Subject: WWII-L Digest - 14 Mar 1995 to 15 Mar 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 1995 00:02:48 -0500

There are 46 messages totalling 1547 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Mush Morton (2)
  2. USSR in the Pacific Theater
  3. QUES: Mountbatten pink
  4. Nimitz vs.(?) the Axis
  5. INF: USN Chronology 03-15-95
  6. HIST: A strange American desertion
  7. IJN armored cruiser (2)
  8. REF: Looking for Soviet tactical practices (2)
  9. More on Manchuria
 10. WWII German, US & Soviet Veterans
 11. Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the
 12. endlossung/Germans or Nazis? (2)
 13. Eastern Front
 14. KAMIKAZES AIRCRAFTS (2)
 15. INFO. German Professor Abbreviations
 16. Martin James Monti (2)
 17. More on Bong
 18. help
 19. South Pacific Theatre
 20. Intro and questions
 21. ADMIN: Commercialism
 22. TAC- Enterprise Green
 23. TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS
 24. VJ vs. VE (2)
 25. Obersalzberg con't
 26. WEAP: Glacier Girl Pictures
 27. WEAP Re: IJN armored cruiser
 28. Doenitz
 29. Dudley Morton
 30. WW II List subscription info
 31. The Ahnenerbe
 32. Last words on Manchuria
 33. Nimitz and ... MIKASA?
 34. CONVENTION UPDATE:  "Little Wars," 18-19Mar95, Chicago/O'Hare/Ramada Inn
 35. Victory at Sea series
 36. POL: Italian Surrender (2)
 37. DOC: U.S. Army Pearl Harbor Board.
 38. INF: 50 Years Ago - 16-MAR-1945

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 14 Mar 1995 20:09:54 -0500
From:    Joseph Feld <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Mush Morton

On 3/12/95 John Riegsdecker wrote the following:
>No matter how you rationalize it, I'm certain we would have tried as a
>war criminal any German or Japanese submariner who had done the same
>thing.

Just as I'm certain, had the fortunes of war been reversed, that the
commanders who ordered the bombings of Dresden and Tokyo would have been
tried for war crimes.  I'm not trying to moralize these actions, or condemn
them.  I'm just trying to say (following the orginal thread of this
discussion, Admiral Doenitz) that convicting a man for "aggresive warfare"
in WWII is like (to paraphrase Francis Ford Coppala) handing out speeding
tickets at the Indy 500.

I think W. T. Sherman had it right: "War is a bloody, evil, thing that I
wish I would never have seen.  But, now that I am here I will do all that I
can with the forces I have been granted to ensure its swiftest resolution."

Joseph Feld
[email-masked]
Ferndale, MI

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 14 Mar 1995 20:10:01 -0500
From:    Joseph Feld <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: USSR in the Pacific Theater

On 3/12/95 Lou Coatney writes:
>     One question about this, though:  If Stalin was getting full
>intelligence about our program, he would have known that we had only
>a few warheads constructed and available.  If he really wanted to
>prolong the war, to expand and consolidate his gains in Asia,
>wouldn't he have forewarned the Japanese, so that they could better
>prepare themselves to endure the blasts and fight on?  (Or would he
>have considered the risk of forewarning them too great:  that they
>might have instead sued for peace -- unconditional surrender, even
>-- sooner?)  Anyway, ...

A thought that I had, if I may.  I think there may be either a shortsighted
or a foresighted explanation to Stalin's behavior, again assuming he had
full knowledge of the Manhattan Project.  Either explanation would fit in
with all I have ever read about Stalin's volatile personality.  On the side
of shortsightedness, Stalin might have considered that allowing the
Americans to remove the Japanese as a threat was worth all considerations.
The foresighted argument might say that Stalin realized that with the
Soviet Union's depleted resources, both intellectual as well as material,
it would take several years to match even the United States' meager atomic
resources, and that only a quick peace would allow him the time he needed
to utilize the information he possessed.  These were just snap impressions,
so I would appreciate any feedback.

>     I'll post the bibliographic entry for S.'s book to you, if you
>give me your e-mail address.

Lou,
My e-mail address *should* be showing up below, provided I've finnaly got
this @$#*&^ mail program (and, boy don't you just *love* computers
sometimes) configured properly.  But, just in case, its:
[email-masked].  Thanks in advance!

Joseph Feld
[email-masked]
Ferndale, MI

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 01:15:28 -0600
From:    "Louis R. Coatney" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: QUES: Mountbatten pink

ROYAL NAVY WARSHIP CAMOUFLAGE, 1939-1945, by Peter Hodges --
  one of the excellent Almark books -- has the explanation.

"Dickie" Mountbatten came up with this nifty new color:  a
  kind of greyish pink!  (Is that what fuschia is?)

Dickie was a trendsetter, of course, so a number of ships
  bathed themselves in this, before the Admiralty really
  started dictating camouflage schemes.

The problem with MP was that it contrasted to almost any
  atmospheric or sea condition in any lighting.  HMS
  MANCHESTER sported MP in the Med and was sunk by Italian
  motor torpedo boats in a heavy daylight haze which concealed
  most of the other ships in that particular Malta convoy.

Another inspiration Lord Mountbatten got credit for was
  Dieppe, of course.  Although some of his schemes were
  disastrous, the man was INDEFATIGABLE -- the very
  *definition* of the word -- and exuded an upbeat charisma
  that convinced his forces they were *winning*, regardless
  of the reality.  His own personal courage cannot be
  disputed, either.

It was ironic that his death would be by IRA bombing.  Noone
  dared *face* that courage and aplomb.

Lou Coatney, [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 01:18:23 -0600
From:    "Louis R. Coatney" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Nimitz vs.(?) the Axis

After the war, we were about to scrap an old Japanese
  armored cruiser which had been preserved after the Russo-
  Japanese War.  Nimitz interceded and saved the ship, to
  the (everlasting?) gratitude of the Japanese people and
  their Navy.

Pity he didn't stand up for Joe Rochefort like that.  (Maybe
  R. had offended/embarrassed even Nimitz?)

Lou Coatney, [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 04:00:12 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 03-15-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
03/15 Thu. Cruiser and destroyer task force (Rear Adm. J. L.
           McCrea) bombards enemy shore installations on
           Matsuwa, Kurile Islands.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Tue, 14 Mar 1995 19:25:25 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: HIST: A strange American desertion

Monti....
        The distinct odor of bull manure.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 08:09:35 -0500
From:    Carlos R Rivera <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: IJN armored cruiser

It the vessel mentioned below the "Mikasa," and if not, what was the name of
the rescued warship?
Many thanks,
Carlos R. Rivera
Ohio State University

-ps-If it was the Mikasa, it was a battleship not an armored cruiser

> After the war, we were about to scrap an old Japanese
>   armored cruiser which had been preserved after the Russo-
>   Japanese War.  Nimitz interceded and saved the ship, to
>   the (everlasting?) gratitude of the Japanese people and
>   their Navy.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 05:13:59 -0800
From:    James Sulzen <[email-masked]>
Subject: REF: Looking for Soviet tactical practices

I am looking for insightful references to the Eastern front conflict
describing Soviet tactical practices and performances.  Given the opening
of access to Soviet sources in recent years, I had hoped by now to see some
good preliminary studies covering the tactical level
(company/battalion/brigade) using Soviet sources.  I assume there must be
researchers digging through what must be an untold wealth of primary and
secondary material.  However, I haven't seen anything along the lines of
what I'm looking for.

There of course are a plethora of high-level histories covering the gross
movement of the front (corps/army/army group), but I personally have never
encountered anything that provides the slightest insight into Soviet
tactical success/failure.  I have seen a number of studies covering
tactical organization and performance of, for instance U.S. and German
ground forces (the most notable I have read being van Creveld's "Fighting
Power").   But even the German sources I've seen tend to dismiss Soviet
success as simply due to overwhelming mass.  Such explanations are neither
insightful nor complete (nor do I believe, particularly fair).

I have a slight interest in operational histories (which unit did what to
whom, where and when), but am mostly interested in studies of tactical and
operational practices and organization (company and battalion formations
used in defense/attack. how long for such formations to formulate and
launch an attack or put together a defense, etc.).

I'd prefer to own the sources, so books in print are the most valuable
references.  However, I do have access to the University of California
library system, so I can probably dig up any particular volume, no matter
how obscure.  Any suggestions would be greatly appreciated.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 09:15:32 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: More on Manchuria

        I mentioned that the Japanese high command in Manchuria included many
experienced and capable generals.  Another one of those was Lt-Gen Shojiro
Iida, referred to formerly in these posts as commander of the 15th Army in
Burma until 1943.  Retired in 1944, Iida was recalled to active service in 1945
and put in charge of the 30th Army in Manchuria.  This army, composed of the
39th, 125th, 138th, and 148th Divisions, garrisoned one of the strongest
defense zones.
        Many of the Japanese units in Manchuria were up to strength (or close
to it) in manpower only.  The great drain of experienced formations had
primarily come in 1944, when most of the best units stationed there were pulled
out and sent to the south or to the home islands to form a cadre for defense.
The big call-up (and combing out of Japanese civilian settlers) I alluded to
last time replaced many of the men, but equipment and training remained
substandard.  Eight Japanese divisions in Manchuria, and several of the
brigades, had only been created barely a month before the Soviet attack.  Many
of these "divisions" had artillery support which amounted to a single four-gun
company (instead of a 36-gun regiment), and few of these artillery pieces were
larger than 75-mm calibre.  The units which garrisoned the heavily-fortified
city of Hailar, precariously located in an exposed position in the northwest
corner of the province, are instructive.  The 119th Division was considered one
of the best-prepared units in the Kwantung Army, but still only had 70% of the
men, weapons, and equipment called for in its table of organization.  The other
Japanese unit in Hailar, the 80th Brigade, represented the other extreme.  It
was so deficient in men and material that it was rated at only 15% of its
nominal combat efficiency.  Nonetheless these units fought well.  Hailar did
not fall until August 18th, and the understrength and supposedly subpar 80th
Brigade by itself held off three Russian divisions and a tank brigade for a
week (showing yet again what the Japanese could accomplish when attacked
head-on in carefully prepared defensive positions).
        The Soviet guesstimate of Japanese air strength, at 1,800 aircraft,
must have counted virtually every plane capable of flying in Manchuria and
Korea as a combat aircraft, and also including several hundred planes based in
the northern part of the home islands, within flying range of the theatre of
operations (these of course were reserved for home defense and took no actual
part in the fighting in Manchuria).  The main Japanese Army air force in
Manchuria proper actually numbered 225 fighters, 40 various bombers, 45
reconnaisance planes, and 600 assorted training aircraft.  The Soviet air
effort reflects the almost absolute lack of opposition.  The Russians flew
roughly 1,000 more reconnaisance than combat missions during the campaign, and
dropped a little over 700 tons of bombs.  The heaviest air attacks came in the
battles for Mutankiang, and even here they were hampered by several days of
rain and overcast.  Once the skies cleared the Soviet air presence was able to
make its presence felt, and materially aid the ground operations there.  The
Soviet air reconnaisance was particularly thorough, though, and resulted
(weather permitting) in an almost constant daylight surveillance of the areas
up to fifty miles in front of the advancing Russian columns.
        I should also say that, for those who have read too much testimony from
the Germans who fought on the eastern front, and consider the Soviet armed
forces to have been totally lacking in subtlety, ability to improvise, staff
preparation, and other demonstrable manifestations of the military art, this
campaign should be instructive (of course, the "Bagration" offensive of the
summer of 1944 in Belorussia/Poland should also have been instructive).
It wasn't the willingness of the average Russian soldier to die or the triumph
of pure mass in default of tactical acumen which won Manchuria.  The Soviet
staffs showed in this campaign a mastery of their profession which would be
admirable in any western army.  Just to have been able to concentrate such huge
forces over such incredible distances on such a tight schedule in itself
constitutes one of the most remarkable feats of logistical organization the war
produced.  But the Soviets also showed repeatedly the ability to improvise to
meet new contingencies.  During the campaign they hastily organized an
effective air resupply effort to bring fuel to the forward mechanized units.
By September some 2,400 tons of motor fuel had been delivered directly to the
forward units in this fashion, even though it was expensive in terms of
resources due to the limited carrying capacity of the Soviet transport planes--
it required over 1,750 transport sorties to carry this out.  The first fuel
resupply flight was mounted on the second day of the campaign.  Vasilevsky's
staff also organized on very short notice the series of parachute drops and air
landings which secured the major cities after the Japanese resistance
collapsed.  These were small-scale operations, usually not more than a little
over 200 paratroopers in each action, but they went off like clockwork.  First
the parachute troops would land and secure the airfield.  Then the transports
would start flying in reinforcements and engineer detachments to defuse bombs
and prevent demolitions.  Further reinforcements were hastily dispatched by sea
(or in some cases amphibious operations mounted in lieu of airdrops), and these
landings included putting ashore 31-ton T-34 tanks.  The Soviet staff showed a
commendable flexibility and high degree of competence which they are not often
given credit for in the west.  Indeed, logistics is generally considered a weak
point of the Soviet war effort, and often their arrangements are described as
primitive.  The Manchurian campaign shows the immense progress made in this
respect during the course of the war as the Soviet armed forces learned their
craft on the job.  I might also cite the movement of Colonel-General Pliev's
mixed Soviet and Mongolian cavalry group through the Gobi desert as another
triumph, even if it was a throwback in terms of technology, as the horse
cavalry soon left its mechanized elements far behind.
        Time forces me to break off.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 09:40:04 +0500
From:    Claude Lamazouere <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WWII German, US & Soviet Veterans

>I am in touch with two Luftwaffe vets, one was a vet of JV44, Wolfgang
>spate, who finished out the war on the western front with Galland's
>group.  I have some addresses of Luftwaffe reunion groups but I haven't
>checked them all out.  If you need information contact me.
>

I'm still interested in getting the information.  Would you please tell me
how to get in touch with them?
Thank you for your help
Claude Lamazouere, Societe Radio-Canada
[email-masked]
tel: (514) 597-5773
fax: (514) 597-5728

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 08:58:02 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the

Hello, Brad and Henry!

Just a note to add to your post.

>         I believe I have seen the film segment that you mentioned and
> I think it was the HMS Barham.  I should warn you that I am dealing
> from my fuzzy and aging memory here.

    No doubt. The man who sank the Barham was Lt-Cdr.
(Fregattenkapitaen Hans-Diedrich Freiherr von Tiesenhausen, who lives
today in Canada.) Needless to say, he was awarded the Knight's Cross
for this accomplishment.

    Thought this would be of interest.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 08:46:13 -0600
From:    Greg Kelley <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

see below----

                                          Glad To Be Of Service!

                                          Greg Kelley
                                          St. Paul Public Library
                                          [email-masked]

On Wed, 8 Mar 1995, Kelvin Brent Luther wrote:

> >         Finally, the only country not to contribute to the holocaust was
> > Bulgaria.  They refused to export their Jewish population to Poland...

Hokay, I think enough's been said about both the Danish & Finnish
reactions to the Holocaust to correct THAT statement, but here's another
title worth looking for--

THE BULGARIAN JEWS AND THE FINAL SOLUTION, 1940-1944
Frederick B. Chary.  University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972

Not ALL the Bulgarian Jews were so lucky, especially those living in
Bulgarian-occupied Thrace; 'course, the same could be said for any
non-Bulgarians living in Bulgarian-occupied Thrace as well.  Local
ethnic, ah, enmity, in that part of the Balkans goes way, WAY Back, the
Bulgarians had their share of atrocities/executions/massacres all in the
line of antiguerrilla activities.

>   As for giving military aid I would
> be interested in knowing what kind of contribution Bulgaria made to the
> war effort if anyone out there knows of a source please let me know.

Look for a copy of

BULGARIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR
Marshall Lee Miller.  Stanford Univeristy Press, 1975.

GERMANY AND ITS ALLIES: A STUDY OF AXIS COLLABORATION DURING THE SECOND
WORLD WAR  also has a good chapter on Bulgaria

>         I also want to come to Bulgaria's defense a little.  They were
> surrounded by hostile countries and made the decision to ally with the
> obvious holder of power in their region against the Russians.

Kelvin, as much as I'm a fan of King Boris (and also a closet fan of the
Royal Bulgarian Navy), I can't quite follow your line of reasoning.  When
the Bulgarians used Nazi Germany to pressure Rumania into relinquishing
the southern Dobrudja viz. the Treaty of Craiova (7th September 1940)
there weren't any Axis forces on ANY Bulgarian border; in fact, the
Balkan-based Little Entente still had a few gasps of life left in it.
The Bulgarian government was one of the very first Balkan nations to
allow Gestapo agents to operate within its country-- early summer 1940
(yeah, BEFORE the French Armistice-- like even BEFORE ITALY  entered
the war)  German troops began entering Bulgaria following Boris' personal
 (and very secretative) request of 18th November; thousands of German troops
 were on station in Bulgaria before the end of 1940 (remember where the
 Wehrmacht launched its invasion of Greece from in March 1941?).
Bulgaria's signature to the Tripartite Pact on 1st March 1941 was more of
a formality by that time.

Oh, I do agree that as Axis powers go Bulgaria wasn't evil incarnate, but
just like Rumania (hey, we ALL know how I feel about them), it warn't no
unblemished saint, either.

                                                         G.A.K.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 07:46:54 -0800
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Mush Morton

At 10:51 PM 3/14/95, Jodi Berls wrote:
[...]

>     Maybe I'm slightly prejudiced, being a (transplanted) Texan myself, but
>I've always thought there was much about Nimitz to respect. I seem to recall
>having read somewhere that Nimitz was one of the few commanders who privately
>expressed some displeasure to Mush Morton, though like the others he made no
>public statement. I can't locate an authenticating source for that one,
>however, and it may be a case of Swiss-cheese memory or some movie scene
>floating around in the back of my mind. I suppose a private reprimand is
>better than nothing, and it would explain why Morton didn't make any effort
>to repeat his attacks on survivors in subsequent patrols.

Jodi,

I concur in your appreciation of Nimitz and I have no connection with
Texas.  Even if you consider that by comparison to Ernie King and Mac,
almost anybody would be appealing, I've always thought he was someone to
admire.  I also feel that way about Spruance, but then of course that could
be because I'm a displaced Hoosier.

John Riegsecker                                 (206) 756-3566
Dept of Mathematics and Computer Science        [email-masked]
University of Puget Sound

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 10:19:48 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Eastern Front

Hello, Allen!

I posted a long list of books dealing with that subject area around
the first of the year. You might contact Joe Barone, the list owner,
and have him give you the archive address to access it. The subject
area in which you are interested carries a multitude of fine works on
this topic.

Sorry I could't be of more use.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 10:25:37 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: KAMIKAZES AIRCRAFTS

Hello, Jorge!

>         Does anybody know which aircrafts were chosen for the Kamikazes pilots?
>         Is there a source where I can find how many Kamikazes were in the WWII?,
> Which target they preferred?, A diary of their missions etc?....

    The Divine Wind by Jiro Horikoshi and Okumiya is a good source on
this topic.

    Kamikazes took several forms, not just the aircraft version.
There were also suicide torpedo units as well.

    The preferred target was the aircraft carrier. A Lt. Seki was the
first Kamikaze pilot, taking off from the Philippines in search of a
carrier.

    Hope this helps, and I am certain that others may have already
answered this question.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 10:30:38 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INFO. German Professor Abbreviations

Hello, Cheryl and Matthew!

Would like to add a note to the post.

> Dipl. Ing.  is short for Diplom Ingenieur which world be someone who as a
> certificate in engineering.

    This degree is awarded only through a Technical High School,
which is an area of higher education separate from the university
system.

> Dr. Ing. is short for Doktor Ingenieur which would be someone with his
> doctorate in engineering.

    Indicates that an individual had to have received this degree
from a university.

    Thanks for allowing my comment.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 08:35:09 -0800
From:    Patrick Charles <[email-masked]>
Subject: Martin James Monti

        For those so inclined, the opinion for Mr. Monti's petition for Habeas
Corpus can be found at 79 Fed. Supp. 651 (volume 79, p. 651 of the Federal
Supplement). It was denied and his conviction was upheld.

Patrick J. Charles
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 10:42:32 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: More on Bong

Hello, Chris!

Thanks for the post.

 If he'd had a wingman it didn't do
> him any good.

    Perhaps in that situation, but attacking a bomber formation is
not the same thing as a dogfight with opposing fighters, where mutual
protection is essential, and a good wingman will always stick with
his leader.

    Thanks for allowing my comment. Please let me hear yours.

    All the best.

    Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 11:44:08 -0400
From:    Sam Lashlee <[email-masked]>
Subject: help

I am not sure where to send this message, but I hope someone on the list has
an answer.  I would like to get a copy of the last weeks digests so that I
can get a little bit of a history on conversations that are currently going
on.  Is there a command I can send to LISTSERV or anywhere else to do that?
I have access to NetScape (like Mosaic), if that is something that is
available on the WWW.

Thanks

Sam
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 08:47:14 -0800
From:    Vince Harms <[email-masked]>
Subject: South Pacific Theatre

Looking for anyone who was in the 40th Division, Headquarters 160th
Infantry.

Send information to:
Vince Harms
4737 SE Foss Road
Port Orchard, WA  98366

e-mail - [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 11:18:54 -0600
From:    "William L. Huber - SAA" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Intro and questions

Hi Doug,

> My primary interests are WWII military history but I do read about other
> eras.

Your in the right place then :-)  Welcome abord!

> I collect WWII edged weapons as well as other military items and I am looking
> for PT Boat items.

There are a number of collectors on this list.  I collect uniforms,
insignia and decorations of the 3rd Reich and there are others who
are also afflicted with this mental disorder.

> Is acceptable to advertise to sell or purchase military collectables,
> including vehicles, on this list?

I dunno, nobody has brought it up before but it would be up to the
list owner.  I tend to think not but if you had something you could
probably send a note telling folks to backchannel you for details.

> Is there a Militaria collectors List?

I don't know of one on Internet but there is one on another network.
Backchannel me and I'll put you in touch.

> Is there a Military Vehicles Collectors list?

Don't know of one.

Cheers, Bill Huber / [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 12:22:02 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: ADMIN: Commercialism

        The policy for advertising on the mailing list is that
commercial enterprises are forbidden to do so.  Individuals who
wish to thin their collections (or a friend's) should feel free
to send a message to the list.  I ask that members who do this
use the SALE, TRADE, and WANT flags in the Subject: line.  Traffic
in this area has been insignificant to none so I don't really
foresee a monstrous increase in bandwidth.  If it should become
a problem, then it will be trottled back.  Of course, all of this
assumes that the items listed are WWII memorabilia or somehow
connected to WWII.  Selling computers, legal services, or pyramid
scams are right out!
--
Joe Barone, WWII-L listowner
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 13:18:02 -0500
From:    Sean Barnett <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TAC- Enterprise Green

        Reply to:   RE>TAC: Enterprise Green

From: Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject:      TAC: Enterprise Green
To: Multiple recipients of list WWII-L <[email-masked]>
        In August and September 1940, while a large German force was being
assembled in the Channel ports to invade England, a smaller force was also
being assembled for a similar operation.  The target of this force was
Ireland and the Germans showed uncharacteristic irony when they named the
operation Enterprise Green.

 Regarding a potential German invasion of England, there has been an
interesting discussion going on on the newsgroup alt.war about the potential
for U.S. intervention to prevent such an operation.  One aspect of the
discussion centered on whether the U.S. could have intervened and whether it
would have (given the politics of the time and the views of the  major
decisionmakers).  I belive that it has been the policy of the U.S. to prevent
the domination of the European landmass by a single power because that would
pose a real threat to U.S. independence and that thus the U.S. would likely
have intervened in the event the Germans had invaded England.  However,
others disagree, and my recollection of U.S. policy may be incorrect--the
policy may have been formulated during the war.  I was wondering whether
anyone has any information regarding the thoughts of military and political
leaders at the time as to a potential U.S. intervention.

Thanks,

Sean Barnett

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 12:52:24 -0600
From:    "Louis R. Coatney" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: IJN armored cruiser

Carlos,

     This was in a biography of Nimitz, and I think I'll let
*you* look it up.  :-)

Lou Coatney, [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 11:18:11 -0800
From:    Patrick Charles <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Martin James Monti

        I don't know what happened, here goes again....

        The decision regarding Martin James Monti's habaes corpus
petition can be found at 79 Fed. Supp. 651 (volume 79, p.651 of the
Federal Supplememt).  It was denied and his conviction was upheld.

[email-masked]
Patrick J. Charles

On Wed, 15 Mar 1995, Patrick Charles wrote:

> Corpus can be found at 79 Fed. Supp. 651 (volume 79, p. 651 of the Federal
> Supplement). It was denied and his conviction was upheld.
>
> Patrick J. Charles
> [email-masked]
>
> QUIT
>

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 13:29:42 -0600
From:    "William L. Huber - SAA" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

> I agree with te opinion that V-J should be used.  I was a Viet Nam era
> vet.  Never got near the place but I was a real live air force vol. and
> proud of it.  The fact that we one WWII and the fact that we were right
> gives us the right to use V-E or V-J any time or place that we see fit.
>
> George Bowman

Just some musings and please, PLEASE don't think I'm being PC but if
VE day is Victory in Europe then why not celebrate VP day as Victory
in the Pacific?  We don't refer to VE Day as Victory over Germany
Day.  I think it was an artifact of the era.   Somebody called it VJ
Day in 1944 or 45 and it stuck.

If this catches on, remember, you heard it here first!

Cheers, Bill Huber / [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 15:06:46 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: KAMIKAZES AIRCRAFTS

        I looked up that book I referred to in my answer to your post.  It is
"I Was A Kamikaze" by Reiyuji Nagatsuka.  You might want to look it up.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 14:53:30 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: VJ vs. VE

The question was raised why VE (Victory in Europe) vs. VJ (Victory over
Japan)... Questions like Victory over Germany, Victory in the Pacific,
etc.

Ironically, I started thinking about this a few days ago, and the main
rationale seems to be fairly simple:

In Europe, there were many distinct and independent combatants in varying
degrees.  Germany wasn't the sole enemy to the Allies.  Italy was also a
clear and distinct enemy.  Other countries join on the side of the Axis in
either full, partial or conciliatory ways.  While we like to focus on
Germany, as the main driving force, perhaps, there only truly distinct
representation would be Europe (Even though that includes people and
countries that were not part of the Axis desires).

Hence, VE Day.

The Pacific is, for the most part, different.  Japan is the clear driving
force here, but there wasn't a real "coalition" of countries making up
the Pacific front.  It was, for all practical purposes, the Allies forces
vs. the Japanese.

And thus was born VJ Day.

In the terms of the time and history, the designations would be appropriate.

--
\\ Robert J. Granvin                                 User Services Specialist
// School of Statistics - University of Minnesota            [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 17:08:11 -0500
From:    Joseph Feld <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Obersalzberg con't

On 3/13/95 Jeff J. Dingbaum wrote:
>The first thing you see entering the tunnel is the date on top (1938 if
>my memory is any good).  You walk down the dimly lit tunnel and you can
>almost feel Hitler walking next to you.  It is really eerie.  According
>to the tour guides he was fond of walking the tunnel, but not so enamored
>of the elevator.

One of the things about the elevator I found particularly ironic was that
if you look near the door you will see a plaque that says, "Otis Elevators,
Chicago Ill."

Joseph Feld
[email-masked]
Ferndale, MI

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 14:12:19 -0800
From:    Steve New <[email-masked]>
Subject: WEAP: Glacier Girl Pictures

I have scanned Dennis Sparks' latest pictures of this P-38F restoration,
and offered them to BYRD.  I'm awaiting a response.

If anyone knows of another FTP site that would want to carry them,
please get me the details.

--

Steve L. New
[email-masked]
Just an armadillo on the shoulder of the information superhighway.

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 17:35:25 EST
From:    "Carl Wernke - [email-masked]" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WEAP Re: IJN armored cruiser

 Carlos R.Rivera wrote on Wed, 15 Mar 1995 08:09:35 -0500 and mentioned the
 IJN Ship MIKASA.

 Carlos and Lew,

 MIKASA was built in England by Vickers of Barrow and completed on
 1 March 1902. MIKASA represented a predilection: for her time, she was the
 biggest, strongest *battleship* in the world. Four hondred feet long, her beam
 was 76 feet, her draft just over 27 feet. Her power came from vertical triple
 expansion boilers of the Belleville type, not one of the latest, but one of
 the most reliable kinds available. With them she could steam at up to
 18 knots, and with a maximum fuel capacity  of 2,000 tons of coal her
 theoretical maximum radius without refueling was 9,000 sea miles at 10 knots.
 Her armament was impressive: four 12-inch guns, two forward and two aft;
 fourteen 6-inch and twenty 3-inch quick-fire mounts; 12- 47mm guns, the
 small 2.5 or 3-pounders; and four underwater torpedo-tubes.

 MIKASA was launched 8 November 1900, and completed 1 March 1902; she was
 Admiral Togo's flagship in the Russo-Japanese War. On the night of
 11-12 September 1905, she sank at her moorings in Sasebo after an
 ammunition and torpedo explosion. She was raised 7 August 1906 and repaired at
 Sasebo and  re-entered service on 24 August 1908. In September 1921, she was
 re-rated as a 1st Class coast-defence ship, but on 17 September in the same
 year, she ran aground near Askold Island off Vladivostok; refloated and
 strickened 20 September 1923. On 12 November 1926, she was opened as a
 memorial by Prince Hirohito and Admiral Togo at Yokosuka, where she
 remained until 1945. She deteriorated between 1945 and 1959, but in 1960
 she was restored.

 Sources: _The Fighting Ships of the Rising Sun: The Drama of the Imperial
 Japanese Navy 1895-1945_, by Stephen Howarth, 1983 and _Warships of the
 Imperial Japanese Navy, 1869-1945_, by Jentschura, Dieter, and Mickel,
 USNI Press.

  Carl Wernke
  History Instructor
  Tidewater Community College

 TCWERNC@VCCSCENT

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 16:37:02 -0600
From:    Mark J Weber <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Doenitz

He wrote his own autobiography, published in 1960.

--
Dr. Mark J. Weber                       [email-masked]
Department of Management and Economics  tel (w) 612-641-2431
Hamline University                      fax (w) 612-641-2956
1536 Hewitt Ave.                        tel (h) 612-475-2960
St. Paul, MN 55104                      fax (h) 612-476-8309

On Tue, 14 Mar 1995, Jodi Berls wrote:

> While we're still on the subject of Karl Doenitz (or before we get too far
> off it), can someone please recommend a good biography of him? I also would
> be interested in a similar work about Otto "the tonnage king" Kretschmer, if
> there is one.
>
> Jodi Berls
> [email-masked]
>

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 16:39:36 -0600
From:    Mark J Weber <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: REF: Looking for Soviet tactical practices

You might try some of David Glantz' books. He is an expert on Soviet
operations/tactics. Only parts of these works are batallion level
studies, however.

--
Dr. Mark J. Weber                       [email-masked]
Department of Management and Economics  tel (w) 612-641-2431
Hamline University                      fax (w) 612-641-2956
1536 Hewitt Ave.                        tel (h) 612-475-2960
St. Paul, MN 55104                      fax (h) 612-476-8309

On Wed, 15 Mar 1995, James Sulzen wrote:

> I am looking for insightful references to the Eastern front conflict
> describing Soviet tactical practices and performances.  Given the opening
> of access to Soviet sources in recent years, I had hoped by now to see some
> good preliminary studies covering the tactical level
> (company/battalion/brigade) using Soviet sources.  I assume there must be
> researchers digging through what must be an untold wealth of primary and
> secondary material.  However, I haven't seen anything along the lines of
> what I'm looking for.
>
> There of course are a plethora of high-level histories covering the gross
> movement of the front (corps/army/army group), but I personally have never
> encountered anything that provides the slightest insight into Soviet
> tactical success/failure.  I have seen a number of studies covering
> tactical organization and performance of, for instance U.S. and German
> ground forces (the most notable I have read being van Creveld's "Fighting
> Power").   But even the German sources I've seen tend to dismiss Soviet
> success as simply due to overwhelming mass.  Such explanations are neither
> insightful nor complete (nor do I believe, particularly fair).
>
> I have a slight interest in operational histories (which unit did what to
> whom, where and when), but am mostly interested in studies of tactical and
> operational practices and organization (company and battalion formations
> used in defense/attack. how long for such formations to formulate and
> launch an attack or put together a defense, etc.).
>
> I'd prefer to own the sources, so books in print are the most valuable
> references.  However, I do have access to the University of California
> library system, so I can probably dig up any particular volume, no matter
> how obscure.  Any suggestions would be greatly appreciated.
>
> QUIT
>

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 18:06:33 -0500
From:    Joseph Feld <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Dudley Morton

On 3/13/95 Jodi Berls wrote:
>I've seen numerous other accounts, but this probably tells you what you want
>to know. Please note that I didn't cite this incident primarily to dump on Dud
>ley Morton -- although I'm deeply uncomfortable with the notion of firing on
>survivors, his point about the Japanese troops coming back to haunt Allied
>ground forces is well taken. It's a pretty fine line between killing them by
>torpedoing their ship and killing them by shooting them with a machine gun,
>anyway. What disturbs me most is that this same patrol was held up by navy
>propagandists as a great, heroic venture without making any mention of the
>life boat incident, and there appears to have been no investigation or
>reprimand involved. Apparently the winning side doesn't have to explain
>itself for such actions.

Sad , but true.  In our own Civil War, you can pick up any high school
textbook and read about the attrocities at Andersonville.  But, you have to
dig pretty deep to read about the same conditions and nearly the same death
rate at Ft. Delaware.  Sending young men out, ordrering them to commit the
"ultimate sin", and then sitting back after the fact and wondering whether
they killed justifiably seems absurd.

Joseph Feld
[email-masked]
Ferndale, MI

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 18:06:40 -0500
From:    Joseph Feld <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WW II List subscription info

>>
>> Joe,
>>
>> Thanks for the info on armored vehicles.
>>
>> One other question.
>>
>> What is this lists policy on advertising?
>>
>> Thanks again,
>>
>> Doug
>>
>
>
>       Speaking for myself Doug I don't mind it as long as its WWII related.
>However I'm sure that Joe has the final word. You out there Joe?

The final word?  Wow, I've been on this list for only two weeks and I've
been promoted to Possessor of the Final Word?  "Vat a country!" :-)

Seriously though, my own, humble opinion echos Scott's.  If it's WWII
related many folks would probably be grateful.

Joseph Feld
[email-masked]
Ferndale, MI

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 18:05:34 -0500
From:    Ron Charlton <[email-masked]>
Subject: The Ahnenerbe

Can anyone suggest a book dealing with the Ahnenerbe, the ideological,
intellectual (?), and cultural organization within the SS?

I have found bits and pieces in various articles and books, but no
comprehensive history. The most I have been able to find in a single source
so far is the chapter in Frederic Reider's  The Order of the SS.

Many thanks -- Ron Charlton
                       [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 18:33:42 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Last words on Manchuria

        A few more random comments on Japanese defensive preparations.  I
should mention that the Japanese air forces in Manchuria itself also had twenty
kamikaze aircraft ready for immediate use (E. Bauer, "History of World War II")
The Japanese apparently did have somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,000 armored
vehicles of all types, but as I said, only one complete tank brigade, which was
held near Mukden as part of the Kwantung Army's main reserve.  A second tank
brigade had begun forming the previous month but was not really combat-ready
when the Soviets struck.  Finally, I wanted to say that most of the Japanese
fortified zones, although planned to a depth of up to 25 miles, were in reality
no more than 12 miles deep.  Still, they could be formidable obstacles.
        On a somewhat unrelated subject, since I spoke a little about Japanese
self-propelled guns (and realizing that I missed a couple types) here were the
chief models: the Ho-Ni I mounted the 75-mm antitank gun (Type 90-- the same
weapon carried in the Chi-Nu tank); the Ho-Ni II carried a 105-mm howitzer;
the Ho-Ni III employed the higher-velocity 75-mm antiaircraft gun and featured
additional armor protection-- this model was more akin to the typical "assault
gun."  All of the above were mounted on a turretless Chi-Ha chassis, and came
in at more or less 16 tons.  (from "World Almanac Book of WW2")  The Ho-Ro had
a 150-mm howitzer on a Chi-Ha or Chi-He chassis (from a drawing with specs in
"Liberation of the Phillipines," can't recall the author offhand-- apparently a
few were used by the Japanese armored division on Luzon).  Finally, the
aformentioned Type 2 "gun tank" with a 75-mm howitzer in a rotating turret on
the Chi-He chassis.  Very few of any model were produced, and most that did
appear were developed relatively late in the war, when those handfull that saw
overseas service were further hampered by severe fuel shortages.
        At any rate, the Soviet attack forces in Manchuria were divided up into
three "Fronts" (roughly equivalent to the German or western Allies "Army
Group").  The Trans-Baikal Front, commanded by Marshal Malinovsky (another
heavy hitter from the war against Germany transfered east for this operation--
he assumed command in the Far East when Vasilevsky was called back to his
Moscow duties at the end of September), formed the right side of the
semi-circle of Soviet attacking armies.  This was the grouping that had to
advance through some 200 miles of semi-desert and then cross the Great Khinghan
mountain chain.  It attacked Manchuria from its western and southwestern
borders.  The Trans-Baikal Front had as its spearhead the 6th Guards Tank Army,
with some 800 tanks and self-propelled guns under command, including over 600
of the new-model T-34's.  (BTW, in addition to the numerous T-34's and a small
number of Stalin tanks, the Soviet forces in Manchuria were still employing
several hundred older vehicles-- specifically, BT-5's, BT-7's, and T-26's--
which were in most cases left over from the last round of fighting with the
Japanese in 1939).  On the far right wing of the front was the six-division
mixed Soviet and Mongolian cavalry group under Col-General Pliev (an experienced
commander of horse cavalry who had been fighting continuously since the German
invasion, starting out as a cavalry division commander in 1941).
        The advance of the Trans-Baikal Front was more of a triumph over nature
and geography than over the enemy.  In fact, no enemy was encountered for the
first four days of the campaign.  At times the motor columns proceeded at a
speed of 25 miles per hour, but fuel shortages soon made themselves felt.  It
was in fact the 6th Guards Tank Army which received most of the airlifted fuel
(over 2,000 tons), including the first such shipments on August 10th (Bauer).
The momentum of the advance was maintained, and soon the tanks were winding
their way slowly through the multiple hairpin turns of the roads through the
Khinghan passes.  Unfortunately for the Soviets, these roads were not really
built to hold up under the weight of 600-plus 31-ton tanks, and the truck
columns following behind were delayed by frequent road repairs.  Still, the
advance proceeded more or less according to schedule.  I should also state, in
reference to the generally excellent Soviet staff work, that the radio com
links between air and ground reconnaisance, command staffs, and the main
columns also functioned extremely well (radio communications being another area
in which the Soviet forces had been noticeably deficient earlier in the war).
Once the main Japanese fortified areas on the east side of the mountains were
reached, the tactics of Malinovsky's front was to mask the heavily defended
areas with infantry and allow the armored/mechanized columns to push on,
driving deep wedges into the Japanese defenses in true "blitzkrieg" fashion.
        The eastern half of the great pincers squeezing Manchuria was formed by
the 1st Far East Front under Meretskov.  They attacked west and southwest from
the strip of Soviet coastal territory interposed between the northern half of
Manchuria and the sea.  I earlier recounted the story of the 1st Far East
Front's dramatic breaching of the frontier fortifications without artillery
preparations.  They had amassed a density of 320 guns per mile for the
carefully-prepared assault, and also positioned powerful searchlights to blind
the defenders, but torrential rains had disrupted the timetable.  While waiting
for the rain to stop Meretskov had authorized the attack to go forward, and the
combination of driving rains and darkness had allowed the well-rehearsed shock
troops to close with the defenses undetected (helped by the element of surprise
abetted by the lack of preliminary bombardment).  The forward elements managed
to advance 7.5 miles in the first 24 hours, but it still took two days to break
free of the frontier fortifications.  Meretskov's forces then found themselves
almost immediately up against an even stronger position in the defenses
surrounding Mutankiang (and here the continuing rain worked against them by
denying them the advantage of their air superiority), and 1st Far East Front
had to face some heavy counterattacks by the strong concentration of Japanese
forces in that area before the city fell August 16th (aided by the clearing
skies).
        The 2nd Far East Front was massed along the Amur river on Manchuria's
northern border.  This grouping was commanded by General Purkayev, who had been
the Soviet commander in the Far East for most of the war.  The troops, too,
were mainly composed of men who had already been in the east prior to the
massive Soviet concentration.  Most of these therefore lacked battle
experience, but they were familiar with the territory and conditions, and
efforts had been made to provide as many units as possible with combat training
under veterans of the German war.  Their advance was more of a frontal push
while the tank and mechanized forces of the other two fronts made deep
penetrations from both flanks further south.  On this front the Japanese 134th
Division made a particularly strong stand, initially holding off the first
Soviet division to cross the Sungari river in the direction of the industrial
center of Harbin.  The advance got bogged down to the extent that Purkayev had
to personally take command in that sector to get things moving.
        The Japanese resistance, already virtually doomed to failure by the
crushing material superiority of the Soviets, was further confounded by
confusion and disintegration in the command structure.  Lt-Gen Hata later
admitted that many of the troops of the Kwantung Army had been out of the
control of Army HQ after the first few days, due to the rapid Soviet advances
which disrupted communications (Vasilevsky).  BTW, the Soviets had also taken
extremely great pains to camouflage their massive build-up, and had been
successful enough that tactical surprise was acheived in many cases during the
first assaults.  Confusion over the Emporer's surrender message further
aggravated the Japanese situation.  When the Emporer's message was broadcast,
followed the next day (August 16th) by specific orders to cease hostilities,
the Japanese 3rd Army in Manchuria immediately ordered its forces to stop
fighting, only to have this instantly countermanded by Kwantung Army HQ.
Yamada, in fact, would not believe the Emporer's message until he received
orders in writing (Aug 17th).  The main centers of eastern Manchuria, including
the most important ports, were not secured until after the general Japanese
surrender had begun.  Mukden was taken August 20th, Dairen and Port Arthur on
the 22nd.  These were some of the airborne and amphibious operations I referred
to in the last post.
        In addition to the 594,000 prisoners (about half a million of whom were
released between 1948 and 1950), the Soviets claim to have killed over 83,000
Japanese during the campaign.  Japanese records are incomplete, but confirm
that at least 21,000 military personnel were killed in action.  The Soviets
admitted to over 30,000 casualties, including some 8,200 killed (Bauer).  In
concurrent actions, the Soviets also overran southern Sakhalin island and the
Kurile island chain.  On southern Sakhalin the 20,000 Japanese military
personnel, though outnumbered by more than three to one in men and ten to one
in artillery, put up a fierce resistance.  Rather than fight through the strong
fortifications along the frontier, the Soviets supported their frontal attack
with an amphibious landing.  But the Japanese counterattacked, and actually cut
off part of the division that landed.  Further landings, however, stretched the
defenders beyond their limited capacity, and by the 20th the island was
secured.
        In a China post tie-in, I wanted to say that once the Soviet operation
was under way, Mao's Communist armies began their own offensive in support.
Specifically, the 8th Route Army, which had given the Japanese so many
headaches over the preceding five-plus years, began a two-pronged advance
northward.  Its eastern arm struck northeast in the general direction of
Peking, while the left wing drove straight north to link up with the right wing
of the Soviet forces.  As I alluded to in a much earlier post, the link-up
benefitted the Chinese Communists in that the Soviets provided them with a
goodly quantity of Soviet and captured Japanese weapons.
        One last addition/clarification.  The two cruisers in Admiral
Yumashev's Pacific Fleet were the KALININ and the KAGANOVICH.  Both were
constructed in the Amur river shipyards, and completed in 1944.  These were
KIROV-class ships, designed and built with considerable Italian assistance.
They were fast for their size, reportedly making over 35 knots under optimum
conditions, and each mounted nine 180-mm guns.  The Soviets, BTW, had planned
to base the two super-battleships they began building in the 1930's in the
Pacific, had they ever completed them (another indication that Japanese fears
regarding Soviet intentions on the Pacific seaboard were not unfounded).  These
two vessels, the SOVIETSKY SOYUZ and the SOVIETSKAYA UKRAINA, would have come
in at over 65,000 tons combat-loaded, mounting nine 16-inch guns and boasting
armor that equaled or exceeded that of the Japanese YAMATO-class, but lack of
funds and steel caused them to be essentially abandoned before the war began
(Antony Preston, "The Russian Navy," in "The Soviet War Machine 1917-45").
Finally, while discussing Soviet naval dispositions, in addition to Yumashev's
fleet the Russian forces also included the Amur River Flotilla, which disposed
in 1945 of more than 60 armed gunboats, patrol craft, and motor launches, as
well as over 100 conscripted civilian river steamers and 70 aircraft
(Vasilevsky).
        Aside from the sources cited, I also consulted Ian Hogg, "The War
Against Japan" in "The Soviet War Machine 1917-45."  And here, with the last
acts of the war for the Japanese, is a good place to end this lengthy labor.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 18:04:50 -0600
From:    "Louis R. Coatney" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Nimitz and ... MIKASA?

Carl,

     Thanks, but I knew/know the MIKASA was a battleship --
or at least predreadnought, of course -- and I don't think
it was she.

Lou

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 18:38:31 -0600
From:    "Louis R. Coatney" <[email-masked]>
Subject: CONVENTION UPDATE:  "Little Wars," 18-19Mar95,
         Chicago/O'Hare/Ramada Inn

In case anyone from my history and gaming nets are in the area
  and want to drop by to say Hello!  (Ummm ... There *is* an
  admission fee, for spectators, though.  There are usually
  *book* dealers, in the dealers' area, too.)

"Little Wars" will be held in the Ramada at O'Hair Int. Airport.
  This is the big toy soldiers and wargaming convention in the
  Midwest, until summer.

I'll be running a 1:1200 Battle of the Java Sea, starting 9AM
  on Sunday (the 19th), for sure -- using my "Naval Action"
  naval wargaming rules.  I've talked with Frank Chadwick, again,
  and Game Designers Workshop is still considering publishing
  them, *if* we can come to terms, etc.

I *should* be running a GERMAN EAGLE VS. RUSSIAN BEAR tournament
  on Saturday, starting at noon, also.  I am still debugging
  SKY, SEA, AND JUNGLE:  THE *HORROR* OF GUADALCANAL, AUG-DEC42.
  (Yes, manual boardgames have to be de-bugged playtested, too.
  :-)  )

ABDA to Victory!  :-)

(I have the *perfect* strategy.  :-)  Incidentally, the rules
  are simple and the ships are fascinating -- once I get them
  finally fitted out for "sea"  :-) -- so if you want to
  command a division of destroyers, .... )

Lou Coatney, 1:1200 ABDA Fleet Commander at Large
  [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 19:07:33 -0600
From:    Terrence Lindell <[email-masked]>
Subject: Victory at Sea series

The recent discussion about accuracy in the Victory at Sea series has
reminded me that I have seen some mention of it being available on
videodisc.  Regardless of some inaccurate footage, this would be an
invaluable resource for teaching WWII.  I have not been successful in
tracking down the videodisc version.  Anyone able to help?

Terry Lindell
Department of History
Wartburg College
Waverly, Iowa  50677
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 20:26:49 -0500
From:    Lee Windsor u <[email-masked]>
Subject: POL: Italian Surrender

Hey Big Joe!

I am currently working on a paper discussing the Allied lack of
co-ordination between military and political strategy with regards to the
surrender of Italy and the launching of "Baytown//Avalanche.  I am trying
to outline some of the factors that contributed to this bungle.  In
particular, I am focusing on the failure to translate broad political and
strategic goals like knocking Italy out of the war and securing bomber
bases, into a set of operational objectives.

I have a couple of questions.  Can you point me towards some good stuff
that deals with the Italian perspective, but that has been published in
English.  I do have Badoglio's book.  Also, my prof pointed me towards an
article in the "Journal of Contemporary History" vol 24 1989.  James J.
Sadkovich is the author of this article entitled "Understanding Defeat:
Reappraising Italy's Role in WWII".  I've just had a quick look at it and
while he makes some good points, some of his arguments seem a little
stretched.  In your travels, have you ever come across this article and
if so, does it hold water?  I greatly appreciate any help you can offer.
I know you are a busy fellow so if you could through a book title or two
at me I woulbe be lots happy!

For the benefit of the other members on the list, Sadkovich is arguing
that western historians have created a myth of poor Italian performance
and that given her industrial capacity, Italian forces performed quite
well.  While some of what he says may be true, it would seem that the
evidence he uses to support some of his claims seems shaky.  He also
makes some strong accusations about British responsability for Italian
involvement in the war, again without too much evidence to sustain his
argument.

I may be wrong in my criticism so if anyone has anything to add on this
issue please pipe in!

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 20:29:30 -0500
From:    Lee Windsor u <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: POL: Italian Surrender

Sorry I forgot to sign that last post.

Lee A. Windsor                             [email-masked].
8th Canadian Hussars                                  35 High St.
Wilfrid Laurier U.                                  Waterloo, ONT
Waterloo, Ontario                                         N2L 3X7
                         "Semper Fidelis"

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 21:46:37 EST
From:    "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Subject: DOC: U.S. Army Pearl Harbor Board.

The U.S. Army Pearl Harbor Inquiry Board Report has been uploaded to

byrd.mu.wvnet.edu
/pub/history/military/wwii/pearl.harbor/army.board

This is the wartime investigative board, convened before the Congressional
investigation of 1946, and frequently cited in those hearings.

Larry J

[email-masked]; Co-Mod.: BYRD.MU.WVNET.EDU (Historical docs)
"Sunday's horoscope is note worthy because of its strange, sudden and wholly
unpredictable and inexplicable occurrences, affecting all phases of life."
Your Horoscope" L.A. Evening Herald Express, Sat, 12/06/41

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 18:36:47 -0600
From:    Kelvin Brent Luther <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

On Wed, 15 Mar 1995, Greg Kelley wrote:

> see below----
>
>                                           Glad To Be Of Service!
>
>                                           Greg Kelley
>                                           St. Paul Public Library
>                                           [email-masked]
>
>
> Kelvin, as much as I'm a fan of King Boris (and also a closet fan of the
> Royal Bulgarian Navy), I can't quite follow your line of reasoning.  When
> the Bulgarians used Nazi Germany to pressure Rumania into relinquishing
> the southern Dobrudja viz. the Treaty of Craiova (7th September 1940)
> there weren't any Axis forces on ANY Bulgarian border; in fact, the
> Balkan-based Little Entente still had a few gasps of life left in it.
> The Bulgarian government was one of the very first Balkan nations to
> allow Gestapo agents to operate within its country-- early summer 1940
> (yeah, BEFORE the French Armistice-- like even BEFORE ITALY  entered
> the war)  German troops began entering Bulgaria following Boris' personal
>  (and very secretative) request of 18th November; thousands of German troops
>  were on station in Bulgaria before the end of 1940 (remember where the
>  Wehrmacht launched its invasion of Greece from in March 1941?).
> Bulgaria's signature to the Tripartite Pact on 1st March 1941 was more of
> a formality by that time.
>
> Oh, I do agree that as Axis powers go Bulgaria wasn't evil incarnate, but
> just like Rumania (hey, we ALL know how I feel about them), it warn't no
> unblemished saint, either.
>
>                                                          G.A.K.
>
> QUIT
>
        Thanks for your reply.  I didn't mean to portray Bulgaria as
saintly with regards to their actions in WWII but was replying to the
popular trend to speak of how some countries occupied by Germany
shouldn't be held responsible for the holocaust (especially and
specifically Poland).  I think the problem is that I am new at this and
should have provided quotes of what I was replying to so that the content
of previous posts wasn't lost in the discussion.  I quess the way I
feel about Bulgaria's involvement with Germany is this.  They have been
involved in numerous wars in the Balkans.  They saw as primary enemies I
would think Rumania, Russia, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia.  They were
looking out for number one and got in on the ground floor with the
Germans. If it had not been for the Austrian Emperor's support in 1908,
there probably would not have been an independant Bulgaria at that time
so they were perhaps predisposed to allying with the Germans.  When it
counted they refused to export their Jewish population.
        Germany was the only power in the region they had no history of
warring with not to mention having been allied with them in WWI.  There
was at all times a significant percentage perhaps even a majority that
favored Russia over Germany.  If we are going to denigrate Bulgaria for
allying with the Germans we have to blame King Boris as he was the major
pro German influence at the time.  It was the Russophilic faction in
Bulgaria that prevented him from following Germany into Russia as he
feared civil war.  In late August `43' Boris was dead yet the Germans
didn't manage to make Bulgaria a puppet at this point either.  Almost
exactly a year later Bulgaria having yet to be at war with Russia sues
for  a seperate peace and calls for the disarmament of German soldiers
on their soil.  The Russians declare war on Bulgaria on Sept. 5th even
though Bulgaria is now in a state of war with Germany.
        The involvement of Bulgaria in the war allied to Germany was
simply the expedient method for them to regain the territory lost to
Yugoslavia, Greece, and Romania in the treaty of Neuilly.  This mirrors
the Versaille treaty where the victors took the spoils.  The role
Versaille played in laying the foundations for another war is the same as
the treaty taking land from Bulgaria and giving it to her neighbors with
whom there are longstanding ethnic rivalries and history of conflict.
        I agree with your closing statement that they weren't angels but
then neither were the Russians and they were our allies.  I simply wanted
to put in a different context what I felt was a somewhat misguided way of
looking at holocaust responsibility.
                                Kelvin Luther

------------------------------

Date:    Wed, 15 Mar 1995 22:21:33 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 16-MAR-1945

On 16-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the U.S. 1st Army sector, the VII Corps extends the
bridgehead over the Rhine at Remagen. In the 3rd Army sector, the 87th
Division begins the offensive for crossing the Moselle. The XII and XX
Corps also cross the Moselle. In the 7th Army sector, Operation Undertone
continues with the three corps attempting to break through the Siegfried
Line.

Eastern Front - Soviet forces open a drive on Vienna.

Philippines - In the XI Corps area, the 6th Division prepares to renew the
eastward drive against the Shimbu Line. Elements of the 43rd Division are
unable to progress in the Sugar Loaf area. In the XIV Corps area, the 158th
Infantry reaches Mabini. This completes the capture of the Calumpan
Peninsula. Elements of the 41st Division land on Basilian Island.

Iwo Jima - Iwo Jima is declared secure at 1800, though the Japanese
continue to hold out on the northern tip.

The Homefront
-------------
Special Army Oath For Japanese-Americans - The War Department says that
U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry must take a special oath foreswearing
"allegiance or obediance to the Japanese Emperor" before acceptance into
the Army.

New Presidential Aide - Col. Richard Park has been appointed military aide
to President Roosevelt.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 16 Mar 1995 04:42:00 UTC
From:    "Edward S. Miller" <[email-masked]>
Subject: VJ vs. VE

Robert J. Granvin wrote:

  > The question was raised why VE (Victory in Europe) vs. VJ (Victory over
  > Japan)...
  > The Pacific is, for the most part, different.  Japan is the clear
  > driving force here, but there wasn't a real "coalition" of countries
  > making up the Pacific front.

Did Japan have Pacific allies?  I vaguely recall that the puppet regimes of
Thailand and Manchukuo may have declared war on the US.  Also perhaps the
exile nationalist "governments" of India and maybe Indonesia.  Does anyone
know?

Ed Miller   [email-masked]

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 14 Mar 1995 to 15 Mar 1995
*************************************************