Subject: WWII-L Digest - 15 Mar 1995 to 16 Mar 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 17 Mar 1995 00:00:32 -0500

There are 30 messages totalling 1138 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Nimitz vs.(?) the Axis
  2. QUES: Mountbatten pink (2)
  3. TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS
  4. INF: USN Chronology 03-16-95
  5. TAC- Enterprise Green
  6. [INF] USAAF 16 MAR 45
  7. VJ vs. VE
  8. Bouillard
  9. Dudley Morton
 10. Mush Morton
 11. Strange American Desertion...
 12. Nimitz vs.(?)
 13. REF: Looking for Soviet tactical practices
 14. Mountbatten Pink
 15. Churchill and Ireland (2)
 16. Big guns (Japanese)
 17. MEDIA:Argentina Returns Ex-Nazi
 18. MEDIA:Iwo Jima II
 19. Ref: Defense of Truman
 20. MEDIA:RETURN TO IWO JI
 21. a new military history list
 22. WEAP: Glacier Girl Pictures
 23. Japan's role in WWII (2)
 24. MUSH MORTON
 25. POW treatment
 26. INF: 50 Years Ago - 17-MAR-1945
 27. HUMOR - Nimitz & MacArthur

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 04:42:00 UTC
From:    "Edward S. Miller" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Nimitz vs.(?) the Axis

Louis Coatney wrote:

  > After the war, we were about to scrap an old Japanese armored cruiser
  > which had been preserved after the Russo-Japanese War.  Nimitz
  > interceded and saved the ship, to the (everlasting?) gratitude of the
  > Japanese people and their Navy.

It was the =MIKASA=, Admiral Togo's flagship at the battle of Tsushima,
1905.  At the time she was the world's largest battleship.  In their zeal US
occupation forces tossed her guns on the beach and otherwise disabled her.
She has now been beautifully restored, aground in concrete at Yokosuka with
an excellent historical museum below decks.  I was aboard last summer, truly
one of the world's finest museum ships.

A footnote: Togo's famous "Z" flag, which flew on the carrier =AKAGI= at
Pearl Harbor, is now a symbol of Japanese nationalist right wingers. It
flies (along with the rising sun naval ensign) from black loudspeaker vans
racing noisily through Tokyo.

Ed Miller   [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 00:11:12 -0500
From:    Jodi Berls <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: QUES: Mountbatten pink

Lou Coatney wrote:

>a kind of greyish pink!  (Is that what fuschia is?)

No, fuschia is a really loud purplish pink. (I was being a bit facetious
about that one -- way too loud for camo, I would think.)

> so a number of ships
  bathed themselves in this, before the Admiralty really
  started dictating camouflage schemes.

When would that have been? Specifically, for my purposes, would it have been
before or after mid-1942?

Thanks very much for the info. I'm sure my friend will be delighted.

Jodi Berls
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 06:54:41 +0000
From:    Nechama Cox <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

I thought the difference in the phrasing was because the victory in Europe
was not just in Germany, but in all the countries that Germany had
occupied, and the other Axis Powers. This was not the case in the Pacific.

Just my $.02

Nechama Cox
[email-masked]

>Just some musings and please, PLEASE don't think I'm being PC but if
>
>VE day is Victory in Europe then why not celebrate VP day as Victory
>
>in the Pacific?  We don't refer to VE Day as Victory over Germany
>
>Day.  I think it was an artifact of the era.   Somebody called it VJ
>
>Day in 1944 or 45 and it stuck.
>

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 04:00:14 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 03-16-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
03/16 Fri. Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, is declared secured.
           Army forces supported by destroyer gunfire land on
           Basilan Island, Sulu Archipelago, P. I.
            United States naval vessel damaged:
             LST 928, by grounding, Iwo Jima area,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
            Japanese naval vessel sunk:
             Coast defense vessel NO. 69, by Army aircraft,
              South China Sea,
              19 d. 02'N., 110 d. 56'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 07:16:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC- Enterprise Green

 >        In August and September 1940,
 >        [email-masked]
 >Status: O
 >
 >assembled in the Channel ports to invade England, a smaller force was also
 >being assembled for a similar operation.  The target of this force was
 >Ireland and the Germans showed uncharacteristic irony when they named the
 >operation Enterprise Green.
 >
 > Regarding a potential German invasion of England, there has been an
 >interesting discussion going on on the newsgroup alt.war about the potential
 >for U.S. intervention to prevent such an operation.  One aspect of the
 >discussion centered on whether the U.S. could have intervened and whether it
 >would have (given the politics of the time and the views of the  major
 >decisionmakers).  I belive that it has been the policy of the U.S. to prevent
 >the domination of the European landmass by a single power because that would
 >pose a real threat to U.S. independence and that thus the U.S. would likely
 >have intervened in the event the Germans had invaded England.  However,
 >others disagree, and my recollection of U.S. policy may be incorrect--the
 >policy may have been formulated during the war.  I was wondering whether
 >anyone has any information regarding the thoughts of military and political
 >leaders at the time as to a potential U.S. intervention.
 >Thanks,
 >Sean Barnett

IMHO, the US had neither the resources NOR the will to become
involved in this operation.  My people in the Irish-American
community would have probably supported it but I doubt if the
rest of the country would want to go to war for Ireland.  And FDR
would not have had the political support in the Congress.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 07:04:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 16 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
FRIDAY, 16 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  B-29, Boeing Superfortress
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  L-5, Stinson Sentinel
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  P-61, Northrop Black Widow

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): Because of a navigational error, 2 B-24s on a
photo mission to Matsuwa Island reach 130 miles (209 km) S of the island, the
deepest penetration of the Japanese Home Islands to date; the B-24s turn N,
photograph Matsuwa Island and bomb Shimushiru Island with unobserved results.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 32 B-24s, escorted by 10
P-51s, pound the N railroad yards at Shihkiachwang; 1 B-25 and 2 P-51s attack
the railroad between Sinsiang and Shihkiachwang; the detachment of the 16th
Fighter Squadron, 51st Fighter Group, operating from Laohokow with P-51s,
returns to base at Chengkung (another detachment is operating from Poseh).

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 23 P-47s support forces of
the Chinese 50th Division in the Hsipaw area; 4 P-38s, supporting the British
36 Division, bomb artillery positions NE of Mogok; 12 B-25s blast a fuel dump
and troop concentration at Panghai; and 40 P-38s sweep roads S of the bomb
line. Transport operations continue on a steady basis.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): During the night of 16/17 Mar,
12 B-24s drop leaflets in Germany and the Netherlands and 20 of 22 B-24s
fly CARPETBAGGER missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): In Germany, 280+ A-20s, A-26s and
B-26s hit the Landau barracks area and communications center, the
Niederscheld town area and rail bridge, 6 other town areas, a marshalling
yard, rail junction, crossroads, and also drop leaflets; fighters escort
the bombers, fly patrols, sweeps, armed reconnaissance, and cover the VIII,
XII, and XX Corps in an assault across the Mosel River from W of Koblenz and
N of Boppard, at one point, as far E as Bad Kreuznach, and as far S as
Merzig; HQ 365th Fighter Group moves from Juzaine Airfield, Florennes,
Belgium to Aachen; the 153d Liaison Squadron, IX Tactical Air Command
(attached to Twelfth Army Group), moves from Duren to Euskirchen with L-5s;
and the 392d Fighter Squadron, 367th Fighter Group, moves from St Dizier to
Conflans, France with P-47s.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): 720+ B-24s and B-17s bomb the
Korneuburg, Vienna/Floridsdorf, Schwechat, and Moosbierbaum, Austria oil
refineries and marshalling yards at Sankt Veit an der Glan, Amstetten, and
Graz, Austria and Varazdin and Pragersko, Yugoslavia; 52 P-51s strafe rail
lines in the Vienna and Linz, Austria and  Passau and Regensburg, Germany
areas and the airfield at Mettenheim, Germany. B-17s and B-24s continue
supply drops to N Italy and Yugoslavia while F-5s and P-38s fly extensive
weather and photo reconnaissance missions; fighters fly 300+ sorties in
escort of the bombers, supply runs, and reconnaissance operations. HQ 1st
Fighter Group and the 27th and 94th Fighter Squadrons move from Salsola
Airfield to Lesina, Italy with P-38s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): B-25s of the 57th Bombardment
Wing, flying their farthest N penetration to date, bomb the Brixlegg, Austria
railroad bridge. In Italy, B-25s also hit the Spilimbergo power plant, with
excellent results, and lightly damage 3 bridges on the Brenner line, 1 in the
C Po Valley, and 1 in NE Italy; XXII Tactical Air Command fighter-bombers
continue to attack communications in the Po Valley and NE Italy, while A-20s
bomb bridges and targets of opportunity on night intruder missions along the
Po R and in the N Po Valley.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA
    Seventh Air Force: On Chichi Jima Island, 13 Guam Island-based B-24s bomb
Susaki Airfield; during the night of 16/17 Mar, Susaki Airfield is hit again,
by 5 B-24s flying individual harassment strikes. Iwo Jima Island in the
Volcano Islands is declared secure although fierce resistance continues on
some parts of the island.
    VII Fighter Command: 16 Iwo-based P-51s dive-bomb and strafe radio and
radar installations, gun positions, and a storage area on Chichi Jima.

  HQ AAF (Twentieth Air Force): Mission 43: 307 XXI Bomber Command B-29s, of
331 airborne, fire-raid Kobe, Japan in the heaviest attack to date, bombing
from 5,000 to 9,500 feet (1,524 to 2,896 m) during the predawn hours of
16/17 Mar; the attack lasts for 2 hours and 8 minutes; about 2.9 square miles
(7.5 square km), i.e., 20%, of the city's area is burned destroying about 500
industrial buildings and damaging 162; 65,951 homes are lost leaving 242,468
people homeless. Casualties are 2,669 dead or missing and 11,289 injured. The
B-29 crews see 314 enemy aircraft which make a total of 93 individual
attacks; the AAF claims 1-0-? Japanese aircraft; 3 B-29s are lost, none to
the fighters.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Luzon Island,
A-20s and B-24s continue pounding Japanese installations at Baguio; P-51s
strike Patapat, hitting vehicles and supplies; fighters on patrol hit Caballo
Island in Manila Bay; the Batangas area is again pounded by fighter-bombers
and A-20s. B-24s hit Talisay and Carolina Airfields on Negros Island and bomb
targets pinpointed by guerrillas on Cebu Island. B-25s bomb San Roque
Airfield on Mindanao Island and attack Tarakan Island and Jesselton Airfields
in Borneo. On Formosa, B-24s also hit the town of Taihoku, airfields at
Heito, and the Okayama naval airbase. HQ 43d Bombardment Group (Heavy) and
the 65th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) move from Tacloban, Leyte Island to
Clark Field, Luzon with B-24s; the 419th Night Fighter Squadron, XIII Fighter
Command, moves from Middelburg Island to Puerto Princesa, Palawan Island with
P-61s.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

16/1202Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 20:40:00 +0700
From:    "Peter E. Beal" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: VJ vs. VE

On Thu, 16 Mar 1995, Edward S. Miller wrote:

> Robert J. Granvin wrote:
>
>   > The question was raised why VE (Victory in Europe) vs. VJ (Victory over
>   > Japan)...
>   > The Pacific is, for the most part, different.  Japan is the clear
>   > driving force here, but there wasn't a real "coalition" of countries
>   > making up the Pacific front.
>
> Did Japan have Pacific allies?  I vaguely recall that the puppet regimes of
> Thailand and Manchukuo may have declared war on the US.  Also perhaps the
> exile nationalist "governments" of India and maybe Indonesia.  Does anyone
> know?

After a brief resistance to a Japanese invaision on December 7/8th, the
Thais requested an armistice.  It is not quite correct to say that they
surrendered.  In early 1942 the Thai government, under pressure from the
Japanese, declared war on the UK and US.  The declaration of war was
delivered in London.  However, the declaration of war on the U.S. was not
delivered by the then Ambassador, M.R. Seni Pramote.  I think he told the
Secretary of State of his situation and was, in turned, told to forget
about delivering it.

After WWII the British demanded reparations, in the form of rice to feed
Malaysia.  They might have also demanded the detachment of some of the
(majority Muslim) southern provinces of Thailand.  The U.S., which did
not consider itself to be at war with Thailand, came to Thailand's
defence and the British moderated their demands including the territorial
issue.

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 08:35:36 -0600
From:    Lauri Hammond <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Bouillard

Does anyone out there know anything about a Francis Bouillard?  He died around
a921 or 22?

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 08:40:51 -0600
From:    "Roddy R. Rupert" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Dudley Morton

On Mon, 13 Mar 1995, Jodi Berls wrote:

> In his book *Wahoo*, Morton's executive officer, Richard O'Kane, recounts an
> incident of Jan. 26, 1943, in which Morton ordered life boats carrying Japanes
> e survivors from a troop transport ship to be smashed with fire from a
> four-inch gun. O'Kane doesn't say anything about specifically targeting the
> troops, only that the life boats were destroyed and that machine gun fire was
> used to "scare the troops out of the boats." O'Kane's opinion is that Morton
> made the right choice because the Japanese troops, if they were pulled out of
> the water, would have immediately been thrown into the battle.

Are there other eyewitnesses of the event who saw it
differently? Where are their written accounts? Are the patrol reports
archived anywhere on the net?

---------------------------
Rod Rupert
Springfield, MO

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 08:55:41 -0600
From:    "Roddy R. Rupert" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Mush Morton

On Tue, 14 Mar 1995, Jodi Berls wrote:

>I suppose a private reprimand is
> better than nothing, and it would explain why Morton didn't make any effort
> to repeat his attacks on survivors in subsequent patrols.

Did the Wahoo ever sink another transport? If not, then the fact that
the incident was not repeated does not seem very significant.

---------------------------
Rod Rupert
Springfield, MO

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 07:14:15 -0800
From:    Allan_Wotherspoon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: QUES: Mountbatten pink

In message Tue, 14 Mar 1995 22:55:45 -0500,
  Jodi Berls <[email-masked]>  writes:

> A modeler friend of mine recently asked me about a color scheme involving
> "Mountbatten pink." I couldn't find anything in my stuff, but my guess was
> that it might have been a color used in so-called dazzle camouflage paint
> applied to warships. Beats me whether that's actually true or not -- I
> based it on a) Mountbatten having been a destroyer officer for at least
> part of the war and b) the painting on the back of my copy of *Jane's
> Fighting Ships of World War II* shows a vessel painted in dazzle with
> patches on it that appear to be -- believe it or not -- pink.
>
> Does anybody know what "Mountbatten pink" would have been used for? What
> kind of pink was it -- salmon? Light pink? More like fuschia?
>
> Jodi Berls
> [email-masked]
>

Jodi:

Mountbatten Pink (also referred to as nipple pink) was used on some RN
destroyers in WW2.  As a camouflage it would be most effective at dusk.  I
don't know if it was used in any pattern schemes as I've only heard of it
being used as an overall colour.  I have no idea about the actual shade.

Allan

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Allan J. Wotherspoon (e-mail: [email-masked])
Burnaby, B.C. Canada

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 10:37:08 -0500
From:    Max Calderwood <[email-masked]>
Subject: Strange American Desertion...

Wasnt there a notorious "Sgt. John D. Provoo" captured on Corregidor that
actually turned on his fellow prisoners and become a turncoat, making
propaganda broadcasts, camps visits etc. etc.

I think he was let off on a legal technicality.  I will check my records.
Does anyone have any additional info on this.  There were many Americans who
made broadcasts, but this individual actually acted agianst his fellow
prisoners and was an active collaborator.

Max

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 10:42:51 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Nimitz vs.(?)

Lou,
>Pity he didn't stand up for Joe Rochefort like that.  (Maybe
>  R. had offended/embarrassed even Nimitz?)
>
I expect Nimitz would have plugged the holes in the Pearl harbor Battleline
if he had been able to... Joe Rochefort had made too many enemies in high
places for anyone but God to save him, apparently. His good information
left a lot of senior leaders who didn't listen, out on a limb - those sorts
of egotists do not let that go unpunished. He was transffered to Washington
to be squashed, found incompetent and discarded - totally discredited, so
he counldn't hurt "important people"... a few of us know the truth, so
Rochefort is vindicated and a lot of Important WW II figures come across
"with their pants down" figuretivly speaking - Joe would probably enjoy
that

Jim O'Neil   Indecision is the cornerstone of Military Flexibility

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 10:43:01 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: REF: Looking for Soviet tactical practices

Jim,
All I know about are the DA-PAM 20 series which are compilations of what
the Germans learned in fighting the Russians [and how the Russians
attacked/defended etc] published in the early 50's. Hard to come by, but
good reading.

Jim O'Neil   Indecision is the cornerstone of Military Flexibility

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 13:10:51 -0500
From:    Sean Barnett <[email-masked]>
Subject: Mountbatten Pink

                      Subject:                              Time:  2:04 PM
  OFFICE MEMO         Mountbatten Pink                      Date:  3/16/95

I have also read of the Japanese using pink as a camouflage color.  I believe
it was IJN Haguro that was described as a "pink-painted cruiser" when it was
sunk near the end of the war.  I don't know anything about the shade of pink
or whether the whole ship was painted pink or pink was merely used in a
pattern.
                                                FYI,
                                                Sean Barnett

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 12:26:58 -0600
From:    JEFF ROBERTS <[email-masked]>
Subject: Churchill and Ireland

Recent discussion of the German "Green" invasion plan rekindled an old
concern which I'd like to share with the list.

Several years ago in graduate school one of our professors (one who I
respect greatly) told our class that during the war, at the depths of
the Battle of the Atlantic, Churchill actually made the government
of Ireland an offer to give them control of Northern Ireland at the end
of the war, provided that Ireland immediately opened her ports to British
shipping!  The Irish declined his offer and remained steadfastly neutral.

I've often wondered about this since that time, and have never run across
any source to confirm or deny it.  Have any of you ever heard the same
story, or run across it in any readings?  Or is this just so much malarkey?

Thanks for your input

Jeff Roberts
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 14:09:10 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Big guns (Japanese)

        Well, four is my lucky number, so...

        APPENDIX 4: Big Guns, Japanese Style

        In one of my earlier posts I made a passing reference to the use of
240-mm howitzers, the biggest mobile guns deployed overseas by the Japanese
during the war, in the reduction of the fortified island of Corregidor in
Manila Bay during April-May 1942.  There were ten of these weapons used in that
operation (and the earlier softening-up of the other island fortresses that
stretched like a deadly necklace south from Corregidor to the shore of Cavite
province).  These were siege pieces, antiquated in appearance but capable of
delivering a very destructive 400-lb shell to the target.  Their capacity for
plunging fire also came in handy in the topographical conditions surrounding
the Corregidor action.  The Japanese obtained larger artillery concentrations
in a few other instances, but the bombardment of Corregidor constituted their
best "Sunday punch" as far as heavy artillery was concerned.  In addition to
the ten 240-mm weapons, the Japanese also had 25 150-mm long-barrelled guns and
howitzers (the rest of the 116 pieces of artillery bombarding Corregidor were
105-mm long-barrel guns and howitzers or the ubiquitous 75-mm field guns,
although there were only 28 of the latter involved).  The 240-mm howitzers
proved gruesomely effective in many instances.  One of the first came on one of
the smaller fortified islands (after the fall of Manila, but before the final
breakthrough on Bataan peninsula to the north of the bay's entrance, these
southern forts were bombarded from positions on the Cavite headlands on the
south side of the bay).  A concrete tunnel wall, weakened and chipped by
previous hits from the heavy 240-mm shells, was penetrated by one of these
400-lb projectiles, which exploded inside the tunnel, where a large number of
US servicemen were lined up for a vaccination, with grisly results.  On
Corregidor itself a 240-mm shell caused heavy casualties when it landed right
at the entrance to Malinta tunnel, the island's HQ and nerve center, just after
dusk, when many of the personnel from the tunnel had gathered outside for a
smoke (there was no smoking permitted inside the tunnel, so it had become the
habit of the men to sneak out for a quick cigarette after sunset, when the
Japanese fire slackened considerably, as they preferred daylight bombardment
where fire could be constantly adjusted as necessary).  It was also a 240-mm
shell which detonated the magazine of one of Corregidor's two 12-inch mortar
batteries, setting off a blast which literally shook the entire island, and
which sent one of the huge mortars sailing hundreds of yards through the air to
land barrel-down on an adjacent golf course built for happier peacetime
days.  In one instance one of the huge 400-lb projectiles was actually (and,
one assumes, fortuitously) dropped straight down an air shaft, striking the
fuel tank of a generator which powered the equipment of an antiaircraft
battery, and horribly burning to death several of the men of that battery
(including their young commanding officer) who were sheltering in the tunnel
that housed the generator.
        The Japanese had all the advantages in this artillery duel.  The US
fortifications on Corregidor were impressive, with 10- and 12-inch naval guns
and a dozen of the squat 12-inch mortars, but they were all emplaced to stop a
seaborne invader from entering Manila bay, and most would not even bear on
Bataan to the north.  Furthermore, the hills in the south of Bataan were higher
than the highest points on Corregidor, so that the Japanese guns sheltered
behind the reverse slopes were safe not only from observation, but also from
the flat trajectories of the big naval guns.  That was why the various Japanese
howitzers played so important a role-- their more arching trajectory could lob
shells over the intervening hills.  Only the dozen big American mortars could
effectively return fire, but they were firing blind according to their best
guess regarding the Japanese artillery positions.  The Japanese, meanwhile, not
only had direct observation from high points on Bataan, but also constant air
observation from spotter planes circling overhead with relative impunity, as by
this time there were no longer US aircraft operating over Luzon, and
bombardment was progressively knocking out the antiaircraft batteries.  That
was why the Japanese preferred to do most of their shooting by daylight, when
they could make every shot count.  Despite the relative ineffectiveness of the
American return fire, an unnacceptably high proportion of the 25 150-mm pieces
were damaged during the operation.  Since little of this damage was due to
American artillery, one assumes most came from either worn-out barrels or
defective ammunition, another example of the logistical and industrial
deficiencies I keep harping on.  The unforeseen necessity for a prolonged phase
of offensive operations in the Phillipines was stretching the tender logistics
capabilities of the Japanese even at this early juncture. (Belote, "Corregidor,
The Saga of a Fortress")
        At any rate, the 240-mm howitzers were not the biggest guns in the
Japanese Army, not by a long shot.  The real big guns were the result of
another of those relatively rare examples of harmonious cooperation between the
Japanese Army and Navy.  After the treaty limiting the number and size of
battleships, the Japanese Navy in the early 1920's found itself with a surplus
of guns and turrets already built or commissioned for installation in new
battleships it would no longer be building.  So the Navy made the Army an offer
it could hardly refuse.  Basically, they told the Army, we'll provide the guns
and equipment for an elaborate coast defense system, and install it all for
you, if you'll agree to take over the responsibilty of manning and maintaining
the guns once they're in place.  The Navy provided for a total of 13 large
coast defense turrets, each mounting two guns-- specifically, three 410-mm
turrets, six 305-mm, two 250-mm, and two 203-mm.  The turrets themselves were
impressive works.  The largest ones, for the 410-mm and 305-mm guns, were
oblong structures thirty feet wide, forty feet deep, and nine feet high.  They
were made of armor plate a foot thick on all sides, and four inches thick on
the top (still enough to resist the majority of WW2 aircraft bombs).
Underground each turret was its own self-contained fortress, with a circular
pit containing the machinery to turn it and operate the electrical systems, a
forced-draft ventilation system to keep out fumes, and tunnels extending
outward to house the crew and the ammunition.  The smaller 250-mm and 203-mm
turrets, which were not quite as well armored, relied on extensive concealment.
Besides ingenious siting, these smaller turrets had their roofs covered with
six inches of concrete, and a foot of dirt on top of that.  The soil was then
planted with plants and weeds to match the surrounding vegetation, so that
after a year the structures blended in with their environment to an amazing
degree.  The gun barrels themselves could be depressed below ground level into
two parallel trenches, which were then covered with camouflage netting to
complete the picture.  The turrets were sited to take maximum advantage of
natural contours and reverse slopes-- the smaller turret at Sunosaki in Tokyo
bay employed this principal of natural concealment to such a degree that it
could only be brought to bear on ships which had already passed its position
and were now presenting their sterns.
        Most of the biggest guns were used to close-- yes, close-- the straits
seperating Japan from Korea.  There was a single (two-gun) 410-mm turret near
Pusan on the Korean shore.  There was another 410-mm and two 305-mm turrets
sited in an arc around the island of Tsushima roughly in mid-channel.  Finally,
the third 410-mm turret and one 305-mm emplacement were situated on the island
of Iki Shima close to the Japanese coast.  This was a state-of-the-art
defensive system, with fields of fire carefully calculated to interlock, and in
theory close the Tsushima straits to large enemy vessels.  Six other turrets
(two each of the 305-mm, 250-mm, and 203-mm) were used to create a deadly ring
around Tokyo bay.  This still left one 305-mm turret for use at Tsuguru,
covering the strait between the main island of Honshu and Hokkaido.
Unfortunately, almost all of the above was taken (virtually verbatim) from Ian
Hogg's "Fortress: A History of Military Defense," which goes into great detail
(including a cross-section drawing of one of the 305-mm turrets in Tokyo bay)
on the technical characteristics but makes no mention if they were used in
action.
        I should also say that on Okinawa the Japanese employed some big but
primitive 675-lb rockets (sometimes described as 320-mm spigot mortars).  These
were in essence terror weapons, launched from crude, v-shaped wooden frames
without any aiming or guidance systems, just sent flying toward the enemy lines
(where their effect was quite sensational when they did by chance hit
something).  On Iwo Jima the Japanese naval personnel also rigged up crude
rockets converted from 551-lb aircraft bombs, again without guidance and with a
range of only a little over a mile.  When they used up their supply of rockets,
the Navy men of this unit became footsoldiers.
        Finally, I want to thank Jim O'Brien for giving me a detailed answer to
my question on the use of radar by the Japanese Navy.  One fact he mentioned,
of which I was not aware but which fits in nicely with my general theme, was
that the Japanese Army first obtained radar through capturing British
ground-based sets in Singapore, and from there developed their own improved
models.  Since I think Jim sent his post straight to me and didn't put it up on
the list, I'll mention for the record that the first Japanese Navy shipboard
sets were installed on the battleships ISE, KONGO, and KIRISHIMA, and the
carrier SHOKAKU in August 1942, followed by the same equipment on the
battleship MUSASHI in September and the carrier ZUIKAKU in November.  The new
AKITSUKI-class destroyers were also fitted with this equipment before going
operational shortly thereafter.  In mid-1943 the Japanese Navy introduced a
radar detector for their ships as well.  The first Japanese Navy radar could
detect formations of aircraft at over 60 miles, single planes at up to 35
miles, and in a test picked up a battleship at 12 miles.  Thanks, Jim.
        Want to leave with a final image I found expressive, and relating to
the Manchurian campaign, namely a photo I once saw of Japanese officers lined
up to meekly deposit their swords in a big pile before their Russian captors.
Talk about a picture worth a thousand words.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 14:15:55 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA:Argentina Returns Ex-Nazi

>From the DoD Newswire 15 March 1995

:REPORT: EX-NAZI TO BE DEPORTED

   BUENOS AIRES, Argentina -- Argentina has promised to
extradite a former Nazi SS captain to Italy this month to stand trial
in the massacre of 335 Italian civilians, a U.S.-based Jewish group
said Tuesday.
   Erich Priebke, 82, has been under house arrest for nine months in
Bariloche, 1,100 miles southwest of Buenos Aires, since admitting to
a role in the 1944 massacre in the Ardeatine Caves outside Rome.
   Tommy Baer, the international president of B'nai B'rith, said
President Carlos Menem told him in a meeting Monday that everything
possible was being done to speed up the case.
   "Argentina has been getting the rap for the delay in Priebke's
extradition," Baer said Tuesday.
   "We told Menem that pressure from the United States and Italy is
mounting," said Baer, who was in Argentina on a two-day visit. "He
replied Priebke would be in Italy this month."
   A spokesman for Menem said he could not confirm or deny Baer's
account, but said Priebke was very likely to be extradited this
month.
   The massacre was in reprisal for the killing of 32 German soldiers
in Nazi-occupied Italy. Priebke has said he was following Adolf
Hitler's orders that 10 Italian civilians be executed for every
German soldier killed.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        [email-masked]
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 14:11:27 -0500
From:    James E Irwin <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA:Iwo Jima II

>From the DoD Newswire 15 March 1995

:VETERANS RETURN TO IWO JIMA

   IWO JIMA, Japan -- Harvey Garner looked down and fell silent
for a moment as his feet sank into the black sand of Invasion Beach.
"This feels familiar,' he said, tears welling in his eyes. "This
feels very familiar."
   From its eerie caverns to the crumbling gray pillboxes that dot
the landscape, Iwo Jima is an island haunted by its bloody past.
   But 50 years after Americans came here to find their own little
hell on earth, Garner and several hundred other veterans of the
battle to win this secluded crag put some of those ghosts to rest
Tuesday.
   "I don't feel bad about coming back here," said Garner, of Tampa,
Fla., as he walked down the beach. Fifty years ago, he ran for his
life up the same stretch of sand, with Japanese shooting at him from
both sides.
   "I thank God I made it. Many didn't," he said.
   The veteran of the 5th Marine Division was among more than 800
American vets and their families who came back to Iwo Jima for a 50th
anniversary memorial.
   U.S. troops stormed ashore on Feb. 19. Tuesday's ceremony, the
only official one planned by the military, commemorated the island's
capture after weeks of bitter fighting.
   A handful of Japanese survivors along with 100 or so relatives of
soldiers who fought here, including the son and widow of the Japanese
commander on Iwo Jima, Tadamichi Kuribayashi, also attended the
ceremony.
   The Japanese government, which has distanced itself from 50th
anniversary ceremonies, sent no Cabinet-level officials, even though
the Americans were represented by Navy Secretary John Dalton and
Marine Commandant Gen. Carl E. Mundy, Jr.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 James E. Irwin (Jim)                  Internet address:
 Defense Personnel Support Center        [email-masked]
 2800 S. 20th Street                   215-737-3678
 Philadelphia PA  19101-8419           Autovon 444-3678

                     "Never in the field of human conflict
                     was so much owed by so many to so few."
                               Winston S. Churchill
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 14:02:00 CST
From:    Roger Dunaway <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Ref: Defense of Truman

Tim,
That was really a good letter you wrote and I think you got your facts
straight.  I would only say that you should be sure to spellcheck your
letter first (of course you will!) and be sure none of the sentences
are fragmentary.
I think your key paragraph is the one mentioning the deadlock in the
Japanese cabinet that had to be broken by the emperor himself.  Emphasize
that without the emperor's intervention they would have gone on fighting;
after all, the Bushido Codde stated that a warrior never surrendered and
would fight to the death.  I might mention that, along with the fact that
even after Japan announced the decision to surrender several American POW's
in Japanese captivity were beheaded...not the sign of a peace-loving people!
Truman's decision was probably the best decision that could be made under the
circumstances and it probably did prevent the destruction of an entire generati
on.  One should also keep in mind that Japan started the war and committed
such atrocities as the rape of Nanking, the Bataan Death March, and the
murder of civilians in Manilla during the U.S invasion of  the Philippines.
Add to this the fact that the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" was an
excuse for Japan to plunder and oppress the nations under its occupation, and o
ne can see the mentality of the government that American decision makers (i.e.
Truman) confronted in 1945.  Anti-nuke activists tend to see things from
a 1990's perspective, forgetting what it was like at that time an totally
ignoring the context in which events occurred.
   So, Bretter, and if you want to use any of                             any
of the info I have supplied, please feel free.  Stay in touch, and keep 'em
in line there at the soon to be Truman State University!
Cheers,
Roger

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 15:56:52 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: MEDIA:RETURN TO IWO JI

I might mention that during the Iwo Jima commemoration, the Secretary of the
Navy announced that LtGen Charles Krulak was to become the new Commandant of
the Marine Corps, replacing Gen Carl Mundy on 1 July. Chuck Krulak is the son
of the famed LtGen Victor H. "Brute" Krulak, who, in my opinion, is one of the
smartest men ever to wear Marine Corps green. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 14:56:40 -0600
From:    "H-War Moderator Mark P. Parillo" <[email-masked]>
Subject: a new military history list

                                          ANNOUNCING H-WAR
                                        H-Net List for Military History

H-War is a moderated electronic discussion group and bulletin board for
scholars, librarians, and teachers in the field of military history and is
part of the H-Net family of LISTSERV discussion lists. We encourage
discussions and announcements concerned with any subspecialty or era of
military history, but especially those that may provide opportunities for
comparative and general perspectives on the entire field

The primary purpose of H-War is to provide a forum for military historians
and other scholars to communicate openly.  In this light, H-War will focus
particularly on research and teaching interests; new scholarship in the
field; discussions of military historiography that foster critical thinking
and enhance professionalism; and the sharing of knowledge and experience
about the teaching of military history, including posting and discussion of
course syllabi and reading lists.  In addition, H-War welcomes announcements
from scholarly and professional societies or other organizations about their
journals, conferences, fellowships, and funding opportunities.  We also
encourage organizers of conferences to send calls for papers and program
contents and graduate students to post abstracts of their doctoral
dissertations and research papers. H-War is also an appropriate forum for
information on bibliographic and archival sources, as well as reports on new
software, datasets or CD-ROMS relevant to military history.

H-War is edited by Prof. Mark Parillo of Kansas State University and Dr. Henry
Lowood of the Stanford University Libraries.  They can be reached via
electronic
mail at [email-masked] and [email-masked], respectively.
The editors consult with an editorial board of international scholars in the
field.

Subscription to H-War is free and open to professional researchers and
instructors in military history or allied fields and to other participants
concerned
with serious scholarship in the field.    When you send in a subscription
request,
the editors will send you a brief questionnaire; it must be completed and
returned
to confirm your subscription.  The information requested in this form tells us
about your professional interests and activities in military history and
will serve
as a directory of H-War members.

To subscribe: send an empty e-mail message to [email-masked], with the
following phrase in the subject line: HWAR SUBREQ.  The editors will send you
a brief questionnaire for the list directory.

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 17 Mar 1995 07:09:41 +1000
From:    "Wilber Williams, Prentice Centre" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP: Glacier Girl Pictures

Steve,

        How much space are we talking about for the pictures? And do you
have a Web page that goes with them? I could volunteer the services of one
of my machines.

Wilber

+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Wilber WILLIAMS                           [email-masked]       |
|Prentice Centre                           Telephone : +61 7 365 4232    |
|The University of Queensland              Facsimile : +61 7 365 4477    |
|Brisbane Qld 4072  AUSTRALIA              Pager : +61 7 831 6199 #20702 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 13:33:29 -0800
From:    Patrick Charles <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japan's role in WWII

        Today's Washington Post (March 16, 1995) has an article entitled,
Nagasaki Mayor Likens A-Bomb, Holocaust; Nagasaki and Hiroshima Mayors
Condemn U.S.".  The Post also a very interesting piece about
Australian historian Gavan Daws' new book called "Prisoners of the
Japanese; POWs of WWII in the Pacific".

Patrick Charles
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 15:44:54 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Japan's role in WWII

>         Today's Washington Post (March 16, 1995) has an article entitled,
> Nagasaki Mayor Likens A-Bomb, Holocaust; Nagasaki and Hiroshima Mayors
> Condemn U.S.".  The Post also a very interesting piece about
> Australian historian Gavan Daws' new book called "Prisoners of the
> Japanese; POWs of WWII in the Pacific".

Not entirely related, but I wonder if someone has been maintaining an
index of these articles that have been appearing in major publications
regarding the Enola Gay, the A-Bomb, VJ Day, etc... Doesn't matter what
viewpoint is being expressed.

On August 6th, we have the only flying B-29 on our ramp, which should make
for an interesting day (if not weekend).  Who knows... might see us on
national news.  :-)

However, we also have a large area dedicated for displays about the home
front.  It's been speculated that it might be interesting to hit the
library and photocopy the articles dealing with the whole A-bomb issue.
Would certainly make for a unique display.  (And I don't want to search
through mounds of newspapers for word-bites... I'm darn lazy... :-)

BTW:  Just for trivia's sake, St. Paul, MN (where the air display is held)
is a "sister city" of Nagasaki, Japan.  This is gonna be one different
weekend to be sure...

--
\\ Robert J. Granvin                                 User Services Specialist
// School of Statistics - University of Minnesota            [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 18:06:52 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: MUSH MORTON

I must state at the beginning that, as a former Marine and Marine Corps
historian, I am not all that enthralled with Nimitz. He bent over backwards
with his head up his you know what in the "interest" of preventing interservice
animosities in the POA. As a result, LtGen "Nelly" Richardson, USARPAC, could
come in and accuse the Marine Corps and Holland M. Smith of being nothing but a
bunch of beach runners and Marine officers incapable of commanding anything
more senior than a battalion, and Nimitz never said a word of protest to
support Smith. In the Smith vs Smith controversey on Saipan, when Robert
Sherrod wrote the story, which was passed by CinCPac censors and appeared in
Time, Nimitz was all for having Sherrod kicked out of the theater, and despite
Richardson's despicable behavior at Saipan--it is all in the record and I have
written a paper on it if anyone is interested--Nimitz still failed to support
his Marines, those who gave him the victories in the Central Pacific leading to
V-J Day. So, I cannot say that Chester Nimitz is one of my heroes. Ernie King
is, because he was what he appeared to be, a tough naval warrior who, it was
rumoured, shaved with a blow torch. MacArthur is something else, and i can only
fight on one front at a time. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 17:04:37 -0800
From:    Jim Curry <[email-masked]>
Subject: POW treatment

Like everyone else on this list, I've greatly enjoyed Mike Yaklich's
posts on WWII Japan. I look forward to more! Back toward the beginning
of the series, Mike had some comments relating to Japanese treatment of
Allied POW's-- which as you know was uniformly awful.
Something I've always been curious about is how the Japanese treated
their prisoners in earlier wars.  I have just finished reading Charles
Burdick's _German Prisoners of War in Japan,1914-1920_(University Press
of America,1982).  The Japanese captured nearly 5,000 Germans at Tsingtao
in 1914, and held them for over five years.
What struck me was how much better treated these men were than the Americans
captured in the Philippines, or the British Empire troops taken at Singapore.
Captivity for the Germans was no paradise; they considered their food and
lodging rather poor. Some of the camp commandants were harsh, and physical
punishment was sometimes inflicted even on German officers.
But Burdick, who based his account on German sources,mentions nothing like
the sadistic cruelty and total neglect suffered by World War II captives
of the Japanese.  I ran across no mentions of prisoner deaths, and over
time living conditions improved.  After 1919 the Germans were returned
home.
If Allied prisoners had been treated as well not much more than two decades
later,there would have been little reason to complain about Japanese
behavior.  Why was Japanese behavior so much worse in the second Great
War?  If Mike or anyone else has any explanation, I'd like to see it.
Jim Curry
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 20:09:01 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 17-MAR-1945

On 17-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the U.S. 1st Army sector, the 1st Division begins its
offensive on the east bank of the Rhine towards the river Sieg. The Remagen
bridge suddenly collapses, after thousands of tanks and trucks have crossed
it. The flow of supplies is ensured though by two additional bridges which
have been constructed downstream. In the 3rd Army sector, the 87th Division
crosses the Moselle near Guels and begins an offensive towards Koblenz. The
XII Corps reaches Boppard and St Goar. The 94th Division takes Birkenfeld.
The 80th Division establishes a bridgehead over the Prims in the Krettnich
area. Elements of the 65th Division cross the Sarr near Menningen while the
division prepares to break out of the Saarlautern bridgehead. In the 7th
Army sector the VI, XV and XXI Corps continue Operation Undertone with the
goal of breaching the Siegfied Line.

Eastern Front - In Hungary, the 3rd Ukraine Front makes progress between
Lake Velencei and Lake Balaton.

Philippines - In the XI Corps area, the 6th Division attacks eastward
against the Shimbu line. Elements of the 43rd Division continue futile
efforts to reduce Sugar Loaf. In the 8th Army sector, the Japanese are
firmly entrenched at Masilay and Pasananca. Elements of the 41st Division
reach Pasananca.

Iwo Jima - The 3rd and 4th Marine Divisions continue mopping up. The 5th
Marine Division has confined the Japanese to a small pcoket on the north
end of the isalnd. Lt. Gen. Kuribayashi is in this pocket which is 700
yeards long and 200-500 yards wide.

Burma - Fierce fighting continues in Mandalay. The Japanese continue to
hold Fort Dufferin.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 19:48:48 -0600
From:    Terrence Lindell <[email-masked]>
Subject: HUMOR - Nimitz & MacArthur

The recent discussion of Nimitz reminds me of a joke told me by a WWII
naval officer who took my WWII class the first time I taught it.  (He was
also the former dean of faculty; I'm happy he liked the course!)

It seems that Nimitz and MacArthur were debarking from a landing craft
in the Philippines, but the vessel dropped its ramp too early and they
both wound up stepping into the drink.  After floundering a bit in the
surf, they managed to struggle to shore.

After he had regained his breath, Nimitz told MacArthur, "General, I want
you to promise me that you won't mention a word of this to anyone.  My
sailors would never forgive me if they found out I can't swim!"

"Don't worry, Admiral.  I know just how you feel.  My troops would never
let me forget it if they found out I can't walk on water," responded
MacArthur.

Terry Lindell
Department of History
Wartburg College
Waverly, Iowa  50677
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 18:26:42 -0800
From:    Patrick Charles <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Churchill and Ireland

        I am not sure, but I think I read about this in Jerrold Packard's
"Neither Friend Nor Foe; The European Nuetrals During World War II".
The book is maybe two or three years old.

Patrick Charles
[email-masked]

On Thu, 16 Mar 1995, JEFF ROBERTS wrote:

> Recent discussion of the German "Green" invasion plan rekindled an old
> concern which I'd like to share with the list.
>
> Several years ago in graduate school one of our professors (one who I
> respect greatly) told our class that during the war, at the depths of
> the Battle of the Atlantic, Churchill actually made the government
> of Ireland an offer to give them control of Northern Ireland at the end
> of the war, provided that Ireland immediately opened her ports to British
> shipping!  The Irish declined his offer and remained steadfastly neutral.
>
> I've often wondered about this since that time, and have never run across
> any source to confirm or deny it.  Have any of you ever heard the same
> story, or run across it in any readings?  Or is this just so much malarkey?
>
> Thanks for your input
>
> Jeff Roberts
> [email-masked]
>

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 15 Mar 1995 to 16 Mar 1995
*************************************************