Subject: WWII-L Digest - 2 Mar 1995 to 3 Mar 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Sat, 4 Mar 1995 00:02:02 -0500

There are 26 messages totalling 1364 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. MEDIA:WWII Truck Found
  2. INF: Tokyo RAid and Chinese casualties
  3. INF: USN Chronology 03-03-95
  4. Patton Museum
  5. Weather Reports
  6. B-29 sans defensive weapons (2)
  7. Patton biography (2)
  8. Nissen  and Quonset Huts
  9. China/Japan part 8 (2)
 10. endlossung/Germans or Nazis?
 11. Greenland P-38F restoration
 12. China/Japan part 9
 13. Endlosung (was:Is it true that they can trace a single document) (2)
 14. Richard I.Bong
 15. China/Japan conclusion
 16. Japanese tactics revisited
 17. INF: 50 Years Ago - 04-MAR-1945
 18. Japanese tactical afterthoughts part 2
 19. Battle of the Bulge
 20. INFO ON USN BATTLE
 21. Glacier Girl
 22. THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 00:19:45 -0500
From:    "Matthew R. Burchette" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: MEDIA:WWII Truck Found

The drivers and crew were not in as good as shape as the truck I'd warrent!

------------------------------

Date:    Thu, 2 Mar 1995 23:13:34 -0800
From:    Pedro A Loureiro <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INF: Tokyo RAid and Chinese casualties

There is quite a lot of information on Japanese atrocities in China,
especially if you can read Chinese.  But even the English language
materials are quite voluminous.

If you have Mosaic, or Netscape, you can actually tap into the Chinese
University of Hong Kong's World Wide Web pages on the Nanjing Massacre.
The address (WWW) is: http://www.arts.cuhk.hk/NanjingMassacre/NM.html
Unfortunately, I have found that it is very difficult to bring up the
Nanjing home-page directly.  The best way to access it is by going into
the Chinese University's menu (http://www.cuhk.hk/) and then pick the
History Department.  You will then find the Nanjing option.  In the event
that you do not have an image browser, you can access the file through
lynx or gopher.

Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley have written many accounts about Japanese
atrocities.  A recent book by Haruko and Theodore Cook, Japan at War: An
Oral History, also has recollections by the Japanese themselves.

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (War Crime Trials)
is another good source.

Also look through the journal, Journal of Studies of Japanese Aggression
Against China.

Pedro Loureiro

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 04:00:12 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 03-03-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
03/03 Sat. Army troops land on Masbate, Burias and Ticao
           Islands, P. I.; landings are supported by naval
           gunfire and Marine aircraft.
           Submarine TUNA (SS-203) lands supplies on northeast
           coast of Borneo.
            United States naval vessel damaged, Iwo Jima area:
             Attack transport BOLIVAR (APA-34), by coastal
              defense gun,
              24 d. 46'N., 141 d. 19'E.
            Japanese naval vessel sunk:
             Oiler HARIO, by mine, off French Indochina,
              18 d. 10'N., 109 d. 40'E.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 04:56:07 -0500
From:    Jeff Olson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Patton Museum

QK.Has anybody been to the Patton Museum at Fort Knox?
.A report would be appreciated.

I've been there a couple of times and can assure you it is well worth
the side trip to Ft. Knox if you are ever in the Louisville, Ky area.
The museum is dedicated to armor of all types and eras.  There are
displays of tanks from many countries.  Patton, of course, is well
covered.  Lots of memorabilia including his "personal" van.  As I
recall they also have a research library but I don't know what it
contains.

Jeff Olson
---
. 1st 1.11 #1611 . [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 07:41:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: Weather Reports

The Associated Press (AP) is reporting that Harry Geise, a
meteorologist who started giving detailed and long-term weather
forecasts on radio station WLS in Chicago has died at age 75.  What
is pertinent to this group is that he started reporting these weather
forecasts in 1941; the US Government forced him to stop in early
1942 because it was believed that these reports would assist German
U-boats in the Atlantic.

Requiescat in pace.

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop              |  Those who have long enjoyed such |
|  Bellcore                   |  privileges as we enjoy forget in |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA         |  time that men have died to win   |
|  [email-masked]  |  them.                     FDR    |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 07:32:26 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: B-29 sans defensive weapons

Hello, Ron!

Martin Caidin in his book "A Torch to the Enemy" states the same.
The weight saved from removing the gunners and defensive armaments
allowed the Superforts to carry more bombs.

Thanks for the post.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 10:03:10 -0500
From:    Matthew Savoie <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Patton biography

Terry,
        Please post the list of Patton bios.  Thanks.
Matt

--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew M. Savoie           |    "Not to know what happened before you were |
Western New England College |    born is to remain always a child."         |
1215 Wilbraham Road         |         - Cicero                              |
Box 1830                    |                                               |
Springfield, MA 01119       |    [email-masked]                           |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 10:05:57 -0500
From:    Matthew Savoie <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Patton biography

Terry,
        Thanks for the list.
Matt
--
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew M. Savoie           |    "Not to know what happened before you were |
Western New England College |    born is to remain always a child."         |
1215 Wilbraham Road         |         - Cicero                              |
Box 1830                    |                                               |
Springfield, MA 01119       |    [email-masked]                           |
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 11:16:09 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Nissen  and Quonset Huts

Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]> write:
> Is there a difference between Nissen and Quonset Huts? Were these
> British and American terms for the same thing? If not, how did
> they differ?

        Since moving to Rhode Island, I have heard that Quonset Huts
acquired that name because they were first constructed at Quonset
Air Station in Rhode Island.  That's about all I can offer on this
topic, though.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
Mulligan!?  On time and on target!?  Cripes!

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 12:14:38 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: B-29 sans defensive weapons

        I believe LeMay also mentions the removal of defensive armament on the
B-29's for low-level missions in "Superfortress."  He also speaks of the
difficulties air gunners had adjusting to the sighting system for the
remotely-operated gun positions.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 13:41:59 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: China/Japan part 8

        Meanwhile, back in China...
        ...there was a war going on.  Although the English-speaking reader may
not run across too much about it in most of the general histories of the Second
World War in the Pacific, it was definitely real to both the Chinese and
Japanese.  In December 1941 there were 22 Japanese divisions deployed in China,
twice the number used in the great southern offensive (just for the record, the
total forces employed in the first three months of the Japanese southern
offensive, including reserves, totalled 11 divisions, 5 brigades, 9 tank
regiments, and the three-battalion "South Seas Detachment."  To clear up
confusion on the number of brigades, since I replied to someone's question by
listing only one, there was one infantry brigade in the opening wave.  The
figure above counts reserves, and also includes the 1st Parachute Brigade, with
only one battalion of actual paratroopers).  In mid-1943 there were in China 26
divisions (including one armored division) and a dozen brigades (including a
horse cavalry brigade), and in August 1945 there were still 28 divisions (one
armored) in China proper (none of these figures counting Manchuria or
Mongolia).  Thus the Japanese commitment in China remained huge, even appearing
to grow as the war progressed (this is however deceiving, as the number of men
per division was definitely higher in 1941; from 1943 onwards many of the
divisions in China were the inferior type "C" divisions, and even the brigades
there in 1943, except for the cavalry, were in most cases distinctly
second-line formations in terms of manpower, training, and equipment).
Nonetheless, Japan remained tied down in China in a large way-- while, on the
other side, and despite the agreements between Roosevelt and Churchill to
concentrate 90% of the Allied war effort in Europe, there were at the end of
1942 more US Army troops in the Pacific than in the Mediterranean and European
theatres.  Japan's commitment in China condemned them to repeat on a strategic
scale the same tactical errors they had demonstrated on Guadalcanal-- i.e.,
being unable to concentrate sufficient forces for the task, they frittered away
many of their best, combat-experienced divisions piecemeal (2nd Division on
Guadalcanal, 6th Division on Bougainville, 1st Division on Leyte, etc).  These
battle-hardened veterans, once lost, could not be replaced.  Although I haven't
read it myself (Toland summarizes it extensively, and Ienaga also makes
reference to it), the recollections of Corporal Kiyoshi Kamiko, a squad leader
in the "Gem" (1st) Division, apparently show both the fighting qualities and
the high attrition suffered by these forces, the pride of the Japanese Army.
Kamiko's unit, during the fighting for the eminence on Leyte known to the GI's
as "Breakneck Ridge," repeatedly threw back American assaults with little more
than rifles, light machineguns, and grenades (and, in one case, the timely
intervention of one heavy artillery piece and four field guns), plus their own
wits and tenacity.  But after the second round of US attacks Kamiko's company
was already down to 25 men, and would soon be critically short of
ammunition as well.  Kamiko was one of a handfull from his division to survive.
        Nor were the units in China necessarily in for soft duty.  In fact, it
was quite the opposite, as this vast unheralded war continued without pause.
The spectacular events of the war between Chiang and the Japanese-- the trench
fighting around Shanghai, the capture and despoilation of Nanking, the shocking
Japanese defeat and near-catastrophe in Shantung province (offset by the fact
that the Japanese were still making spectacular advances virtually everywhere
else), and the destruction of the Yellow river dykes as a Chinese delaying
tactic-- all occurred in 1937-38.  But in 1939 the Japanese Army launched an
offensive against the guerillas in Shansi province, employing three divisions
and on a few occasions surreptitiously using poison gas, while the Navy mounted
its own expedition to take Hainin island in the south.  The year 1940 brought
the ferocious "Hundred Regiments Offensive" by the Communist guerilla armies
in the north, leading to heavy casualties for both sides.  This led to a
large-scale counteroffensive against Mao's forces in the north in 1941, which
caused the Communists further heavy losses.  Still, this hydra was almost
impossible to kill.  By 1944 the Communist forces had again risen to at least
half a million men, by the most conservative Japanese estimates (the estimates
range considerably higher).
        Meanwhile, in the south, Chiang had withdrawn from the war in China
proper to the greatest degree possible, but it takes both sides to make a
peace.  The Doolittle raid on Japan in the spring of 1942 brought a brutal
response in the form of offensive action by some 53 Japanese battalions, who
pushed inland up to 200 miles in an attempt to capture the surviving crewmen
from the raid, and (according to a post I just saw-- was that Jack McKillop?--
if not, great post whoever did it) killing a quarter million Chinese civilians
in reprisal.  This was, of course, going on simultaneously with the "Three All"
policy to depopulate the real and suspected Communist strongholds in the north.
In the winter of 1942-43, five Japanese divisions began what was actually an
extensive foraging operation to bring in foodstuffs for the off-season, but
since this advance seemed to be aimed straight for Chungking, Chiang's Chinese
had to take it seriously.  Chiang's troops did enough fighting in this one that
they fired off roughly half their remaining stocks of ammunition in the
process-- a real problem since, with the Burma road cut, resupply could only
come from the tedious and difficult supply flights over the Hump, as the
mountains separating China from India were known to the fliers.  The capacity
of this extensive resupply by air was extremely limited, and in terms of
resources employed for results gained it was not a very efficient way of waging
war from the Allied point of view.
        In Burma, Stilwell was doing everything he could to reopen a ground
route, primarily with Chinese forces.  Chiang had experienced second thoughts
about his agreement to let Stilwell train (and equip with US weapons) thirty
divisions in India, worrying about the political implications of having such
high-quality troops outside his direct control.  He soon began sabotaging the
plan, and the quality of men (there were constant arguments over the quantity
as well) left much to be desired.  One US processing center for arriving
Chinese recruits in India found 100% of the men that passed through suffering
from some form of disease.  General Wedemayer, Stilwell's successor when
"Vinegar Joe" was finally recalled in 1944, said that even then most of the new
soldiers could not even stand a short hike without collapsing from exhaustion,
and many were literally on the verge of dying from starvation when they came to
the American camps.  Nevertheless, Stilwell's campaign in 1943 proved
successful.  Employing deep penetration tactics and flanking movements in the
tenuous, jungle-covered front, he surprised the Japanese by reaching the key
center of Myitkina.  In the course of this campaign Stilwell drove his small
composite American group, famed as "Merrill's Marauders" (from their
commander's name) to the point of exhaustion.  Merrill himself suffered a heart
attack and had to be evacuated.  But this group worked miracles before becoming
too worn down to continue, and penetrations by Chinese forces also proved
effective (one Chinese unit spent almost a week in "attack preparations"--
i.e., moving through thick jungle to get into attack position.  Another Chinese
force made the deep penetration to take Kamaing that resulted in the Japanese
in Myitkina being cut off from supplies).  The Myitkina battle dragged on for
months, turning into a siege as both sides misestimated the other's
capabilities.  Stilwell did not initially realize how strong the Japanese
garrison, composed largely of men from the experienced 18th Division, was, nor
how tough the pillboxes and other defenses would be to take in frontal warfare.
The Japanese, for their part, seriously overestimated the strength of the
attacking forces.  Though prolonged and costly, the capture of Myitkina was a
definite Allied victory.
        The year 1944 saw the last successful large-scale Japanese ground
offensive of the war.  Not surprisingly, this effort came in China.  I saw
recently on the list the plans Chennault put forth to bomb Japan into
submission using bases in China.  Pearl Harbor delayed but did not terminate
the implementation of this plan.  By 1944 Chennault's 14th Air Force, using
advanced bases in southeast China, was causing the Japanese severe headaches.
Given the tight supply situation in China, the proper use of resources was a
topic of serious disagreement between Chennault and Stilwell.  The latter
argued that it was pointless to build up an air force and the extensive ground
organization that supported it without first having in place a land army
capable of defending their bases against Japanese attack.  Stilwell's dire
predictions came true when the Japanese launched their "Ichi-Go" offensive in
south China during April 1944.  There were 12 Japanese divisions, counting
reserves, employed in this operation (hey, speaking of great names, how about
General Banzai, one of the senior Japanese commanders in this operation?).  In
theory the Chinese had 34 of their own divisions to face them.  In practice,
there were many instances where the Chinese fled from much smaller Japanese
units.  Chennault's air units pounded the advancing Japanese, but could not
stop them (they still controlled the skies to a large degree, in spite of the
Japanese introduction during this operation of their excellent new Ki-84
fighter, which often won in individual engagements but was not yet available in
sufficient quantity to make a real difference).  The tenacious defense of
Hengyang by Chinese Maj-General Fong Tsien-Chueh, who held the city for six
weeks, was an exception to the general pattern of the ground fighting, and in
the end only delayed rather than halted the Japanese.  By the end of summer
Chennault's main bases-- the chief objective of the exercize-- had been
overrun, and the offensive continued on into the fall before petering out due
more to vast spaces and the Japanese scarcity of resources than to Allied
action.
        And with the last successful major Japanese offensive of the war I'll
have to break off.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 14:54:14 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: China/Japan part 8

All of this discussion of the CBI theater has piqued my interest in
that part of the war.  Any suggestions out there from the list as
to the best history of the Sino-Japanese war in particular and the
CBI theater in general?
As always, thanks in advance,
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 14:00:51 -0600
From:    Kelvin Brent Luther <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: endlossung/Germans or Nazis?

On Thu, 2 Mar 1995, Henry Sirotin wrote:

> I think we went through this on this list two months ago (or was it
> Milhist-l?)
>
> 1) While no organized Polish group took part in the Holocaust, and hundreds
> of Poles risked their lives to save Jews, thousands more actively collaborated
> with the Germans. The most likely reason there was no organized collaboration
> was that Poland, unlike most occupied German territory, was directly ruled
> by the Germans. I seriously doubt a Polish puppet government would have
> behaved any differently than, say, Vichy. To cite St. Maximilian Kolbe
> in this context is insulting. Kolbe was one of the most notorious
> anti-Semites in prewar Poland, a journalist and politician who crusaded
> on this issue. This fact would almost certainly have been known to
> John Paul II when he named Kolbe, and was brought out almost immediately
> thereafter, yet the process of canonization continued. Among the million,
> wasn't there ONE Catholic Pole with more wholesome credentials who could
> have been honored? Finally, the only pogrom in Europe *since* the Holocaust
> killed 40-50 Jews in Kielce, Poland, in 1946. As I noted in an earlier post,
> apparently some thought the Holocaust insufficient.
>
> Alex is quite right in noting the Polish contribution to the Allied war
> effort is usually understated- note especially the codebreaking work-
> but this is a separate issue.
>
> 2) Italy took anti-Semitic actions only in response to real or perceived
> requirements of the alliance with the Nazis. I don't think Italy had any
> anti-Jewish laws until c.1938, a very sizable number if not most of the
> Italian Jewish community survived the war, and Italian commanders in
> Yugoslavia intervened to save Jews.
>
> 3) Finland saved its entire native Jewish population of 1700+. The only
> Jews it turned over were 8 non-Finns demanded by the Gestapo on political
> and criminal grounds, who were included in a larger group of about 25 of
> all backgrounds. To their credit, the Finns fully investigated this act
> and to this day it is considered a national scandal. Another 100 or so
> non-Finnish Jews were also protected. President Mannerheim's response to
> increasing German pressure to surrender the Jews was to attend services
> at a leading Helsinki synagogue.
>
> Henry Sirotin
>
        I believe the Danes also managed to save most of their Jewish
population ferrying them to Sweden just before they were to be rounded
up.  I cannot remember how the roundup was leaked but it may have been
the Danish gov't itself before it was taken over by the Nazis and
controlled.  Was this the impetus for the Germans taking over the Danish
gov't, anyone?
        I believe there was more than just one pogrom after the war, many
occuring in places like the current Belarus and Moldova
(Chisinau/Kishenev comes to mind) as well as Yugoslavia.
                                Kelvin Luther

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 16:20:33 EST
From:    "Dennis E. Sparks" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Greenland P-38F restoration

Wednesday, I revisited the Greenland P-38F restoration.  For those on
the list who don't know what I'm talking about, this is the P-38 that
was recovered from under the ice in Greenland in 1992.  I visited the
restoration effort in May 1994 and posted a note to the list about it.

Brief history:  In the early morning hours of 15 July 1942, seven P-38Fs
of the 1st FG and two 97th BG B-17Es departed from the Bluie West 8
airstrip on Greenland and headed for Iceland.  These aircraft were a
part of Operation Bolero, the ferrying of combat aircraft to England.
One of the P-38s soon returned with a runaway propeller, while the others
continued on towards Iceland, 845 miles away.  After five hours of
flying in steadily worsening weather, a coded radio report was received
that seemed to indicate that weather conditions at the airfield near
Reykjavik was closing down rapidly. (Later, there was some evidence
to support the contention that the radio transmission was from a
German U-boat attempting to mislead them.)  The flight turned and
headed back to BW-8.  Two hours from there, they received a report from
BW-8 that the weather was too bad for landing, so they turned toward
Bluie West One, even further away.  After almost nine hours in the
air, the aircraft were forced down on the icecap by lack of fuel.
While the crew were rescued after four days, the aircraft were not
recovered, and lay undisturbed for 50 years, covered by an ever
deepening blanket of snow.

In the summer of 1992, one of the P-38s was recovered from under 270
feet (83 meters) of snow and ice.  Melting their way through the ice,
the recovery team melted a cavern around the aircraft and dismantled
it, lifting it in pieces through a 4 foot by 16 foot trench they had
created.  The recovery and subsequent transportation to Middlesboro,
Kentucky to begin restoration cost more than US$600,000, with about
another $700,000 spent so far on the restoration.  The aircraft is
being restored to flying condition, with an expected completion date
of 1996.  It is reputed to be the only "F" model P-38 in existence
(with the exception of course of five remaining under the ice in
Greenland).

Current Status:
Much progress has been made since I last saw the aircraft in May 1994.
The inboard sections of the wing are now completed, as is the right
outer wing panel.  The engines are undergoing restoration in
Indianpolis, Indiana.  The right engine is finished, and work is
progressing on the left engine.  The engine mounts look finished,
and they were installing the engine control cables and linkages while
I was there.  The booms are complete back to near the tails, which
are still absent.

The central nacelle containing the cockpit and armament is taking shape.
The forward and upper sections of the canopy are sitting in place, though
the cockpit itself is still empty.  According to project manager Bob
Cardin, this aircraft actually started life as a P-38E, being converted
to an "F" model while still on the assembly line.  It still retained
the sideways-folding upper section of the canopy of the earlier model,
a feature that is being preserved on the restored aircraft.  For those
of you unfamiliar with the P-38, it had a fixed forward windscreen and
aft canopy sections.  The central portion was in three pieces, with
two side pieces that rolled up very much like the side windows on an
automobile, and a third section overhead.  This overhead portion was
hinged on the right side of the earlier models, and hinged at the rear
beginning with (about) the "F" model.  Early models of the P-38 featured
a thick piece of armored glass situated inside the forward windscreen.
This armored glass was recovered in good shape and will be placed in
the aircraft when it is on display on the ground, but will be removed
to improve visibility when the aircraft is being flown.

The original nose section, which housed the guns, is installed and is
being finished.  A second nose section is also on display, with the
original guns and ammunition cans temporarily installed in it.  The
guns will be moved when the nose is complete.  The guns were among the
first items removed from the aircraft when it was being removed from
the ice.  They were successfully test fired, using the 50 year old
ammunition, after being brought to the surface.  The remaining
ammunition is now in storage, and replica ammunition loads will be
carried on the restored aircraft.

The landing gear struts have been returned from England where they
underwent a year and a half long restoration.  The struts are not
yet installed.  The original wheels could not be salvaged, and
replacements have been secured.  The tires still were still inflated
when recovered, and samples of the 50 year old air were saved.  The
original main wheels had wheel covers attached, and they had been
painted insignia blue.  I have no idea if this was some form of
squadron marking or simply the pilot's preference.

A pair of drop tanks from Lefty Gardner have been restored and painted.
New self-sealing rubber liners for the fuel tanks are on hand.

Currently wearing a fresh coat of zinc chromate green primer, the
aircraft will be repainted in the same olive drab over gray scheme
that it wore when new.  The insignia were the blue disc with the
white star, and oddly, the red disc in the center of the star.
(A section of the upper left wing and left boom with the national
insignia are on display.)  This puzzled me, as the red disc was
ordered removed in May 1942.  Bob confirmed that the red discs had
indeed been painted over with what he described as "white fence
paint", which easily rubbed off when the aircraft was recovered.
Other than the various stencilled markings, the only other markings
on the aircraft was the tail number.  The restoration crew has
named the aircraft "Glacier Girl", and a suitable piece of nose
art has been designed, to be applied when the aircraft is painted.
A piece of graffiti dating from the construction of the aircraft that
was uncovered under the inboard radiator on the right boom has been
preserved.

Dennis E. Sparks
[email-masked]
Lexington, Kentucky

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 16:27:15 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: China/Japan part 9

        As anyone who read my last post on this subject will realize, the
Japanese war in China, much as it may be ignored in many English-language
texts, was hardly a subsidiary operation.  On the contrary, it continued to
consume a major portion of the Japanese Army's resources.  A good example of
the relative scales involved would be the spring of 1942, when the Japanese
employed 53 battalions for a mere punitive expedition in south China, while at
the same time they allotted 14 battalions to face the Allies in New Guinea and
the Solomons.  Or reflect on the fact that the three divisions employed in the
anti-guerilla operations in Shansi in 1939 constituted a force equal in size to
those which conquered Malaya or the Phillipines.  Or that the 12 divisions for
the "Ichi-Go" offensive of 1944 was one more complete division than initially
used in the entire push south in 1941 (albeit the relative sizes and firepower
of the divisions involved were undoubtably quite different).  At any rate, it
could be argued that it was in fact the immense demands of this "sideshow" in
China that condemned the Japanese Army to fight a "poor man's war" everywhere
else.
        I haven't spoken much about Mao's Communist forces recently.  They were
most definitely still around and kicking, even if they had suffered serious
blows in 1941-42.  In fact, the "Ichi-Go" offensive in the south represented a
major opportunity for Mao's forces, who had previously had to face some of the
strongest Japanese military pressure being exerted on the China front.  While
the Japanese were preoccupied in the south, Mao's Communist guerillas oozed
into the neglected northern areas and set up shop.  Soon the Communists could
count under their control four entire northern provinces, with a combined
population of some 68 million inhabitants.  Mao's power base was secure, not
only for the duration of this war, but for the coming reckoning with Chiang.
        In 1941, already a bad year for the Communists as they faced a serious
and costly Japanese counteroffensive, Chiang's forces had broken their uneasy
truce with the Reds (Chiang gave evidence throughout that he still considered
the internal Communists a greater threat than the external invaders, even
allowing tentative peace feelers to be extended to the Japanese).  One of
Chiang's armies attacked the Communist New Fourth Army, with which it was
supposed to be cooperating.  Chiang's troops fell on the Communist rear
echelons, and inflicted some 5,000 casualties in this surprise attack.  This,
of course, marked the end of any cooperation between the Communist and
Nationalist forces.
        BTW, it was not only left-leaning western journalists like Edgar Snow
who found many admirable qualities in Mao's forces.  Most of the US military
officers who served in missions to the Communists shared those sentiments, and
some got in hot water during the McCarthy era of the early 50's as remarks made
praising the organization, discipline, and efficiency of Mao's movement were
later cited as evidence they were "soft on Communism."  Also BTW, I earlier
wondered if Chu Teh had been commander of the 8th Route Army.  Well, yes, in a
sense (but not the sense I had in mind at the time).  Chu Teh, Mao's
indispensible right arm as I think Snow put it, was the commander-in-chief of
the Communist armies ever since their inception in 1927.  He was also a simple,
robust soldier in his personal habits, in particular having a great love for
the game of basketball, which he helped to introduce into the Chinese Communist
army as a recreational activity.  It was said he still played the occasional
pick-up game of hoops when he was 80 (though I bet he lost a step or two).
This is reminiscent of those photos of Mao swimming rivers at an age when most
people are in the geriatric ward.  Of course, Mao also was a firm believer in
hard physical exercize, and except for his heavy cigarette smoking, lived a
relatively simple lifestyle himself.  In 1918, when Mao was 25, he founded the
"New Citizens Society," a group which among its other activities believed in
tough physical training of a military nature.  They did such things as swim in
the rivers even in November, or sleep on the open ground when it was already
covered with frost.  Mao at this time wrote "Exercize should be savage and
rude."  He valued physical stamina, and the ability to do such things as leap
up on horseback and then shoot a rifle.  Mao himself had, as an 18-year-old,
served a six-month stint as a soldier in the Republican armies in 1911.
        A quick historical diversion.  The downfall of the effective power of
China's ruling dynasty came about in 1911.  The leading party for change was
the young Kuomintang (not pretending to know Chinese, but it translates more or
less as "National Peoples' Party").  Its head was Dr. Sun Yat-sen.  Dr Sun came
from a wealthy family.  He had received a western education, although he did
not generally leave the far east to do so.  But he had seen cultures other than
the Chinese first-hand.  Sun summed up China's condition thusly:
        "In spite of our 400 million people gathered together in one China, we
are in fact a sheet of loose sand (NOTE: Sun was speaking before WWI).  We are
the poorest and weakest state in the world, occupying the lowest position in
international affairs.  The rest of mankind is the carving knife and the
serving dish, while we are the fish and the meat."  Sun believed that China
should be run by and for the Chinese, preferably by and for Chinese who were
like himself of the respectable, educated upper-middle classes.  He came to
head a government in 1911, but quickly realized that he did not have enough of
a political, financial, and military power base in the country to actually
rule.  Therefore he resigned a mere fifteen days after taking office.  The
foreign powers, including the US, and also the old mandarin nobility whose
priveleged position was threatened by Sun's proposed meritocracy of businessman
and professionals, generally supported the corpulent northern warlord Yuan
Shi-kai, who came to rule in Peking with the help of western diplomatic
recognition (and money).  The country remained divided until Chiang undertook
his military campaign to unify it following Sun's death.  And of course there
were also the Japanese.  Their efforts to expand on to the Chinese mainland,
beginning in Korea and Manchuria, had already led to war with China in 1894 and
with the Russians in 1903-05.  Foreign diplomatic intervention had prevented
the Japanese from realizing the full fruits of their victories in each case.
However, during World War I, when Japan joined the Allied nations, its chief
role in the war was to invade the German-controlled portion of China (Tsingtao,
where the good beer comes from-- what a coincidence), defeat the small German
forces stationed there, and then-- stay.  Chinese indignation was great at
having German colonialism simply replaced by Japanese (to say nothing of the
untouched colonial holdings of the US, Britain, France, Italy)-- China had
also, under diplomatic pressure, eventually declared war on Germany.
Realization that that was exactly the case led to the first rail strike in
Chinese history in 1919, as a protest.

        Well, gotta go.  Conclusion of China/Japan to follow.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 16:27:35 -0600
From:    Kelvin Brent Luther <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Endlosung (was:Is it true that they can trace a single document)

On Sun, 26 Feb 1995, Bill the Late-replier wrote:

>     I might accept that Hitler and the other honchos had a fantasy, if you
> will, that the Jews would be exterminated.  But the "systematic" events
> that expelled the Jews from society weren't all that systematic.  They
> might have followed a logical course, but what other course could they
> have followed?
>     In the end, as I was going to say, Hitler might have thought, "it
> would be nice if we could exterminate the Jews".  But to say that there
> was a concrete, realistic "architecture of genocide" (to use my Professor
> Breitman's term) is stretching the ablitiy of people in general to
> see into the future.
>
> William Lippert
> The American University
>
        I can understand where some of the arguments for your point of
view come from, but what I can't get past is the idea that people didn't
know where the policies against the Jews were heading.  We in North
America look at the buildup to the holocaust and say that the German
people could not have known where it was heading.  I think they did.
They obviously could not have known the scope it would reach but they
understood systematic anti-semitism.  They had been practicing it for
centuries.  The actions against the Jews from the early thirties on was
simply the most recent manifestation of it.  I think it would not be
incorrect to assume that the way the Jews were being treated and the laws
being enacted against them would lead any honest contemporary observer to
the conclusion that Jews were going to be murdered because of those
policies.  It is reasonable to assume a number of ten thousand would not
be stretching the imagination.  The simple fact that it reached the scale
it did does not preclude the people willing to stand by while the SA and
SS beat Jews to death in the streets from guilt for the final outcome.
As time wore on it also becomes hard to believe people did not realise
where it was heading.  I think Kristalnacht is probably the point of no
return for German guilt.  This was where there could have been no
question about where the Nazis had taken the German people.  I think that
at this point anyone who could have imagined 10 000 deaths previously
would have easily imagined ten times that many or more.
        After Kristalnacht there were people still willing to speak out.
Had enough people joined the chorus regardless of where Hitler and the SS
took Germany afterwards the German people could have had some claim
to at least partial innocence.  There is no reason to believe that Nazis
efforts against the Jews would not have been set back had there been a
public outcry against their policies at this time.  If it had simply
driven their actions underground then there likely would not be as much
of an issue over the guilt of the German populace.
                                Kelvin Luther

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 18:40:56 -0500
From:    chris garcia <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Richard I.Bong

On Wed, 1 Mar 1995, Jim O'Neil wrote:

> >       I'm looking information about Richard I .Bong
> >       specially in wich airplane he realize more scores.
> >
>
> Esaul Alfredo,
>
> He flew a P-38 "Lightning" for all 40 of his victories. They were all in
> the South-West Pacific Area [New Guinea - New Britian area] against the
> Japanese.
>
> Jim O'Neil   Indecision is the cornerstone of Military Flexibility
>
I don't know much about Richard bong but I will add what I remember from
a TV documentary:
He was a very "straight" kind of guy who didn't join in the traditional
drinking and partying of fighter pilots.  He never drank alchohol, and
when he broke american ace Eddie Rickenbacker's record, Rickenbacker sent
him a case of scotch.  he gave the scotch to his friends and stuck to
Coca Cola.  Bong went to the states where he married his high school
sweetheart, and was killed when test flying (1945?) the Air Force's new
jet fighter, the P-80 "Shooting Star".

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 18:51:16 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: China/Japan conclusion

        We have seen how the war between China and Japan served not only as a
chief underlying cause of the eventual hostilities between Japan and the west,
but also that the Chinese conflict remained a focus for an immense proportion
of Japan's limited military resources.  Nor was the campaign there a picnic
for the soldiers involved, although a Japanese private posted to China probably
had a better chance of surviving the war than most of those sent to fight the
Allies anywhere else.  For the common soldier, given the huge distances and the
limited mechanization available (which Joe Barone, I see, made an excellent
observation on, comparing the degree of US motorization in one small
bridgehead, Anzio, with that of the entire Japanese forces in China), it was a
campaign of long, grueling marches, in which stragglers were often set upon and
murdered by vengefull villagers, all too many of whom had past experience of
Japanese atrocities.  It was also a campaign where the enemy was often
invisible, in that the guerillas could and did vanish into the civilian
population.  I should also mention that part of the preparation for "Ichi-Go"
was a widespread propaganda campaign, including the dropping of thousands of
leaflets, attempting to separate Chiang and the Chinese from the westerners.
To aid in this pursuit, and give some credibility to the theme that the
Japanese were the true friends of China, the Army made strenuous efforts to
enforce discipline, and even to re-educate the troops to prevent outrages
against the civilian population (the fact that these efforts yielded a fair
degree of success belies the excuse that the worst excesses in China were the
result of troops out of their officers' control.  It appears more like the
Japanese command just didn't try very hard to maintain order-- in fact, there
is a great deal of evidence to suggest that atrocities were encouraged at all
levels.  I keep remembering Ienaga speaking of an incident where after a
small-scale massacre a Chinese baby was found lying in the road by a Japanese
soldier, who asked his commanding officer what to do with it.  The
answer-- "kill it!")
        By 1945, though, the Japanese sun in China was definitely setting.  The
catastrophic defeat in Burma in early 1944 had set the stage for the reopening
of the Burma Road.  On the Japanese side, Mutaguchi and most of his staff were
relieved of command after the disaster.  A new formation, 33rd Army, was
created from the remnants of the Japanese forces in Burma, commanded by General
Masaki Honda.  Honda did a pretty good job of organizing a defense in central
and southern Burma, and whenever the British had to hit his positions head-on
they found the going tough.  However, after the loss of virtually an entire
army in the spring even the best improvisations could no longer hold back the
tide, and Japan's days in that country were clearly numbered.  In the north,
Stilwell's forces attempted to renew their push, hurt by the fact that the
Chinese forces which were supposed to be helping them by attacking the Japanese
from the Chungking side of the old Burma road made little progress, then were
largely diverted to stem the Ichi-Go assault.  Behind Stilwell, armies of US
engineers were busy hacking a new road out of the jungle, alleviating the need
of fighting through the strong defensive positions along the old thoroughfare.
Wherever Stilwell advanced, the road more or less followed him.  This
gargantuan task, a monumental feat of engineering, was, BTW, carried out
with the labor of thousands of black Americans working in construction
battalions.  Since we just passed Black History Month, I should mention that
patriotic African-Americans, despite all the disadvantages and barriers of an
institutionalized racism in the armed forces, played a notable role in the
Pacific whenever they were given the chance.  As many on the list know, one of
the first American war heroes was a black man, "Dorie" Miller of the US Navy.
At that time blacks were only allowed two basic jobs in the Navy-- they could
be stewards, a demeaning position which was essentially a shipboard waiter; or
they could be ammunition handlers, a job which involved hard manual labor, and
was dangerous to boot.  Miller was a steward on the battleship WEST VIRGINIA at
Pearl Harbor, who during the attack took over an abandoned .50-calibre mount
and was credited with shooting down three Japanese planes.  He was decorated
but remained a steward, and died in 1943 when the light carrier he was serving
on was sunk by a Japanese submarine during the Tarawa/Makin operation.
        The new road came to be known as the Ledo road, since it passed through
that town, but to the engineers who built it it was known as "Pick's Pike,"
after Maj-General Lewis Pick, who was in charge of construction.  The first
truck convoy went through to China on the new road in January 1945, and the
reopening of the land link certainly put a stamp on the Japanese defeat on the
Chinese mainland.  The final act in clearing the Japanese out of that corner of
northern Burma in January 1945 was the taking of the 7,500-foot peak known as
Huilungshan.  Journalist Theodore White ("In Search of History") vividly
described the action, which he witnessed, as a textbook demonstration of
military art, involving primarily Chinese troops with US air support.  The
degree of efficiently which could be acheived by properly trained, equipped,
and led Chinese troops was clearly evident.  After air strikes which included
the dropping of fragmentation bombs and napalm, the massed Allied artillery
began firing precisely ranged, precisely timed eight-minute salvos-- three
times an hour.  Under cover of each short barrage the Chinese infantry would
advance another stage up Huilungshan's slope, until at last they cleared the
peak with a spirited bayonet charge.
        Meanwhile in the north, the Japanese were able to mount
locally-successful offensive operations (some of which involved the 3rd Armored
Division) well into 1945, but the end was in sight there as well.  The Japanese
never found an adequate answer for Mao's guerilla tactics.  They took ground,
at times they inflicted casualties, but they never actually won.  August 1945
found the Communists still in control of large areas of northern China.  When
the bulk of the 300,000-strong Kwantung Army in Manchuria laid down its arms in
the face of the strong Soviet invasion, it was widely reported that a good many
of those arms were quickly transferred to the Chinese Communists, although many
have subsequently disputed this assertion (which would be hard to verify or
disprove, if only because so many captured Japanese weapons were already being
used by Mao's forces).  Japan was defeated, but the war in China was far from
over.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

PS: Two more to go: a final word on tactics, and an appendix briefly discussing
"the last battlewagon war."

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 20:20:00 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japanese tactics revisited

        I thought I'd try to pass quickly over some of the campaigns of the
Pacific war to which I've referred briefly or not at all in my earlier posts,
and see if I can fit them into the overall pattern I've conjured up.
Particularly, I wanted to look at New Guinea and the post-Guadalcanal Solomons
campaigns.
        A good place to start would be New Georgia.  Despite the belated
recognition of the Japanese general staff of the pivotal role of the
Guadalcanal battle, and the disappointing outcome of same (in the land
fighting, about 25,000 Japanese died, compared to roughly 1,500 Americans-- the
latter about 1,000 Marines, and 500 of the US Army troops who were the majority
on the island by November), some aspects of the fighting on New Georgia, the
next Solomon isle to be attacked, might have been encouraging.  The Japanese
certainly contested the battle with a ferocity  which did not convey any
feeling of inferiority or defeat.  However, there were also some very
disturbing tendencies which continued to show themselves during the battle.
The Japanese ground forces on New Georgia were initially
very small, but they were supported by some of the best air and light naval
units the Japanese Navy had left.  Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, who as Nagumo's
chief-of-staff had actually been the controlling force behind the carriers of
Kido Butai from Pearl Harbor to Midway, was now Japanese naval commander at
Rabaul, responsible for the Solomons.  Rear-admiral Raizo Tanaka, of the famed
"Tokyo Express," still had his light cruisers and destroyers ready to plague
and bewilder the enemy (BTW, though "Tokyo Express" was an American nickname,
the Japanese too had their amusing slang.  The Navy preferred not to
risk transports in enclosed waters with uncertain air support, feeling more
comfortable shipping in reinforcements either in destroyers, which were fast
and could protect themselves, or in small motorboats, which could hide easily
and slip from island to island under cover of dark.  These were known to the
Japanese respectively as "Rat Express" [destroyers] and "Ant Freight.")
        The first American landings at Rendova, a small island within artillery
range of the chosen landing beaches at New Georgia, were carried out on the
last day of June 1943.  The Japanese air response was furious.  They threw in
just about everything they had, but after the losses of the previous year,
culminating in the unsuccessful "I-Go" air offensive, they were already running
out of planes and pilots.  Most of the Japanese attacks suffered
disproportionate losses, further aggravating the situation, but they came on
with great determination, and on many occasions some bombers broke through the
American fighters and flak to do some damage of their own.  On the first day of
the Rendova landings, a Japanese plane put a torpedo into the assault transport
that was serving as the flagship for Admiral Kelly Turner, the emerging
American master of amphibious operations.  On the third day ashore, a whole
formation of Japanese bombers made it in virtually untouched to drop their
loads over an American artillery position and a small peninsula crammed with
troops, where an engineers' dump of gelignite explosives went up, more than 150
people being killed or wounded by the blast.  US casualties to air raids on the
day reached 200 men.  On the fourth of July, the fifth day ashore, the Japanese
arranged a fireworks display by sending over 18 bombers escorted by 66
fighters.  The need to provide such a heavy escort alone says volumes about the
way the Japanese were losing even parity (much less their previous superiority)
in the air combat.  Four bombers managed to reach the main beaches, where their
bombs caused 19 casualties, but the Japanese lost another 11 planes, which was
certainly not offset by the pinpricks they were inflicting (there was one
occasion during this series of raids when the Japanese actually completed an
attack mission without losing a single plane, but this was an exception).  BTW,
while speaking of the Japanese "poor man's war," one aspect comes to mind in
the American "rich man's war" which is not often stressed in the accounts of
the Pacific fighting, namely the superb job done by American antiaircraft
gunners during most of the period from 1943 on.  It was just another example of
the superior American metal that I seem to keep reading of heavy Japanese
losses to AA fire.  Meanwhile, on the Japanese side I vividly recall, from
Yoshida's "Requiem For Battleship Yamato," an incident where an officer on that
Japanese ship gives a clinical explanation in terms of physics describing why
the Japanese ship-mounted 25-mm AA gun (usually emplaced on triple mounts) was
with its inferior muzzle velocity incapable of shooting down the fast new
American aircraft-- this lecture being given while about 250 of those aircraft
were buzzing around attacking the doomed battleship.
        At any rate, on July 3rd Kusaka had received further air
reinforcements, but it was clear the Japanese were already scraping the bottom
of the barrel in this regard.  The Japanese Navy had created a new, land-based
21st Air Fleet, and this was sent to Kusaka.  But this "air fleet" consisted in
fact of 20 Zero fighters, a dozen assorted attack planes, and two reconnaisance
planes.  To beef up the forces at Rabaul further, the Navy transferred in the
entire air complement from one of their small new fleet carriers, a total of 25
more Zeros and 28 single-engined bombers.   (BTW, most of this detail comes
from D.C Horton, "New Georgia."  Horton was a coastwatcher during the campaign.
I should mention that these courageous Australians, who hid in the jungle with
radios keeping an eye on Japanese movements, provided a supremely valuable
intelligence for the Allies in the Solomons.  It was a coastwatcher who tipped
the Americans off to the building of an airfield on Guadalcanal, giving the
impetus for that entire campaign.  Many, including Horton, later went in ahead
of the main landings around New Georgia with special scout units.  The superb
local intelligence of the coastwatchers added to the efforts of the American
codebreakers, whose clever men with clever mechanical computers made possible
events such as Midway and the assassination of Yamamoto.  The Americans, of
course, in this respect owed something of a debt to the Ultra-related work of
the British, who in turn owed a debt to the French and especially the Poles.
Ultra and its derivatives, one of the truly great war-winning intelligence
weapons of WW2, was truly an Allied affair.)
        In July Kusaka also received naval reinforcements, as Admiral Koga sent
him three more cruisers and three destroyers from Combined Fleet.  In the naval
battles, now almost entirely by night as the daytime American air presence was
too strong, the Japanese still held their own.  There were a series of sharp
clashes around New Georgia, all involving Japanese attempts to bring more
troops into the island or its neighbors.  In the first of these battles, the
Japanese sank the US cruiser HELENA but lost one destroyer sunk and another
beached.  Both sides considered this a setback, the Americans because they lost
a cruiser to an inferior force and did not prevent the Japanese landings
entirely, the Japanese because they had only managed to put 850 men ashore.  In
a second battle soon after, US forces ambushed another supply run, and a rapid
outpouring of accurate radar-directed fire sank the light cruiser JINTSU,
Tanaka's long-time flagship.  However, in a virtual repeat of the affair off
Guadalcanal's Tassafaronga Point in 12/42, the Japanese responded quickly, and
the deadly "Long Lance" torpedoes struck three American cruisers and a
destroyer.  Only the destroyer sank, and the cruisers were not as badly damaged
as in the previous reversal, but the Japanese managed to land all their troops,
and this was a definite tactical defeat for the US units.   BTW, by this time
one or two of Tanaka's ships had radar too, although the Americans still seem
to have held the advantage in both technical capabilities of the equipment and
in its effective combat use (unless I'm mistaken, one of the first sets in the
Japanese Navy was in fact on the JINTSU).  It was also in a nocturnal clash at
this time that a Japanese destroyer rammed and sank John F. Kennedy's PT-109.
        The Japanese did receive a stiff setback in a subsequent naval battle
when they tried to reinforce the neighboring island of Kolombangara (also
within artillery range of New Georgia) in early August.  Four Japanese
destroyers were intercepted by six US destroyers, the latter having received
intensive special training as a unit in nightime torpedo attacks.  Even without
the "Long Lance," the Americans hit hard.  Three of the four Japanese ships
were sunk without US loss, and about 900 troops were drowned.
        Meanwhile, on land, once the American forces made the short hop across
to New Georgia, covered by the artillery on Rendova, the outnumbered Japanese
proved tough opponents.  Their complexes of pillboxes studded with machineguns,
and enough 37- and 47-mm antitank guns to make the US armor wary, imposed
constant delays, and a large-scale counterattack (which was less of a suicide
charge and more of an infiltration of a perimeter not yet established in depth)
provided some tense moments.  Progress was so slow that General Hester,
commander of the US Army division which did most of the fighting, was relieved
of his command.  The results were encouraging enough that Sasaki, the Japanese
commander, believed he could hold Kolombangara, which was being continually
reinforced.
        The Japanese command, however, dismayed at the growing US air and sea
power, had decided not to make a further stand in the central Solomons.  This
was fortunate, for during the rest of the campaign there the Allied forces were
to demonstrate a mastery not only in the air but also in ground tactics.
Admiral Halsey premiered the tactic of "island-hopping" by skirting
well-garrisoned Kolombangara to descend on Vella Lavella further north in late
August.  The Japanese were taken by surprise, but their Navy was still equal to
the task of safely withdrawing most of the troops from both isolated
Kolombangara and Vella Lavella.  One incident in the withdrawal from the latter
island in early October showed the Japanese Navy had still not lost its
effectiveness in surface combat.  A force of nine destroyers, five subchasers,
and three small torpedo boats was taking away some of the last defenders, when
they were surprised by three American destroyers.  Each side lost a destroyer,
but the Japanese evacuation was successfully completed.  BTW, I earlier
wondered whether it was Australian or New Zealand forces that did most of the
dirty fighting on Vella Lavella.  You knew I had to go look it up.  In fact it
was the New Zealanders.  New Zealand fighter units flying P-40s were also
active in the Solomons, and participated in some of the first big fighter
sweeps over Rabaul in late '43-early '44.
        The final Solomon battle, Bougainville (spring '44), some of the worst
traits of Japanese Army tactics evidenced on Guadalcanal resurfaced.  General
Hyakutake, hampered again by poor intelligence, launched a full scale attack on
the Allied forces which had come ashore at Empress Augusta bay.  His 15,000 men
attacked an Allied force of 62,000, and suffered accordingly.  This once again
makes an interesting comparison with Sasaki's grudging defense of New Georgia,
where the slow choreography of the American invasion gave the Japanese adequate
time to prepare, even if with scant resources, and where major delays were
thereby imposed.  At Bougainville poor intelligence and more "bamboo spear"
tactics threw away any chance early on.
        Forgive a certain lack of coherence in this post, I had less time to
collect my thoughts before writing.  More thoughts in a minute (for what
they're worth).

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 20:51:51 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 04-MAR-1945

On 04-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the 43rd Division pushes
southeast towards Xanten. The Canadian 2nd and 3rd Divisions complete the
capture of the Hochwald and Balberg forests. The 53rd Division takes
Geldern. In the U.S. 9th Army sector, the 5th Armoured Division cuts the
road linking Rheinberg with Mors. The 2nd Armoured Division takes
Kaldenhausen and finishes mopping up in the area around Urdingen and
Vietelsheide, bringing operations in the Cologne lowlands to a close. In
the U.S. 1st Army sector, the 99th Division is advancing north on the line
Derikum-Ukrath. The 104th Division breaks into the outer defences of
Cologne. The 9th Division takes Derikum and Hausweiler. In the 3rd Army
sector, the 4th and 87th Division resume their advance.

Eastern Front - Russian troops break through to the Baltic coast, splitting
the Germans remaining in Pomerania. THe 2nd White Russian Front reaches the
coast at Koeslin while elements of the 1st White Russian Front thrust to
the coast near Kolberg.

Italian Front - The 10th Moutain Division makes good progress taking M.
Acidola, Madonna di Brasa and M. della Croce.

Philippines - In the XI Corps area, the 43rd Division begins a westward
push into the Zambales Mountains west of Clark Field.

Iwo Jima - The VAC continues to attack with 3 divisions but is unable to
advance appreciably. A B-29 makes an emergency landing on Iwo.

Burma - The Indian 17th Division has largely completed the capture of
Meiktila.

Japan - 192 B-29's participate in a precision attack on the Musashino
aircraft factory in Tokyo.

The Homefront
-------------
Roosevelt Anniversary - Today is the 12th anniversary of President
Roosevelt's first inaugaration.

Curfew Violator's Seized - Police have arrested 15 patrons of a rooming
house speakeasy in New York City on charges of disorderly conduct for
violating the nation-wide midnight curfew. They are charged a fine of $5
each.

Sam Snead Wins Again - Sam Snead is on a real roll, he has won his 6th golf
tournament of the year by winning the Jacksonville Open.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 20:51:01 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Japanese tactical afterthoughts part 2

        The New Guinea campaign presents a totally different picture than most
of the other battles studied.  This is one area of the Pacific in which the
Japanese were, IMHO, completely outfought and out-thought at almost every stage
of the action.  MacArthur, the Allied commander, followed what may be
considered a familiar pattern, in that he looked pretty bad in the early going,
but like a genius later on.   His disdain for the Australian efforts, which
combined superhuman endurance with a remarkable degree of jungle savvy, is hard
to explain except by impatience and, with US troops bogged down in the
Buna-Gona fighting, scapegoating to preserve his own sacred reputation and ego.
Even before the Buna portion of the campaign unfolded, after Australian forces
had triumphed over both the enemy and the elements to evict the Japanese from
Milne Bay at New Guinea's southeastern tip, MacArthur ordered General Blamey,
the Australian and initially the overall Allied ground commander, to go to the
island personally to "vitalize" the Australian efforts.  This treatment should
have been received as a great affront by Blamey, one of the most courageous and
experienced of all Allied commanders, whose troops were doing the brunt of the
fighting and doing it successfully (Blamey, after being repeatedly wounded in
World War I, fought in both the European and Pacific theatres during World War
2).  At any rate, the campaign for Buna cost the Allies 8,500 casualties, and
is one of the low points of MacArthur's career as a commander (I must say also,
in response to a point raised earlier by David Murnain, that in the pursuit of
the Japanese back to Buna an Australian brigade executed a tactical coup worthy
of the Japanese in Malaya or Burma when they penetrated through the jungle in a
wide flanking move and cut off part of the retreating Japanese force).
        Still, MacArthur at Buna-Gona should get points for learning.  What he
learned was the price of attacking the Japanese head-on in prepared jungle
positions.  It was a mistake he did not make on that scale again during the
campaign (at least on New Guinea itself).  The rest of his campaign there was a
masterpiece of movement and deep strategic penetration, cutting the enemy up
and leaving him as helpless as the Allies had been to oppose the dissection of
Indonesia a year earlier.  And the comparison is apt, because it was exactly
the Allied advantage in air and naval forces which allowed such swift,
unexpected descents deep in the enemy rear.  The most stunning example of
MacArthur's new strategy and tactics was Hollandia (although the actions around
the Huon peninsula in the fall of the previous year weren't too shabby, either)
In April 1944 MacArthur's forces swooped down upon Hollandia, New Guinea's best
natural harbor, located at that time 580 miles behind the front lines!!  The
Japanese were taken totally by surprise.  Of the 11,000 Japanese military
personnell in the area, only 500 were combat troops.  The Japanese commander
there, Major-General Toyozo, had only assumed his post ten days before.
Casualties were negligable, except to the Japanese, who lost about 3,000 men.
US troops coming ashore found unmanned defenses, including bunkers with cunning
fields of fire where, in the opinion of one officer, "a squad could hold up a
division."  Some of the landing troops found empty quarters with full bowls of
rice sitting out, having obviously surprised the occupants at their meal (just
as the US landings did on Guadalcanal).   This move trapped General Adachi and
the 40,000 troops of his 18th Army (since also reinforced by 36th Division) far
down the coast.  Adachi and his men showed amazing tenacity and determination.
They moved through hundreds of miles of jungle, and in July they reached and
attacked MacArthur's forces near Aitape.  Adachi by then had 20,000 men left,
but only 8,000 of them were actually infantry, the rest combed-out rear area
personnel.  The attacks continued for 25 days.  Fighting with the courage of
desperation, at one point the Japanese actually acheived a partial breakthrough
of the American positions.  But in the end it was just more "bamboo spear"
tactics, and Adachi lost 9,000 men without having any positive effect on the
outcome of the campaign.

        Fatigue forces me to break off.  I will finish up with one last post
about the change in Japanese tactics to face Allied amphibious invasions, plus
a few thoughts on the Japanese forays into high-tech.  Hopefully a break will
enhance my writing clarity so the point of these last posts will be evident.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 21:49:34 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: Battle of the Bulge

While skimming the internet with PBS on in the background, I heard an
announcement that on Saturday night at 1930 EST, a program on the Battle of the
Bulge will be televised. Enjoy, Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 21:51:47 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INFO ON USN BATTLE

I have to correct you on one fact, Ron. Battle stars on combat ribbons were
bronze. The silver star represented five awards. So a person with one silver
star and a bronze star would indicate that for the Asiatic-Pacific campaign
ribbon, for example, the individual wearing the ribbon participated in six
campaigns. For personal decorations, if you received five of a Navy Cross, for
example, you would wear a gold star--gold and silver stars are larger than the
bronze star, by the way. For the naval services, the guide to decorations is
the "Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual," which is always in a state of being
updated. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 21:43:09 EST
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Endlosung (was:Is it true that they can trace a single document)

Kevin,
   First, I will address the issue of whether or not the Germans were guilty.
It's not an easy question, of course, and there's no definite answer.  But
if you call them guilty because they did not protest after Kristallnacht,
I would disagree.  What could they do?  By this time the regime was firmly
in place and the police had cowed the populace into submission.  I also
think, besides from the general state of oppression, the population had
been dulled by constant propoganda, terror, and social repression.
   The strength of the regime was not that the population was particularly
enthusiastic with the regime - this can be seen by the Nazis only capturing
30% or so of the free vote - but that it was not socially acceptable to
reject any aspects of the regime, let alone openly protest.  I find this
somewhat analogous to the current PC trend - it is not the government or
any particular authority that is responsibility for PC, but social controls
such as rejection by friends, social isolation, etc.   Add to this the
actual government intervention and you come up with a formula for silence.
    And you bring up another good point - how could the Germans not know
where Hitler was headed?  First, just because they might have thought that
the regime was going to eventually exterminate Jews doesn't mean that there
was a concrete plan for doing so.  But that is another matter.
    We do, of course, can easily say, "where else were the Germans headed
other than extermination of the Jews?"  But it was much harder to think
that between 1933 and 1939.  First, what person would want to think that?
It is, in my opinion, a pretty inconceivable idea - up there with conspiracy
theories that run around college campuses.  Most of the German people
believed, during this time, that Jews were merely going to be removed
from Germany through forced emigration - which was the policy at this
time.
    Between 1939 and 1945 they had other things to worry about.  Besides,
how many Jews were there in Germany at this time?  Most of the more respectable
ones (versus the poor and socially isolated) had already left the Reich.
The disappearance of a few Germans here and there should not have been
particularly strange - they were being, according to the authorities and
word on the street - shipped East for resettlement.  I'm inclined to believe
that this explanation was believed not only because it was more realistic
but because it was more palatable.
      One reason the Germans never objected was because the regime carried
out "genocide in stages".  The SPD and supporters of the Republic had the
same problem from 1923 to 1933.  The Nazis carried out a coup in stages -
it was not a dramatic march on Berlin and seizure of power, but a gradual,
incremental coup by gaining Reichstag votes, local leadership, etc.  The
problem with the opponents of the Nazis was that there was no singular event
in which they could say, "look at this!"  By the time the opposition figured
out what was going on it was too late - Hitler was Chancellor.
     The Nazis used this same strategy, and I am not inclined to believe
it was intended (it was functionally evolved), of doing things in slow,
almost indiscernable stages.  It started out with boycotts, was emphasized
by speeches, cemented in laws, culminated in riots, involved forced emigration,
and only near the end culminated in mass extermination.  At no singular point
was the final solution eminent and thus, at no single time could the people
protest.
    The Allies, too, were hoodwinked for a long time by "aggression in stages".
It is well known how Hitler gradually neutralized the great powers; violating
parts (but only parts) of the Versailles Treaty, then tearing it up, occupying
the Saar, taking Austria, the Munich Agreement, and seizing the rest of
Czechoslovakia.  It was only until Sept 1939 that the Allies woke up and
finally figured out what Hitler was up to.  It is easy for us to see that
Hitler was headed on a war path from the beginning of his regime.  But
it was, history has shown us, much more difficult for the English and
French to see it.
    What the Germans and Great Powers experienced, in psychological terms,
was "systematic desensitization".  For example, if you try sticking your
hand in 150 degree water or 32 degree water (it doesn't get colder under
normal conditions) it will fell hot or cold.  But if you start the water
at room temperature or slightly higher and then gradually warm or cool it,
at no specific point can you call it "hot or cold".  There is a threshold
at which the temperature can be quantified, but it is considerably higher
than if one has an immediate immersion to the temperature in question.
    In the end, I kind of feel sorry for the Germans.  They fell victim
to perfectly human thoughts and feelings.  It was not that they were
a bad people but that they, in the end, too human with all of its strengths
and weaknesses.  Whether or not they were guilty is another question which
I will address in another post.
    Thanks for your input, Kelvin, and I look forward to hearing your response
to the above.

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 22:40:07 -0400
From:    Michael E Smith <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Glacier Girl

        Just recieved the summery of the P-38F restoration project.  While
I'm excited to hear that another of these beautiful aircraft will grace us
with its presence, I'm disturbed that non-original markings will be applied
to it.  As an aviation historian, currently acquiring my Masters Degree in
museology, I feel it is of vital importance to preserve historical
material as accurately as possible.  This accuracy should be all the more
important if, as was stated, this is the only P-38F.  Considering how
much money was spent salvaging the aircraft as well as restoring it, it's a
shame that the aircraft will not be "truly" original.

Michael E. Smith
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Fri, 3 Mar 1995 22:28:29 EST
From:    William Lippert <[email-masked]>
Subject: THOUGHTS: Germany and guilt

I thought that, because of the talk recently about the Endlosung (which
was, curiosly enough, begun by some discussion about documents) and German
guilt.  This is a question that has persisted, very passionately, from
the beginning of the war to today.  I don't think it will ever be resolved
for good reason.

     I remember reading an editorial in Life magazine - written in 1943 or
so - about the Germans and whether or not they were bad people.  Actually,
it was a response letter in the front.  Anyway, the editorial had said that
the Germans were a good people and that Hitler had hoodwinked them.  The
response letter made the claim that it was the Germans who brought the
regime to power and the Germans who supported the regime.
    The argument, or indeed philosophical discourse, continued into the
Nuremberg trials - who to punish?  On the one had, it was clear that many
of the people on trial did what they did (though the degree of involvement
was often disputed).  Indeed, many of the perpetrators of crimes were on
the prosecution!  Inevitably, everyone blamed everyone but themselves.  The
most common people to blame were the ones that were already dead or gone:
Bormann (no one liked him anyway), Hitler, Himmler, etc.  On the other hand,
they blamed the actions on the individualy initiative of people under them.
In the trials, the question of German guilt in general did not come up
(as it would not be very German to blame the population) but there was
a sense of collective guilt within the regime that was played up to excuse
individual guilt.
     And so there are three groups responsible for the Nazi crimes: the
Germans as a whole, the regime as a whole, and the top individuals only.
Today the Germans, for the most part, tend to blame the regime.  Survivors
of the war both at Nuremberg and in subsequent memoirs tried to shift
responsiblity to everyone but themselves - "orders are orders" continued
to be a big claim.  And, of course, the actual individuals who were
"truly", that is whom everyone could agree upon, were conveniently dead.
    On the part of the German people, they would make the various claims
that they were lied to, subdued in the police state, and compelled by
loyalty and love of the Reich to, in the least, keep their mouths shut.
And then, of course, they denied knowing of the more negative events and
seemed to experience a collective amnesia after the war.
    The middlemen had several defences: orders, jobs, loyalty, oaths,
and just forced to do so.  They portrayed themselves as tools, albeit big
and effective ones, of the state.  Thus, Jost, head of an Einstazkommando,
Mueller, Gestapo deputy, and countless other bureaucrats and SS Generals
and state deputies and secretaries recieved relatively small sentences, if
any, compared to the crimes of the time.
    And the higher men like Speer and Goring, blamed both the dead, one another
, and people under them.  Speer makes the case in his memoirs that he tried
to confess to a collective guilt and that he and the other leaders on trial
had to pay for the crimes of the regime and of Germany.  This thread of
seeming self-sacrifice reduces his personal guilt and makes him seem like
a martyr.  Others might have asked (and perhaps did) why they should pay
individually for crimes in which everyone had a part in?
    And that, in the end, is a tough question - who should pay the price?
Is it fair for Speer and Doenitz and Ribbentrop to be the scapegoats for
the entire nation?  Or is it fair for all the Germans to pay for the
crimes of a few?  Or should the average bureacrat pay the price for simply
doing his job, with little recourse, both under the command of people
like Goebbels or Himmler and for the benifit of the German people as a
whole who are not much less guilty than themselves?
    These, I think, are hard questions.  Anyone have any thoughts on this?

William Lippert
The American University

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 2 Mar 1995 to 3 Mar 1995
***********************************************