Subject: WWII-L Digest - 6 Mar 1995 to 7 Mar 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 8 Mar 1995 00:03:02 -0500

There are 56 messages totalling 2298 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Intelligence on Tirpitz (2)
  2. Battle of the Bulge
  3. Victory At Sea (3)
  4. TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS (4)
  5. VJ Day (6)
  6. Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5 (4)
  7. "Ching" Lee
  8. INF: Changes in German High Command
  9. more on "Glacier Girl" P-38F (3)
 10. Polish resistance
 11. VJ Day "remembered"
 12. Johnson Automatic Rifle
 13. NOST:  UK Sites (2)
 14. THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt (2)
 15. WEAP: Johnson Rifle
 16. WELCOME TO LIST
 17. LETTERS HOME
 18. Glacier Girl
 19. Victory at Sea, et.al.
 20. INF: 'Bradley, concerning Patton
 21. Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the Bulge)
 22. INFO. German Camp Numbers?
 23. INFO. German Professor Abbreviations (2)
 24. WW I list info? (2)
 25. More on Bong (3)
 26. Last Japan appendix-- the battlewagon war
 27. endlossung/Germans or Nazis?
 28. [INF] USAAF 8 MAR 45
 29. The Last Battlewagon War part 2
 30. Is Japan Sorry?
 31. 50TH: THREE DAY PARIS PASS
 32. INF: 50 Years Ago - 08-MAR-1945
 33. Re2: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt
 34. V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 01:21:28 -0500
From:    Jodi Berls <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Intelligence on Tirpitz

Sydney Allinson wrote:

> THE GREATEST RAID OF ALL

I've heard this title mentioned elsewhere, but frankly, the title struck me
as, uh, somewhat hyperbolic, and I was a little reluctant to launch an
all-out search for it (I understand that it's out of print). I guess what
troubles me is that, while the greatness of the heroism required to undertake
the Saint-Nazaire raid is unquestionable, whether the raid itself was all
that "great" is well open to debate. Is this book the only real source, and
is the text as flowery as the title?

Jodi Berls
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 12:31:07 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Battle of the Bulge

I also recall that the United States Marines also used the
JOHNSON AUTOMATIC RIFLE.
An unusual design, with a rotary magazine.
'Far as I know, the US Marines were the only force to use this weapon in
any numbers. After WW2, the Johnson was purchased to equip the Dutch
army fighting insurgents in the Duth East Indies - now Indonesia.

Anyone else have comment about the Johnson rifle?

Sidney.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 07:07:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Victory At Sea

As I reported last Saturday, WNET, the PBS station in New York
City, broadcast the complete 26 epsiodes of VICTORY AT SEA; they
repeated it on Sunday afternoon.  I and others are very critical of
the film used on this show and that is a true statement.  However,
on second thought, there are a few things I would like to say in
defense of this show.

1. It was aired in 1952 just seven years after the end of the war.
Much of the material we now have available was not available at
that time.

2. This show was produced by a commercial television network, the
National Broadcasting Company (NBC).  Compare this quality program
with the trash that is now broadcast on the commercial networks.

3. Richard Rodgers composed the music for the show.  What a
score!!!

4. Leonard Graves was the narrator.  What a voice!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Just my two cents.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 07:12:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

Ben Frank writes:

 >        By the way, while I have everybody's attention, in the Washington Post
 >yesterday, there was a story which said that the government, out of
 >appreciation for Japanese sensitivities, is not going to call or commemorate
 >V-J Day as V-J Day. The story says that the US and Japan agree that marking
 >WWII's end must be in low key. According to the article, and I quote,
 >"...Washington has assured Tokyo that U.S. government representatives at
 >commemorative events will avoid using the traditional term "V-J Day," short for
 >"Victory-over-Japan Day, to describe the end of the Pacific War. Instead, all
 >American material will simply refer to the "end of the war." I am absolutely
 >appalled and totally pissed off at this pusillanimous action on the part of the
 >government. It is an insult to all veterans of the Pacific War, living and
 >dead, and I call upon the members of this list to take whatever action is
 >within their limits to sound off on the matter. When I cool down sufficiently,
 >I intend writing a letter to the Post. Whether it is published, is another
 >story. An accompany article is headed: "V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era." What a
 >crock! Ben Frank, spring loaded in a pissed off position.

OK Ben, now that you are pissed off, let me piss you off some more.  In
yesterday's (Mon, 6 Mar) edition of the New York Times, there was an
article stating that many members of the Japanese legislature do not want
to appologize to other Asian countries for the Japanese actions during
WWII.  It seems that the Japanese "were liberating these fellow Asians from
the white man's colonialism" or some such bovine excrement.  I saved the
article and will post excerpts from it tonight.  But Ben, before you read
it, please take your Valium and fasten your seat belt!

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 07:29:45 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

Hello, Ben!

I wholeheartedly agree with your comment below!

What agenda does the government have to try and "play down" what the
vets tried so hard to accomplish? To me this is back-stabbing of the
worst sort.

Thanks for the post and allowing my two cents' worth on this.

All the best.

Terry

> "...Washington has assured Tokyo that U.S. government representatives at
> commemorative events will avoid using the traditional term "V-J Day," short for
> "Victory-over-Japan Day, to describe the end of the Pacific War. Instead, all
> American material will simply refer to the "end of the war." I am absolutely
> appalled and totally pissed off at this pusillanimous action on the part of the
> government. It is an insult to all veterans of the Pacific War, living and
> dead, and I call upon the members of this list to take whatever action is
> within their limits to sound off on the matter. When I cool down sufficiently,
> I intend writing a letter to the Post. Whether it is published, is another
> story. An accompany article is headed: "V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era." What a
> crock! Ben Frank, spring loaded in a pissed off position.
>

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 08:39:25 -0500
From:    "Roger D. Corrie" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Victory At Sea

It seems the older and more expert we get the more critical we are, I have a
very fond memory of setting in the den with my father and watching these
shows. It made me ask questions of him I would never have thought of at that
age. I gained a lot of respect for my dad when I saw his ship the USS Evans
after the four kamakazi aircraft had hit his ship, I started asking some
questions when dad went to his bedroom and brought out some papers and very
small little sack.  He showed me the presidential citation write up the ship
and let me hold the little sack.  I learned it was a prayer booklet taken
off one of the Japanese pilots.  I also learned he had given the parachute
to my grandmother.  The pray book is now on board the USS Alabama in the
Chiefs Quaters, which is a memorial to the Evans.  Victory at sea still does
today what it did for me then, it makes the children ask questions of their
fathers and granfathers. It may not be perfect, but in the eyes of this
third generation retired Chief Petty Officer I see all the shipmates that
went before!
CPORog (Roger D. Corrie)            CAG Devil 00 is down I need 5!!!
[email-masked]
http://www.infi.net:80/~cporog/     Is that 5 maintenance min. or 5 real min?
804-427-2200

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 08:43:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: VJ Day

Ben Frank writes:
 >        By the way, while I have everybody's attention, in the Washington Post
 >yesterday, there was a story which said that the government, out of
 >appreciation for Japanese sensitivities, is not going to call or commemorate
 >V-J Day as V-J Day. The story says that the US and Japan agree that marking
 >WWII's end must be in low key. According to the article, and I quote,
 >"...Washington has assured Tokyo that U.S. government representatives at
 >commemorative events will avoid using the traditional term "V-J Day," short for
 >"Victory-over-Japan Day, to describe the end of the Pacific War. Instead, all
 >American material will simply refer to the "end of the war." I am absolutely
 >appalled and totally pissed off at this pusillanimous action on the part of the
 >government. It is an insult to all veterans of the Pacific War, living and
 >dead, and I call upon the members of this list to take whatever action is
 >within their limits to sound off on the matter. When I cool down sufficiently,
 >I intend writing a letter to the Post. Whether it is published, is another
 >story. An accompany article is headed: "V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era." What a
 >crock! Ben Frank, spring loaded in a pissed off position.

For those of you who wish to blast someone, Bill Clinton's e-mail
address is:

      [email-masked]

Have at 'em!

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 08:49:32 -0500
From:    QUACK <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Victory At Sea

"I and others are very critical of the film used on this show and that is a
true statement."
What are you getting at? What do you and the others find objectionable?
Just wondering, Ron

Ron Musco
Poquonock,CT  The Statewith the #1 Women's Basketball Team in the country.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 08:48:24 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

Ben,
        As soon as I read your message I sent off an e-mail to Clinton
making my feelings known about this.  For those of you who don't know,
his address is [email-masked]
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 10:36:02 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

>        I wanted to mention that my calling Admiral Tanaka "the Japanese Kelly
>Turner" was a referral to his specialization in troop and invasion transport,
>not to any unpopular angles of the Japanese admiral's personality.  Overall,
>the US Navy was populated with some pretty good commanders in the admirals'
>ranks.  Chester Nimitz, the Pacific commander-in-chief, emerges as an
>operational mastermind and cool-headed war leader, Ray Spruance was (IMHO)
>prudent without being timid, and the American Navy also had the benefit of a
>solid second line of subordinate admirals like Mitscher, Jesse Ohlendorf, and
>the Chinese-American "Ching" Lee.

Does anyone out there have any bio info on "Ching" Lee - I have never heard
of this gentleman.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 10:59:44 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <[email-masked]>
Subject: "Ching" Lee

I answered my own question - "Ching" Lee is Read Adm. Willis Lee of Task Force
64 and the Battle of Guadalcanal.

"Stand Aside, I'm coming through. This is Ching Lee"

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 09:49:27 -0500
From:    James Ray Watkins <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

Ben Frank:

I probably don't want to step in here, but how would the U.S. government do
this? I do not mean this as a rhetorical question. It does seem distorting,
and insulting, but then again, does anyone know how to remember a war
without igniting exactly the old hatreds that the vets fought to stop? Seems
less like PC than a real problem to me. Would it work to have the Japanese
assist (given that they would fight that); if so, how? I think if we are
going to write the President we should have something more specific than
'that sucks!' I'm curious because, even if I sympathize with Vets, I don't
see any answers coming out of the complaints. What kinds of risks do you
think it would be worth taking, given the power of the Japanese
economically? It this a problem that isn't a problem? That is, the Japanese
would hem and haw but do nothing? If not, what do you think they would do?
Sorry for just questions, but I would really like to see how this could work
out: something concrete I would be willing to put my name to.

Ray Watkins
A.I., Department of Rhetoric and Composition
English, University of Texas at Austin

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:38:10 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: Changes in German High Command

   General Model had been promoted to German commander-in-chief on the
western front, replacing Rundstedt. Known as a zealous nazi, it was assumed
that Hitler was placing nazi party in high command on the western front
as he had done on the eastern front. This additional political control of
the high command was obviously forseen by Hitler, who wanted to bring the
German nation down with him.

-Al

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:43:05 EST
From:    "Dennis E. Sparks" <[email-masked]>
Subject: more on "Glacier Girl" P-38F

In response to the comments generated by my post on the restoration
efforts on the P-38F recovered from under the ice on Greenland...

The six P-38s were part of the 94th FS of the 1st FG - the famous
"Hat in the Ring" squadron of WWI fame.  The pilots for the six
aircraft were Lts. Carl F. Rudder, Harry L. Smith, Dallas "Spider"
Webb, Robert B. Wilson, Robert H. Wilson (no relation), and the
section leader for "Tomcat Yellow", Joseph B. "Brad" McManus.

McManus was the first to land.  Low on fuel, he had lowered his flaps
and landing gear in order to make a slow pass over what seemed to be
a promising emergency landing area.  As he opened his throttles to
climb away, both engines coughed and died from lack of fuel and he
settled in.  When the gear broke through the crust of ice and sank into
the slushy snow, the nosewheel snapped backwards and the aircraft
flipped over on its back, losing its left prop in the process.  McManus
survived with only a sprained shoulder.

The other five P-38s and one of the B-17s belly landed, with the pilot
of one of the P-38s shutting down his engines and feathering his props
before landing.  Because of the potential for less damage, this is the
aircraft that was recovered in 1992.  The second B-17 continued to circle
overhead for about a half hour, continuously transmitting its position
and the situation before it too was forced down bay lack of fuel.
Radio operators at both Bluie West One (BW1) and BW8 were able to get
a fix on the location.  A C-47 dropped supplies by parachutetwo days
later (17 July), and on 19 July, a PBY guided a rescue team with a dogsled
to the downed aircraft.  McManus and the two Norden bombsights from the
B-17s rode out on the dogsled, while the rest of the crew hiked 15 miles
across the ice to a waiting rescue boat.

It's my underestanding that the pilot of the aircraft that was recovered
in 1992 survived WWII, dying in the 1970s or so.  The recovery team
borrowed photographs from his next of kin to help pinpoint the relative
positions of the aircraft.  Several articles were returned to his
family after the aircraft was recovered.  BTW, Brad McManus was part of
the recovery team.

In response to questions regarding the recovery/restoration team's naming
of the aircraft, and designing a piece of nose art, to my knowledge the
aircraft originally carried no name or artwork.  As I may have mentioned
before, the only decoration appears to have been the insignia blue paint
on the wheel covers.  I still haven't heard anyone associated with the
restoration effort definitely indicate that the nose art will be painted
on the aircraft.  Perhaps they will merely display it on a signboard, but
I tend to doubt it.  The artwork is not very risque, and the style is
reminiscent of WWII-era pinups as in Esquire magazine, for example.

My personal preference (which is of almost entirely no consequence), is
that they do not paint it on.  But, while I'm no expert at aircraft
restoration, it does look like the team is going to extraordinary effort
to restore it to original condition, and I for one can overlook this
bit of vanity/public relations effort.  I hope that it does tour for
a while on the airshow circuit, giving people a chance to see this
unique piece of aviation history in flight.

After mailing off photographs of the aircraft to several people on the
list, I still have 30 or 40 shots left over.  If anyone else is interested,
drop me a note, and I'll be glad to send you a few.

Dennis E. Sparks
[email-masked]
Lexington, Kentucky

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:04:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Polish resistance

On 5 March, Nechama Cox wrote:

> I was just reading a book on the begining of the war and there was a
> mention to the Jewish defence of Warsaw when Poland was attacked in 1939.
> I have not hear of this before and I would be interested in any information
> on the topic that people could send my way.

Nechama,
     I have never read anything about a Jewish defense of the city of
Warsaw, but considering the fact that a significant portion of the
city's population was Jewish I would think that a great many Jewish
Poles would have helped to defend the city.  The city of Warsaw resisted
the Germans' attacks for so long that the western Europeans were
impressed by their efforts.  The London Polish government in exile
awarded the city the Vituti Militari, the highest award for valor
that the Poles had (comparable to the CMH).  Only once before had an
entire city been awarded the medal, the city of Lwow was awarded the
medal during the Russo-Polish War of 1919-1921.  The Germans were so
upset by the Poles stubborn resistence that they executed the mayor
after he was captured.  I hope this helps answer your question.

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 09:29:02 PST
From:    Alan Hepburn <[email-masked]>
Subject: VJ Day "remembered"

Can the person who posted the information about changing VJ Day
to "the end of the war" Day please post a source?  I've got
several people wanting some corroboration before they start
yelling at people!  Thanks!

---

Alan Hepburn             |                                                 |
National Semiconductor   |           DON'T   TREAD   ON   ME               |
Santa Clara, Ca          |                                                 |
[email-masked]     |                                                 |

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:38:40 -0600
From:    Jon Stevens <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Johnson Automatic Rifle

What caliber was this rifle? 30.06?

Was this rifle found to be a "dud" like the Reising smg in combat conditions?

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:37:27 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

> Ben Frank:
>
> I probably don't want to step in here, but how would the U.S. government do
> this? I do not mean this as a rhetorical question. It does seem distorting,
> and insulting, but then again, does anyone know how to remember a war
> without igniting exactly the old hatreds that the vets fought to stop? Seems
> less like PC than a real problem to me. Would it work to have the Japanese
> assist (given that they would fight that); if so, how? I think if we are
> going to write the President we should have something more specific than
> 'that sucks!' I'm curious because, even if I sympathize with Vets, I don't
> see any answers coming out of the complaints. What kinds of risks do you
> think it would be worth taking, given the power of the Japanese
> economically? It this a problem that isn't a problem? That is, the Japanese
> would hem and haw but do nothing? If not, what do you think they would do?
> Sorry for just questions, but I would really like to see how this could work
> out: something concrete I would be willing to put my name to.

Actually, many holiday or commemorative names have been changed over time.
Sometimes logically, sometimes unfortunately.

Every 4th of July, we Americans celebrate a day where we won our independence
by force from our now friend and ally, England.  On the other hand, Memorial
Day -- a day to remember those who have given their lives for our freedoms,
has been reduced to a paid day off of work and beer and picnic parties.

VJ day is not a holiday.  Nor is VE day.  Nor are these officially recognized
every year, such as Independence Day.

This year is the 50th anniversary of the final year of WWII.  Many of those
who lived through this time are still with us.  Although with a different
feel, there will even be VE Day commemorations in Berlin.

No one wants to revive or rekindle any old hatreds or angers.  The whole
purpose of commemoration is to remember the history, what happened and
why.

Japan is our friend today.  So is Germany, Italy, Spain, Mexico, England
and many other countries we found ourselves at war with at some point or
another.  By remembering those times when we were not friends and allies
may just help us preserve that friendship.

It's mostly a subconscious anger brewing at our own leaders.  WWII was a
bloody, brutal war and many people are still alive with first hand knowledge
and remembrance of it.  To protect the "Sensitivities" of our now-friend, then
enemy is enough to generate some sort of anger and frustration.

But "downplaying" the term "VJ Day" is usually not enough.  Why are people
angry today at this?  Because it's not the first occurrence of bowing in to
the questions we keep asking ourselves.  Many people, most of whom weren't
around 50 years ago, haven't come to terms with Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  A
sort of self-guilt has been created.

The U.S. intervened in the post-office and cancelled a stamp depicting the
A bomb in order to protect the sensitivities of our Japanese friends.  The
cancellation of the Smithsonian exhibit on the Enola Gay was roundly
criticized by the Japanese as a lost opportunity to "tell the true story"
around the event.  The Japanese government has requested that the U.S. does
not even invite them to WWII Commemorations and to respect their sensitivities,
the U.S. agreed.  Now, we will downplay VJ Day -- the day ALL of WWII came to
an end and all major hostiltiies and killing ended -- in order to protect
the sensitivities of Japan.

Japan is our friend and ally.  We should never forget it.  We shouldn't build
displays that try to create or revive animosities or anger.  But we also should
not deny history, what was done and what was sacrificed.

People aren't angry that the U.S. is downplaying the term VJ Day.  They're
getting angry because it is just one more in a long list of self-deprecating
actions that do an injustice to the memory of those who served then and those
who still survive today.  Most everyone has come to terms with their history.
If Japan has not, or refuses to, that is not anyone else's responsibility but
their own.  It is not our responsibility to subdue a major event in our own
history in order to protect those sensitivities.

This commemoration is a once-in-a-half-century event.  There will be another
remembrance of it in 50 years.  If it ever receives major recognition after
that, it will be on a 100 year basis.

For God's sake, it's not a holiday.  It's a remembrance of a major world-
shaking earth-shattering event that changed the world forever and created a
"ripple effect" that will be felt for centuries to come.

Commemorations must be tasteful and professional.  They must be truthful and
accurate.  They must be historical and educational.  They must be neutral and
not political.  They must not, however, be damaged because of political
agenda or fears.  That's just an insult to all who served -- Allied and
Japanese alike.

--
\\ Robert J. Granvin                                 User Services Specialist
// School of Statistics - University of Minnesota            [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 09:45:20 -0800
From:    Chris Albee <[email-masked]>
Subject: NOST:  UK Sites

I'm heading to London in a few weeks, and would like to hear any opinions
about the various WWII-related sites and museums within day-tripping
range of london.

Hard facts (locations, costs, hours, etc.) would be welcome as well.

Thanks,
chris

chris albee, [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 10:26:00 CST
From:    Richard Battig <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

While I must agree with you on this subject, President Clinton is our President
and should be titled as such.  If you do not like him, that is your right as
an American.  He however deserves the title.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:56:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

On 3 March, 1995, William Lippert wrote:

>     And that, in the end, is a tough question - who should pay the price?
> Is it fair for Speer and Doenitz and Ribbentrop to be the scapegoats for
> the entire nation?  Or is it fair for all the Germans to pay for the
> crimes of a few?  Or should the average bureacrat pay the price for simply
> doing his job, with little recourse, both under the command of people
> like Goebbels or Himmler and for the benifit of the German people as a
> whole who are not much less guilty than themselves?

William,
     I am not about to excuse Speer or Ribbentrop, but I have always
believed that Doenitz got a raw deal.  From what I have read, his only
"war crime" was that he was named Hitler's successor.  In fact, wasn't
part of the reason that Hitler picked him related to the fact that
Doenitz had remained outside of the politics of the Third Reich and
remained primarily a military man?  Just wondering!

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 13:20:22 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP: Johnson Rifle

I don't think my first posting got through so I'll repost (if the first
shows up I'll have egg on my face ;))

        Captain Melvin M Johnson Jr (USMCR) produced his first working
semi-automatic rifle in 1936, though it was to go through several changes
and modifications before it was perfected.  In 1940 he submitted it as a
possible service rifle, and a bitter partisan wrangle ensued between
supporters of johnson and those in favor of the Garand.  But the facts were
beyond despute.  The Garand had been in production for four years; 50,00
were inservice, and the 'bugs' were out of it; whereas the Johnson was a
relatively unknown quantity which would take quite a while to reach the
same state of perfection - and 1940 was no time for the US Army to change
horses mid-stream.
        However, others were in more desperate straits and the Netherlands
East Indies Army ordered 50,000 rifles.  Manufacture began, and the US
Marine Corp, unable to obtain Garand rifles as fast as it needed them, also
bought several thousand.  Production continued throughout the war, though
the USMC gradually replaced the Johnson with the Garand as supplies became
available and the Johnson was only used by the OSS and similar special
forces in the end.  Its reliability was not as good as the Garand and it
was continually being modified during production in the hope of improving
matters.
        The Johnson rifle was unusual in that it operated on the short
recoil principle, probably the only succesful military rifle ever to do so.
It had several ingeneous features, notably the rotary magazine which could
be topped up even with the bolt closed.  The barrel could be removed for
carrying, a feature which attracted intrest from the US Airborne forces who
used some of them.  After the war, however, the Johnson rifle was withdrawn
and has not been produced since.
        Johnson also produced a machine gun which used the same operating
principle as did the rifle.  It was fitted with a bipod and fed from a box
magazine on the left side which could be topped up from the right side of
the gun without having to remove it.  It was offered to the US Army and
turned down, but tthe Dutch Government ordered several thousand for use in
the Netherlands East Indies.  Before this order was completed the Japanese
overran the Indies and the balance of the production order was taken by the
US Army Rangers and the US Marines.  Though it was an excellent design and
made to high standards, it was too delicate to stand the rough and tumble
of combat and was prone to jam at inconvenient moments

The Encyclopedia of World War II  John Keegan

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 09:22:44 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: WELCOME TO LIST

  FOR JOHN BAXTER JONES
  I want to welcome you to the list.  Thanks for the background about
you.  I note you were in the 4th Infantry Division in Viet Nam.  By
coincidence, I was in it in WWII, as users of this list know.  I post
from time to time excerpts from my memoir LETTERS HOME: A WAR MEMOIR.
Hopefully you saw the recent one on my leave in Paris.
  I suppose you know there is a 4th Division Association and hope you
are a member.  If not, send me an EMAIL message, and I will tell you
about it.
  Regards, John Ausland, Oslo, Norway

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 09:18:41 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: LETTERS HOME

  FOR MIKE OAKS AND NEWCOMERS
  Glad you enjoyed the story of my leave in Paris.  Having helped, in
a modest way, liberate it, I still have a love affair with that city
and have enjoyed my many visits there since the war.
  You are right that my LETTERS HOME: A WAR MEMOIR is out of print.  I
have not plans to do another printing, because it is so much work to
market it.  I have, however, made a electronic version, which should
appear on the World Wide Web someday but I have no idea when.  The
fellow who plans to do it has difficulty getting around to it.
  In the meantime, I am peddling the book on disk.  Anyone sending me
an EMAIL message will get a flyer about this.
  Another thought.  The book is in a few libraries in the US.  For
example, the Firestone Library at Princeton, my alma mater, has a
couple copies.  There is also one at the Library of Congress.  Perhaps
your local library can borrow a copy for you on an interlibrary loan.
  Regards, John Ausland

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:41:08 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

Ron Babuka,

>>the Chinese-American "Ching" Lee.
>
>
>Does anyone out there have any bio info on "Ching" Lee - I have never heard
>of this gentleman.
>
I don't have a lot, But I assure you he was not Chinese American! The
"Ching" nickname was from an assignment in the Asiatic Fleet and he was a
recognized gunnery/battleship "expert".

Jim O'Neil   Indecision is the cornerstone of Military Flexibility

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:41:19 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: more on "Glacier Girl" P-38F

>In response to the comments generated by my post on the restoration
>efforts on the P-38F recovered from under the ice on Greenland...
>
>After mailing off photographs of the aircraft to several people on the
>list, I still have 30 or 40 shots left over.  If anyone else is interested,
>drop me a note, and I'll be glad to send you a few.
>
>Dennis E. Sparks
>[email-masked]
>Lexington, Kentucky
Dennis,
My 19 year old would very much like to have some of the pictures - he is
just getting really interested in WW II. I would be interested as well, as
a long time wargamer/history nut. Please send to :
Jim O'Neil
PO Box 555
Hereford, AZ 85615

Thanks,

Jim O'Neil   Indecision is the cornerstone of Military Flexibility

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 13:16:49 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: more on "Glacier Girl" P-38F

Dennis E. Sparks <[email-masked]> writes:
> After mailing off photographs of the aircraft to several people on the
> list, I still have 30 or 40 shots left over.  If anyone else is interested,
> drop me a note, and I'll be glad to send you a few.

        Can anyone scan these photos in and be made available via ftp?
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
What's he want a yacht for?  There ain't no money in yachts...

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 13:14:29 -0600
From:    "William L. Huber - SAA" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Glacier Girl

X-Orig-From: "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>

 {regarding nose art on reconstructed aircraft that had none
originally - at least not on that particular aircraft}

> This is essentially why I personally waffle a bit on the issue.  I would
> still prefer it not be applied, but it can be construed as acceptable, even
> to the purist.  :-)

Robert Granvin's point is well taken.  I guess it depends on who the
target audience is.  If its a bunch of aeronautical engineers who are
concerned with airframe design then nose art is distracting.  If its
a 7th grade class history field trip then AUTHENTIC nose art would
give the plane more of a persona and in that sense a historical
context.  Commemorating the men vs the machine as Robert said earlier.

Consider if the Enola Gay had not had a name painted on it, what would
we have been having so much discussion about? - that B-29 that dropped
the first atomic bomb ?  Enola Gay is a nice handle for the concept.

>From a strictly geewhiz perspective {the only one I feel qualified to
promulgate where aircraft are concerned :-) } it is the planes with
the really cool Vargas girl nose art and racy logos that sell the
postcards at museums.  A guy I work with here at Kelly went to Wright
Patterson on business and went to the museum after the conference.  He
doesn't know a Fokker from a Foxbat but what did he take a picture
of?? - the B-24 named "Strawberry Bitch" and he has it displayed on
his desk as I write this.

So I say, as long as its appropriate to the era, nose art is ok if it
is to displayed to the public.

Cheers, Bill Huber / [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 14:34:27 EST
From:    Doug McCabe <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Victory at Sea, et.al.

                   Ohio University Electronic Communication

   Date:  07-Mar-1995 02:34pm EST

     To:  Remote Addressee                     ( _MX%"[email-masked]" )

   From:  Doug McCabe                                Dept:  Library
          MCCABE                                   Tel No:  (614) 593-2715

Subject:  Re: Victory at Sea, et.al.

         Aside from such PC things as commemorating the end of the war in
    the Pacific as opposed to V-J Day another personal temperature-riser
    are the inexcusable uses of visuals not even closely related to the
    topic at hand.  _Victory at Sea_ is just one example and, somewhat
    cognizant of Jack's excuses for this series, it strikes me that this
    problem is rooted in simple laziness.
         There are thousands and probably millions of feet of film from the
    war in, yes, hundreds of repositories requiring hundreds of hours to
    search for the right material.  A hassle, but look at the alternatives:
    minor to gross misrepresentations of that war, which when added all
    together, present a warped sense of what happened.
         This is not a new problem.  Here in the US it dates back to the
    very first photographed war.  Brady, Gardner and others were all guilty
    of intentionally mislabeling photos, claiming to capture images of
    famous and infamous people or events - making the image fit the image.
    One might have thought that with modern times and sophistication such
    actions would have disappeared but perhaps man's vanity, laziness, and
    desire for profit overshadows mere historical accuracy.
         The problem even continues to this day.  A few years ago I saw a
    book on the Vietnam War which used two photos of an M-60 machinegun
    crew, several pages apart, shot from two different angles but labeled
    as different battles in two different places and times.
         Books are sometimes just as bad.  Cornelius Ryan (someone I'm
    close to since his archives are here) even used a photo in _A Bridge
    Too Far_ which turned out to be the 1940 German attack on Holland
    instead of an Allied resupply mission.  To his credit he had future
    editions corrected.  (I have attempted to do the same thing with the
    upcoming re-release of the book scheduled for this spring.)
         Granted, we who have images sould do a better job of getting the
    word out.  But these days there really is no excuse for dumping into
    programs wrong images just to have visuals or action.
         Then there are my complaints about bad maps in books.... I'll have
    to save that pet peeve for some other time.

    Doug McCabe

Received:  07-Mar-1995 02:34pm

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 13:46:16 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 'Bradley, concerning Patton

As you must imagine, the Tweflth Army Group would be privy to most of the
intelligence which the individual Armies had at their disposal, if not
the Corps commanders. Any discrepancy should be in the timing involved;
sooner or later Twelfth Army group should know the intell that was present.
That bit of reasoning I had moments after reading the following Forward,
written by Gen. of the Army Bradley about Gen Patton. The Forward is to
_Before the Colors Fade_ by Fred Ayer, Jr.

   "A leader - military or civilian - must be judged by results. Patton was
certainly a successful battle leader. He had a battle sense - a sixth sense
if I may call it that - which enabled him to foresee situations that were
developing and make dispositions to meet them. Some officers commented about
this even in maneuvers held just prior to World War II. I remember one
outstanding wartime example. After crossing the Moselle River near Coblenz
with about three divisions and moving rapidly south, he suddenly stopped
his advance and collected his forces. Some members of my 12th Army Group
staff expressed surprise and wondered why he did not keep going as the
advance was going so well. Knowing Patton's feel for battle, I suggested
there must be a reason which George felt but which was not apparent from
the information we had. True, the next day he was hit by a strong counter-
attack which he was able to repel because he had stopped and regrouped.
He then continued his advance." -Gen. Bradley, 1964

   The book has some memorable photos in it of Gen. Patton kneeling before
Prince Baudouin of Belgium, whom incidently was about 6 or 7 years old,...
There is also a photo just after his "leak" in the Rhine. Note that he
beat Montgomery across the Rhine by about 8-10 hours using bridging units.
Montgomery called for an enormous operation including a parachute drop
on the opposite bank, smoke, and some 18,000 men. It was an historical
event, since no modern army had crossed the Rhine in combat, and the
List knows that Patton didn't like being outstaged when it came to his
potential place in history.

-Al

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 14:50:58 -0500
From:    "John E. Kollar" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the Bulge)

The footage of that Austrian Battleship rolling over gets alot of play

in many different shows.  :)

John E. Kollar

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 15:10:58 -0500
From:    "Matthew R. Burchette" <[email-masked]>
Subject: INFO. German Camp Numbers?

People,
Can anyone out there either tell me the numbers that the Germans assigned to
their concentration and extermination camps or point me to a source? The
camps were all give a number begining with KZ. Such as KZ 123 for Nordhausen.
You get the picture. I would like to have these on file for future refs.
Thanks all,
Matthew Burchette

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 15:17:30 -0500
From:    "Matthew R. Burchette" <[email-masked]>
Subject: INFO. German Professor Abbreviations

People,
Here is another one for you. I am in the midst of reading a book on the V-1
and V-2 projects. There keep popping up abbreviations in front of scientists
names that I have no idea what they mean. Help! What does Dipl. Ing. and Dr.
Ing. mean when used in front of a persons name?
Thanks,
Matthew Burchette

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 15:20:32 -0500
From:    "John E. Kollar" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

Ray,

When I read Ben Frank's post the first thing I did was mail in to the
President, but I do see your point on this.  The memories of war are
nasty, but they should be otherwise we would think that war was a good
things (unintentionalized bastardization of quote), but the Japanese gov.
is getting really weird ideas on what happened in WWII, the last time
a nation this big a revision of history was in Germany circa 1930 when
people actually believed that their army had not been defeated in 1920.
When people start changing history, or revising it, the lessons that history
taught are changed.  Many Japanese are actually beginning to think that
they were 'freeing' the rest of East Asia (but don't ask the other
East Asians that question), which is wrong.  On the other hand, what
if Japan wants to tie her economy in to this?  We can play hardball too,
with the rest of east asia with us against Japan, and if we 'allow'
Iran to cut off the gulf to Japanese shipping, well...  My point is
I don't think the Japanese government would tie this in to the economy,
but they want to see how far they can push us to 'revise' our history,
and from their point of view everything they have done so far, from
the Abomb-stamp, to the Enola Gay, to the VJday they have won every,
battle, so why not continue pushing?  Maybe they can even get us to
change our flag from the flag that went up over so many criminally
murdered Japanese to a more benign format? (facetious)

John E. Kollar

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 15:23:14 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: WW I list info?

Sorry to bother this list with this query but I am certain some of you
would know the answer.  Would someone post directly to me the address
of the WW I list?
Thanks,
Brad Coon
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 16:30:28 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: More on Bong

        Since I shot off a quick reply on a list question regarding Richard
Bong, the top-scoring US fighter ace of the war, I wanted to make a few factual
adjustments (I won't say "correct my mistakes" because these are minor details
which do not really materially affect the accuracy of the incidents I
described.  Anyway, I was shooting from the hip).  Anyhow, in the incident I
referred to from spring 1943 (over Oro Bay, New Guinea), where Bong found
himself first with a Zero flying "wingman" for his P-38, then, escaping that
danger, went from the frying pan to the fire as he found himself confronted
with a whole flight of Zeros, that flight numbered nine Japanese planes, not
eight as I stated in the post (makes more sense when you consider the Japanese
operated in three-plane elements).  Also, when Bong spoke of the benefits of a
gunnery course he took between his two tours of combat duty, his actual words
were that had he taken it before his first tour he would have shot down 80
planes (instead of the 40 he is credited with-- in my post I misquoted Bong as
saying he would have had 20 more "kills."  Both minor points, I'm sure you'll
agree, but, hey, accuracy is accuracy.)  Most of this material, BTW, came from
Ray Tolliver, "Fighter Aces."
        While we're talking about Bong, I should also mention that in the fall
of 1944 he almost had a shot at his Japanese Army opposite number while
escorting a bombing raid over Balikpapan, Borneo (a mission which Bong
disobeyed orders to fly-- he was already due to be rotated out and was grounded
until the transport orders came through).  During that action Bong jumped three
Japanese Army Ki-43 fighters led by Lt. Satoshi Anabuki (proof-reading through
my Japan posts after the fact I see my flying fingers somehow truncated his
name to "Anaki").  Anabuki, commander by this time of 381st Sentai (roughly
equivalent to a squadron), I've seen credited with anywhere from 50+ to 70+
aerial victories-- the sources I've seen vary widely on Japanese Army aces.  If
the latter figure (70+) is correct, Anabuki would have been, as far as I know,
the Japanese Army's top fighter ace.  Whatever his actual score, the fact that
he was still alive in the second half of 1944 despite flying the Ki-43 alone
indicates he must have been a pretty good pilot (though by '44 he was flying
the improved version, with a little better speed and a tiny semblence of armor
protection).  At any rate, in fall '44, en route to the oil refineries of
Balikpapan, Bong jumped a three-plane element led by Anabuki, and shot down one
of the two trailing fighters.  Anabuki, however, alerted by the fate of his
wingman, utilized the superb maneuverability of his Ki-43 to break away, and
the two aces never actually locked horns.
        I should also say that losing one's wingman while concentrating on
attack maneuvers was a common fighter pilot's mistake, apparently easy to do in
the confusion and split-second decisions of high-speed fighter combat.  Even
experienced fighter pilots often did it.  Bong was lucky in his close scrape
over Oro Bay, but his survival is probably due to the fact that he remembered
to make sure his wing was covered before he got wrapped up in his attack.  One
famous American fighter pilot who didn't remember to check in a similar
situation paid for the omission with his life.  Col. Neal Kearby shot down 22
Japanese planes in a P-47 over New Guinea.  He won the Congressional Medal of
Honor for a mission over Wewak in October 1943.  Kearby was leading a
four-plane flight on a reconnaisance patrol over Wewak, a major Japanese base
(one of those that MacArthur's campaign deftly bypassed-- it was later taken by
Australian forces making an overland approach).  Their mission was completed,
they were low on fuel and headed home, when Kearby spotted a lone Japanese
fighter, apparently on patrol, pounced on it, and shot it down.  Then they also
saw a formation of a dozen Japanese bombers escorted by 36 fighters.  Despite
the odds of 12-to-1 against, and their low fuel situation, Kearby led his
flight into the attack.  He himself shot down three planes on his first deadly
pass through the Japanese formation.  Then, as a confused melee developed,
Kearby brought down two more Japanese fighters that were hanging on the tails
of other planes from his flight.  At last he led his Thunderbolts into the
safety of some clouds, and they headed for home, Kearby having bagged six enemy
aircraft in one mission.  As I said, Kearby met his death in a later action,
when, intent on shooting down a Japanese fighter, he did not notice that he had
lost his wingman.  Another Japanese fighter latched on to his tail, and
although this enemy plane was soon shot down by another American fighter, it
had already poured its fatal bursts into Kearby's P-47.  BTW, German ace Gerald
Barkhorn was shot down by Soviet number two ace Aleksandr Pokhryshin in similar
circumstances, when the Luftwaffe ace forgot to check his wing while boring in
on a Russian aircraft (Barkhorn survived a crash-landing but suffered arm and
leg wounds in the incident, from the summer of 1944).

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 15:41:49 -0600
From:    "C.K. Bryant" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INFO. German Professor Abbreviations

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, Matthew R. Burchette wrote:

> People,
> Here is another one for you. I am in the midst of reading a book on the V-1
> and V-2 projects. There keep popping up abbreviations in front of scientists
> names that I have no idea what they mean. Help! What does Dipl. Ing. and Dr.
> Ing. mean when used in front of a persons name?
> Thanks,
> Matthew Burchette
>

Dipl. Ing.  is short for Diplom Ingenieur which world be someone who as a
certificate in engineering.

Dr. Ing. is short for Doktor Ingenieur which would be someone with his
doctorate in engineering.

Hope that helps.

C.K. Bryant

*******************************************************************
"The Riskier the road, the greater the profit."    / C.K. Bryant
        The 62nd Rule of Acquisition               / W.I.U. English
*******************************************************************

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 16:13:47 -0600
From:    Jeff Dingbaum <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: More on Bong

Mike Yaklich,

Your posts on Bong and others losing wingmen bring up a question.
What did you do if you lost your wingman?  Did you hookup with a
twosome or did you look for someone else who had lost theirs also?

Jeff Dingbaum
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 23:40:36 +0100
From:    Emmanuel Gustin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

> the skies.  The Kittyhawk, for those who don't know, was essentially a
> souped-up P-40 with a Spitfire (Rolls-Royce) engine installed, boosting
> the speed by 15-20 mph over current P-40 versions.  This was also the
> plane flown by Australia's top ace Clive Caldwell for most of his
> career in North Africa (he later switched to a Spitfire).

Mike, that's not entirely correct. In fact, it's wrong.  Blame the USAAF
and the RAF:  they created the confusion. Curtiss built in its 'Hawk'
series the Hawk 75, Hawk 81, and Hawk 87. The Hawk 75 was the model with a
radial engine. The USAAC gave its Hawk 75s the designation P-36. The Hawk
81 and Hawk 87 were all called P-40 Warhawk, regardless of the designation
applied by Curtiss. Up to the P-40C were model 81 aircraft, and all later
models were Hawk 87s.

But the British tried (for a change) to be logical. They called the Hawk
81 the Tomahawk and the Hawk 87 the Kittyhawk. Most models of the Hawk 87
were powered by versions of the Allison V-1710 engine. Very typically, the
designation Kittyhawk mk.I was applied to both the P-40D and P-40E,
Kittyhawk mk.II was used for the P-40F, Kittyhawk mk.III for both the
P-40K and P-40M, and Kittyhawk mk.IV for the P-40N. Yes, it is confusing!
So only some Kittyhawks, equivalent to the P-40F, had Rolls-Royce Merlin
engines. It was not standard British practice to rename an aircraft when a
new engine was introduced.

Emmanuel Gustin

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 18:14:15 -0500
From:    Scott C Stathis <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: NOST:  UK Sites

>
> I'm heading to London in a few weeks, and would like to hear any opinions
> about the various WWII-related sites and museums within day-tripping
> range of london.
>
> Hard facts (locations, costs, hours, etc.) would be welcome as well.
>
> Thanks,
> chris
>
> chris albee, [email-masked]
>

  Chris

     I would highly recommend to sights one is the Impereal War Museum in
London and the other is the RAF Museum outside of London (sorry I don't
remember the name of the town but the Tube does stop there.) it takes about
two hours to get there and is well whether the trip. You can ask your travel
agent about the exact local.

Hope this helps
Scott
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 19:04:00 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Last Japan appendix-- the battlewagon war

        Appendix 3: The Last Battlewagon War

        The Pacific war was essentially the campaign the battleship fleets of
both the US and Japanese Navies had been preparing to fight for the previous
twenty years.  Each navy had its own circle of senior admirals who had gained
much of their experience in the days before air power had become a major factor
in military operations (especially naval), back when the battleship was the
mightiest instrument of military force on the planet.  These men still believed
in the battle line's supremacy in contesting control of the seas.  Furthermore,
a huge proportion of each navy's budget and resources had gone into building
and maintaining these expensive monsters during the interwar years.  Just as
the US Navy had its "gun club" of conservative admirals who still thought the
battleship was the decisive naval weapon, Japanese naval war plans prior to
Yamamoto's tenure as commander of Combined Fleet all envisioned a "decisive
battle" which they would win with their battleships in more or less the same
fashion as Admiral Togo had defeated the Russians at Tsushima in 1905.
        Events, however, were to lead to a much different sort of war than the
battleship backers had predicted.  Battleships would still play a prominent
role in the fighting-- indeed, this was probably the last time these armored
behemoths would roam the wartime seas in such numbers-- and would even meet
head-to-head on several occasions in the sort of classic battle line actions
the "gun club" members foresaw.  But the decisive weapon of naval warfare in
the Second World War was destined to be air power, not surface gun power, and
this became clear very early on in the Pacific conflict-- in fact, from the
very first week of fighting.  The advent of Yamamoto and Fukodome to the
controlling positions in Japanese naval planning led to the emphasis on
airpower, particularly as deployed by aircraft carriers, in subsequent Japanese
Navy operations.  The success of these Japanese tactics left the Americans with
little choice but to reply in kind, especially since the opening Japanese
strike at Pearl Harbor left the US Navy in the Pacific temporarily without a
battleship fleet.  Only when the Japanese had lost their carrier-based air
weapon did they revert to trying to win the sea war with their battle line,
only to discover that air power had indeed made such tactics impractical in the
waters of 1944.
        Most of the interwar period had been governed by naval arms limitation
treaties among the major naval powers, which imposed absolute limits on the
numbers and tonnage of battleships the signatory nations could build.  The
ratio accepted between the three biggest navies, the US, British, and Japanese,
was 5:5:3-- i.e., for every five American or British battleships the Japanese
were allowed to have three.  Another clause limited the size of all new
battleships to under 35,000 tons.  The US and British navies generally tried to
design ships that could be combat-effective while remaining within the limits.
The Japanese, in the early post-World War I period, had launched an ambitious
battleship construction program which was one of the driving forces in leading
to the establishment of the treaties in the first place (battleships then being
considered more or less the equivalent of nuclear weapons today-- the most
terrible and most expensive weapons of war-- most governments were eager to
avoid a costly arms race in the tight post-war fiscal atmosphere).
        Japan had 11 battleships in December 1941.  Eight of these were older
vessels built during the First World War, but since modernized.  The KONGO,
KIRISHIMA, HARUNA, and HIEI were fast ships, almost in the battlecruiser class
(32,000 tons; eight 14-inch [356-mm] guns; armor 8 inches thick in main belt;
up to 30 knots).  The heavier FUSO, YAMASHIRO (35,000 tons, 24 knots), HYUGA,
and ISE (36,000 tons, 25 knots) were more traditional battleships, all carrying
a dozen 14-inch guns and main belt armor a foot thick.  But the two vessels
which created international attention were the post-WWI NAGATO and MUTSU, among
the most powerful ships in the world in the early 1920's (38,000 tons; eight
16-inch [406-mm] guns; main belt 13 inches; 25 knots).  Added to these older
ships, the Japanese received just as hostilities were commencing the brand new
YAMATO, the most powerful battleship ever built.  It mounted nine 18.1-inch
(460-mm) guns, with a maximum range of 35 miles! Its armor was 16 inches thick
in the main belt, up to 25 inches on the main gun turrets, and this 68,000-ton
monster could move through the water at 27 knots.  A sister ship, the MUSASHI,
was also nearing completion, and would be ready roughly a year later.
        The American battle fleet was also a mix of modernized older vessels
and powerful new ships.  Counting the new ships just entering service, the US
Navy had 17 battleships in December 1942, but of course the American Navy also
had a two-ocean commitment.  There were many classes, so I'll just mention that
the US fleet included (in addition to the pre-WWI ARKANSAS-- 26,000 tons,
twelve 12-inch [305-mm] guns, 21 knots, 11 inch armor in main belt) the WWI or
early post-WWI battleships NEW YORK, TEXAS (27,000 tons; ten 14-inch guns;
12-inch main belt; 21 knots), NEVADA, OKLAHOMA (29,000 tons; ten 14-inch guns;
13.5-inch belt armor; 20 knots), PENNSYLVANIA, ARIZONA, NEW MEXICO, IDAHO,
MISSISSIPPI, CALIFORNIA, and TENNESSEE (33,000 tons; twelve 14-inch guns;
14-inch belt armor; 21 knots).  Added to these dozen older ships were the more
powerful WEST VIRGINIA, MARYLAND, and COLORADO (32,000 tons; eight 16-inch
guns; belt armor up to 16 inches thick; 21 knots).  These latter three reveal
the tendency of US battleship design for much of the interwar period,
emphasizing heavy gunpower and armor above all other considerations.  The US
ships were able to carry such heavy above-the-waterline protection, BTW,
because they adopted the British "all-or-nothing" concept, which essentially
stated that instead of uniformly armoring the whole ship, extra protection was
concentrated around vital areas-- like the main belt and the bridge tower--
while less essential parts of the ship were given either token protection or
none at all.
        The two newest US battleships at the time of Pearl Harbor were the
WASHINGTON and NORTH CAROLINA, just entering service (37,000 tons; nine 16-inch
guns; 12 inch main belt; 28 knots).  These ships reflected a rethinking of
design concepts to the extent that they sacrificed some of their protection in
favor of greater mobility, but acheived a pretty good balance between
firepower, protection, and speed.  The small bugs and flaws in the design of
these ships were largely rectified in the succeeding SOUTH DAKOTA class (SOUTH
DAKOTA, INDIANA, ALABAMA, MASSACHUSETTS), all of which entered service in 1942
(37,000 tons; nine 16-inch guns; 28 knots; main belt armor 12.25 inches, with
major improvements to underwater protection).  These vessels rendered very good
service in the coming conflict, but were soon supplanted by the even better
IOWA-class ships.  Probably the most efficient battleships of the war, the
IOWA-class ships set new standards for large warship design.  At 46,000 tons
(well over 50,000 tons combat-loaded) they were most impressive for their
speed, making an astounding 33 knots, and thus capable of operating with the
fastest new carriers to form extremely powerful task forces.  Their firepower
was also first-rate, with nine 16-inch guns, and armor plate was 12.25 inches
in the main belt.  The general excellence of this design was reflected by the
fact that some of these ships still were able to play a useful role in the
recent Persian Gulf war, and are only being retired from active service as we
speak.  The first of these four ships (IOWA, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, WISCONSIN)
were delivered in 1943, and all four were active by 1944.
        The characteristics of the IOWA-class vessels showed how the role of
the battleship had changed by the second half of the Pacific war.  No longer
were they expected primarily to face their opposite numbers of the Japanese
Navy in a head-to-head slugfest a la Tsushima or Jutland.  Now their task was
to operate along with the fast carriers, to give support and protection against
enemy heavy ships if such appeared, but primarily to act as swift, floating gun
platforms for conventional and antiaircraft artillery.  All of the US
battleships from the WASHINGTON on carried the superlative secondary armament
of twenty dual-purpose 5-inch (127-mm) guns.  These weapons, with a very rapid
rate of fire when served by a properly-trained crew (on the American
battlewagons they all were), were often deadly against surface targets of all
kinds, but they also functioned as heavy antiaircraft guns.  In this latter
employment they truly came into their own when utilizing another example of the
American technological superiority, the proximity fuse.  This was essentially a
tiny, very short-range radar built into the nose of the shell.  The radar
detonated the shell as soon as it was close enough to detect an enemy plane
(i.e., whenever its signal bounced back).  Used during the final year of the
Pacific war, these shells made the 5-inch a truly formidable antiaircraft
weapon.  But US battleships, even by mid-war, were bristling with antiaircraft
guns of all kinds.  For example, at the end of 1943 the WASHINGTON carried (in
addition to the twenty 5-inch guns) 60 automatic 40-mm Bofors guns (on twin
mounts) and 83 automatic 20-mm Oerlikons.  Even a single ship thus provided
could throw up an impressive AA barrage all by itself.
        I didn't mention the British, although they too had 15 battleships and
battlecruisers in 1939, and some of these came to be involved in the Pacific
fighting.  Most of the British battle fleet was at any rate tied down in
European and Mediterranean waters for much of the war (where their chief
preoccupation, post-war historical slant aside, was the Italian fleet for much
of the conflict).  The British battle line included ten old WWI ships (three of
them modernized) mounting eight 15-inch (381-mm) guns each.  They were also
building five newer vessels, the KING GEORGE V-class (KING GEORGE V, PRINCE OF
WALES, DUKE OF YORK, ANSON, HOWE).  These were fast and well-protected,
although the British had made the decision of arming them with smaller 14-inch
guns (a policy Churchill, among others, disputed).  The first of these new
British battleships entered service in 1940, and all five were operational by
1943.
        The Pacific war began with two major disasters for the Allied battle
fleets.  The first and most dramatic, of course, was the virtual destruction of
the US Pacific Fleet battleships at Pearl Harbor in the war's opening act.
Both of these debacles also demonstrated in a fearsome manner the ascendancy of
airpower over conventional surface warships, and gave rise to the dramatic
change in the battleship's perceived role alluded to earlier.  At Pearl Harbor
the US Navy lost the OKLAHOMA, ARIZONA, WEST VIRGINIA, and CALIFORNIA sunk; the
NEVADA beached to prevent sinking; the MARYLAND and the TENNESSEE badly
damaged; and the PENNSYLVANIA, which was in dry dock at the time, also damaged
but less severely.  That amounted to eight of the Pacific Fleet's nine
battleships out of action (albeit temporarily) and forced the US planners to
adopt a strategy, like it or not, in which the battle line would not play the
leading tactical role.  I mentioned earlier the meticulous Japanese training
and preparations for this attack.  Not least of these was in weapons
development, some of which was geared to this specific operation.  Much of the
damage to the US battleships at Pearl was caused by Nakajima B5N bombers of the
first wave.  These single-engined, three-seat aircraft were already nearing the
end of their usefulness in late 1941, being too slow and vulnerable to operate
effectively in the face of heavy fighter opposition-- not a big problem at
Pearl because most of the US fighters were caught on the ground and destroyed
by attacks against the main Hawaiian airfields (see note at the end of this
text on US fighter response on 12/7/41).  Their versatility, however, made the
B5N's still usefull, in that they could serve as either level or torpedo
bombers.  One important Japanese technical breakthrough, just in time for the
Pearl Harbor operation, was the development of an air-dropped torpedo that
could run in Pearl's shallow water-- in many places no more than 35 feet deep--
without hitting bottom.  Another, more primitive but nonetheless ingenious
expedient was the creation of special armor-piercing bombs, made by essentially
welding fins on to standard 16-inch armor-piercing naval shells, to penetrate
the armored decks of the ships moored in "Battleship Row" at Pearl.  The B5N's
in the attack carried either a torpedo, the special AP bombs made from shells,
or the Japanese Navy's standard 551-lb anti-ship bomb.  The other type of
Japanese aircraft in the attack (besides the covering Zero fighters) was the
Aichi D3A dive-bomber.  Like the Army's later Ki-51, the D3A lived by its
superb maneuverability-- when not carrying bombs it could dogfight with most
contemporary American fighters-- but it lacked the Ki-51's armor protection,
and these aircraft too would prove increasingly vulnerable when confronted with
enemy fighter defenses.  The D3A was limited as a means of shipping attack by
its inability (normally) to carry bombs heavier than 220 lbs.  However, a
compensating factor was the accuracy of its form of attack, honed to an art
form by the Japanese carrier pilots through constant practice (and through
learning to dive to lowest possible altitude before releasing their bombs and
pulling out-- this was how they acheived hits with a reported 80% of their
bombs dropped against British cruisers in the Indian Ocean a few months later).
        It was the torpedos which proved the most devastating to the ships at
Battleship Row.  OKLAHOMA and WEST VIRGINIA were hit by nine torpedoes each.
CALIFORNIA-- its watertight doors below deck open for a routine inspection at
the time of the attack-- was sunk by two.  The OKLAHOMA capsized, taking 400
men down with it.  It was hits by two of the special 16-inch shell bombs,
however, that caused the spectacular explosion of the ARIZONA, which killed
some 1,200 of the 1,500 men on board, including Rear-Admiral Kidd-- roughly
half the total fatalities suffered by the Americans at Pearl that day.  The
Japanese pilots took their time-- Fuchida led his flight around for two "dry
runs" over Battleship Row before finally dropping his bombs on the third pass.
The accuracy of the attacks, especially from the torpedo bombers (who also put
several torpedoes into the target ship UTAH, an old battleship, in a case of
mistaken identity), reflected not only their skill developed by long and
realistic training, but also the fact that their targets were sitting ducks.
Of all the US battleships, only the NEVADA managed to get under way during the
raid-- despite having already been hit by a torpedo and shaken by near misses
from five heavy bombs.  The NEVADA was hit by five more bombs from dive-bombers
of the second wave as it tried to navigate through the narrow exit from the
harbor, but it was damage below the waterline from the single torpedo hit that
forced her captain to beach the ship.
        Two days after the debacle at Pearl, another disaster overtook the
Allied battleship forces in the Pacific.  The British had managed to base a
small battle squadron known as "Force Z" at Singapore, hoping the presence of
these ships would be a deterent to the Japanese (a carrier was supposed to also
be part of this force but the one earmarked was undergoing repairs on the other
side of the world in December 1941).  "Force Z," under Admiral Tom Phillips,
consisted of the new battleship PRINCE OF WALES (38,000 tons; ten 14-inch guns;
28 knots; main belt armor 15 inches) and the First World War battlecruiser
REPULSE (32,000 tons; six 15-inch guns; 27+ knots; nine inches of belt armor).
While investigating a (false) report of Japanese landings on Malaya's east
coast, the ships of "Force Z" were set upon by a strong force of Japanese Navy
G3M land-based two-engined bombers.  Despite the heavy antiaircraft armament on
the modern PRINCE OF WALES, with 170 barrels capable of providing AA fire, both
ships were sunk, the PRINCE OF WALES taking five torpedoes and one bomb, the
REPULSE hit by four torpedoes and a bomb.  Of about 3,000 crewmen on the two
ships, some 2,000 were saved, but Admiral Phillips and Captain Leach of the
PRINCE OF WALES chose to go down with their ship (Captain Tennant of the
REPULSE also wanted to remain but was dragged off by his officers).  The
Japanese lost three planes.

        For brevity's sake I'll break this into two parts.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 18:23:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

On Wed, 1 Mar 1995, Kelvin Luther wrote:

        Finally, the only country not to contribute to the holocaust was
Bulgaria.  They refused to export their Jewish population to Poland, and
were the only European country in the German domain to see a war time
increase in their Jewish population.  It was possible for people to
resist collaborating with the holocaust and your right, France deserves
to be exposed for their unparalleled amount of collaboration.

Kelvin,
     While the Bulgarians may not have actively contributed to the
Holocaust, the fact that they were an Axis power prevents them from
claiming that they had no part in the Holocaust.  By giving military
aid to the Germans they allowed the Germans to divert men and material
to the Concentration Camps.  Someone else suggested that the Poles
might have been both anti-German and anti-Semitic.  Using that analogy
the Bulgarians might be described as pro-German and pro-Jewish.

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:22:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 8 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
THURSDAY, 8 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  A-26, Douglas Invader
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  B-26, Martin Marauder
  C-46, Curtiss Commando
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-38, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  P-61, Northrop Black Widow
  P-70, Douglas

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 34 B-24s, supported by 21
P-51s, pound Shihkiachwang; 3 B-24s claim a transport sunk in the S China
Sea; 16 B-25s and 6 P-40s attack railroad tracks, boxcars, gun positions,
sampans, and locomotives, knock out 2 bridges and damage another, and destroy
and damage several locomotives at or near Hengshan, Yehhsien, Lohochai, and
Chungmow; 140+ fighter-bombers fly armed reconnaissance over wide areas of S
and E China, attacking numerous targets of opportunity, mainly river, road,
and railroad targets, storage areas, gun positions, and troops, concentrating
around Changsha, Changanyi, and a bridge at Puchi.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 20 P-47s support the
British 36 Division; 40 fighter-bombers hit troop concentrations and supply
areas along the battlefront and behind the enemy lines; 39 others sweep roads
S of the bomb line, attacking gun positions and other targets of opportunity.
Transports fly 554 sorties to advanced bases and over frontline areas.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 3 missions are flown.
  Mission 872: 1,353 bombers and 326 fighters are dispatched to hit benzol
plants, an oil plant and rail targets in Germany using PFF; NO AIRCRAFT ARE
LOST AND THERE ARE NO CASUALTIES!
  1. 360 B-24s are sent to hit marshalling yards at Betzdorf (70), Siegen
(114) and Dillenburg (73); targets of opportunity are Limburg (10) and
Frankfurt (10); bombing is by H2X radar; 3 B-24s are damaged. Escorting are
99 of 102 P-51s.
  2. 526 B-17s are dispatched to hit the Robert Muser (99) and Bruchstrasse
(63) benzol plants at Langendreer, the Gneisenau benzol plant at Dortmund
(110) and Heddernheim chemical factory at Frankfurt (122); secondary targets
are the marshalling yards at Giessen (69) and Frankfurt (18); 13 others hit
Wetzlar, a target of opportunity; bombing is with H2X radar; 26 B-17s are
damaged. The escort is 95 of 99 P-51s.
  3. 458 B-17s are sent to hit the Emil benzol plant at Essen (114), the
Mathies Stinnes benzol plant at Bottrop (37), the August Viktoria benzol
plant at Huls (111) and the synthetic oil plant at Buer Scholren (75); 109
hit the marshalling yard at Essen, a target of opportunity; bombing is by
Micro-H; 1 B-17 is damaged beyond repair. 93 of 98 P-51s escort.
  4. 9 B-17s fly a screening mission.
  5. 27 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  Mission 873: 11 B-24s drop leaflets in France, the Netherlands and Germany
during the night without loss.
  Mission 874: 15 B-24s attack the marshalling yard at Dortmund during the
night without loss and 4 of 7 B-24s fly CARPETBAGGER missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): 328 B-26s, A-20s and A-26s hit 7
communications centers, 2 marshalling yards, a road overpass, and a military
transport depot in the furtherance of the interdiction program; weather
prevents fighter operations except for a small alert mission by the XXIX
Tactical Air Command (Provisional). Operational HQ of the XXIX Tactical Air
Command (Provisional), HQ 84th Fighter Wing and HQ 303d Fighter Wing move
from Maastricht, the Netherlands to Monchen-Gladbach, Germany; the
detachments of the 39th Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron, 10th
Photographic Group (Reconnaissance) operating from Gosselies and Le Culot,
Belgium with F-5s, return to base at Jarny, France.

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): 550+ B-17s and B-24s hit
marshalling yards at Hegyeshalom and Komarom, Hungary, and Verona, Italy, the
locomotive depot at Maribor, Yugoslavia, and the steel works at Kapfenberg,
Austria; P-51s and P-38s fly escort and reconnaissance missions.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, medium bombers are
hampered by heavy clouds but hit the Novara marshalling yard, Longarone and
Mori rail fills, and Rovereto bridge; fighters and fighter-bombers pound
communications and supplies, destroy a road bridge SW of Bologna, severely
damage an ammunition plant and surrounding complex NW of Milan, and hit
several other targets, including a bridge near Montebello which Brazilian
P-47s operating with the XXII Tactical Air Command cut in half; A-20s,
operating during the night of 7/8 Mar, attack river crossings at Borgoforte,
Cremona, Ostiglia, San Benetto Po, Viadana, and Ora, and numerous vehicles,
lights, and general movement in the C Po Valley and along the Brenner line.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 14 B-24s from Guam Island bomb Susaki Airfield
on Chichi Jima Island through heavy cloud layers; 5 more B-24s hit the
airfield again in 5 individual harassment strikes during the night of 8/9
Mar.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: B-24s pound the
Zamboanga area on Mindanao Island. On Luzon Island, B-24s hit road targets at
Balete Pass while A-20s support guerrilla forces in the San Fernando area;
fighter-bombers hit fuel dumps, gun positions, and other targets near Angat
and Ipo dam and numerous targets of opportunity in the Antipolo area,
personnel and storage areas near Baguio, and several targets in the Cagayan
Valley (including the town of Caggay, the Dummun River area, and barges at
Naguilian). The 6th Combat Cargo Squadron, 2d Combat Cargo Group, based on
Biak Island with C-46s, begins operating from Samar Island; and the 550th
Night Fighter Squadron, XIII Fighter Command, based on Morotai Island with
P-38s, P-61s and P-70s, sends a detachment to operate from Tacloban, Leyte
Island.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

03/0120Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:04:35 EST
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995 11:56:00 CST Alex Bielakowski said:
>
>William,
>     I am not about to excuse Speer or Ribbentrop, but I have always
>believed that Doenitz got a raw deal.  From what I have read, his only
>"war crime" was that he was named Hitler's successor.  In fact, wasn't
>part of the reason that Hitler picked him related to the fact that
>Doenitz had remained outside of the politics of the Third Reich and
>remained primarily a military man?  Just wondering!
>
>Alex Bielakowski

     I don't have the book with me, but Padfield in his biography of Doenitz
goes into detail about his trial and sentence.  As a general rule, the
Russians wanted them all to hang.  The British were a little more selective.
The Americans were probably the most forgiving.  In the case of Doenitz,
he was found guilty, I think, of waging aggressive war and war crimes.  The
first was because of his position as Fuhrer der U-Boat and then CINC-Kriegs-
marine.  The second was for his infamous "Laconia" order, I think it was
called, saying that (and this is not a direct quote but off the top of my
head) "the rescuing of surivivng crew members of enemy ships is incompatible
with the total war on the sea.  All efforts must be taken to see that the
crew of enemy ships do not hinder naval operations".  According to him,
he was just saying that U-boats shouldn't surface to rescue survivors for
longer than they had to - only to capture captains and other officers.
But in one incident, the U-boat Captain gunned down all the survivors
after rescuing the captain and the XO.
    Doenitz made the case that this was a misinterpretation of the order
and, no matter what anyone thought of it, the order had no applicability
because of the risks of surfacing for any length of time no matter what
the reason - gunning survivors or not.
    You can decide for yourself whether the "waging aggressive war" should
apply to Doenitz - that's a fairly subjective question.  As for the latter
order, it's hard to say precisely what he meant.  On the one hand, if
he really did give the order to gun survivors he should have been executed.
But if not, then maybe his term was a little harsh.
    In the end, the decision was a compromise.  I seem to recall that
Padfield said that the Tribunal did not issue any specific explanation,
only a "guilty on counts two and three" (I think it was those two).  The
Americans were ready to let him go, the Russians hated him, and the British
weren't overly fond of him, either.  The ten year sentence doesn't make
much sense but was the best punishment that they Allies could agree upon.
    As for the last Fuhrer part, I suspect that it applied more to the
Russians than the West.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:43:22 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: The Last Battlewagon War part 2

        The twin disasters of Pearl Harbor and the sinking of "Force Z" changed
the Allied approach to naval operations virtually overnight.  The question of
how to employ battleships became somewhat moot, as there were hardly any
battleships left to be employed.  The American Navy had to fight a carrier war
because that was all it had left.  The British Navy, which had four old,
non-modernized WWI battleships in the Indian Ocean, basically fled before the
raid of Kido Butai's carriers in the spring of '42 (after two heavy cruisers
and the small carrier HERMES had been lost to Japanese carrier air attacks).
The loss to the Americans from the Pearl debacle, however, was not permanent.
All of the battlewagons sunk at Pearl Harbor except the ARIZONA, which had
broken in half when it exploded, and the OKLAHOMA were eventually put back into
service.  Even the OKLAHOMA was raised, but was not considered worth repairing.
By 1944 all of the "lost" ships from Pearl Harbor were once again ready to
fight the Japanese, and saw considerable service in the last year or so of the
Pacific war.
        This service was nonetheless somewhat different from that envisioned
when the ships were first designed.  Increasingly, the job of the US
battlewagons came to be shore bombardment.  As the US Pacific counteroffensive
gained momentum, the value of these floating heavy artillery emplacements in
"softening up" island defenses before landings came to be increasingly
appreciated.  At Saipan in June 1944 the six battleships of Mitscher's carrier
task force, including the new IOWA-class ships, dropped 2,400 16-inch shells on
the island in two days.  Poor target selection and the relative inexperience of
these ship's crews at shore bombardment did (unfortunately for the Marines who
were about to land) limit the overall effect of this pounding.  After
complaints about inadequate fire preparation on Saipan, Guam was hit by some
28,000 naval shells (almost all of 5-inch or larger calibre) before the
landings began there.  The culmination of this awesome artillery support
potential was the invasion of Okinawa.  There the preliminary naval bombardment
lasted a week, during which 27,000 heavy shells were rained on the shore.  And
the battleships and other warships stayed around to provide further support,
usually directed by forward observer teams up with the combat infantry, once
the land fighting got under way.  On Saipan naval gunfire was particularly
effective against Japanese armor attempting to counterattack.  On Okinawa, in
the heaviest single day's bombardment of the Pacific war, 324 pieces of
artillery ashore were joined by six battleships, six cruisers, and eight
destroyers to plaster the Japanese main defense line with 19,000 shells in less
than 24 hours.  (Ironically, this did not seem to have a major effect on the
deeply dug-in Japanese-- I mentioned in an earlier post some effective antitank
tactics by the Japanese on Okinawa-- in this instance they knocked out 22
Shermans supporting the US Army's 27th Division during one day's assault on
Kakazu ridge).  The weight of explosive the battleship's heavy guns could
deliver was truly impressive.  Nevertheless, the tangible results of these
heavy bombardments were often less than expected.  I mentioned earlier the
complaints of inadequate pre-landing artillery preparation at Saipan.  The same
criticism was leveled at Iwo Jima, and even on Okinawa I remember Samuel Eliot
Morison writing of his surprise to note, after going ashore himself, that the
practical effects of the heavy shelling were considerably less than would have
been expected.  In part the problem was the flat trajectory of the heavy naval
ordinance, especially battleship 16-inch guns.  These were meant to get maximum
range, and the biggest ones required a correction for curvature of the earth
when aiming, but on the sea where they were designed to fight there were no
intervening hills or mountains.  At Iwo and other places it was noted that the
big naval guns had great difficulty hitting caves or positions sited on reverse
slopes-- in fact it was practically impossible for them to do so.  It was the
same principle which allowed Japanese guns and howitzers (especially the
latter) concealed behind hills in Bataan to win an artillery duel with the
heavy naval guns (10- and 12-inch) emplaced on the heavily fortified island of
Corregidor in April-May '42. Thus the heavy firepower of the battleships
attempting to operate in a land-support role they were not originally designed
for had some limitations.  These big ships with their big guns could
nonetheless be devastating when used for directed fire against targets in the
open, and thus were particularly effective against Japanese counterattacks.
        The fact that Allied battleships came to be increasingly used for
invasion fire support does not mean that they completely relinquished their
intended role in fighting the enemy battle line.  There were still a few
notable confrontations between battleships during the Pacific war.  The most
memorable was the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in November 1942.  A
Japanese force headed by the battleship KIRISHIMA ran into an American covering
force including the WASHINGTON and the SOUTH DAKOTA.  An incredible slugging
match of big ships toe-to-toe in narrow waters ensued, in which both the
offensive capabilities and incredible durability of the more modern US
battleships was amply demonstrated.  An untimely electrical
problem left the SOUTH DAKOTA dead in the water at the very start of the fight.
This ship attracted most of the Japanese attention.  The KIRISHIMA and its
attendant vessels plastered the American battlewagon with 42 large-calibre
shells, including a number of 14-inch, but did not sink the US ship.  The
preoccupation of the Japanese with the SOUTH DAKOTA allowed the WASHINGTON to
smother its adversary with accurate radar-directed gunfire (this being a night
action-- the American superiority in naval radar is something I've referred to
before-- none of the Japanese ships in this engagement had radar).  The
KIRISHIMA was hit by nine 16-inch and forty 5-inch shells from the WASHINGTON
in the space of only seven minutes, and was sunk.
        The one other classic battleship action of note in the war also ended
badly for the Japanese, when the FUSO and YAMASHIRO tried to force their way
through the Surigao Strait during the naval battle of Leyte Gulf.  In another
night action, both were sunk, the FUSO by two torpedoes from US destroyers, the
YAMASHIRO when the six American battleships of Jesse Ohlendorf's squadron
"crossed the T" and blasted the Japanese ship into junk with their combined
firepower.  The victory was all that much sweeter for the Americans in that
five of Ohlendorf's six battleships were refurbished Pearl Harbor victims.
        The Japanese, as the war developed, were left in just the opposite
position as the Americans.  The loss of their carriers at Midway, and the
atrocious wearing away of their trained aircrews culminating in the "Great
Marianas Turkey Shoot," combined to make them increasingly reliant on their
battleships in planning for the "decisive battle" as the war went on.  Leyte
Gulf was their great attempt to allow their battle line to close with the
Americans through a complicated series of movements, but it failed in the face
of US air power.  The MUSASHI was sunk (albeit after absorbing tremendous
punishment, 19 torpedoes and 17 bombs, before going down).  The Japanese were
never able to close with the enemy in a meaningful way, and during the battle
the NAGATO lost a turret to air attacks, and the YAMATO was struck by two
bombs.  Japanese attrition to their battleship arm had been proceeding
throughout the war, and unlike the Americans (who brought eight new
battleships into service after 1941) they built no more battleships, except for
getting the MUSASHI operational.  The HIEI had been lost in the same week as
the KIRISHIMA, severely damaged by US cruisers in another nocturnal slugfest of
big ships known as the First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, and finished off by
American torpedo planes the next day.  The powerful MUTSU was lost to an
explosion, presumed accidental, in June 1943.  The KONGO was sunk by the
American sub SEALION in November 1944.
        As the war progressed, the Japanese needed carriers more than
battleships, and they tried to convert some of their battleships to this task.
The HYUGA and ISE were made into hybrid seaplane carriers, their rear 14-inch
gun turrets removed and replaced by a short flight deck.  In this guise they
could carry up to 23 seaplanes each, but the limitations of both the ships and
the aircraft they employed rendered this stop-gap of little value.  The
Japanese also had, at the start of the war, a third YAMATO-class battleship
already under construction.  This ship, the SHINANO, was instead to be completed
as a super-carrier.  The vessel was however never completely finished.  While
being transferred between ports in Japan it was sunk by the American submarine
ARCHERFISH in November 1944, at least partly due to the overconfidence of the
ship's captain, who, mindful of the amount of damage the MUSASHI had absorbed,
kept sailing onward after the torpedo hits.  But the SHINANO was not as well
protected as its sister ship, its watertight doors and bulkheads had not all
been installed, and its skeleton crew was not as adept at damage-control as the
sailors had been on the pride of Combined Fleet.
        The last great Japanese battleship to be sunk was the YAMATO, making a
vain and suicidal sortie to attempt to aid the defense of Okinawa in April
1945.  It was sunk by swarms of American aircraft without getting anywhere near
the island or the US invasion fleet, although again it took repeated hits to
put the big ship under water.  Of the 3,332 men aboard the YAMATO, only 269
survived.  Admirals Ito and Ariga went down with the ship.  What was left of
the Japanese battle fleet, virtually out of fuel, was crippled in its home
ports by American air raids.  The HARUNA, HYUGA, and ISE at Kure and the NAGATO
at Yokosuka were all struck during July 1945, and none was fully repaired
before the war ended.
        The job of gunnery support for the land forces was not free of its
perils for the American battleships either, particularly after the onset of the
kamikaze suicide air offensive.  Off Okinawa the US battlewagons were regular
targets.  Already during March 1945 the NEVADA, participating in a preliminary
operation, was hit by a suicide plane.  The NEVADA was struck again, this time
by Japanese shore batteries (which hit it with five shells of 6-inch or larger
calibre) on Okinawa in early April.  I've already recounted in my last post how
the WEST VIRGINIA was hit by an Okha rocket-powered suicide plane on April 1st,
the day of the Okinawa landings.   Also in April off Okinawa, a kamikaze struck
the TENNESSEE, the MARYLAND was hit by a suicide plane on one occasion and a
bomb from a conventional air attack on another, and kamikaze or conventional
attacks also scored hits on the NEW YORK and the MISSOURI (the "Mighty Mo,"
later famed as the ship on whose deck the Japanese surrender was signed in
Tokyo bay, was also hit on two occasions-- once by a kamikaze plane that did
little more than burn some paint off the ship's armored side).  The NEW MEXICO
was hit on May 12th as the suicide offensive continued.  The big ships
performed a variety of jobs during the war, but they were seldom out of harm's
way.
        I should also mention the contributions of other Allied battleships in
the Pacific, even thought the US fleets bore the brunt.  At Okinawa, the
American forces were joined by a British fleet under Admiral Fraser, which
included two of the KING GEORGE V-class battleships and five carriers (with a
total of 250 planes).  Even the French eventually got involved.  After France
rejoined the Allies, the battleship RICHELIEU (39,000 tons; eight 15-inch guns
in two quadruple turrets forward of the bridge; 30 knots; 13 inches of armor in
the main belt) was sent to the Pacific in 1945. It participated in a
bombardment of Sabang in April '45, and participated in British operations
against Rangoon in May.  In both these operations the RICHELIEU was joined by
the old British battleship QUEEN ELIZABETH, which also mounted eight 15-inch
guns.  While I'm discussing these British operations, I'd like to note for the
record that the last large-scale amphibious landing of the war was the capture
of Balikpapan by the Australians in July 1945.

        End notes:

        I referred to the lack of a US fighter presence at Pearl Harbor (in
spite of the detection of the Japanese strike force by American radar-- as most
on the list know, the contact was considered to be a flight of B-17's which
were due to fly in that morning).  In fact, six American fighter pilots did get
airborne and engage the Japanese that day.  George Welch and Ken Taylor were
the most successful.  These Army pilots drove to a little-used secondary
airfield and got two P-40's up.  They had no lack of targets, and Welch claimed
four Japanese planes while Taylor shot down three (most of these coming when
they got in among a formation of dive bombers from the second wave).  Welch
wound up the war as an ace with 16 victories.  American pilots claimed a total
of 11 Japanese planes on the day (the Japanese lost 29 aircraft in the Pearl
Harbor operation).  Another US Army pilot who got airborne was Verl Jett-- only
to discover that in his haste he had taken off in a fighter with unloaded guns.
Jett later got to compensate for his frustration somewhat flying a P-39 over
New Guinea, where he gained seven victories in 1942.  Charles MacDonald,
mentioned earlier as the number five US ace in the Pacific (with 27 "kills" in
a P-38-- for a time he commanded the "Satan's Angels" group on New Guinea to
which number two ace Thomas MacGuire also belonged), on his own initiative
organized a flying fighter patrol over Pearl after the raid, in case there was
a further follow-up.  This gained MacDonald more action than he hoped for, as
he was almost shot down by nervous American antiaircraft gunners when he tried
to land for more fuel.

        As a final thought, I want to say that the Japanese defensive tactics
of the late war period which I talked so much about recently were most
effective when the Japanese were able to dig in dominating some crucial
position (as at Biak or on Iwo, where their caves overlooked the airfields
which were the rationale for the landings in the first place).  This made sure
the campaign could not be concluded without digging them out.  It was not always
enough just to find good defensive positions and then dig in.  MacArthur in
particular learned to leave such positions more or less alone if they were not
absolutely vital, and just let the Japanese sit and starve.  This was
essentially what happened on Luzon-- Yamashita's forces sat in their forbidding
central mountains until the war ended.  MacArthur's plan for the invasion of
Japan proper would have done much the same thing-- secure the ports, plains,
and cities, and let the enemy retreat to mountain strongholds to rot if he so
chose.  On Okinawa my guess is that the repeated attacks against Ushijima's
strong bottleneck in the south of the island (after he had surrendered the
northern airfields almost without a fight) were largely due to the need to have
the island secured in order to free up the massive naval support offshore.

        Regards and thanks to any who have borne with me...

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:48:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Is Japan Sorry?

The following article appeared on Page A9 of the Metro edition of the NEW
YORK TIMES on Monday, March 6, 1995.  I have summarized this article and
any typos are mine.

MANY IN JAPAN OPPOSE APOLOGY TO ASIANS FOR WAR

The Japanese Parliment is considering whether Japan should apologize for
invading other Asian countries during WWII and murdering millions of
people.  Many members of the Pariliment are saying that the apology is not
realling needed and support for it is floundering.

Seisuke Okuno, 81, a former Cabinet minister and the leader of 161
lawmakers opposing the resolution said, "These countries had been colonized
and oppressed by whites, so our purpose was to free those nations and
stabilize them.  Incendiary bombs fell on Japan like rain, and atomic bombs
were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  And the Russian Army committed
mind-boggling atrocities against Japanese.  So we think that there were war
crimes more serious than any committed by Japan."

Opponents of the resolution have held a demonstration and obtained 4.5
million signatures on a petition against it.  Masao Horie, chairman of the
Japan Veterans Association, which vigorously opposes the apology resolution
said, "I think World War II was one in which Japan was cornered and forced
to fight for its self-defense."

The U.S. froze Japanese financial assets and imposed an oil embargo on
Japan in the summer of 1941 beacuse of the Japanese occupation of French
Indochina (now Vietnam).  Mr. Horie said that the sanctions meant that
"Japan had no choice but to stand up and fight; otherwise, Japan would have
perished."

Hirotake Yabe, executive director of the Japan Veterans Association said,
"we are trying to change views toward the war but there's still a strong
camp that sees Japan as a villan and believes that Japan conducted a war of
aggression.  They do this with the help of other countries such as China.
So this debate over the resolution is a critical point to determine which
view will prevail."

This bovine excrement is the same thing being offered by criminals in US
criminal courts today.  Wonder if some of our defense lawyers are coaching
the Japanese.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:48:24 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

        Looks like I blew it again on "Ching" Lee.  Don't know where I got that
notion from (that he was Chinese-American)-- its probably a good thing I've
finally come to a conclusion as it seems my quality control has been slipping a
bit in recent installments.  Anyway, accuracy is sure to be served since its
pretty tough to slip anything by this list.
        Thanks for the correction.  I thought it was a pretty tacky nickname if
he was of Chinese descent.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:36:07 -0600
From:    JEFF ROBERTS <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 50TH: THREE DAY PARIS PASS

John:

        I'd like to add my name to the rather lenghty list of folks
        who have expressed their appreciation for your sharing your
        "Letters Home" with us.  I enjoy them very much.

        Your most recent post, however.  I'll explain below.

>           Dear Folks, February 23, 1945, Germany

much deleted ....

>
>           Now to our first evening in Paris. Really no more exciting
>           than an evening in any large city. We went by metro
>           (subway) from Palais Royal to Pigalle. Pigalle is one of the
>           less desirable sections of Paris. We went to the Club Moulin
>           Rouge, which is described by some as a clip-joint. And it is.
>
>           A glass of orange juice to use as a chaser cost 80 francs
>           ($1.60). A bottle of champagne 1000 francs ($20). Capt.
>           Miles and Lt. Parker, who is one of the engineer officers that
>           works with our infantry regiment, and I took in the floor
>           show and somehow acquired some very friendly girls.
>
>           No doubt you will wonder at this. Well, you need not, for
>           there is no woman shortage in Paris. One can walk the five
>           squares from the Hotel Louvre to the Opera and will be
>           stopped no less than fifteen times. In bars or clubs they
>           swarm about like flies. Their price is a package of cigarettes,
>           chocolate bars, or, if you insist, money.
>
>           About five came over to the table. We offered them drinks.
>           They accepted. In no time at all they had drunk all our
>           scotch. Even that was all right, but when they started to
>           quarrel among themselves as to which of them would take
>           which of us home with them and two girls came to blows,
>           we decided it was time to leave.
>
more deletions .....

>           Sunday evening we went to the Folies Bergere.
>
>           Monday morning I slept. In the afternoon, I ran into Marlene
>           Dietrich, and I mean ran into her. When going into the
>           officer's clothing store, she was coming out the door I was
>           going into. A violent collision, apologies, and she went on.
>           I didn't. I turned around to stare. They're not worth a
>           million dollars, but nearly!
>
>           In the evening, we made the rounds of the bars. The others
>           met girls to whom they took a fancy. I returned to the hotel
>           about midnight. (Damn it, why did I have to receive such
>           Puritanical rearing?)
>

        This whole passage is rather surprising, in that it is not very
        "Puritanical" at all!  As someone born in 1959, yet taught that
        the 1940's and 1950's were times of restraint in matters of human
        sexuality, this is a remarkably open letter!  (and sent to your
        parents none the less!!)

        Did the high command really not care to let it be known that its
        officers were going to "clip joints" and hanging out with women
        so nasty that they drank all the liquor and then fought over who
        was going to "do the nasty" with who?  I'm really a little sur-
        prised that this made it past the censors.

        I should point out that I'm not at all surprised that this kind
        of stuff went on, indeed it's rather common in all war situations,
        I'm simply surprised about the openness of it all.  I know that
        the Army came under some criticism for overly strict policies in
        World War *One* (and a decline in morale which they allegedly at
        times provoked), perhaps this openness is a result.  Then again,
        maybe I just need to reassess by impression of the 1940's ---
        maybe it really wasn't what Donna Reed & Beaver Cleaver's mom
        imply!  :)

        Comments welcome, and thanks again, John.

        Jeff Roberts
        [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:52:12 -0600
From:    Terrance Lewis <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW I list info?

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, Roger Coon wrote:

> Sorry to bother this list with this query but I am certain some of you
> would know the answer.  Would someone post directly to me the address
> of the WW I list?
> Thanks,
> Brad Coon
> [email-masked]

[email-masked]

"T"

    ~*+**************************************************************+*~
    <     [email-masked]    [email-masked]     >
    <     History Program       Southern University at New Orleans     >
    < author of "Dorothy L. Sayers' Wimsey & Interwar British Culture" >
    ~*+**************************************************************+*~

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 22:05:07 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 08-MAR-1945

On 08-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the Canadian II Corps
attacks Xanten, which they take. In the U.S. 1st Army sector, the 1st
Division pushes towards the Rhine. The III Corps is engaged in reinforcing
the birdgehead at Remagen. In the 3rd Army sector, the VIII Corps advances
towards the Rhine.

Eastern Front - Fighting continues south of Stettin and Danzig as well as in
Silesia.

Philippines - The XIV Corps begins an eastward drive against the Shimbu
line. In I Corps area, elements of the 33rd Division take Mt. Magabang. In
the 8th Army sector, all organized resistance on Palawan comes to an end.

Iwo Jima - The VAC attacks toward the coast after artillery and naval
gunfire preparation. A few hundred yards are taken in some sectors.

The Homefront
-------------
U.S. Prisoners Back From Luzon - Two hundred seventy-five U.S. officers and
enlisted men have arrived by transport in San Francisco from the Cabanatuan
prison camp in the Philippines. Some hadn't seen America for eight years.

Ohio Floods - The Ohio River has flooded and paralyzed transportation and
scores of war plants in Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky and
Indiana. At least 10 deaths have been reported, with more than half a
billion dollars worth of damage. Hardest hit are Cincinnati, Pittsburgh and
Louisville, Ky.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 21:18:00 CST
From:    Alex Bielakowski <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re2: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, William Lippert wrote:

     I don't have the book with me, but Padfield in his biography of Doenitz
goes into detail about his trial and sentence.  As a general rule, the
Russians wanted them all to hang.  The British were a little more selective.
The Americans were probably the most forgiving.  In the case of Doenitz,
he was found guilty, I think, of waging aggressive war and war crimes.  The
first was because of his position as Fuhrer der U-Boat and then CINC-Kriegs-
marine.  The second was for his infamous "Laconia" order, I think it was
called, saying that (and this is not a direct quote but off the top of my
head) "the rescuing of surivivng crew members of enemy ships is incompatible
with the total war on the sea.  All efforts must be taken to see that the
crew of enemy ships do not hinder naval operations".  According to him,
he was just saying that U-boats shouldn't surface to rescue survivors for
longer than they had to - only to capture captains and other officers.
But in one incident, the U-boat Captain gunned down all the survivors
after rescuing the captain and the XO.
    Doenitz made the case that this was a misinterpretation of the order
and, no matter what anyone thought of it, the order had no applicability
because of the risks of surfacing for any length of time no matter what
the reason - gunning survivors or not.
    You can decide for yourself whether the "waging aggressive war" should
apply to Doenitz - that's a fairly subjective question.  As for the latter
order, it's hard to say precisely what he meant.  On the one hand, if
he really did give the order to gun survivors he should have been executed.
But if not, then maybe his term was a little harsh.

William,
     I doubt that Doenitz meant the order in the way that some of the
U-Boat commanders may have interpreted it.  It goes completely against
the Doenitz's character (or at least what I have read about Doenitz's
character (-: ).  As for not picking up survivors of sunken ships, I
don't doubt that Doenitz was being realistic and "waging an aggressive
war" which was also what most of Allies were doing as well.  I can't
remember many instances of American subs picking up survivors of sunken
Japanese ships in the Pacific.  In the end, the information which you
have so kindly provided seems to support my opinion that the Allies
railroaded Doenitz.

Alex Bielakowski

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 22:30:59 EST
From:    Charles Mattocks <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era

Hi all!

I can't write as well as many on the list, but I agree with Ben Frank!  That
burns it, it was and always will be V-J Day!  I feel it insults all who fought
and died to defeat Japan, I also feel it insults all servicemen past and present
by down playing their accomplishments and contributions to our country!  Its bad
enough .....................<edited fot PC reasons.;-)>.....................
................................ Anyway, thats another story.

I agree with you, Ben and you have my support and if need be my signature!

Semper Fi!

Chip Mattocks

P.S. - Sounds like Slick Willy though. my .02 worth.

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 19:56:24 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Intelligence on Tirpitz

Jodi, it really isn't necessary to dismiss heroism out of hand. :-)
Trust me. THE GREATEST RAID OF ALL is a first-class factual acount of
the St. Nazaire raid.

Sidney.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:09:49 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

Ben...
        The same clowardly PC claptrap is rearing its head in Britain.
PM John Major has issued directions that the British Armed Forces "must keep
a low profile" during the V-E Day 50th Anniversary Celebrations.

Such a decision baffles common-sense. What else, pray, is the entire *point*
of celebrating V-E Day than that of the fact of military victory? It seems
that politico Major (what an unsuitable name!) is obsessed with "not
upsetting the Germans".
The last time one his Prime Minister predecessors had the same priority,
World War Two erupted son afterwards.

God save veterans, today's young people, and the cause of historical
accuracy from the mincing timidity of politicians and acadame.

Sidney Allinson.

PS: It seems Canada is even more cautious.
There has been not so much as a hint of
even tentative plans for V-E/V-J Celebrations here.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 20:15:44 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: VJ Day

There is a sad irony that just before the 50th Anniversary of
V-E/V-J Day, the US dollar is plunging to an all-time low as
a result of financial machinations by Germany and Japan.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 7 Mar 1995 22:45:20 -0500
From:    chris garcia <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: More on Bong

On Tue, 7 Mar 1995, Jeff Dingbaum wrote:

> Mike Yaklich,
>
> Your posts on Bong and others losing wingmen bring up a question.
> What did you do if you lost your wingman?  Did you hookup with a
> twosome or did you look for someone else who had lost theirs also?
>
While we're on the subject of wingman, I will expose my ignorance and ask
a question.  As much as I read about these things, I'm still not clear
what exactly a wingman is for or how he performs his duties.  What does a
wingman do?

In air combat games like Red Baron, if I stick to my flight leader, I
usually end up getting shot down.  The only way it seems to survive is to
go hot dogging off by myself, which in real life would probably get me
shot down too.  What does a good wing man do?

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 6 Mar 1995 to 7 Mar 1995
***********************************************