Subject: WWII-L Digest - 1 Apr 1995 to 2 Apr 1995

From: Automatic digest processor <[email-masked]>
Date: Mon, 3 Apr 1995 00:03:28 -0400

There are 37 messages totalling 1474 lines in this issue.

Topics of the day:

  1. LORD LOVAT  D-DAY COMM
  2. INF: 50 YEARS AGO - 01 (2)
  3. Paul H. Silverstone
  4. Raid on Cabanatuan #8
  5. GEN: Bataan, again. (2)
  6. INF: USN Chronology 04-02-95
  7. VE/VJ Day Celebrations, Commemorations in England
  8. VET: Los ALamos S.E.D reunion?
  9. What If? (4)
 10. Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory (9)
 11. Intelligence on Tirpitz
 12. Aggressive war
 13. Das Boot
 14. Women's WWII Literature
 15. Tactics (?) Assurance of ...
 16. INF: 50 Years Ago - 02-APR-1945
 17. WWII flicks
 18. Hitler's Body
 19. Re[2]: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory (2)
 20. Tactics (?) Assurance (2)
 21. Polish forces in the RAF during the Battle of Britain.
 22. Raid on Cabanatuan #9

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 00:53:01 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: LORD LOVAT  D-DAY COMM

On receipt of the news of Lord Lovat's death, it is appropriate to play the
pipe tune, "Lord Lovat's Lament." Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 00:55:07 -0500
From:    Ben Frank <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 YEARS AGO - 01

John, you are so accurate, it pains me to tell you that the 5th Marine Division
was not part of the III Amphibious Corps, but the V Amphibious Corps and had
just recently finished the battle of Iwo Jima. Cheers, Ben Frank

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 1 Apr 1995 22:15:27 -0800
From:    Ed Kettler <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Paul H. Silverstone

You wrote:

>
>On Thu, 30 Mar 1995, Ed Kettler wrote:
>
>> You wrote:
>>
>>
>> >     Are you *the* Paul H. Silverstone, who authored/compiled
>> >U.S. WARSHIPS OF WORLD WAR II, the exhaustive little handbook
>> >that is running for upwards of $40 in the out-of-print catalogs,
>> >now?
>> >
>> The US Naval Institute reprinted this book a few years ago, so it may
be
>> still in print/available.  I wish someone would reprint the rest of
the
>> series.  I am beginning to think I'm funding Q. M. Dabney's
retirement
>> fund buying those books <BWG>.
>>
>> Ed Kettler
>> [email-masked]
>>
>I have tried to persuade the Naval Institute to publish a new and
revised
>series of the World War II and World War I (New Navy) books in an
>expanded format but no go.  The reprint a few years ago of the WWII
book
>contained an errata and addenda list but there is much new information
>and new pictures which could go into an expanded new book.  They don't
>think there is any demand for such a book.
>Paul Silverstone
>
>
Paul,

That's too bad.  I always found the series very useful.  Larry Bond,
Chris Carlson and I recently released a WW II naval miniatures wargame,
Command at Sea, and I had your book close by at all times.  I also have
the German and Japnese volumes, plus the British and Commonwealth book
is en route from Dabney.  Too bad about USNI; maybe if they'd gotten
started around 1989 we could have had the series redone by this year.
Sigh.

Ed

------------------------------

Date:    Sat, 1 Apr 1995 23:05:19 -0800
From:    James Wilson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Raid on Cabanatuan #8

INSTALLMENT EIGHT IN A SERIES

Raid on Cabanatuan
a scenario of the published book
"Raid on Cabanatuan"
by Forrest Bryant Johnson
(C) 1988 A Thousand Autumns Press
all rights reserved
REPRODUCED ELECTRONICALLY WITH PERMISSION
4/1/95

January 9, 1945.
-----------------
MacArthur's army lands on the west coast of Luzon and fights toward
manila.

At POW Camp Cabanatuan, the garrison force evacuates to retreat north,
leaving only a few guards who are too sick to travel. The allied POW's
grab the chance to break into the Japanese side and steal food. The
daring theft yields the first meal of meat in 1,120 days. But, more
Japanese troops, evacuating the big cities, arrive at the camp bringing
the total guard strength to a little over 100 men, thus ending the POWs'
chance to steal food.

--- TO BE CONTINUED ---
(For info on obtaining a copy of the Book and/or scenario, E-Mail:
Jim Wilson :  [email-masked])

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 01:59:42 -0600
From:    "Robert J. Granvin" <[email-masked]>
Subject: GEN: Bataan, again.

I admit, I haven't followed the discussion on the Bataan Death March all
that closely, nor have I really watched any of the discussions as to whether
it was a wise military move or not.  Jeff, a recent member to the list, was
also at the banquet (heck, the signed the check that I countersigned :-), so
perhaps he has some thoughts and recollections to add to this... I didn't
take notes and wish I had...

However, this evening, we had a guest speaker at our annual Awards Banquet.
Our planned speaker for the evening couldn't attend and arranged for a last
minute replacement.  This was in the form of Mr. Philip Brain, currently of
Edina, MN.  He survived the Bataan Death March and 3.5 years as a Japanese
POW.  Jeff Keopp, a recent member to the list, was also at the banquet (heck,
he signed the check that I countersigned :-), so perhaps he has some thoughts
and recollections to add to this... I didn't take notes and wish I had...

His talk was very emotional... Room stayed painfully silent ... Even
those who really had "to go" never left until he was finished.  He had to
stop several times to collect his thoughts and at least a few times -- his
composure.  I was told that he spent most of his post-war life trying to come
to terms with his experience and only recently found the strength to talk
publicly about them.  That battle was clearly evident in his presentation.

He started by telling us how he found himself in the Phillippines, near Clark
Field in September of 1941.  On December 8th (local time), they got word that
the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor.  He was in a tank batallion and
everyone was ordered to take up positions and defend against an anticipated
Japanese paratroop attack.  However, since the U.S. had not as of that time
yet declared war on the Japanese nation, they were ordered to defend -- but
not to fire.  An interesting predicament indeed!!

Every aircraft at Clark Field was in the air, with the exception of the three
bamboo P-40s at the end of the field.  Sometime along the way, everyone was
essentially "recalled" with the claims that there were no Japanese aircraft in
the air.  Somehow, they managed to convince the commanding officer to let them
stay put because they just didn't believe it.  They then heard that every
aircraft at Clark had been destroyed.  But they knew they were in the air, so
perhaps it was the dummies.  When they got back, they found that all the
aircraft had been recalled and lined up so very nicely for the two flights of
27 Japanese bombers who systematically wiped them out -- except for the three
bamboo P-40s, which were untouched.

The retreating battle got them into Bataan.  He said the order was WP6 (War
Plan 6), which he felt should have been WP6WF (Without Food).

Almost immediately, they were reduced to two meals per day.  At the time of
surrender, they were down to one meal per day.  He made it clear that most
people were in no condition to effect a successful fight.  He said that the
lack of food was taking such a physical toll that if you stood up too fast,
the instant onset of dizziness would make you collapse.  These were not
effective combat soldiers.

Most of these 12,000 men were on the Phillippines or in Bataan prior to the
attack on Pearl Harbor.  Neither they, nor the U.S., had any real experience
of knowledge of Japanese POW treatment -- at least not treatment of American
POWs.  There was no comparison to base a decision on.  At this point, the
trust was probably put in the Japanese word of honor... Or at least their
word.

Air cover was non-existent.  They were harassed by Japanese bombers by day --
every day -- and by artillery at night.  No sleep, no peace, no food, no
supplies and no likelihood of relief or rescue led to only a couple of options.
Surrender and (in theory and all belief) survive or fight ineffectively and
be slaughtered.  He didn't quite word things in that way, but you could read
the emotions in the recollection of the decision making process.

I know that there are also people here who disagree with surrender, either in
general or in this case, but at least for a good portion of the force, a
picture was painted this evening that made it clear that fighting was a poor
option, perhaps, maybe even certainly, a guaranteed disaster or slaughter.

The next half hour were the most riveting and difficult things I have listened
to in a long while...

He talked about the march itself... If you were too weak to continue, you were
bayonetted or shot.  They were stripped of everything he had immediately.
Phil was left with a canteen (which was also his pillow for the next 3.5 years)
and the lid from a mess kit.  The Japanese would rest the group by artesian
springs.  They told them that if anyone tried to get water from these springs,
they would be shot.  Many people tried to make a dash for the springs and get
back.  He said that after a while, the bodies that choked the springs made it
impossible to even try and dash for it.

Part of the transport included being transported in steel box cars.  They
were packed so dense that when POWs died en-route, and many did, they couldn't
fall.  They stayed standing until the doors opened and they were let out at
their next stop.

At this stop, they heard some locals yelling to the prisoners... If they had
any Japanese currency on them, get rid of it!  At first, they figured this
was just some locals trying to get cash off of them.  But then he saw two
prisoners found with Japanese currency.  They were forced to kneel, were
beheaded and their heads placed on stakes for all to see.

He spoke of one of three POW ships he was on.  Like the box cars, there was
no room to sit or lie down.  One bucket left near the gangway was supposed to
be used as a latrine, but you couldn't get to it.  As prisoners died, their
bodies were passed overhead, out to the deck and thrown overboard.  Eventually
enough prisoners died to where they had room to sit down.  By the end of the
war, he had been on three POW ships.

In the camps, they would lose 50-60 prisoners per night.  Dysentery and
malaria were the biggest problems as well as malnutrition and overwork.
If you worked, you lived.  When you couldn't work anymore, you were shot
or bayonnetted.  Much of the time the work details dug two trenches -- one
for a latrine, one for burials.  He said they never were able to keep up
with either.  The burial trenches were the worst, of course.  Bodies would
be stacked every morning.  The rainy season was the worst, as the rain would
wash away the layer of dirt placed on the previous batch of burials.

One of Phil's details was working on a bridge reconstruction crew.  By this
time, he was down to 95 pounds, but the job required varrying 96 pound bags
of concrete and preparing the mixture.  Eventually he couldn't do his job and
was put in the hospital shed.  One night he woke up to two Japanese officers,
looking at him.  One gave an order to the other -- "This is the next one to
die."  He immediately went to his CO to request reinstatement onto the work
details.

He spoke of a group of eight prisoners who had been granted permission to go
outside the gates to collect wild sweet potatoes.  They spent the day collecting
food and were always guarded by four Japanese soldiers.  When they returned to
the camp, a discussion with the camp guards and their guards occurred and then
the guards opened fire and killed all eight.

He spoke of a camp where each "cabin" (concrete floor and walls) held 50
prisoners.  By this time, clothing essentially consisted of a G-string and
nothing else.  No blankets, no nothing.  So the crews working in the rice
fields during the rains really had serious problems.

At this camp, rebels had somehow managed to rescue one prisoner from a work
party.  The camp CO ordered that the remaining 49 be executed.  The Allied
CO succeeded in getting that number reduced to 10.  Phil said we should all
be proud of those 10 -- every one refused a blind fold and held their
composure throughout the ideal.

He spoke of a work party that returned to camp late.  They were working in
the rice fields -- a party of about 1,000.  It was the rainy season, it was
cold and all they had were their minimal G-string things.  Phil was trying
to sneak to the hospital cabin to visit a friend who had had a _second_
amputation surgery (without anaesthetic in both cases) when he heard a noise
coming toward the camp -- he then saw the row of headlights of the returning
work party, coming about 2 hours late.  The sound was of the work party
singing "God Bless America."  (This was one of the times when Phil clearly
had to pause to clear his own eyes.)  This song had been started by one man
who was freezing and had kindof "balled himself up" to conserve warmth and
started humming the song.  A few people picked up on it and started singing
it.  By the time they got to camp, it had spread through all the trucks.

Undoubtedly this scared a lot of people... how would the Japanese finally
react?  The next day, he saw wheelbarrows being brought to the cabin which
housed the commanding American prisoner.  The Japanese CO brought the wheel-
barrows to the hut, saluted the American CO, ordered his men to leave and
went on.  The wheel barrow were filled with bananas, avocados and/or other
similar fruits.

Some 2.5 years have now passed and the Allied forces are moving closer and
closer.  They were now being shipped to Japan.  They knew this was the end
for them one way or another.  They were told -- if Japan itself were invaded,
every prisoner would be executed immediately.  Since they had no clue about
what was to come, the atomic bomb or even the existence of the B-29, they
really felt their days were numbered.  Japan _would_ be invaded and they
would be killed.   The only way they would survive -- maybe -- is if Japan
somehow won this war... And if they were, why were they moving all their
prisoners to Japan?

He was on the last ship to leave for the home islands that did not get
attacked by American subs... though they heard nearby depth charge attacks.

The ship that immediately followed them had 1,619 prisoners on board.  It was
torpedoed.  Those survivors were put on a second ship which was also
torpedoed.  A third ship was the home for those that survived and was also
torpedoed.  By this time, 175 of the 1,619 prisoners were still alive.

He was one of the POWs at Cabanatuan -- ironically, the subject of a recent
and current series of postings on the mailing list.

In Japan they worked a mine... 438 steps down and 438 steps back up.  There
were elevators of course -- just not for them.  At the end of the day, the
worst thing was climbing the stairs -- tired, exhausted and hungry.  The only
way you got through it was distracting yourself.  He did it by planning his
Thanksgiving dinner each day.

Then one day in August, they were sent back.  "No mines for you today."  They
knew something big had to happen.  Then they got the word...!  America has
surrendered!

Three days later they learned that Japan was the one that had actually
surrendered.  They were ordered to climb to the roofs and paint POW on the
roofs, which they did.

When the B-29s spotted the camp, they responded by dropping supplies, medicine
and food.  He mentioned that some chutes failed to open.  He also said that
most of the food went into big vats to make "B-29 Stew."

He came home on a hospital ship.  When he got home, his family had no idea
that he was coming home -- probably wasn't sure he was alive.  When he got
to the west coast and called home, he found that his mother had had a heart
attack and died in 1943 and his brother was killed in action in England,
flying for the Air Corp.  Coming home was painful, but he was home.

Throughout all of this presentation, I watched a few grown men get angry at
the mistreatment he and others endured ... But mostly, I saw a lot of misty-
eyed people of all ages.  When he finished, the standing ovation (which is
fairly rare in our group) was immediate, honest and substantial.  The silence
which followed was almost as painful.  Nobody knew what to say or do, so a
brief recess was called which allowed a Pee and Bar break and to catch your
breath.

But to come full circle, one can't justify the actions done based on the
experiences of one man... But while I didn't ask him personally whether he
felt -- at the time the orders were given -- that the surrender order was
proper, he presented a picture that made it unquestionable that there was
no alternatives.  They were beaten, hungry and had no hope.

In fact, he said that the first night after surrender was the best night of
sleep he had had in more than four months, because for the first time, they
were not being bombed or shelled constantly.

Was the order right or wrong?  The slaughter that followed is just plain, true
and complete brutality and crimes beyond belief.  But I was left with the
feeling that based on what was believed to be reality and what the true
situation was of the man in the field, surrender was the proper course of
action.  They had already met their objectives -- the bottle up enough
Japanese forces to screw up their schedule and the supplies made it impossible
to even feed their own troops adequately enough to keep them all _conscious_.

The debate over the order will probably continue forever.  But before an
order or decision is condemned, I've always felt it important to listen to
the stories of those that were there.  I've met very few and listened to the
story of only one.  But while in the past I've refused to make decision as
to right or wrong, now I'm forced to acknowledge the decision as being the
right one -- if all was as it was supposed to be.

(He also recalled the statement of one of the guards who said "We will beat
America, even if it takes 100 years!"  He made the comment that sometimes he
feels that after 50 years, they're halfway there... :-)

All I know for certain at this point is that we need to get this guy's story
on tape... Most incredible TRUE story of survival I've ever heard.  And the
debate over Bataan continues -- and for this guy, in Japan as a POW, the
debate over the atom bomb is just as close to the heart.  Atom bomb meant
the POWs survived at went home.  Invasion meant that the POWs were executed.
The atom bomb saved his life after all he had been through and survived, it
probably boiled down to that one sequence of events.

[I'm actually kinda glad our speaker-of-choice couldn't make it -- very
heavy stuff for an awards banquet, but YOW...]

--
Robert J. Granvin
Southern Minnesota Wing Confederate Air Force

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 04:00:17 PST
From:    "Keller, Theron P." <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: USN Chronology 04-02-95

UNITED STATES NAVY CHRONOLOGY
from:
//byrd.mu.wvnet.edu/pub/history/military/wwii/naval_chronology/chr4(4,5).txt

1945
04/02 Mon. Army forces supported by destroyers land on Sanga Sanga
           and Bangao Islands, Sulu Archipelago, P. I.
           Submarine HARDHEAD (SS-365) lays mines off Cape Kamao,
           Cochin China.
            United States naval vessels damaged:
             Destroyer SHAW (DD-373), by grounding, Leyte area, P. I.,
              09 d. 36'N., 123 d. 53'E.
             Destroyer FRANKS (DD-554), by collision, Okinawa area,
              25 d. 49'N., 130 d. 01'E.
             Destroyer PRICHETT (DD-561), by horizontal bomber,
              Okinawa area,
              27 d. 17'N., 127 d. 51'E.
             Destroyer BORIE (DD-704), by collision, Okinawa area,
              23 d. 36'N., 131 d. 40'E.
             Destroyer escort FOREMAN (DE-633), by dive bomber,
              Okinawa area,
              26 d. 10'N., 127 d. 11'E.
             Attack transport CHILTON (APA-38), by suicide plane,
              Okinawa area,
              25 d. 59'N., 127 d. 17'E.
             Attack transport HENRICO (APA-45), by suicide plane,
              Okinawa area,
              25 d. 59'N., 127 d. 17'E.
             Attack transport GOODHUE (APA-107), by suicide plane,
              Okinawa area,
              25 d. 56'N., 127 d. 17'E.
             Attack transport TELFAIR (APA-210), by suicide plane,
              Okinawa area,
              25 d. 56'N., 127 d. 17'E.
             Attack cargo ship LACERTA (AKA-29),
              accidentally by United States naval gunfire,
              Okinawa area,
              26 d. 21'N., 127 d. 43'E.
             LST 599, by suicide plane, Okinawa area,
              26 d. 10'N., 127 d. 16'E.
            Japanese naval vessels sunk:
             Coast defense vessel NO. 186, by carrier-based aircraft,
              Yellow Sea.
             Transport NO. 17, by carrier-based aircraft, Yellow Sea.

Information compiled by U.S. Navy Historians.  For more information,
contact the Naval Historical Center at (202) 433-3940.
Archived by: "Larry W. Jewell" <[email-masked]>
Posted by:
Theron P. Keller
Logicon, Inc.
Dahlgren, VA  22448 USA
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 08:26:06 -0400
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: INF: 50 YEARS AGO - 01

On Sun, 2 Apr 1995, Ben Frank wrote:

> John, you are so accurate, it pains me to tell you that the 5th Marine Division
> was not part of the III Amphibious Corps, but the V Amphibious Corps and had
> just recently finished the battle of Iwo Jima. Cheers, Ben Frank
>

Hum - my source has it cited incorrectly. I got this from "2194 Days" which
seems to pick up everything from the green book Chronology volume. I thought
it rather strange when I wrote this, for them to just come off the line (like
last week) and to go straight to Okinawa; but that is what the source said so
I included it. Thanks for pointing this out.

John

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 07:50:29 -0400
From:    Kevin Kamphaus <[email-masked]>
Subject: VE/VJ Day Celebrations, Commemorations in England

The following are VE/VJ days events scheduled in England this year, from
Historic Traveller Magazine May/June 1995, reprinted without permission.

All typos are mine, this is all the information given.

Ongoing Event: The Tank Museum Exhibition, Bovington, Dorset:
        An exhibition of WWII and events leading up to and including VE/VJ day
        on permanent display.

Through Aug. 31st: D-Day to Victory:
        The story of the landings in Normandy in June 1944 and the subsequent
        campaigns in Northwest Europe leading to the Allied Victory in May 1945.
        The Imperial War Museum.

March 17-November 27: London at War:
        An exhibition about London and Londoners at war told through photgraphs,
        film, sound recordings, documents and personal momentos. The Imperial
        War Museum.

April 7-October 1: The Channel Islands: Occupation and Liberation 1940-1945
        The story of the only part of the British Isles to be occupied in WWII
        with fascinating exhibits illustrating daily life and the privations
        suffered by the Islanders. The Imperial War Museum, London.

April 28-30: 1945 Re-lived, Kentwell Hall, Long Melford, Suffolk.
        The exhibition will take visitors back to the week before VE day when
        this medieval manor house was requisitioned as a transit camp for
        troops. A collection of weapons, including Sherman tanks and artillery,
        may be the largest of is type in Europe for VE Day celebrations.

May 4-9: VE Day Commemorations, Liverpool.
        A week long program of events takes place throughout the Merseyside
        area.

May 5-Sept 24: Trhe Nothe Fort, Weymouth:
        All season there is a special WWII exhibition. The Fort has permanent
        displays featuring military, naval and civilian life in Weymouth during
        WWII.

May 6: The World Choir -- 10,000 Male Voices at Wembley Stadium in Aid of the
       Royal British Legion.
        The World Choir is planning its fourth performance to mark VE day and
        will be donating the procceeds to the Legion.

May 7: Pathe New Gala at the Royal Albert Hall in Aid of the Royal British
       Legion.
        Pathe News is organizing a spectacular along the lines of the "Last
        Night of the Proms" which will feature stars of stage, screen and radio
        based on 1940's film footage.

May 7-21: Festival of Dover 1995.
        Various venues, Dover, Kent. The theme "memories" has been chosen to
        reflect the 50th anniversary of VE Day and subsequently the festival
        will adopt a 1940's style in presenting a varied program. Events planned
        include a dinner dance featuring a 40's style big band plus a special
        guest to commemerate VE day. Also gala night, fashion show, blitz
        evening. Events daily.

May-August: VE/VJ Day Festival.
        There will be talks, lectures, a film season, cookery demonstrations,
        music and dance,fashion shows, children's workshops, etc. The Imperial
        War Museum.

May-Sept.: Exhibition: 50th Anniversary of the End of WWII.
        Dover Museum, Dover, Kent.

May 8: VE Celebration and Flying Display.
        Museum of Army Flying, Middle Wallop, Hampshire.

May 8: The Royal British Legion-Celebrating 50 Years of Freedom.
        The Royal British Legion is planning to set up beacons and bonfires
        througout the UK and Europe, to be fired as a signal of peace, the theme
        of the event is "Lightup a Beacon in Europe".

May 8: National Trust Centenary.
        VE Day Photographic Exhibition. Lanhydrock House, Bodmin, Cornwall.

May 8: VE Day Celebrations, Plymouth.
        Variety of events throughout the day culminating in a fireworks display
        in the evening.

May 8: VE Day Celebrations at the Historic Dockyard, Chatham.
        1940's vehicle rally, marchpast, open-air evenings, 1940's concert with
        the Ray Macvay Band. Grand fireworks display plus(to be confirmed)
        memorial service, flypast and band retreat.

May 27-29: "Victory Show".
        A large cross section of military wartime vehicles made in the 50's and
        60's will be displayed with their equipment, at Southsea Common,
        Portsmouth, Hampshire.

July 12: "The Golden Gala" Evening, Royal Albert Hall, London.
        The historic and prestigious event of music and theater will offer a
        magnificent evening of memorable entertainment, bringing together a
        galaxy of stars from stage, screen, classical and popular music.  The
        evening will end with sevral hours of dancing. It is planned to have the
        show televised both nationally and internationally.

Aug 9-16: VJ Day Events at the Nothe Fort, Weymouth.
        Events include a Matchstick Fleet Exhibition, amateur radio broadcast
        to WWII Veterans Service and British Legion Parade of Standards and
        Remembrance Service.

Aug 12-13: Popham National Air Festival. Breamore, Hampshire.
        The events will include a celebration military convoy, a large street
        party, concerts, and a mass ascent of hot air baloons.

Aug 19-20: The sacrifice of war time civilians and veterans will be commemorated
        on August 19 and 20. There will be a government-sponsored parade in
        Westminster, a service in Hyde Park and services in other parts of the
        country. The parade will be the basis of "Tribute and Promise" which
        will raise awareness of the needs of the wartime generation.

Aug 19: End of WWII Commerations-"Tribute and Promise" Royal British Legion.
        It is planned to hold a service of Thanksgiving in Hyde Park to pay
        tribute to the wartime generation. Following this there will be a parade
        of ex-servicemen and women and civilians of that generation. In the
        afternoon there will be events in Hyde park including a drivepast of
        floats and military vehicles of the era, including a flypast.

Aug 20: VJ Day Commemorations.
        The city of Plymouth remembers the end of the War in the Pacific and
        WWII.

Sept. 3: Drumhead Service.
        Royal Navy Memorial, Southsea Common, Portsmouth, Hampshire. Flypast
        by Fleet Air Arm, Historic Flight.

Sept 19-26: GI Brides Reunion.
        Perth, Scotland.

Kevin Kamphaus
Electronic Systems Support Specialist.
G.E. Aircraft Engines
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 10:01:06 PDT
From:    Ray Downes <[email-masked]>
Subject: VET: Los ALamos S.E.D reunion?

Hello all -

I'm tring to find out if there's to be a Los Alamos S.E.D (Special Engineering
Detachment) 50th reunion, perhaps at Los Alamos or at the Trinity Site
(which I've heard will be open July 16 (5:00am till 11:00am)).

Aside, there's an interesting S.E.D. related WWW page at
http://bang.lanl.gov/video/history/lanl50th/10-29-93.html
__
Ray Downes, [email-masked], (919) 992-3314

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 10:12:21 EST
From:    Alan Wild <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: GEN: Bataan, again.

Thanks, Robert. I don't know what else to say. Freedom is still the only
way to go, IMHO. One curious note,...

They seemed to have been rewarded for their patrotism/spirit in singing
God Bless America,... 'Gives one a curious glimpse into the Japanese
value system. A man who commands dignity is respected.

Alan

Alan Wild, Sr. Prog/Analyst
ACC - Lippitt - URI
Kingston, RI  02881

American Legion, Post 102
I am the NRA.

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 15:05:00 UTC
From:    "Edward S. Miller" <[email-masked]>
Subject: What If?

Kelvin Luther speculated:

  >         Finally I wonder if a protracted war would have in the end
  > precipitated a nuclear exchange.  The German A-bomb project was set back
  > by a miscalculation with regards to the efficiency of graphite in
  > controlling fission.  The Germans turned to heavy water which they were
  > unabable to produce enough of.  Once the miscalculation was discovered
  > they were back on track.  The most important point I am interested in
  > hearing views on is what use the U.S. could have or would have made of
  > the A-bomb vs. two major enemies not yet at the verge of defeat.  Would
  > use of the bomb been postponed until a larger stockpile could have been
  > built up?  Would it have been used to create an armistice?  Would a
  > delay  in its use have allowed the Germans to catch up and if so what
  > implications?  Perhaps a limited exchange and then an armistice?

  Unconditional surrender was the only plausible political goal of a war
against the Nazis, an unprecedentedly vicious regime with an ultimate goal
of depopulation enslavement of the rest of Europe.  (The Holocaust was
merely the beginning--later plans called for razing Moscow and Leningrad,
for example.)  This assumes Hitler alive, of course.
  The Germans were years away from an atomic bomb.  Heisenberg, who
dominated German physics, was sure that a bomb required up to 400 lbs of U-
235, according to his recent biographer. This was far beyond German
capabilities.  By 1945 the Germans had shifted to desultory work on a
reactor, not a bomb.  Anyway, an industrial enterprise of the size of Oak
Ridge or Hanford and related power grid could not have survived allied
bombing; separation plants could not have been dispersed like ordnance
factories. Conversely, the U.S. mobilized a superb team of scientists from
home and abroad.  They pursued both the uranium and plutonium bomb which
matured simultaneously.  The plants that were completely safe from attack.
There would have been nine US bombs, as I recall, by early 1946.
  Would we have used the bomb on Berlin?  You bet we would.  That was the
reason for the program in the first place.

Edward Miller  [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 10:25:22 -0500
From:    Drew Halevy <[email-masked]>
Subject: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

Hello all, I thought I would throw out a new question for the list. A
friend and I were discussing when did the war turn against the
Axis-specifically, when did those in Germany and Japan know, in thier
hearts of hearts, that they could not win this war. Some ideas that we
came up with were after Midway for Japan and December of 1942 for the
Germans. I realize that both Japan and Germany had the capicity (and
will) to fight, but they simply lacked the means to win (spread to thin,
lack of supplies, American industry approaching capicity, etc) Any
feelings from other list members, esp. disagreement? I would love to hear
your arguements for different dates.-thanks-Drew

Drew Philip Halevy      |
Grad Student            | Go tell the Spartans, thou who passest by,
Department of History   | That here obedient to their laws we lie.
University of Arkansas  |    Simonides c. 556-468 b.c.
[email-masked]   |

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 08:53:03 -0700
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

>From:         Drew Halevy <[email-masked]>
>Subject:      Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory
>
>Hello all, I thought I would throw out a new question for the list. A
>friend and I were discussing when did the war turn against the
>Axis-specifically, when did those in Germany and Japan know, in thier
>hearts of hearts, that they could not win this war. Some ideas that we
>came up with were after Midway for Japan and December of 1942 for the
>Germans. I realize that both Japan and Germany had the capicity (and
>will) to fight, but they simply lacked the means to win (spread to thin,
>lack of supplies, American industry approaching capicity, etc) Any
>feelings from other list members, esp. disagreement? I would love to hear
>your arguements for different dates.-thanks-Drew
>

Drew,

The Air Force asked Japanese leaders and officials that exact question.
There is a 1946 vintage study in our library that I checked out during
the "Should we invaded Japan discussion" where various Japanese explain
when they knew the war was lost.  I don't recall that many saw Midway as
the point, but I do know that Genda or Fuchida thought it was.  Most of
them knew for an absolute certainty that after Tinian and Siapan all was
lost.

John Riegsecker
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of Puget Sound

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 09:07:45 -0700
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

>>Hello all, I thought I would throw out a new question for the list. A
>>friend and I were discussing when did the war turn against the
>>Axis-specifically, when did those in Germany and Japan know, in thier
>>hearts of hearts, that they could not win this war. Some ideas that we
>>came up with were after Midway for Japan and December of 1942 for the
>>Germans. I realize that both Japan and Germany had the capicity (and
>>will) to fight, but they simply lacked the means to win (spread to thin,
>>lack of supplies, American industry approaching capicity, etc) Any
>>feelings from other list members, esp. disagreement? I would love to hear
>>your arguements for different dates.-thanks-Drew
>>
>
>Drew,
>
>The Air Force asked Japanese leaders and officials that exact question.
>There is a 1946 vintage study in our library that I checked out during
>the "Should we invaded Japan discussion" where various Japanese explain
>when they knew the war was lost.  I don't recall that many saw Midway as
>the point, but I do know that Genda or Fuchida thought it was.  Most of
>them knew for an absolute certainty that after Tinian and Siapan all was
>lost.
>

Through the miracle of online systems here are the references.  You can
see what many of the Japanese were thinking from these two books.  (At
least as interpreted by the Army Air Forces)

 AUTHOR       United States. Army Air Forces.
 TITLE        Mission accomplished; interrogations of Japanese industrial,
                military, and civil leaders of World War II.
 PUB INFO     Washington, U.S. Govt. print. off., 1946.
 PHYS DESC    vi, 110 p. 26 x 20 cm.
 SUBJECTS     World War, 1939-1945 --Japan.
              World War, 1939-1945 --Pacific Ocean.
 NOTES        On cover: Prepared by Assistant chief of air staff--intelligence,
                headquarters Army Air Forces.

 AUTHOR       United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
 TITLE        Japan's struggle to end the war. Chairman's office, 1 July 1946.
 PUB INFO     [Washington, U.S. Govt. print. off., 1946]
 PHYS DESC    v, 36 p. incl. tables. 26 x 20 cm.
 SUBJECTS     World War, 1939-1945 --Japan.
              Japan --Politics and government --1912-1945.
 SERIES       United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Reports. Pacific war ; 2.
 NOTES        "Biographies of Japanese leaders": p. 23-36.

John Riegsecker
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of Puget Sound

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 11:52:11 -0500
From:    Drew Halevy <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

Thanks for the info-I will try and find these two books in the UA
library. An unrealted question- did Genda have a role in the post-war
Japanese military?-Drew

Drew Philip Halevy      |
Grad Student            | Go tell the Spartans, thou who passest by,
Department of History   | That here obedient to their laws we lie.
University of Arkansas  |    Simonides c. 556-468 b.c.
[email-masked]   |
>  AUTHOR       United States. Army Air Forces.
>  TITLE        Mission accomplished; interrogations of Japanese industrial,
>                 military, and civil leaders of World War II.
>  PUB INFO     Washington, U.S. Govt. print. off., 1946.
>  PHYS DESC    vi, 110 p. 26 x 20 cm.
>  SUBJECTS     World War, 1939-1945 --Japan.
>               World War, 1939-1945 --Pacific Ocean.
>  NOTES        On cover: Prepared by Assistant chief of air staff--intelligence,
>                 headquarters Army Air Forces.
>
>  AUTHOR       United States Strategic Bombing Survey.
>  TITLE        Japan's struggle to end the war. Chairman's office, 1 July 1946.
>  PUB INFO     [Washington, U.S. Govt. print. off., 1946]
>  PHYS DESC    v, 36 p. incl. tables. 26 x 20 cm.
>  SUBJECTS     World War, 1939-1945 --Japan.
>               Japan --Politics and government --1912-1945.
>  SERIES       United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Reports. Pacific war ; 2.
>  NOTES        "Biographies of Japanese leaders": p. 23-36.
>
>
> John Riegsecker
> Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
> University of Puget Sound
>
> [email-masked]
>

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 10:58:10 -0700
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

>From:         Drew Halevy <[email-masked]>
>Subject:      Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

>Thanks for the info-I will try and find these two books in the UA
>library. An unrealted question- did Genda have a role in the post-war
>Japanese military?-Drew
>

He became a General and Chief of Staff of the Japanese Air Defence
Force.

John Riegsecker
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of Puget Sound

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 11:17:35 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

>Hello all, I thought I would throw out a new question for the list. A
>friend and I were discussing when did the war turn against the
>Axis-specifically, when did those in Germany and Japan know, in thier
>hearts of hearts, that they could not win this war. Some ideas that we
>came up with were after Midway for Japan and December of 1942 for the
>Germans. I realize that both Japan and Germany had the capicity (and
>will) to fight, but they simply lacked the means to win (spread to thin,
>lack of supplies, American industry approaching capicity, etc) Any
>feelings from other list members, esp. disagreement? I would love to hear
>your arguements for different dates.-thanks-Drew
>
>
Drew,
I think a lot has to do with "How much they knew" - most Japanese were not
told of the loss of four carriers at Midway, likewise, the average German
was not aware of much beyond what he could personally see. A few high
ranking officials who had access to "the truth" [whatever that is] could
see what was coming. As early as 26 March, '42. Churchill is supposed to
have said "It now seems very likely that we and our Allies cannot lose this
war...except through our own fault" [from WORLD WAR II ALMANAC
1931-1945;pg 209; by Robert Goralski]. I am sure people like Adm Canaris,
Adm Yamamoto and others with both information and clear heads, could see
what was "likely", to use Churchills word.

Jim O'Neil   Indecision is the cornerstone of Military Flexibility

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 14:55:10 -0400
From:    Jodi Berls <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Intelligence on Tirpitz

Robert T. Moore wrote:

>The British, for obvious
reasons, were most fearful that that ship would get out into the open
seas to threaten convoys, which were vital to their existence.

Goodness, my original message must have been floating around for quite a
while! Anyway, thanks for your reply. I have been trying to find out whether
the Allies had any hard evidence as to *when* the *Tirpitz* might be moved,
and everything I've located so far, including your post, seems to indicate
that they didn't. That's not the answer I was expecting, but it seems to be
the right one.

Thanks again.

Jodi Berls
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 14:55:21 -0400
From:    Jodi Berls <[email-masked]>
Subject: Aggressive war

Robert T. Moore wrote:

>Accusing some one of waging an agressive war is a term used to label
an agressor who initiates the conflict...

Right. I was having trouble equating the phrase "aggressive war" with the
phrase "war of aggression." I later found an excerpt from the document
defining war crimes for the Nuremburg Tribunal--which, incidentally, never
uses the phrase "aggressive war," but rather defines the crime as "waging a
war of aggression." For some reason, this phrasing makes better sense to me.
I don't know why. Brainlock, maybe.

Thanks.

Jodi Berls
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 14:56:55 -0400
From:    Jodi Berls <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Das Boot

Julie Jenkins wrote:

>And you go to the library and look at the book and realize that it was
published in the 60s by a Uboat man who survived and think about the
statistic that ended the movie & wonder, how DID he sur-
vive?

It's a little strong to call Lothar-Gunther Buchheim a U-boatman. He was a
naval officer but served aboard submarines primarily as a war correspondent.
Which may also explain in part how he survived--he didn't keep going back out
in the boats patrol after patrol. And the bulk of the experiences from which
he wrote *Das Boot* occurred in late 1941--before the tide had really turned
against the U-boats. (Not to say it wasn't dangerous in '41, only that it got
a lot more so later.)

Jodi Berls
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 15:15:18 EDT
From:    Mary Hricko <[email-masked]>
Subject: Women's WWII Literature

Hello everyone,
 Myself and another colleague are working on a book project concerning
Women's War Literature. I am responsible for the section on WWII and
would like to ask your assistance for names of writers I can include. I
am interested in the following material:
1) Any fictional works  (novels, short stories, poetry)
2) Any nonfiction collections (essays, diaries, letters)
3) Cartoons by women or cartoons that have women caricatures related somehow
   to WWII (So far, I've found some interesting HomeFront cartoons...)
4) Autobiographies/Biographies about or by women regarding WWII
5) Any materials from women war correspondents

In addition, if anyone can provide any additional resources I may consult
to assist me with my search, please send me email at: [email-masked]
                  Thanks...
                            Regards, Mary

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 15:30:53 EST
From:    "OConnor, Christopher M" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

>From my reading(though limited) I would say that Midway and Leningrad
were the beginning of theend for the axis.  When tehy realized it is
difficult to say.  From what I understand, HItler didn't know it until
he killed himself at the very end-then again he was not always a great
military man.  I believe taht the JApanese new, but their society, as
you probaply know refuses to lose "face" and they had to continue to
fight to save their own respect.  THis is a terrible way to fight a war
but what can you say, war is war.
I think that you could also argue that the beginning of the end was
when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor instead of invading, as well as
not getting the Aircraft Carriers on 7 December, 1941.  Either of those
occurences could have concievably alterd the Pacific Theatre so much
that the Japanese could have won.  They had to know at that point that
things would not go their way.  I mean how unlucky can you be to have
a USN sub tender stop in the exact cove where you are going to refuel
your recon plane.(this is as I have read in Two of three publications on
Pearl). Of course hindsight is 20-20 but I think I would have felt, an
impending sense of doom if that occured to my first strike element.
Who knows, I could be completely off.
Sincerely, Chris
PS If any of the "factual" stuff I included is wrong, please let me
know, it is important to me.
>Hello all, I thought I would throw out a new question for the list. A
>friend and I were discussing when did the war turn against the
>Axis-specifically, when did those in Germany and Japan know, in thier
>hearts of hearts, that they could not win this war. Some ideas that we
>came up with were after Midway for Japan and December of 1942 for the
>Germans. I realize that both Japan and Germany had the capicity (and
>will) to fight, but they simply lacked the means to win (spread to thin,
>lack of supplies, American industry approaching capicity, etc) Any
>feelings from other list members, esp. disagreement? I would love to hear
>your arguements for different dates.-thanks-Drew
>
>
>Drew Philip Halevy      |
>Grad Student            | Go tell the Spartans, thou who passest by,
>Department of History   | That here obedient to their laws we lie.
>University of Arkansas  |    Simonides c. 556-468 b.c.
>[email-masked]   |

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 16:32:32 -0400
From:    Ron Charlton <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of ...

As I recall some notable Japanese commanders such as Yamamoto knew that in
the long run they could never win a war with the U. S.
Yamamoto somewhat reluctantly agreed to and planned the attack on Pearl
Harbor to buy time for the Japanese to expand in the Pacific then negotiate a
peace giving back some of what they conquered, but  still having gained
considerable territory and resources. Of course the Pearl Harbor attack was
to take place after, very soon after, but still after the declaration of war
was delivered.

 This brings to mind another question for speculation and discussion -- If
the formal declaration of war from the Japanese had  been delivered before
the attack on Pearl Harbor would the U.S. have settled for less than
unconditional surrender?  If so, then the Japanese strategy of conquest and
negotiated peace as described above makes some sense for the Japanese. The
whole thing seems to have blown up in their face when the Pearl Harbor attack
came before the declaration of war.

Ron Charlton

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 17:40:45 -0400
From:    Ron Charlton <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: What If?

Several of the topics listed in What If? are covered in some depth in
"Hitler's Mistakes" by Ronald Lewin, Morrow, 1984. This was the last work by
Ronald Lewin, published after his death.

>From the book jacket:
How Hitler divided responsibility among his minions, thereby producing a
system with inbuilt inefficiency.

How Hitler treated the Church, the Jews, and the "lesser breeds without the
law" and subjected them to his tyranny and how the course of the war might
have been if any of these issues had been handled more wisely.

How the German High Command began to fall apart as the once mighty dictator
gradually lost his power of logical reasoning.

Nor does Lewin duck the inevitable question: If Hitler was incompetent, why
did it take the Allies nearly six years to achieve his downfall?

Thanks for the questions. You have forced me to dust off Lewin's book and
read it again.

Ron Charlton

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 17:40:54 -0400
From:    Ron Charlton <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: What If?

Oh Boy! You have me going on these What If? questions.

Another book with some interesting ideas. - "Hitler: The Victory That Nearly
Was" by Bruce Quarrie, David & Charles Military Books, 1988.

>From the book jacket again:
"What would have happened if . . . Hitler hadn't invaded Russia and divided
his offence; . . . Malta had been captured; . . . Rommel had been given the
troops he needed for the successful invasion of Africa?' These types of
questions have been asked since the outcome of the Second World War in 1945.

Now, for the first time, this book assesses the situations which could have
affected the course of history had Hitler made the correct decisions. . .
.Alternatives are presented that outline the battle movements and strategies
that would have led to victory had they been followed.

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 17:40:56 -0400
From:    Ron Charlton <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: What If?

One interesting bit of speculation concerns Hitler not invading Russia when
he did and fully supplying Rommel to enable him to capture the Suez Canal.
>From there German forces could have blocked allied shipping through the
canal, moved into the rich oilfields of the mid-east and Persian Gulf (there
were militant anti-British groups in Iraq), and then attacked Russia from
both the south and the west. However, Herr Adolf was more concerned with
exterminating what he considered to be Slavic sub-humans rather than winning
the war. Look what happened in the Ukraine where the Germans were hailed as
liberators from communism until the SS death squads were sent in and drove
the Ukraine back into the arms of the Soviets.

One allied general was supposed to have said that Hitler was one of the
allies' greatest assets in winning the war. Don't know if some general really
said it but it sounds good.

Ron Charlton

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 18:14:39 EDT
From:    John Davis <[email-masked]>
Subject: INF: 50 Years Ago - 02-APR-1945

On 02-APR-1945, the following occurred -

World War II - The Battlefronts
-------------------------------
Western Front - In the British 2nd Army sector, the XII Corps reaches the
Dortmund-Ems canal at Rheine. The VIII Corps continues advancing on
Osnaburck. The XIII Corps takes Munster. In the U.S. 1st Army sector, the
3rd Armoured Division consolidates its positions at Paderborn. The 80th
Division reaches the edge of Kassel. In the 7th Army sector, the XV Corps
is still unsuccessfull in their attacks agains Aschaffenberg.

Eastern Front - The 2nd Ukraine Front captures Mosonmagyarovar.

Italian Front - Operation Roast continues, with the V Corps establishing a
bridgehead west of Comacchio.

Philippines - In the XIV Corps area, the 1st Cavalry Division reaches San
Pablo. On Negros Island the 185th Infantry captures Talisay. Intense
fighting is taking place on Cebu Island on Bolo Ridge.

Okinawa - The advance north is happening easier than anticipated. The 6th
Marine Division occupies the peninsula northwest of Hagushi. Considerable
progress has been made in the east with the 7th Division reaching the east
coast in Nagagusuku Bay, cutting the island in two. On the first day, U.S.
losses have been surprisingly low with 28 dead, 27 missing and 104 wounded.

=============================================================================

Sources: "United States Army in World War II, Chronology 1941-1945" compiled
by Mary H. Williams, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of
the Army, "2194 Days of War" by Cesare Salmaggi and Alfredo Pallavisimi,
"Facts On File Yearbook 1945, Person's Index Of World Events" edited by R.L.
Lapica.

Copyright 1995 by John B Davis, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

Previous articles are archived at ftp.webcom.com in directory /pub/jbd/www
and can be accessed via the WWW by URL: http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/ww2.html.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Davis                           |                      [email-masked]
Cary, North Carolina                 |            http://www.webcom.com/~jbd/
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 15:55:13 -0700
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

>From:         "OConnor, Christopher M" <[email-masked]>
>Subject:      Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

[...]

>I think that you could also argue that the beginning of the end was
>when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor instead of invading, as well as
>not getting the Aircraft Carriers on 7 December, 1941.  Either of those
>occurences could have concievably alterd the Pacific Theatre so much
>that the Japanese could have won.  They had to know at that point that
>things would not go their way.  I mean how unlucky can you be to have
>a USN sub tender stop in the exact cove where you are going to refuel
>your recon plane.(this is as I have read in Two of three publications on
>Pearl). Of course hindsight is 20-20 but I think I would have felt, an
>impending sense of doom if that occured to my first strike element.
>Who knows, I could be completely off.
>Sincerely, Chris
>PS If any of the "factual" stuff I included is wrong, please let me
>know, it is important to me.

The cove was French Frigate Shoals, and I think you have this confused
with Midway, at least I have never heard of this incident regarding
Pearl Harbor.  I'm not sure it was just luck the seaplane tenders
Thorton and Ballard were there.

John Riegsecker
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of Puget Sound

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 18:58:38 -0400
From:    Chuck McCormick <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: WWII flicks

Speaking of OPEN CITY, I saw a film recently called 'The Scarlet and the
Black'.  It is supposed to be based on a true story of an Irish priest
who worked at the Vatican who sheltered escaped allied PWs and others in
the months before Rome fell.  I thought it was a nice little movie.

Chuck McCormick
[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 20:01:19 -0400
From:    Ron Charlton <[email-masked]>
Subject: Hitler's Body

>From my English friend --

there are rumors that the German magazine Der Spiegel will be publishing an ar
ticle confirming that the Russians had Hitler's body but destroyed it.

There was a television program about a year ago(?) speculating on this, but
they couldn't cofirm it at the time.

If I get more on this I will post it.

Ron Charlton

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 20:04:59 EST
From:    "OConnor, Christopher M" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re[2]: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

I'm not sure werew I read it I did, but once again I could be
wrong.  I think that I am confused with  your statement about not
being accidental.  Are you saying that they were there because
the US had previous knowledge of the attack on Pearl.  Also what do
you think about the theory of invasion vs. just bombing.
Thanks fro the not Chris
>>From:         "OConnor, Christopher M" <[email-masked]>
>>Subject:      Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory
>
>[...]
>
>>I think that you could also argue that the beginning of the end was
>>when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor instead of invading, as well as
>>not getting the Aircraft Carriers on 7 December, 1941.  Either of those
>>occurences could have concievably alterd the Pacific Theatre so much
>>that the Japanese could have won.  They had to know at that point that
>>things would not go their way.  I mean how unlucky can you be to have
>>a USN sub tender stop in the exact cove where you are going to refuel
>>your recon plane.(this is as I have read in Two of three publications on
>>Pearl). Of course hindsight is 20-20 but I think I would have felt, an
>>impending sense of doom if that occured to my first strike element.
>>Who knows, I could be completely off.
>>Sincerely, Chris
>>PS If any of the "factual" stuff I included is wrong, please let me
>>know, it is important to me.
>
>The cove was French Frigate Shoals, and I think you have this confused
>with Midway, at least I have never heard of this incident regarding
>Pearl Harbor.  I'm not sure it was just luck the seaplane tenders
>Thorton and Ballard were there.
>
>John Riegsecker
>Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
>University of Puget Sound
>
>[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 17:25:41 -0700
From:    Jim O'Neil <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

>The cove was French Frigate Shoals, and I think you have this confused
>with Midway, at least I have never heard of this incident regarding
>Pearl Harbor.  I'm not sure it was just luck the seaplane tenders
>Thorton and Ballard were there.
>
John,
I think you are correct, and it *was not* luck, it was MAGIC... as in the
US ability to read Japanese codes to varying extents, that put the AVDs
there.

Jim O'Neil   Indecision is the cornerstone of Military Flexibility

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 3 Apr 1995 01:10:00 UTC
From:    "Edward S. Miller" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactics (?) Assurance

  Everyone's confused about French Frigate Shoals.  It was an uninhabited
atoll with barely a few acres of dry land, located about 700 miles northwest
of Pearl Harbor (about midway to Midway).  It played no role whatsoever in
the December 7 attack.
  In March 1942 the Japanese sent a tanker submarine to the Shoals. Two
Emily long-range flying boats flew in from the Marshall Islands, refueled
from the sub, bombed Oahu at night, and returned to the Marshalls nonstop.
The bombs fell harmlessly into an extinct volcano crater.  This tipped off
the Americans.
  Japan next planned a similar reconn of Pearl Harbor on the eve of the
Midway operation about the end of May 1942.  Through ultra and the prior
experience the US became aware.  It sent a seaplane tender and landed some
marines at the Shoals. The Japanese sub hung around a couple of days,
reported their presence, and then left. The reconnaissance was aborted. Too
bad for Japan, because the flying boats would have seen Pearl Harbor empty.
The US carriers had already sailed for Midway.
  Incidentally, at the time a big problem was that US fighter planes lacked
the range to fly 1,000 miles from Pearl to Midway. After the Battle the navy
sent a dredge to French Frigate Shoals.  In a few months an islet big enough
for a fighter strip was created from lagoon-bottom sand.  From the air the
rectangular islet looked just like a carrier.  However, about that time some
bright individual invented the belly tank so fighters no longer needed the
intermediate landing.
  I believe the Shoals were maintained as a Coast Guard loran or weather
station long after the war.  It was a dangerous place in storms.

Edward Miller   [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 18:23:33 -0700
From:    John Riegsecker <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Re[2]: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory

>From:         "OConnor, Christopher M" <[email-masked]>
>Subject:      Re[2]: Tactics (?) Assurance of Victory
>
>I'm not sure werew I read it I did, but once again I could be
>wrong.  I think that I am confused with  your statement about not
>being accidental.  Are you saying that they were there because
>the US had previous knowledge of the attack on Pearl.  Also what do
>you think about the theory of invasion vs. just bombing.
>Thanks fro the not Chris

Chris,

If you review your sources, I think you will find it was Midway, not
Pearl,  We did know about Midway prior to the event.  As another person
on the list posted, it may have been MAGIC rather than LUCK, as we were
able to read some of the Japanese ciphers and codes.  As for invasion
vs. bombing, I'm not much for what if, but it's one thing to bomb,
another to invade, and something more to keep your troops there and
supplied.

John Riegsecker
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science
University of Puget Sound

[email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 3 Apr 1995 01:10:00 UTC
From:    "Edward S. Miller" <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Tactics (?) Assurance

Ron Charlton suggests:

  > If the formal declaration of war from the Japanese had  been delivered
  > before the attack on Pearl Harbor would the U.S. have settled for less
  > than  unconditional surrender?  If so, then the Japanese strategy of
  > conquest and  negotiated peace as described above makes some sense for
  > the Japanese. The  whole thing seems to have blown up in their face when
  > the Pearl Harbor attack  came before the declaration of war.

An hour or so of warning, as Japan intended to deliver through its
ambassadors in Washington, wouldn't have softened US rage.  The task force
sailed on November 28th.  Crossing into the eastern Pacific on December 3rd
was an act of war.  Unless Japan declared war several days in before the 7th
it would still have been percieved as launching an assault in peacetime
while we continued to negotiate.  Only a victory by an alerted US fleet
would have removed the stigma and perhaps allowed am end-game softer than
unconditional surrender.

Edward Miller   [email-masked]

------------------------------

Date:    Mon, 3 Apr 1995 09:33:39 +1000
From:    George PISZCZUK <[email-masked]>
Subject: Re: Polish forces in the RAF during the Battle of Britain.

>I was wondering if anyone could help with suggested materials for a paper
>I'm working on now.  It's about the Polish forces which managed to escape
>to Britain during the war and fight again for the Allies.  I'm trying to
>gather enough materials to concentrate entirely on the Poles who joined the
>RAF.  I'm also going to Europe in June, and would be interested in museums
>or records storage facilities anyone could suggest that I may visit to do
>research.  Unfortunately, I don't know Polish so any works will have to be
>in English.
>
>
>Thanks in advance,
>Micheal Whitaker
>[email-masked]
>

I have done some research in this area.

A good start is the ;

        POLISH AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION IN GREAT BRITAIN
        14 Collingham Gardens
        LONDON SW5 0HT

I have some other sources if you wish to contact me direct.

Tracing individuals can be a problem because names were changed to protect
families still in Poland.

George.

  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
  George Piszczuk                          Email: [email-masked]
  University of Newcastle                  Phone: (049) 215440
  Australia                                Fax  : (049) 216907
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------

Date:    Sun, 2 Apr 1995 20:51:55 -0700
From:    James Wilson <[email-masked]>
Subject: Raid on Cabanatuan #9

INSTALLMENT NINE IN A SERIES

Raid on Cabanatuan
a scenario of the published book
"Raid on Cabanatuan"
by Forrest Bryant Johnson
(C) 1988 A Thousand Autumns Press
all rights reserved
REPRODUCED ELECTRONICALLY WITH PERMISSION
4/2/95

January 25, 1945. (Night)
--------------------------

Imperial Japanese Army Battalion Commander Oyabu marches out of
Cabanatuan City with 800 men for a 25-mile journey to San Jose with
orders to engage the advancing Americans at that town. However, after
reaching the town, he receives new orders to return to Cabanatuan City,
but, to use a safer route to the east. Oyabu is a veteran of Japan's war
in China. - A realistic older soldier with concern for his troops who
are all newly arrived replacements lacking combat experience.

--- TO BE CONTINUED ---
(For info on obtaining a copy of the Book and/or scenario, E-Mail:
Jim Wilson :  [email-masked])

------------------------------

End of WWII-L Digest - 1 Apr 1995 to 2 Apr 1995
***********************************************