Subject: WWII-L Digest - 5 Mar 1995 to 6 Mar 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 1995 00:00:49 -0500

There are 21 messages totalling 1321 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. Gas at Iwo Jima (3)
  2. Patton biography
  3. QUEST: German Executors
  4. INFO ON USN BATTLE
  5. Battle of the Bulge
  6. HIST: PTSD
  7. 50TH: THREE DAY PARIS PASS (2)
  8. Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the Bulge) (2)
  9. Educating the young
 10. Glacier Girl
 11. Intro to list
 12. [INF] USAAF 7 MAR 45
 13. INF: 50 Years Ago - 07-MAR-1945
 14. TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS (2)
 15. GAS AT IWO JIMA
 16. Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 5 Mar 1995 21:11:08 -0800
From:    Sidney Allinson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Gas at Iwo Jima

'Dont know about the circumstances on Iwo Jime, but it is a fact that some
Japanese units in Burma used gas hand-grenades. These weapons were German-
made. Probably given to the Japs for "combat testing". British troops
reported being attacked by gas hand-grenades in 1944.
However, there were only a few isolated incidences of their use.

--

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 07:32:53 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Patton biography

Hello, Matt!

Glad it was of some assistance. If you need anything else, please let
me know.

All the best.

Terry

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 07:38:58 GMT-6
From:    "Robert T. Moore" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: QUEST: German Executors

Hello, William!

I associate this trauma with the Bataan Death March survivors. Much
work has been done in this area. You might contact a VA hospital, if
one is nearby, for some info.

Hope this helps.

All the best.

Terry

 Post Traumatic
> Stress Disorder.
>    Anyone familiar with this mental disorder?  There has been a lot of
> literature about it regarding Vietnam Vets; its effects magnified because
> of the political atmosphere both there and in the US.  Additionally, it
> has gone by other names: shell shock in WWI, combat fatigue in WWII.  It
> can have many results: loss of memory, anxiety, and even phobias.
>    Thanks in advance.
>    By the way, is there something wrong with the list?  I haven't gotten
> much today.
>
> William Lippert
>

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 08:44:59 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INFO ON USN BATTLE

>I have to correct you on one fact, Ron. Battle stars on combat ribbons were
>bronze. The silver star represented five awards. So a person with one silver
>star and a bronze star would indicate that for the Asiatic-Pacific campaign
>ribbon, for example, the individual wearing the ribbon participated in six
>campaigns. For personal decorations, if you received five of a Navy Cross, for
>example, you would wear a gold star--gold and silver stars are larger than the
>bronze star, by the way. For the naval services, the guide to decorations is
>the "Navy and Marine Corps Awards Manual," which is always in a state of being
>updated. Ben Frank

Thanks Ben, I was unsure of the actual difference between a bronze and
silver battle star and was hoping that someone would jump in to rescue me.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 09:00:35 -0500
From:    Ron Babuka <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Battle of the Bulge

.
>
>Perhaps Ben Frank could give us the truth of this operation.  Did
>the Marines have cloth helmet covers, M1 Garands, M1 carbines, etc.
>and can you give us the lowdown on the Reising gun which I
>understand was quickly ditched.
>

Reising Submachine Gun

        This weapon was designed by Eugene Reising and manufactured by the
Harrington & Richardson Comapny for the US Marine Corps between 1941 and
1945.  Its was an unusual and unnecessarily complex design, firing from a
closed bolt and using 12 or 20-round box magazines.  While the design was
technically sound, it was not well thought out from the combat point of
view, and in service the gun was found to be extremely sensitive to dirt
and dust, often jamming at inopportune moments.
        The greater part of the production of the Reising submachine gun
was taken by the US Marine Corps and it was extensively used by them in the
campaigns of the South Pacific.  The British government also purchased a
small number.  However, it was not popular and was eventually relegated to
be used as a training weapon and for use with the USA by factory guards and
police forces.

from Encyclopedia of World War II editor John Keegan

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ron Babuka
Cornell University
CIT - Information Resources
Ithaca, New York 14850
(607) 254-6492

Fax: 607-254-6404
http://ir-www.cit.cornell.edu/IR_staff/ron_babuka.html

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 09:18:07 -0500
From:    [email-masked]
Subject: HIST: PTSD

My wife, a Vietnam veteran, is a psychiatric nurse practitioner at a VAMH.
Most of her patients (sorry, they now call them "clients") are Vietnam vets
suffering this condition (she does have a goodly number, as well, who are
WWII and Korea vets with similar problems; e.g., one WWII combatant had had no
apparent problems till Reagan made his visit to the Bitburg cemetary ... he
thereafter began flashbacks to the Battle of the Bulge).

If you have specific questions, I'll be happy to pass them to her.

-- Warren Thompson

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 08:32:24 +0100
From:    JOHN AUSLAND <[email-masked]>
Subject: 50TH: THREE DAY PARIS PASS

  Oslo, March 6, 1995
  As readers of my messages know, I passed up no opportunity to get a
respite from the war.  The highlight was a trip to Paris, shortly
after we broke through the Siegfried Line.
  Usually, I shaved and cleaned up before returning to the 29th Field
Artillery Battalion headquarters from my job as liaison officer to an
infantry battalion.  However, on one occasion I did not, because I was
so furious after a radio team from battalion that I was relying on to
relay messages went to sleep.
  The net result of this performance was that my battalion commander
decided I needed a rest and gave me a three day pass to Paris.  Here
is the letter I wrote home about this:

          Dear Folks, February 23, 1945, Germany

          Let me begin with a report on my recent pass to Paris. We
          left our units in Germany at about 0900 February 16. From
          there we went to division rear, where all the men from the
          various units of the division collected. By the time I reached
          there, I was thoroughly ill - a result of several weeks of GIs
          and a rough ride in a two and a half ton truck.
          Nevertheless, I was on my way and not about to turn back.

          Perhaps you wonder how I got this pass. Well, behind it is
          quite a story. You see, I'll go sometimes for weeks without
          seeing anyone back at our battalion CP. This time varies
          with how long a particular fight lasts. Sometimes during a
          fight there either isn't time or one doesn't feel like washing
          or shaving. However, before I go back to battalion I always
          clean up. The other day, however, I went back without
          shaving.

          You see, when you come back looking fresh, everyone says,
          "Well, you all are really living the life of Riley, aren't you?"
          However, when I went back looking worn and haggard,
          everyone said, "It must be rough up there. You need a rest,
          Aus. I've never seen you look so bad."

          Two days later I received orders to report back to battalion
          to go to Paris.

          Well, anyway we started out for the city. I stretched out in
          the back of a truck, went to sleep, and by the time we got
          there the next noon I felt much better.

          In Paris the Red Cross billeted us at the Washington Club,
          or Hotel Louvre, which is at the opposite end of the street
          from the Opera. The afternoon was spent in cleaning up and
          planning the next several days.

          But let me tell you about the hotel itself. A Capt. Miles,
          from our division headquarters, and I shared a double room,
          with private bath. The room would compare favorably with
          one in the New Yorker or Pennsylvania in New York. On
          each floor was a "key girl" who kept the room keys. As an
          additional service, she would sew insignia, etc. on your
          clothes for you.

          The dining room served breakfast from 0800 to 1000, lunch
          from 1200 to 1400, supper from 1800 to 2000. The food
          was quite good and, while the portions were not too
          generous, one could get seconds. Between meal hours, the
          donut bar was open, where one could get donuts and coffee.

          In the hotel lobby, there an information desk operated by
          French women volunteers who speak English - and,
          incidentally, have a good knowledge of the city.

          Now to our first evening in Paris. Really no more exciting
          than an evening in any large city. We went by metro
          (subway) from Palais Royal to Pigalle. Pigalle is one of the
          less desirable sections of Paris. We went to the Club Moulin
          Rouge, which is described by some as a clip-joint. And it is.

          A glass of orange juice to use as a chaser cost 80 francs
          ($1.60). A bottle of champagne 1000 francs ($20). Capt.
          Miles and Lt. Parker, who is one of the engineer officers that
          works with our infantry regiment, and I took in the floor
          show and somehow acquired some very friendly girls.

          No doubt you will wonder at this. Well, you need not, for
          there is no woman shortage in Paris. One can walk the five
          squares from the Hotel Louvre to the Opera and will be
          stopped no less than fifteen times. In bars or clubs they
          swarm about like flies. Their price is a package of cigarettes,
          chocolate bars, or, if you insist, money.

          About five came over to the table. We offered them drinks.
          They accepted. In no time at all they had drunk all our
          scotch. Even that was all right, but when they started to
          quarrel among themselves as to which of them would take
          which of us home with them and two girls came to blows,
          we decided it was time to leave.

          Sunday morning we got up at eight, had breakfast, and
          went on a tour of the city. Saw the tomb of Napoleon at the
          Hotel des Invalides, the Eifel Tower, the Louvre, Notre Dame,
          Place de la Concorde (location of the Tate's and my
          experience last summer), Arc de Triomphe, etc. Very
          interesting tour.

          In the afternoon Parker and I went to the opera, seeing
          Rigoletto. The performance was quite good, but the settings
          were positively out of this world. I've never seen anything as
          good.

          The opera house itself is reportedly the largest theater in the
          world; certainly it is the most beautiful I've ever seen. Large
          staircases, imposing chandeliers, excellent murals. Really
          very impressive.

          There's one thing though that really gets you, not only at
          the opera but in all of the city. That is the emphasis on
          tipping. Boy, they're really tip conscious.

          Sunday evening we went to the Folies Bergere.

          Monday morning I slept. In the afternoon, I ran into Marlene
          Dietrich, and I mean ran into her. When going into the
          officer's clothing store, she was coming out the door I was
          going into. A violent collision, apologies, and she went on.
          I didn't. I turned around to stare. They're not worth a
          million dollars, but nearly!

          In the evening, we made the rounds of the bars. The others
          met girls to whom they took a fancy. I returned to the hotel
          about midnight. (Damn it, why did I have to receive such
          Puritanical rearing?)

          Tuesday morning I did a little shopping at the Louvre
          Department Store, through which one could stroll for hours.
          In the afternoon I had my picture taken. Then back to here
          in Germany.

          Love, John
          END EXCERPT FROM LETTERS HOME: A WAR MEMOIR

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 12:46:26 EST
From:    Henry Sirotin <[email-masked]>
Subject: Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the Bulge)

Dear Jack,

Re Victory at Sea: "any film they can find" ain't the half of it.
My favorites are in "Midway is East," the third episode, where half
of the battle of Midway is from the fictional Coral Sea battle in
the movie "Air Force," the Japanese carrier gunners are shooting
down Japanese aircraft off Leyte in 1944, and the account of the
success of the American dive bombers is illustrated with multiple
shots of TBF torpedo launches. Maybe that's the real secret of the
American victory- hidden squadrons of TBF/TBMs off a (time-travelling?)
carrier group. The series producers did find some great shots of
armed TBDs taking off, though. These could have been authentic.

Regards,

Henry Sirotin

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 12:55:12 -0500
From:    Howard Holden <[email-masked]>
Subject: Educating the young

My name is Howard Holden.
I am an intern at an educational branch of Turner Broadcasting Systems (you
know, TBS, the folks who bring you the Cartoon Network and Beverly
Hillbillies reruns).
Turner Adventure Learning (TAL) pipes live shows into class rooms and allows
kides to send in questions via this amazing new medium.
We also hold online forums for kids with experts in various fields.
We have a project coming up in May centered around VE Day, and we are looking
for individuals who might spend some online time with the youngsters.  We
would especially like personal accounts of WWII and VE Day.
Anyone interested?  I have to mention, we can't pay.
Please e-mail me privately, and thanks for the time.  I'm sorry to clutter
your list.

Howard
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 14:13:46 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Accuracy and  "Victory at Sea"  (was- Re: Battle of the Bulge)

It wasn't just victory at sea.  I recall seeing a program on one of A&E's
military oriented series.  The announcer was describing the sinking of
a Japanese battleship (the Yamato?) but the film footage was of a
WW I Austrian battleship capsizing after having torpedoed by Italian
torpedo boats.
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 14:13:48 EST
From:    Mike Oaks <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: 50TH: THREE DAY PARIS PASS

On Mon, 6 Mar 1995 08:32:24 +0100,
JOHN AUSLAND  <[email-masked]> wrote:

>  Oslo, March 6, 1995
>  As readers of my messages know, I passed up no opportunity to get a
>respite from the war.  The highlight was a trip to Paris, shortly
>after we broke through the Siegfried Line.

John,
   Great post. Shows there was life other than in the trenches. Thanks for
the insight.
  If I remember correctly, you stated your "Memiors" was already out of
print. Are there any plans for a new edition or do you know of any stores
that may have retained a copy that I may purchase or did you ever perfect
the "electronic" edition? (love those run on sentences)
   Let me know and keep the "memories" coming...
                                            Mike Oaks

/====================================================================\
|    Michael A. Oaks                                                 |
|    Systems Analyst                  Music: A means to mark times   |
|    [email-masked]              stepping stones through |
|    Kennesaw, Georgia 30144                 your calendar of life.  |
|    Tel: (404)423-6049  Fax (404)423-6541          ~ ~ ~ ~      MAO |
|    VWAR-L #146 - - (Sgt. USAF = / AFCS / AFSS / AFDC)              |
|    Break, Break...Kadena, Kadena, Clark, Clark, Request you echo...|
|    (Some things you never forget...even after 25 years...)         |
\====================================================================/

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 15:13:39 -0500
From:    Barone <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Gas at Iwo Jima

John Riegsecker <[email-masked]> writes:
> In the book _Iwo Jima_, Richard Newcomb, it is stated on pages 204-205 of my
> paperback copy, that the use of gas was considered at Iwo.  According to
> the book, a report written by Major General John Sydney Lethbridge
> recommended that the transmitter at Iwo Jima be jammed and then the
> island was to be soaked with gas shells.  Part of the plan was to change
> the yellow banding on gas shells so that the gunners would not know they
> were firing gas shells.  Supposedly Nimitz was for it, but it was
> denied by FDR.  Newcomb also says that neither Japan nor the US had
> signed the Geneva Convention outlawing gas.  Anybody know more about
> this?

        I cannot answer this particular question but I've read that it
was also (or more accurately, previously) considered at Biak in 1944.
This comes from the the January 1991 issue of "World War II", a bi-monthly
publication.  MacArthur wanted to seize the island of Biak off the
northern coast of New Guinea in order to use its airfields for the
invasion of the Philippines and also to bottle up the Japanese on New
Guinea.  The Japanese defense strategy on the island was to use the
caves overlooking the airfields to keep the Americans from capturing
the airfields and, if they did, to keep them from using them.

        After about four weeks of fighting, with only one airfield
captured but unusable, Eichelberger, the second commander of the Task
Force "briefly considered the use of poison gas against the enemy, but
was dissuaded by the objections of his own staff."  Unfortunately, this
line is so vague that I cannot determine how seriously this was considered.
It does make me wonder what kind of latitude field commanders had
concerning the use of poison gas.  I inferred from the quoted line
above that Eichelberger had the gas readily available and that he did
not require authorization from some higher authority in order to use
it; only the arguments of his staff persuaded him not to use it.
--
Joe Barone
[email-masked]
Hey!  Did you lose my aerial photographs?

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 16:09:37 EST
From:    Roger Coon <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Gas at Iwo Jima

One must also wonder what kind of gas.  I would guess mustard gas
rather than one of the nerve agents???
Brad Coon

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 15:14:25 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Glacier Girl

> Is the pilot of this P-38 still alive? Why doesn't someone ask him
> about the name, assuming he (she?) was not just a ferry pilot. If the
> plane was unnamed, the pilot was taking it into combat, and he approves
> the name, why would it be inauthentic to use it- it's not made up out
> of whole cloth, but is a legitimate part of this aircraft's individual
> history. In effect, this plane is being returned to service on public
> relations duty, and "Glacier Girl" is part of its reinstallation.
> I specifically note that I don't suggest this for other restorations,
> most emphatically when the markings bear no relation to the actual
> service history of the type, but I think this is a special case,
> such cases should be considered individually, and so long as the
> application of the design conforms with WW II practice (Robert
> Granvin's point) is acceptable. Just my .02.

This is essentially why I personally waffle a bit on the issue.  I would
still prefer it not be applied, but it can be construed as acceptable, even
to the purist.  :-)

Whether the pilot is around or not is probably immaterial as this was a
ferry flight.  No real history or purpose had yet been established for
the aircraft.

Where my primary red-alert goes off was with the question of self-recognition.
I do not believe, even in this case, that nose art and a name should be
applied as a way to recognize the mechanics and others who rebuilt the
aircraft.  If it makes the mission of the aircraft a bit easier, however,
in this unusual situation, then it's OK.

As far as self-recognition, we do it all the time with our aircraft.  When
our B-25 shows up at an airshow, everything around it says Southern Minnesota
Wing and Confederate Air Force.  We talk about the history of the plane, but
we also talk about what it takes to do this kind of restoration.  The key,
however, is the realization that we're talking about "around the airplane."
With the exception of a small plaque in the nose (unobtrusive and removable
without any damage to the aircraft's authenticity) and the N number that the
FAA requires, the aircraft is as pure as we can make (and that work
continues).  If the aircraft itself commemorated ourselves, and not the
history it's supposed to represent, then we did something wrong.

(When it was mentioned to cut the mechanics some slack, there is no rush more
pronounced than watching something you spent a lot of time working on finally
operate -- and, unlike most people -- those that worked on it usually get to
take part in the operations to the point where it actually can get _boring_ :-)

That's basically where I differ on the issue and still revolves around the
question of "why are you doing this?"  You can do the exact same thing for
both good reasons and wrong reasons.  :-)

So on "Glacier Girl," I remain with mixed emotions, but confident that the
right reasons are the driving force.

--
\\ Robert J. Granvin                                 User Services Specialist
// School of Statistics - University of Minnesota            [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 16:30:00 -0400
From:    John Baxter Jones <[email-masked]>
Subject: Intro to list

Good Afternoon, Everyone,
     Just wanted to introduce myself as a newby on the wwii-l list. My
name is John Baxter Jones; I am a member of the Social Studies Dept.
faculty at Watauga High School, Boone, NC.
     I teach World History (standard fare) and Peace & War (warfare cause
and effect/international relations), a course I, fortunately, was allowed
to develop based upon a lifetime fascination/interest/study of warfare and
my own experiences gained from 2 tours in Vietnam, 1966--'68, with the 4th
Inf. Div. (1st tour) and 25th Inf. Div. (2nd tour).  Also conduct guest
lectures (upon request) at nearby Appalachian State University (Death &
Dying classes and ROTC leadership classes).  I am presently wrapping-up
the rough draft of a novel based upon my experiences in Vietnam.
     My Dad, TSgt. Earl Thomas Jones (1922--1979) was a veteran of the
Pacific Theatre, WWII; serving 1942 thru 1946 (3rd Army Air Corps
<Southeast U.S.>; 13th Army Air Corps <Southwest Pacific>; and Occupation
Forces, Japan), and thus, the stimuli for my nearly 40 years of study of the
phenomena.  My earliest memories of my Dad (when I was 3-4 years
old) were of he and my uncles (European Theatre veterans) sitting around a
campfire, late on brisk coon hunting nights, sharing the stories of their
individual wartime experiences, some funny...most not, and me sitting at
their feet, totally fascinated by these guys who would remain my heroes
for a lifetime.
     They spoke not in boast nor braggadocio, but in almost reverential
tones of the things they had seen and took part in.  Throughout those
years until I went off to war, myself, Dad taught me..made sure I knew..
that there was no glory in warfare,..only death, carnage, and
destruction; but he also taught me that every one must share in the
defense of our freedoms and our principals and that I would do my part
when the time came.  I knew as early as 5 years old that I would serve in
the U.S. military, in some capacity, in the future...it was a given..
Despite the many controversies surrounding the role of America in
Vietnam, I'm glad I served...I was allowed to walk in my Dad's shoes.
That was enough for me.
     I hope I can make a contribution to this list, but, moreso, I want
to learn from the combined knowledge that is apparent here.

Respectfully,

John B. Jones

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 19:37:00 EST
From:    mc killop <[email-masked]>
Subject: [INF] USAAF 7 MAR 45

COMBAT CHRONOLOGY OF THE US ARMY AIR FORCES
WEDNESDAY, 7 MARCH 1945
FTP SITES
  1. ftp.rutgers.edu in directory pub/wwii/usaf
  2. byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (129.71.32.152) in pub/history/military/airforce/
     wwii_chronology

AIRCRAFT MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT:
  A-20, Douglas Havoc
  B-17, Boeing Flying Fortress
  B-24, Consolidated Liberator
  B-25, North American Mitchell
  F-5, Lockheed Lightning
  P-40, Curtiss
  P-47, Republic Thunderbolt
  P-51, North American Mustang
  Spitfire, Vickers Supermarine

NOTE: A number in parenthesis after a target name indicates the number of
bombers attacking.

AMERICAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

  ALASKA (Eleventh Air Force): In the Kurile Islands; 8 B-25s, dispatched to
strike a reported convoy, abort due to weather; so do 8 B-24s after departing
on a shipping sweep and a strike on Kataoka, Shimushu Island.

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

  CHINA THEATER (Fourteenth Air Force): In China, 4 B-25s and 9 P-40s blast
railroad targets N of Kiaotow; single B-25s hit truck convoys in the Hsiang
River Valley, the waterfront at Changsha, and a bridge and other targets of
opportunity on the Pinghan railroad; 130+ fighter-bombers attack numerous
targets throughout S and E China, concentrating on railroad, road, and river
targets in the areas around Nanking, Yoyang, Sintsiang, and Changsha.

  INDIA-BURMA THEATER (Tenth Air Force): In Burma, 30 P-47s support troops of
the British 36 Division in the Mogok area; 18 others support elements of the
Chinese 50th Division near Mansam; elements of the Chinese 38th Division
occupy Lashio; 12 B-25s and 35 fighter-bombers attack road targets, troops,
vehicles, and a variety of targets of opportunity immediately behind enemy
lines. Transports fly 630 sorties supplying forward areas with men and
equipment.

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force): 3 missions are flown.
  Mission 869: 946 bombers and 322 fighters are dispatched to hit oil and
communication targets using PFF; 1 P-51 is lost:
  1. 246 B-24s are sent to hit the marshalling yard at Soest (144) and the
Schildesche water viaduct at Bielefeld (80); Gee-H and H2X radar are used
for bombing; 1 B-24 is damaged beyond repair and 3 damaged; 10 airmen are KIA.
Escorting are 77 P-47s and P-51s.
  2. 344 B-17s are dispatched to bomb the Horderverein (24) and Harpenerweg
(62) oil refineries at Dortmund; secondary targets hit are the marshalling
yards at Paderborn (11), Siegen (113) and Giessen (87); Gee-H and H2X radar
are used; 1 B-17 is damaged beyond repair and 20 damaged; 1 airman is KIA.
The escort is 74 of 85 P-51s.
  3. 340 B-17s are sent to hit the Emscherlippe benzol plant at Datteln
(173) and the Rauxel benzol plant at Castrop (77); secondary targets hit
are the marshalling yards at Siegen (43) and Giessen (28); 1 other hits a
target of opportunity; Micro H and H2X radar are used; 56 B-17s are
damaged. 75 of 76 P-51s escort the bombers.
  4. 6 B-17s and 6 B-24s fly a screening mission.
  5. 4 B-17s fly a scouting mission.
  6. 37 of 38 P-51s fly a sweep of the Dummer Lake-Kassel-Koblenz area.
  7. 23 P-51s escort 5 F-5s and a Spitfire on a photo reconnaissance mission
over Germany; 1 P-51 is lost (pilot MIA).
  8. 24 P-51s fly a scouting mission.
  Mission 870: 11 of 12 B-24s drop leaflets in Germany and the Netherlands.
  Mission 871: 19 of 20 B-24s bomb Dortmund during the night using PFF; 1
B-24 is lost.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Ninth Air Force): Weather cancels combat operations
except for the XXIX Tactical Air Commands support of the US XVI Corps along
the Rhine River in the Wesel area. The 39th Photographic Reconnaissance
Squadron, 10th Photographic Group (Reconnaissance), moves from St Amand to
Jarny, France with F-5s (flights are operating from Gosselies and Le Culot,
Belgium).

MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (MTO)

  STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Fifteenth Air Force): Continued bad weather limits
operations to a supply drop in Yugoslavia and routine reconnaissance and
escort missions; all bombing operations are cancelled and 42 P-51s sent on a
strafing mission against railroad communications in Austria are recalled. The
318th Fighter Squadron, 325th Fighter Group, moves from Lesina to Rimini,
Italy with P-51s.

  TACTICAL OPERATIONS (Twelfth Air Force): In Italy, B-25s continue
interdiction of enemy communications, damaging a railroad bridge at Longarone
and railroad fills at Peri and Ossenigo; the XXII Tactical Air Command
concentrates on communications in the NE, Po Valley and fuel and ammunition
dumps in the C part of the Valley with generally good results; during the
night of 6/7 Mar, A-20s hit the Ostiglia crossing and bridges at Nervesa
della Battaglia and Casarsa della Delizia, and bomb targets of opportunity in
the Brenner area.

PACIFIC OCEAN AREA (POA)

  AAFPOA (Seventh Air Force): 11 Guam Island-based B-24s hit Susaki Airfield
on Chichi Jima Island and the town of Okimura on Haha Jima Island; 5 more hit
Susaki Airfield during the night of 7/8 Mar in individual harassment strikes.

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA [SWPA, Far East Air Force (FEAF)]: On Luzon Island,
B-24s hit the Balete Pass area while A-20s and fighter-bombers hit troop
concentrations and gun positions near Antipolo and near San Fernando, NW of
Ft Stotsenburg, and in the Bayombong-Solano area and targets of opportunity
in the Lake Taal area, the towns of Santa Fe, Lallo and Vigan, and on Caballo
Island in Manila Bay; numerous ground support missions are flown throughout
Luzon.

SOURCES:
AIR FORCE COMBAT UNITS OF WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force History,
  Headquarters USAF, 1961, ISBN 0-912799-02-1
COMBAT SQUADRONS OF THE AIR FORCE, WORLD WAR II, Office of Air Force
  History, Headquarters USAF 1982
THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II: COMBAT CHRONOLOGY, 1941-1945 by the
  Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF, 1973
THE MIGHTY EIGHTH WAR DIARY by Roger A. Freeman, ISBN 1-85409-071-2

Jack McKillop
USAF (Airways and Air Communications Service)
1955-59

-------------------------------------------------------------------
|  Jack McKillop         |  Those who have long enjoyed such      |
|  Bellcore              |  privileges as we enjoy forget in      |
|  Piscataway, NJ USA    |  time that men have died to win them.  |
|  [email-masked]  |                       FDR              |
-------------------------------------------------------------------

07/0035Z MAR

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 21:19:31 EST
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 07-MAR-1945

On 07-MAR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the Canadian 1st Army sector, the Canadian II Corps
prepares for the final attack on Xanten. In the U.S. 1st Army sector, the
4rd Armoured Division and the 104th Division capture Cologne. Elements of
the 9th Armoured Division establish bridgeheads over the rivers Ahr and
Rhine. Other elements of the division manage to capture a bridge at
Remagen, the only one that the Germans have not been able to blow up. In
the 3rd Army sector, the 87th Division advance quickly to the northeast
towards the Ahr. Elements of the 11th Armoured Division take Dockweiler,
Boxberg and Kelberg.

Philippines - In the XIV Corps area, the 6th Division and 1st Cavalry
Division continue preparations for a coordinated drive east against the
Shimbu line. Elements of the 11th Airborne Division advance through
undefended Taal. In the I Corps area, elements of the 33rd Division take
the Aringay bridge and town without opposition.

Iwo Jima - The VAC begins to attack in the center before dawn, withholding
preparatory fire and moving forward with great secrecy. The units of the
3rd Marine Division on the right of the center are pinned down after a
limited advance at daybreak. On the left of the center, the division is not
able to move forward either. On the left flank, the 5th Marine Division
makes limited progress, where the terrain is a greater handicap than the
enemy. On the right flank of the corps the 4th Marine Division is unable to
move and continues to mop up in the read areas. Since the use of naval
gunfire is now greatly restricted most of TF 54 leaves for Ulithi.

The Homefront
-------------
House Passes Draft Of Nurses - The House of Representatives has passed, 347
to 42 and sends to the Senate, a bill that would draft all nurses aged 20
through 44 who are not married and have no dependent children

New Tank Shown - The War Department has announced its newest tank, which
carries a 90-mm. gun and is the most powerful yet built by the U.S. The
tank, has been named the General Pershing and is described as the answer to
the German Tiger tank.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           | [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 | http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 21:34:26 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

By the way, Mike. Hattori wrote on of the best histories of the war from the
Japanese point of view, believable, and I feel accurate. And above all,
objective. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 21:58:31 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: TACTICAL AFTERTHOUGHTS

Mike, the initial plans for Cactus was an assault on Florida Island and Tulagi,
I believe, because Tulagi had one of the best anchorages in the Pacific.
Because there were no maps of Guadalcanal other than the sketches drawn by
Australian planters who had been in the area, LtCol Merrill B. Twining, Asst
G-3 of the 1st MarDiv, and Maj William B. McKean, another member of the G-3
section, were flown by B-17 on a photoreconnaissance mission over the area. It
was only then that it was discovered that the Japs were building an airfield on
Guadalcanal, which changed the strategic picture entirely, and this meant that
the supply line from the US to Australia would truly be in danger. That is when
the primary target was changed to Guadalcanal. If you read the official
histories as well as my namesake's "Guadalcanal," you will know that the 1st
MarDiv never did get good maps of the island.
        By the way, while I have everybody's attention, in the Washington Post
yesterday, there was a story which said that the government, out of
appreciation for Japanese sensitivities, is not going to call or commemorate
V-J Day as V-J Day. The story says that the US and Japan agree that marking
WWII's end must be in low key. According to the article, and I quote,
"...Washington has assured Tokyo that U.S. government representatives at
commemorative events will avoid using the traditional term "V-J Day," short for
"Victory-over-Japan Day, to describe the end of the Pacific War. Instead, all
American material will simply refer to the "end of the war." I am absolutely
appalled and totally pissed off at this pusillanimous action on the part of the
government. It is an insult to all veterans of the Pacific War, living and
dead, and I call upon the members of this list to take whatever action is
within their limits to sound off on the matter. When I cool down sufficiently,
I intend writing a letter to the Post. Whether it is published, is another
story. An accompany article is headed: "V-J Day Passe in P.C. Era." What a
crock! Ben Frank, spring loaded in a pissed off position.

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 22:30:44 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: GAS AT IWO JIMA

It is true that gas, like other options, was considered for Iwo. As a matter
fact, planners had gridded a map of Iwo to determine where the shells were to
be dropped. But one has to realize that Iwo is an island with ocean breezes
constantly flowing over it, and the gas undoubtedly would have be dispersed
before it could do much damage. In the Army green back series, the history of
the Chemical Corps by Dale Birdsell and Brooks Kleber deals with this matter. I
alway wondered when reading operation plans and orders that while there was a
chemical warfare defense plan, there was neve a chemical warfare offensive
plan, and even to this day, I don't know where the gas in the Pacific was
stored and who had the ultimate authority to authorize use of it. I would
suppose gas might have been stored in the Hawaiian Islands and that Nimitz had
the authority, although I doubt if he would have made a move without either
presidential or JCS sanction. Just a supposition. Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 6 Mar 1995 23:17:02 -0400
From:    Mike Yaklich <[email-masked]>
Subject: Tactical afterthoughts on Japan part 5

        June 1944 marked a turning point in how the Japanese organized their
resistance to the great Allied amphibious offensive.  But before I get to that,
I'd like to add a few comments on items recently mentioned.
        I mentioned some of the contributions of African-Americans in the
Pacific theatre in regard to Black History Month.  I guess I should also add
that the Bougainville campaign marked the baptism of fire for the US Army's
only black regular infantry units to fight in the Pacific.  The 93rd Division
included two regiments, the 24th and 25th Regts., whose enlisted men were
entirely African-American (officers down to company commander level remained
white).  The 93rd fought a Joe and Willie in the Pacific kind of war-- a lot of
no-respect, backwater, dirty clean-up work far from the press corps and the
glory.  Their war was mainly mopping-up and secondary operations.  Of course,
these were not secondary operations to the Japanese, who still fought to the
death in most cases.  At any rate, company K of the 25th Regiment made a rather
inauspicious debut on Bougainville in April 1944.  On its very first combat
patrol, the company was surprised by a Japanese machinegun (as US forces also
rediscovered later in Vietnam, in thick jungle a single machinegun covering a
stretch of trail could make for a deadly ambush, and the Japanese used this
tactic a lot in the Pacific).  As the unexpected bursts tore into their ranks
and men went down, confusion set in among the inexperienced K company.  Two of
the American platoons began firing, and then started firing at each other.
There were more casualties, and then a platoon sergeant panicked and ran, many
of his men following.  In spite of the efforts of the white company commander
to get his men to stay put and cease firing, a general skedaddle took place.
The men of K company left behind ten dead men, as well as equipment including a
radio and a mortar, and dragged twenty more wounded back with them.  This
initiation to battle was doubly unfortunate, as it gave the critics of the use
of African-Americans as combat troops (and there were many of them in the
largely-segregated and in many quarters highly prejudiced military
establishment) ammunition to use in making their case.  Never mind that both
black regiments of the 93rd Division subsequently fought reasonably well.  They
later participated in the fighting on Saipan, and then in the
operations against Morotai and the Moluccan islands (fall '44), as the division
was kept pretty busy for the rest of the year.  On Saipan the 24th Regt won a
unit citation for its energetic and efficient operations during the mopping-up
phase of the battle there, and on Morotai a patrol from the 25th Regt captured
one of the highest-ranking Japanese officers to be taken alive on the island.
        Although more than a million African-Americans served in the US armed
forces during the war, which saw the first black general, the first black
fighter ace, and other acheivements (the man who would be the first black
admiral was serving as an officer on a subchaser), one is tempted to agree with
Spector when he dismisses those accomplishments as mere window dressing.  For
most African-American servicemen, World War 2 was a sentence to hard labor,
because it was in various types of labor units that most found themselves.  I
earlier mentioned the construction of the Ledo road through the Burmese jungle,
a task involving much back-breaking labor under extremely difficult
circumstances, and where roughly three-fifths of those backs were black.  The
US Marine Corps was another example.  Later in the war the Marines formed black
combat units, but they were base defense battalions-- self-contained outfits
which could be sent in to secure and if necessary defend small island outposts
like Wake or Midway.  By the time these units had been trained the need for
such battalions had passed, since there were no outposts that were actually
threatened with Japanese invasion by that stage in the war.  Lots of
African-American Marines did see combat, though-- as ammunition handlers (i.e.,
labor units) in amphibious assaults.  These units landed either with the first
waves or soon after.  Their job was to rapidly unload ammunition and create
local dumps (this was frequently done under fire), then usually to carry some
of that ammunition to the forward troops, staying near the front lines to serve
as stretcher bearers to bring the wounded back.  In this manner black Marines
took part in the landings on Saipan and Iwo Jima, among other places.  On
Pelleliu one such unit was observed, after serving as stretcher bearers all
day, to slip away in small groups led by noncoms to go and do their bit in the
front lines as fighters after dark.  The Army Air Force also had a number of
predominantly-black aviation engineer battalions (again, a euphemism for what
were essentially construction and labor units) which saw either combat or a
great deal of hard work behind the lines in the Pacific.  One such battalion,
the 810th, arrived in the Pacific on one of the first American reinforcement
convoys in early 1942, served among other places in Noumea, Guadalcanal, Biak,
and the Phillipines in non-combat assignments, did not return home until four
months after the Japanese surrender, and in all that time did not spend a single
day in a rest camp.  Another black construction battalion, the 811th, got to
trade shots with holdout Japanese snipers while trying to repair, expand, and
maintain an airfield on Iwo Jima.
        Unfortunately, institutionalized prejudice was often the lot of the
African-American military man.  General Vandegrift, the Marine commander on
Guadalcanal who was later elevated to the post of Marine Corps commandant, was
among the more sensible and admirable American commanders when he announced,
"The Negro Marines are no longer on trial.  They are Marines, period."
However, his attitude was not necessarily the majority view among white
officers (its not the Pacific theatre, but I keep thinking of the book "Hit
Hard" where officers training the 761st Tank Battalion in the deep south
frequently sang "I'm Dreaming of a White Battalion" in their mess).  Another
Marine general warned against sending black Marines to American Samoa because,
essentially, he was afraid they'd have too much sex with the "primitively
romantic" (as he put it) native women.  In Sydney, Australia, US military
authorities made virtually all of the city's most popular bars, nightclubs,
theatres, and restaraunts off limits to black personnel.  Even Australian
government officials formally complained of the discrimination shown against
African-American military personnel by their own white officers, claiming it
could only lead to violence and unrest.  MacArthur smugly assured them that
there was no prejudice or discrimination in the American military, and business
went on as usual.  The worst outbreak of racial tension occurred late in the
war on Guam (showing that things got no better as time went on), between black
naval base personnel and white Marines.  The Marines used to cruise by the
black barracks in trucks shouting racial epithets, which soon drew the response
of the black sailors rushing out to pelt the trucks with stones.  The incident
came to a head when a black sailor was shot by a white sailor.  That night
there was, basically, a drive-by shooting at the black barracks-- unidentified
individuals in a truck spraying shots into the black compound as they drove by.
An inquiry by the naval authorities into the spreading violence (including more
shooting incidents) concluded in part that the African-American sailors had
overeacted by confusing a few exceptional examples with prejucial policies on
the part of the military at large, of which it found no evidence (this in a
Navy that practiced segregation as a matter of practical policy!).  I cite
these things to show that I realize that the US of A was not always Mr Clean
either in regard to the way we did things, so that when I mention things like
the Japanese for no apparent reason hacking 400 officers and men of the
Phillipino 91st Division to death with swords during the Bataan Death March no
one will think I'm getting too sanctimonious and picking on the Japanese.
        I also realize I might have stepped into a minefield by making a couple
of positive-sounding references to Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner in my last
few posts.  Actually, all I said was that he was considered the US Navy's
resident expert on amphibious operations, which it is obvious he was.  Among
other operations, he was the man in charge of the landing and covering forces
at Guadalcanal, New Georgia, the Marianas, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.  Turner was
also considered to be one of the most brilliant officers in the whole Navy, not
least of all by Turner himself.  He was certainly a difficult man, supremely
egotistical and overbearing (all the qualities that really turn me off in
MacArthur).  Spector quotes correspondent Robert Sherrod as saying that Turner
couldn't go from ship to shore "without telling the coxswain how to bring the
boat alongside."  His propensity for sticking his inquisitive nose into the
land fighting did not win him any friends among the Marines in the early
Solomons campaign.  Vandegrift was highly annoyed at his attempt to advise the
Marines on the ground fighting on Guadalcanal, and the command set-up Turner
organized for New Georgia has also been critized as inefficient and
counter-productive.  Furthermore, the Marines have a bone to pick with Turner
over Iwo, where he was one of the Navy commanders who decided that a
concentrated three-day naval bombardment of the island would be adequate, in
spite of Marine requests for a ten-day artillery preparation.  The naval
bombardment on Saipan was also considered less than optimally effective,
although in this case it must be admitted that the ships under Turner's direct
command did the bulk of the damage, while other bombarding groups suffered from
poor targeting decisions and inexperience in supporting shore operations.
Also, I wanted to mention that my calling Admiral Tanaka "the Japanese Kelly
Turner" was a referral to his specialization in troop and invasion transport,
not to any unpopular angles of the Japanese admiral's personality.  Overall,
the US Navy was populated with some pretty good commanders in the admirals'
ranks.  Chester Nimitz, the Pacific commander-in-chief, emerges as an
operational mastermind and cool-headed war leader, Ray Spruance was (IMHO)
prudent without being timid, and the American Navy also had the benefit of a
solid second line of subordinate admirals like Mitscher, Jesse Ohlendorf, and
the Chinese-American "Ching" Lee.
        Having said all that, I want to get back to June 1944.  The Marianas
marked the final hurrah for the prevailing Japanese tactical approach to defense
against amphibious landings, which was to try and stop the invaders at the
water line, or, if they succeeded in getting ashore, to immediately hurl them
back into the sea with strong counterattacks.  Saipan was the first of the
Marianas islands attacked, and it was also important because it was considered
part of Japan proper (having been another fruit of Japan's First World War
participation-- it was administratively considered as belonging to the district
including Tokyo).  Saipan was also an island imperative to hold because it was
within range of the Japanese homeland for the new B-29 Superfortress heavy
bomber.  This amazing aircraft, despite repeated problems during development,
once combat-ready proved a potential war-winning weapon (and when combined with
the atomic bomb it was exactly that).  It had a range of 2,800 miles, could
carry up to 20,000 lbs of bombs, could operate loaded at 32,000 feet, and
reached a speed of 355 mph (for comparison, the Japanese Navy's two fastest
fighters to see service during the war, the Shiden and the Raiden, had top
speeds of less than 370 mph and just over 380 mph respectively-- and there were
less than 900 planes of both types combined built!).  On top of that, the
four-engined B-29 was heavily armored, and featured sophisticated defensive
armament, including four small domes, two on top and two beneath the plane,
each mounting a pair of .50-calibre machineguns and controlled from three
remote sighting stations in the fuselage.  There was also a tail position with
two more .50's plus a 20-mm cannon.  However, in early operations the air
gunners had difficulty adjusting to the remote sighting arrangements, and many
of the most successful B-29 raids on Japan were conducted using aircraft
stripped of all armament except for the tail position in order to cut weight
and thus increase speed and range (as I've seen reference to, other than in
LeMay's "Superfortress," in recent list discussion).
        At any rate, for such an important island, the Japanese command
arrangements were noticeably in disarray.  The Marianas were part of the
jurisdiction of the Japanese 31st Army, commanded by Lt-General Hideyoshi Obata
(not to be confused with the previously-mentioned Lt-Gen Eiryo Obata, the air
commander).  Actually, the overall command for the Marianas per se was in the
hands of the Navy's Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, the small but fit officer (in his
long-ago youth he had been a championship wrestler) recently famed as commander
of Kido Butai, the carrier strike force.  Just as Nagumo with Kido Butai had
usually deferred to the advice of his chief-of-staff Kusaka, in the Marianas he
essentially abdicated the actual ground command to the local Army leadership--
a reasonable action, as there were on Saipan at the time of the American
landings about 25,000 Army personnel, compared to only 6,100 marines and naval
base personnel organized into fighting units.  Obata's 31st Army, however, had
a lot more than Saipan to worry about.  The area controlled and defended by
this army was huge.  Obata had a lot of units under command, but they were
spread over a great deal of territory.  In the Marianas, where he made his
headquarters, he had the 43rd Division and the 47th Brigade on Saipan, another
division and one brigade on Guam, and a regiment on Tinian.  He also had
a division and two brigades in the Palaus islands, where many of them wound up
fighting the US Marines on Peleliu.  There was another division and two
brigades on Truk (soon to be joined by another China veteran division, which
however suffered greivous losses of both equipment and men to US submarines en
route.  Truk, like Rabaul, was bypassed and left to starve, which was exactly
what happened.  In spite of attempts to turn every plot capable of being
cultivated into vegetable gardens, there were even reports of cannabalism on
Truk before the war ended.  The book "Peace Is Our Duty" I mentioned in some of
my early posts includes the recollections of a soldier and a marine
antiaircraft gunner who were stuck on Truk).  Finally, there was also the 109th
Division on Iwo Jima.  All that territory and all those units meant that Obata
spent a lot of time away from his HQ.  In fact, when the Americans landed on
Saipan he was away on an inspection tour to the Palaus.  That meant the command
of the defenses devolved on Lt-Gen. Yoshitsugu Saito, commander of the 43rd
Division, who outranked Obata's chief-of-staff (and the Japanese, like many
militaries of the period, were sticklers for propriety in terms of promotions
and the seniority lists).  Saito was not a great choice to command in a crucial
battle.  He had little experience as a commander of troops in the field, and
previous to taking over 43rd Division had served in the Army's horse
procurement department.
        The campaign for Saipan played out exactly like most of the central
Pacific amphibious operations that had preceded it.  The Japanese defense of
the beaches was tenacious.  They had a variety of weapons including 5.5-inch,
6-inch, and 8-inch naval guns emplaced to cover the landing zones, and in spite
of the use of a new model of armored amphibious tractor mounting a 75-mm
howitzer in its tank-like turret US losses in getting ashore were pretty heavy,
some 1,500 killed or wounded.  Once ashore, the Americans near Garapan were hit
with repeated counterattacks, mostly by night, and several including Japanese
armor.  These attacks failed to dislodge the invaders, and cost the Japanese
heavy casualties which hurt their later attempts to defend the island (although
they were still able to impose serious enough delays that the Marine commander
Holland Smith created a furor among his US Army counterparts when he fired
Ralph Smith, the general commanding one of the Army divisions ashore-- the
Army was outraged at having one of its own fired by a Marine, and the
controversy went all the way up to the top levels of the government, where
Holland Smith's action was eventually backed).  When the end appeared to be in
sight, the Japanese threw their customary suicide "banzai" charge, in this case
coming closest to actually succeeding.  The charge overran two battalions of a
US Army infantry regiment, killing or wounding 650 soldiers (the third
battalion was too well dug-in above a rocky gulch), but about 4,300 Japanese
died in the effort.  Two images from things I read about Saipan stick with me.
One (from Manchester, "Goodbye Darkness") is that of a Marine colonel who sat
on a stump, smoking a cigar, throughout the night attack against the beachead
which involved 44 Japanese tanks, calmly calling down naval artillery fire
against the attackers.  The other is of an Army Lt-Colonel, commander of one of
the battalions overrun in the suicide charge, who, already wounded, stood like
the fictitious image of Custer at the Little Big Horn, a pistol in each hand,
and fired at the oncoming Japanese until both weapons were empty.  Then he took
over a .50-calibre machinegun and kept that firing until he was killed.  And
there is, of course, the most ominous image of all, that of some 22,000
Japanese civilians killing themselves by jumping off cliffs.  This was the
first Pacific battleground to have Japanese civilians present in any number,
and the sight of the mass suicides could not have been much comfort to Marines
and GI's later contemplating the kind of resistance they would find in an
invasion of Japan proper.
        Saipan was a grevious defeat for the Japanese.  For the Americans, the
"butcher's bill" was fairly high, over 16,000 casualties counting naval losses.
The subsequent assault on Tinian, however, was a masterpiece of amphibious
tactics, and was concluded with less than 2,000 total casualties.  Guam, the
final major Marianas island to be taken, was also bitterly contested, and cost
over 7,000 men.  Still, the loss to the Japanese was much higher, and not only
in terms of casualties.  For the Japanese Navy had tried and failed in its
attempt to smash the invasion forces in a "decisive battle."  Instead, the
Japanese got the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot" and the effective end of
Japanese naval air power.  It was also shown that the Navy's ability to
intervene successfully against further American offensive operations was open
to serious question, while the Army had failed to defend a territory considered
part of Japan itself.  The impotence shown caused a great crisis among the
higher circles of the Japanese government, and occasioned the fall of Tojo's
government from the power it had held since the war's start.  Nagumo and Saito
both committed suicide when Saipan fell.
        Still, an example of a better way to organize defensively for the
future was also at hand.  The island of Biak, off the northwest coast of New
Guinea, was almost considered a subsidiary target to MacArthur's forces, busy
fighting for the control of the nearby Wakde island area.  It was not exactly
in the front line of Japanese defenses, either.  The Japanese commander on Biak
was a colonel, Col Naoyuki Kuzume.  He had about 11,000 men under his command,
drawn from a variety of small units of various degrees of combat efficiency.
Kuzume's improvised defensive strategy, a basic field expedient, proved a
turning point in Japanese defensive tactics for the war.  Instead of trying to
stop the invaders at the waterline, he withdrew inland, and sheltered his
forces in numerous caves improved for defense by further excavation.  He only
exposed his men to the murderous fire of the Allied artillery on ships and
ashore when they were making counterattacks, and these were much better thought
out than the massed reactions to other invasions like Saipan.  Kuzume's
defensive scheme gave the Americans more than they bargained for (here it was
the US planners who underestimated, and the initial landing force consisting of
part of one Army division was hardly bigger than Kuzume's defending
congregation).  His defense of the island lasted from late May till late July,
and at the height of the fighting his counterattacks even compelled the
Americans to abandon one of their landing beaches.  This, it seemed, was a
model to be emulated, and it was.  By the time the US Marines landed on
Peleliu in September, another subsidiary action expected to be a walkover,
Kuzume's pattern had become the accepted Japanese defensive doctrine, and
Peleliu too turned out to be a long, vicious, and costly campaign.  As I
explained earlier, this new tactical policy would reach its bloody conclusion
with the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
        I should mention too that the Japanese used tank forces for their
counterattacks on both Biak and Peleliu, which initially took the US forces
somewhat by surprise.  It should not have done so, because the Japanese
actually employed their armor pretty widely.  In fact, they used tanks whenever
they had them.  Japanese tanks spearheaded at least three or four attacks in
Malaya, were used in mass (by Japanese standards) on Singapore, were also
employed in fairly large numbers in northern Burma.  Tanks were used in smaller
numbers at every stage of the fighting in the Phillipines (the first couple
vehicles to be put ashore on Corregidor made up Wainwright's mind to surrender
the island, since they landed within a quarter of mile of his HQ in the vast
Malinta tunnels, and he had no antitank weapons).  There were Japanese tanks at
Milne Bay in New Guinea, even a Ha-Go on Tarawa that caused considerable
consternation among the Marines until a 37-mm antitank gun was hand-lifted over
the seawall to knock it out.  I've already referred to the fact that on Saipan
there were at least three attempts to use tanks in the early counterattacks,
including one mass assault with 44 vehicles.  It was not a failure of doctrine,
or a reluctance to employ modern weapons and machinery, it was more a failing
of the Japanese industry and economy to supply the Japanese Army with
sufficient numbers of machines of sufficient quality, a theme I have echoed
often before.  The Japanese were willing to
fight a modern, technological war-- they just didn't have enough of the
technology.  The problem lay in the fact that at Peleliu they could only launch
a tank attack with a mere 13 vehicles, or that at Biak it was a case of light
tanks with 37-mm guns against Shermans (which opposed the Japanese tanks on
Peleliu as well).  In fact, looking at these battles tends to suggest that the
Japanese had a highly developed appreciation for the value of armor, especially
in the infantry support role, and tried to employ tanks whenever possible to
beef up their offensive operations.  On Okinawa, the Japanese counterattacks
undertaken near the Maeda ridge were supported by the only tank regiment they
had, a total of 14 medium and 13 light tanks.  This offensive, probably
ill-conceived (and a definite departure from Ushijima's defensive strategy)
gained some ground due to superhuman exertions by the leading battalions,
though at the cost of fearsome casualties.  Well-directed US gunfire accounted
for most of the Japanese tanks at an early phase.  By the time of the assault
on the town of Tanabaru, in the sector the tanks were operating, there were
only nine light tanks left to support the attack.  The town and the surrounding
hills were taken, but six of the remaining tanks were knocked out in the
effort.  The rifle battalion led by the young Captain Ito, which spearheaded
the attack in this sector (helped by the tanks) had less than 150 of its
original 600 men remaining when it was ordered to withdraw.
        The Japanese could sometimes be extremely clever in adapting to their
low-tech war.  They adapted to poor supply in jungle environments by learning
to forage, watching the monkeys and eating what they ate.  For the night
attacks which they favored, their officers smeared phosphorescent plants on
their backs, or pinned strips of white cloth to the backs of their uniforms, so
their men could follow them in the dark.  These same officers, however, were
still going into combat armed with swords (in addition to the troublesome
little Nambu pistol, useless at much beyond point-blank range).  But their
ingenuity could be admirable.  In the 1920's the ordinance board under Colonel
Nambu developed the machinegun designs that would see the Japanese Army through
most of the Second World War.  These designs were mostly pirated from the WW1
French Hotchkiss, a mechanism not entirely suited to some of the roles to which
the Japanese adapted it.  The Nambu mgs were hardly designer's dreams, the best
that could probably be said for them was that, with meticulous care and
cleaning (which, given the Japanese training, was generally the case) they
worked reasonably well most of the time.  Somehow Nambu's people had managed to
increase the weight of the tripod-mounted version to 122 pounds, much heavier
than the original Hotchkiss (even though the Nambu initially fired a less
powerful cartridge), and something of a load for the average Japanese soldier,
who was only five foot three.  No problem, the Japanese worked out a system
whereby poles could be inserted into slots on the feet of the tripod, allowing
three or four men (and a heavy machinegun crew always included at least that
many) to pick it up and carry it in teams, more or less like a stretcher, with
the added advantage that it could be plopped down ready to fire immediately.
The machinegun company in each Japanese rifle battalion (these, BTW, usually
had four rifle companies instead of the three that were the norm in western
armies) had two platoons, each platoon having two machinegun squads (two
tripod-mounted mgs each) plus an ammunition squad.  The latter consisted of ten
or more backs to be used as human pack animals hauling extra ammunition,
another example of Japanese adaptation to their low-tech environment.
        But that sort of improvisation could hardly cope with the impressive
industrial and technological acheivements of the US and the other Allies.  I
read with interest on this list a little while back where the Japanese also had
been conducting research into the possibilities of atomic weapons.  It seems
the Japanese had competent scientists who were hot on the trail theoretically,
but lacked among other things the uranium to experiment with.  I think that,
even more, what they lacked was the TWO BILLION DOLLARS the Americans were able
to throw at the problem.  Japan just didn't have the luxury of that sort of
expenditure for mere research and development.  The Japanese, later in the war,
were also experimenting with jet and rocket aircraft.  The Japanese Navy's
"Kikka" ("Orange Blossom") jet attack plane was a two-engined design based on
the German Me-262, but smaller.  It actually flew successfully on August 7,
1945-- significantly, the day after the dropping of the Hiroshima a-bomb,
showing how far behind the Japanese actually were in the high-tech war, and the
impossibility of ever catching up.  A second flight ended badly when an
improperly-installed takeoff assistance rocket caused a crash on take-off, but
aside from the prototypes 17 production models were in various stages of
completion when the war ended.  The Kikka (built by Nakajima) would have had a
top speed of over 440 miles per hour, capable of carrying over 1,700 lbs of
bombs or one torpedo.  The Army had its own version, the Karyu ("Fire Dragon"),
on the drawing board, a closer copy of the Messerschmidt 262 which would have
been a fighter with a speed of 520-530 mph and an armament of four automatic
cannon.
        The Navy also experimented with the Mitsubishi J8M rocket-plane.  This
was based on the German Me-163 Komet, the Germans having rendered this small
aid to their ally in sending an engine and some drawings from the Me-163A to
Japan by submarine.  A complete Me-163B along with the full set of construction
plans was to be sent later, but the submarine carrying these items was sunk en
route, so the Japanese had to reconstruct much of the aircraft themselves.
Nonetheless, the J8M was ready for its test-flight in July 1945.  However, its
engine failed shortly after take-off, resulting in a crash which killed the
test pilot, Inuzuka.  This was its only flight.  The design would have acheived
a speed of 555 mph during its short powered flight, and was to have been armed
with two 30-mm cannon.  The Army planned to give priority to the production of
its own version, the Ki-202, but these never flew before the surrender.
        The only rocket-powered aircraft to see service with the Japanese was a
suicide weapon, the Yokosuka MXY "Okha" ("Cherry Blossom," although the Allied
sailors called it "Baka," Japanese for "fool").  With a powerful 2,600-lb
explosive charge in its nose, the Okha was carried aloft by specially-adapted
G4M two-engined bombers.  It was released at high speed and altitude about 50
miles from the target, gliding most of the way in at speeds reaching 290 mph.
The engine was only switched on for the last 30 seconds, boosting the
aircraft's speed to as much as 600 mph before impact.  The first success of this
weapon was a hit scored on the battleship WEST VIRGINIA off Okinawa on April
1st, 1945.  On April 12, another "Baka" sank the destroyer escort MANNERT L.
ABELE, and hits were scored on another destroyer and three transports by these
manned rocket bombs during the campaign.  Nearly 800 Okhas were eventually
built, including 45 glider versions for pilot training purposes, but only a
small percentage of these were actually employed in action.
        And here, with the kamikazes, is a good place to wind it all up.
Because, with their dearth of resources necessary for modern warfare, for the
Japanese that is what "Special Weapons" came down to.  Not atomic bombs or V2
rockets, but suicide planes.  Here once again it is possible to discern that
underlying belief in the superiority of spiritual attributes translated into
material terms.  The biggest kamikaze operation of the war came off Okinawa.
Operation "Ten-Go" commenced on April 6th, 1945, when nearly 700 suicide planes
were unleashed against the Allied fleets off Okinawa.  This was a long-prepared
attempt to fight the elusive "decisive battle" once more, but despite the
horror of this form of attack the results were not decisive, although three
destroyers, two important ammunition ships, and an LST were sunk, with ten
other vessels, mostly escort ships, damaged.  The Japanese pilots, BTW, had
orders to ignore all but the biggest warships and aim for the loaded
transports.  It seems this was often disregarded, since the destroyer pickets
came to suffer most heavily from this form of attack.  Although the big raid on
April 6th did not strike the serious blows planned, there would be nine more
kamikaze operations organized under "Ten-Go" and involving at least 50 and
sometimes as many as 300 aircraft before Okinawa was finally secured.  A total
of 34 Allied ships were sunk by these assaults off Okinawa, and casualties
among sailors ran into the thousands.
        I should say that the first suicide air attack of the war actually came
on the first day of the war, at Pearl Harbor.  A Japanese fighter commander
named Iida in the second wave got into a kind of western shoot-out with a brave
American at the airfield he was strafing.  The American had a BAR (Browning
Automatic Rifle, the weapon used to provide automatic fire support in the
typical US rifle squad), and he had companions in the armory inside the
building to pass him new, loaded BAR's every time he emptied a 20-shot clip.
After Iida's first pass, the American shouted "Pass me another BAR, I think I
got the sonofabitch!"  He had indeed-- Iida's Zero was hit in the fuel tank,
and with the leak would probably not make it back to his carrier.  So the
Japanese officer deliberately crashed his plane into a hanger.  The first
planned suicide attack, however, came off the north coast of New Guinea at the
end of May 1944, and was made by four Japanese Army Ki-45 two-engined aircraft.
        The Ki-45 was originally designed as a heavy fighter plane.  When new
versions appeared mounting a 20-mm or 37-mm nose cannon (in addition to one or
two 12.7-mm mgs) the type had some success in a shipping attack role off New
Guinea, and it was also encountered in many roles in the China-Burma theatre,
including reconnaisance, long-range fighter, and ground attack.  The aircraft's
chief virtues were good maneuverability for a two-engined plane, and decent
speed.  In 1944 the surviving examples were converted to "Kai-C" nightfighter
versions, mounting (in addition to a 20- or 37-mm and two 12.7-mm in the nose)
two 12.7-mm mgs behind the cockpit firing obliquely upward, similar to the
German "Schragemusik" configuration.  One of the reasons for the US interest in
China, BTW, was that it was originally (before the capture of the Marianas and
the transfer of operations to Tinian) planned to base B-29's there to raid
Japan.  The first B-29 raids against the Japanese homeland were in fact
launched from eastern China just before the Japanese "Ichi-Go" offensive
overran their bases in the summer of 1944.  They also targeted industrial
complexes and harbors in Manchuria from the Chinese bases, and raided
Indochinese and southeast Asian coastal areas as well.  The Japanese Army in
1944 countered the first B-29 missions by establishing two large night fighter
bases across their paths, one at Hanoi in the south, and one at Anshan in
Manchuria.  Ki-45's based at Anshan on one occasion in the summer of 1944
brought down seven B-29's in a single night, but this success was a rare
exception.  The use of the Ki-45 as a nightfighter was hindered by the fact
that the aircraft carried no radar, due to production difficulties with the
radar set.  And that is why I included this description, and the whole topic of
Japanese night fighters, as another example of the Japanese shortcomings in the
high-tech war.  The Japanese Navy had their own two-engined nightfighter, the
Nakajima J1N1-S Gekko ("Moonlight").  It had a radar in the nose, mounted four
20-mm cannon (all in oblique fixed mounts, two firing upward and two firing
down), and furthermore the aircraft was so maneuverable it could turn as
tightly as many single-engined fighters.  But the Gekko could not climb high
enough or fly fast enough to intercept the B-29, and at any rate only 475 of
the nightfighter version were built during the war.

        As a final note, I wanted to add to my China posts that during the
"Ichi-Go" offensive the Chinese group of American-trained and -equipped
divisions known as "Y-Force," which was attacking along the Burma road from the
Chinese side, was in September (as the Japanese were reorganizing for one final
push in the main offensive) itself attacked by the Japanese in a subsidiary
operation.  I forgot to mention that.
        Also, as a parting kudo for our friends down under, I should mention
that an Australian fighter squadron which had fought in North Africa, equipped
with Kittyhawks, gave the Japanese, even the Zero, all they could handle over
New Guinea in the early going there, when Lae wing was generally ruling the
skies.  The Kittyhawk, for those who don't know, was essentially a souped-up
P-40 with a Spitfire (Rolls-Royce) engine installed, boosting the speed by
15-20 mph over current P-40 versions.  This was also the plane flown by
Australia's top ace Clive Caldwell for most of his career in North Africa (he
later switched to a Spitfire).

        One appendix to go.

        Regards

        Mike Yaklich

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End of WWII-L Digest - 5 Mar 1995 to 6 Mar 1995
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