**************************BurmaNet*************************** "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies" ************************************************************* The BurmaNet News: 6 April 1995 Issue #140 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ NOTED IN PASSING: "The dictatorship imposed on Burma for thirty some years has molded all it's citizens--unfortunately that includes prodemocracy friends--in a political culture that does not tolerate difference of opinion. In many ways, we have unconsciously learned in those thirty years to behave in the way of the those that we despise." Contents: *********************CONTACT REQUESTS************************* ***********************INSIDE BURMA*************************** THE NATION:BURMA ADMITS 'DE FACTO' DEVALUATION BKK POST: BURMA OPPOSITION FEARS LOSING KEY ETHNIC BACKING **********************KAREN STATE***************************** KHRG: WHITHER DKBA?: SLORC'S NORTHEN KAREN OFFENSIVE, 1 of 4 ********************THE KARENNI******************************** KNPP: REGARDING THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KARENNI NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND THE SLORC ********************SHAN STATE******************************** THE NATION:MTA READY TO JOIN BURMA UNION ***********************THAILAND******************************** BKK POST:PREMIER ORDERS OFFICIAL PROTESTS AGAINST RANGOON BKK POST:VICTIM'S KIN THREATEN TO PARADE CORPSE IN PROTEST BKK POST:MEASURES TO HELP MAE SAI THE NATION:CHINA HAILS ASEAN BID FOR SE ASIA MEET IN THAILAND THE NATION:ARMED ROBBERS KILL 1 ********************INTERNATIONAL*************************** UNCHR: 1995_REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR Parts 4-6 of 6 ************************************************************** The BurmaNet News is an ********************************* electronic newspaper * Iti * covering Burma. Articles * snotpo * from newspapers, magazines, * werthatcor * newsletters, the wire * ruptsbutfea * services and the Internet as * r.Fearoflos * well as original material * ingpowercor * are published. * ruptsthosewhoare * The BurmaNet News is * subjecttoit...Theef * e-mailed directly to * fortnecessarytoremain * subscribers and is * uncorruptedinanenvironm * also distributed via * entwherefearisanintegralpar * the soc.culture.burma * tofeverydayexistenceisnoti * and seasia-l mailing * mmediatelyapparentto * lists and is also * thosefortunate * available via the * enoughtolivein * reg.burma conference on * statesgovern * the APC networks. For a * edbytherule * free subscription to * oflaw...fear * the BurmaNet News, send * is ahab it. * an e-mail message to: * Iam * * no * majordomo@igc.apc.org * taf * * ra * In the body of the message, * id. * type "subscribe burmanet-l" * Aun * (without quotation marks) * gSa * * nS * Letters to the editor, * uu * comments or contributions * Ky * of articles should be * i. * sent to the editor at: ********************************* strider@igc.apc.org In Washington: Attention to BurmaNet c/o National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) Information Office 815 15th Street NW, Suite 609 Washington D.C. 20005 Tel: (202) 393-7342, Fax: (202) 393-7343 In Bangkok: Attention to BurmaNet c/o Burma Issues PO Box 1076, Silom Post Office Bangkok 10504 Thailand Tel: (066) (02) 234-6674, Fax: (066) (02) 631 0133 [The NCGUB is the government-in-exile, made up of the people who won the election in 1990. Burma Issues is a Bangkok-based non-governmental organization that documents human rights conditions in Burma and maintains an archive of Burma-related documents. Views expressed in The BurmaNet News do not necessarily reflect those of either NCGUB or Burma Issues] ************************************************************* Information about Burma via the WorldWideWeb: BurmaNet News webpage: http://taygate.au.ac.th/~web/michael/bnn/bnn.htm BurmaWeb http://www.uio.no/~tormodl FreeBurma website http:// ************************************************************** *************THE BURMANET NEWS--APRIL 6, 1995***************** ************************************************************** *********************CONTACT REQUESTS************************* This is a new section of the BurmaNet News that you can use in trying to contact someone whose address you do not have. If you are looking for someone, send a note to burmanet@igc.apc.org with your name and return address. Your contact request, but not your name, will be posted with the next issue of the BurmaNet news. If the person you are looking for responds, he or she will be given your name and contact information. Whether to respond is of course, up to them. ****** 1 Looking for Cham Toik, does he have an email address? ********************INSIDE BURMA******************************* ****************KAREN STATE/KAWTHOOLEI************************* WHITHER DKBA?: SLORC'S NORTHEN KAREN OFFENSIVE An Independent Report by the Karen Human Rights Group March 29, 1995 / KHRG #95-10 The purpose of this report is not to describe the military details of the fall of Manerplaw and other areas, as these subjects have been covered elsewhere. Instead, this report focusses on the effects on the civilian population of this year's SLORC/DKBA offensive in the Moei and Salween river areas along the Thai/Burma border. Some information on the formation of the DKBO/DKBA and the fall of Manerplaw is given in order to make the other information more understandable, but the main issues covered in the report are the destruction of villages, forced relocations, new flows of refugees, movements of existing refugee camps and terrorist attacks in Thailand, all of which are part of the ongoing SLORC/DKBA offensive. The first section of the report gives a detailed summary of events and how they fit into the overall picture, while the second section consists of detailed interviews with villagers involved in various aspects of the situation. There have been countless rumours flying up and down the border area, so many reported incidents have taken a great deal of time and effort to check and confirm. Rumoured events which proved impossible to confirm have either been omitted from the report or noted as unconfirmed reports. Contents I. SUMMARY OF EVENTS The DKBO and the fall of Manerplaw ................................2 The broader offensive ........................................................3 Refugee movements ...........................................................5 Border Incursions ..............................................................8 Manerplaw area ....................................................9 Mae Paw Muh Hta / Huay Heng ..............................9 Ka Htee Hta, U Da Hta, Ber Lu Ko .....................11 Baw Noh ..............................................12 Gray Hta, Sho Kloh, Beh Klaw .........................14 Huay Bone, Huay Kalok ................................15 Other Camps ..........................................16 Attacks on Thai targets ..............................16 The Thai response ....................................17 SLORC / DKBA relations ..........................18 Chronology of recorded events ...................19 II. INTERVIEWS SLORC & DKBA in the villages ....................21 Life in Myaing Gyi Ngu ..........................24 Meh Sa Ger refugees .............................27 Ka Htee Hta refugee camp ........................29 Ber Lu Ko kidnapping ............................32 Gray Hta killings ...............................33 Meh Po / Huay Heng truck shooting ...............34 III. APPENDICES Map Burmese copies of statements, Copies of related newspaper articles I. SUMMARY OF EVENTS The DKBO and the fall of Manerplaw Since 1992 we have received reports from villages, particularly in Thaton and Pa'an Districts, that local SLORC commanders and Intelligence units were actively spreading propaganda that the Karen National Union is anti-Buddhist, that the Karen Revolution is a Christian revolution and that Karen leaders had told their Christian supporters that as soon as the revolution succeeded they would kill all the Buddhists. Villagers were told that SLORC troops didn't really want to burn and loot their villages and execute people, but that they had to because the KNU was around, so it was all the KNU's fault. They were told not to cooperate with the KNU and to pressure the KNU into a ceasefire. Despite the villagers' fear and hatred of SLORC, over time this propaganda gradually began to have an effect for several reasons. Two main factors were the villagers' complete lack of education, and the truth to the accusation that Christians were promoted over Buddhists in the KNU. But perhaps most significant was the fact that the KNU had never tried to politically educate the villagers or get them politically involved in the revolution, so they didn't even properly understand what the KNU was fighting for; instead, they only knew they had to give rice to KNU forces, their sons to the KNU Army, and see their villages burned as SLORC retaliation for KNU military operations. They were fed up. Then in 1993 some monks began offering them an alternative: refuse to help the KNU, come and stay at "refuges" around monasteries, all your food and other needs will be provided and, best of all, SLORC won't bother you. People began moving to these "refuges", where they received food and other needs from the monks - who were in turn receiving it all from SLORC. The villagers didn't know where the food was coming from, so they began believing monks such as U Thuzana must have "magic powers". Thuzana and the other leaders sent their strongest supporters back into the villages to bring the others, and when most people didn't want to leave their homes the movement began threatening them. From that point on, the movement used fear and threats more often than persuasion to get recruits. In late 1994 things became more serious, as monks and villagers were ordered by Thuzana to disarm KNU soldiers in the villages. The movement became armed. In December, it occupied Thu Mwe Hta monastery at the junction of the Salween and Moei rivers. In 1993-94, a huge new monastery hall was built there, and it was later discovered that a large arms cache had been placed under it - indicating the apparent amount of pre-planning which had gone into this sequence of events. At Thu Mwe Hta the group cut off a main KNU supply line and called all KNU Buddhist soldiers and villagers to come and join them. Many KNU soldiers walked away from hilltop positions which they had been defending, underfed and undersupplied, for years. SLORC walked into the positions, including Min Yaw Kee ridge, from which they could easily mount an assault on Manerplaw. The movement became violent. Some KNU soldiers and villagers who wouldn't join them were killed in several villages. The KNU sent negotiating teams, including Buddhist monks, to Thu Mwe Hta but they were arrested and held hostage. Their release was negotiated, and on Dec. 15th an agreement was struck between the KNU and the new group. Its leaders had already retreated on Dec. 12 to Myaing Gyi Ngu (Karen name Khaw Taw), near Ka Ma Maung, where they set up headquarters at a monastery with a great deal of weapons stored around it. These leaders tore up the Thu Mwe Hta agreement and the group at Thu Mwe Hta once again put the river under siege. On Dec. 21 the leaders declared the formation of the "Democratic Kayin Buddhist Organization" (DKBO) and the "Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army" (DKBA), and demanded that the KNU hand over Manerplaw. Negotiations at Thu Mwe Hta broke down. SLORC's Southeastern Regional Commander Maj. Gen. Maung Hla promptly visited Myaing Gyi Ngu and promised the DKBA all required weapons and uniforms. SLORC immediately began providing the DKBA with uniforms, a badge, food and other supplies - and apparently even wrote several of the DKBA's political statements, in the opinion of experienced Burmese dissidents who read them. The KNU set a deadline of midnight Dec. 31st for the "mutineers" to "return to the fold". The deadline passed, and a couple of days later the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) began attacking Thu Mwe Hta, which fell within a few days (shortly after the KNLA scored a direct hit on the ammunition cache under the monastery hall). The Thu Mwe Hta group withdrew to the Sleeping Dog Mountain area. The SLORC then took over complete control for the offensive. DKBA members were divided up, a small handful assigned to each SLORC unit as guides, and the offensive began on January 20. By January 23 the SLORC established a foothold on the Manerplaw side of the Salween. Using the DKBA guides to indicate all the back pathways and KNLA positions, they advanced quickly. The KNLA decided to limit its defence to delaying actions, and torched most of Manerplaw before withdrawing. The SLORC arrived in Manerplaw on January 27th, and raised the yellow DKBA flag. However, on the hill below Manerplaw's monastery there was a more realistic sign: SLORC soldiers made huge white letters on the ground, visible from the air, reading in Burmese "eA[ (661) cr& (10)" ["Strategic Command 661 - Light Infantry Battalion 10"; a Battalion in SLORC's #66 Light Infantry Division]. Observers on the Thai side of the river got photos of the lettering, which a few hours later had suddenly been rubbed out and replaced with the English lettering "DKBA". ______________________________________________________________ ________________ The Broader Offensive While much attention was focussed on the SLORC's capture of Manerplaw itself, the offensive against the surrounding areas has been largely ignored. This offensive has continued since the fall of Manerplaw, as the SLORC works toward securing the entire Salween and Moei River sections of the Thai border. The KNU and pro-democracy groups were forced to abandon their Manerplaw headquarters, but in the process of the Manerplaw/Salween offensive it is the tens of thousands of villagers who have suffered the most. At least 100 Karen villages have been destroyed or no longer exist. The following is just a partial list: Manerplaw (*), Tee Thay Kee, Tee Taw Kloh, Klaw Deh (*), Kler Thay Lu (t), Tee Thay Kee (t), Mae Po Hta (t), Mu Yu Hta (t), Baw Shaw Lu (t), Pa Hee Lu (t), Pway Baw Lu (t), Htoo Wah Lu (t), Ka Paw Lu (t), Lo Kwa Lu (*), Ga Ma, Ya Deh Ni, Naw Deh (*), Lah Hee Lu, Thu Mwe Hta, Mae Let Hta, Gawa Yeh, Meh Leh Kee, Oo Ghay Thu, Meh Bpa, Min Yaw Kee, Meh Pru, dozens of small villages in Meh Pru area, Meh Kong Kay, Meh Paw Muh Hta, Pu Mya Lu (t), Thay Law Hta (t), Mae Paw Muh Hta (t), many villages in Dawn Gwin (*) and Meh Paw Muh Hta areas, Bwa Der, Maw Leh Meh Hta, Meh Ku Hta, Meh Nyo Hta, Nya Ku Pu, Wah Ku Der, Ee Thu Ku, Ko Ra Hta, Baw Bo Kyu, Klaw Hta, Ko Lar Hta, Htoo Ka Toe, Htay Day, Htoo Bway Kay, Htay Kler Toe, Saw Bway Der, Moi Yeh Hta, Du Ho Reh, Kyauk Nyat, Thee Muh Hta, Ka Dteh Hta (*), Weh Gyi, Weh Gyi (t), Oo Thu Hta, Ka Htee Hta (t), Bon Ya Hta (t), Oo Da Hta (t), Oo Kweh Hta (t), Yaung Nai Oo (t), ... and many others not named here. Those denoted by (t) were displaced Karen villages or refugee camps on the Thai side of the border. Only a few of the villages mentioned (denoted by *) were primarily Karen military garrisons or positions, and these were abandoned and in some cases burned by withdrawing Karen troops before SLORC forces could arrive. Many of the other civilian-only villages were burned and destroyed by advancing SLORC troops or forced to flee before SLORC could arrive. Those who remained in their villages suddenly found themselves with no Karen Army in the area to protect them. In these cases, many fled as soon as SLORC appeared near the village, or after SLORC had shelled or shot up the village upon entering it. Villages in the Kyauk Nyat area of the upper Salween River found that after their area was occupied, the DKBA began posting notices in some villages stating that all villagers must join DKBO or their villages would be burned. When this happened, Christians were the first to flee, followed by Buddhists. There are also reports that many villages west of the Salween River are being forcibly relocated south and west to areas further inside Karen State in the area of Myaing Gyi Ngu, headquarters of the DKBO. It appears that the SLORC and the DKBA may be trying to clear all civilians out of the region within 10 km. or more of the Thai border, effectively establishing this swath of territory as a military-only zone. This would support the opinion of some analysts who feel the SLORC is trying to implement a "Fifth Cut": in addition to the "Four Cuts" program to cut off the opposition from civilian support, SLORC now seems to be doing everything it can to cut off the escape route of refugees to Thailand. Over the past year or two, SLORC seems to have realized that the flight of refugees is a weak point in its complete control over the country; there has been a great increase in SLORC's verbal attacks on refugees in the media and in SLORC pressure on neighbouring countries to return the refugees. In recorded conversations last year, some senior SLORC Intelligence officers discussed how in the Irrawaddy Delta they have no problem with forced labour projects because the people can't escape, but in areas closer to the borders such as Arakan State and the Ye-Tavoy railway, people flee to neighbouring countries, causing problems for the projects and international bad publicity for SLORC [see "SLORC Officers Talk", KHRG #94-27, 25/9/94]. SLORC may feel that if it can eliminate the embarrassing existence of refugees, it will be one large step closer to absolute power within Burma and general acceptance abroad. This would help to explain the SLORC's use of the DKBA to attack refugee camps in Thailand [see the section in this report on border incursions]. While most people agree that it would be virtually impossible for SLORC to completely block escape across its long and forested border with Thailand, it could certainly decrease the flow of refugees to a trickle if it can establish a wide "free-fire" military-only zone adjacent to the border, and if Thailand is willing to cooperate by immediately handing back any refugees it captures (as it is already doing along the Shan State border), then this "Fifth Cut" could be very effective. Fewer people would even try to escape if they knew they had little chance of succeeding. Already, new refugees have reported that there are 700 Karen families from the Kyauk Nyat area who want to flee to Thailand but are trapped between 2 main SLORC lines extending north-south along the Salween River and east-west from Kyauk Nyat to Papun. Of those who have fled the current offensive, over 10,000 have arrived in Thailand, many are hiding in the mountains and forests of their home areas, many have fled to the homes of relatives or friends in villages or towns further inside Burma, and some have gone, whether by force, threats, fear, or willingly, to DKBA camps. In these DKBA locations, they are reportedly being provided with food for the time being by SLORC. One particular location near Myaing Gyi Ngu has been set up by SLORC as a "model village", and is now regularly featured in their media as a propaganda exercise. SLORC Television and print media have shown SLORC Generals and SLORC "Non-Governmental Organizations" (such as the "Maternal and Child Health and Welfare Organization" headed by Intelligence Chief Khin Nyunt's wife) visiting the "model village" to give gifts to dazed-looking Karen villagers who have "fled the yoke of KNU rule". SLORC's Burmese-language radio reported that SLORC had invited foreign NGO's to come in and give aid to these "refugees", but as yet there have been no reports of any takers. It appears likely that SLORC will maintain one or two such places as they are for show, while most villagers who go to the DKBA will be kept in other villages - where they will be treated well for a few months, then put to use as porters and labourers for the SLORC military. The testimony of "Saw Htoo Thaw" in this report gives an insight into life in the "model village", including forced labour and forced conscription as porters and soldiers. As soon as Manerplaw itself had fallen, the SLORC worked quickly to secure its grip on the Moei River near Manerplaw. Thousands of porters had already been rounded up for the Manerplaw offensive from towns and villages stretching from Mudon and Moulmein in the south to Thaton in the north. SLORC's tactics in rounding up these porters, such as surrounding video cinemas and capturing all the men or abducting people from their homes in the middle of the night, were reminiscent of their tactics in 1992, when they rounded up an estimated 20,000 civilians for their last major Manerplaw offensive [for details on Manerplaw porters, see "Porters: Manerplaw & Kawmoora Areas", KHRG #95-07, 25/2/95]. Immediately after the capture of Manerplaw, SLORC began setting up small camps every kilometre or so along the river to the south of Manerplaw. Many porters were brought in from the hills surrounding Meh Tha Waw, the SLORC supply base to the south, to carry supplies to these camps. Many of these porters were "say muh wah" - Karen girls, almost all teenagers, from remote hill villages who wear the traditional white dress before marriage. Witnesses on the Thai bank of the Moei River saw 100 or more of these girls being held under guard in fenced enclosures along the Moei riverbank every evening. The fences were still visible in photos taken weeks later, each of their sharpened bamboo stakes with an empty milk-tin hanging on top so the girls couldn't get over the fence at night without making alot of noise. None of them are known to have escaped. At the same time, SLORC completed a dirt road connecting Meh Tha Waw to Manerplaw within 2 weeks. When this was done the "say muh wah" porters were sent back and SLORC trucks began moving supplies, though some men and women porters were still visible with SLORC troops along the road. According to observers on the Thai riverbank, it appeared that DKBA soldiers carried their own loads, while SLORC porters carried only their guns and were always accompanied by porters carrying heavy loads. By February 10, the SLORC trucks were going up and down the road all day - empty on their way to Manerplaw and full of soldiers, equipment and pillaged goods on the way back to Meh Tha Waw. SLORC was clearly not anticipating any KNLA attack to retake Manerplaw and was shifting most of its troops to increase its offensives to the south - in KNLA 7th Brigade area, and at Kawmoora. At the same time new Battalions were being sent through Papun for an offensive further north to secure the entire area west of the Salween River. SLORC troops pushed up the Salween river from Thu Mwe Hta (at the Moei river junction) and Dawn Gwin areas, and down the Salween from Saw Hta, in the far north just below the Kayah State border. As combined SLORC and DKBA units appeared up and down the Salween riverbank, refugee camps and Thai Karen villages across the river began to flee. Even the bustling Thai trading village of Mae Sam Lap fled up a stream 2-3 km. into Thailand after SLORC and DKBA crossed the river into Mae Sam Lap several times. Thai traders could be seen selling their wares from bamboo shelters by the stream, looking like refugees, while the Thai Army had to occupy Mae Sam Lap to protect the border. SLORC troops coming through Papun also formed another line west-east from Papun to the Salween River at Kyauk Nyat, and performed sweeping operations south of this line to drive out any KNU forces while driving villagers into fleeing at the same time - as soon as they fled, the DKBA was ready and waiting to take them to Myaing Gyi Ngu. [Continued in the next issue] ********************THE KARENNI******************************** KNPP: REGARDING THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE KARENNI NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE PARTY AND THE SLORC 1. During his tour of the Kayah State on November 17-18, 1993, Major General Khin Nyunt, secretary-1 of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), declared to the world that he was offically inviting the armed organizations to enter into cease-fire talks with the SLORC. 2. The prevailing thinking and trend in the world today is for nations to avoid resolving their differences through armed confrontation and to settle them on the negotiating table peacefully and through justice for both the sides. 3. On the basis of the principle of peaceful coexistence with neighboring countries and a peaceful life for every human being on this planet, and with the aim to promote a peaceful life and the standard of living of the Karenni people, and including the people of Burm a, the Karenni National Progressive Party will establish peaceful relations with Burma. 4. The cease-fire with the SLORC does not mean that the Karenni National P rogressive Party has given up its basic policies. Quite the contrary, it will continue to stick to its political stance. 5. Hence, following the Karenni National Progressive Party's agreement to cease-fire with the SLORC on March 7, 1995, the Karenni Government will do the following in the i nterest of all the Karenni people: 1. Rehabilitate and develop the villages within the Karenni nation . 2. Implement education and health programs of the Karenni people. 3. Undertake economic projects to raise the standard of all the Ka renni people. 4. Provide the leadership in carrying out tasks aimed at regional tranquillity and rule of law in the Karenni nation. 5. Safeguard the interests of all the Karenni people and give emph asis to the work to promote democratic and civil liberties and human rights . 6. Undertake work to uphold national identity, traditional culture and customs, national language, national dress, and freedom of relig ious faith. Following the cease-fire agreement between the Karenni National Progres sive Party and the SLORC, it is hereby solemnly declared the Karenni Government will undertake the six major tasks defined above. Central Committee The Karenni National Progressive Party Karenni Nation Date: March 18, 1995 ********************INTERNATIONAL*************************** UNCHR: 1995_REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR Parts 4-6 of 6 UNCHR: 1995_REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR (4/6)[Para.95-113] II. ALLEGATIONS A. Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution ------------------------------------------------ 95. Numerious communications from non-governmental sources continue to be received by the Special Rapporteur reporting extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary killings of civilians by Myanmar military forces under a variety of circumstances. 96. In the regions of the country with predomianantly non-Burman population and where insurgencies have been taking place, namy of the alleged killings are summary executions of civilians who are accused of either being insurgents or collaborating with insurgents. For example, in March 1994, members of the Myanmar military's Western Military Command patrolling the Naf River (Rakhine State) came across some Muslims fishing from a small boat. The soldires reportedly tried to extort money form the fishermen and, when unsuccessful, tied them up with rope and brought them to Balu Khali village in Maungdaw Township. Eight of the fishermen were reportedly interrogated and tortured over five days; the soldires charged them with carrying out clandestine operations rather than simply fishing. On 31 March 1994, the fishermen were reportedly executed. 97. Many of the reports from non-governmental sources have described occasions on which soldiers of the Myanmar army have opened fire with light arms against civilians without any evident provocation. Such situations have frequently been reported in the context of attempt by the army to arrest annd detain civilians for the purposes of forced portering and other labour; as villagers attempt to avoid being arrested or to escape the approaching troops, soldires are often reported to open fire. For example, on 11 September 1994, Myanmar Army forces from Division No.33 , Battalion No. 27, reportedly entered Kyaun Sein village. When the vilalgers ran away because they were afraid to be teken as porters, the Tatmadaw reportedly opened fore on them . One villager was hit by a bullet and died the same evening, while three other men were captured by the soldires and executed on 12 September 1994. 98. In addition to the reports received by the Special Rapporteur alleging summary or arbitrary executions, he also interviewed persons, during his visit to the refugee camps in Thailand, who claim to be witnesses to such huan rights violations. 99. The Special Rapporteur has received testimonies alleging governmental responsibility for a pattern of deaths in custody. In the cases received by the Special Rapporteur of alleged violations of the right to life of persons held in detention in which charges were filed, the detentions were primarily carried out under SLORC orders, in application of the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act, particularly section 5(J), and article 17 of the 1908 Unlawful Association Act. During his visit to Myanmar, the Special Rapporteur requested the Government of Myanmar to provide information concerniing the fate of 25 political leaders and elected representatives, studenta and monks who had allegedly died while in custody. Priou to his dieparture from Myanmar, the Government provided the Special Rapporteur with its response to his inquireies; the response of the Government of Myanmar is reproduced in annex I to this report. Concerning the 25 cases raised by the special Rapporteur, this response may be summarized as follows: the Government denied detention in 7 cases; 4 persons were said to have been released; 3 persons were said to be still serving their terms; 10 persons were said to have been given medical treatment upon falling ill, but to have succumbed to disease nevertheless; and 1 person was said to have committed suicide. 100. Other cases of reported summary or arbitrary executions were described in paragraphs 53 to 55 of the interim report of the Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session (A/49/651 of 8 November 1994). These cases included allegations of: severe torture, causing the death of the victims; the killing of civilaians for having disobeyed orders from the Tatmadaw to relocate their homes, to supply goods or provide labour for little or no compensation; arbitrary "revenge" killings of persons frm villages near to the locations of attacks carried out by insurgents forces against the Tatmadaw. Collective and arbitrary punishments are often said to include summary executions of civilians present in the area. 101. In response to the request of the Special Rapporteur for information on any infestigations into these allegations undertaken by the Government, the Government of Myanmar replied, in a note verbale dated 4 November 1994, as follows: "No instances of extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execution can be permitted in the Union of Myanmar and no provision is made in the law for such." 102. The Special Rapporteur is aware that sometimes reports of arbitrary killings tend to be exagggerated or distorted, that there are cases of good treatment of villagers and captured insurgents by the Tatmadaw soldiers, that there is evidence that the Government is trying to discipline those soldiers who have committed serious human rights violations, that instances of such violations appear to be decreasing and that the insurgents also commit serious violations of human rights from time to time. However, the Special Rapporteur cannot deny, inview of so many detailed and seemingly reliable reports, that violations appear to be committed consistently and on a wide scale by the soldiers of the Myanmar Army against innocent villageers (particularly those belonging to the ethnic minorities) in the form of summary or extrajudicial executions and arbitrary killings which occur in the contexts of forced labour ,rape, forced relocation and confiscation of property. 103. In relation to specific cases, the Special Rapporteur draws attention to the report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (E/CN.4/1995/61, paras. 227-230). In this connection, the Special Rapporteur is aware that the Government of Myanmar has recently responded in detail to the allegations transmitted to it by theSpecial Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. B. Arbitrary arrest and detention 104. Although some political prisoners have been released during the last two years from centres of detention in Myanmar, reports from various sources describe how an unknown number of civilians continue to be arrested for criticizing SLORC, the tatmadaw and the process being undertaken in the National C0nvention of drafting a new constitution aimed at facilitating the transfer of power to to a civilian government. Other persons reportedly arrested in a large numbers are suspected insurgents (or sympathizers there with ) who remain detained in prisons in country areas, especially in the regions with predominantly non-Burman populations. 105. The Nobel Prize winner, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, is still being held under prolonged house detention without trial; on 20 July 1994, she had completed five years indetention. Seeking her release and return to freedom in Myanmar, including respect for all of her civil and political rights under international law, parliamentarians, non-governmental organizations and individuals throughout the world have sent thousands of petitions to the United Nations in the last few months. 106. In a letter dated 5 October 1994, the Special Rapporteur requested the government of Myanmar to provide specific reasons, including reference to specific legal authority, for keeping Daw Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest after 20 July 1994, and to indicate precisely when the Government intends to release her. 107. In a note verbale dated 4 November 1994, the government of Myanmar provided the Special Rapporteur wiht the follawing detailed responses to the above inquiries: "1. (a) ... she (Daw Aung San Suu Kyi) had beeninfluenced by anti-government , opportunistic politicians and insurgent groups in their attempt to seize political power for their own end, at a time when political vacuum developed by the people's genuine desire to forsake the socialist economic system and their yearning for the return to a multi-party democratic system; "(b) For her own good and for the good of the country she had to be restrained in order to prevent her from promoting the cause of these unsavoury political elements who found their way and got themselves into positions of influence around her to create disunity among the only unified establishment left in this country, the Tatmadaw, which was endeavouring to stabilize the situation created by the political vacuum; "(c) Despite repeated caution on the part of the authorities, she made seditious speehes incitiong the people to acts of violence and to cause division wihtin the armed forces and division between the armed forces and the people. "2. The specific legal authority ofr restraining Daw Aung San Kuu Kyi is the 1975 Law to Safegurad the State Against the Dangers of Those Desiring to Cause Subversive Acts. Under this Law, if there are reasons to believe that any citizen has done or is doing or is about to do any act which infringe the sovereignty and security of the State or public peace and tranquility, the Council of Ministers is empowered to pass an order, as may be necessary, restricting any fundamental right of such person. "3. Also, under Section 10 (b) and Section 14 of this 1975 Law to Safeguard the State Against the Dangers of Those Desiring to Cause subversive Acts, there is thelagal basis for the restraint of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi after 20 July 1994. Under this Law the Council of Ministers may pass an order as may be necessary restrictiog any fundamental right of a citizen if there are reasons to believe that he has committed , or is committing or is about to commit, any act which infringes the sovereignty and security of the State or public peace and tranquility. To exercise such power a Central Body, consisting of the Minister for Home Affairs as Chairman, and the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Foreign Affairs as members has been formed. "4. The Central Bady in passing restriction orders for safeguarding the State against dangers has the following powers: (a) arresting and detaining a pweson for a period not exceeding 60 days at a time up to a total of 180 days; (b) Restraining a person up to one year. "5. If it becomes necessary to extend the period of detantion or restraint, the Central Body may be autiorized by the Council of Ministers to detain or restrain a person for a period not exceeding one year at a tile up to a total of five years. "6. In accordane with Section (13) of the Law, the Central Bady shall obtain the prior sanction of the Council of ministers if it is necessary to continue the restraint of the person against whom action is taken for a period longer than contained in Section 10 (b). "7. In so doing, in accordance with Section (14) of the Law, the Council of Ministers may, in granting prior sanction to continue the detention and arrest or to continue to restrain, permit a period not exceeding one year at a time up to a total of five years. "8. Hence, the Central Bady can restrain a person for one year with its won mandate entrusted by Section 10 (b) of the Law and , with prior sanction of the Council of Ministers, can extended the period of restraint for five years in accordance with SEction (14) of the Law. "9. In view of the foregoing, there is the legal basis for restraining Daw Aung San Suu Kyi after 20 July 1994 based on Section 10 (b) and Section (14) of the 1975 Law to Safeguard the State Against the Dangers of those Desiring to Cause Subversive Acts." 108. In his letter dated 5 October 1994, the Special Rapporteur also requested the Government of Myanmar to provide information regarding: Khin Zaw Win; U Khin Maung Swe (aged 52 years, a prominent dissident Members of Parliament-elect and member of the Central Executive Committee of the National League for Democracy); U Sein Hla Oo (aged 58 years, a journalist and opposition politician); Dr. Htun Myat Aye ( dentist) ; Daw San San Tin ( a translator); Daw San San Nwe ( a writer) and her daughter. 109. Inits note verbale dated 4 November 1994, the government of Myanmar provided the Special Rapporteur with the following general response to the above inquiries: "In the Union of Myanmar, a person cannot be arrested and detained if it is not in accordance with the law. It is provided in Section 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that no police officer shall detain in custody a person for a period exceeding 24 hours. Where it is necessary to detain such an accused for more than 24 hours, special order of a Magistrate has to be obtained under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The arrested person has the right of defence and the right to have lagal defence counsel. Moreover, the arrested or detained person has the right to apply freely for bail to the Magistrate concerned and the Court may grant him bail according to the merits of the case." 110. The following are the detailed charges againsst the persons mentioned in the summary of allegations received by the Special Rapporteur in the note verbalel of 4 November 1994 from the Government of Myanmar: ---------------------------------------------------------------- Name ! Charge(s) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Khin Zaw Win "(a) Under Section 17 (a) of the Unlawful Association Act (1908) for contactiong some members of teh terrosist groups and providing funds for them. He was sentenced on 6 October 1994 to therr years' imprisonment after due process of law; "(b) Under Section 5(e) of the Emergency Provisions Act for arranging to write and distribute seditious literature. He was sentenced on 6 October 1994 to seven years' imprisonment after due process of law; "(c) Under Section 9 (2)/24 (1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act (1947) for trying to smuggle out precious stones and foreign currency . He was sentenced on 6 October 1994 to three years' imprisonment after due process of law. "... Moreover, Yangon Divisional (Northern District )Court found Dr. Khin Zaw Win guilty of an illegal act under Section 5 (2)/(4) of the Government Officiaal Secret Act (1923) for smuggling out confidential data from the Ministry of Energy of the Government of the Union of Myanmar. Accordingly, he is sentenced on 6 October 1994 to two years' imprisonment with labour." ---------------------------------------------------------------- Daw San San Nwe "... guilty of an illegal act and criminal offence under Section 5 (e) of the Emergency Provisions Act and Section 109 of the code of Criminal Procedure for [her] colloboration with Dr. Khin Zaw win in writing and distributing false news that could jeopardize the security of the State. Accordingly, they were sentenced on 6 October 1994 to seven years' imprisonment. "Moreover, Daw San San Nwe was sentenced to three years' imprisonment under Section 17(1) of the Unlawful Associations Act (1908) on 6 October 1994 by the same sourt for contacting some members of the terrosist groups and providing funds for them. ---------------------------------------------------------------- U Khin Maung Swe "...guilty of an illegal act and criminal offence under Section 5 (e) of the Emergency Provision Act and Section 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for [his] collaboration with Dr. Khin Zaw Win in writing and distributing false news that could jeopardize the security of the State. Accordingly, they were sentenced on 6 October 1994 to seven years'imprisonment." ---------------------------------------------------------------- Dr. Htun Myat Aye "...has not been detained. As he was aware of the movements of Dr. Khin Zaw Win and his colleagues, he was questioned and then released." ---------------------------------------------------------------- Daw San San tin "when legal action was taken against Dr. Khin Zaw Win and his colleagues, [she] was not included." ---------------------------------------------------------------- 111. The Government of Myanmar also responded that U Khin Maung Swe, U Sein Hla Oo, Daw san San Nwe and her daughter "had the right of defence and the right to have legal defence counsel for their cause". 112. The Special Rapporteur continues to receive reports indicating that several persons who have reportedly been sentenced may not benefit from the minimum standards of judicial guarantees. Numerous persons aer reportedly subjected to lengthy prison terms which constitute disproportional sentences in relation to the offences for which they have been found guilty. Information from reliable sources indicates that there are general problems in the matter of fair trial especially in the sense of free access to defence lawyers, sufficiency of time for careful examination of the cases, and proportionality between offences committed and punishments applied. For example, on 11 January 1994, the Special court of Yangon West District sentenced to death four persons after they had been found guilty of murdering a student: the judgements were rendered within a few days of the arrest of those accused. 113. With respect to other specific cases, the Special Rapporteur draws attention to the report of the working Group on Arbitrary Detention (E/CN.4/1995/31 paras. 7-8 and 13-14) and Decision No. 13/1994, adopted by the working group on 28 September 1994. ENDS(4/6)\ Cc: uneoo@physics.adelaide.edu.au Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit UNCHR: 1995_REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR (5/6)[Para 114-144] C. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment ---------------------------------------------------------- 114. Numerous allegations, often in considerable detail, have been received from various sources alleging that members of the Myanmar military, intelligence and security services and police continue to torture persons in detention or otherwise subject them to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishemnt. Such treatment seems to be routinely employed during the interrogations of persons who have been arbitrarily arrested or held on suspicion of real or perceived anti-government activities. Allegations include subjection tosevere beatings, shackling, near suffocation, burning, stabbing, rubbing of salt and chemicals in open wounds and psychological torture, including threats of death. Other reported methods of torture include sexual assault and rape, mostly among womenserving as porters. 115. The Special Rapporteur received testimony from reliable sources, corroborated by photographs, indicating that detaines are very often chained and are forced to sleep on cold cement, and that many of them suffer from sickness and serious diseases. The same reliable testimony and photographic evidence indicate that cells are often overcrowded and that prisoners are provided with inadequate hygenic or medical care. 116. In addition to several reports received by the Special Rapporteur alleging widespread torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in Myanmar, he has also interviewed persons claiming to be victims or to have witness such human rights violations. 117. With respect to specific cases, the Special Rapporteur draws attention to the report of the Special Rapporteur on torture (E/CN.4/1995/34, paras. 492-500). IN this connection, the Special Rapporteur is aware that the Government of Myanmar has responded to the allegations transmitted by the Special Rapporteur on Torture. D. Freedom of movement ---------------------- 118. During his visit to Myanmar, the Special Rapporteur was pleased to note that several members of intergovernmental and international non-governmental organizations are permitted to travel through the country to implement their programmes directly with the concerned population. Nevertheless, reliable sorces informed the Special Rapporteur that forced relocation and internal displacement of persons occurs on a wide scale. People continue to be forcible relocated, without compensation, to new towns and villages. For example, on 9 July 1994, some 80 persons are said to have been forced to leave Kyein-ta-li village in southern Rakhine State; they were forced to leave on very short notice and were not allowed to bring any property with them. In another example , about 1,500 persons were said to have been forced to leave their homes in Nga-let village in Min-pya township in northern Rakhine State on 13 July 1994; these persons are said to have been rounded up by the military and put on seven boats. In July 1994, in Rakhine State, a muslim community composed of 250 households was allegedly forced to move from their native village of Ngla, in Minbya township, to Maung Daw township. IN a third example, another Muslim community composed of 360 households was reportedly forced to move from their village of Kawalong, Myauk U township, to be relocated in Maung Daw on 4 October 1994. 119. Allegations have also beenmade that 30 Muslim heads of family weree rounded up from villages around Pyapon township in the delta area of the Irrawaddy division an dsent to Yangon, where they were detained at the police lock-up in Barr Street. The detained persons are all said to be holders of national identity cards and to be owners of the land that they have worked on for generations. Reports claim that these persons now face deportation or forcible relocation, without compensation, to Rakhine State. 120. Forced relocations and evictions have also been reported by reliable sources in connection with major development projects. According to several non-governmental sources, Myanmar authorities are forcing Muslims to dismangle their cenmeteries and religious buildings at six months' notice, to make room for more profitable construction related to tourism. Such acts are claimed to have taken place in, for example, Yangon, Mandalay, and Yan-bye township, the local authorities have reportedly ordered six mosques to be dismantled. The reason said to hav been goven by the authorities for the order is that the trustees of the mosques could not produce any documentation concerning the legality of the buildings. The mosques are several hunderd years old. E. Freedom of expression ------------------------ 121. During his visit to Myanmar the Special Rapporteur was pleased to note that several members of the foreign press, including members of foreign radio and television companies, were alloweed entry into Myanmar. Foreign news papers were also available in some book stores in Yangon, and more than 80 Myanmar magazines, of social and cultural interest, are available to the public. Nevertheless, the Special Rapporteur was also informed that, within Myanmar, the written press, radio and television continue to be subject to governmental censorship, and that the distribution of written material was also subject to governmental restrictions and control. For example, all magazines muxt be read by a governmental body before their distribution. 122. According to an article entitled "Action taken against destructive elements" which was published in the 23 August 1994 edition of the State-controlled English-language newspaper The New Light of Myanmar (printed on p.12) , the receiving or passing of information or written material from and to foreigners appears to be illegal. By prosecuting persons for such exchange of information, the Government of Myanmar effectively intimidates its citizens and discourages them from exercising their fundamental rights to freedom of expression. 123. The Special Rapporteur is especially concerned about the fact that during his visit to Myanmar he was unable to meet citizens who wished to contact him, because of their fear of subsequent repercussions. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur notes that one of the charges against Khin Zaw Win, who was arrested in July 1994, was that of haveing made arrangements to send fabricated news on Myanmar to the Special Rapporteur during his visit to the country in 1992. This allegation was published on 23 August 1994 in the same article of The New Light of Myanmar referred to above, as follows: "Dr. Khin Zaw Win and group met those who have opposite views on government and the Tatmedaw and made arrangements for sending fabricated news on Myanmar to Professor Yozo Yokota, representative of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights during his visit in December 1992." The Special Rapporteur was informed during his visit to Myanmar that this particular charge was not considered as a basis for judgment by the court, but the fact that it was widely reported, including by the government newspaper, would have a strong psychologocal effect on people and cause them to be extremely reticent about contactiong him. F. Labour rights ---------------- 124. The Special Rapporteur has been informed that workers in Myanmar do not enjoy basic labour rights including, in particular, freedom of association and the right to organize. There is hardly any trade union movement, and workers and trade unionists who criticize the Government would risk interrogation and arrest. 125. The Special Rapporteur received amny complaints from several reliable sources that men, women and children from the age of 14 years are allegedly used ofr forced labour for the construction of railways, roads and bridges. Persons with past records are randomly rounded up by local police or the military in resettlement areas, and in downtown Yangon, along Insein Road and in the small coffee houses. In the country side, village headmen are responsible for filling forced labour and porter quotas or providing large sums of money to the military instead. 126. The Special Rappporteur received testimonies describing minutely the duties of porters. Porters are required to carry heavy loads of ammunition, food and other supplies between army camps, generally over rugged mountains which are inaccessible by vehicle. They must often construct the camps for the military upon arrival. They are not paid for thier work and are allowed only a minimum of food and rest. 127. The Special Rapporteur takes note of the fact that the matter has been raised before appropriate bodiew of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). On 7 November 1994, ILO issued document GB. 261/13/7 entitled "Report of the Committee set up to consider the representation made by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions under article 24 of the ILO Constitution alleging non-observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)". The Committee has concluded that "the exaction of labour and services, in particular porterage service, under the Village Act and the Towns Act is contrary to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), ratified by the Government of Myanmar in 1955". G. Rights of the child ---------------------- 128. The Special Rapporteur is pleased to note that the Government of Myanmar formally withdrew the reservations made by Myanmar upon accession to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in July 1991 with respect to article 15 ( regarding freedom of association) and article 37 ( regarding the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in regard, interalia, to the treatment of children during interrogation). However, the Special Rapporteur is concerned that there is some evidence of childern being forced to serve in the army as soldiers or as porters. This practice, which is reported to remain widespread, would involve a variety of human rihgts violations, including forced labour, cruel and degrading traetment ( if not also torture) and threats to life. 129. Regarding allegations of violations of childern's rights, the Special Rapporteur interviewed several witnesses during his visits to the refugee camps in Thialand. He met childrn of 16 and 17 years of age who claimed that they had been forced to serve in the Myanmar Army two years earlier. Such military service of childern is contrary to article 38, paragraphs 2 and 3, of th eConvention on the Rights of the child, to which Myanmar is a party. H. Treatment of the Muslim population in Rakhine State ------------------------------------------------------ 130. In early 1992, there was a mass influx of some 250,000 Muslim refugees into Bangladesh from Rakhine State in Myanmar. To address this problem, a joint statement was made by the Governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh, on 23 April 1992, concerning the voluntary repatriation of refugees. Bangladesh requested the assistance of UNHCR to facilitate the repatriation and memoranduan of understanding between UNHCR and the Governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar were signed on 12 May 1993 and 5 November 1993, respectively. 131. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur welcomed the willingness of the Government of Myanmar to cooperate with UNHCR in order to ensure the voluntary and safe return of the Muslim population who had fled to Bangladesh from Rakhine State. Between September 1992 and the end of Spetember 1994, a total of 75,000 refugees had returned to Myanmar and, according to UNHCR, it is anticipated that an additional 45,000 refugees will have returned by the end of 1994. If the aforementioned anticipated return is accomplished as planned, the total number of returnees at the end of 1994 would be 120,000, or approximately half the number who fled. 132. The Special Rapporteur welcomed the undertaking of the Government of Myanmar to allow the establishment in December 1993 in Rakhine State of a UNHCR permanent field office with internaitonal staff. This presence may dissapate the fear of many of the Muslim population of Rakhine State who remain in the camps on the Bangladeshi side of the Border. Many of them are said to be fearful of possible ill-treatment by the Myanmar authorities upon internaitonal monitoring. 133. In Myanmar, five reception centres(Taungpyo, Ngakhuya, Pyinphyu, Kanyinchaung and Magyichaung) and one transition centre (in Buthidaung) have been established. Upon arrival at the recption centres, returnee families are issued "family lists" serving as temporary identity documentation until they are provided with a returnee identity card. 134. UNHCR reports that, up to the present, all returnees have been able to move back into their former homes. Most returnees who had access to land prior to their departure for Bangladesh will be able to rgain their land after the next harvest. In cases where the returnees are unable to claim their land back, the authorities have committed themselves to finding alternative solutions at the location of the returnees' former residences. 135. UNHCR is playing a key role in helping create conditions in Rakhine State conducive to the return of the refugees and to monitor their wellbeing. The Special Rapporteur is informed that the returnees are free to travel and will be entitled to the same rights as other residents of Myanmar. The governmental authorities are also obliged to inform UNHCR of cases of arrest or detention of returnees and to allow UNHCR officers access to any detained returnee. I. The National Convention -------------------------- 136. On 9 January 1993, the Government convened a national convention to lay down the basic principles for the elaboration of a new and enduring consittution. Of the 702 delegates from 8 categories of people, 49 are selected by the 10 political parties remaining after the 1990 elections, 106 are elected representatives and the remainder of the delegates from the other 6 categories were chosen be SLORC. Before any real discussion could take place at eh National Convention, a broad frame work of basic objectives was provided by the Government: (a) non-disintegration of the Union; (b) non-disintegration of national solidarity; (c) consolidation and perpetuity of sovereignty; (d) emergence of a genuine multiparty democratic system; (e) development of eternal principles of justice, liberty an equality in the State; and (f) participation of the Tatmadaw in a leadership role in the national politics in the future. 137. The Special Rapporteur has been informed that each of the eight groups represented were to have a panel of five chairmen who would lead the discussions and that, in the political parites group, only one chairman was from NLD - the party that won a majority in the 1990 elections. In the elected representatives group, where 89 of the remaining 106 delegates were from NLD. No NLD representatives were selected as chairmen. 138. During his visit to the Naitonal Convention, the Special Rapporteur met with several delegates. He was informed that all the delegates to the Naitonal convention are required to stay in the Convention compound. IN the same dormitory, five delegates live together. There is one sergeant clerk in each dormitory serving the delegates. It is reported that these sergeant clerks may also observe the activities of the delegates. 139. Delegates are not totally free to meet with other delegates inside the compound. They are not entitled to leave the compound without authorization. When they leave the compound, delegates are not allowed to take out any written or printed materials. It was also reported to the Special Rapporteur that when the delegates return to their states to see their families they are sometimes harassed by the local authorities. The special Rapporteur is concerned that such an atmosphere does not permit the delegates to be in touch with the populations they represent, or enable they to take into account their grievances, wishes and points of view and, thus, to represent them meaningfully during the debates which are taking place in the National Convention. 140. The Special Rapporteur was told that the delegates enjoy the freedoms of expression and discussion. However, they cannot distribute discussion papers among themselves: all papers have to be distributed to the chairman of the groups. The chairmen scrutinize the contents and, if the statements are found to be contradictory with the agreed principles, the relevant parts are deleted. Only then will the papers be read at the group meetings. When the proposed statements are to be read before the plenary meeting, they have to be submitted again for scrutiny by the Work Committee. 141. The reply of the government in response to a query by the special Rapporteur with regard to progress made so far in the National Convention on the drafting of a new constitution, and the anticipated schedule for future meetings, is reproduced in the addendum to the interim report of the Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly (A/49/594/Add.1,pp.13 to 15 of the English version.) J. The movement towards reconciliation with the insurgents ---------------------------------------------------------- 142. The Special Rapporteur has been informed that the government of Myanmar extended an official invitation to the armed groups to return to the legal fold, to hold toalks with the Government and to join hands with the government in the ongoing national endeavour for the development of border areas and national races. During his meetings in Myanmre, the government of Myanmar provided the Special Rapporteur with a list of the 13 ethnic and other armed groups which "had returned to the legal fold", i.e. have signed ceasefire agreements whith the Government of Myanmar. The list is reprodeced in annex II to the present report. 143. In connection wiht the "return to the legal fold"of various of the former insurgent groups, the Special Rapporteur notes a list supplied to hum by the government of Myanmar which names 77 persons who have been released from imprisonment subsequent to receiving sentences for a variety of politically related offences, including offences under section 17(1) of the 1908 Unlawful Association Act. This list is reprodeced in annex III to the present report. 144. In response to the Government's invitation to "return to the legal fold", it was reported in November 1994 that the leaders of the Karen National Union (KNU) , the largest armed insurgent group, was ready to discuss a ceasefire with the Government of Myanmar. It is still too early to make any meaningful assessment of developments in this respect. But, from the viewpoint of protection of human rights, such a move towards true national reconciliation should be welcomed because, as stated above, many caases of serious human rights violations are being committed in the context of military operations. For example, Kachine state, where an isurgency was previously taking place during which foreigners were prohibited to visit, has become opened for journalists and tourists as a result of the return of the Kachine Independence Organization (KIO) guerrilla group to the legal fold. During a visit to Kachine State in November 1994, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt was quoted as saying that peace is now prevailing in Kachine State. ENDS(5/6)\ UNCHR: 1995_REPORT BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR (6/6)[Para 144-155] III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. Conclusions -------------- 145. The visit of the Special Rapporteur to the Union of Myanmar at the invitation of the government was facilitated by the efforts, cooperation and courtesy extended to him by the officials of the government, in particular Lieutenent General Khin Nyunt, Secretary One of SLORC, and U Ohn Gyaw, Minister for foreign Affairs. Most of the requests of the special Rapporteur to meet pwesons pertinent to his mandate were met, including meetings with the Attorney-General, Chief Justice, Minister of Information, some political leaders in detention and representatives of political parties. However, the Special Rapporteur was disappointed that he was not allowed to meet Daw Aung San suu Kyi. He also regrets that the meetings with the representatives of political parties were held at a place and in an atmosphere not fully ensuring privacy. However, the Special Rapporteur commends the Government for arranging quite effeciently his visit to Mon State, Mandalay State and Mengwe State, Insein Prison, Mandalay Prison and other places and facilities which he had requested to visit. 146. The Special Rapporteur generally observed in Yangon and Mandalay that there were visible signs of relaxation of tension in the life of the people. There were many consumer goods in market places where many shoppers crowded. Streets and bridges have been constructed or improved. There were many cars on the streets. Indeed, inthe centre of Yangon, traffic congestion and parking problems occurred at certain times of the day. However, the Special Rapporteur was informed that this development and construction is benefiting only a few persons. IN fact, there were poor people in the cities and, in particular, in the country side; these persons did not appear to be sharing in any new prospersity, and rather appeared to be suffering from inflationary pressures on basic necessities such as rice and medicines. 147. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the expanding cooperationbetween the Government of Myanmar and various United nations organs and with international humanitarian non-governmental organizations. 148. The Special Rapporteur continues to be concerned about the serious restrictions imposed upon people in the enjoyment of civil and political rights. The people do not generally enjoy freedom of thought, opinion, expression, publication and peaceful assembly and association. They seem to be always fearful that anything they or their familiy members say or do, particularly in the area of politics, could put them at risk of arrest and interrogation by the police or military intelligence. Consequently, most people with whom the Special Rapporteur spoke casually avoided any conversation touching upon political subjects. Several people told him that meny persons wished to tell the Special Rapporteur their stories, but were too afraid to come to see him. 149. The persons whose civil and political rights are most severely restricted are the leaders of political parties, particularly the NLD leaders, and delegates to the National convention, again particularly those from NLD. Because of both visible and invisible pressures, they cannot assemble in a group, cannot freely discuss, and cannot publish or distribute printed materials. In this situation it is difficult to assume that, in the Naitonal convention, open and free exange of views and opinions are taking place in order to produce a truly democratic constitution. 150. The special Rapporteur is pleased to note that the Government of Myanmar has continued to release persons who have been detained for political activities. He also welcomes the Government's decision to allow pwesons other than members of her immediate family to visit Daw Aung San suu Kyi, as well as the beginning of a dialogue between her and the government. He would however, express concern that htere aer still hundreds of such persons detained in Myanmar, most notably Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. He also regrets that, in the summer of 1994, five persons were specifically arrested for engaging in political activities and were subsequently sentenced to long prison terms. 151. Government representatives have repeatedly explained to the Special Rapporteur that the Government is willing to transfer power to a civilian government, but that, in order to do so, there must be a strong constitution and that, in order to have a strong constitution, it is doing its best to complete the work of the National Convention. However, the Special Rapporteur cannot help but feel that, given the composition of the delegates ( only one out of seven delegates was elected in the 1990 elections), the restrictions imposed upon the delegates (practically no freedom to assemble, to print and distribute leaflets or to make statements freely) and the general gukdelines to be strictly followed (including the principle regarding the leading role of the Tatmadaw), the National Convention does not appear to constitute the necessary "steps towards the restoration of democracy, fully respectiong the will of the people as expressed in the democratic elections held in 1990" (General Assembly resolution 47/144, para. 4). 152. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the fact that, subsequent to the signing on 5 November 1993 of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Union of Myanmar and UNHCR to facilitate and guarantee the voluntary and safe return of Myanmar residences from Bangladesh, and the subsequent opening of a UNHCR field office in Rakhine State to allow UNHCR international staff to monitor the repatriation of the refugees, tens of thousands of refugees have been successfully repatriated. 153. The Special Rapporteur further welcomes the undertaking of various training programmes for military officers and soldiers with the cooperation of ICRC and the Myanmar Red Cross Society in the area of international humanitarian law. 154. The Special Rapporteur is paying special attention to the recent successes of the government initiative to invite the armed insurgent groups to enter into talks with the Government and ne notes, in particular, some initially positive response from the Karen National Union. He is hopeful that the process will move forward in the direction of achieving true reconciliation and peace throughout the country. B. Recommendation ----------------- 155. In the light of the foregoing conclusions, the Special Rapporteur submits the following recommendations for the consideration of the Government of Myanmar: (a) The Government of Myanmar should fulfil in good faith the obligations it has assumed under articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations "to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of ... universal respec t for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion". In this respect, the Special Rapporteur notes that the Governemnt of Myanmar is in an ideal position to encourage the delegates of the National Convention to include various human rights provisions in the new constitution using, as a reference, the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human rights, a copy of which should be circulated to each delegate in the Burmese language; (b) The Government of Myanmar should consider accession to: the International Convenants on Human Rights; the convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the two Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949; (c) Myanmar law should be brought into line with accepted international standares regarding protection of physical integrity, including the right to life, protection against disappearance, prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, providing humane conditions for all persons under detention and insurance of teh minimum standards of judicial guarantees; (d) The Government of Myanmar should take steps to facilitate and guarantee enjoyment of the freedoms of opinion, expression and association, in particular by decriminalizing the expression of oppositional views, reliquishing government control over the media nad literary and artistic communities, and permitting the formation of independently organized trade unions; (e) All political leaders, including elected political representatives, students, workers, peasants and oter arrested or detained under maritial law after the 1988 and 1990 demonstrations or as a result of the National Convention, should be tried by a properly constituted and independent civilian court in an open and internationally accessible judicial process. If found guilty in such judicial proceedings, they should be given a just sentence; alternatively, they should be immediately released and the Government refrain from all acts of intimidation, threats of reprisals agaainst them or their families. With respect to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Governmet should release her immediately and unconditionally; (f) The Government of Myanmar should take the necessary steps to bring the conduct of the military , including ordinary soldiers and officers, into line with accepted international human rights and humanitarian standards so that they do not arbitrarily kill, rape, confiscate property, force persons into acts of labour or porterage, relocate them or otherwise treat persons with respect to their dignity as human beings. When the hiring of local villagers for porterage and other works may be required for governmental purposes, it should be undertaken on a voluntary basis and adequate wages should be paid. The nature of the work should be reasonable and in accordance with established international labour standards. When the relocation of villages is considered necessary for military operations or for development projects, proper consultation with the villagers should take place and appropriate compensation should be paid for those relocations which may be determined necessary for reasons of the public good; (g) The government of Myanmar should take all steps to refrain from recruting any person who has not attained the age of 15 years into their armed forces, in accordance with article 38.3 of teh Convention on the Rights of the Child; (h) All military and law enforcement personnel, including prison guards, should be throughly informed and trained as to their responsibilities, in full accordance with the standards set out in international human rights instruments and humanitarian law. Such standards should be incorporated into Myanmar law and legislation, including the new constitution to be drafted. The training programme undertaken with the cooperation of ICRC is a good start in this direction and should be continued; (i) Given teh magnitude of the abuses, official condemnation should be made by the Government of all acts by authorities invilving human rights violations. such acts, including all acts of intimidation, thrieats or reprisal, should not benefit from the present system of almost complete denial by, and impunity under, the Government; (j) The Government of Myanmar should consider revision of th 1982 Citizenship Law to abolish its burdensome requirements for citizenship. The law should not apply its categories of second class citizenship in a manner which has discriminatory effects on racial or ethnic minorities, particularly the Rakhine Muslim population. It should be brought into line with the principles embodied in the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 30 August 1961; (k) The Government of Myanmar is encouraged to continue its cooperation with UNHCR in facilitating and ensuring the voluntary and safe return of Rakhine Muslims from Bangladesh; (l) The Government of Myanmar is also encouraged to continue its cooperation with international non-governmental organizations in facilitating and ensuring the free access of their international staff to ordinary persons in the townships and villages in order to establish contacts and provide assistance to persons who are suffering from a shortage or lack of food, safe water, medicines, medical care and proper education. ANNEXES ------- I. RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF MYANMAR TO ALLEGATIONS OF EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTION WHILE IN CUSTODY, AS RAISED BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR DURING HIS MEETING WITH COLONEL KYAW WIN OF THE DIRETORATE OF DEFENCE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ON 10 NOVEMBER 1994. II. NATIONAL ARMED GROUPS WHICH HAVE RETURNED TO THE LEGAL FOLD. III. CHART SHOWING PARTICULARS OF THOSE AGAINST WHOM ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN FOR HAVING CONTACT WITH KNU INSURGENTS AND WHO HAVE BEEN RELEASED BY THE MYANMAR AUTHORITIES DURING 1994. END OF REPORT\ ************************************************************** NEWS SOURCES REGULARLY COVERED/ABBREVIATIONS USED BY BURMANET: ABSDF: ALL BURMA STUDENT'S DEMOCRATIC FRONT AMNESTY: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AP: ASSOCIATED PRESS AFP: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE AW: ASIAWEEK Bt.: THAI BAHT; 25 Bt. EQUALS US$1 (APPROX), BBC: BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION BF: BURMA FORUM BKK POST: BANGKOK POST (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK) BRC-CM: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-CHIANG MAI BRC-J: BURMESE RELIEF CENTER-JAPAN CPPSM:C'TEE FOR PUBLICITY OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE IN MONLAND DVB: DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA (SHORTWAVE-RADIO, FROM NORWAY) FEER: FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW GOA: GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA IRRAWADDY: NEWSLETTER PUBLISHED BY BURMA INFORMATION GROUP KHRG: KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP KNU: KAREN NATIONAL UNION Kt. BURMESE KYAT; UP TO 150 KYAT-US$1 BLACK MARKET 106 KYAT US$1-SEMI-OFFICIAL 6 KYAT-US$1 OFFICIAL MOA: MIRROR OF ARAKAN MNA: MYANMAR NEWS AGENCY (SLORC) THE NATION: A DAILY NEWSPAPER IN BANGKOK NCGUB: NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF BURMA NLM: NEW LIGHT OF MYANMAR (DAILY STATE-RUN NEWSPAPER,RANGOON) NMSP: NEW MON STATE PARTY RTA:REC.TRAVEL.ASIA NEWSGROUP RTG: ROYAL THAI GOVERNMENT SCB:SOC.CULTURE.BURMA NEWSGROUP SCT:SOC.CULTURE.THAI NEWSGROUP SEASIA-L: S.E.ASIA BITNET MAILING LIST SLORC: STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL [SLORC] POSTED BY AN OFFICIAL SLORC SOURCE [SLORCITE] ATTRIBUTABLE TO BUT NOT ACKNOWLEDGED AS A SLORC SOURCE TAWSJ: THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL UPI: UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL USG: UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT VOA: VOICE OF AMERICA XNA: XINHUA NEWS AGENCY **************************************************************