************************** BurmaNet ************************** "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies" ************************************************************** The BurmaNet News: Monday, January 23, 1995 Issue #99 Quote of the Day: "It would have been emotionally satisfying for about 15 minutes, but it wouldn't have been a very constructive engagement." An amused Australian commenting on the near- shooting by the Mon of the Thai businessman linked to the forced repatriation of Mon refugees. . ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Contents: *************************INSIDE BURMA************************* 1 AP: NOBEL LAUREATE STILL HELD 2 DAILY YOMIURI: DEADLINE FOR SUU KYI'S RELEASE 3 BKK POST: BURMA ENDS REGISTRATION OF RICE DEALERS **************************SHAN STATE************************** 4 NATION: U.S. CITIZENS NEED NOT FEAR THE MTA, ASSURES KHUN SA 5 NATION: SPECIAL ARMY FORCE TIGHTENS NOOSE ON KHUN SA'S EMPIRE ***************************THAILAND*************************** 6 BURMANET: XUWICHA'S FINGERPRINTS 7 BURMANET: THE SPORT OF KINGS 8 NATION [LETTER]: BURMESE SEEM TO BE SINGLED OUT ***************************MON STATE************************** 9 DVB: MON LEADER VIEWS FAILURE OF CEASE-FIRE TALKS WITH JUNTA *************************KAREN STATE************************* 10 NATION: KNU CLAIM SLORC INCITING RELIGIOUS SPLIT IN THAILAND ****************************REGION**************************** 11 ECONOMIST: CHINA LOGS ON TO THE INTERNET 12 AWSJ: ASIA'S DRUG WAR 13 REUTERS: BISHOPS SLAM ASIA FOR ``DEATH-DEALING" POLICIES 14 SEASIA-L ASIAN STUDIES ACROSS THE CURRICULUM ************************************************************** The BurmaNet News is an ********************************* electronic newspaper * * covering Burma. 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For a * vernedbytheru * free subscription to * leoflaw...Iam * the BurmaNet News, send * n ota frai * an e-mail message to: * d.. * * .D * strider@igc.apc.org * aw * * Au * Subscriptions are handled * ng * manually so please allow * San * for a delay before your * Su * request is fielded. * uK * Letters to the editor, * yi * comments or contributions * . * of articles should be ********************************* sent to the strider address as well. For those without e-mail, BurmaNet can be contacted by fax or snailmail. Tel/Fax: (in Thailand) (66)2 234-6674 By snailmail: Attention to BurmaNet, care of Burma Issues PO Box 1076, Silom Post Office, Bangkok 10504 Thailand By email: strider@igc.apc.org *************************INSIDE BURMA************************* AP: NOBEL LAUREATE STILL HELD January 21, 1995 RANGOON, Burma (AP) -- Despite speculation she would be freed when her latest sentence expired, opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest on Thursday. Burma's military junta has confined the Nobel Peace Prize winner to her house in Rangoon since July 20, 1989, under a law ``safeguarding the state from dangers of subversionists.'' It has repeatedly extended her confinement, with the latest six-month extension expiring Thursday. *************************INSIDE BURMA************************* DAILY YOMIURI: DEADLINE FOR SUU KYI'S RELEASE The Daily Yomiuri (Japan): January 20, 1995 Yangon (Kyodo) Expectations that opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi would be released in January vanished as the gate of her lake-side residence compound remained closed as usual when the six-month period of extended detention expired on Thursday. She was placed under house arrest on July 20, 1989 under a 1975 law to protect the state from "subversion." Her five-year detention period was to end on July 19, 1994. But she was told by the government in January 1994 that her detention had been extended to January 1995, the final date understood to be Jan. 19, 1995. Detention or restriction is extendible every six months for up to a total of three years. The law was amended in 1991 to extend the total detention period of five years. Last February, the deputy chief of Defense Sevices Intelligence, Col. Kyaw Win, said her detention period would be extended by a full year up to July 1995, for a total of six years. "The first year of her detention was regarded as the arrest period and the restriction periods under the law began the following year," he said. However, the general public and many foreign journalists believed she would be released in January. At least 15 foreign journalists are currently in Yangon to watch her release. *************************INSIDE BURMA************************* BKK POST: BURMA ENDS REGISTRATION OF RICE DEALERS Sunday, January 15, 1995 AFP, Rangoon THE BURMESE government has lifted regulations that required wholesale rice dealers to register with the Trade Minister, a move that will allow free trade in the country's main staple, an official newspaper said Friday. The Mirror daily said the movement would take affect "almost immediately." It was seen as an attempt to further liberalize the economy and to ensure the availability of rice and make it more affordable. Rice trading, a state monopoly under the former socialist government, was freed to some extent in 1987. But when government subsidies ended, prices began rising. Rice prices jumped in 1988 after the suppression of the pro-democracy movement here and the military take-over, and the government enacted the registration law for wholesalers in 1990 to control prices and end smuggling. **************************SHAN STATE************************** NATION: SPECIAL ARMY FORCE TIGHTENS NOOSE ON KHUN SA'S EMPIRE Friday, January 13, 1995 by Korkhet Chantalertluk THE THAI army has tightened the noose on the notorious empire of drug warlord Khun Sa thanks to the work of a special force set up last October. The so-called Naresuan Force, formed under the auspices of the army's Third Region Command on Oct 1, is said to be the most aggressive measure taken so far by the government against the head of the self-styled Shan State and marks a distinct hardening of Thai attitudes. It follows on from the recent joint Thai-US police crackdown that reportedly crippled Khun Sa's Thai network. The Naresuan Force, based in the Mae Rim district of Chiang Mai, patrols a 500- kilometre stretch of the Thai-Burmese border from Mae Hong Son's Muang district to Mae Sai district in Chiang Rai. Headed by Lt Gen Thanom Watcharaput, the force is designed to clamp down on cross-border movement of narcotics, weapons, food and logistical supplies to and from Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA). The Naresuan Force's range of operation covers areas opposite Burma's northeastern Shan Sate especially in the territory controlled by the MTA. The largely ethnic Shan Force has been fighting the decades-long guerrilla war with the Rangoon government. "The MTA controls the southern part of Shan State which forms part of the so-called Golden Triangle -- an area straddling the borders of Burma, Thailand and Laos. The Golden Triangle supplies much of the world's opium and heroin to international markets. Khun Sa, 60, is of mixed Chinese and Shan decent. He is said to command a force of about 20,000 ethnic Shan and has been conducting a sporadic, decades-long g uerrilla war with the Rangoon government. However, anti-narcotics agencies claim the MTA is more akin to a private army used by Khun Sa to safeguard his lucrative opium business than any force of idealistic separatists engaged in a struggle to obtain independence for ethnic Shan people. The formation of the Naresuan Force is one of the more visible results of a more determined stance by the Thai government to resolve long-standing problems occurring along its shared border with Burma -- problems that include illegal trafficking in drug and war weapons, cross-border raids and the influx of illegal immigrants. According to information released by the Third Region Command, the government has drawn up a revised policy on national security in relation to Burma. The 1994-1996 policy has four main objectives. * To help Burma be a good neighbour, with stability and development; * To improve ties and cooperation with Burma on economic, education and social aspects, on the basis of mutual benefits; * To erase suspicion and promote trust between the two countries; * To strengthen security along the Thai-Burmese border. "At first the army -- which was aiming to reduce the number of personnel -- did not approve of the force's formation," a senior official of the Naresuan Force said. "However, after being told about the need, the army endorsed the Third Region Command's proposal." The army's concern over contraband trade along the Thai-Burmese border and freq uent battles between Rangoon soldiers and minority forces also contributed to t he need for the setting up of the Naresuan Force. The formation of the force was seen as a serious attempt by the government to put pressure on Khun Sa. The force aimed to block drug trafficking into Thailand as well as the chemicals used for producing drug, food and medical supplies, and the arms trade. The powerful Burmese junta leader, Lt Gen Khin Nyunt, secretary of the Burmese State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), said last week Khun Sa and his army must be completely uprooted. Last year the Third Region Command decided to close down all border checkpoints in Mae Hong Son and Chiang Rai provinces, effectively curtailing food supplies and basic daily necessities heading towards Khun Sa's area. However, villagers were allowed to carry necessities into Burma for "humanitarian reasons". However, recent press reports said that the Third Region Command failed to comp ly with a directive two months ago by National Security Council (NSC) which demanded an "easing" of a regulations banning transport of food supplies into the Khun Sa-controlled area. A high-ranking official in the Third Region Command rejected the reports as gro undless. He said that neither the premier nor the NSC had instructed an easing of the rules concerning Khun Sa's forces. "The NSC merely said that the prime minister had instructed the Third Region Command to open new checkpoints to promote lawful trade along the borders. The command has cooperated with provincial authorities," the official said. "We recently opened a new trading spot in Mae Hong Son's Khun Yuam district, an d will soon open another in Chiang Mai's Chiang Dao district." However, there were reports that some officials at the Third Region Command were uneasy over an "unclear directive". "[In certain spots] there are problems about drugs, arms trade and security. The Burmese [government] forces could raid Khun Sa forces [near the Thai border] at any time. So how could we open checkpoints for the border trade," a source in the Third Region Command said. In late November, Thai anti-narcotics police in cooperation with the US drug en forcement agencies arrested 10 of Khun Sa's leading "lieutenants". "Their key men later approached the Third Region Command and asked us to negotiate with police for the release of their men. But we rejected their plea, and t old them to go back, otherwise we would also arrest them for illegally entering Thailand," the source said. ***************************THAILAND*************************** BURMANET: XUWICHA'S FINGERPRINTS January 23, 1995 There is an saying that "you can't keep a good man down." Neither, it seems, can you keep a bad one down. The previous article (about the Naresuan force in Thailand) bears the fingerprints of Thai businessman cum policy-maker Xuwicha Hiranyaprueck. Xuwicha, a close aid to and sometime proxy for Thai National Security Council chief Charan Kullawanich, has become visible again in Thai policy-making after a period of enforced hibernation. His currently focus is on "counter- narcotics" work, hence Naresuan force for which he is reportedly seeking American help in funding. Xuwicha's current focus on counter-narcotics seems somewhat ironic given the nature of some reports about Xuwicha's previous business transactions involving products from Laos. Xuwicha's reemergence is not entirely unwelcome as he tends to make crystal clear what is objectionable about Thailand's policy vis-a-vis Burma. It isn't so much his dubious counter-narcotics credentials but rather, his willingness to advance Thai foreign policy goals by putting refugees in harm's way. The Neresuan force, by way of example, has shown every bit as much prowess at turning away Shan refugees and escaped porters fleeing the Burmese army as it has against Khun Sa's men. At present, the Thai government is also quietly attempting to force relief agencies to stop giving food aid to an ABSDF camp near Prachuab Khiri Khan in southern Thailand, which is but one more in a series of attempts to force a general repatriation of exiled students to Burma. Xuwicha dropped out of sight after August 1994 after his growing name recognition became a liability for his boss, Gen. Charan. One instance of his outliving his usefulness came during a an attempt to pressure Mon rebels to sign a cease-fire. He helicoptered up to Pa Yaw refugee camp in August 1994 to demand that the refugees from Halockanie camp (which had recently been attacked by the Burmese army) return to Burma. Among the threats Xuwicha made then was to have New Mon State Party leader Naing Shwe Kyin and others arrested if they did not sign a cease-fire with the SLORC. Although Naing Shwe Kyin snubbed Xuwicha by refusing to meet with him face to face, the Mon leader did intervene to restrain one of his deputies who wanted to shoot the voluble Thai businessman. Of the incident, an Australian observer later quipped, "it would have been emotionally satisfying for about 15 minutes, but it wouldn't have been a very constructive engagement." One week after the Pa Yaw incident, the Mon broke off cease-fire talks with SLORC and a day later, announced they would blow up the Total/Unocal pipeline which SLORC proposes to run through Mon territory. ***************************THAILAND*************************** BURMANET: THE SPORT OF KINGS January 23, 1995 In their naming of the Naresuan force (see articles above), Thai officials seem to be engaging in a less than good-natured sport with the Burmese. The purpose of Naresuan is surely welcome to the SLORC: blockading Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army. But it is the name of the force that carries an unpleasant reminder for the Burmese. The force is named for King Naresuan of the early Thai kingdom of Ayuthaya, (b1555-d1605), who participated in an expedition against the Shan States in 1581. Naresuan is most remembered however, not for his battles against the Shan, but for killing the Burmese crown prince Minkyi-Zwa in the battle of Nong Sarai (1592), and for attacking the Burmese cities of Pegu and Toungoo. The SLORC has shown itself to be adept at the same sort of gamesmanship. In Tachilek, Shan State, the Burmese are putting up a statue of their King Bayinnaung. Bayinnaung first conquered the Shan States in 1556 and the gesture is, in part, an ungenerous reminder of that to Shans by SLORC. However, putting the statue in a border region facing towards Thailand is a gesture with a meaning that is probably not lost on the Thais-- Bayinnaung twice sacked the Thai kingdom of Ayuthaya. The first time (1564), Bayinnaung carried off the king as a hostage and after the Thais later rebelled, he sacked the city again (1569), taking very nearly everybody else back to Burma as slaves. ***************************THAILAND*************************** NATION [LETTER]: BURMESE SEEM TO BE SINGLED OUT Sunday, January 15, 1995 ON THE Jan 9 as I was seeing off a friend at Don Muang International Airport, I witnessed eight handcuffed Burmese accompanied by an Immigration Department officer being put on the plane to Singapore. My curiosity was aroused as I sensed that if they were criminals they should be deported back to Burma. On inquiring, I discovered that they were all legally staying in Bangkok at Ruamsirimit Apartment, Vipawadi Rangsit Road. On Dec 29, they were raided by the Immigration authorities, and even though all could produce their passports and visas, they were illegally detained without charge. To be candid one of them went personally and explained things to the higher immigration authorities as well as contacting the Burmese Embassy. But no action whatsoever was taken. The Burmese Embassy's explanation was that most of the overseas Burmese sympathize with the democratic aspirations, and hence should not reside in Thailand. It dawn upon me that the Immigration authorities were either working hand in glove with the SLORC or are outright corrupt. Perhaps the immigration authorities need something like a Saudi gem case to reveal their corruption or at least tangible proof that the Taw Maw is taking orders from the SLORC's representative at Bangkok. Will somebody clear this matter up for me, please. My-an-Mar Bangkok ***************************MON STATE************************** DVB: MON LEADER VIEWS FAILURE OF CEASE-FIRE TALKS WITH JUNTA Democratic Voice of Burma dvb@oslonett.no 8 January, 1994 [Translated by FBIS] ((Interview with Naing Shwe Kyin, chairman of the New Mon State Party, by unidentified Democratic Voice of Burma correspondent; place and date not given--recorded)) [Corresp]: Mr. Chairman, It has been learned that a meeting between the New Mon State Party (NMSP) adn the SLORC has come to an impasse. If it is true, why. [Kyin]: It is true that the cease-fire negotiations have become uncertain. We held the meeting witht he SLORC with the intention of achieving a cease-fire, and with both parties maintaining their positions. We will try to achieve and transform the regional cease-fire into a national one. We have particpated in various organizations, that is why [the SLORC should also meet with the National Democratic Front; the DAB, the Democratic Alliance of Burma; and the NCBU, the National Council of the Union of Burma. However, it does not watn to hold talks with these organizations. It only wants to talk with individual groups. SLORC officials have proposed that all of our members stay witin a five-mile perimeter. Moreover, they told us that we have to inform them whenever we leave the area and that we will have no right to leave the area with our weapons. It seems taht the SLORC wants us to continue talks after they put us in a restricted area. Their attitude is wrong. So we have decided not to continue with the talks. [Corresp]: It has been learned that the NMSP held a meeting due to pressure from many quarters. Is that the only reason? We would like to know if there are others. [Kyin]: Pressure was not the only thing. We responded to the SLORC's official overture because we need internal peace. The other reasons included the urging of the Thai National Security Council, and officers of the No. 9 Thai Local Regional Command; and the recent incident at the Halockkhani Mon refugee camp [where Mon refugees were forcibly repatriated to Burma by Thai officials]. We went because there was an opportunity to hold a meeting with the SLORC based on a real need for internal peace. The other reason we had was that we do not want the people to usee us as a weapons-wielding bloodthirsty group, which engages itself in illegal activities and does not want internal peace. We are always willing to hold talks if there is an opportunity for internal peace. [Corresp]: What are the differences between the NMSP and SLORC's basic stands? [Kyin]: Our NMSP's basic stand is to hold a meeting as a front, which includes the NSF, the DAB, and the NCUB. We want the SLORC to meet these front-like organisations for wide-ranging discussions. But the SLORC only wants to talk to individual groups. This means the division of democratic forces and ethnic natinal forces. We believe that effective internal peace cannot be built by holding talks with individual groups. The other thing we want is a round-table meeting between the SLORC and all the above-mentioned groups to discuss and coordinate politcal problems. It seems that the SLORC is only interested in purely military matters. A cease-fire is a purely military matter. The SLORC urged us to participate in the National Convention where political discussions are held as observers. It seems we have to give up our belief in armed struggle to attend the National Convention. We cannot accept this condition. [Corresp]: My last question for Mr. Chairman is what shoudl the stands be, so that a meeting can be held to end more than 40 years of civil war? [Kyin]: To end this civil war of more than 40 years, a situation has to be created that will allow both sides to eliminate the grudges, anger, and doubts against one another. Only then will it become easier to continue the talks. If talks are held while they still have grudges, then an effective peace can never be achieved. I think if the talks are held in the presence of a person or an organization trusted by the majority of the people-- that means an organization like the United Nations--then we can smoothly resolve the civil war that we are facing. *************************KAREN STATE************************* NATION: KNU CLAIM SLORC INCITING RELIGIOUS SPLIT IN THAILAND Saturday, January 14, 1995 by Yindee Lertcharoenchok ANTI-RANGOON ethnic Karen guerrillas have accused the Burmese junta of trying to drive a wedge between religious factions in Karen refugee camps in Thailand by sending infiltrators to stir up resentment. The Christian-led Karen National Union (KNU), the largest armed ethnic group wh ich is still refusing to enter into a peace dialogue with Rangoon, said the Bur mese ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was also trying to stir disunity based on religious differences within the Karen organization. The guerrillas said the plan was formulated during a morning meeting on Jan 2 of Burma Army's Southern Operation Command Chief Maj Gen Maung Hla and his 20-member entourage with a group of Karen Buddhist mutineers and monks, led by U Thu zana, a widely respected Buddhist clergyman among local Buddhist communities who was accused by the KNU of being a SLORC spy. The one-hour meeting took place at a Buddhist temple in Myaing Gyi Ngu on the e ast bank of the Salween River where the mutineers had established their headqua rters after defecting from the KNU to form a rival group called the Democratic Kayin (Karen) Buddhist Association. The closed-door discussions occurred amid tight security with two battalions of Burma Army's 44th Division standing on alert in nearby villages to provide protection. According to Padoh Mansha, a close aide of KNU leader Gen Bo Mya, Maung Hla and his team, who flew into Myaing Gyi Ngu from Rangoon, had urged the Karen mutineers to recruit more troops and the SLORC would support them with food, money and weapons. The Burmese operation chief also urged the mutineers to fight the KNU and to try to take over the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw, about 30 miles northeast of Myaing Gyi Ngu, said Mansha in an interview this week. "Gen Maung Hla told the mutineers that [if they capture the KNU headquarters] t hey would be allowed to occupy Manerplaw. He also promised them the Karen State , peace and development projects in the area," said Mansha. During the meeting, Maung Hla had urged the Buddhist monks and former refugees to travel to Karen camps in Thailand to encourage the refugees to return to life in SLORC-controlled areas in Burma. The monks were to create resentment throu gh "rumours" of KNU religious discrimination against Buddhist Karen civilians a nd KNU members, said Mansha. "The SLORC has promised to provide food for the returnees for one year," he said. Already five monks were sent to Mae Ta Waw, a former KNU camp on the Moei River which was captured by Burmese troops in 1989 and remains under their control, and that the group of clergymen intended to cross into Thai border camps "to create (religious) disturbance" according to Mansha. The KNU, meanwhile, was trying to explain and clarify the whole situation to it s members and refugees to avoid any misunderstandings, he added. In separate interviews this week, Thai authorities at the border have expressed "extreme concern" about the reports of infiltrations of instigators of religious unrest in refugee camps in Thailand. They feared that the "fragile and delicate" religious conflicts inside the KNU, which had resulted in armed clashes between the Christian-led KNU and a group of 25-300 Buddhist mutineers last month, would escalate and spill across the border. Mansha said the KNU had already obtained evidence to prove that the SLORC had a ssisted and supported the mutineers. He cited the incident on Jan 8 near Gan Nyi Naung, where eight mutineer were ki lled. "When we investigated the bodies closely, we found that they were in fact Burmese troops who joined with the "mutineers," he said. KNU forces also captu red seven or eight heavy weapons at the scene, mortars and heavy machine-guns. ****************************REGION**************************** ECONOMIST: CHINA LOGS ON TO THE INTERNET January 7, 1995 Beijing It is hard to guess which attributes of the Internet China's government might find most terrifying: its anarchic management syle, its organic growth or its ability to foster cheap, instananeious communication between millions of computer users worldwide. Yet China's first direct commercial links to the Internet have been approved by the government and are due to begin operation this month. Two dedicated lines, one from Beijing and the other from Shanghai, will allow anybody in China with a computer and a modem to tap directly into the full range of the Internet's resources. Jointly operated by Sprint, an American telecommunications company, and China's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, teh new lines are expected to be wildly popular. Sprint says it will probably need to expand the lines' capacity within a few months to accomodate expected growth in demand. The government's willingness to particpate seems to bea case of "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em". Attempts since the 1989 Tienanmen Square demonstrations to control channels of international communication have not been successful. Shortly after the demonstrations in 1989, the government tried to limit the spread of fax machines byregistering them. It failed. In 1993, Li Peng, the prime minister, announced a ban on the private use of satellite dishes capable of receiving foreign television broadcasts. Coming after hundreds of thousands of them had already been installed however, the bas was widely ignored. Small satellite dishes today remain a prominent feature of cityscapes throughout China. The government seems to have concluded that any effort to stilfe electronic communication via the Internet would likewise fail. All across China, computer specialists have already managed to engineer their own forms of indirect or partial access to the Internet. By organising a commercial link-up, the government can at least keep a better eye on what is going on--and make a profit on the traffic at the same time. But the Internet has the potential to nuetralise one fothe government's more effective counter-dissident strategies: expulsion. Cut off from events in China, the exiled dissidents have tended to fade into irrelevance. In future, some of the fire-brands Beijing believed to be safely out of the way may use the Internet to spread the word back home. ****************************REGION**************************** WSJ: ASIA'S DRUG WAR January 11, 1995 The Wall Street Journal Trade and information aren't the only things that have gone global. Try drug addiction. Around the world, the U.S. is often protrayed as a socity sinking under the weight of drug abuse. But where the U.S. has about 600,000 heroin addicts, Thailand probably has that many in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces alone. According to the , Singapore is treating 7,700 addicts (up from 5,700 in 190). Assuming improbably, that these are the only ones, Singapore still has an addiction rate 12% higher than the U.S. Malaysia claims about 100,000 addicts, Thaiwan about 50,000, and the standard estimate for Vietnam is 500,000. Without much doubt these figures understate the severity of the problem in some countries. When Taiwan seized 1,114 kilos of heroin in 1993, officials claimed the bulk was for domestic consumption. Hong Kong clinics have registered a 50% jump in female addicts since 1993, which they attribute to the price of a gram of heroin plummeting to $40, half the price of three years ago. While the big money is made on the streets of New York and Los Angeles, most of Asia's opium is consumed in Asia. So the explosion in the Golden Triangle, especially Burma, is deeply troubling. Opium output has trebled since 1988, to about 3,500 tons, according to Asean officials. Prosecutions are still launched against lingtime traffickers in places like Thailand, but in fact the business has rapidly migrated into the hands of new Chinese gangs. The quantity has gone up, and the purity has improved by a factor of 1,000% or more. To understand why, look no farther than Burma's emergence as China's economic satellite. In the late 1980s, China began courting the Burmese regime, then in bad odor with the rest of the world for slaughtering hundreds of demonstators. Beijing dropped its support of the Communicst Party of Burman and other ethnic rebel groups and opened the long Sino-Burmese border to trade. That pried the lid from a Pandora's Box whose contents are now spilling out into the world through China. The ex-insurgents, led by the Wa tribal followers of Burma's Communists, nowadays devote themselves to the heroin business. Dozens of refineries have opened along the border, with the drugs moving overland by courier through China and finally out via Hong Kong and Taiwan. These mainland routes have already eclipsed Burmese drug warlord Khun Sa and Thai export routes. For the time being, the Rangoon government has reached cease- fires with most of the ethnic rebels in the north. Rangoon leaves them to their drug trafficking, and probably even rakes off a share of the profit, while concentrating its main energies on building up the army and crushing urban dissent. No doubt these cease-fires are temporary: The Burmese military is reportedly set to renew is offensive against the Khun Sa operatin, armed with a fresh supply of weapons from Beijing. In time, the army probably hoes to subdue the rest of Burma's minorities as well. But that goal has eluded the Burmese military for 50 years, and for nwo the local militias still call the shots in the mountainous north. Poppy cultivation has boomed under teh supr of competition for buyers. For their part, the Chinese see their Burmese client as an economic and military bridgehead into Southeast Asia. What they got in the bargain was an opium bridgehead into China. Junkies are suddenly proliferating along the drug routes through Yunnan and Guangxi, in the inland provinces and even among Beijing's yuppies. China recently admitted to having 300,000 "registered" addicts and called the situation "very grim." Health officials put the real number at 2.5 million. In 1992, the People's Armed Police was sent in to clean out a smuggling center protected by corrupt Yunnan officials. The battle lasted nearly 11 weeks and netted nearly 1,000 kilos of drugs. China hasn't forgotten that tens of millions were junkies early in the century. Biochemistry being what it is, the simple fact of drugs being available is likely to produce a growing addiction crisis. When Lee Brown of the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy toured the region last June, several governments urged him to restart anti-narcotics cooperation with Burma. But the Burmese regime is still in the doghouse with Congress over its human rights record and the detention of Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu yi. In any case, the old school, which sees U.S. and European consumers as the main drivers of the heroin trade, may be out of date. Malaysia recently nabbed a high-school-age heroin dealer. Police suspect that pushers are trying to lock in a new clientele among upwardly mobile young users. Asia's wealth is driving a big part of the business these days. And while the U.S. can help, China is the real key to Asia's developing drug crisis. **************************SHAN STATE************************** NATION: US CITIZENS NEED NOT FEAR THE MTA, ASSURES KHUN SA Sunday, January 15, 1995 OPIUM warlord Khun Sa does not want to make enemies of other countries and it was needless for the United States to caution its citizens against travelling in parts of northern Thailand, according to a prominent aide to the leader of the self-styled Shan state. Kuensai Jaiyen is responsible for liaising between Khun Sa's Mong Thai Army (MTA) and foreign countries. He said people living in Shan state -- an area claimed by ethnic Shan separatists on the Thai-Burmese border -- were disheartened to learn about the US warning. "Although people have been violating the human rights of the Shan for a long time, we have never wanted to make enemies of, or attack [the citizens] of other countries. We want to make friends. We need help from other countries. "The US is the most powerful country in the world. How would we dare to challenge it," Kuensai said. The warning, issued by the US State Department last Saturday, identified three provinces in northern Thailand -- Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai and Mae Hong Son -- as "areas of greatest concern [to the US". It warned American tourists travelling in the North against "possible reprisals" by Khun Sa's MTA, after a number of his leading lieutenants were arrested in late November. The crackdown is said to have crippled Khun Sa's heroin smuggling network in this country. Referring to the thorny question of ethnic Shan cultivating opium poppies, Kuensai explained that people living in Shan state would have great difficulty finding other ways to earn a living as long as Burmese government troops kept on attacking their strongholds along the Thai-Burmese border. "This problem of opium-growing could be settled very amicably, if only the Burmese government would stop attacking us," he said. Kuensai repeated earlier requests for Shan state to be consulted over plans to set in motion the Economic Quadrangle Development project. This is an agreement between this country and China, Laos and Burma to cooperate on mutually beneficial developments projects. "Any developments initiated on Shan soil without prior approval from the Shan people will only serve to hurt the feelings of local people," he said. Meanwhile, PM's Office Minister Savit Bhothiwihok, the minister with overall responsibility for the Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT), said he has a meeting in Chiang Mai on Monday with police chiefs from the three provinces mentioned in the US State Department warning. He said they will discuss ways of beefing up security for tourists travelling through the area. Last Friday, Defence Minister Vijit Sookmark gave assurances that US tourists travelling in the North were not at risk. Khun Sa himself recently wrote to a Thai daily newspaper claiming that Washington is pressuring the Burmese government to clamp down on ethnic minority groups along the Thai-Burmese border. In his letter, he said his Shan state was a "lucrative area which many parties want to exploit". ****************************REGION**************************** REUTERS: BISHOPS SLAM ASIA FOR ``DEATH-DEALING" POLICIES January 18, 1995 MANILA, Philippines (Reuter) - Asia's Roman Catholic bishops Wednesday slammed governments in the region for adopting ``death-dealing'' policies that deny the poor the fruits of economic progress. The 21-nation Federation of Asian Bishops Conferences (FABC), meeting in Manila, also decried the growth of consumerism among Asians, which made them want ``to have more, eat more and waste more,'' a conference spokesman said. Archbishop Orlando Quevedo, FABC's Filipino secretary-general, said the bishops were concerned that many Asian governments were pursuing policies that emphasized industrialization so much ``that the basic sectors of society are left without enjoying the fruits of development.'' ``We think that the policy of economic development that is being followed by many Asian countries is death-dealing for the poor,'' Quevedo told reporters. ****************************REGION**************************** SEASIA-L ASIAN STUDIES ACROSS THE CURRICULUM Jan 19, 1995 ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 18 Jan 1995 15:43:53 -1000 From: Jim Shimabukuro To: Multiple recipients of list APEX-L Subject: Asian Studies Across the Curriculum "Asian Studies Across the Curriculum" Second Annual Conference April 5-6, 1995 Burkshire Conference Center Towson State Univeristy Baltimore, Maryland Asian Studies Development Program (ASDP) Sponsored by: Towson State University Essex Community College East-West Center University of Hawaii CALL FOR PAPERS This conference welcomes proposals that investigate approaches infusing Asian materials into traditional disciplines, that consider theoretical issues in teaching Asian materials, that discuss pedagogical issues in teaching across disciplines and across cultures, or that explore traditional areas of Asian studies. Papers should be twenty minutes long. Proposals for both individual papers and panels of three related papers are welcome. Proposals should include name, address, phone numbers, FAX number (if available), and a 250 word description of each presentation. Deadline for proposals is January 15, 1995. Presenters will be notified by February 15, 1995. For further information, please contact Professor Nancy Hume Department of English Essex Community College 7201 Rossville Boulevard Baltimore, Maryland 21237 Phone (410) 780-6911 FAX (410) 682-6871 E-Mail: E7Q4W0L@TOE.Towson.Edu ************************************************************** NEWS SOURCES REGULARLY COVERED/ABBREVIATIONS USED BY BURMANET: AP: ASSOCIATED PRESS AFP: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE AW: ASIAWEEK AWSJ: ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL Bt.: THAI BAHT; 25 Bt.3 DUS$1 (APPROX), BBC: BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION BI: BURMA ISSUES BKK POST: BANGKOK POST (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK) BRC-CM: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-CHIANG MAI BRC-J: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-JAPAN CPPSM: C'TEE FOR PUBLICITY OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE IN MONLAND FEER: FAR EAST ECONOMIC REVIEW IRRAWADDY: NEWSLETTER PUBLISHED BY BURMA INFORMATION GROUP JIR: JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW KHRG: KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP Kt. BURMESE KYAT; 150 KYAT3DUS$1 BLACK MARKET 100 KYAT3DUS$1 SEMI-OFFICIAL 6 KYAT3DUS$1 OFFICIAL MOA: MIRROR OF ARAKAN NATION: THE NATION (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK) NLM: NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR (DAILY STATE-RUN NEWSPAPER, RANGOON) R.T.A.:REC.TRAVEL.ASIA NEWSGROUP S.C.B.:SOC.CULTURE.BURMA NEWSGROUP S.C.T.:SOC.CULTURE.THAI NEWSGROUP SEASIA-L: S.E.ASIA BITNET MAILING LIST SLORC: STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL USG: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT XNA: XINHUA NEWS AGENCY **************************************************************