be someone who as a
certificate in engineering.

Dr. Ing. is short for Doktor Ingenieur which would be someone with his
doctorate in engineering.

Hope that helps.

C.K. Bryant

*******************************************************************
"The Riskier the road, the greater the profit."    / C.K. Bryant
        The 62nd Rule of Acquisition               / W.I.U. English
*******************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 16:13:47 -0600
From:    Jeff Dingbaum <dingbaum@HEP.NET>
Subject: Re: More on Bong

Mike Yaklich,

Your posts on Bong and others losing wingmen bring up a question.
What did you do if you lost your wingman?  Did you hookup with a
twosome or did you look for someone else who had lost theirs also?

Jeff Dingbaum
dingbaum@hep.net

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 23:40:36 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <gustin@HHIPE.UIA.AC.BE>
Subject: Re: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

> the skies.  The Kittyhawk, for those who don't know, was essentially a
> souped-up P-40 with a Spitfire (Rolls-Royce) engine installed, boosting
> the speed by 15-20 mph over current P-40 versions.  This was also the
> plane flown by Australia's top ace Clive Caldwell for most of his
> career in North Africa (he later switched to a Spitfire).

Mike, that's not entirely correct. In fact, it's wrong.  Blame the USAAF
and the RAF:  they created the confusion. Curtiss built in its 'Hawk'
series the Hawk 75, Hawk 81, and Hawk 87. The Hawk 75 was the model with a
radial engine. The USAAC gave its Hawk 75s the designation P-36. The Hawk
81 and Hawk 87 were all called P-40 Warhawk, regardless of the designation
applied by Curtiss. Up to the P-40C were model 81 aircraft, and all later
models were Hawk 87s.

But the British tried (for a change) to be logical. They called the Hawk
81 the Tomahawk and the Hawk 87 the Kittyhawk. Most models of the Hawk 87
were powered by versions of the Allison V-1710 engine. Very typically, the
designation Kittyhawk mk.I was applied to both the P-40D and P-40E,
Kittyhawk mk.II was used for the P-40F, Kittyhawk mk.III for both the
P-40K and P-40M, and Kittyhawk mk.IV for the P-40N. Yes, it is confusing!
So only some Kittyhawks, equivalent to the P-40F, had Rolls-Royce Merlin
engines. It was not standard British practice to rename an aircraft when a
new engine was introduced.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 18:14:15 -0500
From:    Scott C Stathis <stathis@STUDENT.UMASS.EDU>
Subject: Re: NOST:  UK Sites

>
> I'm heading to London in a few weeks, and would like to hear any opinions
> about the various WWII-related sites and museums within day-tripping
> range of london.
>
> Hard facts (locations, costs, hours, etc.) would be welcome as well.
>
> Thanks,
> chris
>
> chris albee, cea@netcom.com
>

  Chris

     I would highly recommend to sights one is the Impereal War Museum in
London and the other is the RAF Museum outside of London (sorry I don't
remember the name of the town but the Tube does stop there.) it takes about
two hours to get there and is well whether the trip. You can ask your travel
agent about the exact local.


Hope this helps
Scott
stathis@student.umass.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 19:04:00 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Last Japan appendix-- the battlewagon war

        Appendix 3: The Last Battlewagon War

        The Pacific war was essentially the campaign the battleship fleets of
both the US and Japanese Navies had been preparing to fight for the previous
twenty years.  Each navy had its own circle of senior admirals who had gained
much of their experience in the days before air power had become a major factor
in military operations (especially naval), back when the battleship was the
mightiest instrument of military force on the planet.  These men still believed
in the battle line's supremacy in contesting control of the seas.  Furthermore,
a huge proportion of each navy's budget and resources had gone into building
and maintaining these expensive monsters during the interwar years.  Just as
the US Navy had its "gun club" of conservative admirals who still thought the
battleship was the decisive naval weapon, Japanese naval war plans prior to
Yamamoto's tenure as commander of Combined Fleet all envisioned a "decisive
battle" which they would win with their battleships in more or less the same
fashion as Admiral Togo had defeated the Russians at Tsushima in 1905.
        Events, however, were to lead to a much different sort of war than the
battleship backers had predicted.  Battleships would still play a prominent
role in the fighting-- indeed, this was probably the last time these armored
behemoths would roam the wartime seas in such numbers-- and would even meet
head-to-head on several occasions in the sort of classic battle line actions
the "gun club" members foresaw.  But the decisive weapon of naval warfare in
the Second World War was destined to be air power, not surface gun power, and
this became clear very early on in the Pacific conflict-- in fact, from the
very first week of fighting.  The advent of Yamamoto and Fukodome to the
controlling positions in Japanese naval planning led to the emphasis on
airpower, particularly as deployed by aircraft carriers, in subsequent Japanese
Navy operations.  The success of these Japanese tactics left the Americans with
little choice but to reply in kind, especially since the opening Japanese
strike at Pearl Harbor left the US Navy in the Pacific temporarily without a
battleship fleet.  Only when the Japanese had lost their carrier-based air
weapon did they revert to trying to win the sea war with their battle line,
only to discover that air power had indeed made such tactics impractical in the
waters of 1944.
        Most of the interwar period had been governed by naval arms limitation
treaties among the major naval powers, which imposed absolute limits on the
numbers and tonnage of battleships the signatory nations could build.  The
ratio accepted between the three biggest navies, the US, British, and Japanese,
was 5:5:3-- i.e., for every five American or British battleships the Japanese
were allowed to have three.  Another clause limited the size of all new
battleships to under 35,000 tons.  The US and British navies generally tried to
design ships that could be combat-effective while remaining within the limits.
The Japanese, in the early post-World War I period, had launched an ambitious
battleship construction program which was one of the driving forces in leading
to the establishment of the treaties in the first place (battleships then being
considered more or less the equivalent of nuclear weapons today-- the most
terrible and most expensive weapons of war-- most governments were eager to
avoid a costly arms race in the tight post-war fiscal atmosphere).
        Japan had 11 battleships in December 1941.  Eight of these were older
vessels built during the First World War, but since modernized.  The KONGO,
KIRISHIMA, HARUNA, and HIEI were fast ships, almost in the battlecruiser class
(32,000 tons; eight 14-inch [356-mm] guns; armor 8 inches thick in main belt;
up to 30 knots).  The heavier FUSO, YAMASHIRO (35,000 tons, 24 knots), HYUGA,
and ISE (36,000 tons, 25 knots) were more traditional battleships, all carrying
a dozen 14-inch guns and main belt armor a foot thick.  But the two vessels
which created international attention were the post-WWI NAGATO and MUTSU, among
the most powerful ships in the world in the early 1920's (38,000 tons; eight
16-inch [406-mm] guns; main belt 13 inches; 25 knots).  Added to these older
ships, the Japanese received just as hostilities were commencing the brand new
YAMATO, the most powerful battleship ever built.  It mounted nine 18.1-inch
(460-mm) guns, with a maximum range of 35 miles! Its armor was 16 inches thick
in the main belt, up to 25 inches on the main gun turrets, and this 68,000-ton
monster could move through the water at 27 knots.  A sister ship, the MUSASHI,
was also nearing completion, and would be ready roughly a year later.
        The American battle fleet was also a mix of modernized older vessels
and powerful new ships.  Counting the new ships just entering service, the US
Navy had 17 battleships in December 1942, but of course the American Navy also
had a two-ocean commitment.  There were many classes, so I'll just mention that
the US fleet included (in addition to the pre-WWI ARKANSAS-- 26,000 tons,
twelve 12-inch [305-mm] guns, 21 knots, 11 inch armor in main belt) the WWI or
early post-WWI battleships NEW YORK, TEXAS (27,000 tons; ten 14-inch guns;
12-inch main belt; 21 knots), NEVADA, OKLAHOMA (29,000 tons; ten 14-inch guns;
13.5-inch belt armor; 20 knots), PENNSYLVANIA, ARIZONA, NEW MEXICO, IDAHO,
MISSISSIPPI, CALIFORNIA, and TENNESSEE (33,000 tons; twelve 14-inch guns;
14-inch belt armor; 21 knots).  Added to these dozen older ships were the more
powerful WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, and COLORADO (32,000 tons; eight 16-inch
guns; belt armor up to 16 inches thick; 21 knots).  These latter three reveal
the tendency of US battleship design for much of the interwar period,
emphasizing heavy gunpower and armor above all other considerations.  The US
ships were able to carry such heavy above-the-waterline protection, BTW,
because they adopted the British "all-or-nothing" concept, which essentially
stated that instead of uniformly armoring the whole ship, extra protection was
concentrated around vital areas-- like the main belt and the bridge tower--
while less essential parts of the ship were given either token protection or
none at all.
        The two newest US battleships at the time of Pearl Harbor were the
WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA, just entering service (37,000 tons; nine 16-inch
guns; 12 inch main belt; 28 knots).  These ships reflected a rethinking of
design concepts to the extent that they sacrificed some of their protection in
favor of greater mobility, but acheived a pretty good balance between
firepower, protection, and speed.  The small bugs and flaws in the design of
these ships were largely rectified in the succeeding SOUTH DAKOTA class (SOUTH
DAKOTA, INDIANA, ALABAMA, MASSACHUSETTS), all of which entered service in 1942
(37,000 tons; nine 16-inch guns; 28 knots; main belt armor 12.25 inches, with
major improvements to underwater protection).  These vessels rendered very good
service in the coming conflict, but were soon supplanted by the even better
IOWA-class ships.  Probably the most efficient battleships of the war, the
IOWA-class ships set new standards for large warship design.  At 46,000 tons
(well over 50,000 tons combat-loaded) they were most impressive for their
speed, making an astounding 33 knots, and thus capable of operating with the
fastest new carriers to form extremely powerful task forces.  Their firepower
was also first-rate, with nine 16-inch guns, and armor plate was 12.25 inches
in the main belt.  The general excellence of this design was reflected by the
fact that some of these ships still were able to play a useful role in the
recent Persian Gulf war, and are only being retired from active service as we
speak.  The first of these four ships (IOWA, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, WISCONSIN)
were delivered in 1943, and all four were active by 1944.
        The characteristics of the IOWA-class vessels showed how the role of
the battleship had changed by the second half of the Pacific war.  No longer
were they expected primarily to face their opposite numbers of the Japanese
Navy in a head-to-head slugfest a la Tsushima or Jutland.  Now their task was
to operate along with the fast carriers, to give support and protection against
enemy heavy ships if such appeared, but primarily to act as swift, floating gun
platforms for conventional and antiaircraft artillery.  All of the US
battleships from the WASHINGTON on carried the superlative secondary armament
of twenty dual-purpose 5-inch (127-mm) guns.  These weapons, with a very rapid
rate of fire when served by a properly-trained crew (on the American
battlewagons they all were), were often deadly against surface targets of all
kinds, but they also functioned as heavy antiaircraft guns.  In this latter
employment they truly came into their own when utilizing another example of the
American technological superiority, the proximity fuse.  This was essentially a
tiny, very short-range radar built into the nose of the shell.  The radar
detonated the shell as soon as it was close enough to detect an enemy plane
(i.e., whenever its signal bounced back).  Used during the final year of the
Pacific war, these shells made the 5-inch a truly formidable antiaircraft
weapon.  But US battleships, even by mid-war, were bristling with antiaircraft
guns of all kinds.  For example, at the end of 1943 the WASHINGTON carried (in
addition to the twenty 5-inch guns) 60 automatic 40-mm Bofors guns (on twin
mounts) and 83 automatic 20-mm Oerlikons.  Even a single ship thus provided
could throw up an impressive AA barrage all by itself.
        I didn't mention the British, although they too had 15 battleships and
battlecruisers in 1939, and some of these came to be involved in the Pacific
fighting.  Most of the British battle fleet was at any rate tied down in
European and Mediterranean waters for much of the war (where their chief
preoccupation, post-war historical slant aside, was the Italian fleet for much
of the conflict).  The British battle line included ten old WWI ships (three of
them modernized) mounting eight 15-inch (381-mm) guns each.  They were also
building five newer vessels, the KING GEORGE V-class (KING GEORGE V, PRINCE OF
WALES, DUKE OF YORK, ANSON, HOWE).  These were fast and well-protected,
although the British had made the decision of arming them with smaller 14-inch
guns (a policy Churchill, among others, disputed).  The first of these new
British battleships entered service in 1940, and all five were operational by
1943.
        The Pacific war began with two major disasters for the Allied battle
fleets.  The first and most dramatic, of course, was the virtual destruction of
the US Pacific Fleet battleships at Pearl Harbor in the war's opening act.
Both of these debacles also demonstrated in a fearsome manner the ascendancy of
airpower over conventional surface warships, and gave rise to the dramatic
change in the battleship's perceived role alluded to earlier.  At Pearl Harbor
the US Navy lost the OKLAHOMA, ARIZONA, WEST VIRGINIA, and CALIFORNIA sunk; the
NEVADA beached to prevent sinking; the MARYLAND and the TENNESSEE badly
damaged; and the PENNSYLVANIA, which was in dry dock at the time, also damaged
but less severely.  That amounted to eight of the Pacific Fleet's nine
battleships out of action (albeit temporarily) and forced the US planners to
adopt a strategy, like it or not, in which the battle line would not play the
leading tactical role.  I mentioned earlier the meticulous Japanese training
and preparations for this attack.  Not least of these was in weapons
development, some of which was geared to this specific operation.  Much of the
damage to the US battleships at Pearl was caused by Nakajima B5N bombers of the
first wave.  These single-engined, three-seat aircraft were already nearing the
end of their usefulness in late 1941, being too slow and vulnerable to operate
effectively in the face of heavy fighter opposition-- not a big problem at
Pearl because most of the US fighters were caught on the ground and destroyed
by attacks against the main Hawaiian airfields (see note at the end of this
text on US fighter response on 12/7/41).  Their versatility, however, made the
B5N's still usefull, in that they could serve as either level or torpedo
bombers.  One important Japanese technical breakthrough, just in time for the
Pearl Harbor operation, was the development of an air-dropped torpedo that
could run in Pearl's shallow water-- in many places no more than 35 feet deep--
without hitting bottom.  Another, more primitive but nonetheless ingenious
expedient was the creation of special armor-piercing bombs, made by essentially
welding fins on to standard 16-inch armor-piercing naval shells, to penetrate
the armored decks of the ships moored in "Battleship Row" at Pearl.  The B5N's
in the attack carried either a torpedo, the special AP bombs made from shells,
or the Japanese Navy's standard 551-lb anti-ship bomb.  The other type of
Japanese aircraft in the attack (besides the covering Zero fighters) was the
Aichi D3A dive-bomber.  Like the Army's later Ki-51, the D3A lived by its
superb maneuverability-- when not carrying bombs it could dogfight with most
contemporary American fighters-- but it lacked the Ki-51's armor protection,
and these aircraft too would prove increasingly vulnerable when confronted with
enemy fighter defenses.  The D3A was limited as a means of shipping attack by
its inability (normally) to carry bombs heavier than 220 lbs.  However, a
compensating factor was the accuracy of its form of attack, honed to an art
form by the Japanese carrier pilots through constant practice (and through
learning to dive to lowest possible altitude before releasing their bombs and
pulling out-- this was how they acheived hits with a reported 80% of their
bombs dropped against British cruisers in the Indian Ocean a few months later).
        It was the torpedos which proved the most devastating to the ships at
Battleship Row.  OKLAHOMA and WEST VIRGINIA were hit by nine torpedoes each.
CALIFORNIA-- its watertight doors below deck open for a routine inspection at
the time of the attack-- was sunk by two.  The OKLAHOMA capsized, taking 400
men down with it.  It was hits by two of the special 16-inch shell bombs,
however, that caused the spectacular explosion of the ARIZONA, which killed
some 1,200 of the 1,500 men on board, including Rear-Admiral Kidd-- roughly
half the total fatalities suffered by the Americans at Pearl that day.  The
Japanese pilots took their time-- Fuchida led his flight around for two "dry
runs" over Battleship Row before finally dropping his bombs on the third pass.
The accuracy of the attacks, especially from the torpedo bombers (who also put
several torpedoes into the target ship UTAH, an old battleship, in a case of
mistaken identity), reflected not only their skill developed by long and
realistic training, but also the fact that their targets were sitting ducks.
Of all the US battleships, only the NEVADA managed to get under way during the
raid-- despite having already been hit by a torpedo and shaken by near misses
from five heavy bombs.  The NEVADA was hit by five more bombs from dive-bombers
of the second wave as it tried to navigate through the narrow exit from the
harbor, but it was damage below the waterline from the single torpedo hit that
forced her captain to beach the ship.
        Two days after the debacle at Pearl, another disaster overtook the
Allied battleship forces in the Pacific.  The British had managed to base a
small battle squadron known as "Force Z" at Singapore, hoping the presence of
these ships would be a deterent to the Japanese (a carrier was supposed to also
be part of this force but the one earmarked was undergoing repairs on the other
side of the world in December 1941).  "Force Z," under Admiral Tom Phillips,
consisted of the new battleship PRINCE OF WALES (38,000 tons; ten 14-inch guns;
28 knots; main belt armor 15 inches) and the First World War battlecruiser
REPULSE (32,000 tons; six 15-inch guns; 27+ knots; nine inches of belt armor).
While investigating a (false) report of Japanese landings on Malaya's east
coast, the ships of "Force Z" were set upon by a strong force of Japanese Navy
G3M land-based two-engined bombers.  Despite the heavy antiaircraft armament on
the modern PRINCE OF WALES, with 170 barrels capable of providing AA fire, both
ships were sunk, the PRINCE OF WALES taking five torpedoes and one bomb, the
REPULSE hit by four torpedoes and a bomb.  Of about 3,000 crewmen on the two
ships, some 2,000 were saved, but Admiral Phillips and Captain Leach of the
PRINCE OF WALES chose to go down with their ship (Captain Tennant of the
REPULSE also wanted to remain but was dragged off by his officers).  The
Japanese lost three planes.

        For brevity's sake I'll break this into two parts.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich



------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 18:23:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <ABIELAK@LUCCPUA.IT.LUC.EDU>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

On Wed, 1 Mar 1995, Kelvin Luther wrote:

        Finally, the only country not to contribute to the holocaust was
Bulgaria.  They refused to export their Jewish population to Poland, and
were the only European country in the German domain to see a war time
increase in their Jewish population.  It was possible for people to
resist collaborating with the holocaust and your right, France deserves
to be exposed for their unparalleled amount of collaboration.

Kelvin,
     While the Bulgarians may not have actively contributed to the
Holocaust, the fact that they were an Axis power prevents them from
claiming that they had no part in the Holocaust.  By giving military
aid to the Germans they allowed the Germans to divert men and material
to the Concentration Camps.  Someone else suggested that the Poles
might have been both anti-German and anti-Semitic.  Using that analogy
the Bulgarians might be described as pro-German and pro-Jewish.

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:22:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 8 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
THURSDAY, 8 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  C-46, Curtiss Commando
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  P-61, Northrop Black Widow
  P-70, Douglas

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 34 B-24s, supported by 21
P-51s, pound Shihkiachwang; 3 B-24s claim a transport sunk in the S China
Sea; 16 B-25s and 6 P-40s attack railroad tracks, boxcars, gun positions,
sampans, and locomotives, knock out 2 bridges and damage another, and destroy
and damage several locomotives at or near Hengshan, Yehhsien, Lohochai, and
Chungmow; 140+ fighter-bombers fly armed reconnaissance over wide areas of S
and E China, attacking numerous targets of opportunity, mainly river, road,
and railroad targets, storage areas, gun positions, and troops, concentrating
around Changsha, Changanyi, and a bridge at Puchi.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 20 P-47s support the
British 36 Division; 40 fighter-bombers hit troop concentrations and supply
areas along the battlefront and behind the enemy lines; 39 others sweep roads
S of the bomb line, attacking gun positions and other targets of opportunity.
Transports fly 554 sorties to advanced bases and over frontline areas.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 3 missions are flown.
  Mission 872: 1,353 bombers and 326 fighters are dispatched to hit benzol
plants, an oil plant and rail targets in Germany using PFF; NO AIRCRAFT ARE
LOST AND THERE ARE NO CASUALTIES!
  1. 360 B-24s are sent to hit marshalling yards at Betzdorf (70), Siegen
(114) and Dillenburg (73); targets of opportunity are Limburg (10) and
Frankfurt (10); bombing is by H2X radar; 3 B-24s are damaged. Escorting are
99 of 102 P-51s.
  2. 526 B-17s are dispatched to hit the Robert Muser (99) and Bruchstrasse
(63) benzol plants at Langendreer, the Gneisenau benzol plant at Dortmund
(110) and Heddernheim chemical factory at Frankfurt (122); secondary targets
are the marshalling yards at Giessen (69) and Frankfurt (18); 13 others hit
Wetzlar, a target of opportunity; bombing is with H2X radar; 26 B-17s are
damaged. The escort is 95 of 99 P-51s.
  3. 458 B-17s are sent to hit the Emil benzol plant at Essen (114), the
Mathies Stinnes benzol plant at Bottrop (37), the August Viktoria benzol
plant at Huls (111) and the synthetic oil plant at Buer Scholren (75); 109
hit the marshalling yard at Essen, a target of opportunity; bombing is by
Micro-H; 1 B-17 is damaged beyond repair. 93 of 98 P-51s escort.
  4. 9 B-17s fly a screening mission.
  5. 27 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  Mission 873: 11 B-24s drop leaflets in France, the Netherlands and Germany
during the night without loss.
  Mission 874: 15 B-24s attack the marshalling yard at Dortmund during the
night without loss and 4 of 7 B-24s fly CARPETBAGGER missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): 328 B-26s, A-20s and A-26s hit 7
communications centers, 2 marshalling yards, a road overpass, and a military
transport depot in the furtherance of the interdiction program; weather
prevents fighter operations except for a small alert mission by the XXIX
Tactical Air Command (Provisional). Operational HQ of the XXIX Tactical Air
Command (Provisional), HQ 84th Fighter Wing and HQ 303d Fighter Wing move
from Maastricht, the Netherlands to Monchen-Gladbach, Germany; the
detachments of the 39th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron, 10th
Photographic Group (Reconnaissance) operating from Gosselies and Le Culot,
Belgium with F-5s, return to base at Jarny, France.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): 550+ B-17s and B-24s hit
marshalling yards at Hegyeshalom and Komarom, Hungary, and Verona, Italy, the
locomotive depot at Maribor, Yugoslavia, and the steel works at Kapfenberg,
Austria; P-51s and P-38s fly escort and reconnaissance missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, medium bombers are
hampered by heavy clouds but hit the Novara marshalling yard, Longarone and
Mori rail fills, and Rovereto bridge; fighters and fighter-bombers pound
communications and supplies, destroy a road bridge SW of Bologna, severely
damage an ammunition plant and surrounding complex NW of Milan, and hit
several other targets, including a bridge near Montebello which Brazilian
P-47s operating with the XXII Tactical Air Command cut in half; A-20s,
operating during the night of 7/8 Mar, attack river crossings at Borgoforte,
Cremona, Ostiglia, San Benetto Po, Viadana, and Ora, and numerous vehicles,
lights, and general movement in the C Po Valley and along the Brenner line.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 14 B-24s from Guam Island bomb Susaki Airfield
on Chichi Jima Island through heavy cloud layers; 5 more B-24s hit the
airfield again in 5 individual harassment strikes during the night of 8/9
Mar.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s pound the
Zamboanga area on Mindanao Island. On Luzon Island, B-24s hit road targets at
Balete Pass while A-20s support guerrilla forces in the San Fernando area;
fighter-bombers hit fuel dumps, gun positions, and other targets near Angat
and Ipo dam and numerous targets of opportunity in the Antipolo area,
personnel and storage areas near Baguio, and several targets in the Cagayan
Valley (including the town of Caggay, the Dummun River area, and barges at
Naguilian). The 6th Combat Cargo Squadron, 2d Combat Cargo Group, based on
Biak Island with C-46s, begins operating from Samar Island; and the 550th
Night Fighter Squadron, XIII Fighter Command, based on Morotai Island with
P-38s, P-61s and P-70s, sends a detachment to operate from Tacloban, Leyte
Island.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  jem3@cc.bellcore.com  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

03/0120Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:04:35 EST
From:    William Lippert <WL1958A@AMERICAN.EDU>
Subject: Re: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:56:00 CST Alex Bielakowski said:
>
>William,
>     I am not about to excuse Speer or Ribbentrop, but I have always
>believed that Doenitz got a raw deal.  From what I have read, his only
>"war crime" was that he was named Hitler's successor.  In fact, wasn't
>part of the reason that Hitler picked him related to the fact that
>Doenitz had remained outside of the politics of the Third Reich and
>remained primarily a military man?  Just wondering!
>
>Alex Bielakowski

     I don't have the book with me, but Padfield in his biography of Doenitz
goes into detail about his trial and sentence.  As a general rule, the
Russians wanted them all to hang.  The British were a little more selective.
The Americans were probably the most forgiving.  In the case of Doenitz,
he was found guilty, I think, of waging aggressive war and war crimes.  The
first was because of his position as Fuhrer der U-Boat and then CINC-Kriegs-
marine.  The second was for his infamous "Laconia" order, I think it was
called, saying that (and this is not a direct quote but off the top of my
head) "the rescuing of surivivng crew members of enemy ships is incompatible
with the total war on the sea.  All efforts must be taken to see that the
crew of enemy ships do not hinder naval operations".  According to him,
he was just saying that U-boats shouldn't surface to rescue survivors for
longer than they had to - only to capture captains and other officers.
But in one incident, the U-boat Captain gunned down all the survivors
after rescuing the captain and the XO.
    Doenitz made the case that this was a misinterpretation of the order
and, no matter what anyone thought of it, the order had no applicability
because of the risks of surfacing for any length of time no matter what
the reason - gunning survivors or not.
    You can decide for yourself whether the "waging aggressive war" should
apply to Doenitz - that's a fairly subjective question.  As for the latter
order, it's hard to say precisely what he meant.  On the one hand, if
he really did give the order to gun survivors he should have been executed.
But if not, then maybe his term was a little harsh.
    In the end, the decision was a compromise.  I seem to recall that
Padfield said that the Tribunal did not issue any specific explanation,
only a "guilty on counts two and three" (I think it was those two).  The
Americans were ready to let him go, the Russians hated him, and the British
weren't overly fond of him, either.  The ten year sentence doesn't make
much sense but was the best punishment that they Allies could agree upon.
    As for the last Fuhrer part, I suspect that it applied more to the
Russians than the West.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:43:22 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: The Last Battlewagon War part 2

        The twin disasters of Pearl Harbor and the sinking of "Force Z" changed
the Allied approach to naval operations virtually overnight.  The question of
how to employ battleships became somewhat moot, as there were hardly any
battleships left to be employed.  The American Navy had to fight a carrier war
because that was all it had left.  The British Navy, which had four old,
non-modernized WWI battleships in the Indian Ocean, basically fled before the
raid of Kido Butai's carriers in the spring of '42 (after two heavy cruisers
and the small carrier HERMES had been lost to Japanese carrier air attacks).
The loss to the Americans from the Pearl debacle, however, was not permanent.
All of the battlewagons sunk at Pearl Harbor except the ARIZONA, which had
broken in half when it exploded, and the OKLAHOMA were eventually put back into
service.  Even the OKLAHOMA was raised, but was not considered worth repairing.
By 1944 all of the "lost" ships from Pearl Harbor were once again ready to
fight the Japanese, and saw considerable service in the last year or so of the
Pacific war.
        This service was nonetheless somewhat different from that envisioned
when the ships were first designed.  Increasingly, the job of the US
battlewagons came to be shore bombardment.  As the US Pacific counteroffensive
gained momentum, the value of these floating heavy artillery emplacements in
"softening up" island defenses before landings came to be increasingly
appreciated.  At Saipan in June 1944 the six battleships of Mitscher's carrier
task force, including the new IOWA-class ships, dropped 2,400 16-inch shells on
the island in two days.  Poor target selection and the relative inexperience of
these ship's crews at shore bombardment did (unfortunately for the Marines who
were about to land) limit the overall effect of this pounding.  After
complaints about inadequate fire preparation on Saipan, Guam was hit by some
28,000 naval shells (almost all of 5-inch or larger calibre) before the
landings began there.  The culmination of this awesome artillery support
potential was the invasion of Okinawa.  There the preliminary naval bombardment
lasted a week, during which 27,000 heavy shells were rained on the shore.  And
the battleships and other warships stayed around to provide further support,
usually directed by forward observer teams up with the combat infantry, once
the land fighting got under way.  On Saipan naval gunfire was particularly
effective against Japanese armor attempting to counterattack.  On Okinawa, in
the heaviest single day's bombardment of the Pacific war, 324 pieces of
artillery ashore were joined by six battleships, six cruisers, and eight
destroyers to plaster the Japanese main defense line with 19,000 shells in less
than 24 hours.  (Ironically, this did not seem to have a major effect on the
deeply dug-in Japanese-- I mentioned in an earlier post some effective antitank
tactics by the Japanese on Okinawa-- in this instance they knocked out 22
Shermans supporting the US Army's 27th Division during one day's assault on
Kakazu ridge).  The weight of explosive the battleship's heavy guns could
deliver was truly impressive.  Nevertheless, the tangible results of these
heavy bombardments were often less than expected.  I mentioned earlier the
complaints of inadequate pre-landing artillery preparation at Saipan.  The same
criticism was leveled at Iwo Jima, and even on Okinawa I remember Samuel Eliot
Morison writing of his surprise to note, after going ashore himself, that the
practical effects of the heavy shelling were considerably less than would have
been expected.  In part the problem was the flat trajectory of the heavy naval
ordinance, especially battleship 16-inch guns.  These were meant to get maximum
range, and the biggest ones required a correction for curvature of the earth
when aiming, but on the sea where they were designed to fight there were no
intervening hills or mountains.  At Iwo and other places it was noted that the
big naval guns had great difficulty hitting caves or positions sited on reverse
slopes-- in fact it was practically impossible for them to do so.  It was the
same principle which allowed Japanese guns and howitzers (especially the
latter) concealed behind hills in Bataan to win an artillery duel with the
heavy naval guns (10- and 12-inch) emplaced on the heavily fortified island of
Corregidor in April-May '42. Thus the heavy firepower of the battleships
attempting to operate in a land-support role they were not originally designed
for had some limitations.  These big ships with their big guns could
nonetheless be devastating when used for directed fire against targets in the
open, and thus were particularly effective against Japanese counterattacks.
        The fact that Allied battleships came to be increasingly used for
invasion fire support does not mean that they completely relinquished their
intended role in fighting the enemy battle line.  There were still a few
notable confrontations between battleships during the Pacific war.  The most
memorable was the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November 1942.  A
Japanese force headed by the battleship KIRISHIMA ran into an American covering
force including the WASHINGTON and the SOUTH DAKOTA.  An incredible slugging
match of big ships toe-to-toe in narrow waters ensued, in which both the
offensive capabilities and incredible durability of the more modern US
battleships was amply demonstrated.  An untimely electrical
problem left the SOUTH DAKOTA dead in the water at the very start of the fight.
This ship attracted most of the Japanese attention.  The KIRISHIMA and its
attendant vessels plastered the American battlewagon with 42 large-calibre
shells, including a number of 14-inch, but did not sink the US ship.  The
preoccupation of the Japanese with the SOUTH DAKOTA allowed the WASHINGTON to
smother its adversary with accurate radar-directed gunfire (this being a night
action-- the American superiority in naval radar is something I've referred to
before-- none of the Japanese ships in this engagement had radar).  The
KIRISHIMA was hit by nine 16-inch and forty 5-inch shells from the WASHINGTON
in the space of only seven minutes, and was sunk.
        The one other classic battleship action of note in the war also ended
badly for the Japanese, when the FUSO and YAMASHIRO tried to force their way
through the Surigao Strait during the naval battle of Leyte Gulf.  In another
night action, both were sunk, the FUSO by two torpedoes from US destroyers, the
YAMASHIRO when the six American battleships of Jesse Ohlendorf's squadron
"crossed the T" and blasted the Japanese ship into junk with their combined
firepower.  The victory was all that much sweeter for the Americans in that
five of Ohlendorf's six battleships were refurbished Pearl Harbor victims.
        The Japanese, as the war developed, were left in just the opposite
position as the Americans.  The loss of their carriers at Midway, and the
atrocious wearing away of their trained aircrews culminating in the "Great
Marianas Turkey Shoot," combined to make them increasingly reliant on their
battleships in planning for the "decisive battle" as the war went on.  Leyte
Gulf was their great attempt to allow their battle line to close with the
Americans through a complicated series of movements, but it failed in the face
of US air power.  The MUSASHI was sunk (albeit after absorbing tremendous
punishment, 19 torpedoes and 17 bombs, before going down).  The Japanese were
never able to close with the enemy in a meaningful way, and during the battle
the NAGATO lost a turret to air attacks, and the YAMATO was struck by two
bombs.  Japanese attrition to their battleship arm had been proceeding
throughout the war, and unlike the Americans (who brought eight new
battleships into service after 1941) they built no more battleships, except for
getting the MUSASHI operational.  The HIEI had been lost in the same week as
the KIRISHIMA, severely damaged by US cruisers in another nocturnal slugfest of
big ships known as the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, and finished off by
American torpedo planes the next day.  The powerful MUTSU was lost to an
explosion, presumed accidental, in June 1943.  The KONGO was sunk by the
American sub SEALION in November 1944.
        As the war progressed, the Japanese needed carriers more than
battleships, and they tried to convert some of their battleships to this task.
The HYUGA and ISE were made into hybrid seaplane carriers, their rear 14-inch
gun turrets removed and replaced by a short flight deck.  In this guise they
could carry up to 23 seaplanes each, but the limitations of both the ships and
the aircraft they employed rendered this stop-gap of little value.  The
Japanese also had, at the start of the war, a third YAMATO-class battleship
already under construction.  This ship, the SHINANO, was instead to be completed
as a super-carrier.  The vessel was however never completely finished.  While
being transferred between ports in Japan it was sunk by the American submarine
ARCHERFISH in November 1944, at least partly due to the overconfidence of the
ship's captain, who, mindful of the amount of damage the MUSASHI had absorbed,
kept sailing onward after the torpedo hits.  But the SHINANO was not as well
protected as its sister ship, its watertight doors and bulkheads had not all
been installed, and its skeleton crew was not as adept at damage-control as the
sailors had been on the pride of Combined Fleet.
        The last great Japanese battleship to be sunk was the YAMATO, making a
vain and suicidal sortie to attempt to aid the defense of Okinawa in April
1945.  It was sunk by swarms of American aircraft without getting anywhere near
the island or the US invasion fleet, although again it took repeated hits to
put the big ship under water.  Of the 3,332 men aboard the YAMATO, only 269
survived.  Admirals Ito and Ariga went down with the ship.  What was left of
the Japanese battle fleet, virtually out of fuel, was crippled in its home
ports by American air raids.  The HARUNA, HYUGA, and ISE at Kure and the NAGATO
at Yokosuka were all struck during July 1945, and none was fully repaired
before the war ended.
        The job of gunnery support for the land forces was not free of its
perils for the American battleships either, particularly after the onset of the
kamikaze suicide air offensive.  Off Okinawa the US battlewagons were regular
targets.  Already during March 1945 the NEVADA, participating in a preliminary
operation, was hit by a suicide plane.  The NEVADA was struck again, this time
by Japanese shore batteries (which hit it with five shells of 6-inch or larger
calibre) on Okinawa in early April.  I've already recounted in my last post how
the WEST VIRGINIA was hit by an Okha rocket-powered suicide plane on April 1st,
the day of the Okinawa landings.   Also in April off Okinawa, a kamikaze struck
the TENNESSEE, the MARYLAND was hit by a suicide plane on one occasion and a
bomb from a conventional air attack on another, and kamikaze or conventional
attacks also scored hits on the NEW YORK and the MISSOURI (the "Mighty Mo,"
later famed as the ship on whose deck the Japanese surrender was signed in
Tokyo bay, was also hit on two occasions-- once by a kamikaze plane that did
little more than burn some paint off the ship's armored side).  The NEW MEXICO
was hit on May 12th as the suicide offensive continued.  The big ships
performed a variety of jobs during the war, but they were seldom out of harm's
way.
        I should also mention the contributions of other Allied battleships in
the Pacific, even thought the US fleets bore the brunt.  At Okinawa, the
American forces were joined by a British fleet under Admiral Fraser, which
included two of the KING GEORGE V-class battleships and five carriers (with a
total of 250 planes).  Even the French eventually got involved.  After France
rejoined the Allies, the battleship RICHELIEU (39,000 tons; eight 15-inch guns
in two quadruple turrets forward of the bridge; 30 knots; 13 inches of armor in
the main belt) was sent to the Pacific in 1945. It participated in a
bombardment of Sabang in April '45, and participated in British operations
against Rangoon in May.  In both these operations the RICHELIEU was joined by
the old British battleship QUEEN ELIZABETH, which also mounted eight 15-inch
guns.  While I'm discussing these British operations, I'd like to note for the
record that the last large-scale amphibious landing of the war was the capture
of Balikpapan by the Australians in July 1945.

        End notes:

        I referred to the lack of a US fighter presence at Pearl Harbor (in
spite of the detection of the Japanese strike force by American radar-- as most
on the list know, the contact was considered to be a flight of B-17's which
were due to fly in that morning).  In fact, six American fighter pilots did get
airborne and engage the Japanese that day.  George Welch and Ken Taylor were
the most successful.  These Army pilots drove to a little-used secondary
airfield and got two P-40's up.  They had no lack of targets, and Welch claimed
four Japanese planes while Taylor shot down three (most of these coming when
they got in among a formation of dive bombers from the second wave).  Welch
wound up the war as an ace with 16 victories.  American pilots claimed a total
of 11 Japanese planes on the day (the Japanese lost 29 aircraft in the Pearl
Harbor operation).  Another US Army pilot who got airborne was Verl Jett-- only
to discover that in his haste he had taken off in a fighter with unloaded guns.
Jett later got to compensate for his frustration somewhat flying a P-39 over
New Guinea, where he gained seven victories in 1942.  Charles MacDonald,
mentioned earlier as the number five US ace in the Pacific (with 27 "kills" in
a P-38-- for a time he commanded the "Satan's Angels" group on New Guinea to
which number two ace Thomas MacGuire also belonged), on his own initiative
organized a flying fighter patrol over Pearl after the raid, in case there was
a further follow-up.  This gained MacDonald more action than he hoped for, as
he was almost shot down by nervous American antiaircraft gunners when he tried
to land for more fuel.

        As a final thought, I want to say that the Japanese defensive tactics
of the late war period which I talked so much about recently were most
effective when the Japanese were able to dig in dominating some crucial
position (as at Biak or on Iwo, where their caves overlooked the airfields
which were the rationale for the landings in the first place).  This made sure
the campaign could not be concluded without digging them out.  It was not always
enough just to find good defensive positions and then dig in.  MacArthur in
particular learned to leave such positions more or less alone if they were not
absolutely vital, and just let the Japanese sit and starve.  This was
essentially what happened on Luzon-- Yamashita's forces sat in their forbidding
central mountains until the war ended.  MacArthur's plan for the invasion of
Japan proper would have done much the same thing-- secure the ports, plains,
and cities, and let the enemy retreat to mountain strongholds to rot if he so
chose.  On Okinawa my guess is that the repeated attacks against Ushijima's
strong bottleneck in the south of the island (after he had surrendered the
northern airfields almost without a fight) were largely due to the need to have
the island secured in order to free up the massive naval support offshore.

        Regards and thanks to any who have borne with me...

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:48:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Is Japan Sorry?

The following article appeared on Page A9 of the Metro edition of the NEW
YORK TIMES on Monday, March 6, 1995.  I have summarized this article and
any typos are mine.

MANY IN JAPAN OPPOSE APOLOGY TO ASIANS FOR WAR

The Japanese Parliment is considering whether Japan should apologize for
invading other Asian countries during WWII and murdering millions of
people.  Many members of the Pariliment are saying that the apology is not
realling needed and support for it is floundering.

Seisuke Okuno, 81, a former Cabinet minister and the leader of 161
lawmakers opposing the resolution said, "These countries had been colonized
and oppressed by whites, so our purpose was to free those nations and
stabilize them.  Incendiary bombs fell on Japan like rain, and atomic bombs
were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  And the Russian Army committed
mind-boggling atrocities against Japanese.  So we think that there were war
crimes more serious than any committed by Japan."

Opponents of the resolution have held a demonstration and obtained 4.5
million signatures on a petition against it.  Masao Horie, chairman of the
Japan Veterans Association, which vigorously opposes the apology resolution
said, "I think World War II was one in which Japan was cornered and forced
to fight for its self-defense."

The U.S. froze Japanese financial assets and imposed an oil embargo on
Japan in the summer of 1941 beacuse of the Japanese occupation of French
Indochina (now Vietnam).  Mr. Horie said that the sanctions meant that
"Japan had no choice but to stand up and fight; otherwise, Japan would have
perished."

Hirotake Yabe, executive director of the Japan Veterans Association said,
"we are trying to change views toward the war but there's still a strong
camp that sees Japan as a villan and believes that Japan conducted a war of
aggression.  They do this with the help of other countries such as China.
So this debate over the resolution is a critical point to determine which
view will prevail."

This bovine excrement is the same thing being offered by criminals in US
criminal courts today.  Wonder if some of our defense lawyers are coaching
the Japanese.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  jem3@donuts0.bellcore.com  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:48:24 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

        Looks like I blew it again on "Ching" Lee.  Don't know where I got that
notion from (that he was Chinese-American)-- its probably a good thing I've
finally come to a conclusion as it seems my quality control has been slipping a
bit in recent installments.  Anyway, accuracy is sure to be served since its
pretty tough to slip anything by this list.
        Thanks for the correction.  I thought it was a pretty tacky nickname if
he was of Chinese descent.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:36:07 -0600
From:    JEFF ROBERTS <JJR7904@TNTECH.EDU>
Subject: Re: 50TH: THREE DAY PARIS PASS

John:

        I'd like to add my name to the rather lenghty list of folks
        who have expressed their appreciation for your sharing your
        "Letters Home" with us.  I enjoy them very much.

        Your most recent post, however.  I'll explain below.


>           Dear Folks, February 23, 1945, Germany

much deleted ....

>
>           Now to our first evening in Paris. Really no more exciting
>           than an evening in any large city. We went by metro
>           (subway) from Palais Royal to Pigalle. Pigalle is one of the
>           less desirable sections of Paris. We went to the Club Moulin
>           Rouge, which is described by some as a clip-joint. And it is.
>
>           A glass of orange juice to use as a chaser cost 80 francs
>           ($1.60). A bottle of champagne 1000 francs ($20). Capt.
>           Miles and Lt. Parker, who is one of the engineer officers that
>           works with our infantry regiment, and I took in the floor
>           show and somehow acquired some very friendly girls.
>
>           No doubt you will wonder at this. Well, you need not, for
>           there is no woman shortage in Paris. One can walk the five
>           squares from the Hotel Louvre to the Opera and will be
>           stopped no less than fifteen times. In bars or clubs they
>           swarm about like flies. Their price is a package of cigarettes,
>           chocolate bars, or, if you insist, money.
>
>           About five came over to the table. We offered them drinks.
>           They accepted. In no time at all they had drunk all our
>           scotch. Even that was all right, but when they started to
>           quarrel among themselves as to which of them would take
>           which of us home with them and two girls came to blows,
>           we decided it was time to leave.
>
more deletions .....

>           Sunday evening we went to the Folies Bergere.
>
>           Monday morning I slept. In the afternoon, I ran into Marlene
>           Dietrich, and I mean ran into her. When going into the
>           officer's clothing store, she was coming out the door I was
>           going into. A violent collision, apologies, and she went on.
>           I didn't. I turned around to stare. They're not worth a
>           million dollars, but nearly!
>
>           In the evening, we made the rounds of the bars. The others
>           met girls to whom they took a fancy. I returned to the hotel
>           about midnight. (Damn it, why did I have to receive such
>           Puritanical rearing?)
>

        This whole passage is rather surprising, in that it is not very
        "Puritanical" at all!  As someone born in 1959, yet taught that
        the 1940's and 1950's were times of restraint in matters of human
        sexuality, this is a remarkably open letter!  (and sent to your
        parents none the less!!)

        Did the high command really not care to let it be known that its
        officers were going to "clip joints" and hanging out with women
        so nasty that they drank all the liquor and then fought over who
        was going to "do the nasty" with who?  I'm really a little sur-
        prised that this made it past the censors.

        I should point out that I'm not at all surprised that this kind
        of stuff went on, indeed it's rather common in all war situations,
        I'm simply surprised about the openness of it all.  I know that
        the Army came under some criticism for overly strict policies in
        World War *One* (and a decline in morale which they allegedly at
        times provoked), perhaps this openness is a result.  Then again,
        maybe I just need to reassess by impression of the 1940's ---
        maybe it really wasn't what Donna Reed & Beaver Cleaver's mom
        imply!  :)

        Comments welcome, and thanks again, John.

        Jeff Roberts
        JJR7904@tntech.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:52:12 -0600
From:    Terrance Lewis <tlewis@PRALINE.NO.NEOSOFT.COM>
Subject: Re: WW I list info?

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, Roger Coon wrote:

> Sorry to bother this list with this query but I am certain some of you
> would know the answer.  Would someone post directly to me the address
> of the WW I list?
> Thanks,
> Brad Coon
> coon@cvax.ipfw.indiana.edu

wwi-l@ukanaix.cc.ukans.edu

"T"

    ~*+**************************************************************+*~
    <     tlewis@praline.no.NeoSoft.com    LEWISHISTORY@delphi.com     >
    <     History Program       Southern University at New Orleans     >
    < author of "Dorothy L. Sayers' Wimsey & Interwar British Culture" >
    ~*+**************************************************************+*~

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 22:05:07 EST
From:    John Davis <jbdavis@NANDO.NET>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 08-MAR-1945

On 08-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the Canadian II Corps
attacks Xanten, which they take. In the U.S. 1st Army sector, the 1st
Division pushes towards the Rhine. The III Corps is engaged in reinforcing
the birdgehead at Remagen. In the 3rd Army sector, the VIII Corps advances
towards the Rhine.

Eastern Front - Fighting continues south of Stettin and Danzig as well as in
Silesia.

Philippines - The XIV Corps begins an eastward drive against the Shimbu
line. In I Corps area, elements of the 33rd Division take Mt. Magabang. In
the 8th Army sector, all organized resistance on Palawan comes to an end.

Iwo Jima - The VAC attacks toward the coast after artillery and naval
gunfire preparation. A few hundred yards are taken in some sectors.

The Homefront
-------------
U.S. Prisoners Back From Luzon - Two hundred seventy-five U.S. officers and
enlisted men have arrived by transport in San Francisco from the Cabanatuan
prison camp in the Philippines. Some hadn't seen America for eight years.

Ohio Floods - The Ohio River has flooded and paralyzed transportation and
scores of war plants in Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky and
Indiana. At least 10 deaths have been reported, with more than half a
billion dollars worth of damage. Hardest hit are Cincinnati, Pittsburgh and
Louisville, Ky.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | jbdavis@nando.net
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 21:18:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <ABIELAK@LUCCPUA.IT.LUC.EDU>
Subject: Re2: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, William Lippert wrote:

     I don't have the book with me, but Padfield in his biography of Doenitz
goes into detail about his trial and sentence.  As a general rule, the
Russians wanted them all to hang.  The British were a little more selective.
The Americans were probably the most forgiving.  In the case of Doenitz,
he was found guilty, I think, of waging aggressive war and war crimes.  The
first was because of his position as Fuhrer der U-Boat and then CINC-Kriegs-
marine.  The second was for his infamous "Laconia" order, I think it was
called, saying that (and this is not a direct quote but off the top of my
head) "the rescuing of surivivng crew members of enemy ships is incompatible
with the total war on the sea.  All efforts must be taken to see that the
crew of enemy ships do not hinder naval operations".  According to him,
he was just saying that U-boats shouldn't surface to rescue survivors for
longer than they had to - only to capture captains and other officers.
But in one incident, the U-boat Captain gunned down all the survivors
after rescuing the captain and the XO.
    Doenitz made the case that this was a misinterpretation of the order
and, no matter what anyone thought of it, the order had no applicability
because of the risks of surfacing for any length of time no matter what
the reason - gunning survivors or not.
    You can decide for yourself whether the "waging aggressive war" should
apply to Doenitz - that's a fairly subjective question.  As for the latter
order, it's hard to say precisely what he meant.  On the one hand, if
he really did give the order to gun survivors he should have been executed.
But if not, then maybe his term was a little harsh.

William,
     I doubt that Doenitz meant the order in the way that some of the
U-Boat commanders may have interpreted it.  It goes completely against
the Doenitz's character (or at least what I have read about Doenitz's
character (-: ).  As for not picking up survivors of sunken ships, I
don't doubt that Doenitz was being realistic and "waging an aggressive
war" which was also what most of Allies were doing as well.  I can't
remember many instances of American subs picking up survivors of sunken
Japanese ships in the Pacific.  In the end, the information which you
have so kindly provided seems to support my opinion that the Allies
railroaded Doenitz.

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 22:30:59 EST
From:    Charles Mattocks <chipm@C.ABAC.PEACHNET.EDU>
Subject: Re: V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era

Hi all!

I can't write as well as many on the list, but I agree with Ben Frank!  That
burns it, it was and always will be V-J Day!  I feel it insults all who fought
and died to defeat Japan, I also feel it insults all servicemen past and present
by down playing their accomplishments and contributions to our country!  Its bad
enough .....................<edited fot PC reasons.;-)>.....................
................................ Anyway, thats another story.

I agree with you, Ben and you have my support and if need be my signature!

Semper Fi!

Chip Mattocks

P.S. - Sounds like Slick Willy though. my .02 worth.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 19:56:24 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <ub076@FREENET.VICTORIA.BC.CA>
Subject: Re: Intelligence on Tirpitz

Jodi, it really isn't necessary to dismiss heroism out of hand. :-)
Trust me. THE GREATEST RAID OF ALL is a first-class factual acount of
the St. Nazaire raid.

Sidney.


--

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:09:49 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <ub076@FREENET.VICTORIA.BC.CA>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

Ben...
        The same clowardly PC claptrap is rearing its head in Britain.
PM John Major has issued directions that the British Armed Forces "must keep
a low profile" during the V-E Day 50th Anniversary Celebrations.

Such a decision baffles common-sense. What else, pray, is the entire *point*
of celebrating V-E Day than that of the fact of military victory? It seems
that politico Major (what an unsuitable name!) is obsessed with "not
upsetting the Germans".
The last time one his Prime Minister predecessors had the same priority,
World War Two erupted son afterwards.

God save veterans, today's young people, and the cause of historical
accuracy from the mincing timidity of politicians and acadame.

Sidney Allinson.

PS: It seems Canada is even more cautious.
There has been not so much as a hint of
even tentative plans for V-E/V-J Celebrations here.


--

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:15:44 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <ub076@FREENET.VICTORIA.BC.CA>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

There is a sad irony that just before the 50th Anniversary of
V-E/V-J Day, the US dollar is plunging to an all-time low as
a result of financial machinations by Germany and Japan.


--

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 22:45:20 -0500
From:    chris garcia <moonie@AMANDA.DORSAI.ORG>
Subject: Re: More on Bong

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, Jeff Dingbaum wrote:

> Mike Yaklich,
>
> Your posts on Bong and others losing wingmen bring up a question.
> What did you do if you lost your wingman?  Did you hookup with a
> twosome or did you look for someone else who had lost theirs also?
>
While we're on the subject of wingman, I will expose my ignorance and ask
a question.  As much as I read about these things, I'm still not clear
what exactly a wingman is for or how he performs his duties.  What does a
wingman do?

In air combat games like Red Baron, if I stick to my flight leader, I
usually end up getting shot down.  The only way it seems to survive is to
go hot dogging off by myself, which in real life would probably get me
shot down too.  What does a good wing man do?

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 6 Mar 1995 to 7 Mar 1995
***********************************************

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Status: O

There are 28 messages totalling 1367 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt (2)
  2. VJ DAY
  3. INF: USN Chronology 03-08-95
  4. VJ Day (4)
  5. NOST: UK Sites
  6. P-40s
  7. Postmortem on Japan posts
  8. Is Japan Sorry?
  9. Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5
 10. Re2: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt
 11. Request
 12. NOST:  UK Sites (2)
 13. WWII German, US & Soviet Veterans (2)
 14. Your Recent Post (was: Intro to List)
 15. endlossung/Germans or Nazis?
 16. VICTORY AT SEA
 17. INF: 50 Years Ago - 09-MAR-1945
 18. INFO. German Professor Abbreviations
 19. more on "Glacier Girl" P-38F
 20. [INF] USAAF 9 MAR 45
 21. Tokyo Raid
 22. NEW MEMBER

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:37:39 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <ub076@FREENET.VICTORIA.BC.CA>
Subject: Re: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

        < ".... Doenitz got a raw deal..." >

!!!

o o
 "
 U

        The Last Nazi, German Fuhrer GrossAdmiral Karl Doenitz, spent the
last decades of his long life assiduously erasing his Nazi past and building
the myth he was just an honest sailor who somehow was thrust into being
Adolph Hitler's chosen successor.
        Rather than make my own comments, I offer this quotation from a
recent book written by a German:
                THE ODYSSEY OF A U-BOAT COMMANDER:RECOLLECTIONS OF ERICH TOPP
                        Praeger, New York, 1992.

        "... Grand Admiral Doenitz's apologists hold that he was an unpolitical
officer, but I am not convinced, and here my criticism sets in.
        His [Doenitz] unconditional commitment to Hitler, his decrees and
speeches that reflect National Socialist ideology and utterances of its chief pokesman spokesman -- all this induces me to reject this innocence assesment ...
        So much we know today from the talks he gave; so much we can deduce
from his presence where Himmler openly discussed his strategy of liquidation against Poles, Russians, and Jews, I conclude that Doenitz knew more than he
admitted".
                                        -- U-Boat Captain Erich Topp.


--

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 19:50:18 -1000
From:    Jim Adams <jimadams@UHUNIX.UHCC.HAWAII.EDU>
Subject: VJ DAY

Mr. President.  No matter what you say or do, historically it was Victory
over Japan (VJ) day.  You can not change history.  The celebration of
this historic event is praising the deeds of the day, not calling for a
renewed conflict.  But when you slap the faces of the veterans that
sacrificed so much in the past by trying to change or ignore their
history, you hurt us all.

I am the sun of a WWII veteran, a Pearl Harbor survivor.  My generation,
which is your generation derives its heritage from our fathers.  Do not
dishonor them and try to change this heritage.  I am proud of where I
have come from and what I have gained from the sacrifices of my father's
generation.  They taught me to stand up and be counted.  What are you doing?

****************************************************************************
Jim Adams                       jimadams@uhunix.uhcc.Hawaii.edu
Cultural Resource Manager
USS Arizona Memorial, NPS       (808) 422-2771  extension 130
1 Arizona Memorial Place
Honolulu, Hawaii 96818
****************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 04:00:12 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <tkeller@LOGICON.COM>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 03-08-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
03/08 Thu. Inter-American Conference, in session at Mexico City
           since 21 February 1945, ends.
            Japanese naval vessel sunk:
             Transport No. 143, by Army aircraft, Formosa area,
              23 d. 35'N., 121 d. 35'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <ljewell@EXPERT.CC.PURDUE.EDU>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
tkeller@logicon.com

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 10:32:29 +0100
From:    Robert Martensson <Robert.Martensson@NEXUS.SE>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

>There is a sad irony that just before the 50th Anniversary of
>V-E/V-J Day, the US dollar is plunging to an all-time low as
>a result of financial machinations by Germany and Japan.
>
Could people please stick to the subject WW2 and not drag current economical
and political affairs into the fray. There is sure enough postings in this
list as it is (my work is suffering :-)).

In all friendliness
        Robert Maartensson
        robert@nexus.se

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 12:31:38 CET
From:    "COL Donnell, Doug" <4atf@PIRMASENS-EMH1.ARMY.MIL>
Subject: Re: NOST: UK Sites

Chris -

Ref your question regarding WWII related sites in and near London. . .

Four came to mind.  First, the Imperial War Museum.  Allow plenty of time.
It's huge.  To call it interesting would be a vast understatement.  Second,
the RAF Museum in Hendon (outskirts of London).  Third, Churchill's bunker
(in downtown London).  Was opened to the public about 3 years back.
Fourth, RAF Duxford, also part of the Imperial War Museum (but located in
Duxford) -- lots of restored airplanes and interesting exhibits.  It's
located on the site of a WWII airfield.  If you're lucky (and I was when
I visited), there will be some flying activity involving WWII vintage
aircraft.

One of the RAF NCOs in my unit is going to see if he can dig up any more
info that might be of help to you.  Let me know if you have any further
questions. Enjoy your trip!

                                Doug

Doug Donnell
Ruppertsweiler, Germany
4atf@pirmasens-emh1.army.mil

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 07:11:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: P-40s

 >> the skies.  The Kittyhawk, for those who don't know, was essentially a
 >> souped-up P-40 with a Spitfire (Rolls-Royce) engine installed, boosting
 >> the speed by 15-20 mph over current P-40 versions.  This was also the
 >> plane flown by Australia's top ace Clive Caldwell for most of his
 >> career in North Africa (he later switched to a Spitfire).


Mike,

I prepared this post months ago when the question came up of what were
the names of P-40s.  Hope this helps.

Jack McKillop


Someone asked last week if the popular name of the Curtiss P-40 was
Kittyhawk, Tomahawk and/or Warhawk?  In checking my sources, I found the
following statement on page 474 of CURTISS AIRCRAFT 1907-1947 by Peter M.
Bowers:

  "Britain operated its direct-purchase and Lend-Lease P-40 variants under
the names of Tomahawk and Kittyhawk.  It did not use the name Warhawk
applied by Curtiss to variants powered with the Merlin engine."

Additional research of this book and others revealed the following facts:

1. Only two models of the P-40 were equipped with the V-1650-1 engine, i.e.,
the Packard-built Rolls Royce Merlin 28 liquid-cooled inline engine.  These
P-40 Warhawks were:

   XP-40F-CU (Model 87-B3): One P-40D re-engined with the V-1650-1 engine
   YP-40F-CU: One P-40F used for engine cooling tests
   P-40F-CU: 1,311 production aircraft of the XP-40F-CU in blocks 1 through
     20
   P-40L-CU (Model 87-B3): Lightweight version of the P-40F; 700 built with
     many being converted to P-40Rs.

The P-40F was easily recognizable because it eliminated the carburetor air
intake on the upper nose.

2. The remaining P-40s had the Allison V-1710 liquid-cooled inline engine
also used on the P-38, P-39 and early Mustangs (the A-36A, P-51 and P-51A).
These no-name aircraft were:

   XP-40-CU (Model 75P): One P-36A re-engined with the V-1710-19 engine.
   P-40-CU (Model 81): 199 production XP-40s
   P-40A: One modified P-40
   P-40B (Model H81-B): 131 improved P-40s
   P-40C (Model H81-B): 193 improved P-40Bs
   P-40D (Model H87-A2): 23 improved P-40s with many changes
   P-40E (Model 87-B2): 820 improved P-40Ds
   TP-40E: Two P-40Es with two-seat cockpit
   XP-40G (Model 81-AG): One P-40 with Tomahawk IIA wings
   P-40G: 43 P-40s refitted with Tomahawk IIA wings (16 to USSR)
   P-40H: Designation not used
   P-40J: Project cancelled May 42
   XP-40K: One modified P-40K
   P-40K: 1300 improved P-40Es
   TP-40K: One P-40K to two-seat trainer
   P-40M: 600 improved P-40K-20-CUs
   P-40N (Models 87V and 87W): 5,210 improved P-40Ms
   TP-40N: 30 P-40Ns converted to two-seat trainers
   P-40P: Project cancelled; built as P-40Ns
   XP-40Q (Model 87X): Three modified P-40Ks
   P-40R: 300 P-40Fs and Ls re-engined with Allison V-1710 engine

Note that Curtiss applied two model numbers to the P-40s, Model 81 to the
P-40 through P-40C and Model 87 to the P-40D through P-40R.  I checked three
references in preparing this and found contradictory information about the
Curtiss model numbers however, since the Bowers book deals exclusively with
Curtiss aircraft, I ASSUMED that his book was correct.

3. The Brits identified their Model 81s as Tomahawks and their Model 87s as
Kittyhawks.  The other Commonwealth air forces, i.e., Australian, Canadian,
New Zealand and South African Air Forces, used the Brit designation.  The
Soviet Union, Turkey, Egypt and the Free French also received Brit aircraft
but I do not know what they called them.  The Brit designations were:

   Tomahawk Mk I (Model H81-A): 140 acft equivalent to P-40; 3 to RCAF.
   Tomahawk Mk II: Improved Tomahawks delivered in Oct and Nov 40
   Tomahawk Mk IIA (Model H81-A2): 110 acft equivalent to P-40B; 23 to USSR
     and 1 to RCAF
   Tomahawk Mk IIB (Model H81-A2 and -A3): 930 in four lots; generally
     equivalent to P-40C.  Used by RAF and SAAF in North Africa.  100 H81-A3s
     to China for use by AVG; 23 to USSR; and some to Turkey and Egypt.
   Kittyhawk Mk I (Model A87-A2): 560 equivalent to P-40D.  72 to RCAF and
     17 to Turkey.
   Kittyhawk Mk IA (Model H87-A3 and -A4): 1500 equivalent to P-40E.  Many
     to RAAF, RCAF and RNZAF.
   Kittyhawk Mk II (Model H87-B3): Brit records show 330 P-40Fs and P-40Ls
     as Mk IIs; later records list first 230 as Mk IIs.  81 to USAAF; 7 to
     Free French; one to RNZAF.
   Kittyhawk Mk III: Of 616 Mk IIIs, first 192 were P-40Ks, the next 160
     were P-40Ls and final 264 were P-40Ms.  Last 170 to USSR; 210 to RAAF;
     15 to RCAF; 58 to RNZAF.
   Kittyhawk Mk IV (Models H87V and H87W): 586 P-40Ns with 130 going to
     USSR.  Many to RAAF, RCAF and RNZAF.

Accordingly, unless I can confirm the model, I will no longer designate the
P-40 as a Warhawk.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  jem3@donuts0.bellcore.com  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 09:19:18 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Postmortem on Japan posts

        What started out a month ago as transcribing a short bit of Toland's
"Rising Sun" in response to a question to the list from John Ausland somehow
took on a life of its own, and became a sweeping if somewhat disjointed
panorama of the war in the Pacific.  Looking back on all I've regurgitated to
the list on this subject, I wanted to thank anyone who hung in there with me
and read all or part of my many (largely unsolicited) posts on this topic.  For
those who felt I was just cluttering up the e-mail ether with this drivel, my
apologies, but rest assured that it will probably be some time before I recover
enough to launch into so monstrous a project again.  I will try to be better at
chopping things into more digestible fragments if I feel tempted to spew out
something similar in the future.
        Four things I wish I had said, or didn't say:

        1. In proof-reading some paper copies of previous posts after the
fact, it strikes me that in my discussion of "gekokujo" I didn't make it clear
enough that the system by which the Army came to have the power to bring down
governments was a direct result of changes instituted immediately after the
2/26 Incident of 1936.  That is, the service regulations were changed to state
that the Army (War) and Navy Ministers had to be active officers of the service
in question.  This was a direct response to the violent dissent within the
military.  I mentioned the new system and how it worked, but perhaps didn't
make the connection specifically enough.
        2. I also wish I had mentioned, in regards to potential invasion of
Japan, that the option of blockade was already in place, whether formally
declared or no.  Looking through some things I saved from other peoples' posts
to the list, I was struck by the discussion on the B-29 air mining campaign of
the Japanese home waters that ran here a couple months back.  I see that in the
spring and summer of 1945 alone over 200 Japanese ships were sunk by mines
dropped by B-29's-- not to mention mines deployed by submarines, etc, or the
toll subs were taking in torpedo attacks, or the destruction of shipping by air
raids on harbors, etc.  Add to this a bad harvest in 1945 in Japan, and the
more I think about it, the more I believe that, considerations of motivation
aside, ending the war in August 1945 probably spared the Japanese people an
even greater and more prolonged martyrdom.
        3. I mentioned the name of Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi a few times
without saying much about this officer, and that strikes me as an omission.
Terauchi, after the initial successes of the southern offensive which was
primarily under his control, was associated with more ill than good in the
Japanese war effort.  He criticized both Homma in the Phillipines and Imamura
in Indonesia for being too easy on the local populations.  He was in charge of
building the Japanese Burma railroad and road, where roughly a third of the
50,000 prisoners of war used essentially as slave labor died.  And he was the
man who constantly pressured Yamashita to defend Leyte, and send reinforcements
there, when Yamashita was trying to husband his resources for the fight on
Luzon.  Terauchi suffered a severe stroke at the end of the war, just before the
signing of the Japanese surrender.
        4.  I wanted to say something on the topic of factual error.  This
comes up because in the last week I've caught myself, or been caught by others
on the list, in three of these, and frankly, I find that a little embarrassing.
In fact, a lot embarrassing.  The one I particularly wish I could have back was
my passing reference to Admiral Willis "Ching" Lee as being of Chinese-American
descent.  I have no idea why that pseudo-fact stuck in my mind, and since I
don't have time to go look it up (none of my handy sources make reference to
it) I'll take Jim O'Neil's word for it he wasn't.  At any rate, since much of
this has been downloaded to the terminal in more or less stream of
consciousness fashion, I've done a lot of my own back-checking of facts and
figures that I've thrown out.  Most of the time the things that I wasn't 100%
sure about turned out to have been right after further checking.  A few times
they weren't, and I've posted corrections to the list.  The ones that really
bother me are the items like the "Ching" Lee reference and referring to the
Churchill-Roosevelt agreement on resources as 90-10% instead of 70-30-- i.e.,
ones where I've not only been wrong, but DIDN'T catch myself or question it.
Those are the ones that make me feel like I'm slipping.  Nonetheless, I often
use this list as a resource (and it was definitely one of my sources for
portions of these posts), so I don't mind having you all proofread me either.
Much as it bothers me to be wrong, I'd rather be told I'm wrong and learn
something than continue making the same mistake in the future.  Thanks again to
everyone who expressed positive comments or otherwise showed interest (and
thanks as well to those who kept me honest on the factual content).

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 10:21:02 EST
From:    Mike Oaks <moaks@KSCMAIL.KENNESAW.EDU>
Subject: Re: Is Japan Sorry?

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:48:00 EST,
mc killop  <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM> wrote:

>The following article appeared on Page A9 of the Metro edition of the NEW
>YORK TIMES on Monday, March 6, 1995.  I have summarized this article and
>any typos are mine.
>
>MANY IN JAPAN OPPOSE APOLOGY TO ASIANS FOR WAR
>
>The Japanese Parliment is considering whether Japan should apologize for
>invading other Asian countries during WWII and murdering millions of
>people.  Many members of the Pariliment are saying that the apology is not
>realling needed and support for it is floundering.
>
SNIP SNIP SNIP
  Jack,
    It looks like they're trying to re-write history again!!!

/====================================================================\
|    Michael A. Oaks                                                 |
|    Systems Analyst                  Music: A means to mark times   |
|    moaks@kscmail.kennesaw.edu              stepping stones through |
|    Kennesaw, Georgia 30144                 your calendar of life.  |
|    Tel: (404)423-6049  Fax (404)423-6541          ~ ~ ~ ~      MAO |
|    VWAR-L #146 - - (Sgt. USAF = / AFCS / AFSS / AFDC)              |
|    Break, Break...Kadena, Kadena, Clark, Clark, Request you echo...|
|    (Some things you never forget...even after 25 years...)         |
\====================================================================/

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 10:15:40 -0500
From:    James Ray Watkins <dawgonpete@MAIL.UTEXAS.EDU>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

>Ray,
>
>When I read Ben Frank's post the first thing I did was mail in to the
>President, but I do see your point on this.  The memories of war are
>nasty, but they should be otherwise we would think that war was a good
>things (unintentionalized bastardization of quote), but the Japanese gov.
>is getting really weird ideas on what happened in WWII, the last time
>a nation this big a revision of history was in Germany circa 1930 when
>people actually believed that their army had not been defeated in 1920.
>When people start changing history, or revising it, the lessons that history
>taught are changed.

Wasn't one of the lessons of WWI that 'punishing' a country (Germany) led
only to more problems, not less? I say that because, while I think it is
interesting to speculate on what the Japanese 'think,' we are, after all,
Americans and I am even more interested in what 'we' have or have not
learned from history. Here, WWII. Reading in this list often makes me wonder
if the futility of agression is one of things that is being 'revised' out of
our historical memory. Seems all too often that those who want the war
remembered are not willing to do the work to actually come up with a way to
do this that doesn't just seem to want to 'punish' the Japanese. Into that
vacumm rush the PR people whose job it is to keep their bosses in office. PC
is, after all, just a washed out version of current academic thinking,
history become sound bites. I think this is exactly relevant to this list
because here there are people who could keep an eye on all the factual
details such a project would have to take into account.

  Many Japanese are actually beginning to think that
>they were 'freeing' the rest of East Asia (but don't ask the other
>East Asians that question), which is wrong.  On the other hand, what
>if Japan wants to tie her economy in to this?  We can play hardball too,
>with the rest of east asia with us against Japan, and if we 'allow'
>Iran to cut off the gulf to Japanese shipping, well...  My point is
>I don't think the Japanese government would tie this in to the economy,
>but they want to see how far they can push us to 'revise' our history,
>and from their point of view everything they have done so far, from
>the Abomb-stamp, to the Enola Gay, to the VJday they have won every,
>battle, so why not continue pushing?

This will get me in trouble for sure, but I think that all history, official
or not, is written out of just these kinds of struggles. We- either
historians or not, Japanese or not, governments or not- all have our agendas
that we- from a position of power or not- work out in a complicated series
of negotiations. Even if we imagine some 'pure' intellectual work in which
we arrive at consensus and 'truth' there is still the messy process of
getting that 'truth' into the schools and so on. That 'dirty' and
'political' process includes this list, and it includes what you or I might
consider some pretty wako ideas. It all goes into the mix. In this sense-
and this sense specifically- the Japanese are only doing what we all do:
pushing their own agendas as far as they can. I am still interested in
knowing how far we should push back, and to what end.

Do we, say, keep VJ day as it is, but try to get the Japanese to understand?
We don't, for example, call the Fourth of July, Victory over England. In
this light I like the idea of an War's end celebration, done with the
Japanese and the Germans. Surely the one thing we can all try to agree on is
that the 'end' of the war is worth remembering. And given that we are trying
to work out problems (not impose our ideas on the other party, never a good
tactic in a conversation) we have to start with the common ground. In any
case, I think I would rather push for that kind of cooperation (given that
some elements in Japan and Germany and the US would not like that) rather
than for almost anything else which would encourage the idea that making
someone into 'the ultimate enemy' is a good idea. Thats not history, its a
politcal cartoon. If there are consequnces to be paid in this, then I want
the 'end' to be worth the investment.

In order to be able to honestly say that the vets did something worthwhile,
I think we have to stick to the principles that they died for. The stakes
for us are much lower, after all. One of those principles is that
'agression' is no way to conduct affairs between people. And the way not to
be agressive, here, is to use all this knowledge to do more than complain,
but to try to work out concrete solutions based on mutual respect. That's
always more difficult than just pushing people around. I'd love to see the
Vets groups in all three countries try to come up with a mutual solution:
that simple effort, to me, would embody best the principles that I like to
think made 'our' victory so important to remember. No matter what the PR
folk did or said, then, we would be drawing the line, not between
Japan/Germany/Italy and Europe/America, etc. but between those who chose
cooperation and understanding and those who chose violence and force. I want
my kids to be taught that preventing war is a job that has to be done
everywhere, not just 'out there' and I want them to be able to recognize
agression and resist it, in whatever guise it takes.

 Maybe they can even get us to
>change our flag from the flag that went up over so many criminally
>murdered Japanese to a more benign format? (facetious)
>
>John E. Kollar

Would you give up a 'symbol' for a larger cause?


Ray Watkins
A.I., Department of Rhetoric and Composition
English, University of Texas at Austin

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 11:58:48 -0500
From:    "Charles R. Hensel" <henchar@LYCO.LYCOMING.EDU>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

On Wed, 8 Mar 1995, Robert Martensson wrote:

> >There is a sad irony that just before the 50th Anniversary of
> >V-E/V-J Day, the US dollar is plunging to an all-time low as
> >a result of financial machinations by Germany and Japan.
> >
> Could people please stick to the subject WW2 and not drag current economical
> and political affairs into the fray. There is sure enough postings in this
> list as it is (my work is suffering :-)).
>
> In all friendliness
>         Robert Maartensson
>         robert@nexus.se
>
Although the current state of the US dollar has nothing to do directly
with WWII, it is important to kee4p current affairs in context with the
past.  In this day and age, discussion of that sort is the only way many
people are exposed to our history.  God knows the schools aren't helping.

--Chuck Hensel
  Lycoming College Class of '98

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 12:09:34 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

        Emanuel, thanks for the elaboration on the admittedly confusing naming
and numbering of the Curtiss Hawk series aircraft.  I do believe, however, that
the aircraft I was referring to, both in North Africa and in New Guinea, were
of the later series with the Rolls-Royce Merlins.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 12:39:33 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Re: Re2: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

        Let's not forget that the Laconia Order resulted from an incident where
Axis submarines in an attempt to rescue survivors from a sunken Allied ship
were repeatedly attacked by Allied aircraft.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 12:38:51 -0500
From:    Barone <m1b@SSD.RAY.COM>
Subject: Re: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

William Lippert <WL1958A@AMERICAN.EDU> writes:
> ... In the case of Doenitz,
> he was found guilty, I think, of waging aggressive war and war crimes.  The
> first was because of his position as Fuhrer der U-Boat and then CINC-Kriegs-
> marine.  The second was for his infamous "Laconia" order, I think it was
> called, saying that (and this is not a direct quote but off the top of my
> head) "the rescuing of surivivng crew members of enemy ships is incompatible
> with the total war on the sea.  All efforts must be taken to see that the
> crew of enemy ships do not hinder naval operations".

        Here is some info that I have on the incident that prompted the
"Laconia Order".

        On Spetember 12, 1942, the U-156 sunk the liner "Laconia" near
Ascension Island.  Kapitan-Leutnant Hartenstein surfaced his submarine
to begin rescuing the ship's passengers, mostly Italian prisoners-of-war
and the families of servicemen, and sent a radio message alerting the
Allies to the situation.  Two other U-boats, and an Italian submarine,
changed course to assist, and Admiral Doenitz requested help from Vichy
ships in Dakar.

        The U. S. 1st Composite Squadron on Ascension Island received
the message from the U-156 but claimed that the message was garbled and
that it was not informed that the Germans were involved it rescuing the
survivors.  The squadron was asked to provide an air-escort for the
British lifeboats.  Meanwhile, on September 16, an American B-24 Liberator
of the USAAF 343rd BS was flying from Ascension to Africa and spotted
the British boats with the surfaced U-156 displaying Red Cross flags.
The pilot, Lt. Harden, asked for instructions from the commander of
the 1st CS, Captain Richardson, and was ordered to attack.

        On September 17, following this attack on the U-156, which was
still engaged in rescue operations, Admiral Doenitz issued his "Laconia
Order," forbidding U-boats to attempt to save the passengers and crews
of their targets in order to protect the submarines.
--
Joe Barone
m1b@ssd.ray.com
It's a Mark 6!  And we got her by the ass!

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 14:41:14 -0500
From:    THOMPSON@LVC.EDU
Subject: Request

Can anyone tell me if the library at the US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks
PA can be accessed electronically?

-- Warren Thompson

thompson@lvc.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 12:05:37 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <ub076@FREENET.VICTORIA.BC.CA>
Subject: Re: NOST:  UK Sites

Chris Albee...
        AS well as the Imperial War Museum and RAF Duxford, there are
several other WW2-related places near London.

        Among them:

        Kent Battle Of Britain Museum
        Hawkinge, Nr Folkstone, Kent.

        Airborne Forces Museum
        (Parachute Regt & Glider Pilots Reg)
        Browning Barracks, Aldershot, Hants.

        Aldershot Military Museum
        ('Home Of The British Army")
        Aldershot, Hants.

        Royal Air Force Museum
        Hendon
        (on the "Tube"
        (on the Lundon Underground "Tube", Northern Line to Colindale Stn)

        D-Day Museum
        Portsmouth.

Lots of others, but I guess you'll already have a longer list than you need.

Bon Voyage -- Sidney.


--

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 17:16:35 +0500
From:    Claude Lamazouere <clamazou@MONTREAL.SRC.CA>
Subject: WWII German, US & Soviet Veterans

Hi,

I'm presently working on VE-day.  Are you in touch with German or Soviet
veterans involved in the last battles in Europe (Berlin particulary)?
On the other hand do you know any US vet of the 69th infantry division who
were the first Amrican soldiers to meet the Soviets in Torgau on April, 26th
1945?

I want to make interviews with such persons for a radio documentary to be
broadcast next month on the Canadian national radio.

Any other suggestion is welcome..

Thank you for your help
Claude Lamazouere, Societe Radio-Canada
clamazou@montreal.src.ca
tel: (514) 597-5773
fax: (514) 597-5728

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 17:37:55 -0400
From:    John Baxter Jones <JONESJB@CONRAD.APPSTATE.EDU>
Subject: Re: Your Recent Post (was: Intro to List)

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, George Bauer wrote:

> I hope the misspellings in your recent post are typographical errors
> rather than actual misspellings

* JBJ responds-
Mr. Bauer:
     I rarely respond to such inane baiting--but just to give some
color to your (obviously) otherwise sad existence--I will try to
answer your concerns. I aplogize to the other list members in advance.
     #1- If you are going to be this nitpicking and petty-minded
(if I may be allowed to stray from the <your> straight-and-narrow
<mindedness>), please be specific as to my mistakes so that we all can
determine whether *your* spelling ability is as intact as your
megalomaniacal (sp?) ego;
     #2- Since I, like most others on this list, have a life which
includes other meaningful, important activities over and above this list,
I must confess to actually posting with "spelin' errs" from time to time
due to a lack of time to adequately correct same (realizing, of course,
that this is a cardinal sin that I, and other perpetrators <sp?> on this
list, will surely burn in Hell for);
     #3- Your concern for my academic soul, while appreciated, begs the
question: Is this a WWII (content oriented) list, or is it a SPELL-L
(spelling bee list)?


-Mr. George Bauer voices further concerns:
>--particularly since you claim to be a high school social science teacher.

* JBJ responds-
     What is this "claim" bullshit?  Do you suggest that I may have spent
half my life in the classroom pretending to be a teacher?  Wait until the
authorities at the local Board (finally) catch on to this!  There will
certainly be hell to pay! {Does a misspelled word <gasp!> mean that I
will have to give back my Master's Degree(s) and 20+ years of certification?}


-Mr. George Bauer voices even greater concerns:
> Or should I assume that teachers can't > spell?

* JBJ responds-
     Didn't your mother (or your college professors <"assuming", of
course, that you have a degree>) ever tell you what happens when you
*assume* something?  It makes an *ass* out of *u* and *me*! (I aplogize to
the other 99.44% of this list who have heard this eons ago.)


-Mr. George Bauer voices the ultimate concern:
> Oh yes, there was also a grammatical error.
> "Another misspelling?"

* JBJ responds-
     (gasp! to the 3rd power) May I respectfully suggest that Mr. Bauer
(or someone with *real* expertise) take a close look at his *own* post as
to grammatical errors (Re <being somewhat more specific than he>: "Or
should I assume that teachers can't spell?" *and* ""Another
misspelling?"" <Are these *really* independent sentences?>)
     Furthermore (said with chin jutting indignantly out), since when has
it been appropriate for one (even *one* as obvioulsy learned as Mr. <Dr.?>
Bauer) to put in quotes ("Another misspelling?") his own *obviously*
overblown observations?  Does this denote a higher level of expertise?
Does this denote how one feels about himself?  Do you have trouble
getting your giant ego through doorways?
     Mr. Bauer, I would be remiss if I did not touch upon one last point.
Was there something in particular in my introductory post that set you
off?  Is it because I am from the backwoods of North Carolina?  Could
it be the fact that I am a Vietnam vet who is proud of his service?
Could I be somewhat more facetious (sp?)?
     Since there are, obviously, many others on this list who are
educators..who are more concerned with content than spelling..who don't
have the time necessary to correct every little mistake in their
contributions to the combined knowledge of the list members, then, Sir, it
would seemingly follow that you would be kept busy in your obvious efforts
to police the writings herein.  Is this the case, Sir?!  If not, then,
Sir, why trash my well-meaning, sincere self-introduction to this
assembled membership--I came here to learn HISTORY!.  Was I not humble
enough? Did I not bow and scrape correctly?
     Jeez..I feel almost as stupid as you seem by my giving enough
credence to your self-aggrandizement (sp?) to even respond at all....


Lay chilly...get a real life,


John Baxter Jones
dau tieng '67--'68


* One last observation: It doesn't take a genius to be a mean-spirited
person.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 16:38:44 -0600
From:    Kelvin Brent Luther <umluther@CC.UMANITOBA.CA>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, Alex Bielakowski wrote:

> On Wed, 1 Mar 1995, Kelvin Luther wrote:
>
>         Finally, the only country not to contribute to the holocaust was
> Bulgaria.  They refused to export their Jewish population to Poland, and
> were the only European country in the German domain to see a war time
> increase in their Jewish population.  It was possible for people to
> resist collaborating with the holocaust and your right, France deserves
> to be exposed for their unparalleled amount of collaboration.
>
> Kelvin,
>      While the Bulgarians may not have actively contributed to the
> Holocaust, the fact that they were an Axis power prevents them from
> claiming that they had no part in the Holocaust.  By giving military
> aid to the Germans they allowed the Germans to divert men and material
> to the Concentration Camps.  Someone else suggested that the Poles
> might have been both anti-German and anti-Semitic.  Using that analogy
> the Bulgarians might be described as pro-German and pro-Jewish.
>
> Alex Bielakowski
>
        I was not commenting on their contribution to the Axis cause but
answering the idea that the Poles were somehow being singled out for
their contribution to the holocaust.  As for giving military aid I would
be interested in knowing what kind of contribution Bulgaria made to the
war effort if anyone out there knows of a source please let me know.  I
feel safe in saying that their contribution to the war effort is a
roundabout way of assigning guilt for the holocaust (as mentioned above
France's contribution was large both militarily as well as direct
contributions to the holocaust).  Militarily many more German soldiers
were free to man camps and round up Jews because they didn't have to
occupy collaborationist Vichy France to the same extent they would occupy
any other conquered area.  I was also trying to point out that the simple
fact that many other people died in the camps besides Jews does not mean
the rest of the people from their group didn't contribute.  If thousands
of Catholics died it doesn't mean Catholics didn't contribute to the
roundups.  They were not interned because they were Catholics but because
they either had a Jewish relative, inlaw, or had tried to protect people
from the camps.  Much has also been written about how the Germans
considered just about everything and everyone they disagreed with to be
Jewish and degenerate.  Rest assured that anyone in the camps had somehow
been placed in this category.
        I also want to come to Bulgaria's defense a little.  They were
surrounded by hostile countries and made the decision to ally with the
obvious holder of power in their region against the Russians.  Because of
this they managed to maintain some semblance of autonomy and saved their
Jewish population (I am not implying that saving the Jews was their
motivation only the outcome of their retaining power).  The Danes managed
to save their Jewish population because they too had some autonomy after
the Germans invaded (I believe they then lost their control over their
gov't).  Finally the Finns also managed to deny the Germans the right to
export their Jewish population to the camps.  Again, a country forced to
ally itself to the Germans because of the Russians.  We can sit back and
say the Russians were our allies but this was only out of convenience to
them.  They cooperated with Hitler and later Japan in their aggressive
expansionist policies.  Would Hitler have invaded Poland when he did if
Russia hadn't colluded with him to divide it?  I for one resent Russia's
actions far more than Finland's or Bulgaria's regardless of their later
being thrown into the allied arena by a German invasion.
                                Kelvin Luther

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 17:01:40 -0600
From:    Terrence Lindell <LINDELL@WARTBURG.EDU>
Subject: Re: NOST:  UK Sites

Chris,

Regarding your question about sites to visit in the London area, I would
encourage you to look for a copy of the following book:

        Bookman, John T. and Powers, Stephen T.  _The March to Victory:
                A Guide to World War II Battles and Battlefields
                from London to the Rhine_.  Revised ed.
                Niwat, CO:  University Press of Colorado, 1994.

It lists museums and historic sites, giving hours and stating whether
or not there is an admission fee (but not how much).

Enjoy the visit!

Terry Lindell
Department of History
Wartburg College
Waverly, Iowa  50677
lindell@wartburg.edu

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 19:04:23 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <ben.frank@HIS.COM>
Subject: VICTORY AT SEA

The producer of the show, Henry Solomon, I believe his name is, was himself a
naval officer and worked with Samuel Eliot Morison in collecting naval history
and preparing Morison's 15-volume history of the Navy in WWII. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 19:00:34 EST
From:    John Davis <jbdavis@NANDO.NET>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 09-MAR-1945

On 09-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the Canadian 4th Division
takes Veen. In the U.S. 1st Army sector, the 1st Division captures Bonne.
The 9th Division takes over control of the bridgehead at Remagen, while the
Germans continue to try to destroy the bridge by bombing. In the 3rd Army
sector, the VII Corps reaches the Rhine.

Philippines - The XIV Corps continues eastward attacks. In the 8th Army
sector, the naval bombardment of the Zamboanga area in Mindanao is begun in
preparation for attack.

Iwo Jima - The VAC continues efforts to clear the rest of Iwo. The 3rd
Marine Division breaks through to the coast in the corps center, splitting
the Japanese forces remaining on the island. The division also continues
the reduction of bypassed pockets in the rear. The 4th and 5th Marine
Divisions are unable to advance any appreciable amount on the flanks.

Japan - Powerfull fire raids on Japanese cities occur on the nights of the
9th and 10th. This marks a radical change in prvious tactics from precision
bombing against industrial targets to a concentration on wearing down the
Japanese will to resist in preparation for an invasion of Japan.

The Homefront
-------------
Troops To Be Redeployed - A War Department source reports that after V-E
day a "big load" of soldiers will return to the U.S. for redeployment to
the Orient, while others will be shipped there directly.

Mass Army Furlough - Wearing scores of Purple Hearts and other decorations,
5,380 veterans of battles in Italy arrive at Camp Kilmer, N.J. on rotation
furlough.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | jbdavis@nando.net
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 16:52:10 -0800
From:    Steve New <newst@IX.NETCOM.COM>
Subject: Re: INFO. German Professor Abbreviations

You wrote:

>
>People,
>Here is another one for you. I am in the midst of reading a book on the
V-1
>and V-2 projects. There keep popping up abbreviations in front of
scientists
>names that I have no idea what they mean. Help! What does Dipl. Ing.
and Dr.
>Ing. mean when used in front of a persons name?
>Thanks,
>Matthew Burchette
>
>
Dipl. Ing.  An engineer with a diploma.

Dr. Ing.  An engineer with a doctorate.


--

Steve L. New
newst@ix.netcom.com
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 16:59:15 -0800
From:    Steve New <newst@IX.NETCOM.COM>
Subject: Re: more on "Glacier Girl" P-38F

You wrote:

>
>Dennis E. Sparks <sparks@ALPHA.CAER.UKY.EDU> writes:
>> After mailing off photographs of the aircraft to several people on
the
>> list, I still have 30 or 40 shots left over.  If anyone else is
interested,
>> drop me a note, and I'll be glad to send you a few.
>
>        Can anyone scan these photos in and be made available via ftp?
>--
>Joe Barone
>m1b@ssd.ray.com
>What's he want a yacht for?  There ain't no money in yachts...
>
>

Joe,

I'll be glad to scan them (as soon as I convince Dennis to send me a
set).  As for FTP, I'm pretty sure that BYRD would accept them, but I'd
have to check with them first.

I'm willing to give it a try.

--

Steve L. New
newst@ix.netcom.com
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 15:49:23 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <ub076@FREENET.VICTORIA.BC.CA>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

Chuck Hensel...

        "... God knows the schools aren't helping [study of history] ..."

Precisely.


--

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 20:51:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 9 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
FRIDAY, 9 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  L-5, Stinson Sentinel
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): 3 B-24s fly a negative shipping search.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 32 B-24s, escorted by 5
P-51s, bomb railroad yards at Sinsiang; 15 B-25s and 2 P-40s knock out 2
bridges at Hwaiyuanchen and E of Jungtse, and hit railroad targets and other
targets of opportunity at Yehhsien, Chowkiakow, Hsuchang, and E of Junan; 50+
fighter-bombers on armed reconnaissance attack railroad targets, river and
road traffic, bridges, gun positions, and troops at several locations,
particularly around Kweiyi, Hengyang, Nanking, and Sinyang.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 16 P-47s support elements
of the Chinese 50th Division near Mansam; 80+ fighter-bombers operating over
and behind enemy lines attack trucks, horses and carts, troops, and artillery
pieces. 568 air supply sorties are flown to forward areas.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 2 missions are flown.
  Mission 875: 1,045 bombers and 443 fighters are dispatched to hit
marshalling yards and industrial plants in Germany; they claim 0-0-2
Luftwaffe aircraft; 7 bombers are lost:
  1. 423 B-17s are sent to hit the Ost (150) and Main (222) marshalling yards
and a casting plant (38) at Frankfurt visually and using Micro H, H2X radar
and smoke markers; 6 B-17s also fly a screening mission; 3 B-17s are lost, 1
damaged beyond repair and 182 damaged; 7 airmen are WIA and 28 MIA. Escorting
are 94 of 101 P-51s; they claim 0-0-1 aircraft in the air.
  2. 318 of 336 B-17s attack the marshalling yard and a large tank factory at
Kassel visually; 6 other B-17s fly a screening mission; 3 B-17s are lost, 2
damaged beyond repair and 188 damaged; 4 airmen are WIA and 28 MIA. The
escort is 97 of 99 P-51s; 1 is damaged beyond repair.
  3. 282 B-24s are sent to bomb marshalling yards at Munster (97), Rheine
(93) and Osnabruck (87) using Gee-H and H2X; 1 B-24 is lost and 52 damaged; 1
airman is WIA and 12 MIA. 47 of 51 P-51s escort.
  4. 4 B-17s fly a scouting mission.
  5. 141 P-47s and P-51s fly a freelance sweep in support of the bombers; 1
P-51 is damaged beyond repair.
  6. 27 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  7. 15 P-51s escort 12 F-5s and 3 Spitfires on a photo reconnaissance mission
over Germany; they claim 0-0-1 aircraft in the air.
  Mission 876: 11 B-24s drop leaflets in the Netherlands, France and Germany
during the night; and 2 of 9 B-24s fly CARPETBAGGER missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 600+ A-20s, A-26s and
B-26s hit 6 marshalling yards, storage and vehicle depots, ammunition-filling
plants, and 12 targets of opportunity as part of the interdiction campaign;
fighters fly armed reconnaissance, hit special targets, cover the Remagen
bridgehead and support the US 9th Infantry and 9th Armored Divisions
committed there, support the 4th Armored Division at the Mosel River bridge
at Treis, the XX Corps along the Mosel and Saar Rivers, and the XVI Corps
along the Rhine River near Wesel. The 125th Liaison Squadron, IX Fighter
Command [attached to the XXIX Tactical Air Command (Provisional)], moves from
Maastricht, the Netherlands to Monchen-Gladbach, Germany with L-5s; and the
153d Liaison Squadron, IX Tactical Air Command (attached to Twelfth Army
Group), moves from Spa, Belgium to Duren, Germany with L-5s.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): 372 B-17s and B-24s, with
fighter escorts, bomb marshalling yards at Graz (2 yards), Klagenfurt, Sankt
Stefan, and Sankt Paul, Austria, and Ljubljana, Yugoslavia; river bridges at
Sankt Paul are also bombed; 27 P-38s bomb the Knittelfeld, Austria
marshalling yard and 13 others strafe the Graz, Austria-Maribor, Yugoslavia
railroad lines. Routine supply, reconnaissance, and escort missions continue.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, B-25s hit bridges at San
Ambrogio di Valpolicella, San Michele all'Adige, Bozzolo, Santa Margherita
d'Adige, Ora, and Montebello, the marshalling yard at Ora, and the bridge
approach at Ala; fighters and fighter-bombers attack bridges, railroads,
vehicles, trains, supply dumps, parked airplanes, buildings, and other
targets over wide areas, including Milan, Cittadella, Ala, Santa Margherita
d'Adige, La Spezia, Ghedi, Lecco, and the battle area in the N Apennines.
A-20s, on intruder missions during the night of 8/9 Mar, bomb river crossings
in the Po Valley at several locations, among them Ostiglia, San Benedetto Po,
and Borgoforte.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 13 Guam Island-based B-24s fly a daylight
strike on Susaki Airfield on Chichi Jima Island while 5 more, on single-
bomber raids, hit the airfield during the night of 9/10 Mar. 24 Angaur
Island-based B-24s pound the town of Zamboanga on Mindanao Island.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s bomb
Zamboanga on Mindanao Island. B-25s, in cooperation with PT boats, attack
targets on Basilan Island, Philippine Islands. On Luzon Island, B-24s hit
the Ipo area, B-25s and fighter-bombers support ground forces E of Manila
Bay, hit Japanese-occupied areas at Mabiga, Lipa Bay, and Ternate, and bomb
and strafe targets of opportunity on Caballo Island in Manila Bay; B-25s,
A-20s, and fighter-bombers hit bridges at Bayombong, the town of Makati,
Cabugao, and Cauayan, San Fernando and the Solvec Cove areas on the NW coast,
the town of Cauayan, and Aparri Airfield. B-24s pound the dock area at Takao,
Formosa.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  jem3@cc.bellcore.com  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

09/0150Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 21:13:00 EST
From:    mc killop <jem3@DONUTS0.BELLCORE.COM>
Subject: Tokyo Raid

>From the US Air Force News Service
      Feature Package

020.  Tokyo Fire Raid anniversary
021.  Career soldier recalls bombing run on Japanese
022.  Challenges in Cuba
                              &    &    &
                              &    &    &
                              &    &    &
020.  Tokyo Fire Raid anniversary
by Daniel L. Haulman
     MAXWELL AFB, Alabama (AFNS Features) -- During the three and a
half months before March 1945, the largest and most advanced bombers
of World War II systematically raided Japan from the Marianas.
Approaching at high altitudes of 30,000 feet (9,144 m), the B-29
Superfortresses faced strong jet stream winds that blew them and
their bombs off course, and cloud cover that obscured their targets.
They rarely hit the relatively small Japanese factories, which were
scattered throughout the large cities.
     Aware that Japanese cities were constructed of highly flammable
materials, Major General Curtis E. LeMay, commander of the XXI Bomber
Command, conceived a radical solution:  low-level incendiary bombing at
night.  Attacking at night would minimize the threat of flak and
fighters, eliminate the need to attack at high altitude, and allow
LeMay to increase bomb loads by stripping the B-29s of most of their
guns.  Approaching the targets beneath the clouds and jet stream
would increase accuracy.  A single fire bombing raid might destroy
several industries at the same time.
     On the evening of March 9, 1945, LeMay launched more than 300
Superfortresses, each laden with six tons of fire bombs, against
Japan's largest city, Tokyo.  Approaching just after midnight at
altitudes between 5,000 and 9,000 feet (1,524 and 2,743 m), the first
bombers laid out a giant X pattern with napalm over a three-by-four-
mile (4.8 by 6.4 km) section of eastern Tokyo.  Other bombers dropped
on the pattern.  In three hours, almost 2,000 tons of incendiaries
rained over the Japanese capital.
     The Japanese were unprepared for the revolutionary tactics.
Antiaircraft artillery missed most of the bombers.  Flak brought down
only 14 Superfortresses and damaged another 42.  Japanese fighters
failed to destroyed a single B-29.  Japanese losses, on the other hand,
were astounding.
     Sixteen square miles (41.5 squadre km) of Tokyo, including more
than 18 percent of its commercial area, burned to the ground.  The
raid killed at least 83,000 of the 6 million people then in the city,
and destroyed more than 267,000 buildings, a quarter of the total.  A
million people lost their homes.  No other single air raid in the
history of the world killed more people or destroyed more property.
When he personally inspected the devastated area on March 18, Emperor
Hirohito was greatly moved.
     The great Tokyo fire raid of March 10 changed the course of the
war.  Destroying at least 22 industrial targets, it proved that the
Superfortresses could severely damage Japan's industrial base.
Secondly, the raid signaled a shift in American bombing strategy from
precision attacks on specific targets to mass destruction of urban
areas.  Culminating in the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the new policy sapped Japanese morale and decisively
influenced the emperor's decision to surrender.
(Haulman is assigned to the Air Force Historical Research Agency)
                      &     &     &
                      &     &     &
                      &     &     &
021.  Career soldier recalls bombing run on Japanese
by SSgt. Stephen Pierce
     TRAVIS AFB, California (AFNS Features) -- The old phrase, "the
third time's a charm," rings true with George Justice -- his military
career spans three separate enlistments from 1937 to 1973.
     His first stint in the military lasted three years as a vehicle
operator in the Army, but he could only stay away about month before
joining the Army Air Corps as an aircraft mechanic.  When World War II
was over, Justice decided he had enough of military life.  His
decision to stay away was changed by the escalation of events in
Korea. After being recalled to active duty, Justice decided to hang
around a while this time.
     The retired senior master sergeant considers himself one of the
luckiest men alive, having survived the combat theater during World War
II and the Vietnam Conflict.
     "Every day I would walk down the same path to the hard stand
(where the aircraft are parked).  One day I noticed a hand grenade
lying on the edge of the path, apparently for quite some time.  After
the bomb guys exploded it, I realized just one wrong step and that
could have been me," said Justice about one experience on the tiny
Pacific island of Saipan during World War II.
     Another unforgettable experience happened the night he first
arrived on Saipan in November 1944.  "We were told to dig a foxhole
next to our tent, but like a few others, I didn't the first night.
About midnight that night as Tokyo Rose promised, those Zeros came in
strafing the base.  As I was trying to find some kind of cover, I kept
thinking, 'God I'll dig my hole if they just let me live through
tonight,'" said Justice.
     Just as embedded into his memory of his time at Saipan were his
accomplishments and the successes of the aircraft he maintained.
     "My aircraft flew 29 straight missions without an abort.  That
means when it was scheduled, it went," he said. "Not all the airplanes
came back. Some with only one engine.  Fortunately, none of my aircraft
had any serious damage."
     Justice said the early days of the Army Air Corps had one thing
over the Air Force of today -- total unit cohesiveness. He prefers the
concept of a whole unit going as a team, not just one person from here
and there.
     "When the chips are down, I want to know who I can count on," he
said.
     During World War II, the Army Air Corps commanders counted on the
B-29 Superfortress crews of the 500th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy)
stationed on Saipan.  Justice was part of that unit, and the following
excerpts about the first fire raid on Tokyo (March 9, 1945) were
written by Arthur Miller and appeared in the unit's memory book, An
Unofficial Pictorial History of the 500th Bombardment Group.
     "It was a sober group of combat crews who walked slowly back to
their Quonsets after the briefing. 'Over Tokyo at 5,000 feet' -- it
was inconceivable, beyond comprehension. 'What would they think of
next?' mused more than one as he got his gear together and prepared to
jump to the flying line.
     Minds slowly reviewed the previous three months -- December,
January and February -- when the 73rd Wing was fighting the battle over
Japan alone, when enemy fighters were thick as flies in an uncovered
latrine, when flak was black and accurate, when crew after crew
heartbreakingly ditched hundreds of miles from home with little hope
of rescue.
     "Then it was time for the 500th and slowly the big 'Z' ships
jockeyed into position, lined up, and roared off, leaving behind a
strangely empty airfield and a quiet group of stay-at-homes.
     "To the uninitiated, it may be stated without equivocation that it
is a mighty long road from Saipan to Tokyo over a mighty wide
and deep ocean.  Cruising along, all alone except for occasional
glimpses of running lights from other planes, the crews felt lonely
and a million miles from nowhere. The flight plan called for each
plane to fly by way of Iwo Jima, for by this time the Marines had
the situation in hand on that little bit of Purgatory, and it furnished
an excellent checkpoint.
     "Landfall! The tip of the Chofu peninsula -- about 35 miles
(56 km) away -- was showing on the radar screen. ... Then a faint
glow appears, looking like the very beginning of sunrise, quickly
expanding into a bright orange reflection in the sky.  The
bombardier opens the doors and at the same time the plane plunges
headlong into a huge column of acrid, black smoke.  It is tossed
around like a leaf, the turbulence is worse than a West Texas
thunderstorm.  Suddenly they are out of the smoke and there below
lies a panorama out of Dante's Inferno, a huge, gushing, roaring fire
licking its irresistible way through the heart of proud Tokyo.
     "Result of this mission: 17.2 square miles of Tokyo up in
smoke, a reported 100,000 dead; 500th Group losses on mission,
none.
     "Mission complete." (Pierce is assigned to the 60th Airlift Wing
at Travis)
--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force News Agency                   :  DSN: 945-6164
AFNEWS/IICP                             :  (210) 925-6164
203 Norton Street                       :  sysop@afnews.pa.af.mil
Kelly AFB, TX 78241-6105                :  131.13.24.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


--
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Air Force News Agency                   :  DSN: 945-6164
AFNEWS/IICX                             :  sysop@afnews.pa.af.mil
Kelly AFB, TX 78241-5000                :  131.13.24.1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 22:56:05 -0500
From:    chris garcia <moonie@AMANDA.DORSAI.ORG>
Subject: Re: WWII German, US & Soviet Veterans

On Wed, 8 Mar 1995, Claude Lamazouere wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I'm presently working on VE-day.  Are you in touch with German or Soviet
> veterans involved in the last battles in Europe (Berlin particulary)?
> On the other hand do you know any US vet of the 69th infantry division who
> were the first Amrican soldiers to meet the Soviets in Torgau on April, 26th
> 1945?
>
> I want to make interviews with such persons for a radio documentary to be
> broadcast next month on the Canadian national radio.
>
> Any other suggestion is welcome..
>
I am in touch with two Luftwaffe vets, one was a vet of JV44, Wolfgang
spate, who finished out the war on the western front with Galland's
group.  I have some addresses of Luftwaffe reunion groups but I haven't
checked them all out.  If you need information contact me.





> Thank you for your help
> Claude Lamazouere, Societe Radio-Canada
> clamazou@montreal.src.ca
> tel: (514) 597-5773
> fax: (514) 597-5728
>

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 8 Mar 1995 23:36:20 -0500
From:    "Paul C. Perkins, M.D." <PERK1518@AOL.COM>
Subject: NEW MEMBER

I've been lucky enough to write the manuscripts for two photo books about
 WW2 aircraft. The Lady - The Boeing B-17 and The Solder - Consolidated B-24
Libertaor are published by Howell Press. A third book, about the P-51 Mustang
is soon to go to press.

Truth be known - my biggest thrill is listening to the people who made the
history. I delight in listening to the remembrances of those folks who made
these planes fly... design engineers, production personel,  test pilots,
mechanics, combat pilots...

Don't hesitate. It isn't like you MUST say something profound or
earth-shattering about your experience(s). Descriptions of daily staion life
useful. The machines don't need to be the central focus of your
correspondence.

I am very careful to ensure that people's remembrances are correctly quoted.
 E-mail me at PERK1518@aol.com
- Paul C. Perkins, M.D. / 1518 State Rte. 343 / Yellow Springs, Ohio / 45387

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 7 Mar 1995 to 8 Mar 1995
***********************************************

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Subject:  WWII-L Digest - 8 Mar 1995 to 9 Mar 1995
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Status: O

There are 40 messages totalling 1711 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. VJ DAY "REMEMBERED"
  2. Intelligence on Tirpitz
  3. NOST: UK Sites
  4. THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt (2)
  5. Re2: THOUGHTS: Germany an...
  6. Johnson Automatic Rifle
  7. Britain and V-J Day (2)
  8. Media: Most combat-decorated soldier buried (2)
  9. Aggressive Warfare
 10. POSTMORTEM ON JAPAN PO
 11. NEW MEMBER
 12. Your Recent Post (was: Intro to List)
 13. Apologies to the emporer for Japan posts
 14. Native Americans in WW2
 15. MEDIA:RIP LTC Urban
 16. MEDIA:Tokyo Remembers
 17. Postmortem on Japan posts (2)
 18. MEDIA:Remagen Bridge
 19. MEDIA:Austria's Nazi Past
 20. more on "Glacier Girl" P-38F
 21. INFO: Marianas
 22. Re2: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt
 23. More on Bong
 24. Japan bibliography (2)
 25. VJ Day (2)
 26. Japan biblio (2)
 27. Re2: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?
 28. KAMIKAZES AIRCRAFTS
 29. Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the Bulge)
 30. INF: 50 Years Ago - 10-MAR-1945
 31. Generals
 32. New User Intro
 33. [INF] USAAF 10 MAR 45

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 00:51:55 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <ben.frank@HIS.COM>
Subject: VJ DAY "REMEMBERED"

Ron, I posted the item. It appeared on page A-29 of the Washington Post of 5
March. It was written by T.R. Reid, the Post's Tokyo correspondent. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 01:37:28 -0500
From:    Jodi Berls <Jberls@AOL.COM>
Subject: Re: Intelligence on Tirpitz

Sidney Allinson wrote:

> Jodi, it really isn't necessary to dismiss heroism out of hand. :-)

Ack! Nor did I intend to, though in retrospect I can see how my post might
have been taken that way. It must have been too late and too many hours in
staring-at-the-screen mode.

Thanks. I will launch a full-scale search for the book.

Jodi Berls
jberls@aol.com

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 01:37:31 -0500
From:    Jodi Berls <Jberls@AOL.COM>
Subject: Re: NOST: UK Sites

> Fourth, RAF Duxford, also part of the Imperial War Museum (but located in
Duxford) -- lots of restored airplanes and interesting exhibits.  It's
located on the site of a WWII airfield.  If you're lucky (and I was when
I visited), there will be some flying activity involving WWII vintage
aircraft.

I can second this vote. It'd be a fairly long day trip from London, but they
have *fast* and relatively cheap trains over there, so it could be done in a
day, and I thought it was terrific. Duxford is near Cambridge, incidentally.
I was there in 1986, so I can't begin to offer realistic information about
1995 costs or hours, but it's a fascinating place.

Jodi Berls
jberls@aol.com

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 01:37:35 -0500
From:    Jodi Berls <Jberls@AOL.COM>
Subject: Re: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

William Lippert wrote:

>The second was for his infamous "Laconia" order, I think it was
called, saying that (and this is not a direct quote but off the top of my
head) "the rescuing of surivivng crew members of enemy ships is incompatible
with the total war on the sea.  All efforts must be taken to see that the
crew of enemy ships do not hinder naval operations".  According to him,
he was just saying that U-boats shouldn't surface to rescue survivors for
longer than they had to - only to capture captains and other officers.

     According to Terraine's  *The U-Boat Wars: 1916-195*:

     "All attempts to rescue members of ships sunk, therefore also fishing
out swimmers and putting them into lifeboats, righting capsized lifeboats,
handing out provisions and water, have to cease. Rescue contradicts the most
fundamental demands of war for the annihilation of enemy ships and crews.
 ... Be hard. Think of the fact that the enemy in his bombing asttacks on
German towns has no regard for women and children."

     The irony, of course, is that this order was issued after the U-156 had
been repeatedly attacked by Allied aircraft while attempting to rescue
*Laconia* survivors. I like Terraine's ending analysis: "The *Laconia* story
is blurred at every edge; if there is any moral at all to be extracted from
it, it would seem to be only a repetition, once again, of Admiral Fisher's
perception in 1913 to the effect that submarine warfare 'is acknowledged to
be an altogether barbarous method ... (but) the essence of war is violence,
and moderation in war is imbecility.'"
     Doenitz, being a thoroughgoing Nazi in a political sense, is not what I
would want as a role model for my children, but he certainly had a duty to
try to protect his subordinates. Under the circumstances, I'm not sure there
was any option for him except to order his boats not to pick up survivors.
     I have always wanted someone to explain to my perhaps-too-literal brain
just why "aggressive war" is a war crime. What the heck is a "non-aggressive
war?" If all parties are "non-aggressive," there's no war, right? Despite my
slightly flippant tone, I'm serious about this question -- what were the
folks at Nuremburg really trying to accomplish by establishing this as a war
crime?

Jodi Berls
jberls@aol.com

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 01:37:36 -0500
From:    Jodi Berls <Jberls@AOL.COM>
Subject: Re: Re2: THOUGHTS: Germany an...

Alex Bielakowski wrote:

> I can't
remember many instances of American subs picking up survivors of sunken
Japanese ships in the Pacific.

No, and there is at least one notorious instance of an American boat gunning
Japanese survivors in the water. The skipper in question, Dudley Morton,
didn't survive the war, but my bet is that if he had, he would *not* have
been tried for war crimes. At the risk of sounding like an Axis apologist (whi
ch I am *not*) I think we are sometimes too quick to forget that war is
conducted by human beings, none of whom are perfect -- including us. I don't
know that I agree that Doenitz "got a raw deal," but I think there's a fair
amount of irony in the specific charges on which he got nailed.

Jodi Berls
jberls@aol.com

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 01:37:40 -0500
From:    Jodi Berls <Jberls@AOL.COM>
Subject: Re: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

Sidney Allinson wrote:

> ...German Fuhrer GrossAdmiral Karl Doenitz spent the last decades of his
long life assiduously erasing his Nazi past...

     Well, yes, but he was hardly the only one, and some who deserved worse
served less prison time (or ended up living as comfortable middle-class
citizens here in the States, courtesy of Uncle Sam, which frankly makes me
madder than blazes). I don't know -- I have very mixed feelings about Doenitz.
 I don't think the mere fact that he was politically a Nazi (if he tried to
cover that up, he didn't do a very good job of it) automatically constitutes
a war crime. I don't care much for Nazis, then or now, but I think actions,
not political philosphies, are crimes. On the other hand, if he did know
things about the liquidations, then I might be inclined to revise my opinion
of him. But the quote from Topp's book doesn't cite any specifics.
     By the way, thanks for that citation -- I'll search for that one, too.
My husband recently picked up a copy of Cremer's *U-boat Commander* (retitled
from the original *U-333*), which has been out of print for a while, at a gun
show. Needless to say, the spouse has been getting a royal treatment for a
couple of weeks after making that find. He knows how to get chocolate-chip
cookies from scratch when he wants them!

Jodi Berls
jberls@aol.com

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 01:29:54 -0500
From:    John Cropp <jcropp@FREENET.COLUMBUS.OH.US>
Subject: Re: Johnson Automatic Rifle

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, Jon Stevens wrote:
> What caliber was this rifle? 30.06?
> Was this rifle found to be a "dud" like the Reising smg in combat conditions?

The Johnson Rifle fired 30.06.  It was not a "dud", but it was not as
rugged as the M1 and jammed more often.  Still it was capable of accurate
fire of a heavy rifle caliber.  I've fired the Johnson, and would not feel
naked in a social situation.  Its' trigger was as good as the M1, and its
loading procedure was almost as good.  Not a bad piece, but it was in 2nd
place to the Garand.
                         Hope this helps,
                         John Cropp

John L. Cropp                      *   "Quomodo manibus mortalis
jcropp@freenet.columbus.oh.us      *    talia magna opera
11041 Fancher Rd.                  *    coquinaria?"
Westerville, OH 43082              *

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 08:21:56 +0000
From:    Nechama Cox <nechama@BOREALIS.COM>
Subject: Britain and V-J Day

The Times yesterday published a couple of articles on V-J Day.  I thought
this one might be of interest to the list.

(Please excuse the typos, it is early here.)

The Times, March 8, 1995

"VJ veterans appalled by US appeasement"

        British verterans of the Far East campaign expressed disgust
yesterday at President Clinton's decision to ban the term VJ-Day -- Victory
over Japan -- from American commemorations marking the 50th anniversary of
the end of the Second World War.
        Dowing Street, however, said Britain had no plans to bow to
Japanese sensibilities and that the term VJ-Day, in common use for half a
century, would be applied to British events marking the anniversary in
August.  Air Vice-Marshall Sir Bernard Chacksfield, chairman of the Burma
Star Association, which represents 17,000 survivors of the war against
Japan, said that his organization had made strong representations to John
Major when the anniversary events were being planned.
        "This was a victory over Japan; there can be no flannelling about.
We do not feel like being mealy-mouthed in commemorating a victory that was
won at such cost in lives."  The American decision to bow to diplomatic
pressure and name the commemorations simply End of the War was disgusting,
he said.
        Harold Payne, president of the Far East Prisoners of War
Association, took an equally firm view.  "I don't care a sausage what other
countries do; we are British, and to us VJ is victory over Japan.  Why
should we change it out of consideration for the Japanese?  They did not
give much consideration to us when we were their prisoners of war."  There
was still a strong anti-Japanese feeling within his association's 68
branches.
        The Royal British Legion said yesterday that it had "no problem"
with the term VJ-Day.  The Japanese Embassy in London refused to be drawn
into the controversy, saying that the manner and naming of commemerations
was a matter for individual governments.  An Embassy spokesman denied that
Toyko had applied diplomatic pressure, but the fact remains that Australia
and New Zealand have opted for "Victory in the Pacific" as the title of
their events, and Canada has opted for "Canada Remembers".
        The date of Germany's surrender, May 8, 1945, is known as Victory
in - not over - Europe and the Japanese believe they have been singled out
in terms of semantics.


Maybe the British have something here :)

Nechama Cox
nechama@borealis.com

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 08:29:58 EST
From:    Alan Wild <AWILD@URIACC.URI.EDU>
Subject: Media: Most combat-decorated soldier buried

Army pallbearers carried the casket of Lt. Col. Matt Urban during funeral
services at Arlington Nation Cemetary yesterday. Urban, 75, a World War
II veteran known as the most combat-decorated soldier in U.S. history,
died last week of complications from a colapsed lung. he was awarded 29
medals for bravery and received the Purple Heart 7 times.

God Speed,...

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 08:36:54 EST
From:    William Lippert <WL1958A@AMERICAN.EDU>
Subject: Aggressive Warfare

Jodi,
   You bring up a good question and many Germans felt they were given a
"raw deal" not only because they were tried for aggressive warfare, but
also for the other crimes which were not illegal before their commitment.
In this country (the US) one cannot be tried of committing a crime before
it is a crime.  That's called ex post facto.
    But there is such a thing as "aggressive warfare" and the idea has run
through the centuries.  I suppose it was first seriously implemented in
modern history after WWI when the Germans were forced to admit that they
were the guilty party for causing it.
    I can first tell you what is considered non-aggressive warfare.

1. Defensive Warfare: the act of defending against an aggressive nation.
Kuwait would be an example, or Belgium in WWII
2. War to correct a gross immorality: Somalia, Haiti, and the protection of
the Kurds would fall under this category (though they were not necessarily
wars).
3. There may be others I don't remember

Anyway, aggressive warfare is rather subjective in its definition.  Sometimes
the protection of citizens abroad is considered aggressive, sometimes not.
As for Doenitz, I do not believe that he was guilty of waging agressive
war.  Maybe the Wermacht general staff, such as Keitel or Jodl, but not
Doenitz.  He had no real impact on the decision of the war or its waging
(aside from the subs) until he was appointed CINC in 1942(?)  If the
tribunal came to their decision on this basis, that he was CINC, I wonder
why they would think he was guilty of waging an aggressive war three years
after it had started.

Well, that's my thoughts.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 09:00:10 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <ben.frank@HIS.COM>
Subject: POSTMORTEM ON JAPAN PO

Well done, Mike. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 08:04:22 CST
From:    "SCHERRER, TIM" <AD16@NEMOMUS.BITNET>
Subject: Re: NEW MEMBER

I've seen the books and I knew John Wilson who was in the B-24 book--I'm
also in the WWII Airman's Preservation Society and we have all the gear
you could ever want to do pictures for additional books.  We did the
display at the 91st Bomb Group Reunion this summer and the vet's said it
was like walking back into the past.  TAS

************************************************************************
*  Tim A. Scherrer          "You'll be fighting WWII for the rest of   *
*  Facilities Supervisor     your life", Ron Scherrer, 1971            *
*  WP:816-785-5253                                                     *
*  HP:816-665-6704                                                     *
*  ID# AD16%NEMOMUS@ACADEMIC.NEMOSTATE.EDU                             *
************************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 08:12:16 -0500
From:    James Ray Watkins <dawgonpete@MAIL.UTEXAS.EDU>
Subject: Re: Your Recent Post (was: Intro to List)

>On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, George Bauer wrote:
>
>> I hope the misspellings in your recent post are typographical errors
>> rather than actual misspellings
>
>* JBJ responds-
>Mr. Bauer:
>     I rarely respond to such inane baiting--but just to give some
>color to your (obviously) otherwise sad existence--I will try to
>answer your concerns. I aplogize to the other list members in advance.


None needed, I think your right on the money. I got one of these ugly little
things too a few weeks back. The language police. And a class/caste thing,
too. I spent too much time for the last twenty-years trying to follow those
rules. G.B. Shaw once pointed out that fish could be spelled ghoti. Go figure.


Ray

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 09:23:46 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <MFY@VMS.CIS.PITT.EDU>
Subject: Apologies to the emporer for Japan posts

        I'm almost beginning to think I should have quit while I was ahead.  In
rereading my final appendix on the battleships, I caught yet another error.
When I said I was having a bad week, I wasn't kidding.  Hope I haven't
succeeded in damaging my credibility.  Anyway, for some reason best known to my
fugitive brain cells, I said the Japanese Navy D3A divebomber usually didn't
carry bombs heavier than 220 lbs.  In fact, its usual load was one 551-lb bomb
under the fuselage and a 66-lb bomb under each wing.
        That "Ching" Lee error still bothers me, especially since I was
familiar with the outlines of his wartime career (even if, obviously, I didn't
know as much as I thought I did about the man himself).  I even knew he was one
of the US Navy's top experts on gunnery radar, not to mention one of our top
battleship commanders (Lee was the US commander at the battleship encounter I
just described, the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal-- also in charge of the
famed Task Force 34 under Halsey at Leyte Gulf).  On a brighter note, I have
since found out why all mention of Admiral Tanaka vanishes after mid-1943.
After the sinking of the JINTSU in the action I described off Kolombangara, he
apparently complained too heartily that the attempts to keep the Solomons
reinforced and resupplied were too costly in terms of ships, and was relieved
of his command.
        All of the naval actions around Guadalcanal from the carrier battle off
the Santa Cruz islands in late October through the two naval battles in narrow
waters off the island were part of the same elaborate series of maneuvers by
the Japanese naval forces under Admiral Kondo to pass a large supply and
reinforcement convoy to the island.  This convoy consisted of 11 transports
escorted by 12 of Tanaka's destroyers, and carrying a total of 12,000 troops
(most of the veteran 38th Division and 3,000 marines) and 10,000 tons of
supplies.  American air attacks sank all but four of the transports en route,
and these last four, beached so that they could be unloaded, were virtually
destroyed by further bombing runs.  Less than 4,000 men and only five tons of
the vital supplies made it to the island, and it was this failure that
ended the Japanese attempts to retake Guadalcanal.  Since I referred to Col.
Hattori of the Japanese operations section, I should mention that it was he who
vetoed an earlier plan by Tsuji to regain air supremacy over Guadalcanal by
withdrawing significant air units from Manchuria.  Even at this stage Hattori
was too worried such a weakening of Manchurian defenses would invite a Russian
attack.
        I realize that in the course of all these posts one action I never
referred to was the Japanese landings on the Aleutian islands of Attu and
Kiska.  This was a subsidiary operation of the Midway battle, carried out
partly as a diversion, supported by two light carriers.  It was the one part of
the Japanese plan that worked perfectly, but it was only a secondary part of
the plan.  The Japanese subsequently fought a long delaying action on Attu
before being wiped out (here they really used bamboo spear tactics at the end--
the last charge by some 800 Japanese included a number of men with rifles who
charged with fixed bayonets because they were out of ammunition).  They managed
to withdraw undetected from Kiska.  The most notable action in the Aleutians
might have been the naval battle of Komodorski bay, where the American heavy
cruiser SALT LAKE CITY along with a light cruiser and some destroyers engaged
in a long-range daylight gunnery duel with the Japanese heavy cruisers NACHI
and MAYA, who were escorting two merchantmen with reinforcements.  Though the
SALT LAKE CITY was left dead in the water (after itself scoring several hits on
the NACHI) the Japanese admiral withdrew (he was relieved of his command for
this).
        Another remarkable Pacific naval action I wish I'd gotten into occurred
in the Indian Ocean in November 1942.  Two Japanese commerce raiders-- armed
merchant ships that utilized disguise to close with their victims-- attacked
the Dutch tanker ONDINA, escorted by the 733-ton Indian Navy minesweeper
BENGAL.  The Japanese ships, HOKOKO MARU and AIKOKO MARU, each mounted eight
5.5-inch guns.  The BENGAL had a single 3-inch gun, the ONDINA one 4-inch.
Yet the two Allied ships fought the Japanese off, the BENGAL actually sinking
the HOKOKO MARU (which caught fire after being hit), although the Dutch tanker
also sank as a result of damage in the battle.
        Finally, some war in the Pacific trivia:

        FIRST SHOTS FIRED AGAINST THE WESTERN ALLIES were by Japanese cruisers
                which began bombarding the landing beach and airfield at
                Kota Bharu in northeastern Malaya a good half hour before
                Japanese planes appeared over Pearl Harbor
        FIRST SHOTS OF THE PACIFIC WAR BY AMERICANS came from the destroyer
                WARD, which fired at a surfaced Japanese midget sub trying to
                sneak into Pearl Harbor before the air attack, scoring a hit
                on the conning tower at point-blank range.
        FIRST JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR was Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki, who was
                washed ashore uncouncious after his midget sub went aground
                on Oahu.
        FIRST AMERICAN FIGHTER ACE OF THE PACIFIC WAR was Edward "Butch"
                O'Hare, the guy the airport in Chicago is named after, who
                while flying off the carrier LEXINGTON in February 1942 got
                in among a Japanese bomber formation and shot down five in
                five minutes.  O'Hare recorded 12 aerial victories before he
                was killed in 1944 by the tail gunner of an American TBF
                torpedo bomber in a case of mistaken identity.
        FIRST USE OF NAPALM IN THE PACIFIC came during the campaign on Tinian.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 08:26:11 -0600
From:    Greg Kelley <gregk@STPAUL.LIB.MN.US>
Subject: Re: Native Americans in WW2

Native Americans serving in World War II

Army         21,767

Navy          1,910

Marines         874

Coast Guard     121

TOTAL        24,672


Five Native Americans won the Medal of Honor during the war--
one with the 26th Division in Sicily (John N. Reese, an Oklahoma Creek),
three with the 45th Division in Italy (Van T. Barfoot, Choctaw, Ernest
Childers, Oklahoma Creek, and Jack Montgomery, Oklahoma Cherokee), and
the fifth (Ernest E Evans, Pawnwee) was a posthumous award for commanding
the USS Johnston (DD-557) at Leyte Gulf.

Of the Native Americans sering with the Marines, some 400 were Navajos
assigned to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Marine Divisions as part of the
Navajo code talkers program.

Both Choctaws and Comanches were used with Army Signal Corps units in the
European Theater of Operations.


Above cited from THE NATIVE AMERICAN ALMANAC (Prentice-Hall, 1994)


                                          Glad To Be Of Service!

                                          Greg Kelley
                                          St. Paul Public Library
                                          gregk@stpaul.lib.mn.us

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 10:32:19 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <paa5137@DPSC.DLA.MIL>
Subject: MEDIA:RIP LTC Urban

>From the DoD Newswire 6 March 1995

:LT. COL. MATT URBAN DIES

   HOLLAND, Mich.  -- Lt. Col. Matt Urban, a highly-decorated
combat soldier in World War II and recipient of the Medal of Honor,
died Saturday from complications of a collapsed lung. He was 75.
   Nicknamed "The Ghost" because of his sophisticated combat
exploits, Urban was awarded 29 medals for bravery and was awarded the
Purple Heart seven times, one for each time he was wounded in battle.
He was listed as "the most combat-decorated soldier in American
history" in the 1989 Guinness Book of World Records.
   Urban led his troops through six campaigns in North Africa,
Sicily, Belgium, France and Germany.
   He was awarded the Medal of Honor on July 19, 1980, by President
Carter, 35 years after the original nomination was lost. The medal is
the nation's highest decoration for bravery.
   Other awards he received include the Silver Star, Legion of Merit,
Bronze Star, Presidential Unit Citation, World War II Victory Medal
and the American Defense Service Medal.
   He also wrote the book, "The Matt Urban Story: Life and World War
II Experiences."
   Urban was born in New York state. In Michigan, he was recreation
director for the city of Port Huron for seven years, director of the
Monroe Community Center for 16 years and director of the civic and
recreation department of Holland.


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        jirwin@dpsc.dla.mil
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 10:34:15 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <paa5137@DPSC.DLA.MIL>
Subject: MEDIA:Tokyo Remembers

>From the DoD Newswire 6 March 1995

:TOKYO RECALLS DEADLY AIR RAID

   TOKYO  -- A picture of peace and calm, children play in a
sandbox outside the Ireido temple, their laughter mixing with the
sweet smell of incense in the cool air of late winter.
   Fifty years ago, the spot was at the center of one of the most
horror-filled nights of World War II: the firebombing of Tokyo.
   The world remembers the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
which climaxed intensifying U.S. air and land attacks designed to end
a war that began with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. But this
week, the Japanese capital recalls its own descent into hell in the
early hours of March 10, 1945.
   "It was just after midnight when I was awakened by the sound of
the B-29s," said Katsumoto Saotome, who was a child of 12 at the
time. "By the time I looked outside, the flames were already raging
and spreading everywhere."
   For the next several hours, 334 American bombers dropped more than
1,700 tons of incendiary bombs. By dawn, Tokyo was an inferno.
   Fanned by winds created by its own flames, the firestorm razed an
area of roughly 16 square miles -- one fifth of the city. It was the
war's deadliest air raid, outstripping the carnage 27 days earlier
when British and American bombers produced a firestorm in Dresden,
Germany.
   Estimates of the death toll in Tokyo run from 83,000 to 197,000 --
the enormous range a measure of the scale of destruction. Along with
so much else, the flames incinerated family registers and other
demographic records making it impossible for authorities to
accurately measure casualties.
   One million people were left homeless by the attack, which
destroyed working-class areas in northeast Tokyo and left huge swaths
of burned-out blocks in landmark neighborhoods like the Ginza
district.
   "My family lost our house, everything," said Saotome. "But by
dawn, we realized we were lucky. That's when we reached the river and
saw the water thick with corpses. It was terrible."
   Saotome, who has dedicated his life to documenting the bombing's
effects, says he believes about 100,000 people died that night, with
10,000 more killed in later air raids before Japan's surrender on
Aug. 16, 1945. He agrees the precise number of deaths may never be
known.
   Because it was carried out with conventional weapons -- mostly
incendiary bombs and napalm -- the Tokyo raid has long been seen as a
historical footnote to the unleashing of a shocking new weapon, the
atomic bomb.
   There is little doubt, however, that the Tokyo firestorm caused
roughly the same number of immediate deaths as the bombing of
Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945, and more than the total number killed
three days later in the bombing of Nagasaki, roughly 70,000.
   The attack on Tokyo, which came as U.S. Marines fought hideously
bloody battles on the island of Iwo Jima, marked a dramatic raising
of the stakes in the Pacific War. Within weeks, a half dozen other
major Japanese cities became smoldering wastelands.
   "It was all part of one process," said Saotome. "From the blanket
bombing that started with Tokyo, things escalated to Hiroshima."
   In recent years, Tokyo has designated March 10 -- which during the
war was Army Day -- as Peace Day.
   Buddhist and Roman Catholic services are to be held at the Ireido
temple, where the souls of the people killed in the bombing raids and
an additional 58,000 who died in the Tokyo earthquake of 1923 are
worshipped.
   A major exhibition on the bombing has drawn thousands of visitors
over the past few weeks at one Tokyo museum. A ward office in
downtown Tokyo has collected tens of thousands of paper cranes, a
traditional symbol of health and recovery, for a memorial it is
planning.
   For some who lived through the bombing to see Japan rise from the
ashes of defeat to become a world power, there is concern that the
most important lessons have yet to be learned.
   "Our government has never reflected on the past," Saotome said.
"It has never apologized to those it harmed. We will never be able to
put this behind us until that is done."


----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        jirwin@dpsc.dla.mil
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 09:20:16 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <jconeil@PRIMENET.COM>
Subject: Re: Postmortem on Japan posts

Mike,
I don't think you owe anyone an apology. I wish I could discourse half so
intelligently on the subject, and I have read much of what you have. You
have a real talent for pulling the meat of the matter out, and explaining
it clearly. Now when do we get the cover page and the table of contents for
your book?

Rear Admiral Willis A Lee Jr; An Annapolis Graduate [I was wrong too - his
nick-name "Ching Chong" came from there according to Coggins in "The
Campaign for Guadacannal"] and a Radar expert, as well as a Battleship
Gunnery Jock par excellance. My books are so confused i can't find all the
stuff I am sure I have on this man; He's a very interesting character -
read: "Battleship at War" by Ivan Musicant for some insights. He [Lee] died
of a heart attack on 25 Aug 1945 in his launch at Casco Bay, Maine, while
working on anti-kamikaze tactics & gunnery techniques for the Navy.
        Sorry I can't find more

Jim O'Neil   Indecision is the cornerstone of Military Flexibility

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 9 Mar 1995 10:29:40 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <paa5137@DPSC.DLA.MIL>
Subject: MEDIA:Remagen Bridge

>From the DoD Newswire 7 March 1995

:'MIRACLE OF REMAGEN' RECALLED

   REMAGEN, Germany -- After a career that owed much to American
friends, Heinz Schwarz recalls with pleasure the morning he
eavesdropped on the urgent message to the commander of the Remagen
bridge 50 years ago.
   "The Amis have broken through!" the caller said. "Prepare to blow
the bridge! Heil Hitler!"
   Schwarz, then 16, fled his post at the telephone exchange atop the
bridge tower on the east side of the Rhine.
   Within an hour, U.S. Army Sgt. Michael Chinchar had captured that
tower, leading an American column that swarmed across the bridge into
military history.
   The events of March 7, 1945, were quickly dubbed the "Miracle of
Remagen."
   The miracle was that the methodical German army had failed to
destroy a bridge over the Rhine, the most important natural obstacle
to the Allied advance into Germany.
   Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower pushed 25,000 soldiers across the
railroad bridge from its capture until it collapsed 10 days later. By
then, Army engineers had put two pontoon bridges across the river. An
enraged Hitler ordered a kangaroo court to execute four officers in
charge of the bridge.
   The Remagen bridgehead "was psychologically devastating" to
Germany and probably shortened the war by anywhere from a week to a
month, thus saving thousands of lives, said Kurt Kleemann, Remagen's
historian and an organizer of 50th anniversary observances.
   In the intervening years, Germans who came to see World War II as
a disastrous sacrifice for an evil Fuehrer began to view the loss of
the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen as their victory, too.
   "I